Holding

Calling a Scheduled Caste person 'Chamar' with intent to insult or humiliate in a place within public view is an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and the FIR against appellants 2 and 3 stands, while the FIR against appellant 1 is quashed as no prima facie offence is made out.

Summary

The appellants were charged under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 for calling a Scheduled Caste informant "Chamar" (or "Chuda‑Chamar") in what the FIR described as a public setting. The Supreme Court examined whether the term "Chamar" in contemporary usage denotes an insult intended to humiliate, and whether the alleged utterance occurred in a "place within public view" as required by the statute. It held that the popular, derogatory meaning of the word must be considered and that the phrase "place within public view" includes private premises visible to the public, distinct from a "public place". Consequently, the FIR against appellants 2 and 3 was deemed prima facie sufficient to proceed to trial, while no such case was found against appellant 1 because his alleged remarks were not made in public view. The Court therefore quashed the proceedings against appellant 1 and dismissed the appeals of appellants 2 and 3.

Issues considered

Whether the use of the word 'Chamar' constitutes an intentional insult or humiliation of a Scheduled Caste member under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
Whether the alleged utterance was made in a 'place within public view' as required by the statute.
Whether the FIR can be quashed at the pre‑trial stage under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Whether the popular meaning of the term 'Chamar' overrides its etymological meaning for the purpose of statutory interpretation.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Constitution of Indias. Article 21
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 3(1)(x)

Subjects

SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) ActSection 3(1)(x)caste insultChamarpublic viewintent to humiliatequash FIRCriminal Procedure Code 482constitutional equality

Judgment

[2008] 12 S.C.R. 132

l>,
A SWARAN SINGH & ORS.
V.
STATE THROUGH STANDING COUNSEL & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1287 of 2008)
AUGUST 18, 2008
B
[ALTAMAS KABIR AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ.]
1
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989- s. 3 (1) (x) - Charges under- Of three
c accused - For calling a person 'Chamar' - Quashing of
charges sought - Held: Calling a member of Scheduled
Caste as 'Chamar' with intent to insult or humiliate is an of-
fence - Ascertainment of the intent, however, is matter of evi-
dence - 'Chamar' though is name of a Caste, is often used in
derogatory sense - While interpreting the provision popular
D
meaning of the word 'chamar' should be taken into account
and not its etgmological meaning - On perusal of FIR prima
facie a criminal case is made out against accused Nos. 2 and "'":"

3 - The act was done in public view with intent to insult or hu-
miliate the informant- Accused No. 1 though uttered the word
E in derogatory sense, but since it was not done in public view,
he is not liable to be charged -Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 - s. 482 - Constitution of India, 1950 -Article 21.
Words and Phrases - 'Chamar' - Meaning of in the con-
F text of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989. ,.J:-

Appellant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were charged u/s 3 (1) of
Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989, on the basis of FIR alleging that the
G appellants had addressed him as 'Chamar'. Against the
order of framing charges, appellants filed Criminal Revi-
~
sion which was dismissed by High Court. Hence the
present appeal.

H 132
SWARAN SINGH & ORS. v. STATE THROUGH 133
STANDING COUNSEL & ANR.
~"'
Disposing of the appeals, the Court A

HELD: 1.1 It is true that Chamar is the name of a caste
among Hindus who were traditionally persons who made
leather goods by handicraft. However, today the word
'Chamar' is often used by people belonging to the so-
called upper castes or even by OBCs as a word of insult, B

{ abuse and derision. Calling a person 'Chamar' is nowa-
days an abusive language and is highly offensive. In fact,
the word 'Chamar' when used today is not normally used
to denote a caste but to intentionally insult and humiliate
someone. [Paras 13 and 21] [139, B; 141,D] c
'The People of India' by Watson Kaye; 'The Tribes &
Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh' by
W.Crooke; 'The Chamars of Uttar Pradesh' by A.B Mukerji;
'The Chamar Artisans' by Satish Kumar Sharma; 'The Tribes
D
and Castes of the North-Western India' by W. Crooke - re-
>: ferred to
..,.
1.2 While interpreting Section 3(1 )(x) of Schedule
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989, the purpose for which the Act was enacted, has E
to be seen. It was obviously made to prevent indignities,
humiliation and harassment to the members of SC/ST
community, as is evident from the Statement of objects &
reasons of the Act. Hence, while interpreting Section
3(1 )(x) of the Act, the popular meaning of the word 'Chamar' F
~ is to be taken into account, which it has acquired by us-
age, and not the etymological meaning. If one goes by
the etymological meaning, the very object of the Act would
be frustated, and hence that would not be a correct man-
ner of interpretation. [Para 22] [141,E-F]
G
1.3 Calling a member of the Scheduled Caste 'Chamar'
+ with intent to insult or humiliate him in a place within pub-
lie view is certainly an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of
the Act. Whether there was intent to insult or humiliate by
using the word 'Chamar' will of course depend on the con- H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 12 S.C.R.

A text in which it was used. The SC/ST communities are also ~

equal citizens of the country, and are entitled to a life of
dignity in view of Article 21 of the Constitution. [Paras 24
and 29] [142,C; 143,F]
2.1 At this stage all that the High Court can see in the
B petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or in a writ petition, is
whether on a perusal of the FIR, treating the allegations to
).
be correct, a criminal offence is prima facie made out or not
or whether there is any statutory bar. A perusal of the FIR
clearly shows that, prima facie, an offence is made out
c against the appellants 2 and 3. Treating the allegations in
the FIR to be correct an offence under Section 3(1 )(x) of
the Act is prima facie made out against appellants 2 and 3
because it prima facie seems that the intent of the appel-
lants was to insult or humiliate the first informant, and this
D was done within the public view. The trial has still to be
held and the appellants will have an opportunity of estab-
lishing their innocence
. .in the trial. However, at this stage
')(

y.
the FIR against them cannot be quashed and the trial must
proceed. [Paras 8, 25 and 26] [137,H; 138,A; 142,D-E-F]
E Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC
736; State of Orissa vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC
540 - referred to
2.2 It is not correct to say that the alleged act was not
F committed in a public place and hence does not come
within the purview of section 3(1 )(x) of the Act. The provi- .):-
sion does not use the expression 'public place', but instead
the expression used is 'in any place within public view'.
There is a clear distinction between the two expressions.
A place can be a private place but yet within the public view.
G
On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a
place which is owned or leased by the Government or the _;f..
municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an in-
strumentality of the State, and not by private persons or
private bodies. [Paras 27 and 28] [142,G-H; 143,D-E]
H
-"I
SWARAN SINGH & ORS. v. STATE THROUGH 135
STANDING COUNSEL & ANR. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
,.,..
3. It is eviden_t from a perusal of the FIR that appel- A
lant No. 1 joined appellant Nos. 2 and 3 in insulting the
informant, and he also used the word 'Chamar' in a de-
rogatory sense. However, a perusal of the F.l.R. shows
that he did not use these offensive words in the public
view. There is nothing in the F.l.R. to show that any mem- B
ber of the public was present when he uttered these
words, or that the place where he uttered them was a place

• which ordinarily could be seen by the public. Hence, no
prima facie offence is made out against appellant No.1.
[Paras 33 and 34] [144,F-H] c
Case Law Reference
(2005) 13 sec 540 Referred to Para 8
(2006) s sec 736 Referred to Para 8
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal D
'i No. 1287 of 2008
"" From the final Judgment and Order dated 22.1.2007 of
the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Revision Peti-
tion No. 285-287 of 2006
E
Gaurav Bhatia, Abhishek Chaudhary and Samir Ali for the
Appellants.
Ashok Bhan, Asha G. Nair, D.S. Mahra and Vinay Kumar
Garg for the Respondents.
F
,.1...,
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MARKANDEY KATJU, J. 1. Le~ve granted.
2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judg-
ment & order dated 22.01.2007 passed by the High Court of G
_i Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 285-287 of 2006.
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.

4. Appellant No. 1 Swaran Singh is the husband of appel-
H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

~
A lant No. 2, Smt. Simran Kaur and father of appellant No. 3, Ms.
Tarjeet. They· reside on the first floor of the premises M-39,
Greater Kailash-11, New Delhi. The ground floor of the said pre-
mises was occupied by one Shri Umesh Gupta, a business-
man.
B 5. It appears that an FIR at Police Station C.R. Park, New
Delhi was filed against the appellants by one Vinod Nagar. The )__
FIR read as follows:
f-
''To
c SHO
P.S. Chittaranjan Park
New Delhi.

D Sub: Complaint against Smt. Simran Kaur and her
daughter resident of M-39, 1st floor, G.K.-11, New Delhi
:.
Sir, f.
I, Vinod Nagar S/o Sh. Ram Singh Nagar R/o A-113,
Dakshin Puri, New Delhi and work with Sh. Umesh Gupta
E
at M-39, Ground Floor G.K.-11 as driver since last one year.
I belong to Khatik Caste. I usually stand near the Car which
is parked at the gate. Smt. Sim ran Kaur and her daughter
(whose name I do not know but I can identify her) whenever
cross near by since last 15-20 days speak that I am a
F chuda-chamar and whenever they come I should not come
).
in the way. It hurts my emotion and when I tried to tell this
to her husband Sh. Sarwan Singh he also said that you
are actually a chuda-chamar and hence they are not saying
anything wrong. When I told happening to my employer
G Sh. Umesh Gupta and he talked to Sardar Sarwan Singh
and on this Sarwan Singh misbehaved and said that he
~-
will not let we people stay there. I also came to know that
Sarwan Singh has filed a Court case against my employer
Sh. Umesh Gupta. I did not complain earlier because this
H man may stop saying these words to me. About today on
SWARAN SINGH & ORS. v. STATE THROUGH 137
STANDING COUNSEL &ANR. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
,:..·
10.122004 around 8.45 a.m. in the morning when I came A
to duties to the house of Sh. Umesh Gupta Ji, I took the
keys and started cleaning the vehicle. At that time both
mother and daughter threw dirty water on me and said
that chuda-chamar why did you come and Simran Kaur

-
-<.
said that at this time when her daughter goes to office B
-...,/

.. therefore by putting this water on me they were making
1- me to take bath. I have become tense due to this act of
their and I feel that I should quit this job but I belong to a
poor family and job is my compulsion. Even finding another
., I
t job is not so easy. When the water was thrown on me at
that time guard Albis and Ohan Singh driver were also
c
present. It is therefore requested that you should take an
appropriate ·action against the above-mentioned persons.
I shall be thankful to you.
Thanks D

. Vined Nagar
' ... s/o Sh. Ram Singh R/oA-113
Dakshin Puri
New Delhi".
E
6. On the basis of the said FIR investigation was done
and a charge-sheet dated 14.6.2005 was filed against the ap-
pellants under section 3(1 )(x) of The Scheduled Castes and
The Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (here-
in after referred to as the Act). F
~ 7. Thereafter, by the order dated 14.3.2006 charges were
.... framed against the appellants. Against the order of framing
'
I
charges Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 285-287 of 2006 were
{
filed in the Delhi High Court which were dismissed by the im-
pugned judgment. Hence, this appeal by Special Leave. G

4
8. It may be noted that the trial has still to be held and the
'·
appellants will have an opportunity of establishing their inno-
cence in the trial. At this stage all that the High Court can see in
~

' the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or in a writ petition, is
H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A whether on a perusal of the FIR, treating the allegations to be
correct, a criminal offence is prima facie made out or not or
whether there is any statutory bar vide Indian Oil Corporation
vs. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736 (vide para 12), State of
Orissa vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540 (vide paras ·
1
B 9 and 10), etc. At this stage the correctness or otherwise of the f--
allegations in the FIR has not to be seen by the High Court, and
that will be seen at the trial. It has to be seen whether on a pe-
rusal of the FIR a prima facie offence is made out or not.
9. A perusal of the FIR shows that the first informant Vinod
C Nagar belongs to the Scheduled Caste. He has alleged in the ~-

FIR 'that appellant Nos. 2 & 3 Swaran Singh and her daughter
Ms. Tarjeet told him whenever they come near him for the last
15 to 20 days that he is a Chuda-Chamar and he should not
come in tlieir way. When Vinod Nagar complained about this to
D appellant No. 1 Swaran Singht, he also said that Vinod Nagar
actually is a Chuda~ Chamar and that appellant Nos 2 and 3
did not say anything wrong.
10. It is also alleged in the FIR that Smt. Simran Kaur and
her dauther Ms. Tarjeet threw dirty water on the first informant
E and said 'Chuda-Chamar why did you come .. .'.
11. The question which arises for consideration in this case
is whether prima facie an offence has been committed under
section 3( 1)(x) of the Act. Section 3( 1)(x) states :
F "(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe, -
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
G Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
Shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be· 1ess than six months but which ..-
may extend to five years and with fine."
12. The question in this case is whether calling a person
H
SWARAN SINGH & ORS. v. STATE THROUGH 139
STANDING COUNSEL & ANR. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
"" 'Chama!' amounts to intentionally insulting with intent to humiliate A
a member of the Scheduled Caste.
13. It is true that Chamar is the name of a caste among
Hindus who were traditionally persons who made leather goods
by handicraft [vide the People of India by Watson Kaye, the
Tribes & Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh B
j.. by W Crooke, The Chamars of Uttar Pradesh by A.B Mukerji,
The Chamar Artisans by Satish Kumar Sharma, The Tribes
and Castes of the North-Western India by W Crooke etc.].
The word 'chamar' is derived from the Hindi word·~· which
means leather. c
14. Before the coming of the British into India, the Chamars
were a stable socio-economic group who were engaged in
manufacturing leather goods by handicraft. As is well-known,
feudal society was characterized by the feudal occupational
D
division of labour in society. In other words, every vocation or
....,. occupation in India became a caste e.g. Dhobi (washerman),
Badhai (carpenter), Lohar (blacksmith), Kumbhar (potter) etc.
The same was the position in other countries also during feudal
times. Thus, even now many Britishers have the surname Baker,
Butcher, Taylor, Smith, Carpenter, Gardener, Mason, Turner, etc. E
which shows that their ancestors belonged to these professions.
15. It is estimated that before the coming of the British
into India about 40% of the population of India was engaged in
industry while the rest of the population was engaged in agri- F
<
-+-- culture. This industry was no doubt handicraft industry, and not
mill industry. Nevertheless, there was a very high level produc-
tion of goods in India by these handicraft industries before the
coming of the British, and many of these goods were exported
often up to Europe, the Middle East, China, etc. e.g. Dacca
G
Muslin, Murshidabad silk, and other kind of textiles, etc.
-+-
16. A rough and ready test of the level of economic devel-
opment of a country is to find out how much percentage of the
population is engaged in industry, and how much in agriculture.
The greater the percentage of population in industry and lesser H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

· A in agriculture the more prosperous the country. Thus, the U.S.A.,
the most prosperous country in the world today has only about
2 or 3% of its population in agriculture, while the rest is in indus-
try or services.
· 17. India was a relatively prosperous country before the
B coming of the British because a high percentage of the people
(which could be up to 40%) was engaged at that time in indus-
try (though no doubt this was handicraft industry, not mill ind us-
.try). Thus, Lord Clive around 1757 (when the battle of Plassey
was fought) described Murshidabad (which was then the capi-
C tal of Bengal) as a city more prosperous than London, vide
'Glimpses of World History' by Jawaharlal Nehru (Third Impres-
sion p.416,. chapter entitled 'The Indian Artisan goes to the wall').
18. When the British conquered India they introduced the
products of their mill industry into India, and exorbitantly raised
0
the export"duties on the Indian handicraft products. Thereby they ·
practically destroyed "the handicraft industry in India. The result
was that by the end of the British rule hardly 10% or even less of
the population of India was still in the handicraft industry, and
the rest of those who were earlier engaged in the handicraft
E industry were made unemployed. In this way about 30% of the
population of India who were employed in handicraft industry
became unemployed, and were driven to starvation, destitu-
tion, beggary or crime (the thugs and 'criminal' tribes were re-
ally these unemployed sections of society). As an English ~ov-
F ernor General wrote in 1.834, 'the bones of the cotton weavers
are bleaching the plains of India'.
19. In this connection it may be noted that in the revenue
· records in many states in our country one often finds recorded :
G 'A son of B, caste lohar (smith), vocatioA agriculture'; or 'C son
of D, caste badhai (carpenter), vocation agriculture', or 'E son
of H, caste kumhar (potter), vocation agriculture', etc. This indi-
cates thafthe ancestors ofthese persons we.re in those profes-
sions, bu-t later they became unemployed as British mill indus-
try destroyed.·their handicraft. Some people think that if the Brit-
H
SWARAN SINGH & ORS. v. STATE THROUGH 141
STANDING COUNSEL & ANR. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
~
ish had not come into India an indigenous mill industry would A
have developed in India, and India would have become an In-
dustrial State by the 191h Century, like North America or Europe,
but it is not necessary to go into this here.

I
20. The Chamars also suffered terribly during this period.
~
The British industries e.g. Bata almost completely destroyed B
!
, the vocation of the Chamars, with the result that while they were
.r
a relatively respectable section of society before the coming of
British rule (because they could earn their livelihood through
manufacture of leather goods) subsequently they sank in the
social ladder and went down to the lowest strata in society, be- c
cause they lost their livelihood and became unemployed.
21. Today the word 'Chamar'- is often used by people be-
longing to the so-called upper castes or even by OBCs as a word
• of insult, abuse and derision. Calling a person 'C/Jamar' is nowa-
~
D
days an abusive language and is highly offensi\ e. In fact, the word
~
.,,. 'Chamar' when used today is not normally used to denote a cable
but to intentionally insult and humiliate someone.
22. It may be mentioned that when we interpret section

a 3(1)(x) of the Act we have to see the purpose for which the Act
was enacted. It was obviously made to prevent indignities, hu-
miliation and harassment to the members of SC/ST commu-
E

nity, as is evident from the Statement of Objects & Reasons of
the Act. Hence, while interpreting sectior. 3(1 )(x) of the Act, we
have to take into account the popular meaning of the word F
~ 'Chamar,' which it has acquired by usage, and not the etymo-
logical meaning. lfwe go by the etymological meaning, we may
frustrate the very object of the Act, and hence that would not be
a correct manner of interpretation.
23. This is the age of democracy and equality. No people G
J... or community should be today insulted or looked down upon.
and nobody's feelings should be hu.rt. This is also the spmt of
our Constitution ·and is part of its basic features. Hence, in our
opinion, the so-called upper castes and OBCs should not use
the word 'Chamar' when addressing a member of the Sched- H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 12 S.C.R.

~
A uled Caste, even if that person in fact belongs to the 'Chamar'
caste, because use of such a word will hurt his feelings. In such
a country like ours with so much diversity - so many religions,
castes, ethnic and lingual groups, etc. - all communities and
~·
groups must be treated with respect, and no one should be /

B looked down upon as an inferior. That is the only way we can
keep our country united.
~
24. In our opinion, calling a member of the Scheduled Caste
'Chamar' with intent to insult or humiliate him in a place within
public view is certainly an offence under section 3(1 )(x) of the
c Act. Whether there was intent to insult or humiliate by using the
word 'Chamar' will of course depend on the context in which it
was used.
25. A perusal ofthe FIR clearly shows that, prima facie, an
D
offence is made out against the appellants 2 and 3. As already r
stated above, at this stage we have not to see whether the alle-
gations in the FIR are correct or not. We have only to see whether
treating the FIR allegations as correct an offence is made out
"'
~1

or not. In our opinion, treating the allegations in the FIR to be
correct an offence under section 3(1 )(x) of the Act is prima fa- )

E cie made out against appellants 2 and 3 because it prima facie
seems that the intent of the appellants was to insult or humiliate
~
the first informant, and this was done within the public view.
26. Of course, it will be open to the appellants 2 and 3 to
F put up their defence at the trial, and the trial court may or may
not accept the correctness of the allegations in the FIR. How- ,J-
ever, at this stage we cannot quash the FIR against them and
the trial must proceed.
27. Learned counsel then contended that the alleged act
G was not committed in a public place and hence does not come
within the purview of section 3(1 )(x) of the Act. In this connec- ...l_

tion it may be noted that the aforesaid provision does not use
the expression 'public place', but instead the expression used
is 'in any place within public view'. In our opinion there is a clear
H distinction between the two expressions.
SWARAN SINGH & ORS. v. STATE THROUGH 143
STANDING COUNSEL & ANR. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]

28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the A
first informant, was insulted by appellants 2 and 3 (by calling
him a 'Chamar') when he stood near the car which was parked
at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a
place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a
place within public view. It could have been a different matter s
had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and
. j... also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is com-
mitted outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and
the lawn can be seen by someone from ·the road or lane out-
side the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within c
the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a build-
ing, but some members of the public are there (not merely rela-
tives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the
public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression
'place within public view' with the expression 'public place'. A
0
place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On
the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place
which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipal-
ity (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of
the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.
E
29. Our Constitution provides for equality which includes
special help and care for the oppressed and weaker sections ·-
of society who have been historically down trodden. The SC/
ST communities in our opinion are also equal citizens of the
country, and are entitled to a life of dignity in view of Article 21 of F
the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. In the age of de-
mocracy no people and no community should be treated as
being inferior. However, the truth is that in many parts of our
country persons belonging to SC/ST are oppressed, humiliated
and -insulted. This is a disgrace to our country.
G
30. In this connection it may be mentioned that in America
I ....). to use the word 'Nigger' today for an African-American is re-
garded as highly offensive and is totally unacceptable, even if it
was acceptable 50 years ago. In our opinion, even if the word
'Chamar' was not regarded offensive at one time in our coun- H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.
...'
'

A try, today it is certainly a highly offensive word when used in a -,:.
derogatory sense to insult and humiliate a person. Hence, it
should never be used with that intent. The use of the word
'Chamar' will certainly attract section 3(1 )(x) of the Act, if from
the context it appears that it was used in a derogatory sense to
B insult or humiliate a member of the SC/ST.
31. The caste system is a curse on our nation and the
sooner it is destroyed the better. In fact it is dividing our country ~
at a time when we must all be united as Indians if we wish to
face the gigantic problems confronting us e.g. poverty, unem-
c ployment, price rise, corruption, etc. The Scheduled Castes and
The Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is a
salutary legislative measure in that direction .
.32. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that so
far as appellant No. 1, Swaran Singh is concerned, his case
D
even treaUng the allegations in the FIR to be correct, does not
attract section 3(1 )(x) of the Act. Learned counsel submitted
that in the FIR it is mentioned that when the first informant Vinod ~
"""·
Nagar complained to appellant No.1, Swaran Singh that his wife
and daughter were insulting him by calling him 'Chuda-
E Chamar', Swaran Singh said that actually he (Vi nod Nagar) is
a 'Chuda-Chamar' and hence they did not say anything wrong.
33. We have already stated above that in today's context
even calling a person 'Chamar' ordinarily amounts to intention-
f ally insulting that person with intent to humiliate him. It is evident
from a perusal of the FIR that appellant No. 1, Swaran Singh
joined his wife and daughter in insulting Vinod Nagar, and he
>
also used the word 'Chamar' in a derogatory sense.
34. However, a perusal of the F.l.R. shows that Swaran
G Singh did not use these offensive words in the public view. There
~{
is nothing in the F.l.R. to show that any member of the public
_......_ \
was present when Swaran Singh uttered these words, or that
thE:; place where he uttered them was a piace which ordinarily
could be seen by the public. Hence in -our opinion no prima
H facie offence is made out against appellant no.1.
SWARAN SINGH & ORS. v. STATE THROUGH 145
STANDING COUNSEL & ANR. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]

> 35. The High Court in the impugned judgment has ob- A
served (in paragraph 16) that the question whether the appel-
lants indeed uttered the offending words with intention to hu-
miliate the complainant, are matters of evidence. We fully agree
with this view. Hence, we find no merit in the appeals of appel-
lants 2 and 3, and they are accordingly dismissed. However, B
the appeal of appellant No.1 is allowed, and the proceedings
against him are quashed. There will be no order as to costs.
K.K.T. Appeals disposed of.