Supreme Court of India

SUKHRAMversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation: 2007 INSC 841
Decided: 17 August 2007
Disposal: Case Partly allowed
Bench: C K THAKKER

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the convictions of appellant A‑2 under Sections 302 and 201 IPC could not be sustained and set them aside.

Summary

The case involved a dowry‑related death of Meerabai, whose husband (appellant A‑1) and father‑in‑law (appellant A‑2, Sukhram) were initially convicted by the trial court of offences under Sections 304‑B and 498‑A IPC. The High Court set aside those convictions but convicted both of them for murder under Section 302 IPC and for causing disappearance of evidence under Section 201 IPC, despite no charge of murder being framed against A‑2. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 222 CrPC could not be invoked to convict A‑2 of a lesser offence, that the conviction under Section 302 IPC was invalid under Section 464(2)(a) CrPC, and that the prosecution had not proved the essential ingredients of Section 201 IPC, particularly the knowledge and intent to screen the offender. Consequently, the Court set aside A‑2’s convictions and ordered his release.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 222 CrPC to convict a person of a lesser offence when no charge for the greater offence was framed.
Whether a conviction under Section 302 IPC can stand when the charge was not framed against the accused and in view of Section 464(2)(a) CrPC.
Whether the prosecution established the elements of Section 201 IPC, especially knowledge of the offence and intent to conceal it, on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
Whether the testimony of PW‑12 was sufficient to infer A‑2’s knowledge of the murder.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 222, s. 313, s. 464(2)(a)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 304-B, s. 34, s. 498-A
Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970s. 2(a)

Subjects

dowry deathmurderSection 302 IPCSection 201 IPCcircumstantial evidenceSection 222 CrPCSection 34 IPCconviction set asideappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

A SUKHRAM
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

AUGUST 17, 2007

B [C.K. THAKKERAND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 201, 302, 304-B, 498-A rlw Section 34/Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973; Ss. 222, 313 and 464:

C Dowry death-A,ccused-husband in collusion with his father allegedly
• harassed his wife for demand of dowry, committed her murder and thrown her
dead body in a well-FJR-lnvestigation-Charge-sheet-Trial Court found
both the accused guilty of committing offences punishable u!s. 304-B and
498-A r!w Section 34 JPC-Setting aside the conviction of both the accused
D u!s. 304-B, 498-A rlw Section 34 !PC, High Court found both the accused
guilty of committing offences punishable u!Ss. 302° and 201 rlw Section 34
!PC and sentenced them accordingly-On appeal, Held: Though charge for
committing offence punishable u!s. 302 framed against accused, A-1 but no
such charge framed against accused A-2-0nly charge proved against A-2
was for offence punishable u!s. 201 !PC-Though the Courts are empowered
E u!s. 222 Cr.P.C. to convict a person for committing an offence which is minor
in comparison to the one for which he is charged and tried-By no stretch
of imagination, offences ulSs. 304B and 498-A !PC for which A-2 was convicted
by trial Court could be said to be minor offences in comparison to the offence
punishable u!s.201 !PC for which A-1 was charged-Hence, S?ction 222
F Cr.P.C. not attracted-Besides, conviction of A-2 u!s. 302 !PC by High Court
cannot held to be correct when tested in the touchstone of the provisions
contained uls.464(2)(a) Cr.P.C.-And also on proven facts on record,
conviction u!s.302 not made out-Hence conviction and sentencing of
appellant A-2 u!s. 302 !PC cannot be sustained and thus set aside.

G Section 201 !PC-Disappearance of evidence-Involvement of accused
A-2, father in the offence committed by his son, accused A-I-Held: Mere
suspicion is not sufficient, there must be cogent evidence to prove that the
accused know/had information sufjicient to lead him to believe that offence
committed and he had caused the evidence to disappear in order to screen

H 44
+
SUKHRAM v. ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA 45
the offender-Since ihere was no eyewitness in the present case, conclusion A
had to be drawn from circumstantial evidence-The circumstances from which
the conclusion ofguilt has to be drawn not only requires to be fully established
but should also be conclusive in nature and consistent with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused-Thus, evidence has to be carefully scrutinized-
Merely because A-2 is the father of A-1, it cannot be presumed as a matter B
of legal proof that he deemed to have knowledge of the offence committed.
by his son A-I-Even believing the evidence of PW2, though the said witness
declared hostile, mere presence of A-2 in the house is not sufficient to draw
a presumption of having knowledge of commission of offence by his son A-
l-Prosecution has failed to establish charges against A-2 for committing
the offence uls. 201 /PC-Hence, conviction and sentence ofA-2 for committing C
the offences punishable u/s. 201 cannot be sustained and, thus, set aside.

Marriage between accused-appellant A-1 and the deceased was
solemnized on 21st April, 1986. Allegedly, her husband had been harassing
her for demand of more and more dowry and A-2, father-in-law of the deceased
desired to have illicit relationship with her, which she resisted. She had been D
complaining to her parents, brother and other relatives about the ill treatment
made out to her by her in-laws. On 18th February, 1987, the deceased was
reported to be missing. Later, her dead body was found in a well A-2 registered
a report at the police station. The Police started investigation and sent the
dead body for post mortem. In the meantime, PW-6, father of the deceased E
also lodged a complaint at the police station, suspecting that his daughter
had been killed by her husband, A-1 in collusion with his father, A-2 and her
dead body thrown by them in the well. Post mortem report revealed that death
was caused by asphyxia due to throttling and smothering and not due to
drowning. On the basis of the post mortem report and after collecting
evidence, an FIR was registered by the Police against the accused persons F
under Sections 498-A, 302, 201 read with Section 34 IPC and both the accused
were arrested. On completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed
against the accused persons and the case was committed to the Sessions Court.

The Trial Court found that there was no eye-witness to the incident and,
therefore, the case of the prosecution rested only on circumstantial evidence; G
that the Trial Court observed that there were two circumstances against
>· accused A-1, namely, (i) motive and (ii) Al was last seen together with his
wife, the deceased; and that the circumstances put forth by the prosecution
may lead to inference that death of the deceased might have been caused by
accused A-1 but they are not sufficient for convicting him for the offence of H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 9 S.C.R.

A murder. The Trial Court held that the prosecution was able to establish that
deceased was ill treated and harassed on account of demand of dowry and she
died within a very short span of ten months of the marriage. Therefore, the
appellants had committed offences, punishable under Sections 304-B and 498-
A read with Section 34 IPC. The Trial Court also held that there was no
B evidence to show that the body of the deceased was thrown in the well either
by appellant A-1 or A-2 or both of them and, therefore, offence under Section
201 IPC was not proved. Aggrieved by the judgment of trial Court, both the
appellants preferred an appeal and the State preferred cross appeal before
the High Court. By the impugned judgment, while allowing both the appeals,
the High Court has set aside the conviction of both the appellants under
C Sections 304-B, 498-A read with Section 34 IPC but found both of them guilty
for committing offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 read with
Section 34 IPC. Accordingly, each of the appellant has been sentenced under
Section 302 read with 34 IPC to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine
of Rs. 1000/- each and under Section 201 read with 34 IPC, each of them has
been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of
D Rs. 500/-, with default stipulations. Hence the present appeal. However, despite
opportunities, appellant A-I failed to surrender and consequently his appeal
was dismissed.

The counsel appearing on behalf of the accused-appellant contended that
E the High Court committed serious error in holding appellant, A-2 guilty of
commission of offences under Sections 302 and 201 IPC, particularly when
there was no specific charge framed against him under Section 302 off PC;
that the High Court again erred in holding that the offence u/s 201 IPC stood
established by the evidence of PW-12, mother of Al, even if a part of the
testimony of PW-12 is held to be reliable, at best it gives rise to a suspicion
F about the presence of A-2 in the house and no more; that except for the
aforenoted statement of PW-12, which has otherwise been discarded by the
Trial Court and the High Court, there is not even an iota of evidence to show
that appellant A-2 knew or had reason to believe that accused A-1 had
committed the offence; and that the High Court has neither recorded any
G reason nor analysed the evidence adduced by the prosecution and thus,
grievously erred in reversing the finding recorded by the Trial Court to the
effect that ingredients of Section 201 of IPC had not been proved against
appellant, A2.

Allowing the appeal to the extent it pertains to appellant, A-2, the Court
H
SUKHRAM v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 47
HELD:l.1. Though charge for offence punishable under Section 302 A
IPC had been framed against appellant A-1, no such charge was framed against
appellant A-2, even with the aid of Section 34 IPC. The only charge framed
against A-2 was for an offence punishable under Section 201 read with Section
34 of IPC. True that Section 222 Cr.P.C. clothes the Court with the power to
convict a person of an offence which is minor in comparison to the one for
which he is charged and tried, but by no stretch of imagination, offences under B
Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC, under which appellant A-2 was convicted by
the Trial Cou1t, could be said to be minor offences in relation to that under
Section 201 IPC, for which he was charged. In fact, the three offences are
distinct and belong to different categories. The ingredients of the offences
under the said Sections are vastly different. Therefore, Section 222 Cr.P.C. C
had no application on facts in hand. (Para 11) (54-A, B, C)

1.2. Conviction of appellant A-2 by the High Court under Section 302
IPC cannot be held to be valid when tested on the touchstone of the provision
contained in Section 464{2){a) Cr.P.C. If it was convinced that a failure of
justice had, in fact, been occasioned, the High Court was required to follow D
the procedure laid down in the Section, which was not done. That apart, even
on the proven facts on record, a case for convicticn under Section 302 IPC
was not made out against the said appellant. (Para 12) (54-D, El

1.3. Bearing in mind the factual and legal backdrop, this Court is of
the opinion that the High Court was not justified in convicting appellant A-2 E
for having committed a major offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
Nonetheless, it is well settled that notwithstanding acquittal of the said
appellant of the offence under Section 302 IPC, his conviction under Section
201 IPC is still permissible. (Para 13) (54-E, F)
F
Smt. Kalawati & Anr. v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR (1953)
SC 131, followed.

1.4. It is plain that the intent to screen the offender committing an
offence must be the primary and sole aim of the accused. It hardly needs any
emphasis that in order to bring home an offence under Section 201 IPC, a G
mere suspicion is not sufficient. There must be on record cogent evidence to
prove that the accused knew or had information sufficient to lead him to believe
that the offence had been committed and that the accused has caused the
evidence to disappear in order to screen the offender, known or unknown. ·1
(Para 15) 155-G, H; 56-AI
'ij
-+
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 9 S.C.R.

A Pa/vinder Kaur v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1952) SC 354; Suleman
Rehiman Mulani & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1968) SC 829; Nathu
& Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (19791 3 SCC 574 and V.L. Tresa v. State
of Kera/a, (2001J·3 SCC 549, relied on.

1.5. In the present case, indubitably there is no eye witness and the
B prosecution had sought to establish the case against the appellants from
circumstantial evidence. It is trite to say that in a case based on circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
have not only to be fully established but all the circumstances so established
should be of conclusive nature and consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt
C of the accused. Moreover, all the established circumstances should be complete
and there should be no gap in the chain of evidence. Therefore, the evidence
has to be carefully scrutinized and each circumstance should be dealt with
carefully to find out whether the chain of the established circumstances is
complete or not. (Para 17} (56-C, D, El ,

D Dhananjoy Chatterjee Alias Dhana v. State of W.B., (1994} Supp 2 SCC
220, relied on.

1.6. In the present case, the motive was alleged to be the greed for dowry
and desire of appellant A-2 to have illicit relationship with the deceased, which
theory has been rejected by the High Court while acquitting the appellant for
E offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC. Therefore, there is no
gainsaying that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of a motive.
It is in this background that it has to be examined whether the evidence and
the circumstances relied upon by the High Court while recording the
conviction of appellant A-2 are consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of
F the said appellant. (Para 181 (56-F; 57-Al

1.7. The sole reason given by the High Court for holding appellant A-2
guilty of offence under Section 201 of IP{:: is the circumstance flowing from
the evidence of PW-12, mother of A-1, wherein she had stated that accused
No. J and the deceased were sleeping in one room and she was sleeping in the
G other room. Undoubtedly, the mainstay of the prosecution case was the
testimony of PW-12. There is absolutely no other evidence or circumstance
attributing to A-2 the knowledge of the commission of offence in respect of
his daughter-in-law. Merely because A2 happened to be father of appellant A-
l, it cannot be presumed as a matter of legal proof that he must be deemed to
have the knowledge of the offence committed by his son. Even ifthe evidence
H
SUKHRAM v.. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.K. JAIN, J.] 49
of PW-12 is taken at its face value, though the witness was declared hostile A
and had been cross examined by the prosecution counsel, mere presence of
appellant, A-2 in the house is not sufficient to draw a presumption that he
had the knowledge of commission of offence by his soo. appellant, A-1. There
is no other established circumstance to complete the cuain to bring home the
offence under Section 201 IPC. Thus the prosecution has failed to establish B
that the conduct of appellant A-2, both at the time of the. occurrence and
immediately thereafter, is consistent with the hypothesis of his guilt.
Therefore, the High Court was in error in convicting:appellant A-2 for having
'.
committed offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. Hence,
conviction of appellant A-2 cannot be sustained.
[Paras 19 and 20) (57-B, C, D, E, F) C

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIO~ : Criminal Appeal No. 1203 of
2006.

From the final Judgment and Order dated 15.9.2005 of High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Criminal Appeal No. 301/95. D

S.V. Deshpande. and Amit Yadav for the Appellant.

Sushi! Karanjkar and V.N. Raghupathy for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E
D.K. JAIN, J. I. This appeal under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court
(Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 has been preferred
by Sudhakar, the husband of the deceased, Meerabai and Sukhram, her father-
in-law (hereinafter referred to as appellants A-1 and A-2 respectively) against
the common judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur F
Bench, Nagpur passed in Cross Criminal Appeals No. 201 of 1995 and 301 of
1995 respectively filed by the said appellants, challenging their conviction
and sentence under Section 304-B, 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code (for short 'IPC') and by the State challenging their acquittal for
the offences punishable under Section 302 and 20 I read with Section 34 IPC.
By the impugned judgment, while allowing both the appeals, the High Court G
has set aside the conviction of both the appellants under Sections 304-B, 498-
A read with Section 34 IPC but has found both of them guilty and convicted
them for having committed offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201
read with Section 34 IPC. Each of the appellant has been sentenced under
Section 302 read with 34 IPC to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 9 S.C.R.

A of Rs. 1000/- each and under Sectiori 20 l read with 34 IPC, each of them has
been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of
Rs.500/-, with default stipulations.

2. We may note at the outset that despite opportunities, appellant A-
1·failed to surrender and consequently vide order dated I 0th November, 2006
B his appeal was dismissed. Therefore, we are required to consider the appeal
filed by A-2.

3. Marriage between appellant A-I and the deceased was solemnized on
2I st April, 1986. At the time of marriage some amount in cash, a gold ring and
C other articles are stated to have been given by way of dowry. It is alleged
that not being satisfied with the same, the appellants started ill treating her,
and further appellant A-2 had an evil eye on the deceased and he insisted
that she should have illicit relations with him which, she resisted. She is
stated to have complained to her parents, brother and other relatives about
the ill treatment.
D
4. On 18th February, 1987, the deceased was reported to be missing. The
appellants searched for her and found her body in a nearby well. Appellant
A-2 registered a report at the police station. On receipt of the information, the
then P.S.I. conducted enquiry; visited the place of incident i.e. the well
wherefrom the body of the deceased was retrieved; drew panchnama and sent
E the dead body of Meerabai for post mortem examination. Investigations were
taken over. by PW-14, who recorded the statements of various persons;
conducted house search of the accused but nothing incriminating was found;
prepared spot panchnama and seized certain articles from the brother of the
deceased (PW-13). In the meantime, Bisan (PW-6), father of the deceased and
F othe.r relatives.reached deceased's place and lodged a complaint at the police
station, suspecting that his daughter had been killed by the appellants and
then thrown in the well. Post mortem report was received on 19th February,
1987, in which the cause of death was mentioned as Asphyxia due to throttling
and smothering and not due to drowning. On receipt of the report and after
collecting evidence, an FIR was registered against the accused under Sections
G 498-A, 302, 20 I read with Section 34 IPC and both the accused were arrested.
On completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused
in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, who in turn committed the case to the
Sessions Court.

. 5. Both the accused were charged for having subjected the deceased
H · to cruelty and harassment in furtherance of the common intention with a view
SUKHRAM v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.K. JAIN, J.] 51
to coerce her or her brother to satisfy unlawful demand of dowry and thereby A
committed an offence under Section 498-A IPC. A- I was also charged with
throttling the deceased in between the night of 17th and 18th February, l 987
and caused her death otherwise than under normal circumstances, within
seven years of her marriage and soon before her death, she was subjected
to cruelty or harassment by him, thereby committing an offence punishable
under Section 304-B IPC. A-1 was also charged for having committe·d murder B
of Meerabai, thereby committing an offence under Section 302 IPC. Both A-
l and A-2 were charged for having caused disappearance of evidence
connected with the offence of murder, punishable with iife imprisonment, by
throwing the body of the deceased in the well with the intention to screen
the offender from legal punishment and thereby committed an off~nce C
punishable under Section 201 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. The accused
pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

6. The prosecution examined a number of witnesses to prove its case
which mainly included panch witnesses concerned with various panchnamas,
relatives of the deceased, her mother-in-law (PW-12) and the neighbour. In D
their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
the accused denied the com1..ission of the offence. Their plea in defence was
that of alibi, claiming that on the fateful night they had gone to their fields.
It was only on the next day in the morning that they learnt that the deceased
was not in the house; they searched for her and found her body in the well. E
Appellant A-2 reported the matter to the police, inter alia, stating that he had
learnt that on the • revious night the deceased had a quarrel with one Shrawan
Thakare, who was staying in their house as a guest and had an evil eye on
her. On conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court found that there was no eye-
witness to the incident and, therefore, the case of the prosecution rested only
on circumstantial evidence. It was observed that although Indira Kisan Tiwade F
(PW-11) and Bhagirathabai (PW-12), sister and mother of the appellant, A-1,
respectively were in the house, but they had not uttered anything against A-
l. On the contrary they had tried to implicate one Sbrawan who had come to
their house as a guest. They also denied having seen the appellants throttling
the neck of the deceased and that she was crying. Both the said witnesses G
were declared hostile. Nevertheless, the Trial Court observed that there were
·r- two circumstances against appellant A-1, namely, (i) motive and (ii) last seen
together.

7. Referring to the statement of PW-12, wherein she had said that
"accused No. I and deceased, Meerabai were sleeping in one room and we H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 9 S.C.R.

A were sleeping in the other room," the Trial Court observed that the
circumstances put forth by the prosecution may lead to inference that
Meerabai's death might have been caused by appellant A- I but they are not
sufficient for convicting him for the offence of murder. However, relying on
the evidence of the father (PW-6); mother (J>W-10); sister (PW-7) and cousin
B (PW-5) of the deceased, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that Meerabai
was subjected to cruelty on account of demand for dowry, the motive for
causing the death stood proved and that the circumstance of being last seen
together alone in the company of appellant A-I also stood proved. The Trial
Court, thus, held that the prosecution was able to establish that deceased was
ill treated and harassed on account of demand of dowry and she died within
C a very short span often months of the marriage. Therefore, the appellants had
committed offences, punishable under Sections 304-B and 498-A read with
Section 34 IPC. The Trial Court also held that there was no evidence to show
that the body of the deceased was thrown in the well either by appellant A-
l or A-2 or both of them and, therefore, offence under Section 20 I IPC was
not proved.
D
8. As noted above, both the appellants as well as the State preferred
appeals to the High Court against the said verdict of the Trial Court. On going
through the evidence, the High Court found that the allegations as regards
demand of Rs.500/- and that appellant A-2 had an evil eye on the deceased
E was a material improvement made by all the witnesses in their evidence before
the court; on which they were confronted with their statements under Section
161 of Cr.P.C. The High Court held that the prosecution had not been able
to establish the charge against both the appellants for having committed
offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC and, therefore, the Trial Court was
not justified in convicting them for these two offences. However, the High
F Court noted that from the evidence of PW-12 it was borne out that on the
fateful night both the accused, the deceased and PW-12 were present in the
house; though this witness did not wholeheartedly support prosecution's
case, but she had in her evidence admitted that on the fateful night they were
present in the house. The High Court observed that the factum of the deceased
G residing with her husband and in-laws on the fateful night stood established
by the evidence of PW-12, who had also admitted her own presence in the
house, which was quite natural being the wife of appellant A-2. Relying on
the said evidence, the High Court felt that by this evidence, the prosecution
has established that appellant A- I and the deceased were sleeping together
in one room on the fateful night which was specifically denied by appellant,
H A-1, who had taken the plea that he and his father had gone to the field and
SUKHRAM v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.K. JAIN, J.) 53
his maternal uncle was a guest in the house and his mother was also in the A
house. According to the High Court, evidence of PW-12 by itself was sufficient
to establish the fact that both the appellants were present in the house. As
regards the cause of death, the High Court relied on the evidence of PW-8,
who had performed the post mortem on the dead body and had found multiple
bruises on both sides of the neck; bruises on nose and lips and rupture of B
carotid. According to the opinion of PW-8, the injuries were anti mortem and
the deceased had died due to throttling and not for any other reason. Relying
on the evidence of PW-8 and the Investigating Officer (PW-16), the High
Court came to the conclusion that the appellants had opportunity to commit
the crime. The High Court was of the view that the fact that the deceased was
throttled to death and then thrown in the well, read with established C
circumstances that on the fateful night she was sleeping in the room along
with her husband and even appellant A-2 was present in the house, to which
there was no explanation given by both the appellants, the chain of
circumstances stood completed. According to the High Court, all these facts
taken together were conclusive to establish that it was the appellants who in
furtherance of their common intention had committed murder of deceased D
Meerabai by throttling her to death and then thrown her dead body in the
well so as to cause disappearance of evidence. Consequently, as noted
above, both the appellants were convicted for having committed offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 20 I read with Sections 34 IPC and were
sentenced as aforementioned. Hence the present appeal by the appellants. E
9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that
the High court committed serious error in holding appellant, A-2 guilty of
commission of offences under Sections 302 and 20 I IPC, particularly when
there was no specific charge against him under Section 302 of IPC. In so far
as the offence under Section 201 is concerned, it is urged that the High Court F
again erred in holding that the said offence stood established by the evidence
of PW-12. It is submitted that even if a part of the testimony of PW-12 is held
to be reliable, at best it gives rise to a suspicion about the presence of A-
2 in the house and no more. It is asserted that except for the aforenoted
statement of PW-12, which has otherwise been discarded by the Trial Court G
and the High Court, there is not even an iota of evidence to show that
appellant A-2 kriew or had reason to believe that appellant A- I had committed
an offence. Learned counsel has also argued that the High Court has neither
recorded any reason nor analysed the evidence adduced by the prosecution
and thus, grievously erred in reversing the finding recorded by the Trial Court
to the effect that ingredients of Section 20 I of IPC had not been proved H
-+
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 9 S.C.R.

A against the said appellant.

I 0. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, supported the
view taken by the High Court.

11. We have perused the Trial Court's record. We find that though
B charge for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC had been framed
against appellant A-I, no such charge was framed against appellant A-2, even
with the aid of Section 34 !PC. The only charge framed against A-2 was for
an offence punishable under Section 20 I read with Section 34 of !PC. True
that Section 222 Cr.P.C. clothes the Court with the power to convict a person
of an offence which is minor in comparison to the one for which he is charged
C and tried, but by no stretch of imagination, offences under Sections 304-B and
498-A IPC, under which appellant A-2 was convicted by the Trial Court, could
be said to be minor offences in relation to that under Section 201 IPC, for
which he was charged. In fact, the three offences are distinct and belong to
different categories. The ingredients of the offences under the said Sections
D are vastly different. Therefore, Section 222 Cr.P.C. had no application on facts
in hand.

12. At this junction, we may also note that conviction of appellant A-
2 by the High Court under Section 302 IPC cannot also be held to be valid
when tested on the touchstone of the provision contained in Section 464(2)(a)
E Cr.P .C. If it was convinced that a failure of justice had, in fact, been occasioned,
the High Court was required to follow the procedure laid down in the Section,
which was not done. That apait, even on the proven facts on record, a case
for conviction under Section 302 !PC was not made out against the said
appellant.

F 13. Bearing in mind this factual and legal backdrop, we are of the
opinion that the High Court was not justified in convicting appellant A-2 for
having committed a major offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
Nonetheless, it is well settled that notwithstanding acquittal of the said
appellant of the offence under Section 302 IPC, his conviction under Section
20 I IPC is still permissible. (See: Constitution Bench decision in Smt. Kalawati
G & Anr. v. The State of Himachal Pradesh 1). Therefore, the question that
remains to be examined is regarding the correctness of the conviction of
appellant, A-2 for offence under Section 20 I !PC.
14. Section 201 IPC reads as follows:

H I. AIR(l953)SCJ31.
I

SUKHRAM v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.K. JAIN, J.) 55

"201. Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false A
information to screen offender.-Whoever, knowing or having reason
to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence
of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of
screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention
gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or B
believes to be false,

if a capital offence.-shall, if the offence which he knows or believes
to have been committed is punishable with death, be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
c
if punishable with imprisonment for life. -and if ·the offence is
punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which
may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also
be liable to fine;
D
if punishable with less than ten years' imprisonment.-and if the
offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not extending
to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description
provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth
part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence, E
or with fine, or with both."

15. The first paragraph of the Section contains the postulates for
constituting the offence while the remaining three paragraphs prescribe three
different tiers of punishments depending upon the degree of offence in each
situation. To bring home an offence under Section 20 I of IPC, the ingredients F
to be established are: (i) committal of an offence; (ii) person charged with the
offence u11der Section 201 must have the knowledge or reason to believe that
an offence has been committed; (iii) person charged with the said offence
should have caused disappearance of evidence and (iv) the act should have
been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment
or with that intention he should have given information respecting the offence, G
which he knew or believed to be false. It is plain that the intent to screen the ,_
offender committing an offence must be the primary and sole aim of the
accused. It hardly needs any emphasis that in order to bring home an offence
under Section 20 I IPC, a mere suspicion is not sufficient. There must be on
record cogent evidence to prove that the accused knew or had information H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 9 S.C.R.

A sufficient to lead him to believe that the offence had been committed and that
the accused has caused the evidence to disappear in order to screen the
offender, known or unknown.

16. In Palvinder Kaur v. The State of Punjab (Rup Singh-Caveator)2
this Court had said that in order to establish the charge under Section 20 I
B IPC, it is essential to prove that an offence has been committed; that the
accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed;
with requisite knowledge and with the intent to screen the offender from legal
punishment, caused the evidence thereof to disappear or gave false information
respecting such offence knowing or having reason to believe the same to be
C false. It was observed that tne Court should safeguard itself against the
danger of basing its conclusion on suspicions, however, strong they may be.
(Also See: Suleman Rehiman Mulani & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra3, Nathu
& Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh4 , Vl. Tresa v. State of Kerala5).

17. In the present case, indubitably there is no eye witness and the
D prosecution had sought to establish the case against the appellants from
circumstantial evidence. It is trite to say that in a case based on circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
have not only to be full ive nature and consistent with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused. Moreover, all the established circumstances should be
complete and there should be no gap in the chain of evidence. Therefore, the
E evidence has to be carefully scrutinized and each circumstance should be
dealt with carefully to find out whether the chain of the established
circumstances is complete or not. (See: Dhananjoy Chatterjee Alias Dhana
v. State of WB.)6. It also needs to be emphasized at this stage itself that in
a case based on circumstantial evidence motive assumes great significance
p inasmuch as its existence is an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive
reasoning.

18. In the present case, the motive was alleged to be the greed for
dowry and desire of appellant A-2 to have illicit relationshipwith the deceased,

G 2. AIR (1952) SC 354.

3. AIR (1968) SC 829.

4. [J979J 3 sec 574.

5. c2001J 3 sec 549.

H 6. [1994] Supp (2) sec 220.
SUKHRAM v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.K. JAIN, J.] 57
which theory, as noted above, has been rejected by the High Court while A
acquitting the appellant for offences under Sections 304-8 and 498-A IPC.
Therefore, there is no gainsaying that the prosecution failed to establish the
existence of a motive. It is in this background that it ha£ to be examined
whether the evidence and the circumstances relied upon by the High Court
while recording the conviction of appellant A-2 are consistent with the B
hypothesis of the guilt of the said appellant.

19. The sole reason given by the High Court for holding appellant A-
2 guilty of offence under Section 20 I of IPC is the circumstance flowing from
the evidence of PW-12, wherein she had stated that: 'Accused No. I and the
deceased Meerabai were sleeping in one room and we were sleeping in the C
other room'. Undoubtedly, the mainstay of the prosecution case was the
testimony of PW-12. There is absolutely no other evidence or circumstance
attributing to A-2, the knowledge of the commission of offence in respect of
his daughter-in-law, Meerabai. Merely because he happened to be father of
appellant A- l, it cannot be presumed as a matter of legal proof that he must
be deemed to have the knowledge of the offence committed by his son. Even D
if the evidence of PW-12 is taken at its face value, though the witness was
declared hostile and had been cross examined by the prosecution counsel,
mere presence of the appellant, A-2 in the house, in our opinion, is riot
sufficient to draw a presumption that he had the knowledge of commission
of offence by his son, appellant, A- l. There is no other established circumstance E
to complete the chain to bring home the offence under Section 201 IPC. We
are of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish that the conduct
of appellant A-2, both at the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter,
is· consistent with the hypothesis of his guilt. We have therefore, no hesitation
in holding that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in convicting
appellant A-2 for having committed offences punishable under Sections 302 F
and 201 IPC.

20. In the light of the above discussion, conviction of appellant A-2
(Sukhram) cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we allow the appeal to the
extent it pertains to appellant, A-2 and se! aside the conviction and sentence
passed on him. He shall be. set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other G
case.

S.K.S. Appeal partly allowed.

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