TAHIR V. ISANIversusMADAN WAMAN CHODANKAR, (SINCE DECEASED) NOW THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES & ORS.

         [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2810 : 2025 INSC 1044

                 Tahir V. Isani
                       v.
   Madan Waman Chodankar, (Since Deceased)
  Now Through His Legal Representatives & Ors.
               (Civil Appeal No. 6391 of 2025)
                          06 May 2025
        [Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]


                    Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in holding that since the
appellant was a transferee pendent lite of judgment debtor,
therefore, in view of provisions of Rule 102 of Or.XXI of CPC, the
application filed by the appellant under Rules 97 and 101 of Or.XXI
CPC was not maintainable.

                           Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXI, RR.97, 98, 99, 100,
101, 102 – In 1996, respondent no.1-tenant filed a special civil
suit no.97/1996/B against MK for dissolution of partnership,
recovery of profit and ejectment – No issues relating to
ownership of the property which was leased out to respondent
no.1 – Appellant herein had purchased the said property not
from any party to the said suit, i.e. the plaintiff or defendant,
but from owner M/s. R Pvt. Ltd., who was not a party to the
proceedings – In the said suit decree was granted in favour
of respondent no.1 – Respondent no.1 filed an application
for execution of decree – Appellant moved an application
u/Or.XXI, Rules 97 and 101 of CPC objecting to execution of
decree – Application of respondent no.1 was dismissed by
the Executing Court – Aggrieved, decree-holder preferred
writ petition – The High Court set aside the order of
the Executing Court and it also closed the enquiry –
Correctness:
Held: The Executing Court was right in rejecting the application
of respondent no.1 – The appellant in the present case does
not trace his title from the judgment-debtor, i.e. the MK and
therefore, he is not a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-
debtor – The appellant is a bona fide buyer who had bought
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                             2811

     Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, (Since Deceased)
            Now Through His Legal Representatives & Ors.

     the suit property from M/s R Pvt. Ltd., vide registered sale
     deed dated 24.04.2007, who traced their title from the original
     owner, Mrs. M, vide registered sale deed dated 16.01.1988 –
     The transferor, M/s R Pvt. Ltd., of the appellant was not a
     party to the suit bearing Special Civil Suit No. 97/1996/B, the
     decree of which has been put to execution – They were third
     party, having received the ownership rights from the original
     owner in 1988 – Thus, even if the appellant did buy the subject-
     property in 2007, during the pendency of the suit between the
     MK and the present respondents, the bar of Rule 102 of Order
     XXI does not affect or prohibit the appellant from raising his
     objections before the Executing Court under Rules 97 and
     101 and subsequently receive its adjudication under Rules 98
     and 100 – Thus, the impugned order of the High Court is set
     aside and the Executing Court is directed to proceed with the
     enquiry – The Executing Court is directed to decide the application
     u/Or.XXI, Rules 97 and 101 CPC on its own merits. [Paras 14-16]

     Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI, R.102 – Scope
     of – Discussed:
     Held: The whole scheme of Rule 102 of Order XXI intends to
     preserve the idea of achieving finality of the judicial decisions –
     The provision imbibes the principle of “interest reipublicae ut
     sit finis litium” i.e., it is in the interest of the State that there
     should be an end to litigation – In a suit pending between a
     plaintiff and a defendant as to the right to a particular estate,
     the decision of the court in that case shall be binding not only
     on the litigating parties, but also on those who derive title
     under them by alienations (transfer) made while the suit was
     pending, whether such alienees, i.e. transferees, had or had
     not notice of the pending proceedings – Therefore, Rule 102 of
     Order XXI intends to protect the interests of the decree-holder
     against the attempts of unscrupulous judgment-debtors and their
     subsequent transferees who indulge in activities and leave no
     stone unturned to deprive the decree-holders from reaping the
     benefits of the decree granted in their favour – The Rule being
     equitable in nature, therefore, estops further creation of rights as
     it explicitly states that nothing in Rules 98 and 100 shall apply
     to the resistance or obstruction being made by the transferee
     pendente lite of judgment-debtor. [Para 9]
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                         Supreme Court Reports


    Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI, R.102 – Ingredients
    of – Discussed:
    Held: Rule 102 of Order XXI expressly lays down the ingredients as
    to when it can be applied – For a case to fall under Rule 102, it is
    a condition precedent that there exists a decree for the possession
    of immovable property – Secondly, there must be a resistance or
    an obstruction in the execution of the said decree – Thirdly, such
    obstruction or resistance must be made by a person to whom the
    judgment-debtor has transferred the property – Fourthly, such
    transfer must have occurred after the institution of the original
    suit, i.e. the one in which the decree was passed – If the aforesaid
    ingredients are made out, Rule 102 prohibits the protection of
    Rules 98 and 101 to such errant transferee of judgment-debtor –
    The transferee of a judgment-debtor who traces his title to the
    immovable property, that is the subject matter of a pending suit,
    is not entitled to seek the remedy available under Rules 97 to 102
    of Order XXI – However, Rule 102 of Order XXI applies only to a
    person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the immovable
    property which was subject matter of that suit pendente lite – If the
    person who is resisting or obstructing the execution of the decree
    for possession of such property, is not the transferee of judgment
    debtor, i.e. he does not trace his title from judgment-debtor, bar
    of Rule 102 does not apply to him. [Paras 11, 13]

                             Case Law Cited
    Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram and Others [2008] 4 SCR 1192 : (2008)
    7 SCC 144; Jini Dhanrajgir and Another v. Shibu Mathew and
    Another [2023] 5 SCR 551 : (2023) 20 SCC 76 – relied on.
    Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 1 De G & J 566 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
    Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Transfer of Property, 1882.

                             List of Keywords
    Order XXI, R.97; Order XXI, R.102; Transferee pendente lite of
    the judgment-debtor; Execution; Title to the immovable property;
    Equitable; Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; Objections before
    the Executing Court; Ingredients of Order XXI, Rule 102; Resistance
    or Obstruction.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                        2813

       Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, (Since Deceased)
              Now Through His Legal Representatives & Ors.

                                        Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6391 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2022 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Bombay at Goa in WP No. 86 of 2022

                                    Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Ninad Laud, Ivo Dcosta, Guruprasad Naik, Ms. Ishani Shekhar,
       Sahil Tagotra.
       Advs. for the Respondents:
       Yashraj Singh Deora, Sr. Adv., Priyesh Mohan Srivastava, M/S.
       Mitter & Mitter Co..

                       Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                                Order

1.     Leave granted.
2.     This appeal assails the correctness of judgment and order dated
       25th July, 2022, passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa1 in
       Writ Petition No.86 of 2022, whereby the learned Single Judge
       allowed the writ petition, and after setting aside the order dated
       17th September, 2021, passed by the Executing Court, allowed
       the application Ext.D-100 dated 22nd October, 2019, and thereby
       discontinued the enquiry under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 of the
       Code of Civil Procedure, 19082. The above impugned order was
       passed placing reliance upon the provisions contained in Order XXI
       Rule 102 of the CPC.
3.     Relevant facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal are
       as under: -
       3.1 Mrs. Maria Eduardo Apolina Gonsalves Misquita was the owner
           of plot of land measuring 477 square meters with a two-floor
           building ground + first standing thereon registered at No.1624,



1    Hereinafter, referred to as ‘High Court’
2    In short, “CPC”
2814                                                     [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                       Supreme Court Reports


         Book No.B(5)(new), page-156 (reverse) in the Land Registration
         Office, Panaji bearing Matriz No.958.
    3.2 A part of the aforesaid property on the ground floor, measuring
        123 square meters with plinth area and approximately 89.78
        square meters area of building, was leased out on rent to
        Madan Waman Chodankar (respondent no.1), vide deed dated
        22nd February, 1977.
    3.3 Later on, respondent no.1 entered into a partnership on 13th
        March, 1977 with Dyaneshwar Keshav Malik and others (‘Maliks’)
        for setting up a hardware business and other allied products.
        The business of the said firm was to be carried out from a
        portion of the aforesaid leased premises. However, the tenancy
        as per the partnership was to continue with respondent no.1.
    3.4 The original owner, Mrs. Misquita, vide registered sale deed
        dated 16th January, 1988, sold the entire property to M/s. Rizvi
        Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Thereafter, an agreement was
        executed between the purchaser, M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels
        Pvt. Ltd and the Maliks (sub-lessee) for surrendering the
        possession in order to enable the purchaser to demolish the
        building, construct a new multi-storied building and thereafter
        provide space to the sub-lessee upon construction of the new
        building and in the meantime provide alternate space to the
        sub-lessee. In the said document of 16th April, 1988 respondent
        no.1 was a confirming party.
    3.5 Respondent no.1 filed a Regular Civil Suit No.112/88/C for
        injunction against M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. as they
        sought to demolish portion of the building apparently in the light
        of the agreement dated 16th April, 1988. In 1989, M/s. Rizvi
        Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. preferred an application for eviction
        of respondent no.1 before the Court of Rent Controller being
        Rent Case No.17 of 1989 alleging that there has been sub-
        letting by respondent no.1 to Maliks, which was contrary to the
        lease deed dated 22nd February, 1977.
    3.6 In 1996, respondent no.1 filed a Special Civil Suit No.97/1996/B
        against Maliks for dissolution of partnership, recovery of profit
        and ejectment. The written statement filed by Maliks in the
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                     2815

     Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, (Since Deceased)
            Now Through His Legal Representatives & Ors.

           said suit clearly stated that all parties had surrendered their
           rights in favour of M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. on
           11th April, 1988.
     3.7 Meanwhile, the Court of Civil Judge, Jr. Division, vide judgment
         dated 22nd July, 1999, decreed the injunction suit filed by
         respondent no.1 and restrained M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt.
         Ltd. from demolishing the building. The decree and judgment of
         the Civil Judge was carried in appeal by way of Regular Civil
         Appeal No.91/99, which was dismissed, vide order dated 24th
         December, 2001.
     3.8 M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd., vide registered sale
         deed dated 24th April, 2007, sold the property in question to
         the appellant, Tahir V. Isani. Thereafter, the Maliks executed a
         surrender deed on 5th October, 2007 in favour of the appellant
         after accepting Rs.10 lakhs.
     3.9 The Trial Court hearing, the suit for dissolution of the
         partnership and eviction of Maliks decreed the Special Civil Suit
         No.97/1996/B in favour of the respondent no.1 (being decree-
         holder now), vide an ex parte judgment dated 24th April, 2008,
         as the Maliks did not contest the suit any further.
    3.10 Respondent no.1 filed an application for execution of the decree
         dated 24th April, 2008, which was registered as Execution
         Application No.22 of 2008 (B). In February 2009, the appellant
         moved an application under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 of CPC
         objecting to the execution of the decree. The said application
         was opposed by the respondent no.1.
    3.11 The appellant applied for framing of issues on 18th August, 2011.
         The Executing Court while framing issues, vide order dated 5th
         September, 2013, dealt with the issue relating to Section 52 of
         the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 on the ground that that the
         sale deed dated 24th April, 2007, was prior to the decree and
         further noted that the tenancy rights had been surrendered by
         a written agreement dated 11th April, 1988.
    3.12 The evidence was being recorded in the proceedings under
         Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 of CPC, in which the statement
         of the appellant was also recorded sometime around 2019. It
2816                                                          [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


            was at this stage, i.e. after ten years, that the legal heirs of
            respondent no.1, who were brought on record on account of
            his death, moved an application to discontinue the enquiry
            on the basis of doctrine of lis pendens. The Executing Court
            dismissed the application of the respondent, vide order dated
            17th September, 2021. Aggrieved, the decree-holder preferred
            Writ Petition No.86 of 2022, which has since been allowed by
            the impugned order dated 25th July, 2022. Hence, the appellant
            is before us.
4.   This Court while issuing notice on 2 nd September, 2022 had
     passed an order of status quo of possession with regard to the suit
     property.
5.   We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
     material on record. Before proceeding further, it would be worthwhile
     to briefly refer to the findings recorded by the Executing Court while
     dismissing the application dated 20th December, 2019, and also the
     findings recorded by the High Court in the impugned order dated
     25th July, 2022.
6.   The Executing Court recorded the following reasons: -
     i.     The suit in question i.e. 97/1996/B was only for dissolution of
            partnership and recovery of profits and ejectment. It did not
            deal with the title to the property in question.
     ii.    There was no issue relating to ownership of the said property
            as admittedly respondent no.1 had claimed to be a tenant under
            a lease deed dated 22nd February, 1977 and subsequently,
            having sub-let the same had formed a partnership with Maliks.
     iii.   The appellant had purchased the property not from any party
            to the said suit, i.e. the plaintiff or the defendant, but from the
            owner M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd., who was not a
            party to the proceedings in which decree was granted in favour
            of respondent no. 1.
     iv.    The appellant being the owner of the property in question had
            a right to raise objection under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 of
            CPC and the Executing Court was bound to enquire into and
            thus, adjudicate upon the said objection.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                          2817

       Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, (Since Deceased)
              Now Through His Legal Representatives & Ors.

      v.     It relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Dev Raj
             Dogra and others v. Gyan Chand Jain and others3 and
             concluded that the doctrine of lis pendens was not applicable
             to the present case and, therefore, the enquiry should be
             continued and brought to its logical conclusion.
7.    The High Court was of the view that since the appellant was a
      transferee pendente lite of judgment debtor, therefore, in view of
      provisions of Rule 102 of Order XXI of CPC, the application filed
      by the appellant under Rules 97 and 101 of Order XXI CPC was
      not maintainable. It accordingly allowed the writ petition filed by
      respondent no. 1, and set aside the order of the Executing Court dated
      17th September, 2021, thereby allowing the application, Ext.D-100
      and closing the enquiry.
8.    In order to appreciate the controversy at hand, we deem it fit to
      reproduce hereinbelow the relevant provisions of Order XXI of CPC
      as applicable to the present case: -
              “Resistance of delivery of possession to decree-holder
                                   or purchaser
             97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of
             immovable property.—(1) Where the holder of a
             decree for the possession of immovable property or
             the purchaser of any such property sold in execution
             of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in
             obtaining possession of the property, he may make an
             application to the Court complaining of such resistance
             or obstruction.
             (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the
             Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in
             accordance with the provisions herein contained.
             98. Orders after adjudication.—(1) Upon the determination
             of the questions referred to in rule 101, the Court shall,
             in accordance with such determination and subject to the
             provisions of sub-rule (2),—


3    (1981) 2 SCC 675
2818                                                    [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                      Supreme Court Reports


             (a) make an order allowing the application and
             directing that the applicant be put into the possession
             of the property or dismissing the application; or
             (b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances
             of the case, it may deem fit.
        (2) Where, upon such determination, the Court is satisfied
        that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without
        any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some
        other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by
        any transferee, where such transfer was made during
        the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it
        shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of
        the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or
        obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at
        the instance of the applicant, order the judgment-debtor,
        or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf,
        to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may
        extend to thirty days.
        99. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser.—
        (1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor
        is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of
        a decree for the possession of such property or, where
        such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by
        the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the
        Court complaining of such dispossession.
        (2) Where any such application is made, the Court shall
        proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance
        with the provisions herein contained.
        100. Order to be passed upon application complaining
        of dispossession.—Upon the determination of the
        questions referred to in rule 101, the Court shall, in
        accordance with such determination,—
             (a) make an order allowing the application and
             directing that the applicant be put into the possession
             of the property or dismissing the application; or
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                               2819

       Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, (Since Deceased)
              Now Through His Legal Representatives & Ors.

                    (b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances
                    of the case, it may deem fit.
             101. Question to be determined.—All questions (including
             questions relating to right, title or interest in the property)
             arising between the parties to a proceeding on an
             application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives,
             and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall
             be determined by the Court dealing with the application
             and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court
             shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
             in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed
             to have jurisdiction to decide such questions.
             102. Rules not applicable to transferee lite pendente.—
             Nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or
             obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of
             immovable property by a person to whom the judgement-
             debtor has transferred the property after the institution
             of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the
             dispossession of any such person.
             Explanation.—In this rule, “transfer” includes a transfer
             by operation of law.”
9.    The whole scheme of Rule 102 of Order XXI intends to preserve
      the idea of achieving finality of the judicial decisions. The provision
      imbibes the principle of “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e., it
      is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation.
      In a suit pending between a plaintiff and a defendant as to the right
      to a particular estate, the decision of the court in that case shall
      be binding not only on the litigating parties, but also on those who
      derive title under them by alienations (transfer) made while the suit
      was pending, whether such alienees, i.e. transferees, had or had not
      notice of the pending proceedings. In this regard, we are benefitted by
      the decision of this Court in Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram and others4,
      where this Court had the occasion to deal with the scheme of Rule
      102 of Order XXI, and held that: -


4    (2008) 7 SCC 144
2820                                                     [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                       Supreme Court Reports


         “17. Rule 102 clarifies that Rules 98 and 100 of Order
         21 of the Code do not apply to transferee pendente lite.
         That Rule is relevant and material and may be quoted in
         extenso:
              “102. Rules not applicable to transferee
              pendente lite.—Nothing in Rules 98 and 100
              shall apply to resistance or obstruction in
              execution of a decree for the possession of
              immovable property by a person to whom the
              judgment-debtor has transferred the property
              after the institution of the suit in which the
              decree was passed or to the dispossession of
              any such person.”
         Bare reading of the Rule makes it clear that it is based
         on justice, equity and good conscience. A transferee
         from a judgment-debtor is presumed to be aware of
         the proceedings before a court of law. He should be
         careful before he purchases the property which is the
         subject-matter of litigation. It recognises the doctrine of
         lis pendens recognised by Section 52 of the Transfer of
         Property Act, 1882. Rule 102 of Order 21 of the Code thus
         takes into account the ground reality and refuses to extend
         helping hand to purchasers of property in respect of which
         litigation is pending. If unfair, inequitable or undeserved
         protection is afforded to a transferee pendente lite, a
         decree-holder will never be able to realise the fruits
         of his decree. Every time the decree-holder seeks
         a direction from a court to execute the decree, the
         judgment-debtor or his transferee will transfer the
         property and the new transferee will offer resistance
         or cause obstruction. To avoid such a situation, the
         Rule has been enacted.”
                                             (emphasis supplied)

    Therefore, Rule 102 of Order XXI intends to protect the interests of
    the decree-holder against the attempts of unscrupulous judgment-
    debtors and their subsequent transferees who indulge in activities
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                         2821

      Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, (Since Deceased)
             Now Through His Legal Representatives & Ors.

     and leave no stone unturned to deprive the decree-holders from
     reaping the benefits of the decree granted in their favour. The Rule
     being equitable in nature, therefore, estops further creation of rights
     as it explicitly states that nothing in Rules 98 and 100 shall apply to
     the resistance or obstruction being made by the transferee pendente
     lite of judgment-debtor.
10. Recently, this Court in the case of Jini Dhanrajgir and another v.
    Shibu Mathew and another5 noted the plight of the decree-holders
    in our country. The Court quoted a Privy Council decision in 1872 and
    concluded that the observations made therein still hold true, where
    Privy Council had stated that the difficulties of litigants in India indeed
    begin when they have obtained a decree. For the ready reference,
    the relevant extract is quoted hereinbelow: -
            “. . . More than a century and a half back, the Privy
            Council (speaking through the Right Hon. Sir James
            Colville, J.) in Raj Durbhunga v. Coomar Ramaput
            Sing [1872 SCC OnLine PC 16] lamented that the
            difficulties of litigants in India indeed begin when
            they have obtained a decree. A reference to the above
            observation is also found in the decision of the Oudh
            Judicial Commissioner’s Court in Kuer Jang Bahadur v.
            Bank of Upper India Ltd. [Kuer Jang Bahadur v. Bank
            of Upper India Ltd., 1925 SCC OnLine Oudh JC 217] It
            was ruled there that the courts had to be careful to
            ensure that the process of the court and the laws of
            procedure were not abused by judgment-debtors in
            such a way as to make the courts of law instrumental
            in defrauding creditors, who had obtained decrees in
            accordance with their rights.
            2. Notwithstanding the enormous lapse of time, we are
            left awestruck at the observation [Raj Durbhunga v.
            Coomar Ramaput Sing, 1872 SCC OnLine PC 16] of the
            Privy Council which seems to have proved prophetic.
            The observation still holds true in present times



5   (2023) 20 SCC 76
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                        Supreme Court Reports


          and this case is no different from cases of decree-
          holders’ woes commencing while they are in pursuit
          of enforcing valid and binding decrees passed by
          civil courts of competent jurisdiction. The situation
          is indeed disquieting, viewed from the perspective
          of the decree-holders, but the law, as it stands, has
          to be given effect whether the court likes the result
          or not. . .”
                                              (emphasis supplied)

11. While it is important to protect the interests of decree-holders, who
    hold an enforceable decree in their favour, it cannot be gainsaid that
    such interests cannot be blanketly protected. Rule 102 of Order XXI
    expressly lays down the ingredients as to when it can be applied.
    For a case to fall under Rule 102, it is condition precedent that there
    exists a decree for the possession of immovable property. Secondly,
    there must be a resistance or an obstruction in the execution of
    the said decree. Thirdly, such obstruction or resistance must be
    made by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred
    the property. Fourthly, such transfer must have occurred after the
    institution of the original suit, i.e. the one in which the decree was
    passed. If the aforesaid ingredients are made out, Rule 102 prohibits
    the protection of Rules 98 and 101 to such errant transferee of
    judgment-debtor.
12. In Usha Sinha (supra), the Court also had the occasion to deal
    with the mischief of such transferees who engage in conveyance
    pendente lite. The Court quoted with approval the locus classicus
    from English law on the doctrine of lis pendens Bellamy v. Sabine,
    [(1857) 1 De G & J 566], wherein the English Court recognised
    that the intent behind such provision is to stop the vicious cycle of
    introducing subsequent new buyers (alienees) while a suit is already
    pending. If such principle is not applied, the Court held that there
    would be no certainty that the litigation would ever come to an end.
    This Court noted with disapproval the mischief being created by
    such transferees and their vendors, being the judgment-debtor, who
    transfer the immovable property at any time after the institution of
    the suit and held as follows: -
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                            2823

     Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, (Since Deceased)
            Now Through His Legal Representatives & Ors.

           “18. Before one and a half century, in Bellamy v. Sabine
           [(1857) 1 De G & J 566 : 44 ER 842] , Lord Cranworth, L.C.
           proclaimed that where a litigation is pending between a
           plaintiff and a defendant as to the right to a particular
           estate, the necessities of mankind require that the
           decision of the court in the suit shall be binding not
           only on the litigating parties, but also on those who
           derive title under them by alienations made pending
           the suit, whether such alienees had or had not notice
           of the pending proceedings. If this were not so, there
           could be no certainty that the litigation would ever
           come to an end.
           ...
           23. It is thus settled law that a purchaser of suit property
           during the pendency of litigation has no right to resist
           or obstruct execution of decree passed by a competent
           court. The doctrine of “lis pendens” prohibits a party from
           dealing with the property which is the subject-matter of suit.
           “Lis pendens” itself is treated as constructive notice to a
           purchaser that he is bound by a decree to be entered in
           the pending suit. Rule 102, therefore, clarifies that there
           should not be resistance or obstruction by a transferee
           pendente lite. It declares that if the resistance is caused
           or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente
           lite of the judgment-debtor, he cannot seek benefit of
           Rules 98 or 100 of Order 21.
           ...
           26. For invoking Rule 102, it is enough for the
           decree-holder to show that the person resisting the
           possession or offering obstruction is claiming his
           title to the property after the institution of the suit in
           which decree was passed and sought to be executed
           against the judgment-debtor. If the said condition is
           fulfilled, the case falls within the mischief of Rule 102 and
           such applicant cannot place reliance either on Rule 98 or
           Rule 100 of Order 21.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)
2824                                                        [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     Therefore, it is absolutely clear, that the transferee of a judgment-
     debtor who traces his title to the immovable property, that is the
     subject matter of a pending suit, is not entitled to seek the remedy
     available under Rules 97 to 102 of Order XXI. At the cost of repetition,
     we state that the whole scheme of Rule 102 of Order XXI read with
     Section 52, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is to protect the interest of
     a decree-holder who has successfully attained a decree of possession
     of an immovable property.
13. However, Rule 102 of Order XXI applies only to a person to whom
    the judgment-debtor has transferred the immovable property which
    was subject matter of that suit pendente lite. If the person who is
    resisting or obstructing the execution of the decree for possession
    of such property, is not the transferee of judgment-debtor, i.e. he
    does not trace his title from judgment-debtor, bar of Rule 102 does
    not apply to him. That is to say that if the person who is resisting or
    obstructing the decree for possession has received the property from
    person other than the judgment-debtor, such person is competent
    to gain the benefit of Rules 97 to 101 of Order XXI. In fact, he is
    entitled to such benefit even if he had been transferred the immovable
    property pendente lite, i.e. during the pendency of the suit, in which
    the decree was passed.
14. Coming now to the facts of the present case, we are of a considered
    view that the Executing Court was right in rejecting the application,
    Ext. D-100, not only for the reasons given by the Executing Court
    in the order dated 17th September, 2021, but also for the following
    reasons: -
     a)   The appellant in his application of February 2009 filed under
          Order XXI Rule 97 and 101 of CPC had mentioned all the facts
          in detail including the details about the sale deed dated 24th
          April, 2007, as also the surrender deed dated 5th October, 2007.
          The filing of the application by the respondent, Ext.D-100 in
          2019 after ten years itself was belated and mala fide. The said
          application ought to have been filed in the very beginning. The
          plea taken that in the cross-examination, the admission of the
          appellant about the surrender deed dated 5th October, 2007,
          gave cause to the respondent to file the application for closing
          the enquiry was completely untenable. The fact regarding the
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                        2825

     Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, (Since Deceased)
            Now Through His Legal Representatives & Ors.

           surrender deed dated 5th October, 2007, was mentioned in the
           application under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 of CPC filed in
           February 2009.
     b)    The Executing Court upon an application filed by the appellant
           in 2011 had framed the issues in 2013 and had directed for
           conducting the enquiry. At that stage also the respondent did
           not object to the same and participated in the enquiry. It took
           six years for the respondent to move the application and that
           too on a totally lame and untenable ground. The High Court
           committed serious error in allowing the writ petition and closing
           the enquiry.
     c)    The appellant being the owner of the property in question had
           a right to object and ensure that there was no collusive decree
           which was sought to be executed.
15. The appellant in the present case does not trace his title from the
    judgment-debtor, i.e. the Maliks and therefore, he is not a transferee
    pendente lite of the judgment-debtor. The appellant is a bona fide
    buyer who had bought the suit property from M/s Rizvi Estate and
    Hotels Pvt. Ltd., vide registered sale deed dated 24th April, 2007, who
    traced their title from the original owner, Mrs. Misquita, vide registered
    sale deed dated 16th January, 1988. The transferor, M/s Rizvi Estate
    and Hotels Pvt. Ltd., of the appellant was not a party to the suit
    bearing Special Civil Suit No. 97/1996/B, the decree of which has
    been put to execution. They were third party, having received the
    ownership rights from the original owner in 1988. Thus, even if the
    appellant did buy the subject-property in 2007, during the pendency
    of the suit between the Maliks and the present respondents, the bar
    of Rule 102 of Order XXI does not affect or prohibit the appellant
    from raising his objections before the Executing Court under Rules
    97 and 101 and subsequently receive its adjudication under Rules
    98 and 100.
16. In view of the above discussion, the appeal deserves to be allowed.
    The impugned order dated 25th July, 2022, passed by the High Court
    is set aside. The Executing Court is directed to proceed with the
    enquiry, conclude the same and bring it to its logical conclusion in
    accordance with law.
2826                                                     [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                            Supreme Court Reports


17. It is made clear that the Executing Court will decide the application
    under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 of CPC on its own merits and
    uninfluenced by any observations made by us in this order.
18. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.


     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan