SUNEETI TOTEJAversusSTATE OF U.P. & ANOTHER

                 [2025] 2 S.C.R. 918 : 2025 INSC 267

                             Suneeti Toteja
                                    v.
                         State of U.P. & Another
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 975 of 2025)
                              25 February 2025
       [B.V. Nagarathna* and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether, in light of the facts and circumstances of this case and
       the position of law apropos to the sanction for prosecution, the
       High Court ought to have exercised its powers u/s.482 of the CrPC
       to quash the charge-sheet and the summoning with respect to the
       appellant herein.

                                 Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.197, 482 – Complainant
       alleged sexual harassment during her tenure at FSSAI – Enquiry
       report of ICC found accused-SSG guilty of the charges – SSG
       challenged the report before CAT – Meanwhile, appellant herein
       got posted at FSSAI and she was appointed PO of ICC – Before
       the Tribunal, the appellant filed a counter-affidavit on behalf of
       respondent nos. 3, 6, 7 (including complainant) defending the
       enquiry report – However, complainant asserted that she had
       not authorised the appellant to file affidavit on her behalf –
       In response, the FSSAI filed a Misc. application and sought
       amendment in the counter-affidavit since the complainant was
       willing to defend herself independently – In the interregnum,
       FIR was already filed by the complainant against the SSG,
       though appellant was not named in FIR her name surfaced
       during statement recorded u/s. 164 of CrPC – Complainant
       alleged that appellant threatened and pressurized her to
       withdraw case – In charge-sheet appellant was arrayed as
       accused no.4 – Sanction u/s.197 CrPC was not granted within
       stipulated time period and it was deemed to be have been
       received – Special Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance
       and summons were issued – Appellant sought quashing of
       charges against her – Her petition was dismissed by the High
       Court – Correctness:
* Author
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                              919

                    Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another


     Held: The counter affidavit reproduces the conclusions and
     recommendations of the ICC and has therefore sought dismissal
     of the Original Application filed by SSG – Thus, the said counter
     affidavit does not reveal any aspersions made by the appellant
     or the Authority against the complainant, or any averment to
     defend the actions of the accused-SSG – The counter affidavit
     has been filed by the appellant in her official capacity as the
     Director, FSSAI and the Presiding Officer, ICC – The appellant
     respected the desire of the complainant to represent her case
     independently and therefore filed Misc. application before the
     Tribunal, seeking to amend the counter affidavit filed earlier – Thus,
     there is no criminal intent on the part of the appellant to cheat
     the complainant or wrongfully represent her in the proceedings
     before the Tribunal – As far as issue of sanction for prosecution
     arising in the present case is concerned, it is only to be seen if
     the accused public servant was acting in the performance of his/
     her official duties, and if the answer is in the affirmative, then
     prior sanction for their prosecution is a condition precedent to
     the cognizance of the cases against them by the courts – In the
     instant case, the appellant had filed the counter affidavit and
     interacted with the complainant in her capacity of a Presiding
     Officer, ICC – The correctness of the allegations with regard to
     the conduct of the appellant need not be ascertained herein by
     this Court but the fact that she was acting in her official duty
     is sufficient to hold that a prior sanction from the department
     was in fact necessary before the Magistrate taking cognizance
     against her – The Magistrate therefore erred in proceeding to
     take cognizance against the appellant without the sanction for
     prosecution being received from BIS – Since, BIS has eventually
     refused to grant sanction for the prosecution of the appellant,
     the prosecution against the appellant could not have been
     sustained – The High Court erred in not considering the fact that
     the sanction for prosecution was not granted by the competent
     authority u/s. 197 of the CrPC and eventually the sanction was
     expressly denied by the competent authority with respect to the
     allegations against the appellant – Consequently, the chargesheet,
     the summoning order and the consequent steps, if any, taken
     by the trial court pursuant to the same are liable to be quashed
     qua the appellant. [Paras 21, 22, 23, 29, 32]
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – Prosecution
     of Judges and public servants – Deemed sanction – In the
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       instant case, the charge-sheet stated that the sanction for the
       prosecution of accused no.4 and others was sought u/s. 197
       of the CrPC, but since the sanction was not granted within
       the stipulated time period, the sanction for prosecution was
       deemed to have been received – The Special Chief Judicial
       Magistrate took cognizance of the charge-sheet and issued
       summons – Propriety:
       Held: Section 197 of CrPC does not envisage a concept of deemed
       sanction – The Magistrate was not right in taking cognizance of the
       offence against the appellant herein without there being a sanction
       for prosecution granted by the competent authority. [Paras 30, 32]

                               Case Law Cited
       Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761;
       Amod Kumar Kanth v. Association of Victim of Uphaar Tragedy
       [2023] 6 SCR 669 : 2023 SCC Online SC 578; Amrik Singh v. The
       State of PEPSU [1955] 1 SCR 1302 : AIR 1955 SC 309 – relied on.
       Vineet Narain v. Union of India [1997] Supp. 6 SCR 595 : AIR
       1998 SC 889; Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [2012]
       3 SCR 52 : (2012) 3 SCC 64 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
       Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition
       and Redressal) Act, 2013; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal
       Procedure, 1973.

                               List of Keywords
       Sanction for Prosecution; Internal Complaints Committee; Section
       197 of CrPC; Public Servant; Cognizance; Issuance of summons;
       Public servant; Criminal intent; Cognizance; Deemed sanction;
       Sexual harassment; Enquiry report; Sanction u/s.197 CrPC; Action
       in performance of official duties; Prior sanction for prosecution.

                              Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       975 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 16.11.2022 of the High Court of
       Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in A482 No. 8057 of 2022
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                       921

                    Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another


                           Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Ms. Rebecca John, Ms. Meenakshi Kalra, Ms. Shobhana Takiar,
     S N Kalra, Ms. Gade Meghana, Ms. Anjali Chaudhary.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Shaurya Sahay, Aditya Kumar, Ruchil Ra, Vikas Bansal, Prashant
     Bhushan, Ms. Suroor Mandar.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment

     Nagarathna, J.

     Leave granted.
2.   The present Criminal Appeal arises out of the order dated 16.11.2022
     passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow
     Bench, in Application u/s 482 No.8057/2022, wherein the High Court
     has dismissed the petition filed by the appellant herein for quashing
     of the summoning order dated 12.07.2022 and the chargesheet
     No.01/2022 dated 02.07.2022.
3.   The appellant herein is stated to be an employee of the Bureau
     of Indian Standards (BIS). Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to
     the present case are that Dr. Manisha Narayan, the respondent
     No.2 herein (hereinafter referred to as “complainant”) had filed
     FIR No.610/2018 dated 30.10.2018 at the Aliganj Police Station,
     District Lucknow. It was stated in the said FIR that during her tenure
     with the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (hereinafter
     “FSSAI” or “authority”) in New Delhi in the capacity of an Associate
     Director, she was sexually harassed on multiple occasions by Dr.
     S.S. Ghonkrorkta, the Enforcement Director therein. Being aggrieved,
     she disclosed the same to her mother who then filed a complaint
     before the FSSAI for action to be taken under the provisions of the
     Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition
     and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter “POSH Act”). An Internal
     Complaints Committee (ICC) was constituted to investigate the
     allegations of the complainant and the enquiry was referred to the
     ICC on 04.12.2014. The enquiry report of the ICC was submitted to
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       the Chief Executive Officer of FSSAI on 22.06.2015, which found Dr.
       S.S. Ghonkrorkta to be guilty of the offences charged against him
       and thereby it was recommended to the Authority to register an FIR
       against him for offences under Sections 354, 509, 192, 197, 204,
       218, 202 and 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter “IPC”),
       apart from taking appropriate disciplinary action against the other
       officers involved in the misconduct.
4.     However, as per the complainant, since the Authority did not take any
       action against the persons involved in the offence and misconduct,
       she was compelled to file FIR No.610 of 2018 dated 30.10.2018,
       in respect of offences punishable under Sections 354, 509, 120B,
       192, 197, 204, 218, 202, 468, 471 and 506 of IPC, against Dr. S.S.
       Ghonkrorkta and Mr. Sunil Kumar Bhadoria. It is pertinent to note
       that the appellant herein was neither part of the ICC proceedings,
       nor named in the FIR. Her name surfaced during the statement
       given by the complainant under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
       Procedure (hereinafter “CrPC”) on 14.10.2020.
5.     Meanwhile, Dr. S.S. Ghonkrorkta challenged the investigation report
       of the ICC before the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi
       (hereinafter “the Tribunal” for short) by filing O.A. No.1505 of 2016, and
       vide order dated 16.09.2016, the Tribunal directed the respondents
       therein not to act on the report of the ICC. In the said case before
       the Tribunal, the complainant was arrayed as respondent No. 6 and
       the FSSAI was represented by its officials who were arrayed as
       respondent Nos.3 and 7. The appellant was posted on deputation
       during the period from 27.04.2016 to 25.07.2019 at the FSSAI, New
       Delhi. On 12.05.2016, the appellant herein was appointed as the
       Presiding Officer (PO) of the ICC. In her capacity as the PO of the
       ICC, she filed a short counter affidavit dated 16.01.2017 on behalf
       of respondent Nos.3, 6 and 7 therein before the Tribunal. In the said
       affidavit, the appellant largely defended the findings of the enquiry
       report submitted by the ICC. However, the complainant later asserted
       that she had not authorized the appellant to file the counter affidavit
       on her behalf and that the said counter affidavit was filed without
       her knowledge and consent. In response, the FSSAI, represented
       by the respondent Nos.3 and 7 therein, filed a Misc. Application
       No.1658 of 2017 before the Tribunal, seeking the amendment of
       the counter affidavit filed by them in O.A. No.1505 of 2016, since
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                           923

                    Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another


     the complainant was willing to represent herself independently in
     the case. Subsequently, the appellant was repatriated to her parent
     Department BIS on 25.07.2019.
6.   In the interregnum, the FIR had already been filed by the complainant
     on 30.10.2018, though it did not name the appellant as an accused
     person. On 16.06.2020, the statement of the complainant under
     Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short
     “CrPC”) was recorded but the appellant was not named therein as
     well. Thereafter, on 14.10.2020, the statement of the complainant
     was recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC and it is here that the
     allegations against the appellant were brought out. These allegations
     primarily pertained to the counter affidavit filed by the appellant herein
     before the Tribunal. It was alleged that the appellant was representing
     the complainant before the Tribunal without her knowledge and
     consent and that the appellant had wrongfully submitted the affidavit
     before Tribunal to the effect that the complainant had authorized the
     appellant to represent her in those proceedings.
7.   It was further alleged by the complainant that she was transferred
     from Delhi to Chennai during the pendency of the proceedings
     before the Tribunal, and when she gave a representation to cancel
     her transfer, the appellant threatened her by saying that if she does
     not want to go to Chennai, then she can take a study leave and quit
     the place, or else, she would be harassed. The appellant was also
     allegedly involved in threatening and pressurising the complainant
     to withdraw the case.
8.   In pursuance of these allegations, the chargesheet No.1 dated
     02.07.2022 was filed in the matter and the appellant herein was
     arrayed as accused No. 4 thereunder. The chargesheet stated
     that the sanction for the prosecution of accused No.4 and others
     was sought under Section 197 of the CrPC, but since the sanction
     was not granted within the stipulated time period, the sanction for
     prosecution was deemed to have been received and therefore the
     chargesheet was filed against the accused persons for the offences
     punishable under Sections 509, 120B, 192, 354A, 506, 202, 218, 204
     and 197 of the IPC. The Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow,
     vide order dated 06.10.2022, took cognizance of the chargesheet
     and offences stated thereunder and issued summons against the
     accused persons.
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9.     Being aggrieved, the appellant and two other co-accused persons
       filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC before the High Court,
       seeking quashing of the chargesheet No.1 dated 02.07.2022 and
       the summoning order dated 06.10.2022 passed by the Special Chief
       Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow. However, by the impugned order dated
       16.11.2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
       Lucknow Bench in Application u/s 482 No.8057/2022, the prayer of
       the appellant for the quashing of the chargesheet and the summoning
       order was dismissed. The High Court however reserved liberty to
       the appellant to approach the Magistrate in accordance with law and
       directed the trial court to release the appellant on bail.
10. It is this order of the High Court which has now been assailed by
    the appellant before this Court through the present Criminal Appeal.
11. We have heard learned senior counsel Ms. Rebecca John, appearing
    for the appellant herein; learned counsel appearing for the respondent-
    State; and learned counsel, Mr. Prashant Bhushan, appearing for
    complainant.
12. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has submitted that the High
    Court was not correct in refusing to quash the chargesheet and the
    summoning order with respect to the appellant, having regard to
    the facts and circumstances of the case. It was submitted that the
    appellant is a government servant who had acted in the course of
    her official duties and therefore, cognizance could not have been
    taken against the offences alleged against her in the absence of a
    valid sanction for prosecution granted by the concerned authority.
    That the competent authority to grant sanction for prosecution of
    the appellant herein is the BIS. However, the Investigating Officer
    failed to send the letter seeking sanction directly to the BIS and had
    sent it to FSSAI on 02.12.2021, as a result of which the letter was
    received by the BIS only on 29.07.2022, which was way beyond the
    stipulated period of four months for granting sanction.
13. The learned senior counsel drew our attention to the letter Ref.
    No.HRD/7:062545 dated 22.09.2022 sent by BIS to the Additional
    Chief Secretary, Department of Home, UP Police Division/4, Lucknow.
    In the said letter, the BIS had prima facie found the appellant to have
    not been involved in the aforesaid crime, but the BIS sought the
    copy of the FIR and other relevant documents to take an appropriate
    decision in the matter of grant of sanction for prosecution with respect
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                            925

                    Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another


     to the appellant. It is further submitted that after perusal of the relevant
     FIR and chargesheet, BIS had sent another letter dated 14.11.2022,
     wherein BIS found that the appellant was in no way related to the
     allegations made in the chargesheet and thus it was not a fit case
     for grant of sanction for prosecution. Therefore, BIS had categorically
     denied the sanction for prosecution of the appellant in the said case
     vide its letter dated 14.11.2022.
14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-State have filed
    their counter affidavit, wherein they have defended the action of taking
    cognizance against the appellant and have sought the dismissal of
    this criminal appeal. It was contended that the Investigating Officer
    had sought the sanction for prosecution, but upon not receiving
    the sanction, the Investigating Officer had sought a legal opinion
    and on the basis of the same, the officer had proceeded to file the
    chargesheet against the appellant. Reliance has been placed by the
    counsel on the judgment of this Court in Vineet Narain vs. Union
    of India, AIR 1998 SC 889 [“Vineet Narain”], to contend that the
    time limit of three months for grant of sanction for prosecution has
    to be strictly adhered to and therefore, in light of the fact that no
    sanction was granted by the competent authority within the stipulated
    time period, the State was correct in proceeding on the basis of
    deemed sanction. Therefore, it is submitted that enough material
    was available on record to proceed against the appellant, and once
    the cognizance has been taken and the trial has commenced, it is
    not open for the proceedings to be quashed on the ground of refusal
    of sanction for prosecution.
15. Learned counsel, Sri Prashant Bhushan, has supported the impugned
    order and has also sought the dismissal of the present criminal
    appeal, since the trial court and the High Court have already taken
    the argument of sanction for prosecution into consideration. It was
    submitted that the appellant has concealed material facts before this
    Court, including the fact that the appellant and the other co-accused
    have filed applications before the trial court for seeking discharge
    in the matter. That the appellant has annexed only the summoning
    order of the trial court to give an impression that the trial court had
    mechanically issued summons to the accused and not applied its
    mind, but in fact the trial court had also filed a separate detailed
    order dated 12.07.2022 while issuing process in the matter. It was
    also submitted that the appellant not only filed an affidavit before the
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       Tribunal without the knowledge and consent of the complainant, but
       had also committed perjury by trying to protect the other accused
       persons of the Authority. That there has been dereliction of duty by
       the appellant insofar as the appellant in her capacity as the presiding
       officer of the ICC was duty-bound to keep the complainant informed
       about the proceedings in the case and to proceed in furtherance of
       the findings of the ICC in its investigation report.
16. With respect to the contention that the complainant did not name
    the appellant in the FIR and the statement under Section 161 of the
    CrPC is concerned, learned counsel has submitted that the police
    had initially refused to file the FIR against the appellant herein since
    her name was not mentioned in the ICC report and later during the
    stage of recording of her statement under Section 161 of the CrPC,
    the police forced the complainant to restrict her statement to the
    accused mentioned in the FIR. Thus, it was only later when statement
    was recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 of the CrPC that
    the complainant felt it was safe to explain her stance with respect
    to the appellant herein.
17. Learned counsel for the complainant has reiterated the argument
    with respect to deemed sanction upon which the prosecution
    against the appellant was proceeded with and has submitted that
    the letter of BIS which expressly refused to grant sanction was
    issued beyond the stipulated period for granting sanction and
    therefore it does not amount to a denial of sanction for prosecution.
    Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court
    in Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64
    [“Subramanian Swamy”], to contend that if no decision is taken
    by the sanctioning authority, then at the end of the extended time
    limit, sanction will be deemed to have been granted to the proposal
    for prosecution. It was further submitted that the issue of sanction
    may be raised by the appellant either at the stage of cognizance or
    at any subsequent stage of the trial, so as to contend that since the
    cognizance has now been taken in the matter, the plea of sanction
    for prosecution may be taken by the appellant before the trial court
    when they appear in compliance with the summons or at the stage
    of discharge. Thus, there is no occasion to examine the issue of
    sanction for prosecution during the exercise of the powers under
    Section 482 of the CrPC.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                         927

                    Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another


18. We have considered the material on record and the extensive
    submissions advanced at the Bar. The short issue for consideration
    before this Court is, whether, in light of the facts and circumstances
    of this case and the position of law apropos to the sanction for
    prosecution, the High Court ought to have exercised its powers
    under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the chargesheet and the
    summoning with respect to the appellant herein.
19. The appellant herein is a permanent employee of BIS since
    06.09.1999. She was holding the post of Scientist E/Director & Head
    (FAD) in BIS. On 27.04.2016, she was relieved from BIS to take
    up her assignment as the Director at FSSAI on deputation basis.
    She was relieved on 25.07.2019 from the FSSAI and thereafter,
    she reported at BIS. Therefore, the appellant was at FSSAI from
    27.04.2016 to 25.07.2019. During this tenure, the appellant took over
    the position of Presiding Officer of ICC after the erstwhile presiding
    officer was repatriated to BIS, Ministry of Health on completion of her
    tenure in April 2016. The allegations of sexual harassment levelled
    by complainant date back to the year 2012. The enquiry under the
    provisions of the POSH Act took place during the year 2014-15 and
    the final enquiry report of the ICC was submitted on 22.06.2015 to
    the Chief Execution Officer of the Authority. Therefore, it is clear that
    the appellant was not in the picture or involved in the dispute till the
    submission of the enquiry report of the ICC in June 2015.
20. The report of the ICC was assailed by the accused Dr. S.S.
    Ghonkrokta before the Tribunal by filing of O.A. No.1505 of 2016 on
    16.03.2016. The appellant joined FSSAI, Delhi on 27.04.2016, after
    a month of filing of this Original Application before the Tribunal. In
    the subsequent month, she was appointed as the Presiding Officer
    of ICC. It is for the period thereafter, to which the allegations of the
    complainant pertain to.
21. The complainant in the present case has alleged that the appellant
    filed a counter affidavit before the Tribunal on her behalf, without the
    consent or knowledge of the complainant. The perusal of the said
    counter affidavit shows that the appellant had detailed the events
    that unfolded in the Authority from the time the sexual harassment
    complaint was filed by the complainant and till the completion of the
    enquiry by the ICC. The counter affidavit reproduces the conclusions
    and recommendations of the ICC and has therefore sought dismissal
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       of the Original Application filed by Dr. S.S. Ghonkrokta. Thus, the
       said counter affidavit does not reveal any aspersions made by the
       appellant or the Authority against the complainant, or any averment to
       defend the actions of the accused Dr. S.S. Ghonkrokta. The counter
       affidavit has been filed by the appellant in her official capacity as
       the Director, FSSAI and the Presiding Officer, ICC.
22. Be that as it may. The appellant respected the desire of the
    complainant to represent her case independently and therefore filed
    M.A. No.1658 of 2017 before the Tribunal, seeking to amend the
    counter affidavit filed earlier. Thus, there is no criminal intent on the
    part of the appellant to cheat the complainant or wrongfully represent
    her in the proceedings before the Tribunal. Further, the question is
    whether, the actions of the appellant were during the course of her
    official duties only requiring sanction for prosecution.
23. Now coming to the contentious issue of sanction for prosecution
    arising in the present case, the test to decide whether sanction
    is necessary in a particular case is, whether, the act is totally
    unconnected with the official duty or whether, there is a reasonable
    connection with the official duty. In the present case, the letter
    requesting sanction for prosecution was sent to FSSAI, Delhi by the
    Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Home (Police), Government
    of UP, but the same was not sent to BIS, even though at that time,
    the appellant had gone back to BIS from her deputation at FSSAI.
    The letter seeking sanction for prosecution is said to have been
    received by BIS only on 29.07.2022. By that time, the chargesheet
    had already been filed and the summoning order was issued by the
    Magistrate. Thereafter, BIS sought for further documents, including
    the FIR, and upon furnishing of the FIR and the chargesheet, BIS
    denied the sanction for prosecution of the appellant vide its letter
    dated 14.11.2022. This issue of sanction was decided by BIS within
    the stipulated period of four months. The relevant paragraph of the
    letter dated 14.11.2022 reads as under:
            “2. To examine the matter, the related documents i.e.
            the report of Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) and
            the copy of FIR was sought from FSSAI vide BIS letter
            dated 25 Aug 2022 and 22 Sep 2022 respectively. On
            perusal of the records received, the following facts are
            observed:
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                    Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another


           i.     The alleged offence (based on the complaint filed by Dr.
                  Manisha Narayan against Dr. S. S. Ghonkrokta) took place
                  during the period May 2012 to December 2012 and the
                  ICC submitted its report in June 2015.
           ii.    Smt. Suneeti Toteja Scientist-E was relieved on 27
                  April 2016 (FN) from BIS to lake up her assignment on
                  deputation as Director in FSSAl, long after the occurrence
                  of the alleged incident and submission of the report by
                  the ICC. She was relieved from FSSAl on 25 July 2019
                  and reported back to BIS on 26 July 2019.
           iii.   Dr S.S. Ghonkrokta had filed a case in CAT (O.A. No.
                  1505 of 2016) for setting aside the constitution of ICC. its
                  proceedings and findings. Smt. Suneeti Toteja had signed
                  the counter affidavit (to dismiss the referred OA) in this
                  ease in her official capacity’ as the presiding officer of the
                  ICC. alter the erstwhile presiding officer Dr. Sandhya Kalra
                  was repatriated to the Ministry of Health on completion of
                  her tenure in April 2016.”
24. The question therefore is whether the sanction was necessary in
    the present case for the prosecution of the appellant, or whether the
    Magistrate was correct in taking cognizance against the appellant
    without there being any sanction.
25. For the sake of convenience, the provisions of Section 197 CrPC
    are reproduced hereinunder:
           “197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.—
           (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate
           or a public servant not removable from his office save by
           or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any
           offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting
           or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no
           Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with
           the previous sanction save as otherwise provided in the
           Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013—
           (a)    in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
                  case may be, was at the time of commission of the
                  alleged offence employed, in connection with the
                  affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;
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       (b)   in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
             case may be, was at the time of commission of the
             alleged offence employed, in connection with the
             affairs of a State, of the State Government:
       Provided that where the alleged offence was committed
       by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period
       while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article
       356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause
       (b) will apply as if for the expression “State Government”
       occurring therein, the expression “Central Government”
       were substituted.
       Explanation.—For the removal of doubts it is hereby
       declared that no sanction shall be required in case of a
       public servant accused of any offence alleged to have been
       committed under section 166A, section 166B, section 354,
       section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D,
       section 370, section 375, section 376A, section 376AB,
       section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB
       or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
       (2)   No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged
             to have been committed by any member of the Armed
             Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in
             the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous
             sanction of the Central Government.
       (3)   The State Government may, by notification, direct that
             the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class
             or category of the members of the Forces charged with
             the maintenance of public order as may be specified
             therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon
             the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the
             expression “Central Government” occurring therein, the
             expression “State Government” were substituted.
       (3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3),
            no court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged
            to have been committed by any member of the Forces
            charged with the maintenance of public order in a State
            while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                          931

                    Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another


                 official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued
                 under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in
                 force therein, except with the previous sanction of the
                 Central Government.
           (3B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
                this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that
                any sanction accorded by the State Government or any
                cognizance taken by a court upon such sanction, during the
                period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and
                ending with the date immediately preceding the date on
                which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act,
                1991 (43 of 1991), receives the assent of the President,
                with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed
                during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause
                (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the
                State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the
                Central Government in such matter to accord sanction
                and for the court to take cognizance thereon.
           (4)   The Central Government or the State Government, as the
                 case may be, may determine the person by whom, the
                 manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the
                 prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is
                 to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which
                 the trial is to be held.”
26. The object and purpose of the aforesaid provision was recently
    reiterated by this Court in the case of Gurmeet Kaur vs. Devender
    Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761, which reads as follows:
           “22. … the object and purpose of the said provision is to
           protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified
           criminal prosecution while they discharge their duties
           within the scope and ambit of their powers entrusted to
           them. A reading of Section 197 of the CrPC would indicate
           that there is a bar for a Court to take cognizance of such
           offences which are mentioned in the said provision except
           with the previous sanction of the appropriate government
           when the allegations are made against, inter alia, a public
           servant. There is no doubt that in the instant case the
           appellant herein was a public servant but the question is,
932                                                       [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                       Supreme Court Reports


         whether, while discharging her duty as a public servant on
         the relevant date, there was any excess in the discharge
         of the said duty which did not require the first respondent
         herein to take a prior sanction for prosecuting the appellant
         herein. In this regard, the salient words which are relevant
         under sub-section (1) of Section 197 are “is accused of
         any offence alleged to have been committed by him while
         acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
         duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except
         with the previous sanction”. Therefore, for the purpose
         of application of Section 197, a sine qua non is that the
         public servant is accused of any offence which had been
         committed by him in “discharge of his official duty”. The
         said expression would clearly indicate that Section 197 of
         the CrPC would not apply to a case if a public servant is
         accused of any offence which is de hors or not connected to
         the discharge of his or her official duty. However, there are
         a line of judgments which have considered this expression
         in two different ways which we shall now advert to.”
27. In Amod Kumar Kanth vs. Association of Victim of Uphaar
    Tragedy, 2023 SCC Online SC 578 disposed of by a three-Judge
    Bench of this Court on 20.04.2023, of which one of us (Nagarathna,
    J.) was a member, it was observed that the question of cognizance
    being taken in the absence of sanction and thereby Section 197 of
    the CrPC being flouted is not to be conflated and thereby confused
    with the question as to whether an offence has been committed.
    The salutary purpose behind Section 197 of the CrPC is protection
    being accorded to public servants. In paragraphs 28, 29 and 31, it
    was observed as under:
         “(28) The State functions through its officers. Functions of
         the State may be sovereign or not sovereign. But each of
         the functions performed by every public servant is intended
         to achieve public good. It may come with discretion. The
         exercise of the power cannot be divorced from the context
         in which and the time at which the power is exercised or if
         it is a case of an omission, when the omission takes place.
         (29) The most important question which must be posed and
         answered by the Court when dealing with the argument
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                             933

                    Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another


           that sanction is not forthcoming is whether the officer was
           acting in the exercise of his official duties. It goes further.
           Even an officer who acts in the purported exercise of his
           official power is given the protection under Section 197 of
           the Cr.P.C. This is for good reason that the officer when
           he exercises the power can go about exercising the same
           fearlessly no doubt with bona fides as public functionaries
           can act only bona fide. In fact, the requirement of the
           action being bona fide is not expressly stated in Section
           197 of the Cr.P.C., though it is found in many other statutes
           protecting public servants from action, civil and criminal
           against them.
                                       xxxx
           (31) One ground which has found favour with the High Court
           against the appellant is that the appellant, according to the
           High Court, could raise the issue before the Magistrate.
           (32) Here we may notice one aspect. When the question
           arises as to whether an act or omission which constitutes
           an offence in law has been done in the discharge of official
           functions by a public servant and the matter is under a
           mist and it is not clear whether the act is traceable to
           the discharge of his official functions, the Court may in
           a given case tarry and allow the proceedings to go on.
           Materials will be placed before the Court which will make
           the position clear and a delayed decision on the question
           may be justified. However, in a case where the act or the
           omission is indisputably traceable to the discharge of the
           official duty by the public servant, then for the Court to
           not accept the objection against cognizance being taken
           would clearly defeat the salutary purpose which underlies
           Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. It all depends on the facts and
           therefore, would have to be decided on a case-to-case
           basis.”
     It was concluded that learned Magistrate had erred in the facts of the
     said case in taking cognizance against the appellant therein contrary
     to the mandate of Section 197 of the CrPC and on that short ground
     alone, the appeal was allowed and the proceedings challenged in
     Section 482 CrPC were quashed. However, it was observed that the
934                                                           [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


       same would not stand in the way of the competent authority taking
       a decision in the matter and/or granting sanction for prosecuting the
       appellant therein in accordance with law.
28. In another case titled Amrik Singh vs The State of PEPSU, AIR
    1955 SC 309, this Court explained the scope of Section 197 of
    CrPC as follows:
            “8. … It is not every offence committed by a public servant
            that requires sanction for prosecution under section 197(1)
            of the Code of Criminal Procedure; nor even every act done
            by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of
            his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly
            concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned,
            it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the
            office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would
            be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper
            discharge of his duties, because that would really be a
            matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be
            investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage
            of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution
            of the prosecution.”
            The Court thereunder further concluded that:
            “12 … The result then is that whether sanction is
            necessary to prosecute a public servant on a charge of
            criminal misappropriation, will depend on whether the acts
            complained of hinge on his duties as a public servant. If they
            do, then sanction is requisite. But if they are unconnected
            with such duties, then no sanction is necessary.”
29. As per the aforementioned proposition, it is only to be seen if the
    accused public servant was acting in the performance of his/her official
    duties, and if the answer is in the affirmative, then prior sanction for
    their prosecution is a condition precedent to the cognizance of the
    cases against them by the courts. It is therefore largely a disputed
    question of fact here and not a question of law. However, this fact
    of appellant herein acting in her official capacity is not seriously
    contested by the respondents herein. In the instant case, the appellant
    had filed the counter affidavit and interacted with the complainant
    in her capacity of a Presiding Officer, ICC. The correctness of the
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                         935

                    Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another


     allegations with regard to the conduct of the appellant need not be
     ascertained herein by this Court but the fact that she was acting
     in her official duty is sufficient to hold that a prior sanction from
     the department was in fact necessary before the Magistrate taking
     cognizance against her. The Magistrate therefore erred in proceeding
     to take cognizance against the appellant without the sanction for
     prosecution being received from BIS, and since BIS has eventually
     refused to grant sanction for the prosecution of the appellant, the
     prosecution against the appellant could not have been sustained.
30. The argument advanced by the respondent-State and the complainant
    with respect to “deemed sanction” is also not tenable. Section 197
    of CrPC does not envisage a concept of deemed sanction. The
    chargesheet, as well as the counter affidavit of the respondent-
    State, have relied upon the judgment of this Court in Vineet Narain
    to contend that lack of grant of sanction by the concerned authority
    within relevant time would amount to deemed sanction for prosecution.
    However, a perusal of the said judgment reveals that it did not deal
    with Section 197 CrPC and rather it dealt with the investigation
    powers and procedures of Central Bureau of Investigation and
    Central Vigilance Commission. While it did mention that the time
    limits for grant of sanction for prosecution must be strictly adhered to,
    there is no observation to the effect that lack of grant of sanction for
    prosecution within the time limit would amount to deemed sanction
    for prosecution.
31. Similarly, learned counsel for the complainant had placed reliance on
    the judgment of this Court in Subramanian Swamy to lend credence
    to the argument of deemed sanction for prosecution. However, even
    the said judgment does not in any manner lay down the notion of
    deemed sanction. First, the said judgment dealt primarily with the
    Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the sanction for prosecution
    under that Act. Secondly, G.S. Singhvi, J. while penning his separate
    but concurring opinion in the said judgment, had given some
    guidelines for the consideration of the Parliament, one of which is
    to the effect that at the end of the extended period of time limit, if
    no decision is taken, sanction will be deemed to have been granted
    to the proposal for prosecution, and the prosecuting agency or the
    private complainant will proceed to file the chargesheet/ complaint in
    the court to commence prosecution within fifteen days of the expiry
    of the aforementioned time limit. However, such a proposition has
936                                                       [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


       not yet been statutorily incorporated by the Parliament and in such
       a scenario, this Court cannot read such a mandate into the statute
       when it does not exist.
32. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the learned Magistrate was
    not right in taking cognizance of the offence against the appellant
    herein without there being a sanction for prosecution granted by the
    competent authority. Further, the High Court erred in not considering
    the fact that the sanction for prosecution was not granted by the
    competent authority under Section 197 of the CrPC and eventually
    the sanction was expressly denied by the competent authority with
    respect to the allegations against the appellant. The necessary
    sanction not having been granted has vitiated the very initiation of
    the criminal proceeding against the appellant herein. Consequently,
    the chargesheet, the summoning order and the consequent steps,
    if any, taken by the trial court pursuant to the same are liable to be
    quashed qua the appellant herein and are thus quashed.
       The appeal is therefore allowed in the aforesaid terms.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan