SUNIL DUTT SHARMAversusSTATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)

                        [2013] 9 S.C.R. 1000


A                      SUNIL DUTT SHARMA
                                   v.
                STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)
                (Criminal Appeal No. 1333 of 2013)
                        OCTOBER 08, 2013
B
           [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                   RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.]

        Penal Code, 1860:
c
          s.304-B - Dowry death - Conviction and sentence of life
    imprisonment awarded by courts below - Sentence, if
    excessive or disproportionate - Held: The principles of
    sentencing evolved by Supreme Court though largely in the
D   context of death penalty will be applicable to all lesser
    sentences so long as the sentencing judge is vested with the
    discretion to award a lesser or a higher sentence resembling
    the swing of the pendulum from the minimum to the
    maximum - Jn the instant case, the proved facts on the basis
E   of which offence u/s. 304-B was held to be established, while
    acquitting the accused-appellant of offence u/s. 302, do not
    disclose any extraordinary, perverse or diabolic act on his part
    to take an extreme view of the matter -- On a cumulative
    application of the principles that would be relevant to adjudge
    the crime and the criminal test, this is not a case where the
F   maximum punishment of life imprisonment ought to have
    been awarded At the same time, from the order of trial court,
    it is clear that some of the injuries on the deceased, though
    obviously not fatal injuries, are attributable to accused-
    appellant and, as such, the minimum sentence prescribed i.e.
G   seven years would also not meet the ends of justice Rather
    a sentence of ten years RI would be appropriate - Ordered
    accordingly - Sentence/Sentencing - Code of Criminal
    Procedure, 1973 - s.354(2).

H                                1000
SUNIL DUTT SHARMA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF 1001
                  DELHI)

    Sentence/Sentencing:                                          A
     Sentence for offence punishable u/s 304-B /PC - Held:
In a situation where commission of an offence is held to be
proved by means of a legal presumption the circumstances
surrounding the crime to determine the presence of                8
aggravating circumstances (crime test) may not be readily
forthcoming unlike a case where there is evidence of overt
criminal acts establishing the direct involvement of the
accused with the crime to enable the court to come to specific
conclusions with regard to the barbarous or depraved nature       C
of the crime committed - Necessity to combat the menace of
demand for dowry or to prevent atrocities on women and like
social evils as well as the necessity to maintain the purity of
social conscience cannot be determinative of the quantum of
sentence inasmuch as the said parameters would be
common to all offences uls. 304-B /PC - It, therefore, cannot     D
be elevated to the status of acceptable jurisprudential
principles to act as a rational basis for awarding varying
degrees of punishment on a case to case basis - Factors to
be taken into account while imposing the sentence uls 304
/PC, discussed - Penal Code, 1860 - s.304-B.                      E
     The accused-appellant was tried for offences
punishable u/ss. 302 and 304-B of IPC for causing the
death of his wife in the night intervening 16/17.05.92. He
was acquitted of the offence punishable u/s. 302, IPC on          F
the benefit of doubt. However, he was found guilty of the
offence punishable u/s. 304-8, IPC and was sentenced to
imprisonment for life. The conviction and sentence was
affirmed by the High Court.

    In the instant appeal, limited notice was issued only         G
as regards the sentence imposed on the accused-
appellant
    Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                  H
    1002   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A      HELD: 1.1 The power and authority conferred by use
  of the different expressions in various provisions of the
  Penal Code, indicate the enormous discretion vested in
  the courts in sentencing an offender who has been found
  guilty of commission of any particular offence. Nowhere,
B either in the Penal Code nor in any other law in force, any
  prescription or norm or even guidelines governing the
  exercise of the vast discretion in the matter of sentencing
  has been laid down except s.354(2) of the Code of
  Criminal Procedure, 1973 which, inter-alia, requires the
c judgment of a court to state the reasons for the sentence
  awarded when the punishment prescribed is
  imprisonment for a term of years. [para 5] [1008-A-C]

       1.2 There is no reason that the principles of
  sentencing evolved by this Court over the years though
D largely in the context of the death penalty will not be
  applicable to all lesser sentences so long as the
  sentencing judge is vested with the discretion to award
  a lesser or a higher sentence resembling the swing of the
  pendulum from the minimum to the maximum. The issue
E though predominantly dealt with in the context of cases
  involving the death penalty has tremendous significance
  to the Criminal Jurisprudence of the country inasmuch
  as in addition to the numerous offences under various
  special laws in force, hundreds of offences are
F enumerated in the Penal Code, punishment for which
  could extend from a single day to 10 years or even for
  life, a situation made possible by the use of the
  seemingly same expressions in different provisions of the
  Penal Code. [Para 10 and 12] [1018-D-E; 1019-C-D]
G
       Jagmohan Singh vs. The State of U.P. 1973 (2) SCR 541
  = (1973) 1 SCC 20; Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1980)
  2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab,
  1983 ( 3 ) SCR 413     = (1983) 3 SCC 470; Sangeet and
H Another vs. State of Haryana 2012 (13 ) SCR 85 = (2013) 2
SUNIL DUTT SHARMA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF1003
                  DELHI)

SCC 452; Shankar Kisanrao Khade vs. State of Maharashtra       A
(2013) 5 sec 546 - referred to.
     1.3 So long as there is credible evidence of cruelty
occasioned by demand(s) for dowry, any unnatural death
of a woman within seven years of her marriag~ makes the
husband or a relative of the husband of such woman             B
liable for the offence of "dowry death" u/s. 304-B though
there may not be any direct involvement of the husband
or such relative with the death in question. In a situation
where commission of an offence is held to be proved by
means of a legal presumption the circumstances                 C
surrounding the crime to determine the presence of
aggravating circumstances (crime test) may not be
readily forthcoming unlike a case where there is evidence
of overt criminal acts establishing the direct involvement
of the accused with the crime to enable the court to come      D
to specific conclusions with regard to the barbarous or
depraved nature of the crime committed. [Para 13) [1019-
F-H; 1020-A-B]
     1.4 The necessity to combat the menace of demand
for dowry or to prevent atrocities on women and like           E
social evils as well as the necessity to maintain the purity
of social conscience cannot be determinative of the
quantum of sentence inasmuch as the said parameters
would be common to all offences u/s. 304-B IPC. It,
therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of acceptable      F
jurisprudential principles to act as a rational basis for
awarding varying degrees of punishment on a case to
case basis. [Para 13) [1020-B-D]
    1.5 The factors, namely, the time spent between
marriage and the death of the woman; the attitude and          G
conduct of the accused towards the victim before her
death; the extent to which the demand for dowry was
persisted with and the manner and circumstances of
commission of the cruelty, would be a surer basis for
determination of the crime test. Further, the fact whether     H
   1004     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013) 9 S.C.R.


A the accused was also charged with the offence u/s. 302
  IPC and the basis of his acquittal of the said charge
  would be another very relevant circumstance. As against
  this the extenuating/mitigating circumstances which
  would determine the "criminal test" must be allowed to
B have a full play. These two sets of circumstances being
  mutually irreconcilable cannot be arranged in the form of
  a balance sheet as observed in Sangeet but it is the
  cumulative effect of the two sets of different
  circumstances that has to be kept in mind while rendering
c the sentencing decision. This would be the correct
  approach while dealing with the question of sentence so
  far as the offence u/s. 304-B IPC is concerned. [Para 13]
  [1020-D-H]
       1.6 Applying the parameters laid down by judgments
D of this Court to the facts of the instant case, it transpires
  that the death of the wife of the accused-appellant
  occurred within two years of marriage. There was a
  demand for dowry and there is evidence of cruelty or
  harassment. The autopsy report of the deceased showed
E external marks of injuries but the cause of death of
  deceased was stated to be due to asphyxia resulting
  from strangulation. In view of the said finding of the
  doctor who had conducted the postmortem, the trial court
  thought it proper to acquit the accused of the offence u/
F s. 302 IPC on the benefit of doubt as there was no
  evidence that the accused was, in any way, involved with
  the strangulation of the deceased. The proved facts on
  the basis of which offence u/s. 304-B IPC was held to be
  established, while acquitting the accused-appellant of the
G offence u/s. 302 IPC, do not disclose any extraordinary,
  perverse or diabolic act on the part of the accused-
  appellant to take an extreme view of the matter. [Para 14]
  [1021-A-D]
      1. 7 Besides, at the time of commission of the offence,
H the accused-appellant was about 21 years old and as on
    SUNIL DUTT SHARMA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF 1005
                      DELHI)

    date he is about 42 years. The accused-appellant also has     A
    a son who was an infant at the time of the occurrence.
    He has no previous record of crime. On a cumulative
    application of the principles that would be relevant to
    adjudge the crime and the criminal test, this Court is of
    the view that this is not a case where the maximum            B
    punishment of life imprisonment ought to have been
    awarded to the accused-appellant. At the same time, from
    the order of the trial court, it is clear that some of the
    injuries on the deceased, though obviously not the fatal
    injuries, are attributable to the accused-appellant. The      c
    said part of the order of the trial court has not been
    challenged in the appeal before the High Court. Taking
,   into account the said fact, this Court is of the view that
    in the instant case, the minimum sentence prescribed i.e.
    seven years would also not meet the ends of justice.          D
    Rather a sentence of ten years RI would be appropriate.
    Consequently, the order of the High Court is modified and
    the punishment of ten years RI is imposed on the
    accused~appellant for the commission of the offence u/
    s. 304-B IPC. The sentence of fine is maintained. [Para 14]
                                                                  E
    [1021 ·D·H; 1022-A-C]
                        Case Law Reference:
        1973 (2) SCR 541           referred to        Para 5
        (1980) 2 sec 684         · referred to        Para 5      F
        1983 (3) SCR 413           referred to        Para 5
        2012 (13) SCR 85           referred to        Para 5
        (2013) 5 sec 546           referred to        Para 5
                                                                  G
        CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 1333 of 2013.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2011 of the
    High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 449
    of 1997.                                                      H
    1006    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A        Manisha Bhandari, Surabhi Aggarwal, Sankalp Kashyap,
    Shilpa Dewan, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for the Appellant.
        P.K. Dey, Asha G. Nair, S. Saini, D.S. Mahra for the
    Respondent.

8       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
        RANJAN GOGOi, J. 1. The accused-appellant was tried
  for offences under Sections 302 and 304-8 of the Indian Penal
  Code (hereinafter for short the "Penal Code") for causing the
  death of his wife in the night intervening 16/17.05.92. He has
C been acquitted of the offence under Section 302 of the Penal
  Code on the benefit of doubt though found guilty for the offence
  under Section 304-8 of the Penal Code following which the
  sentence of life imprisonment has been imposed. The
  conviction and sentence has been affirmed by the High Court.
D Aggrieved, the appellant had moved this Court under Article
  136 of the Constitution.
      2. Limited notice on the question of sentence imposed on
  the accused-appellant having been issued by this Court the
  scope of the present appeal stands truncated to a
E determination of the question as to whether sentence of life
  imprisonment imposed on the accused-appellant for
  commission of the offence under Section 304-B of the Penal
  Code is in any way excessive or disproportionate so as to
  require interference by this Court.
F      3. Section 304-8(2) of ttie Penal Code which prescribes
    the punishment for the offence contemplated by Section 304-
    8(1) is in the following terms:
        "Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
G       imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
        years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
        (emphasis is ours).
       4. Expressions similar to what has been noticed above are
  to be found in different sections of the Penal Code which may
H be taken note of :
SUNIL DUTT SHARMA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF1007
          DELHI) [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

(i) Sections 115, 118, 123, 124,                              A
     126, 127, 134, 193, 201,
     214, 216, 216A, 219, 220,
     221, 222, 225, 231, 234,
     243, 244, 245, 247, 249,
     256, 257, 258, 259, 260, n            t d                B
     281, 293, 308, 312, 317, may ex en n.to            seven
     325, 333, 363, 365, 369, years/ten years '
     370, 380, 381, 387, 393,
     401, 402, 404, 407, 408,
     409, 433, 435, 437, 439,                                 c
     452, 455, 466, 468, 472,
     473, 474, 477A, 489C, 493,
     494, 495 and 496
 ..      .                        "imprisonment for life or
(11) Sections 122, 222, 225, 305, imprisonment for a term not D
     371, 449, 450                exceeding teTJ years"

                               "imprisonment for life or
(iii) Sections 124A, 125, 128, with imprisonment of either
       130, 194, 232, 238, 255 description which may
       etc.                    extend to __ years"         E
                               "imprisonment for life or
(iv) Sections 122, 225, 305,   with imprisonment of either
                               description for a term not
      371, 449
                               exceeding _ years"
                                                              F
                               "imprisonment for a term
                               which shall not be less than
(v) Section 3048               seven years but which may
                               extend to imprisonment for
                               life"                           G
                               "imprisonment of either
                               description for a term which
(vi) Section 376               shall not be less than seven
                               years or for life or for a term
                               which may extend to ten H
                               vears"
    1008       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A       5. The power and authority conferred by use of the different
  expressions noticed above indicate the enormous discretion
  vested in the Courts in sentencing an offender who has been
  found guilty of commission of any particular offence. No where,
  either in the Penal Code or in any other law in force, any
B prescription or norm or even guidelines governing the exercise
  of the vast discretion in the matter of sentencing has been laid
  down except perhaps, Section 354(2) of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure, 1973 which, inter-alia, requires the judgment of a
  Court to state the reasons for the sentence awarded when the
c punishment prescribed is imprisonment for a term of years. In
  the above situation, naturally, the sentencing power has been
  a matter of serious academic and judicial debate to discern
  an objective and rational basis for the exercise of the power
  and to evolve sound jurisprudential principles governing the
  exercise thereof. In this regard the Constitution Bench decision
0
  of this Court in Jagmohan Singh vs. The State of U.P. 1 (under
  the old Code}, another Constitution Bench decision in Bachan
  Singh vs. State of Punjab 2, a three Judge Bench decision in
  Machhi Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab 3, are watersheds
E in the search for jurisprudential principles in the matter of
  sentencing. Omission of any reference to other equally
  illuminating opinions of this Court rendered in scores of other
  monumental decisions is not to underplay the importance
  thereof but solely on account of need for brevity. Two recent
  pronouncements of this Court in Sangeet and Another vs.
F State of Haryana4 and Shankar Kisanrao Khade vs. State of
  Maharashtra5 reflect the very labourious and painstaking efforts
  of this Court to summarize the net result of the judicial exercises
  undertaken since Jagmohan Singh (supra} and the unresolved
  issues and grey areas in this regard and the solutions that could
G
    1.   (1973) 1 sec 20.
    2.   (1980) 2 sec 684.
    3.   (1983) 3 sec 470.
    4.   c2013) 2 sec 452.
H 5. c2013) 5 sec 546.
SUNIL DUTT SHARMA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF1009
          DELHI) [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

be attempted. The aforesaid decisions of this Court though             A
rendered in the context of exercise of the power to award the
death sentence, whether the principles laid down, with suitable
adaptation and modification, would apply to all 'lesser' situations
so long the court is confronted with the vexed problem of
unraveling the parameters for exercise of the sentencing power         B
is another question that needs to be dealt with.

      6. For the sake of precision it may be sufficient to take note
of the propositions held in Bachan Singh (supra) to have flown
from Jagmohan Singh (supra) and the changes in propositions
(iv)(a) and (v)(b) thereof which were perceived to be necessary        C
in the light of the amended provision of Section 354(3) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The above changes were
noticed in Sangeet (supra) and were referred to as evolution
of a sentencing policy by shifting the focus from the crime
(Jagmohan Singh) to crime and the criminal (Bachan Singh).             D
The two concepts were described as Phase-I and Phase-II of
an emerging sentencing policy.

     7. The principles culled out from Jagmohan Singh (supra)
in Bachan Singh (supra) and the changes in proposition (iv)(a)         E
and (v)(b) may now be specifically noticed.

     Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab2

     160. In the light of the above conspectus, we will now
     consider the effect of the aforesaid legislative changes on       F
     the authority and efficacy of the propositions laid down by
     this Court in Jagmohan case. These propositions may be
     summed up as under:

           "(i) The general legislative policy that underlines the     G
     structure of our criminal law, principally contained in the
     Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, is
     to define an offence with sufficient clarity and to prescribe
     only the maximum punishment therefor, and to allow a very
     wide discretion to the Judge in the matter of fixing the          H
    1010   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A      degree of punishment.

             With the solitary exception of Section 303, the same
       policy permeates Section 302 and some other sections
       of the Penal Code, where the maximum punishment is the
       death penalty.
B
              (ii)-(a) No exhaustive enumeration of aggravating or
       mitigating circumstances which should be considered
       when sentencing an offender, is possible. "The infinite
       variety of cases and facets to each case would make
c      general standards either meaningless 'boiler plate' or a
       statement of the obvious that no Jury (Judge) would need."
       (referred to McGoutha v. California)

             (b) The impossibility of laying down standards is at
D      the very core of the criminal law as administered in India
       which invests the Judges with a very wide discretion in the
       matter of fixing the degree of punishment.

             (iii) The view taken by the plurality in Furman v.
       Georgia decided by the Supreme Court of the United
E      States, to the effect, that a law which gives uncontrolled
       and unguided discretion to the Jury (or the Judge) to
       choose arbitrarily between a sentence of death and
       imprisonment for a capital offence, violates the Eighth
       Amendment, is not applicable in India. We do not have in
F      our Constitution any provision like the Eighth Amendment,
       nor are we at liberty to apply the test of reasonableness
       with the freedom with which the Judges of the Supreme
       Court of America are accustomed to apply "the due
       process" clause. There are grave doubts about the
G      expediency of transplanting western experience in our
       country. Social conditions are different and so also the
       general intellectual level. Arguments which would be valid
       in respect of one area of the world may not hold good in
       respect of another area.
H
SUNIL DUTI SHARMA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF1011
          DELHI) [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

        (iv)(a) This discretion in the matter of sentence is to    A
   be exercised by the Judge judicially, after balancing all the
   aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime.

         (b) The discretion is liable to be corrected by
   superior courts. The exercise of judicial discretion on well
                                                                   8
   recognised principles is, in the final analysis, the safest
   possible safeguard for the accused.

           In view of the above, it will be impossible to say that
   there would be at all any discrimination, since crime as
   crime may appear to be superficially the same but the facts C
   and circumstances of a crime are widely different. Thus
   considered, the provision in Section 302, Penal Code is
   not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground
   that it confers on the Judges an unguided and uncontrolled
   discretion in the matter of awarding capital punishment or D
   imprisonment for life.

         (v)(a) Relevant facts and circumstances impinging on
   the nature and circumstances of the crime can be brought
   before the court at the preconviction stage, notwithstanding    E
   the fact that no formal procedure for producing evidence
   regarding such facts and circumstances had been
   specifically provided. Where counsel addresses the court
   with regard to the character and standing of the accused,
   they are duly considered by the court unless there is
   something in the evidence itself which belies him or the        F
   Public Prosecutor challenges the facts.

         (b) It is to be emphasised that in exercising its
   discretion to choose either of the two alternative sentences
   provided in Section 302 Penal Code, "the court is G
   principally concerned with the facts and circumstances
   whether aggravating or mitigating, which are connected
   with the particular crime under inquiry. All such facts and
   circumstances are capable of being proved in accordance
   with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act in a trial H
    1012   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A      regulated by the CrPC. The trial does not come to an end
       until all the relevant facts are proved and the counsel on
       both sides have an opportunity to address the court. The
       only thing that remains is for the Judge to decide on the
       guilt and punishment and that is what Sections 306(2) and
B      309(2), CrPC purport to provide for. These provisions are
       part of the procedure established by law and unless it is
       shown that they are invalid for any other reasons they must
       be regarded as valid. No reasons are offered to show that
       they are constitutionally invalid and hence the death
c      sentence imposed after trial in accordance with the
       procedure established by law is not unconstitutional under
       Article 21". (emphasis added)"

       161. A study of the propositions set out above, will show_
       that, in substance, the authority of none of them has been
D      affected by the legislative changes since the decision in
       Jagmohan case. Of course, two of them require to be
       adjusted and attuned to the shift in the legislative policy.
       The first of those propositions is No. (iv)(a) which
       postulates, that according to the then extant Code of
E      Criminal Procedure both the alternative sentences
       provided in Section 302 of the Penal Code are normal
       sentences and the court can, therefore, after weighing the
       aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the particular
       case, in its discretion, impose either of those sentences.
F      This postulate has now been modified by Section 354(3)
       which mandates the court convicting a person for an
       offence punishable with death or, in the alternative with
       imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years,
       not to impose the sentence of death on that person unless
G      there are "special reasons" - to be recorded - for such
       sentence. The expression "special reasons" in the context
       of this provision, obviously means "exceptional reasons"
       founded on the exceptionally grave circumstances of the
       particular case relating to the crime as well as the criminal.
       Thus, the legislative policy now writ large and clear on the
H
SUNIL DUTT SHARMA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF1013
          DELHI) [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
  face of Section 354(3) is that on conviction for murder and      A
  other capital offences punishable in the alternative with
  death under the Penal Code, the extreme penalty should
  be imposed only in extreme cases.

  163. Another proposition, the application of which, to an        8
  extent, is affected by the legislative changes, is No. (v). In
  portion (a) of that proposition, it is said that circumstances
  impinging on the nature and circumstances of the crime
  can be brought on record before the pre-conviction stage.
  In portion (b), it is emphasised that while making choice        C
  of the sentence under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the
  court is principally concerned with the circumstances
  connected with the particular crime under inquiry. Now,
  Section 235(2) provides for a bifurcated trial and
  specifically gives the <focused person a right of pre-
  sentence hearing, at which stage, he can bring on record         D
  material or evidence, which may not be strictly relevant to
  or connected with the particular crime under inquiry, but
  nevertheless, have, consistently with the policy underlined
  in Section 354(3), a bearing on the choice of sentence.
  The present legislative policy discernible from Section          E
  235(2) read with Section 354(3) is that in fixing the degree
  of punishment or making the choice of sentence for various
  offences. including one under Section 302 of the Penal
  Code. the court should not confine its consideration
  "principally" or merely to the circumstances connected with      F
  the particular crime. but also give due consideration to the
  circumstances of the criminal.

  164. Attuned to the legislative policy delineated in Sections
  354(3) and 235(2), propositions (iv)(a) and (v)(b) in· G
  Jagmohan shall have to be recast and may be stated as
  below:

  "(a) The normal rule is that the offence of murder shall be
  punished with the sentence of life imprisonment. The court
  can depart from that rule and impose the sentence of death       H
    1014    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 9 S.C.R.


A       only if there are special reasons for doing so. Such
        reasons must be recorded in writing before imposing the
        death sentence.

        (b) While considering the question of sentence to be
        imposed for the offence of murder under Section 302 of
B
        the Penal Code, the court must have regard to every
        relevant circumstance relating to the crime as well as the
        criminal. If the court finds, but not otherwise, that the
        offence is of an exceptionally depraved and heinous
        character and constitutes, on account of its design and the
c       manner of its execution, a source of grave danger to the
        society at large, the court may impose the death
        sentence."

       8. In Sangeet (supra) the Court also took note of the
D "suggestions" (offered at the Bar) noticed in Bachan Singh
  (supra) to be relevant in a determination of the circumstances
  attending the crime (described as aggravating circumstances)
  as well as those which pertain to the criminal as distinguished
  from the crime (referred to as the mitigating circumstances).
E The attempt at evolution of a principle based sentencing policy
  as distinguished from a judge centric one was noted to have
  suffered some amount of derailment/erosion. In fact, the several
  judgments noted and referred to in $angeet (supra) were found
  to have brought in a fair amount of uncertainty in application of
F the principles in awarding life imprisonment or death penalty,
  as may be, and the varying perspective or responses of the
  court based on the particular facts of a given case rather than
  evolving standardized jurisprudential principles applicable
  across the board.
G     9. The above position was again noticed in Shankar
  Kisanrao Khade (supra). In the separate concurring opinion
  rendered by Brother Madan B. Lokur there is an exhaustive
  consideration of the judgments rendered by this Court in the
  recent past (last 15 years) wherein death penalty has been
H converted to life imprisonment and also the cases wherein
SUNIL DUTT SHARMA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF1015
          DELHI) [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

death penalty has been confirmed. On the basis of the views                    A
of this Court expressed in the exhaustive list of its judgments,
reasons which were considered adequate by the Court to
convert death penalty into life imprisonment as well as the
reasons for confirming the death penalty had been set out in
the concurring judgment at paragraphs 106 and 122 of the                       B
report in Shankar· Kisanrao Khade (supra) which paragraphs
may be extracted hereinbelow to notice the principles that have
unfolded since Bachan Singh (supra).

      "106. A study of the above cases suggests that there are
      several reasons, cumulatively taken, for converting the                  C
      death penalty to that of imprisonment for life. However,
      some of the factors that have had an influence in
      commutation include:

            (1) the young age of the accused [Amit v. State of                 D
      Maharashtra 6 aged 20 years, Rahuf aged 24 years,
      Santosh Kumar Singh 8 aged 24 years, Rameshbhai
      Chandubhai Rathod (2) 9 aged 28 years and Amit v. State
      of U.P. 10 aged 28 years];
                                                                               E
           (2) the possibility of reforming and rehabilitating the
      accused (in Santosh Kumar Singh8 and Amit v. State of
      U.P.10 the accused, incidentally, were young when they
      committed the crime);

           (3) the accused had no prior criminal record (Nirmal                F
      Singh 11, Raju12, Bantu 13, Amit v. State of Maharashtra 6,

6.   (2003) s sec 93.
7.   Rahul v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 10 SCC 322.
8.   Santosh Kumar Singh v. State, (2010) 9 SCC 747.                           G
9.   Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod (2) v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 2 SCC 764.
10. c2012) 4 sec 101.
11. Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana (1993) 3 SCC 670.
12. Raju v. State of Haryana (2001) 9 SCC 50.
13. BjU'ltu v. State of M.P. (2001) 9 sec 615.                                 H
    1016      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2013) 9 S.C.R.


A        Surendra Pal Shivbalakpa/1 4 , Rahuf and Amit v. State
         of LJ.P. 10);

               (4) the accused was not likely to be a menace or
         threat or danger to society or the community (Nirmal
         Singh 11 , Mohd. Chaman 15, Raju12, Bantu13, Surendra Pal
B
         Shivbalakpa/1 4, Rahuf and Amit v. State of U.P. 1°).

               (5) a few other reasons need to be mentioned such
         as the accused having been acquitted by one of the courts
         (State of T.N. v. Suresh 16, State of Maharashtra v.
c        Suresh 17, Bharat Fakira Dhiwar18, Mansingh 19 and
         Santosh Kumar Singh 8 );

               (6) the crime was not premeditated (Kumudi La/2°,
         Akhtar2 1, Raju 12 and Amrit Singh 22 );
D             (7) the case was one of circumstantial evidence
         (Mansingh 19 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha 23}.

                In one case, commutation was ordered since there
         was apparently no "exceptional" feature warranting a death
E        penalty (Kumudi La/2°) and in another case because the
         trial court had awarded life sentence but the High Court
         enhanced it to death (Haresh Mohandas Rajput24 ).


F 14. Surendra Pal Shivbalakpal v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 127.
    15. Mohd. Chaman v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 2 SCC 28.
    16. (1998) 2 sec 372.
    11. c2000) 1 sec 471.
    18. State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar, (2002) 1 SCC 622.
G 19. State of Maharashtra v. Mansingh, (2005) 3 sec 131.
    20. Kumudi Lal v. State of U.P., (1999) 4 SCC 108.
    21. Akhtar v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 60
    22. Amrit Singh v. State of Punjab (2006) 12 SCC 79.
    23. Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467.
H 24. Haresh Mohandas Rajput v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 12 SCC 56.
SUNIL     oun SHARMA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF1017
                 DELHI) [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

      122. The principal reasons for confirming the death penalty     A
      in the above cases include:

           (1) the cruel, diabolic, brutal, depraved and
     gruesome nature of the crime (Jumman Khan 25 ,
     Dharianjoy Chatterjee 26, Laxman Naik27, Kamta Tiwan"28,         B
     Nirrnal Singh 11 , Jai Kumar 9, Satish 30, Bantu31 , Ankush
     Maruti Shinde 32, B.A. Umesh 33, Mohd. Mannan 34 and
     Rajendra Pra/hadrao Wasnik3 5);

           (2) the crime results in public abhorrence, shocks the
     judicial conscience or the conscience of society or the          C
     community (Dhananjoy Chatterjee 26, Jai Kumaf 9, Ankush
     Maruti Shinde 32 and Mohd. Mannan 34 );

            (3) the reform or rehabilitation of the convict is not
     likely or that he would be a menace to society (Jai Kumaf 9,     D
     B.A. UmesM3 and Mohd. Mannan34 );

          (4) the victims were defenceless (Dhananjoy
     Chatterjee 26, Laxman Naik27, Kamta Tiwari28, Ankush
     Maruti Shinde 32, Mohd. Mannan 34 and Rajendra
     Pra/hadrao Wasnik3 5 );                                          E

          (5) the crime was either unprovoked or that it was
      premeditated (Dhananjoy Chatterjee 26, Laxman Naik27,
      Kamta Tiwari28, Nirmal Singh 11 , Jai Kumar29, Ankush
                                                                      F
25. Jumman Khan v. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 752.
26. Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., (1994) 2 SCC 220.
27. Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa, (1994) 3 SCC 381.
28. Kamta Tiwari v. State of M.P., (1996) 6 SCC 250.
29. Jai Kumar v. State of M.P., (1999) 5 SCC 1.                       G
30. State of U.P., v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114.
31. Bantu v. State of U.P., (2008) 11 SCC 113.
32. Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 667.
33. B.A. Umesh v. State of Kamataka, (2011) 3 SCC 85.
34. Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 317.                 H
    1018      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A        Maruti Shinde32, B.A. Umesh 33 and Mohd.Mannan34 ) and
         in three cases the antecedents or the prior history of the
         convict was taken into consideration (Shivu 36, B.A.
         Umesh 33 and Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik35 )."

        However, in paragraph 123 of the report the cases where
8
  the reasons for taking either of the views i.e. commutation or
  confirmation as above have been deviated from have been
  noticed. Consequently, the progressive march had been
  stultified and the sentencing exercise continues to stagnate as
C a highly individualized and judge centric issue.

       10. Are we to understand that the quest and search for a
  sound jurisprudential basis for imposing a particular sentence
  on an offender is destined to remain elusive and the sentencing
  parameters in this country are bound to remain judge centric?
D The issue though predominantly dealt with in the context of
  cases involving the death penalty has tremendous significance
  to the Criminal Jurisprudence of the country inasmuch as in
  addition to the numerous offences under various special laws
  in force, hundreds of offences are enumerated in the Penal
E Code, punishment for which could extend from a single day to
  10 years Qr even for life; a situation made possible by the use
  of the seemingly same expressions in different provisions of
  the Penal Code as noticed in the opening part of this order.

       11. As noticed, the "net value" of the huge number of in
F depth exercises performed since Jagmohan Singh (supra) has
  been effectively and systematically culled out in Sangeet and
  Shankar Kisanrao Khade (supra). The identified principles
  could provide a sound objective basis for sentencing thereby
  minimizing individualized and judge centric perspectives. Such
G principles bear a fair amount of affinity to the principles applied
  in foreign jurisdictions, a resume of which is available in the
  decision of this Court in State of Punjab vs. Prem Sagar and

    35. Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 4 SCC 37.
H   3~. Shivu v. High Court of Kamataka, (2007) 4 SCC 713.
SUNIL DUTI SHARMA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF1019
          DELHI) [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

Others37• The difference is not in the identity of the principles;      A
it lies in the realm of application thereof to individual situations.
While in India application of the principles is left to the judge
hearing the case, in certain foreign jurisdictions such principles
are formulated under the authority of the statute and are applied
on principles of categorization of offences which approach,             B
however, has been found by the Constitution Bench in Bachan
Singh (supra) to be inappropriate to our system. The principles
being clearly evolved and securely entrenched, perhaps, the
answer lies in consistency in approach.

     12. To revert to the main stream of the case, we see no            C
reason as to why the principles of sentencing evolved by this
Court over the years through largely in the context of the death
penalty will not be applicable to all lesser sentences so long
as the sentencing judge is vested with the discretion to award
a lesser or a higher sentence resembling the swing of the               D
pendulum from the minimum to the maximum. In fact, we are
reminded of the age old infallible logic that what is good to one
situation would hold to be equally good to another like situation.
Beside paragraph 163 (underlined portion) of Bachan Singh
(supra), reproduced earlier, bears testimony to the above fact.         E

      13. Would the above principles apply to sentencing of an
accused found guilty of the offence under Section 304-B
inasmuch as the said offence is held to be proved against the
accused on basis of a legal presumption? This is the next
                                                                        F
question that has to be dealt with. So long there is credible
evidence of cruelty occasioned by demand(s) for dowry, any
unnatural death of a woman within seven years of her marriage
makes the husband or a relative of the husband of such woman
liable for the offence of "dowry death" under Section 304-B
though there may not be any direct involvement of the husband           G
or such relative with the death in question. In a situation where
commission of an offence is held to be proved by means of a
legal presumption the circumstances surrounding the crime to
a7. c2oos) 1 sec 550.
                                                                        H
    1020     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   determine the presence of aggravating circumstances (crime
    test) may not be readily forthcoming unlike a case where there
    is evidence of overt criminal acts establishing the direct
    involvement of the accused with the crime to enable the Court
    to come to specific conclusions with regard to the barbarous
8   or depraved nature of the crime committed. The necessity to
    combat the menace of demand for dowry or to prevent
    atrocities on women and like social evils as well as the
    necessity to maintain the purity of social conscience cannot be
    determinative of the quantum of sentence inasmuch as the said
C   parameters would be common to all offences under Section
    304-B of the Penal Code. The above, therefore, cannot be
    elevated to the status of acceptable jurisprudential principles
    to act as a rational basis for awarding varying degrees of
    punishment on a case to case basis. The search for principles
    to satisfy the crime test in an offence under Section 304-B of
D   the Penal Code must, therefore, lie elsewhere. Perhaps, the
    time spent between marriage and the death of the woman; the
    attitude and conduct of the accused towards the victim before
    her death; the extent to which the demand for dowry was
    persisted with and the manner and circumstances of
E   commission of the cruelty would be a surer basis for
    determination of the crime test. Coupled with the above, the fact
    whether the accused was also charged with the offence under
    Section 302 of the Penal Code and the basis of his acquittal
    of the said charge would be another very relevant circumstance.
F   As against this the extenuating/mitigating circumstances which
    would determine the "criminal test" must be allowed to have a
    full play. The aforesaid two sets of circumstances being mutually
    irreconcilable cannot be arranged in the form of a balance sheet
    as observed in Sangeet (supra) but it is the cumulative effect
G   of the two sets of different circumstances that has to be kept
    in mind while rendering the sentencing decision. This, according
    to us, would be the correct approach while dealing with the
    question of sentence so far as the offence under Section 304-
    B of the Penal Code is concerned.
H
SUNIL DUTI SHARMA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF1021
          DELHI) [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

      14. Applying the above parameters to the facts of the A
present case it transpires that the death of the wife of the
accused-appellant occurred within two years of marriage. There
was, of course, a demand for dowry and there is evidence of
cruelty or harassment. The autopsy report of the deceased
showed external marks of injuries but the cause of death of B
deceased was stated to be due to asphyxia resulting from
strangulation. In view of the aforesaid finding of Dr. LT. Ramani
(PW-16) who had conducted the postmortem, the learned Trial
Judge thought it proper to acquit the accused of the offence
under Section 302 of the Penal Code on the benefit of doubt . c
as there was no evidence that the accused was, in any way,
involved with the strangulation of the deceased. The proved
facts on the basis of which offence under Section 304-B of the
Penal Code was held to be established, while acquitting the
accused-appellant of the offence under Section 302 of the D
Penal Code, does not disclose any extraordinary, perverse or
diabolic act on the part of the accused-appellant to take an
extreme view of the matter. Coupled with the above, at the time
of commission of the offence, the accused-appellant was about
21 years old and as on date he is about 42 years. The
accused-appellant also has a son who was an infant at the time E
of the occurrence. He has no previous record of crime. On a
cumulative application of the principles that would be relevant
to adjudge the crime and the criminal test, we are of the view
that the present is not a case where the maximum punishment
of life imprisonment ought to have been awarded to the F
accused-appellant. At the same time, from the order of the
learned Trial Court, it is clear that some of the injuries on the
deceased, though obviously not the fatal injuries, are
attributable to the accused-appellant. In fact, the finding of the
learned Trial Court is that the injuries No. 1 (Laceration 1" x %" G
skin deep on the side of forehead near hair margin) and 2
(Laceration 1 %" x 1" scalp deep over the frontal area) on the
deceased had been caused by the accused-appellant with a
pestle. The said part of the order of the learned Trial Court has
not been challenged in the appeal before the High Court. Taking H
    1022      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 9 S.C.R.


A into account the said fact, we are of the view that in the present
  case the minimum sentence prescribed i.e. seven years would
  also not meet the ends of justice. Rather we are of the view
  that a sentence of ten years RI would be appropriate.
  Consequently, we modify the impugned order dated 4.4.2011
B passed by the High Court of Delhi and impose the punishment
  of ten years RI on the accused-appellant for the commission
  of the offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code. The
  sentence of fine is maintained. The accused-appellant who is
  presently in custody shall serve out the remaining part of the
c .
  sentence in terms of the present order.

           15. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent
    indicated above.

    R.P.                                      Appeal partly allowed.