THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS.versusKAMLESH RANI BHATLA

676                      [2023]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    3 S.C.R. 676                [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A                  THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS.
                                        v.
                          KAMLESH RANI BHATLA
                         (Civil Appeal No. 1927 of 2023)
B                               MARCH 23, 2023
          [ANIRUDDHA BOSE AND KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
             Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1972: r. 26(4) –
      Forfeiture of service on resignation – Withdrawal of resignation –
C     On facts, the respondent tendered her resignation to contest election,
      and the resignation was accepted – She lost the election and
      thereafter, applied for withdrawal of resignation – Application was
      kept pending – She then filed writ petition wherein the High Court
      directed the authorities to deliberate upon and thereafter dispose
      of her request qua withdrawal of her resignation taking note of the
D     judgment of the High Court in Nirmal Verma’s case – Respondent’s
      representation was rejected by the appellant on the ground that she
      was charge-sheeted for her involvement in political activities while
      working – Application thereagainst by the respondent – Allowed by
      the tribunal with a direction to the authorities to process the case of
E     the respondent for withdrawal of her resignation and allow her to
      join duty as Assistant Teacher – Writ petition by the appellant –
      Rejection of, by the High Court holding that no enquiry was
      conducted against respondent and even vigilance clearance was
      granted to her before accepting her resignation – On appeal, held:
      There is no absolute bar on the employer in permitting withdrawal
F     of resignation even after the same is accepted – Rule 26 does not
      contain any such provision – Resignation can become effective either
      by stipulation of law or by acceptance thereof – In the instant case,
      the first order of the High Court was a direction upon the employer
      to take a decision in terms of Nirmal Verma’s case which implies
G     that her withdrawal plea was required to be examined within a given
      parameter and since the employer never challenged the direction
      laying down the scope within which they were to consider the
      withdrawal plea of the respondent, the right of the respondent to be
      considered within that parameter had crystallised – Authorities could
      not and did not, go beyond that parameter – Authorities, in the
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                                       676
THE GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. v. KAMLESH                       677
                RANI BHATLA

order of rejection, did not take the stand that once accepted, a       A
resignation cannot be withdrawn – Appellants also did not reason
their rejection order with the ground that there was no compelling
reason for the respondent to tender her resignation – Both the fora
opined that the respondent’s case could not be distinguished from
the ratio of the case of Nirmal Verma’s case merely on the strength
                                                                       B
of issue of memorandum of charges against her – Resignation can
become effective only on acceptance thereof and sub-rule (4) of r.
26 lays down situations in which there can be withdrawal even after
resignation becomes effective – Respondent’s plea for withdrawal
of resignation was rejected on grounds spelt out therein – Tribunal
and the High Court found the reasoning of the appellant                C
unsustainable – Judgment of the High Court sustaining the tribunal’s
decision do not warrant any interference.
      Nirmal Verma v. MCD and Anr. [Decision dated
      18-03-2005 of Delhi High Court in WP (C) No.
      3303/2003]; Directorate of Education v. Manisha                  D
      Sharma [Decision dated 28-11-2019 of Delhi High
      Court in WP (C) 8494/2015]; State of Haryana and
      Others v. Ram Kumar Mann (1997) 3 SCC 321 –
      referred to.
                      Case Law Reference                               E

[1997] 2 SCR 329               relied on               Para 11
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1927
of 2023.
                                                                       F
      From the Judgment and Order dated 09.10.2019 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in WP (C) No. 1118 of 2019.
      Ms. Madhavi Gordie Divan, ASG, Ms. Neela Kedar Gokhale, VVV
Pattabhiraman, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Advs. for
the Appellants.                                                        G
      M. S. Saini, Jatinder Pal Singh, Ms. Reema Chawla, Advs. for
the Respondent.


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678            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
            Leave granted.
             2. The appellants question the legality of a judgment of a Division
B     Bench of the Delhi High Court, which in substance sustains an order of
      the Central Administrative Tribunal allowing the respondent to withdraw
      her resignation and permit her to re-join duty. At the material point of
      time, the respondent was working as an Assistant Teacher in a school
      under the Directorate of Education, Delhi Government, who are the
      appellants before us. She had tendered her resignation on 22nd March
C     2012 as she desired to participate in the elections for the post of a
      Counsellor of Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Her request for resignation
      was accepted by the authorities on 29th March itself, with effect from
      22nd March 2012. She, however, lost the election, which was held in the
      month of April the same year. On 21st April 2012, she applied for
D     withdrawing her resignation and re-join duty for the post in question.
      This application, however, was kept pending in spite of several reminders
      in the years 2013 and 2014.
             3. The respondent then filed a writ petition before the Delhi High
      Court. This was registered as W.P. (C) No. 1522 of 2014 and the said
E     petition was disposed of on 20th March 2014 with the following directions
      and order:-
            “6. The petitioner, is aggrieved by the fact that, there has
            been no decision on her request, as yet. The petitioner,
            apparently, has also taken recourse to the Right to Information
F           Act, 2005 (RTI Act). In respect of the application made under
            the RTI Act, the petitioner though has received a response
            dated 18.01.2013 from respondent nos. I and 2, which only
            indicates that the decision regarding her request for
            withdrawal of resignation is ? under process.

G           7. In view of the aforesaid facts, in my opinion, the
            respondents cannot, not take a decision in the matter.
            Therefore, the writ petition is disposed of with a direction to
            the respondents to deliberate upon and thereafter dispose of
            the request of the petitioner qua withdrawal of her resignation;
            albeit by a speaking order. The needful will be done
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THE GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. v. KAMLESH                         679
        RANI BHATLA [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

      expeditiously, though not later than 10 weeks from today. The      A
      copy of the order passed will be furnished to the petitioner.
      The respondents, while passing the order, will also take note
      of the judgment of this court dated 18.03.2005, passed in
      WP(C) No. 3303/2003, titled Nirmal Verma vs MCD and Anr.
      8. The writ petition and the application are disposed of with      B
      the aforesaid directions.”
                          (quoted verbatim from the paper book)
              th
       4. On 14 May 2015, the Deputy Director of Education, District
South East, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi had
rejected her plea and, inter-alia, ordered:-                             C

      “… AND WHEREAS, the operative part of the judgment dated
      18.03.2005 in W.P.(C) No. 3303/2003 of Hon’ble High Court
      Delhi is re-produced as under;-
      “… It would, thus, be seen that in the cases cited above and       D
      as also in Durgesh Mohanpunu’s case which is the latest case
      processed after the petitioner’s case, the respondents have
      taken a consistent position that legally it is permissible for
      them to allow withdrawal of resignation after its acceptance
      and have followed the practice of restoration of service. In
      the petitioner’s case also accordingly there is no ground made     E
      out for adopting a different yardstick or contrary legal
      submission to defeat the petitioner’s case. Petitioner had also.
      within a month of the acceptance of her resignation and within
      a week of her losing the election requested for being permitted
      to withdraw the resignation in accordance with Rule 26(4) of       F
      CCS Pension Rules. It is not the case of respondents that
      petitioner was not having a good record or had been guilty
      of any misconduct: or impropriety or it being a case of any
      doubt on the integrity etc. Denial of reinstatement in service
      to the petitioner and not treating the petitioner at par with
      others in the absence of any distinguishing feature, renders       G
      the respondent’s action arbitrary and tantamount to denial
      of equality as guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution
      of India. Reference in this regard may be made to Sengara
      Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. Reported at.....”.
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680            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A           AND WHEREAS, the case of Mrs. Kamlesh Rani Bhatia cannot
            be equated .at par with Nirmal Verma case.
            NOW, THEREFORE, after considering all the aspects of the
            matter, the request of Mrs. Kamlesh Rani Bhatia for
            withdrawal of her resignation is considered and found no
B           merit, hence, rejected.
            This, issues with the prior approval of competent authority &
            in compliance of order of Hon’ble High Court dated
            20.03.2014, passed in W.P. (C) No 1522/2014.”
                                  (quoted verbatim from the paper book)
C
             5. This order was challenged by the respondent before the Central
      Administrative Terminal. The Tribunal in a judgement delivered on 20th
      March 2017, relying upon Rule 26(4) of the Central Civil Services
      (Pension) Rules, 1972, sustained the respondent’s case, primarily relying
      on judgement of the Delhi High Court in the case of “Nirmal Verma -
D     vs- MCD and Anr.” delivered on 18th March 2005 in Writ Petition
      (Civil) No.3303/2003.
             6. We find from the order of the Tribunal that the main argument
      that was advanced before it by the appellant herein was that the case of
      Nirmal Verma (supra) was distinguishable in the sense that no
E     chargesheet was issued to the applicant in that case whereas in the case
      of respondent, a chargesheet had been submitted alleging breach of
      certain provisions of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
      The memorandum of charges was issued on 4th September 2011 and the
      two articles of charges related to her involvement in political activities
F     while working. Annexure II of Memorandum of charges stipulated: –
                                                              “ANNEXURE II
            STATEMENT OF IMPUTATION OF MISNDUCT/
            MISBEHAVIOUR IN SUPPORT OF THE ARTICLE OF
            CHARGES FARAMED AGAINST SMT, KAMLESH RANI
G           BATLA, ASSTT. TEACHER.
            ARTICLE-I
            Smt. Kamlesh Rani Batla, Assistant Teacher while working in
            Govt. Sarvodya Coed. Middle School, J-Block, Sangam Vihar,
            New Delhi, during her duty hours, attended the meeting held
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THE GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. v. KAMLESH                           681
        RANI BHATLA [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

      by the BSP, the National Political Party without informing or        A
      taking permission from the department.
      ARTICLE-II
      Smt. Kamlesh Rani Batla, Assistant Teacher while working in
      Govt. Sarvodya Coed. Middie School, J-Block, Sangam Vihar,
      New Delhi, and during the elections period canvassing and            B
      delivering slogans for the BSP as evident from the CDs and
      photo clippings.
      Thus, she has violated Rule 3 of CCS Conduct Rules, 1964
      which unbecoming of a government servant.”
                                                                           C
                           (quoted verbatim from the paper book)
       7. As we have already indicated, only argument advanced by the
appellant before the Tribunal was that a chargesheet was issued to the
respondent before her resignation. On that basis, the authorities wanted
to distinguish her case in relation to the case of Nirmal Verma (supra).   D
The Tribunal observed and held:-
      “5. The only argument advanced by the counsel for the
      respondents that a chargesheet was issued to the applicant
      before her resignation and accordingly the case of the
      applicant cannot stand on the same footing as that of Nirmal
                                                                           E
      Verma, relied upon by her, does not seem to be justified for
      the simple reason that if a chargesheet was issued to the
      applicant then it was within the domain of the respondents
      not to accept her resignation and they could not have issued
      vigilance clearance. Once the respondents have given the
      vigilance clearance in respect of the applicant and allowed          F
      her to contest MCD election, hence, in my considered opinion,
      the respondents are estopped from taking the plea of pendency
      of chargesheet against the applicant. I am also of the view
      that the respondents were very much within their capacity not
      to accept the applicant’s resignation pending enquiry, if any,
                                                                           G
      rather they ought to have awaited the decision in the enquiry.
      Hence, at this stage, taking the above plea of pendency of
      chargesheet and distinguishing the character of the present
      case with that of Nirmal Verma’s case (supra) seems to show
      their power vested with the respondents to deny or reject the
      applicant’s application for withdrawal of her resignation.           H
682            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A           Since all the conditions set out under Rule 26 of CCS
            (Pensions) Rules, 1972 are satisfied by the applicant, the stand
            of the respondents to deny the applicant to withdraw her
            resignation is not reasonable in these circumstances apart
            from being contrary to law.
B           6. Going through the judgment in Nirmal Verma’s case (supra),
            I find that the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in a similar manner
            allowed the case of petitioner therein taking into consideration
            the rule position and directed the respondents to process the
            request of the petitioner for withdrawal of her resignation
            and also to allow her to join back her duties. Hence, adopting
C           the same ratio as laid down by the Hon’ble High Court of
            Delhi in Nirmal Verma’s’ case (supra), I allow the instant OA
            with a direction to the respondents to process the case of the
            applicant for withdrawal of her resignation and allow her to
            join duty as Assistant Teacher and the intervening period be
D           also decided as per existing rule with consequential benefits.
            However, the respondents are at liberty to proceed with the
            pending chargesheet, if any, as per rules. No costs.”
                                  (quoted verbatim from the paper book)
             8. The High Court in the order impugned, observing that no enquiry
E     was conducted against respondent and even vigilance clearance was
      granted to her before accepting her resignation, rejected the writ petition
      filed by the appellant authorities.
             9. Before us, on behalf of the appellant, Ms. Divan, learned
      Additional Solicitor General has cited a decision of the Delhi High Court
F     in the case of Directorate of Education -vs- Manisha Sharma in
      W.P. (C) 8494/2015 decided on 28th November 2019. The Division Bench
      of the High Court in this judgement, had referred to the decision in the
      case of Nirmal Verma (supra) and observed: –
            “14. The Court is unable to agree with the reasoning in Nirmal
G           Verma v. MCD (supra) that since there was no misconduct on
            the part of the candidate, she should be permitted to withdraw
            her resignation. What was not noticed in Nirmal Verma v. MCD
            (supra) is the fact that the resignation had already been acted
            upon and that Rule 26(4), in any event, did not stand
            attracted.”
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THE GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. v. KAMLESH                          683
        RANI BHATLA [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

    10. Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 stipulate:-              A
    “26. Forfeiture of service on resignation.-
    (1) Resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed
    to be withdrawn in the public interest by the appointing
    authority, entails forfeiture of past service.
                                                                          B
    (2) A resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it
    has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another
    appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the
    Government where service qualifies.
    (3) Interruption in service in a case falling under sub-rule          C
    (2), due to the two appointments being at different stations,
    not exceeding the joining time permissible under the rules of
    transfer, shall be covered by grant of leave of any kind due
    to the Government servant on the date of relief or by formal
    condonation to the extent to which the period is not covered
    by leave due to him.                                                  D
    (4) the appointing authority may permit a person to withdraw
    his resignation in the public interest on the following
    conditions, namely:-
       (i) That the resignation was tendered by the Government
                                                                          E
       servant for some compelling reasons which did not involve
       any reflection on his integrity, efficiency or conduct and
       the request for withdrawal of the resignation has been made
       as a result of a material change in the circumstances which
       originally compelled him to tender the resignation;
                                                                          F
       (ii) that during the period intervening between the date on
       which the resignation became effective and the date from
       which the request for withdrawal was made, the conduct
       of the person concerned was in no way improper;
       (iii) that the period of absence from duty between the date
       on which the resignation became effective and the date on          G
       which the person is allowed to resume duty as a result of
       permission to withdraw the resignation is not more than
       ninety days;

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684            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A               (iv) that the post, which was vacated by the Government
                servant on the acceptance of his resignation or any other
                comparable post, is available.”
            (5) Request for withdrawal of a resignation shall not be
            accepted by the Appointing Authority where a Government
B           servant resigns his service or post with a view to taking up an
            appointment in or under a private commercial company or in
            or under a corporation or company wholly or substantially
            owned or controlled by the Government or in or under a body
            controlled or financed by the Government.
C           (6) When an order is passed by the Appointing Authority
            allowing a person to withdraw his resignation and to resume
            duty, the order shall be deemed to include the condonation of
            interruption in service but the period of interruption shall
            not count as qualifying service.

D           (7) A resignation submitted for the purpose of Rule 37 shall
            not entail forfeiture of past service under the Government.”
             11. In the case of Manisha Sharma (supra), the Division Bench
      opined that there was no material change in the circumstances which
      originally compelled the respondent to tender her resignation therein and
E     the respondent voluntarily resigned because she intended to contest the
      election. It was also held that once the resignation had been accepted
      and acted upon, thereafter, the incumbent could not contend that she
      was under any compulsion for tendering her resignation. Once resignation
      had been acted upon, there was no question of permitting a person to
      withdraw such resignation. This was the view taken by this Court in the
F     case of State of Haryana and others -vs- Ram Kumar Mann [(1997)
      3 SCC 321].
             12. So far as the factual context of this case is concerned, as we
      have narrated above, the first order of the High Court was a direction
      upon the employer to take a decision. At that point of time, the ratio laid
G     down in the case of Nirmal Verma (supra) prevailed and the High
      Court had directed the authorities to take decision in terms of the said
      ratio while considering the plea of the respondent before us. The appellant
      had accepted that judgment and the rejection decision was taken within
      the parameters set by the High Court in the order passed on 20th March
      2014. The only reason as to why the respondent’s request for withdrawal
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THE GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. v. KAMLESH                               685
        RANI BHATLA [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

of resignation was rejected was that a memorandum of charges had               A
been issued against her. The authorities, in the order of rejection, did not
take the stand that once accepted, a resignation cannot be withdrawn.
At no stage of this case, which underwent two rounds of litigations, the
authorities had raised the point which formed the basis of the judgment
in the case of Manisha Sharma (supra). The appellants also did not
                                                                               B
reason their rejection order with the ground that there was no compelling
reason for the respondent to tender her resignation. In the second round
of proceedings from which this appeal arises, the Tribunal did not find
justification for rejection of the respondent’s plea for withdrawal of
resignation to be acceptable. We have reproduced earlier in this judgment
the reasoning given by the Tribunal in sustaining the respondent’s case.       C
Before the Tribunal, as also the High Court, the controversy remained
confined to issue of memorandum of charges against the respondent.
Both the fora opined that the respondent’s case could not be distinguished
from the ratio of the case of Nirmal Verma (supra) merely on the
strength of issue of memorandum of charges against her.
                                                                               D
        13. After the High Court sustained the Tribunal’s verdict which
went in favour of the respondent, on 28th November 2019, the Division
Bench judgment in the case of Manisha Sharma (supra) was delivered.
In this judgment, the Division Bench, on analysing the conditions specified
in Rule 26(4) found that having resigned to contest the election, the
respondent therein could not be heard to say that she was under                E
compulsion. It was also held that once the resignation has been accepted
and acted upon, then there is no question of permitting a person to
withdraw such a resignation. In the facts of the present case, however,
that ground was not invoked to reject the respondent’s withdrawal request
herein. Moreover, the parameter based on which the authorities were            F
asked to take decision on the request for withdrawal of resignation was
laid down by the High Court itself. The boundary within which the
authorities were to examine the incumbent’s plea was not questioned by
the authorities before any forum. On the other hand, they accepted the
said parameter and rejected the plea thereby confining their consideration
within the boundary demarcated by the High Court.                              G

       14. In our opinion, in the context of this case, the ratio of Manisha
Sharma (supra) cannot be made applicable. We accept, as a proposition
of law, the interpretation given to the Rule 26(4) by the Division Bench
in the said judgment. But in the case of the respondent herein, her
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686            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A     withdrawal plea was required to be examined within a given parameter
      and since the employer never challenged the direction laying down the
      scope within which they were to consider the withdrawal plea of the
      respondent, the right of the respondent to be considered within that
      parameter had crystallised. The authorities could not, and did not, go
      beyond that parameter.
B
             15. Now the question arises as to whether we could import
      additional reasoning into the decision of the employer on the basis of
      interpretation given to said Rule 26(4) by the High Court subsequent in
      point of time. Ultimately, what we are dealing with in this appeal is a
      decision of an employer terminating the master-servant relationship on
C     the basis of certain grounds laid down in the rejection order. It is a fact
      that Rule 26(4) operates in the case of the respondent and in the event
      we had found that the first decision of the High Court was absolutely
      contrary to the provisions of the said Rules, we might have had accepted
      the argument of Ms. Divan founded on reasoning contained in the case
D     of Manisha Sharma (supra). But as per the said provision, we do not
      find there is absolute bar on the employer in permitting withdrawal of
      resignation even after the same is accepted. Said Rule 26 does not contain
      any such provision. Moreover, sub-rule (4) of Rule 26 envisages certain
      situations wherein withdrawal of resignation might be permitted even
      after the resignation becomes effective. The situations contemplated in
E     sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of Rule 26(4) permit withdrawal of resignation
      after the same becomes effective. Resignation can become effective
      either by stipulation of law or by acceptance thereof. To illustrate the
      former situation, some statutory instrument may contain deeming
      provisions for resignation to become effective in the event after tendering
F     the resignation letter, no decision is taken by the employer within a given
      timeframe. That is not the case here. So far as the present case is
      concerned, resignation can become effective only on acceptance thereof
      and sub-rule (4) of Rule 26 lays down situations in which there can be
      withdrawal even after resignation becomes effective. This question,
      however, does not arise here as what we are examining in this judgment
G     is legality of an order by which the respondent’s plea for withdrawal of
      resignation was rejected on grounds spelt out in the order itself. The
      Tribunal and the High Court found the reasoning of the appellant
      unsustainable.

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THE GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. v. KAMLESH                               687
        RANI BHATLA [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

       16. In the peculiar facts of this case, in our opinion the judgment     A
of the High Court sustaining the Tribunal’s decision do not warrant any
interference.
      17. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. All connected
applications are disposed of.
       18. There shall be no order as to costs.                                B


Nidhi Jain                                                 Appeal dismissed.
(Assisted by : Anurag Agarwal, LCRA)


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