Holding

The High Court erred in overturning the trial court’s acquittal of Suman Sood for kidnapping for ransom; her conviction under Sec. 364A is set aside, while all other convictions of both appellants are upheld.

Summary

The husband (Daya Singh) and wife (Suman Sood) were extradited from the United States and tried in Rajasthan for kidnapping a politician's son, conspiracy, and related offences. The trial court convicted both of several IPC offences, acquitting Suman Sood of kidnapping for ransom (Sec. 364A). The High Court reversed that acquittal, convicting her of Sec. 364A. The Supreme Court examined whether the extradition order permitted prosecution for Sec. 364A and Sec. 365, held that the order expressly covered Sec. 364A and that a lesser offence (Sec. 365) could be tried even if not mentioned. It found ample evidence of kidnapping and ransom demand for the husband, but no evidence linking the wife to the ransom demand, and therefore set aside her Sec. 364A conviction while upholding all other convictions. The Court dismissed the husband’s appeal and partially allowed the wife’s appeal, restoring her acquittal on the kidnapping‑for‑ransom charge.

Issues considered

Whether an extradition order that mentions a specific offence (Sec. 364A IPC) authorises trial for that offence and for lesser offences not expressly listed.
Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the kidnapping was for ransom, satisfying the elements of Sec. 364A.
Whether the wife can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom absent direct evidence of her participation in the ransom demand.
Whether conviction for conspiracy can be sustained on circumstantial evidence.
Whether the appellate court may overturn a trial‑court acquittal when two reasonable conclusions are possible.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 33
Explosive Substances Act, 1908s. 4, s. 5
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 1208, s. 120A, s. 343, s. 346, s. 353, s. 364A, s. 365, s. 420, s. 468, s. 471
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987

Subjects

extraditionkidnapping for ransomconspiracyacquittalappellate reviewIPC sectionsevidencelesser offenceinternational law

Judgment

'~ SUMAN SOOD @ KAMAL JEET KAUR A
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN

MAY 14, 2007

[C.K. THAKKER AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, JJ.) B

Constitution of India-Article 33-Penal Code, 1860--Sections 120A,
~ 1208, 343, 346, 353, 364A, 365, 420, 468 & 471-Explosive Substances Act,
1908-Sections 4 & 5-Extradition Act, 1962 as amended by Extradition
(Amendment) Act, 1993-Section 21-Accused, husband and wife, irrvolved
c
in kidnapping-Accused were arrested and extradited from outside the country
and were charged for offences of criminal conspiracy, kidnapping for ransom
and wrongful confinement-Trial court corrvicted and sentenced both the
accused for the charged offences and acquitted the accused-wife of offence
of kidnapping for ransom-High Court confirming the corrviction and sentence D
of the accused and rc:versing the order of acquittal of the accused-wife-
T Correctness of-Held, on evidence on record, the prosecution has proved
) beyond all reasonable doubt the charges framed against the accused except
for the offence of kidnapping for ransom by the accused-wife-Hence, order
of acquittal passed by the trial court upheld-Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
E

Appellants-accused, husband and wife, were involved in kidnapping of a
politician's son to seek release of one of their members of a terrorist
organization. The victim was kidnapped in a car and held captive in the house
of the accused for some days before he was released. Both the accused were
F
arrested from United States of Ameri,~a and were extradited to India, for
commission of offences under sections 343, 346, 353, 364A, 365, 420, 468,
471, 120A and 1208 IPC and for offences punishable under sections 4 and 5
of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. Trial Court convicted and sentenced
the appellant-husband under sections 364A, 365, 343 r/w 1208 and 346 r/w
1208 IPC and the appellant-wife under sections 365 r/w 1208, 343 r/w 1208 G
and 346 r/w 1208 IPC and acquitted her of offence under section 364A r/w
1208 IPC. The appellants preferred appeals before High Court being
aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence. The State also filed an
"r appeal against the order of acquittal of the appellant-wife under section 3.64A
49<) H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A r/w 1208 IPC. The High Court dismissed the appeals of the appellants and
allowed the appeal of the State by reversing the order of acquittal of the
appellant-wife.

In appeals to this Court, the appellants contended that they could not be
prosecuted under section 364A IPC since there was no reference of the
B offence in the Extradition Order; that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the kidnapping of the victim was for ransom for conviction
of the offence under section 364A IPC; and that the prosecution did not prove
that the accused were in possession of the house or the car in which the victim
was kidnapped belonged to them. The appellant-wife further contended that
<t the Extradition Order did not refer to the offence under section 365 IPC and
hence conviction and sentence under section 365 r/w 1208 IPC was illegal;
that there was no evidence against her as to criminal conspiracy; and that
the High Court erred in convicting her for kidnapping for ransom under
section 364A r/w 1208 IPC.

D The respondent State contended that the order of conviction and sentence
recorded by the High Court needs no interference; that, in the Extradition
Order, express reference was made to section 364A IPC and hence no
objection can be raised against trial of the accused under the said provision;
and that there was sufficient evidence of kidnapping and also for ranso-m.

:q Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1. There is Final Judgment of Certification of Extraditability
which was in the nature of judgment, order or decree expressly granting
extradition of the accused for various offences alleged to have been committed
by them. Section 364A IPC has been mentioned explicitly in the judgment. It,
F therefore, cannot be successfully contended that the appellants-accused could
not have been prosecuted and tried for an offence punishable under section
364A IPC. [Paras 24 and 27] [511-D, HJ

1.2. It is well settled that if the accused is charged for a higher offence
G and on the evidence led by the prosecution, the Court finds that the accused
has not committed that offence but is equally satisfied that he has committed
a lesser offence, then he can be convicted for such lesser sentence. Since
extradition of the accused was allowed for a crime punishable under higher
offence (Section 364A IPC), her prosecution and trial for a lesser offence ~/
[Section 365) cannot be held to be without authority of law.
H (Paras 29 and 34] (513-H; 514-A)
SUMAN SOOD@KAMALJEET KAUR,. STATE OF RAJAS THAN 501

>-- Rosiline George v. Union of India, 11994] 2 SCC 80: JT (1993) 6 SC A
~-. 51; Daya Singh & Ors. v. Union of India, 12001] 4 SCC 516; JT 12001] 5
sec 31 referred to.
Thiradv. Ferrandino, 365 Fred Supp. 1155, referred to.

1.3. The kidnapping of the victim has been clearly established and B
cogently proved by the prosecution evidence. The trial court considered the
witnesses in its proper perspective and came to the conclusion that the victim
was kidnapped. There is no infirmity in the prosecution evidence and in the
~,
-< findings recorded by both the Court The demand was clearly communicated
through phone calls for which the victim was kidnapped. It cannot be said
that since nothing was mentioned in the fax messages, the kidnapping,
c
abduction and detention of the victim was not for ransom. Neither the trial
court nor the High Court has committed either an error of fact or an error
of law in convicting the accused-husband for the offences punishable under
sections 365 and 364A IPC. !Paras 36, 38 and 39] (514-C, E, F; 515-F, G]
D
1.4. The evidence as to the purchase and exclusive possession of the
house by the accused where the victim was kept is established and prosecution
--r evidence has been accepted by both the courts. Likewise, ownership of the
) car and possession thereof by the accused is equally proved. Nothing was
shown as to how the courts were wrong in relying upon the evidence and why
such evidence should be discarded. [Para 40] (515-H; 516-A] E
1.5. Both the Courts have considered the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses and recorded a finding that identity of the accused was established
beyond doubt The evidence of the victim was natural and inspired confidence.
The photographs of the accused shown on television and published in
newspapers does not in any way adversely affect the prosecution, if otherwise F
the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is reliable and the Court is satisfied
as to identity of the accused. It is thus proved beyond doubt that the accused-
husband had committed offences punishable under section 343 read with
section 1208 IPC as also under section 346 read with 1208 IPC.
[Para 41] [516-C-E) G
1.6. An inference as to conspiracy can be drawn from the surrounding
circumstances inasmuch as normally, no direct evidence of conspiracy is
available. It is clear that an inference drawn by both the Courts as to criminal
' r conspiracy by the accused-wife cannot be held ill-founded. From the prosecution
evidence, it is amply proved that the victim had been kidnapped by accused- H
502 SUIPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A husband and his companions. The accused-wife was very much aware of the
said fact She was all throughout keeping a watch on the victim. She used to
give food, medicine etc. siince the victim was not keeping good health. Both
the courts were right in convicting the accused-wife for offences punishable
under sections 364 read with 1208, 343 read with 1208 and 346 read with
1208 IPC. There is no infirmity in the reasoning or conclusion of the courts
B below and there is no ground to interfere with the said finding.
!Para 531 [519-G-H; 520-AI

C
Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharashtra, [1964) 2 SCR 368: AIR
11965) SC 82; Baburao Bajirao Patil v. State of Maharashtra, [19711 3 SCC
432; Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), [1988) 3 SCC 609; AIR
.
[19881 SC (1883); Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, (200318 SCC 461; AIR (2003)
SC 4427; JT (2003) Supp 1 SC 200, referred to.

Halsbury's Laws of England {4th Edition: Vol. 11}, referred to.

1.7. There is no evidence at all-direct or indirect-to connect accused-
D wife with kidnapping of the victim for ransom. She was not a member of the
party in the car in which the victim was kidnapped. It is not even an allegation
of the prosecution that the accused had at any occasion made demand for
release of the member of the terrorist organization or she was present when ·
such telephone calls were made to the family members of the victim. There is
nothing to show that she was a member of the terrorist organization. There
E is also no evidence to show that she even knew the member of the terrorist
organization or was interested in his release. The victim nowhere stated in
his deposition that during the entire period, she had told him that he was
kidnapped and kept there so that one of the members of the terrorist
organization should be released. There is no iota of evidence to connect the
F accused with ransom and the alleged demand of the accused-husband for
release of the member of the terrorist organization.
[Para 63) [521-F-H; 522-A-B)

Concise Oxford English Dictionary [2002); Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd
Edition) referred to.
G 1.8. Merely on the ground that the accused-wife was staying with her
husband in her house, it cannot be held that she was in 'continued association'
and involved as a co-conspirator in criminal conspiracy with accused-husband
in keeping the victim and in keeping the victim in her house. No witness has
directly or even indirectly deposed about ransom by the accused-wife. It is
H settled law that in case two views are possible and the trial court has acquitted
SUMAN SOOD@KAMALJEETKAUR v. STATEOFRAJASTHAN[C.K. THAKKER,J.l 503
")-
the accused, the High Court would not interfere with such order of acquittal. A
On the facts and in the circumstances in its entirety and considering the
evidence as a whole, it cannot be said that by acquitting the accused-wife for
offences punishable under section 364A read with section 1208 IPC, the trial
court had acted illegally or unlawfully. The High Court ought not to have set
aside the finding of the acquittal of the accused-wife for an offence under
section 364A read with section 1208 IPC. B
(Paras 66, 67, 68 and 701 (522-F; 523-B, C; 524-D)
\
-~ State· (NCT) of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu@ Afsan Guru, (2005[ 11 SCC
600; JT (2005) 7 SC 1 and Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, JT
(2007) 3 SC 316, (2007) 3 SCALE 90, referred to.
c
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 867 of
2006.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 20.03.2006 of the High Court
of Judicature ofRajasthan at Jaipur in S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 1247 of2004. D
! WITH
)
Cr!. Appeal No. 727 of 2007.

Sushi! Kumar, Kamini Jaiswal, Dasvir Singh Dalee, Shomila Bakshi, Sunita E
Dwivedi, Vinay Arora and Sudarshan Singh Ravat for the Appellant.

Milind Kumar (for Aruneshwar Gupta) for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
-y C.K. THAKKER, J. I. Leave granted in S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2965 of2006.

2. Present criminal appeals are filed by Daya Singh Lahoriya @ Rajeev
Sudan@ Vinay Kumar and Suman Sood@ Kamal Jeet Kaur@ Kanwaljit Kaur,
husband and wife respectively against the judgment and order passed by the
.• High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan (Jaipur Bench) dated March 20, 2006 G
in S.B. Criminal Appeal Nos. 1247 of2004 and D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 11
of2005 respectively.
y 3. By the said order, the High Court confirmed the order of conviction
and sentence passed against Daya Singh for offences punishable under
H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 6 S.C.R.

A Sections 364A, 365, 343 read with 120B and 346 read with 120B Indian Penal
Code (!PC). 111e said conviction was recorded by the Additional Sessions
Judge (Fast Track) Category I, Jaipur on October 20, 2004 in Sessions Case
No. 26 of 2003. So far as Suman Sood is concerned, she was convicted by
the trial Court for offences punishable under Sections 365 read with 120B, 343
read with 120B and 346 read with 120B !PC. She was, however, acquitted for
B offences punishable under Section 364A and in the alternative under Sections
364A read with I 20B !PC. Her challenge against conviction and sentence for
offences punishable under Sections 365 read with 120B, 343 read with 120B
and 346 read with l 20B !PC was negatived by the High Court. But her
,
)..
acquittal for offences punishable under Sections 364A read with 120B was set
c aside by the High Court in an appeal by the State and she was convicted for
the said offence and was ordered to undergo imprisonment for life.

PROSECUTION CASE

4. To appreciate the controversy raised by the parties, few relevant facts
D may be stated.

5. It was the case of the prosecution that one Rajendra Mirdha, son of
~
Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha was staying ait 81-C, Azad Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur.
He used to regularly wake up at about 6.30/6.45 in the morning and to take
walk for about an hour or an hour and a half. According to the prosecution,
E on February 17, 1995, as usual, he left his residence for a morning walk at
aboµt 7.00 a.m. He had hardly completed two or three rounds and when again
he reached at the road for further rounds, he saw a white Maruti car and one
man came out of it. The said man asked Rajendra Mirdha about the location
of House No. 105 or 106. Before he could reply, he was pushed into the car
and was taken away. There were three persons in the car having weapons.
F
Rajendra Mirdha did notJtnow why he was kidnapped. After some time, Mr.
Mirdha was taken in -One .house. The kidnappers then told Mr. Mirdha that ..,.-
they were the members ofthe Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF). One of their
members, Devendra Pal Singh Bhullar was arrested at the Indira Gandhi
International Airport on the night of January 18-19, 1995 on his return to India
G after•the German authorities declined to grant him asylum and the kidnappers
wanted him to be released. It was also stated that the kidnappers had nothing
agairlst Rajendra Mirdha personally. It was also the case of the prosecution
that at the relevant time, Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha, father of Rajendra Mirdha
~
was heading Joint Parliamentary Committee, being a Chairman of the Committee.
According to the kidnappers, Shri R'lill Niwas Mirdha was thus an influential
H
SUMAN SOOD@KAMALJEETKAUR v. STATEOFRAJASTHAN [C.K. THAKKER,J.l 505

person and was in a position to get the said act done by the Government. A
According to the prosecution, PW 5 Udai Rani Mirdha, wife of Rajendra
Mirdha received a telephonic call at about 8.40 a.m. from an unknown person
who stated that Rajendra Mirdha had been made hostage and until and unless
l Devendra Pal Singh Bhullar was freed, they would not release Rajendra
'
Mirdha. He further stated that neither Police should be informed nor the
telephone be tapped. The caller also stated that he would again telephone B
Udai Rani Mirdha. Udai Rani informed the above incident and a call from
unknown person to Harendra Mirdha, PW 29, younger brother of Rajendra
'
·~· Mirdha. Harendra Mirdha went to Ashok Nagar Police station and lodged
First Information Report (FIR) about abduction of his elder brother Rajendra
Mirdha. A case was registered as FIR No. 57 of 1995 (Ex.P-29) under Section c
365 !PC and investigation started. During the investigation, according to the
prosecution, it was revealed that accused Daya Singh, Suman Sood and other
persons were involved in the abduction of Rajendra Mirdha. Necessary steps
were, therefore, taken to arrest the accused. Daya Singh and Suman Sood
were arrested from Minneapolis Airport, Minnesota, USA on August 3, 1995
while they were illegally trying to cross over to Canada. The United States D
,. District Judge, Northern District of Texas. Fort Worth Division allowed the
extradition of accused Daya Singh to India inter alia for offences punishable
under Sections 343, 346, 353, 364A, 365, 420, 468, 471, 120A and 1208 IPC as
also for the offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive
Substances Act, 1908. Likewise, extradition of accused Suman Sood was E
allowed for offences punishable under Sections 343, 346, 353, 364A, 420, 468,
471, 120A and 1208 !PC. It appears that after the accused were brought to
India, prosecution was launched against them also for offences under the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 ("TADA" for short).
Since the order of extradition did not mention trial of offences under TADA,
Daya Singh filed a Writ Petition in this Court by invoking Article 32 of the F
''1'' Constitution contending that the prosecution under TADA was without
authority, power and jurisdiction and no prosecution could have been launched.
This Court, considering the relevant provisions of the Extradition Act, 1962,
in the light of the order of extradition held the contention well-founded and
allowed the petition holding that no prosecution under TADA could have G
been instituted. The said decision was reported as Daya Singh & Ors. v.
Union of India, [200 I] 4 SCC 516 : JT [200 I] 5 SCC 31. After the above
decision, prosecution for offences under TADA was dropped, the case was
'r' transferred from the Designated Court, Ajmer under TADA to the Court of
Sessions Judge, Jaipur City which was finally tried and decided by the
H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Category No. I, Jaipur and was
registered as Sessions Case No. 26 of 2003.

DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT

6. The prosecution examined 61 witnesses. Several documents were also
B produced on record. The parties were heard and finally on October 20, 2004,
the trial Court recorded an order of conviction as also of sentence.

7. So far as Daya Singh is concerned, he was convicted and sentenced
,
>-
as under - uls. 364 AIPC:
c To suffer imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.500/- in default to further
suffer simple imprisonment for six months.

U/s. 365 !PC:

To suffer imprisonment for seven years and fine of Rs.500/- in
D default to further suffer simple imprisonment for six months.

U/s. 343/1208 !PC: r

To suffer imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs.500l- in
default to further suffer six months imprisonment.
E U/s. 346/1208 !PC:

To suffer imprisonment for two years.

The substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

F 8. Accused Suman Sood was convicted as under -
y
U/s. 365/1208 !PC:

To suffer imprisonment for seven years and fine of Rs.500/- in
default to further suffer simple imprisonment for six months.
0 U/s. 343/1208 !PC:

Th suffer imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs.500/- in
default to further suffer six months imprisonment.
""(

U/s. 346/1208 !PC:

~
SUMAN SOOD@KAMALJEET KAUR>. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 507

~
To suffer imprisonment for two years. A
DECISION OF HIGH COURT
I
~
9. Both husband and wife were aggrieved by the order of conviction
~ and sentence and approached the High Court of Rajasthan. The State was
also aggrieved by the order of acquittal of Suman Sood for offence under B
Section 364A, in the alternative under Section 364A read with Section 120B,
IPC and preferred an appeal. As already noted earlier, appeals of both the
accused were dismissed by the High Court while the appeal of State of
~.
~ Rajasthan against Suman Sood was allowed and she was convicted for an
offence punishable under Section 364A read with Section l 20B, !PC. The High
Court also ordered that looking to the gravity and dastardly nature of acts c
and consequences, Daya Singh as well as Suman Sood "shall not be released
from the prison unless they served out at least twenty years of imprisonment
including the period already undergone by them".

APPEALSJN SUPREME COURT
D
I 0. The above orders have been challenged by the appellan!s-accused
I in this Court.

11. On August 21, 2006, leave was granted in appeal filed by Suman
Sood. Printing was dispensed with and appeal was ordered to be heard on
E
SLP Paper Books. Parties were directed to file additional documents. It appears
that an application for bail was submitted by Suman Sood stating therein that
she had undergone the sentence for which conviction had been recorded by
the trial Court against her and she had to remain in jail because of the order
of conviction recorded by the High Court for an offence punishable under
Section 364A read with 120B, !PC. She, therefore, pray~d that she be released F
on bail. The Court, however, instead of granting prayer of bail, directed the
Registry to place the matter for final hearing. Daya Singh had also preferred
an appeal against his conviction. On February 6, 2007, when the appeal of
Suman Sood was called out for hearing, it was stated that Daya Singh was
convicted by the trial Court as well as by the High Court and he had also
filed an appeal, but it was at the stage of S.L.P. and notice was issued, but
G
no leave was granted. It was further stated that judgment of the High Court
was common in both the matters, but the matter of Daya Singh was not placed
·y on Board. The Court, therefore, directed the Registry to place the papers
before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice oflndia for obtaining appropriate orders
so that both the matters could be placed before one Bench. Now, all the H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A matters have been placed for hearing before us.
SUBMISSIONS BY APPELLANTS

12. We have heard Mr. Sushi! Kumar, Senior Advocate for Suman Sood,
Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Advocate for Daya Singh for the appellants-accused and
B Mr. Milind Kumar, Advocate for the respondent-State.

13. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sushi! Kumar for Suman Sood and Ms.
Kamini Jaiswal for Daya Singh contended that Extradition Treaty had been
entered into between the United States of America and Great Britain in 1931.
In the said Treaty, there was no reference of offence of kidnapping for ransom
C punishable under Section 364A, IPC. Prosecution and trial for offences under
Section 364A and/or Section 364A read with Section 120B, !PC was, therefore,
illegal, without jurisdiction and conviction is liable to be set aside. It was also
urged that no case had been made out against the appellants for an offence
punishable under Section 364A, !PC inasmuch as ingredients of Section 364A,
D !PC had not been established by the prosecution. No witness had stated that
the accused had administered any threat or asked to pay any ransom for the
release of victim Rajendra Mirdha. Fax messages received by Shri Ram Niwas
Mirdha made no reference of ransom. Again, there was no evidence worth the
name which would prove that Daya Singh was a member of KLF or he had
any link with Bhullar. It was urged that identity of the accused was not
E established beyond doubt and the prosecution witnesses had admitted that
photographs of accused were shown on Television and printed in Newspapers.
Identification Parade, therefore, was mere farce and an empty formality. It was
also not proved that House No. B-117, Model Town exclusively belonged to
'Daya Singh wherein Rajendra Mirdha was detained. Ownership of white
F Maruti car equally was not proved. There was no evidence as to conspiracy
and both the Courts were wrong in convicting the appellants for the offences
with which he was charged.

14. On behalf of Suman Sood. certain additional arguments were
1 advanced. It was contended that extradition was not granted for an offence
G punishable under Section 365, !PC. She, therefore, could not have been
prosecuted and tried nor could have been convicted for the said offence. Her
conviction, hence, is liable to be quashed and set aside. It was also urged
that when she was acquitted for an offence punishable under Section 364A,
!PC and in the alternative for an offence punishable under Section 364A/120B,
I !PC, the High Court was clearly wrong in convicting her under Section 364A
H
SUMANSOOD@KAMALJEETKAUR "· STATEOFRAiASTHAN[C.K. THAKKER,J.] 509

~-·.' read with Section 1208, !PC. It was also urged that the High Court had. A
ignored an important consideration that she was not an accused in Vaishali
Nagar FIR No. 44 of 1995. In FIR No.84 of 1995 of Ma[viya Nagar, she was
prosecuted along with her husband Daya Singh for offences punishable
under Sections 420, 468, 471, IPC and also under Section 4 of the Explosive
Substances Act, 1908, but the trial Court acquitted her observing that there
was no evidence on the basis of which she could be convicted. Leave to
B
Appeal against acquittal of Suman Sood was also dismissed by the High
Court and the said decision has attained finality. In view of !he above facts,
; even if it is held that h~r conviction for other offences is not illegal, the order
-<.
of the High Court setting aside acquittal for an offence punishable under
Section 364A read with Section 1208, !PC deserves to be set aside. c
SUBMISSIONS BY STATE

15. On behalf of the State, it was submitted that order of conviction and
sentence recorded by the High Court needs no interference. Regarding
extradition, it was stated that Extradition Treaty was of 1931. Section 364A, D
!PC was inserted in the statute book in the year 1993. Obviously, therefore,
,- no reference was found of the said provision in the Treaty. But in the
Extradition-Order, dated June 11, 1997, passed by the American Court, express
)
reference was made to Section 364A, !PC and hence, no objection can be
raised against trial of accused under the said provision.
E
16. Similarly, extradition of accused Daya Singh was also allowed for
offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act,
1908. The trial of the accused, therefore, cannot be held to be unlawful or
without legal sanction.

17. On merits, it was submitted that there was sufficient evidence of F
y kidnapping and also ofransom, which was demand of release of Bhullar. The
evidence established kidnapping, abduction and detention of Rajendra Mirdha
in House No. B-117, Model Town, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur by Daya Singh. It was
also proved that white Maruti car in which victim was taken, belonged to
Daya Singh. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeals deserve to be G
dismissed by confirming the order of conviction and sentence passed by the
High Court

,. 18. We have given our anxious and most thoughtful consideration to
the rival submissions of both the sides. We have also perused the judgments
of both the courts and have minutely gone through the evidence on record: H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A EXTRADITION OF ACCUSED

19. As to extradition, it may be stated that on December 22, 1931, a
Treaty had been entered into between the United States of America and Great
Britain. It provided reciprocal extradition of accused/convicts of any of the
crimes or offences enumerated in Article 3. The said Article, inter alia included
B the following crimes/offences;

7. Kidnapping or false imprisonment.

c
9. abduction

20. Forgery, etc.
D Article 7 reads thus;

A person surrenderied can in no case be kept in custody or be
brought to trial in the territories of the High Contracting Party to
whom the surrender has been made for any other crime or offence, or
on account of any other matters, than those for which the extradition
E shall have taken place, until he has been restored or has had an
opportunity of returning, to the territories of the High Contracting
Pa1ty by whom he has been surrendered.

20. Article 14 of the Treaty expressly stated that His Britannic Majesty
p acceded to the Treaty on behalf of any of his Dominions named in the Treaty.
It, inter alia included India.

21. The Extradition Treaty of 1931 continues to hold the field. In Thirad
v. Ferrandino, 355 Fred Supp 1155, the Government of India sought the
extradition of J, an Indian citizen and a resident alien in the USA. The
G allegation againstJwas that while serving in Indian Navy, he embezzled huge
sum of money. Extradition of J was, therefore, demanded. J challenged the
action on the ground that 1931 Treaty was between USA and Great Britain
when India was a Dominion of Great Britain. In 1950, India became Republican
State and the Treaty which was as British-India did not survive. The contention, ~
Ifhowever, was negatived and extradition of J was granted.
SUMAN SOOD@KAMALJEET KAUR v. ST ATE OF RAJASTHAN [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 511

22. In Rosi/ine George v. Union of India, [1994) 2 SCC 80: JT (1993) A
>--· 6 SC 51, this Court referring to leading decisions on the point held that it is
well-settled legal proposition in International Law that a change in the form
of Government of a contracting State wou Id not put an end to its treaties.
India, even under British Rule, had retained its personality as a State under
International Law. It was a member of the United Nations in its own right.
Grant of Independence in 1947 and status of Sovereign Republic in 1950 did
B
not put an end to the treaties entered into by the British Government prior
to August 15, 1947 or January 26, 1950 on behalf of India .
... ~ 23. The Extradition Treaty between India and United States of America
' entered in the year 1931, therefore, holds the field, is subsisting and is
operative.
c
24. Moreover, in the instant case, there is Final Judgment of Certification
ofExtraditability dated June II, 1997, which was in the nature of judgment,
order or decree, expressly granting extradition of Daya Singh and Suman Sood
for various offences alleged to have been committed by them. Section 364A, D
!PC has been mentioned explicitly in the said judgment. Both these documents

,, have been proved by PW 56 S.P. Khadagwat.

) 25. In fact, in the light of the order of extradition of Daya Singh for the
offences specified in the extradition decree, a contention was raised by him
in this Court that he could not be prosecuted for offences punishable under E
TADA, which contention had been upheld by this Court in Daya Singh.

26. In the operative part, the Court stated;

"In view of the aforesaid position in law, both on international law
as well as the relevant statute in this country, we dispose of these F
cases with the conclusion that a fugitive brought into this country
-.,- under an Extradition Decree can be tried only for the offences
mentioned in the extradition decree and for no other offence and the
Criminal Courts of this country will have no jurisdiction to try such
fugitive for any other offence". (emphasis supplied)
G
27. It, therefore, cannot be successfully contended that the appellants-
accused could not have been prosecuted and tried for an offence punishable
under Section 364A, !PC. The contention of the appellants, therefore, has no
-
)- substance and must be rejected.
H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A 28. On behalf of Suman Sood, one more argument was advanced. It was
contended that Extradition Order in her case did not refer to Section 365, !PC
but both the Courts convicted her for the said offence under Section 365/
1208, !PC which was illegal, unlawfu I and without authority of law. Her
conviction and imposition of sentence for an offence punishable under Section
B 365 read with Section 1208, !PC, therefore, is liable to be set aside.

29. We find no substance in the said contention as well. It is no doubt
true that Section 365, !PC had not been mentioned in the order of extradition.
811t as already seen earlier, Section 364A, IPC had been included in the decree.
Now, it is well-settled that if the accused is charged for a higher offence and
C on the evidence led by the prosecution, the Court finds that the accused has
not committed that offence but is equally satisfied that he has committed a
lesser offence, then he can be convicted for such lesser offence. Thus, if A
is charged with an offence of committing murder of 8, and the Court finds
that 8 has not committed murder as defined in Section 300, !PC but is
convinced that 8 has committed an offence of culpable homicide not amounting
D to murder (as defined in Section 299, !PC), there is no bar on the Court in
convicting 8 for the said offence and no grievance can be made by 8 against
such conviction.
r
30. The same principle applies to extradition cases. Section 21 of the
Extradition Act, 1962 as originally enacted read thus;
E
"Section 21: Accused or convicted person surrendered or returned
by foreign State or Commonwealth country not to be triedfor previous
offence:- Whenever any person .accused or convicted of an offence,
which if committed in India, would be an extradition offence, is
surrendered or returned by a foreign State or Commonwealth country,
F that person shall not, until he has been restored or has had an
opportunity of returning to that State or country, be tried in India for
an offence committed prior to the surrender or return, other than the
extradition offence proved by the facts on which the surrender or
,return is based."
G
31,. The section, however, was amended in 1993 by the Extradition
(Amendment) Act, 1993 (Act 66of1993). The amended section now reads as
under;

'fSection 21 - Accused or convicted person surrendered or returned
H b'y foreign State not to be tried for certain offences. - Whenever any
SUMAN SOOD@KAMALJEET KAUR v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN (C.K. THAKKER, J] 513

,.. person accused or convicted of an offence, which, if committed in
India would be an extradition offence, is surrendered or returned by
A

a foreign State, such person shall not, until he has been restored or
has had an opportunity of returning to that State, be tried in India for
an offence other than-

(a) the extradition offence in relation to which he was surrendered or B
returned; or

(b) any lesser offence disclosed by the facts proved for the purposes
of securing his surrender or return other than an offence in relation
-"'(
to which an order for his surrender or return could not be lawfully
made; or c
(c) the offence in respect of which the foreign State has given its
consent."

(emphasis supplied)
D
32. It is, therefore, clear that the general principle of administration of
criminal justice applicable and all throughout applied to Domestic or Municipal
.._(
Law has also been extended to International Law or Law of Nations and to·.
) cases covered by Extradition-Treaties.

33. In Daya Singh, this Court dealing with amended Section 21 of the E
Extradition Act, stated;

"The provision of the aforesaid section places restrictions on the
trial of the person extradited and it operates as a bar to the trial of
the fugitive criminal for any other offence until the condition of
restoration or opportunity to return is satisfied. Under the amended F
Act of 1993, therefore, a fugitive could be tried for cny lesser offence,
disclosed by the facts proved or even for the offence in respect of
which the foreign State has given its consent. It thus, enables to try
the fugitive for a lesser offence, without restoring him to the State or
for any other offence, if the State concerned gives its consent".
G
(emphasis supplied)

34. Now, it cannot be disputed that an offence under Section 365, IPC
-'..;,.. is a lesser offence than the offence punishable under Section 364A, IPC. Since
extradition of Suman Sood was allowed for a crime punishable with higher
H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A offence (Section 364A, !PC), her prosecution and trial for a lesser offence
(Section 365, !PC) cannot be hdd to be without authority of law. The
contention, therefore, has no force and is hereby rejected.

MERITS

B 35. Having disposed of preliminary objections raised by the appellants,
let us now come to the merits of the matter.

DAYA SINGH LAHORIYA

36. So far as kidnapping of Rajendra Mirdha is concerned, it has been
C clearly established and cogently proved by prosecution evidence. In our
opinion, the trial Court was right in relying upon testimony of PW I Prem
Devi, maid servant of Rajendra Mirdha, PW 2 Rakesh Kumar, son of PW I,
PW 3 Hemram, Chef at the House of Rajendra Mirdha, PW 5 Udai Rani
Mirdha, wife ofRajendra Mirdha, PW 6 Kishore Singh, a neighbour of victim
.
Rajendra Mirdha, who in his evidence stated that he saw a white Maruti car
D in that area on the previous night of February 16, 1995 at about 8.00 p.m., and
most importantly, PW 9, victim Rajendra Mirdha himself. PW 29 Harendra
Mirdha, real brother of Rajendra Mirdha who was informed by Udai Rani
Mirdha about kidnapping of her husband Rajendra Mirdha and on the basis
of the said information, Harendra Mirdha lodged a complaint. PW 50 Shri Ram
E Niwas Mirdha and PW 36 Hari Kishen also corroborated the incident of
kid11apping of Rajendra Mirdha. The trial Court, in our opinion, considered the
evidence of the witnesses in its proper perspective and came to the conclusion
that Rajendra Mirdha was kidnapped. We see no infirmity in the prosecution
evidence nor in the finding recorded by both the courts. Kidnapping of
Rajendra Mirdha is thus clearly established.
F
37. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that it
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping of Rajendra Mirdha
was for ransom or any demand was made by accused Daya Singh for release
of Rajendra Mirdha. It may, however, be stated that it was the case of the
G prosecution from the very beginning that Rajendra Mirdha was kidnapped
only to get Bhullar, a member of Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) released
and s'nce Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha, father of victim Rajendra Mirdha was
holdll\g an important office of Chairman of Joint Parliamentary Committee, he
could·. exercise his influence to get said Bhullar released. PW 5 Udai Rani
Mirdhft, in her evidence, clearly deposed that after her husband was kidnapped ·
H at aboµt 7.00 a.m. on February 17, 1995, she received a phone call from
SUMAN SOOD @ KAMALJEET KAUR r. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [C. K. THAKKER, J.] 5J5

,.,. kidnappers which was picked up by her. The caller told her that Rajendra A
Mirdha had been kidnapped by them. The caller also told Udai Rani to write
.down name of Bhullar who should be released by exercising influence by her
father-in-law Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha. PW 9 Rajendra Mirdha also deposed
that the kidnappers told him that they were the members of Khalistan Liberation
Force (KLF) and wanted one of the members (Bhullar) to be released who had
been arrested. PW 29 Harendra Mirdha corroborated the version of Udai Rani. B
PW 50 Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha also stated that he used to receive calls from
kidnappers that Bhullar should be released else he would have to face serious
~
consequences. The witness also deposed that the caller stated that the
witness could even talk to the Prime Minister for release of Bhullar and the
Prime Minister would not decline such request. It is true that PW 52 Rakesh c
Kumar, owner of the Fax shop at Rohtak deposed that one fax message was
sent to Delhi while the other was sent to Chandigarh. It is also true that he
expressed his inability to identify the accused as sender of fax messages. But
the witness _had been declared 'hostile' by ·the prosecution and while answering
a question by the Public Prosecutor, the witness stated that he had correctly
identified the person in jail who had sent fax messages but added that it was D
not Daya Singh. He stated that it was not true to say that he was refusing
·~(
to identify the accused due to fear .
.>
38. It is true that two fax messages (Ex. P-19 and P-20) sent by Rajendra
Mirdha and received by Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha made no reference to any
E
demand or ransom. In our judgment, however, the message had already been
conveyed through a telephone call to Udai Rani Mirdha, wife of victim
Rajendra Mirdha as also to Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha, father of Rajendra Mirdha.
Obviously, therefore, the demand was clearly communicated for which Rajendra
Mirdha was kidnapped. It, therefore, cannot be said that since nothing was
mentioned in the fax message by victim Rajendra Mirdha, his kidnapping, F
abduction and detention was not for ransom.

39. From what is stated above, in our opinion, neither the trial Court nor
the High Court has committed either an error of fact or an error of law in
convicting accused Daya Singh for the offences punishable under Sections
365 as also 364A, !PC. So far Suman Sood is concerned, we will deal with her G
involvement in the case at an appropriate stage.

40. The evidence as to purchase of House No. B-117, Model Town,
Ashok Nagar, Jaipur and exclusive possession of the said house by the
accused is established and prosecution evidence has been accepted by both H
5Hi SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 6 S.C.R.

A the courts. Likewise, ownership of white Maruti car bearing Registration No.
RJ-14 IC 2005 and possession there,of by the accused is equafiy proved.
Nothing was shown to us how both the courts were wrong in relying upon
the, evidence and why such evidence should be discarded. We are, therefore,
um1ble to accept the submission of the appellants that it was not proved that
the .accused were in possession of House No.8-117, Model Town or Maruti
B car in which victim Rajendra Mirdha was kidnapped did not belong to them.

41. Regarding identification of ac:cused, both the courts have considered
the evidence of prosecution witnesses and recorded a finding that identity
of the accused was established beyond doubt. We are also satisfied that
C evidence of PW 9, victim Rajendra Mirdha was natural and inspired confidence.
His evidence established that he was kidnapped in the morning of February
17, '1995 and he remained with the kidnappers up to the date of encounter on
February 25, 1995, i.e. for eight-nine days. Obviously, therefore, his evidence
was of extreme importance. It was believed by both the courts and we see
nothing wrong in the approach of the courts below. It is true and admitted
D by the prosecution witnesses that the photographs of the accused were
shown on television as also were published in newspapers. That, however,
does not in any way adversely affect the prosecution, if otherwise the evidence T

of prosecution witnesses is reliable and the Court is satisfied as to. identity
of the accused. Even that ground, therefore, cannot take the case of the
E appellants further. It is thus proved beyond doubt that the accused had
committed offences punishable under Section 343 read with 1208, !PC as also
under Section 346 read with 1208, !PC.

42. At the time of hearing of appeals, a list was given by the learned
counsel for the State that several cases had been registered against Daya
p Singh. The learned counsel for the accused, however, submitted that the list
was not accurate and in most of the cases, either Daya Singh was not
prosecuted or the prosecution had resulted in acquittal except in few cases
where there was conviction or the proceedings were pending. In the final
written submissions, the State Counsel clarified the status as regards all cases
and it appears that the learned counsel appearing for Daya Singh was right.
G In some of the cases, there was no pros,ecution against the accused. In some
other 1cases, the accused was acquitted except in few cases where either there
was cpnviction or the matters were sub-judice. We are, however, deciding the
preseyt case in the light of evidence before the Court and express no opinion
on otller cases.
H
..
SUMAN SOOD@KAMALJEET KAUR"· STATE OF RAJASTHAN [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 5 J7

}-· 43. From the above discussion and findings recorded, in our considered A
opinion, neither the tria[ Court nor the High Court has committed any error
in convicting appellant-accused Daya Singh for the offences punishable under
Sections 365, 364A, 343/1208 and 346/1208, IPC. SUMAN SOOD

44. So far as Suman Sood is concerned, it may be stated that the trial
Court did not convict her for any offence independently. She was convicted B
for offences punishable under Sections 365/1208, 343/1208 and 346/1208,
IPC.
-·-{ CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

45. The learned counsel for Suman Sood strenuously urged that there c
was no evidence against her as to criminal conspiracy. She was neither in the
car in which Rajendra Mirdha was kidnapped nor one of the members of the
'kidnapping-operation' team. There is also no evidence to show that she was
aware of the plan of other accused and was a part to such conspiracy. Even
if the entire prosecution story is believed, it can be said that after Rajendra
D
Mirdha was kidnapped and was taken to House No. B-117, Model Town,
Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, she was found there. Now, it is the case of the prosecution
1
}
that she was the wife of accused Daya Singh and, therefore, her presence in
her own house with her husband was most natural. The said fact, without
anything more, therefore, cannot connect her with the crime said to have been
committed either by her husband or by someone else. E
46. At the first blush, the argument appears to be attractive, but on
closer scrutiny, we find no substance in it. Prosecution case is very clear on
the point. According to witnesses, Suman Sood was all through out in House
No.B-117, Model Town, where Rajendra Mirdha was kept. In fact, it was she
who was looking after victim Rajendra Mirdha. She provided him food, F
medicine, etc. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that she was not aware of
kidnapping of Rajendra Mirdha nor that she was unaware of the fact that the
victim was kept under wrongful confinement in a manner which would indicate
that confinement of Rajendra Mirdha was at a secret plaGe.
G
47. True it is that there is no direct evidence to show that Suman Sood
was a party to the conspiracy in kidnapping Rajendra Mirdha and in detaining
him at House No.B-117, Model Town. But it is well settled that an inference
';.- as to conspiracy can be drawn from the surrounding circumstances inasmuch
as normally, no direct evidence of conspiracy is available.
H
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 6 S.C.R.

A 48. In Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.; Vol. 11; para 58); it has
been stated;

"Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to
do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an
indication offence at common law, the punishment for which is
B imprisonment or fine or both in the discretion of the Court.

The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination
by agreement. The agreement may be express or implied, or in part
express and in part implied. The conspiracy arises and the offence is
committed as soon as the agreement is made; and the offence continues
c to be committed so long as the combination persists, that is until the
conspiratorial agreement is terminated by completion of its performance
or by abandonment or frustration or however, it may be. The actus
reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal conduct,
not the execution of it. It is not enough that two or more persons
pursued the same unlawful object at the same time or in the same
D
place; it is necessary to show a meeting of minds, a consensus to
effect an unlawful purpose. It is :10t, however, necessary that each
conspirator should have been in communication with every other."

49. In Bhagwan Swarup v. State ofMaharashtra, [1964] 2 SCR 368: AIR
E (1965) SC 682; this Court stated;
"The essence of conspiracy is, therefore, that there should be an
agreement between persons to do one or other of the acts described
in the section. The said agreement may be proved by direct evidence
or may be inferred from acts and conduct of the parties. There is no
F difference between the mode ofproof of the offence of conspiracy and
that of any other offence; it can be established by direct evidence or
by circumstantial evidence".

(emphasis supplied)

G 50. In Baburao Bajirao Patil v. State of Maharashtra, [1971] 3 SCC 432,
this Court observed that there is seldom, if ever, that direct evidence of
conspiracy is forthcoming. Conspiracy from its very nature is conceived and
hatched in complete secrecy, for otherwise the whole purpose would be
frustrated.

H 51. In Kehar Singh v. State (Deihi Administration), [1988] 3 SCC 609
SUMAN SOOD@KAMALJEET KAUR r. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [C.K. THAKK.ER, J.l 5 J9
.._
: AIR (1988) SC 1883, Shetty, J. said; A
"Generally, a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be
difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same. The prosecution will
often rely on evidence of acts of various parties to infer that they
were done in reference to their common intention. The prosecution
will also more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy B
can be undoubtedly proved by such evidence direct or circumstantial.
But the Court must enquire whether the two persons are independently
-{. pursuing the same and or they have come together to the pursuit of
the unlawful object. The fonner does not render them conspirators,
but the latter is. It is, however, essential that the offence of conspiracy
requires some kind of physical manifestation of agreement. The express
c
agreement, however, need not be proved. Nor actual meeting of two
persons is necessary. Nor it is necessary to prove the actual words
of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing
the unlawful design may be sufficient".
D
52. In Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, [2003] 8 SCC 461 : AIR (2003) SC
'! 4427 : JT (2003) Supp I SC 200, this Court observed;
> "Privacy and secrecy are more characteristics of a conspiracy,
than of a loud discussion in an elevated place open to public view.
Direct evidence in proof of a conspiracy is seldom available, offence E
of conspiracy can be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence.
It is not always possible to give affirmative evidence about the date
of the formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the persons who
took part in the formation of the conspiracy, about the object, which
the objectors set before themselves as the object of conspiracy, and
about the manner in which th~ object of conspiracy is to be carried F
r out, all this is necessarily a matter of inference".

53. Keeping in view the principles laid down in the above decisions, if
we consider the case of Suman Sood, it is clear that an inference drawn by
both the Courts as to criminal conspiracy by her cannot be held ill-founded.
From the prosecution evidence, it is amply proved that Rajendra Mirdha had
G
been kidnapped by Daya Singh and his 'companions'. He was to be kept at
a secret place. Suman Sood was very much aware of the said fact. In fact, she
,.. was all throughout keeping watch on the victim. So much so that she used
to give food, medicine, etc. since victim Rajendra Mirdha was not keeping
good health. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, in our H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A considered view, both the courts were right in convicting Suman Sood for
offences punishable under Sections 365 read with 1208, 343 read with 1208
and 346 read with 1208, !PC. We find no infirmity in the reasoning or
conclusion of the courts below and see no ground to interfere with the said
finding.

B KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM

54. We are, however, of the view that the High Court was not right in
reversing acquittal of Suman Sood for an offence punishable under Section
364A/120B, JPC. Section 364A relates to kidnapping for ransom. Let us consider
C the nature and ambit of an offence of kidnapping for ransom.

55. Offences of kidnapping and abduction were included in the Indian
Penal Code in 1860 when the Code was enacted. An offence of kidnapping
for ransom, however, did not find place then. It was only in 1993 that by Act
42 of 1993, Section 364A was inserted. The offence is serious in nature and
D punishment prescribed for the crime is death sentence or imprisonment for life
and also of payment of fine.

56. Section 364A reads thus:

364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc
E Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention
after such kidnapping or abduction and threatens to cause death or
hurt to such person, or lby his conduct gives rise to a reasonable
apprehension that such pe:rson may be put to death or hurt, or causes
hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or
F 159[any foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation
or any other person] to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay
a ransom, shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to fine.

57. Before the above section is attracted and a person is convicted, the
G prosecution must prove the following ingredients;
(1) The accused must have kidnapped, abducted or detained any
person;

(2) He must have kept such person under custody or detention;
H and
SUMAN SOOD@KAMALJEET KAUR 1·. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 52 J

~ (3) Kicln,~pping, abduction or detention must have been for ransom. A

[see also Mdlleshi v. State of Karnataka, [2004] 8 SCC 95]

58. The term 'ransom' has not been defined in the Code.

59. As a noun, 'ransom' means "a sum of money demanded or paid for
B
the release of a captive". As a verb, 'ransom' means "to obtain the release
of(someone) by paying a ransom", "detain (someone) and demand a ransom
for his release". "To hold someone to ransom" means "to hold someone
-i:'. captive and demand payment for his release". (Concise Oxford English
Dictionary, 2002; p.1186).
c
60. Kidnapping for ransom is an offence of unlawfully seizing a person
and then confining the person usually in a secrete place, while attempting to
extort ransom. This grave crime is sometimes made a capital offence. In
addition to the abductor a person who acts as a go between to collect the
ran•;om is generally considered guilty of the crime.
D
61. According to Advanced Law Lexicon, (3rd Edn., p.3932); "Ransom
-,' is a sum of money paid for redeeming a captive or prisoner of war, or a prize.
} It is also used to signify a sum of money paid for the pardoning of some great
offence and or setting the offender who was imprisoned".

62. Stated simply, 'ransom' is a sum of money to be demanded to be E
paid for releasing a captive, prisoner or detenu.

63. In the present case, there is no evidence at all direct or indirect to
connect Suman Sood with kidnapping of Rajendra Mirdha for ransom.
Admittedly, she was not a member of the party in the Maruti car in which
Rajendra Mirdha was kidnapped. It is not even an allegation of the prosecution
F
that Suman Sood had at any occasion made demand for release of Bhullar or
she was present when such telephone calls were made to family members of
Rajendra Mirdha (Udai Rani Mirdha, wife of Rajendra Mirdha or Shri Ram
Niwas Mirdha, father of Rajendra Mirdha). There is nothing to show that
Suman Sood was a member of Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF). There is also G
no evidence to show that Suman Sood was even knowing Bhullar or was
interested in his release. PW 9 Rajendra Mirdha admittedly remained in House
No. B-117, Model Town where Suman Sood was present for about eight-nine
- -+· days from February 17,, 1995 to February 25, 1995. Rajendra Mirdha nowhere
stated in his deposition that during the entire period, Suman Sood had told
H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A him that he was kidnapped and kept there so that one of the members of ~
Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) should be released. We have upheld her
conviction for offences punishable under Sections 365/120B, 343/120B and
346/l 20B, !PC keeping in view the fact that Rejendra Mirdha was kidnapped
by Daya Singh and was kept at a secret place (House No. B-117) and Suman
Sood was staying in the house and was aware that Rajendra Mirdha was
B kidnapped by her husband and was kept at secret place. But there is no iota
of evidence to connect Suman Sood with ransom and the alleged demand of
accused Daya Singh for release of Bhullar.

ACQU/1TAL BY TRIAL COURT
c 64. According to the trial Court, the prosecution had failed to prove
charge against Suman Sood for an offence punishable under Section 364A or
364A read with 120B, !PC 'beyond reasonable doubt' inasmuch as no reliable
evidence had been placed on record from which it could be said to have been
established that Suman Sood was also a part of 'pressurize tactics' or had
D terrorized to victim or his family members to get Devendra Pal Sjngh Bhullar
released in lieu of Rajendra Mirdha. The trial Court, therefore, held that she
was entitled to benefit of doubt.

65. In the facts and circumstances in their totality, by recording such
finding, the trial Court has neither committed an error of fact nor an error of
E law.
66. As noted in earlier part of the judgment, Suman Sood is the wife of
accused Daya Singh. It was, therefore, natural that she was staying with her
husband in House No.B-117, Model Town and merely on that ground, it
cannot be held that she was in 'continued association' and involved as a co-
F conspirator in criminal conspiracy with Daya Singh in kidnapping of Rajendra
Mirdha and in keeping the victim in House No.B-117. The Courts below,
however, held her guilty for offences punishable under Sections 365/120B,
343/120B and 346/1208, IPC and we have upheld the said conviction as
according to us, both the Courts were right in drawing an inference that she
G must be presumed to be aware of kidnapping of Rajendra Mirdha and in
detainir\g him. She was all throughout present in the said house and was very
well aware that the victim had been kidnapped and was kept at a secret place.
Because of these circumstances, we have negatived the argument of the
learned counsel for Suman Sood and held that the ratio laid down in State
(NCT) of Delhiv v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005] 11 SCC 600 : JT
H
SUMANSOOD@KAMALJEETKAUR v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN (C.K. THAKKER,J.] 523

~
(2005) 7 SC I would not apply wherein wife of the accused was acquitted by A
this Court.

67. That, however, does not mean that Suman Sood was also a part of
conspiracy in kidnapping for ransom. No witness has directly or even indirectly
deposed about ransom by Suman Sood. The learned advocate appearing for
the respondent-State also could not point out anything from which it can be B
said that she had committed an offence punishable under Section 364A read
with Section 1208, !PC.
- -{
68. It was, therefore, submitted by the learned counsel appearing for
Suman Sood that the trial Court was wholly justified in acquitting her for an
offence for kidnapping for ransom and no other view was possible. But even
c
if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the other view was possible,
it is settled law that in case two views are possible and the trial Court has
acquitted the accused, the High Court would not interfere with such order of
acquittal.
D
..,,
.
69. In this connection, reliance was placed on a recent decision of this
Court in Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, JT (2007) 3 SC 316 :
~
(2007) 3 Scale 90. Considering the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 and of 1973 and referring to leading decisions of the Privy
Council as well as of this Court, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) stated;
E
"From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following
general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;
(I) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is F
founded;
'
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate
Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion,
both on questions of fact and of law; G
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons',
'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances',
-+ 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended
to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal
against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate
Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the
Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
B Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by
a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured
his acquittal, tht: presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffinned and strengthened by the trial court.
c (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court".
70. On the facts and in the circumstances in its entirety and considering
D the evidence as a whole, it cannot be said that by acquitting Suman Sood for
offences punishable under Section 364A read with 1208, !PC, the trial Court
had acted illegally or unlawfolly. The High Court, therefore, ought not to have
set aside the finding of acquittal of accused Suman Sood for an offence under r
Section 364A read with 1208, IPC. To that extent, therefore, the order of ~
conviction and sentence recorded by the High Court deserves to be set aside.
E FJNALORDER
71. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal filed by Daya Singh deserves
to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed and the order of conviction
and sentence recorded against him by the trial Court and confinned by the
F High Court is upheld.
72. So far as accused Suman Sood is concerned, an order of conviction
and sentence recorded by the trial Court and upheld by the High Court for
offences punishable under Sections 365/1208, 343/1208 and 346/1208, IPC is
confinned and upheld. Her conviction and order of sentence for offence
G punishable under
Section 364A read with 1208, IPC passed by the High Court, however,
is set aside and her acquittal for the said offence recorded by the trial Court
is restored.
73. Appeals are accordingly disposed of.
H
B.S. Appeals disposed of.