SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR & ANR.versusTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

630                      [2021]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    6 S.C.R. 630                [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A               SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR & ANR.
                                        v.
                      THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
                        (Criminal Appeal No. 526 of 2021)
B                                 MAY 25, 2021
        [DINESH MAHESHWARI AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
             Sentence/Sentencing: Sentences to run concurrently or
      consecutively – Duty of Court of first instance to specify – Held: It
      is legally obligatory upon the court of first instance while awarding
C
      multiple punishments of imprisonment to specify in clear terms as to
      whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively – If
      the Court of first instance does not specify the concurrent running
      of sentences, the inference, primarily, is that the Court intended
      such sentences to run consecutively, though, the Court of first
D     instance ought not to leave this matter for deduction at the later
      stage – Moreover, if the Court of first instance is intending
      consecutive running of sentences, there is yet another obligation
      on it to state the order (i.e., the sequence) in which they are to be
      executed.
E            Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.31(1) – Held: s.31(1)
      vests complete discretion with the Court to order the sentences for
      two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently having regard
      to the nature of offences and the surrounding factors – There cannot
      be any straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of such
      discretion by the Court; but this discretion has to be judiciously
F
      exercised with reference to the nature of the offence/s committed
      and the facts and circumstances of the case – However, if the
      sentences (other than life imprisonment) are not provided to run
      concurrently, one would run after the other, in such order as the
      Court may direct.
G           Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.220 – The ‘single
      transaction’ principle is essentially referable to s.220 which
      provides that if more offences than one are committed in one series
      of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, then
      the accused may be charged with and tried at one trial for every
H     such offence – In a given case, after such trial for multiple offences,
                                       630
   SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                       631
                      PRADESH

if the accused is convicted and awarded different punishments,            A
concurrent running thereof may be provided depending on the facts
and the relevant surrounding factors.
      Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1.1 It is beyond a shadow of doubt that Section 31(1)
CrPC vests complete discretion with the Court to order the                B
sentences for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently
having regard to the nature of offences and the surrounding
factors. Even though it cannot be said that consecutive running
is the normal rule but, it is also not laid down that multiple
sentences must run concurrently. There cannot be any straitjacket         C
approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the Court;
but this discretion has to be judiciously exercised with reference
to the nature of the offence/s committed and the facts and
circumstances of the case. However, if the sentences (other than
life imprisonment) are not provided to run concurrently, one would
run after the other, in such order as the Court may direct.               D
[Para 10][639-B-D]
       1.2 For what has been provided in Section 31(1) CrPC read
with the expositions of this Court, it follows that the Court of
first instance is under legal obligation while awarding multiple
sentences to specify in clear terms as to whether they would run          E
concurrently or consecutively. [Para 11][639-D-E]
      Nagaraja Rao v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2015)
      4 SCC 302 : [2015] 12 SCR 424 – relied on.
       1.3 If the Court of first instance does not specify the            F
concurrent running of sentences, the inference, primarily, is that
the Court intended such sentences to run consecutively, though,
as aforesaid, the Court of first instance ought not to leave this
matter for deduction at the later stage. Moreover, if the Court of
first instance is intending consecutive running of sentences, there
is yet another obligation on it to state the order (i.e., the sequence)   G
in which they are to be executed. The disturbing part of the matter
herein is that not only the Trial Court omitted to state the requisite
specifications, even the High Court missed out such flaws in the
order of the Trial Court. [Para 12][639-H; 640-A-B]
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632            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A            2. The ‘single transaction’ principle is essentially referable
      to Section 220 CrPC, which provides that if more offences than
      one are committed in one series of acts so connected together
      as to form the same transaction, then the accused may be charged
      with and tried at one trial for every such offence. In a given case,
      after such trial for multiple offences, if the accused is convicted
B
      and awarded different punishments, concurrent running thereof
      may be provided depending on the facts and the relevant
      surrounding factors. The principle related with ‘single transaction’
      cannot be imported for dealing with the question at hand.
      [Para 14][640-E-F]
C           Manoj alias Panju v. State of Haryana (2014) 2 SCC
            153 : [1996] 1 SCR 532; Nagaraja Rao v. Central
            Bureau of Investigation (2015) 4 SCC 302 : [2015] 12
            SCR 424; Gagan Kumar v. State of Punjab (2019) 5
            SCC 154 : [2019] 3 SCR 367 – distinguished.
D           State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors.(1996) 2 SCC
            384; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Anoop Singh (2015)
            7 SCC 773 : [2015] 6 SCR 960 – held inapplicable.
            3. The offences in question were committed in the year
      2008 i.e, before amendment of IPC by the Amending Act 13 of
E     2013; the appellants have continuously served about 13 years
      and 2 months of imprisonment; and nothing adverse in regard to
      their conduct while serving the sentences has been placed on
      record. The requirements of complete justice to the cause could
      adequately be met by providing that the maximum period of
F     imprisonment to be served by the appellants shall be 14 years
      and not beyond. [Para 17][642-D-E, F-G]
            Muthuramalingam & Ors. v. State (2016) 8 SCC 313 :
            [2016] 5 SCR 30 – followed.
            O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala &
G           Ors. (2015) 2 SCC 501 : [2014] 11 SCR 140 – relied
            on.
            Mohan Baitha & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2001) 4
            SCC 350; Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed

H
   SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                            633
                      PRADESH

      Bhatti v. Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention),                   A
      Ahmedabad & Anr. (1988) 4 SCC 183 : [1988] 2 Suppl.
      SCR 747 – distinguished.
                         Case Law Reference
[2015] 12 SCR 424                  distinguished             Para 7.1
                                                                               B
[2019] 3 SCR 367                   distinguished             Para 7.1
[2014] 11 SCR 140                  relied on                 Para 7.1
(2001) 4 SCC 350                   distinguished             Para 7.2
[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 747            distinguished             Para 7.2
                                                                               C
[1996] 1 SCR 532                   distinguished             Para 7.2
(1996) 2 SCC 384                   held inapplicable         Para 7.3
[2015] 6 SCR 960                   held inapplicable         Para 7.3
[2016] 5 SCR 30                    followed                  Para 7.5          D
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 526 of 2021.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 21.02.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal appeal No. 7399 of 2008.
                                                                               E
      Pai Amit, Deepak Raj Premi, Parashuram A.L., Manaswi Agrawal,
Rohit R. Saboo, Ms. Ranu Purohit, Ms. Pankhuri Bhardwaj, Ms. Bhavana
Duhoon, Satyam Tandon, Advs. for the appellants.
      Vinod Diwakar, AAG, Sarvesh Singh Baghel, B.N. Dubey, Ms.
Shivranjani Ralawata, Advs. for the respondent.
                                                                               F
      The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
                              JUDGMENT
      Leave granted.
       2. In view of the order dated 13.04.2018 passed by this Court           G
while granting permission to file Special Leave Petition and issuing notice,
the scope of this appeal is restricted to the question of sentence; and the
appellants herein, after their conviction of offences under Sections 363,
366 and 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), have already

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634            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A     undergone 13 years and 2 months of imprisonment. In the given
      circumstances, we have heard learned counsel for the parties finally at
      this stage itself.
            2.1. Even the short question involved in this matter carries the
      peculiarities of its own, as noticed infra.
B            3. As regards relevant background aspects, suffice it to notice
      that on 03.02.2008, Case Crime No. 44 of 2008 for offences under
      Sections 363 and 366 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) came to be
      registered at Police Station, T.P. Nagar, Meerut on the basis of a written
      complaint that the complainant’s 13-year-old daughter, who had gone to
C     school on 15.01.2008, had not returned; and after a lot of efforts, the
      complainant came to know that the accused-appellant No. 2 Faimuddin
      @ Feru @ Sonu had enticed his daughter. In the course of investigation,
      the victim girl was recovered and, ultimately, the charge-sheet was filed
      against the appellants for offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376
      IPC. They were tried in Sessions Trial No. 575 of 2008 wherein, the
D     Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5,
      Meerut, in its judgement and order dated 12.09.2008, convicted them of
      offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376(1) IPC.
             4. After having recorded conviction as aforesaid, the Trial Court
      sentenced the appellants to several punishments in the following manner:
E     rigorous imprisonment for a term of 5 years with fine of Rs. 2,000/- and
      in default, further imprisonment for 6 months for the offence under Section
      363 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for a term of 7 years with fine of Rs.
      3,000/- and in default, further imprisonment for 1 year for the offence
      under Section 366 IPC; and rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10
F     years with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default, further imprisonment for
      1½ years for the offence under Section 376(1) IPC. However, the Trial
      Court did not specify as to whether the punishments of imprisonment
      would run concurrently or consecutively; and if they were intended to
      run consecutively, the Trial Court did not specify the order in which one
      punishment of imprisonment was to commence after expiration of the
G     other.
            5. As against the judgment and order of the Trial Court, only the
      appellant No. 1 Sunil Kumar @ Sudhir Kumar preferred an appeal before
      the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, being Criminal Appeal No.
      7399 of 2008. However, learned counsel for the appellant before the
H     High Court confined his arguments only on the point of sentence and did
   SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                            635
                      PRADESH

not press on the point of conviction. Thus, the conviction recorded by         A
the Trial Court attained finality, for the appellant No. 2 having not filed
the appeal and for the appellant No. 1, even after filing the appeal, having
not challenged the same. Accordingly, the High Court, examined only
the question of sentence qua the appellant No. 1 and, in its impugned
judgement and order dated 21.02.2018, while holding that the default
                                                                               B
stipulations were rather disproportionate, proceeded to modify the order
of sentencing only to the extent that in the event of default in payment of
fine, the accused-appellant (i.e., the appellant No. 1) shall undergo
additional imprisonment for the terms of 5 months, 3 months and 1 month
for the offences under Sections 376(1), 366 and 363 IPC respectively.
However, the High Court, even after taking note of the fact that the           C
accused-appellant had already undergone 10 years of imprisonment, did
not consider that the Trial Court had neither provided for concurrent
running of sentences nor provided the order of running of sentences, if
they were to run consecutively. Interestingly, while the Trial Court
sentenced the appellants for offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376(1)
                                                                               D
in that order, the High Court provided for modification of default
stipulations in converse order i.e., for offences under Sections 376(1),
366 and 363 IPC respectively.
      6. For the reason that the decisions aforesaid were silent on the
point of concurrent or consecutive running of sentences, the Jail
Superintendent, District Jail, Meerut, while issuing certificates of           E
confinement on 14.03.2018, stated that the accused-appellants had
undergone 10 years and 1 month of imprisonment but, there being no
mention in the sentencing order about concurrent running of sentences,
they were serving 22 years of imprisonment. Faced with such a
predicament, the accused-appellants have approached this Court.                F
       7. While confining his arguments to the question of sentence,
learned counsel for the appellants Mr. Amit Pai has industriously put
forward the submissions with reference to Section 31 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) and a good number of the decisions
of this Court.                                                                 G
       7.1. The learned counsel has contended, while relying on the
decisions in Nagaraja Rao v. Central Bureau of Investigation: (2015)
4 SCC 302 and Gagan Kumar v. State of Punjab: (2019) 5 SCC
154, that it is obligatory for the Court awarding punishments to specify
whether they shall be running concurrently or consecutively; and the           H
636            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A     omission on the part of the Trial Court and the High Court, to state the
      requisite specifications, cannot be allowed to operate detrimental to the
      interests of the accused-appellants. The learned counsel has contended
      that though as per the mandate of Section 31 CrPC, unless specified to
      run concurrently, the sentences do run consecutively but, for that purpose,
      the Court is required to direct the order in which they would run; and no
B
      such direction having been given by the Trial Court or by the High Court,
      it cannot be said that the Courts were consciously providing for
      consecutive running of sentences. Further, with reference to the decision
      in O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala & Ors.: (2015)
      2 SCC 501, the learned counsel would urge that it is not the normal rule
C     that multiple sentences are to run consecutively.
             7.2. The learned counsel Mr. Pai has also attempted to adopt
      another line of argument that concurrent or consecutive running of
      sentences is also to be governed by ‘single transaction’ principle, as
      discernible from a combined reading of Sections 31(1) and 220(1) CrPC.
D     In this regard, apart from the aforesaid decisions in Nagaraja Rao and
      Gagan Kumar,the learned counsel has also relied upon the decisions in
      Mohan Baitha & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr.: (2001) 4 SCC 350;
      Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti v. Assistant
      Collector of Customs (Prevention), Ahmedabad & Anr.: (1988) 4
      SCC 183; and Manoj alias Panju v. State of Haryana: (2014) 2
E     SCC 153 and has submitted that looking to the nature of accusation,
      there was no reason for the Courts to direct consecutive running of
      sentences in the present case.
            7.3. Further, the learned counsel for the appellants has referred to
      the decisions in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors.: (1996) 2
F     SCC 384 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Anoop Singh: (2015) 7
      SCC 773 to submit that those too were the cases involving offences
      under Sections 363, 366 and 376 with victim being a minor; and therein,
      this Court has awarded the sentences running concurrently.
             7.4. The learned counsel has also argued that though the appellant
G     No. 2 did not prefer appeal against the judgment and order of the Trial
      Court, this Court permitted him to file SLP by the order dated 13.04.2018;
      and, therefore, benefit of reduction of default sentence, as ordered by
      the High Court, deserves to be extended to the appellant No. 2 too.
            7.5. The learned counsel Mr. Pai, even while frankly pointing out
H     the observations of the Constitution Bench in Muthuramalingam &
   SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                            637
                      PRADESH

Ors. v. State: (2016) 8 SCC 313 (paragraph 28), to the effect that sub-        A
section (2) of Section 31 has no application to a case tried by the Court
of Sessions nor sub-section (2) forbids a direction for consecutive running
of sentences awardable by the Court of Sessions, has made a fervent
appeal that the appellants have already undergone over 13 years of
imprisonment; and if ordained to serve for a total term of 22 years by
                                                                               B
consecutive running of sentences, it would be highly disproportionate to
the actual punishment they need to suffer in this case.
        8. On the other hand, the learned AAG Mr. Vinod Diwakar has,
firmly as also fairly, put forward the views on behalf of the respondent-
State in opposition to the contentions aforesaid.
        8.1. The learned AAG Mr. Diwakar would submit that Section 31          C
CrPC vests a discretion in the Trial Court to direct whether or not the
sentences would run concurrently when the accused is convicted at one
trial of two or more offences but, in the present case, after noticing the
gravity and nature of offences i.e., kidnapping and rape of a 13-year-old
girl, the Trial Court has exercised its discretion and did not mention that    D
the sentences would be running concurrently; and, therefore, ipso facto,
they are to run consecutively.
        8.2. The learned AAG has also submitted that the principles related
with commission of offences in a single transaction do not lead to the
proposition that different sentences in relation to multiple offences shall
                                                                               E
invariably be running concurrently; and has referred to the enunciations
in O.M. Cherian (supra).The learned AAG has further referred to the
Constitution Bench decision in the case of Muthuramalingam (supra)
to submit that except life imprisonments, the other term sentences
awarded by the Court for several offences do run consecutively, unless
directed otherwise.                                                            F
        8.3. The learned AAG for the State would submit that concurrent
running of sentences, as provided in any particular case, relates to the
facts and circumstances pertaining to that case and the appellants cannot
claim any parity for concurrent running of sentences with reference to
any other decided case, even if relating to the offences of similar nature.    G
The learned AAG would argue that in the present case, looking to the
nature and gravity of offences, the Trial Court has exercised its discretion
in not directing concurrent running of sentences, which only means that
the sentences are to run consecutively; and that an omission on the part
of the Trial Court in not specifying the order of running cannot mean that
the sentences are to run concurrently.                                         H
638             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A            9. We have given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions
      and have examined the record of the case with reference to the law
      applicable.
             10. The contentions urged in this matter essentially revolve around
      the provisions contained in Section 31(1) CrPC. The contours of these
B     provisions have been succinctly delineated and explained by this Court
      in the case of O.M. Cherian (supra) in the following terms: -
             “20. Under Section 31 CrPC it is left to the full discretion of the
             court to order the sentences to run concurrently in case of conviction
             for two or more offences. It is difficult to lay down any straitjacket
C            approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the courts.
             By and large, trial courts and appellate courts have invoked and
             exercised their discretion to issue directions for concurrent running
             of sentences, favouring the benefit to be given to the accused.
             Whether a direction for concurrent running of sentences ought to
             be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the
D
             offence or offences committed and the facts and circumstances
             of the case. The discretion has to be exercised along the judicial
             lines and not mechanically.
             21. Accordingly, we answer the reference by holding that Section
             31 CrPC leaves full discretion with the court to order sentences
E
             for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently, having
             regard to the nature of offences and attendant aggravating or
             mitigating circumstances. We do not find any reason to hold that
             normal rule is to order the sentence to be consecutive and exception
             is to make the sentences concurrent. Of course, if the court does
F            not order the sentence to be concurrent, one sentence may run
             after the other, in such order as the court may direct. We also do
             not find any conflict in the earlier judgment in Mohd. Akhtar
             Hussain and Section 31 CrPC.”
              10.1. In Muthuramalingam (supra), the basic question before
G     the Constitution Bench was as to whether consecutive life sentences
      could be awarded to a convict on being found guilty of a series of murders,
      for which, he had been tried in a single trial. In the course of determination
      of this question, the Constitution Bench dealt with several dimensions of
      sentencing, particularly those relating to multiple sentences and observed,
      inter alia, that,-
H
   SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                             639
                      PRADESH

      “23……So interpreted Section 31(1) CrPC must mean that                     A
      sentences awarded by the court for several offences committed
      by the prisoner shall run consecutively (unless the court directs
      otherwise) except where such sentences include imprisonment
      for life which can and must run concurrently….”
       10.2. Thus, it is beyond a shadow of doubt that Section 31(1)            B
CrPC vests complete discretion with the Court to order the sentences
for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently having regard
to the nature of offences and the surrounding factors. Even though it
cannot be said that consecutive running is the normal rule but, it is also
not laid down that multiple sentences must run concurrently. There cannot
be any straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion       C
by the Court; but this discretion has to be judiciously exercised with
reference to the nature of the offence/s committed and the facts and
circumstances of the case. However, if the sentences (other than life
imprisonment) are not provided to run concurrently, one would run after
the other, in such order as the Court may direct.                               D
       11. For what has been provided in Section 31(1) CrPC read with
the expositions of this Court, it follows that the Court of first instance is
under legal obligation while awarding multiple sentences to specify in
clear terms as to whether they would run concurrently or consecutively.
In the case of Nagaraja Rao (supra),this Court expounded on this legal          E
obligation upon the Court of first instance in the following terms:-
      “11. The expressions “concurrently” and “consecutively”
      mentioned in the Code are of immense significance while awarding
      punishment to the accused once he is found guilty of any offence
      punishable under IPC or/and of an offence punishable under any            F
      other Special Act arising out of one trial or more. It is for the
      reason that award of former enure to the benefit of the accused
      whereas award of latter is detrimental to the accused’s interest.
      It is therefore, legally obligatory upon the court of first instance
      while awarding sentence to specify in clear terms in the order of
      conviction as to whether sentences awarded to the accused would           G
      run “concurrently” or they would run “consecutively”.”
      12. As noticed, if the Court of first instance does not specify the
concurrent running of sentences, the inference, primarily, is that the Court
intended such sentences to run consecutively, though, as aforesaid, the
Court of first instance ought not to leave this matter for deduction at the     H
640             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A     later stage. Moreover, if the Court of first instance is intending consecutive
      running of sentences, there is yet another obligation on it to state the
      order (i.e., the sequence) in which they are to be executed. The disturbing
      part of the matter herein is that not only the Trial Court omitted to state
      the requisite specifications, even the High Court missed out such flaws
      in the order of the Trial Court.
B
             13. Even when we find the aforementioned shortcomings in the
      orders passed by the Trial Court as also by the High Court, the question
      is as to whether the sentences awarded to the appellants could be
      considered as running concurrently? As noticed, the omission to state
      whether the sentences awarded to the accused would run concurrently
C     or would run consecutively essentially operates against the accused
      because, unless stated so by the Court, multiple sentences run
      consecutively, as per the plain language of Section 31(1) CrPC read
      with the expositions in Muthuramalingam and O.M. Cherian (supra).
      The other omission to state the order of consecutive running cannot
D     ipso facto lead to concurrent running of sentences.
             14. Faced with the position that the stated omissions will not, by
      themselves, provide a room for concurrent running of sentences, learned
      counsel for the appellants has endeavoured to invoke the ‘single
      transaction’ principle. In our view, the said principle is essentially referable
E     to Section 220 CrPC, which provides that if more offences than one are
      committed in one series of acts so connected together as to form the
      same transaction, then the accused may be charged with and tried at
      one trial for every such offence. In a given case, after such trial for
      multiple offences, if the accused is convicted and awarded different
      punishments, concurrent running thereof may be provided depending on
F     the facts and the relevant surrounding factors. We are afraid, the principle
      related with ‘single transaction’ cannot be imported for dealing with the
      question at hand.
             14.1. In the case of Mohan Baitha (supra),this Court observed
      that the expression ‘same transaction’, from its very nature, is incapable
G     of an exact definition and it is not possible to enunciate any comprehensive
      formula of universal application for the purpose of determining whether
      two or more acts constitute the same transaction. The question involved
      in that case did not relate to sentence but to the inquiry and trial of
      different offences pertaining to Sections 304-B, 498-A, 120-B and 406
H     IPC and territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate in Bihar when the alleged
   SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                             641
                      PRADESH

incident constituting one of the offences, i.e., under Section 304-B IPC,       A
had taken place in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Of course, in the case of
Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (supra),this Court indicated that if a transaction
constitutes two offences under two enactments, generally it is wrong to
have consecutive sentences but this Court hastened to observe that such
a rule shall have no application if the transaction relating to the offences
                                                                                B
is not the same or the facts concerning the two offences are quite
different. Significantly, in that case, consecutive running of sentences
awarded to accused-appellant, in two different cases pertaining to the
Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and the Customs Act, 1962, was upheld by this
Court with the finding that the two offences for which the appellant was
prosecuted were ‘quite distinct and different’. The only modification           C
ordered by this Court was concerning the term of imprisonment for the
latter conviction while disapproving its enhancement from 4 years to 7
years by the High Court after noticing that he was already sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of 7 years in the first offence. The trial and
conviction in the case of Manoj alias Panju(supra) had been for offence
                                                                                D
under Section 307 IPC as also under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms
Act. In the case of Nagaraja Rao (supra), the trial and conviction had
been of offences under Section 381 IPC and Section 52 of the Post
Office Act, 1898. In the case of Gagan Kumar (supra), offences were
under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC. These decisions, essentially
proceeding on their own facts, do not make out a case for interference          E
in favour of the appellants.
       15. The punishments awarded by this Court in the cases of Gurmit
Singh and Anoop Singh (supra), relate to the individual facts and
circumstances and cannot be adopted as the precedents for the purpose
of particular quantum of sentences and their concurrent running.                F
Significantly, in both the said cases, the conviction was recorded by this
Court after setting aside the impugned orders of acquittal. The orders
passed by this Court, for striking a just balance in the matter of sentencing
after reversing the acquittal, cannot be applied to the present case where
conviction recorded by the Court of first instance was not even challenged,
                                                                                G
and has attained finality.
       16. For what has been discussed hereinabove, we are not inclined
to accept the principal part of the submissions of learned counsel for the
Appellants. However, the other part of his submissions, that requiring
the appellants to serve a total term of 22 years in prison would be highly
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642            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 6 S.C.R.


A     disproportionate to the actual punishment they need to suffer in this case,
      cannot be brushed aside as altogether unworthy of consideration.
             17. We have taken note of the observations of the Constitution
      Bench in Muthuramalingam (supra), which were made in the context
      of a previous decision of this Court, where the eventuality of consecutive
B     running of life sentences was obviated with reference to the proviso to
      sub-section (2) of Section 31. The Constitution Bench though endorsed
      the view that consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded but observed
      that the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 CrPC cannot be relied
      upon to support this conclusion and also observed that sub-section (2) of
      Section 31 CrPC has no application to a case tried by the Court of
C
      Sessions nor sub-section (2) forbids a direction for consecutive running
      of sentences awardable by the Court of Sessions.
              17.1. Even when sub-section (2) of Section 31 CrPC is not directly
      applicable, some of the relevant features of the present case are that the
      offences in question were committed in the year 2008 i.e, before
D     amendment of IPC by the Amending Act 13 of 2013; the appellants
      have continuously served about 13 years and 2 months of imprisonment;
      and nothing adverse in regard to their conduct while serving the sentences
      has been placed on record. In the given set of circumstances, we have
      pondered over the question as to what ought to be the order for a just
E     balance on the requirements of punishment on one hand and reasonable
      release period for the appellants on the other, while keeping in view the
      overall scheme of awarding of punishments and execution thereof,
      including the ancillary aspects referable to Sections 433 and 433A CrPC
      as also Section 55 IPC whereunder, serving of a term of 14 years even
      in the sentence of imprisonment for life is the bottom line (subject to the
F     exercise of powers of commuting by the appropriate Government in
      accordance with other applicable principles). After anxious consideration
      of all the relevant factors, we are of the view that the requirements of
      complete justice to the cause before us could adequately be met by
      providing that the maximum period of imprisonment to be served by the
G     appellants shall be 14 years and not beyond.
             18. However, the submission for extending the benefit of
      modification of default stipulations qua the appellant no.2 carries the
      shortcoming that the said appellant did not prefer appeal against the
      judgment and order of the Trial Court. This is coupled with the fact that
H     in the root cause of this matter, the initial accusation of enticing the
    SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                              643
                       PRADESH

victim was made against the appellant No.2. In view of the overall                A
circumstances and the principal subject matter of this appeal, we find no
reason to re-open the issue which was not taken up by the appellant
No.2 at the relevant stage.
       19. In view of the above, in exercise of powers under Article 142
of the Constitution of India, we provide for modification of the punishment       B
awarded to the appellants in the manner that the maximum period of
imprisonment to be served by them in relation to offences in question
shall be 14 years and not beyond. It goes without saying that this order
of modification is passed only in the peculiar facts and circumstances of
this case.
                                                                                  C
       19.1. However, the requirement of payment of fine and the default
stipulations, as applicable to the appellant No.1 in terms of the order of
the High Court and to the appellant No.2 in terms of the order of the
Trial Court, shall remain intact. Learned counsel for the appellants submits
that as per his instructions, the appellant No.1 has deposited the fine
amount. The submission is taken on record. However, it is made clear              D
that in default in payment of fine, the defaulter-appellant shall undergo
respective default sentences consecutively and in the order they have
been imposed, for offences under Sections 363, 366, and 376(1) IPC.
       20. The appeal is partly allowed, as aforesaid.
                                                                                  E
        21. While closing on the matter, we deem it appropriate to reiterate
what was expounded in the case of Nagaraja Rao (supra), that it is
legally obligatory upon the Court of first instance, while awarding multiple
punishments of imprisonment, to specify in clear terms as to whether
the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. It needs hardly
an emphasis that any omission to carry out this obligation by the Court of        F
first instance causes unnecessary and avoidable prejudice to the parties,
be it the accused or be it the prosecution.

Devika Gujral                                            Appeal partly allowed.
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