Holding

A co‑owner landlord is deemed to occupy "his own" non‑residential building and is entitled to evict under Section 10(3)(a)(iii), rendering the earlier eviction order void.

Summary

Super Forgings and Steels (P) Ltd., the tenant, appealed against an eviction order passed under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The landlord, the late Thyambally Rasuljee, had sought possession on the ground that he did not occupy any building of his own for his business. During the pendency of the appeal, the landlord died and his sons, as co‑owners of both the premises where the business was shifted and the petitioned premises, took over the partnership. The Supreme Court had to decide whether a co‑owner landlord can be regarded as occupying "his own" building for the purpose of the eviction provision and whether the earlier eviction order remained valid. The Court held that a co‑owner is deemed to occupy his own non‑residential building and is entitled to invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii), and that the eviction order was not a vested right and could be set aside in view of the subsequent developments. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the eviction order was set aside.

Issues considered

Whether a landlord who is a co‑owner of a non‑residential building occupied for his business satisfies the requirement of "his own" premises under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
Whether the eviction order obtained by the deceased landlord remains enforceable against the tenant after his death and after the co‑owners become owners.
Whether the Supreme Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136, may consider events occurring after the institution of eviction proceedings to modify or set aside the order.
Whether the right conferred by Section 10(3)(a)(iii) creates an accrued or vested right once an eviction order is passed.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 136
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960s. 10(3)(a)(iii)
West Bengal Tenancy Act, 1956s. 13(1)(f)

Subjects

evictionrent controlco‑ownershiplandlord's own premisesArticle 136Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Actnon‑residential premisesvested rightSupreme Court jurisdiction

Judgment

SUPER FORGINGS AND STEELS'( SALES) PVT.LTD. A
v.
THYAMBALLY RASULJEE (DEAD)
THROUGH LRS.

DECEMBER 1, 1994
B
[K. RAMASWAMY ANDN. VENKATACHALA, JJ.]

Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 Section 10
(3) (a) (iii)- Eviction petition under.:_ Landlord, for purposes of carrying
on his business occupying, a non-residential building, of which he is a co- C
owner- Whether such a building can be regarded as 'his own' envisaged
uls JO (3) (a) (iii)- Held, Yes- landlord cannot claim benefit ofground of
eviction available u/s JO (3) (a) (iii).

Constitution ofIndia-Article 136- Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1960- Section JO (3) (a) (iii)- Eviction order under- D
Appeal- Events and developments subsequent to institution of eviction
proceedings- Power of Supreme Court in appeal under Article 136 to take
congnizance ofsuch events and developments and mould reliefsought.

The landlord filed a petition against the tenant on the ground
available to him u/s 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease E
and Rent Control) Act, 1960, for eviction of the tenant from the
petition non-residential building. The petitioner submitted that he was
carrying on business in the name and style of a partnership firm at
non-residential building, taken on rent, not being his own and there is a
threat of eviction. The petitioner further stated that he is not in
occupation of any building of his own for the business which he is F
carrying on. Eviction order was made by the Rent Controller holding
that the facts constituting the ground of eviction u/s 10 (3) (a) (iii) were
satisfactorily established. Both the appeal and revision filed against the
order of eviction were dismissed~ Hence this appeal.

Certain developments took place during the pendency or the G
present appeal. After an order was made by this Court granting special
leave to appeal from eviction order, partnership business which was
carried on by the landlord at the rented non-residential building came
to be shifted to another non-residential building. Landlord died and
partnership business of the firm came to be carried on by some of its
partners who were brought on record as L. R.'s of deceased landlord. H
229
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A ·On an enquiry held by this Court it was disclosed that the partnership
of which the deceased landlord and his sons were the partners had
become the partnership of respondents, the sons of the deceased
landlord and that respondents are the co-owners of non-residential
building in which the business was now shifted and that they also
became the co-owners of the petition non-residential building, on the
B demise of the original landlord, as his heirs.

In view of these facts which had emerged as a result of
developments in the case during the pendency of the present appeal, the
main question that required consideration and decision w.as, whether
the sons of the deceased landlord who, as co-owners of a non-residential
c building are carrying on the business of their partnership in that non-
residential building be regarded as landlords not occupying a non-
residential building in the city which is their own, for obtaining u/s 10
(3) (a) (iii) of the Act, possession of the petition non-residential building
of which also they are co-owners. ,·
D It was contended on behalf of the tenant that a landlord occupying
for purpose of carrying on his business a non-residential building, of
which he is a co-owner could not claim the benefit of ground of eviction
available u/s 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act against a tenant in a non-
residential building of which he is an owner or a co-owner. The
respondents submitted that a landlord who is ~ co-owner of non-
E residential building where he carried on his business, not being its sole
owner, such building could not be regarded as 'his own' envisaged u/s
10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act as would disentitle him to the benefit of the
ground of eviction, available thereunder.

It was also argued on behalf of the respondents that even if the
F non-residential· building where respondent 1, the original landlord was
carrying on the partnership business of the firm, for the carrying on of
which he wanted to get possession of the non-residential building in
occupation of the appellant- tenant had come to be owned by
respondents 2 to 11 because of the death of respondent- 1 during the
pendency of the present appeal, they could not be denied the benefit of
G eviction order under appeal got by the deceased u/s 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the
Act.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : I.I A non-residential building in occupation of landlord
H which is 'his own' envisaged in Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu
S. F. S. (P) LTD. v. RASULJEE [VENKATACHALA, J.] 231

Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is not only that of which A
.he is an absolute owner, but also that of which he is a co-owner, for a
co-owner of a building who is its landlord is regarded under the Rent
Control Laws of our country as its owner entitled to obtain possession
of such a building from a tenant for his bonafide requirement. [236 CJ
1.2 The respondents, who were carrying on the business of B
partnership in non-residential building of which they were co-owners
could be regarded as landlords, who were occupying their own non-
residential building envisaged under clause (iii) of Section 10 (3) (a) of
the Act, as would disentitile them to retain the benefit of the eviction
order made by the Rent Controller against the tenant in respect of the
petition non-residential building at the instance of the deceased - C
respondent-1, for carrying on his business on the ground that he did
not occupy bis own non-residential building for the purpose.
Consequently, the eviction order of the Rent Controller as affirmed by
the .Appellate Authority and the High Court, which was. under
challenge in this appeal is set aside taking into consideration the
developments which had taken place during its pendency in this court. D
(237 D to F]
Sri Ram Pasricha V Jagannath and Ors., (1977) 1 SCR 395, relied
on.
1.3 Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act confers a right on a landlord to
take advantage of the ground available thereunder to evict his/her E
tenant from a non-residential building. The right conferred under that
provision·of the Act is not an accrued right. Therefore, if a landlord
under the Act obtains an eviction order in respect of a non residential
building against the tenant taking advantage of the right conferred
upon him in that regard u/s 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act such eviction order
does not create in him an indefeasible vested right when it bas not F
become final and conclusive, having become the subject of an appeal
under Article 136 of the Constitution, where this Court bas the power
to annual such eviction order, iftbe circumstances so warrant.
[238 D, E]
1.4 The power of the Supreme Court in an appeal under Article G
136 of the Constitution to take cautious cognizance of events and
developments subsequent to institution of eviction proceedings and
grant, deny mould the relief sought by a party, in consonance with
justice and fair play is not restricted merely because it is exercising its
power to deal with an appeal conferred upon it by the Constitution.
[239 F] H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A 1.5 In the instant case, respondents 2 to 11 became disentitled to
obtain eviction order u/s 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act because they were the
co-owners of a non residential building, where they were .carrying on ·
the business of partnership for carrying on which business the deceased
respondent- 1 had sought eviction of the appellant- tenant from
another non-residential building of which also respondents 2 io 11 had
B become the co-owners after the demise of respondent-I. Thus, the
subsequent developments which had arisen during the pendency of the
present appeal warrant the setting aside of the eviction order which
was questioned in appeal. [2~9 H, 240 A]

Abbott V Minister for Land (1895) AC 425 and Kanaya Ram and Ors.,
v. Rajender Kumar and Ors., (1985) 1 SCC 436, relied on.
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1754 of
1982.

(From the Judgment and Order dated 22-12-81 of the Madras High
Court in C. RP. No. 1923of1981). .
D
E. C. Agarwala and Anant Palli for the Appellant.

Ambdsh Kumar for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

E VENKATACHALA, J. This is a tenant's appeal by special leave
granted under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is directed against the
Judgment and order dated 22-12-1981 of the High Court of Judicature at
Madra8 in CRP No. 1923of1981 by which an eviction order made by the
courts below against the tenant/appellant under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 "the Act'', was
F affirmed.

Messrs Fakruddin and Company is a partnership firm the business of
·which was formerly carried on by Thyabally Rasuljee, respondent- I at non
residential building No. 155 Linghi Chetty Street, Madras taken on rent, not
being his own.
'G
Messrs Super Forgings and Steels Ltd, a company registered under the
Indian Companies Act is the tenant, which was carrying on its business in a
non-residential building No. 118, Linghi Chetty Street, Madras-''the
petition non- residential building" of which respondent- I was the landlord.
The landlord filed a petition against the tenant on the ground available to
H him under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act before the Rent Controller ~t
S. F. S. (P) LTD. v. RASULJEE [VENKATACHALA, J.] 233

Madras for eviction of the tenant from the petition non-residential building, A
by stating the facts which constituted the said ground, thus :

"The petitioner submits that he is carrying on business in the
name and style of Messrs Fakruddin and Company which is a
partnership firm at No. 155 ( Old No.307) Linghi Chetty
Street, G. T. Madras-I, which is a rented building and there is B
a threat of eviction. The petitioner is not in occupation of any
building of his own for the business which he is carrying on
anywhere in the City of Madras."

Since it was found by the Rent Controller that the facts constituting the
said ground of eviction under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, on which C
the landlord had sought eviction of ·the tenant from the petition non-
residential building were satisfactorily ~stablished, eviction order was made
by him in respect of the petition non-residential building. Though, that
eviction order was challenged by the tenant before the Appellate Authority
and the High Court, in appeal and revision, respectively, both the appeal
and revision were dismissed -by judgements and orders made in them. The D
present appeal by special leave, filed by the tenant in the year 1982 is
directed against the said eviction order of the Rent Controller and
judgements and orders of the Appellate ~uthority and the High Court.

Certain developments which have 1*en place during the pendency of
the present appeal in this Court, need mention here as they directly bear on E
the case unaer appeal :- That in the year 1984, after an order was made by
this Co~ on 29-4-I 982, granting special leave to appeal from eviction
order of the Rent Controller and the judgements and orders of the Appellate
Authority and the High Court and granting stay of eviction order operating
against the tenant, partnership business of Mis. Fakruddin and Company
which was carried on by respondent- I at the rented non-residential building F
No. 155 Linghi Chetty Street, Madras came to be shifted to non-residential
building No. 151, Linghi Chetty Street, Madras. Respondent-I in the
present appeal, who was the landlord since died on 16-8-1985, that
partnership business of Mis Fakruddin and Company, came to be carried on
by some of its partners who are some of the respondents 2 to I I in this G
appeal, brought on record as L. R.'s of deceased respondent-I. When the
said developments were brought to the notice of a Divisions Bench of this
Court presided over by one of us (Ramaswamy, J.), before which the:
present appeal had come up for hearing on 29.9.1993, an order was made
directing the Small Causes Court, Madras, to hold an enquiry into matters
relating to the ·partners who are carrying on the business of Messrs H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A Fakruddin and Company after the demise of respondent- I the owners of
non-residential building No. I 5 I Linghi Chetty Street, Madras, where the
business of Mis. Fakruddin and Company is presently carried on, its
partners who had become the owners of the petition non-residential
building after the death of its owner r~spondent-1 and the owners of non-
residential building No. 15I, Linghi Chetty Street, Madras, and to submit a
B report on the question specified therein. On an enquiry held by the Court of
Small Causes at Madras, . pursuant to the said order, the report dated
4.4.1994 is sent by it to this Court. The true facts disclosed in that report,
which were not controverted, before us are :

(i) that the partnership business of Mis Fakruddin & Company which
c was carried on by the deceased landlord respondent-I, in rented
building No.I55, which was not his own, was shifted .in the year
I 984 to non-residential building No.15 I, Linghi Chetty Street
Madras;

(ii) that the partnership of Mis. Fakruddin and Company, of which
D respondent- I the father and respondents 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9, the
sons were the partners, has become the partnership of sons of the
deceased respondent-I, i.e. respondents 5, 6 and 9, Rashida, the
wife of respondent-5, Sara, the wife of the respondent-6, Farida
the wife of respondent-9 and respondent- I I Sugrabai the wife of
deceased respondent- I-- the active partners out of them being
E respondents 5, 6 and 9, the sons of deceased respondent- I;

(iii) that respondents-2 to IO are the co-owners of non-residential
building No.I5I; Linghi Chetty Street, Madras after its purchase
which had taken place even before filing of the eviction petition by
the landlord, respondent- I against the tenant-appellant for its
F eviction from non-residential building No.118, Linghi Chetty
Street, Madras;

(iv) that the petitioners-2 to I I became the co-owners of the non-
residential bqilding No. I I8, Linghi Chetty Street, Mdras- the
petition non-residential building on the demise of respondent-I;
G as his heirs.

Because of the said true facts disclosed from the report of the Court of
Small Causes at Madras which have emerged as a result of developments in
the case during the pendency of the present appeal, the main question that
H needs our consideration and decision is, whether respondents-5, 6, and 9,
S. F. S. (P) LTD. v. RASULJEE [VENKATACHALA, J.] 235

the sons of the deceased respondent- I who, as co-owners of non·resiedntial A
buidling No. 151, Linghi Chetty Street, Madras, are carrying on the
business of their partnership Mis. Fakruddin and Company in that non-
residential building be regarded as landlords not occupying a non-
residential buidling in the city which is their own, for obtaining under
Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, pdssession of the petition non-residential
building of which also they are co-owners. B
That a landlord who, for purposes of carrying on his business, is not
occupying a non residential building of his own in the city can get under
Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, possession of another non-residential
building of his own in the city in the occupation of a tenant was not
disputed on behalf of the tenant appellant. But it was contended on behalf C
of the tenant·appellant that a landlord occupying for purposes of carrying
on his business a non·residential building, of which he is a co-owner cannot
claim the benefit of ground of eviction available under section 10 (3) (a)
(iii) of the Act against a tenant in a non-residential building of which he is a
owner or a co-owner. The sustainability of that contention was, questioned,
rather strenuously, by learned counsel for respondents 2 to 11 on the plea D
that a landlord who is a co-owner of non-residential. building where he
carries on his business, not being its sole owner, such building cannot be
regarded as 'his own' envisaged under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act as
would disentitle him to the benefit of the ground of eviction, available
thereunder. We find it difficult to accept the plea advanced on behalf of
respondents 2 to 11 in questioning the sustainability of the contention raised E
on behalf of the appellant tenant.

Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act insofar as it is material, reads t,hus : -

"10 (3) (a)................. .
F
(i)

(ii) ...................... ..

(iii) In case it is any other non residential building if the landlord or
(any member of his family ) is not occupying for purposes of a G
business which he or (any member of his family) is carrying on, a
non- residential building in the oity, town or village concerned
which is his own."

If a landlord is a co-owner of a non-residential building in the city,
town or village concerned, which he is occupying for purposes of carrying H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A on his business, will be not be occupying therefor a non residential building
of his own envisaged in the above Section lO (3) (a) (iii), as would
disentitile him to the ground of eviction available thereunder being the real
question needing our answer in the light of the aforesaid plea of learned
counsel for respondents urged in questioning the sustainability of the
contention raised on behalf of the appellant tenant, we have to find the
B answer therefor.

The answer to the said question, in our view, cannot be anything other
than that a non residential building in occupation of landlord which is 'his
own' envisaged in Section lO (3) (a) (iii) above, is not only that of which he
is an absolute owner, but also that of which he is a co-owner, for a co-
C owner of a building who is its landlord is regarded under Rent Control
Laws of our country as its owner entitled to obtain possession of such a
building from a tenant for his bonafide requirement.

In Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and Ors., [1977] l SCR 395, a three
· Judge Bench of this Court had to consider the question whether a co- owner
D landlord can be said to require the premises for his own occupation within
the meaning of the expression "if he is the owner" in Section 13 (1) (f) of
the West Bengal Tenancy Act, 1956 which read thus:

"Sec. 13. Protection of tenant against eviction--

E (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other
law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any
premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the
landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the
following grounds, namely--

F (f) where the premises are reasonably required by the
landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding or for
making thereto substantial additions or alterations or for his
own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of
any person for whose benefit the premises are held."

G The Bench which considered the aforesaid question with reference to
the said provision of Rent Control law, expressed its view thereon, thus:

"Jurisprudentially, it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a
property is not its owner. He owns every part of the
composite property along with others and it cannot be said
H that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the
S. F. S. (P) LTD. v. RASULIEE [VENKATACHALA, J.] 237

property. The position will change only when partition takes A
place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission
that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner
of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the
meaning of section 13 (1) (f). It is not necessary to establish
that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the
purpose of section 13 (1) (f) as long as he is a co-owner of B
the property being at the same time the acknowledged
landlord of the defendants......... We are of the opinion that
co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any
sole owner of a property is."

The owner in the expression 'if he is the owner' in Section 13 (1) (f) of C
the West Bengal Tenancy Act, 195.6 when as opined by this Court ought to
be regarded as 'the co-owner; inasmuch as 'the owner', like any sole owner
of property, there would be no justification for us to hold that 'the non-
residential building which is his own' in Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act,
can only be that of its absolute 'owner' and not of its 'co-owner'.
D
Therefore, we have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that the
respondents, who are carrying on the business of Mis Fakruddin and
Company in non-residential building No. I5I, Linghi Chetty Street MadRls,
of which they are co-owners can be regarded as landlords, who are
occupying their own non-residential building envisaged under clause (iii) of E
Section 10 (3) (a) of the Act, as would disentitle them to retain the benefit
of the- eviction order made by the Rent Controller against the tenant in
respect of the petition non-residential building at the instance of the
deceased respondent-I, for carrying on 'his business on the ground that he
did not occupy his own non-residential building for the purpose.
Consequently, the eviction order of the Rent Controller as affirmed by the F
Appellate, Authority and the High Court, which is under challenge in this
appeal, calls to be set aside taking into consideration the developments
which have taken place during its pendency in this Court.

However, it was argued on behaif of respondents 2 to 11 that even if
the non-residential building where respondent- I was carrying on the G
partnership business of Mis Fakruddin and Company, for the carrying on of
which he wanted to get possession of the non-residential building in
occupation of the appellant-tenant had come to be owned by respondents 2
to 11 because of the death of respondent- I during the pendency of the
present appeal, they could not be denied the benefit of eviction order under H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A appeal got by the deceased respondent -I under section IO (3)(a) (iii) of the
Act. What was submitted on behalf of respondents 2 to I I was that a
proceeding for eviction under the Act should be regarded as having created
a vested right when the eviction order of the Controller was affirmed by the
High Court in a revision petition allowed under the Act and an appeal
pending in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution against that
B eviction order, being special appeal provided for under the Constitution
cannot be considered as a continuation eviction proceeding as would entitle
this Court to deny the relief got by a party from the Rent Controller and the
High Court because of the subsequent developments taking place during the
pendency of the appeal in this Court. We find it difficult to accede to the
c said submission ma4e on behalf of respondents 2 to I I in this appeal.

Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act confers a right on a landlord to ~e
advantage of the ground available thereunder to evict his/her tenant from a
non-residential building. The right conferred under that provision of the Act
is not an accrued right. As held by the Privy Council in Abbott v. Ministers
D for Land, [I895] AC 425, that a mere right to take advantage of the
provision of an Act is not an accrued right and this position is accepted by
this Court in Kanaya Ram and Others v. Rajender Kumar and Others,
[ 1985) I sec 436, as well. Therefore, if a landlord under the Act obtains an
eviction order in respect of a non-residential building against the tenant
taking advantage of the right conferred upon him in that regard under
E section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act such eviction order does not create in him
an indefeasible vested right when it has not become final and conclusive,
having become the subject of an appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution, where this Court has the power to annual such eviction order,
if the circumstances so warrant. In Pasupu/eti Venkateswar/u v. The Motor
F and General Trade, [I975] 1SCC770, where a three Judge Bench of this
Court had an occasion to deal about the jurisdiction and property of Court
taking note of the circumstances which come into being after the
commencement of the eviction proceeding under a Rent Control
Legislation, which will have a fundamental impact on the right to relief or

G
the manner of moulding it, explained the legal position thus :
--
" .. It is basic to our processual jl;lrisprudence that the right to
relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes
the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that the
procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial
process. If a fact, arising after the /is has come to court and
H
S. F. S. (P) LTD. v. RASULJEE [VENKATACHALA, J.] 239

has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner A
of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the
tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which
stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies
bending the rules of the procedure, where no specific
provision or fairplay is not violated, with a view to promote
substantial justice- subject, of course, to the absence of B
other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we
contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of
updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation
pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances
repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on C
this point are legion, even as situations for applications of
this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that
for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and
meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the
current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take
cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent D
to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of
fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed ..."

The said legal position adumbrated by the three Judge Bench of this
Court, leaves no room for us to doubt the power of this Court to take note
of the circumstances which have cropped up during the pendency of an E
appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution for granting, denying or
moulding the relief to be given to a party in such appeal, for meeting the
ends of justice. Hence, the power of this Court in an appeal under Article
136 of the Constitution to take cautious congnizance of events and
developments subsequent to institution of eviction proceeding and grant, F
deny, mould the relief sought by a party, in consonance with justice and fair
play is not restricted merely because it is exercising its power to deal with
an appeal conferred upon it by the Constitution.

In the facts of the present case as we have pointed out earlier
respondents 2 to 11 become disentit)ed to obtain eviction order under G
section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act because they are the co-owners of a non-
residential building, where they are carrying on the business of Mis
Fakruddin and Company for carrying on which business the deceased
respondent-I had sought eviction of the. appellant-tenant from another non-
residential building of which also respondents 2 to 11 have become the co-
H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A owners after the demise of respondent- I. Thus, the subsequent
developments which have arisen during the pendency of the present appeal
warrant the setting aside of the eviction order which is questioned in appeal.

In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the eviction order made
against the appellant-tenant by the Rent Controller and the appellate and the
B revisional orders made thereon by the appellate authority and the High
Court, with no costs.

A.G. Appeal allowed.

. ....