Holding

A former partner remains jointly and severally liable for tax arrears of the firm for periods when he was a partner, as mandated by Section 25 of the Partnership Act, 1932; the absence of a specific provision in the 1961 Act does not negate this liability.

Summary

The respondent, Arunagiri Chettriar, retired from a partnership firm in 1963 and later the firm was dissolved. The Income Tax Officer issued a notice that the respondent was jointly and severally liable for tax arrears of the firm for assessment years 1962-63 and 1963-64, arguing that liability attaches to any partner who was a member during the period the tax arose. The respondent contended that his retirement terminated any such liability. The Supreme Court held that under Section 25 of the Partnership Act, 1932 every partner is liable for acts of the firm done while he was a partner, and this liability does not cease upon retirement; the absence of a specific provision in the 1961 Act analogous to the 1922 Act’s proviso does not alter the principle. The Court overruled the Kerala High Court decision and affirmed earlier rulings that erstwhile partners remain liable for partnership debts, including tax arrears. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court judgment and dismissing the respondent’s writ petitions.

Issues considered

Whether an erstwhile (retired) partner is jointly and severally liable for tax arrears of a partnership firm relating to periods when he was a partner.
Whether liability arises under Section 25 of the Partnership Act, 1932 despite the partner’s retirement.
Whether the lack of a provision in the Income Tax Act, 1961 analogous to the proviso of Section 46(2) of the 1922 Act affects the partner’s liability.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXI Rule 50
Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989s. 188-A
Income Tax Act, 1922s. 46(2) proviso
Income Tax Act, 1961s. 156, s. 182, s. 183, s. 184, s. 185, s. 186, s. 187, s. 188, s. 189, s. 2(43)
Indian Partnership Act, 1932s. 25

Subjects

partnershiptax arrearsjoint and several liabilityIncome Tax ActSection 25erstwhile partnerassessment yeardissolutioncivil procedure

Judgment

THE III INCOME TAX OFFICER, CIRCLE - I, SALEM AND ANR. A
v.
ARUNAGIRI CHETTIAR

MAY 7, 1996

[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND SUHAS C. SEN, JJ.] B

Income Tax Act, 1961 : Sections 2(43), 156 and 182 to 189.

Assessment years 1962-63 and 1963-64-Partnership fimr'-Assessee
erstwhile partner thereof-Firm reconstituted and subsequently dis- C
solved-Liability of assessee to pay t~eld: Eve11 though assessee retired
from partnership fim1 he was still liable to pay tax arrears due from partner-
ship jinn pertaini11g to the period duri11g which he was ti partner-Abse11ce in

- the 1961 Act of provision similar to S.46(2) of 1922 Act made no dif-
ference-S.188-A explicitly provided what was implicit hitherto--Part11ership'
Act, 1932, S.25-lncome Tax Act, 1922, S.46(2}-Code of Civil Procedure, · D
1908, Or. 21 R 50.

The respondent-assessee was a partner in a firm from which he
retired. On bis retirement, the firm was continued by taking in two new.
partners. The said firm was subsequently dissolved. The assessments for E
the accounting years relevant to the Assessnient years 1962-63 and 1963-64
were completed. The Income Tax Officer sent a communication to the
respondent•assessee that in respect of the arrears of tax due from the firm
for the aforesaid assessment years, he too was jointly and severally liable
afong .with the other partners Inasmuch as he was a partner of the firm
during the relevant accounting years. The respondent denied his liability F
on the ground that he ceased to be a partner long ago; that there was a
change in. the constitution of the firm after his retirement and that such
re-constituted partnership along was responsible for paying the said ar-
rears. The Income Tax Officer did not agree with the respondent's conten·
!ions. Recovery proceedings were Initiated and the respondent's properties G
. attadred, .mm euP,n lie appr!Jltched' Ille H"ig& Cf111'rt IOy way ot two writ
pi!titions, ·

1'he High Conl't altowed tire pttifkllr!< iJll''lile iiromut tbat the arrears
of tax due from the fll'lll could rrot be recovered from· an erstwhile partner
because the Income Tax Act, 1961 did not contain a provision correspond· H
461
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ing to the proviso to Section 46(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.
Aggrieved by the High Court's judgment the Revenue preferred the present
appeal.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

B HELD : 1. Section 25 of the Partnership Act, 1932 does not ma)\e a
distinction between a continuing partner and an erstwhile partner. Its
principle is clear and specific viz., that every partner is liable for all the
acts of the firm done while he is a partner jointly along "ith other partners
and also severally. If a continuing partner is liable to pay the tax due from
C the firm relating to the period when he was a partner of the firm, it cannot
be held that the said liability ceases merely because a partner has ceased
to be a partner subsequent to the said period. The absence of a provision
corresponding to the proviso to Section 46(2) of the 1922 Act in the Income
Tax Act, 1961 (the instant case deals with the provisions obtaining prior
to 1.4.1989, i.e., prior to the introduction of Section 188-A) made no
D difference to the position, since the liability of the partners to pay the dues
of the firm does not arise by virtue of Order XX! Rule SO of the Code of
-
Civil Procedure 1908, which is attracted by virtue of the said proviso, but
on account of the basic premise mentioned hereinabove. Order XX! Rule
SO merely reiterates the said basic premise; it does not create a new
E liability. [468-D-F)

Income Tax Officer, Assessment - II, Calicut & Anr. v. C. V. George &
Ors., (1976) lOS I.T.R. 144, overruled.

Sahu Rajeshwar Nath v. Income Tax Officer, Meentt & Anr., (1964) S4
F I.T.R. 7SS, approved.

Sahu Rajeshwar Nath v. Income Tax Officer, C- Ward, Meernt & Anr.
(1969) 72 l.T.R. 617, explained.

G Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa, (1996] 3 S.C.R. 400
and Malabar Fisheries Company v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kera/a,
(1979) 120 I.T.R. 49, relied on.

Income Tax Officer v. Radha Krishan, 66 I.T.R. 590, held inapplicable.

H Stevens v. Britten, [19S4] 3 All. E.R. 385, cited.
.THE III l.T.O. v. ARUNAG!Rl CHETTIAR [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 463

Lindley on Pa1t11ership, (12th Edn.) and Simon's Income Tax, (2nd A
edition), Vol. I, P. 337, para 510, referred to.

2. It may be mentioned that by virtue of introduction of Section 188-A in
the Income Tax Act, 1961 the controversy of the present nature would not have
arisen. This section explicitly provided what was implicit hitherto. [471-A, DJ
B
CIVIL APPELLAT_E JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1615-16
of 1979.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.1.78 of the Madras High
Court in W.P. Nos. 3944-45 of 1976.
c
G.C. Sharma, V.U. Eradi and S.N. Terdol for the Respondent.

- Ms: Janki Ramachandran (AC.) for the Government.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :

B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. The question in these appeals is: whether
D

an erstwhile partner is liable to pay the tax arrears due from the partner-
ship firm pertaining to the period when he was a partner. The Madras High
Court has had held that he is not. The Revenue is disputing the correctness
of that holding.
E
The respondertt-a.ssessee \vas a partner in-the firm, Sannanna Chet-
tiar and Sons. He retired therefrom on April 19, 1963. On his retirement,
the firm was continued by taking in two new partners. The said firm too
was dissolved with effect from April 12, 1972. The assessments for the
Assessment Years 1962-63 and 1963-64 were completed on March 25, 1967 F
and March 29, 1968. (For the two accounting years relevant to the said
assessment years, accounts were duly made up by the partners and the
share of profits due to the respondent paid to him before his retirement.)
On February 23, 1972, the Income Tax Officer sent a communication to
the respondent that in respect of the arrears of tax due from the firm for
the aforesaid assessment years, he too is jointly and severally liable along G
with the other partners inasmuch as he was a partner of the firm during
the relevant accounting years. The respondent denied his liability on the
ground that he ceased to be a partner long ago, that there was a change
in the constitution of the firm after his retirement and that such re-
constituted partnership alone is responsible for paying the said arrears. The H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Income Tax Officer did not agree with the respondent's contentions.
Recovery proceedings were initiated and the respondent's properties at-
tached, whereupon he approached the Madras High Court by way of two
writ petitions. The High Court allowed the writ petitions mainly relying
upon and following the decision of a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court
in Income Tax Office1; Assessment-JI, Calicut & Anr. v. C. V George & Ors.,
B
(1976) 105 I.T.R. 144 which dissented from the decision of the Allahabad
High Court in Salm Rajeshwar Nath v. Income Tax Office1; Meenit & Anr.,
(1964) 54 I.T.R. 755. The reasoning of the High Court, in short, is this :
Section 189(3) has no application to the facts of the case inasmuch as the
respondent was not a partner of the firm at the time of its dissolution; he
c ceased to be a partner long prior to the dissolution. Further, because the
Income Tax Act, 1961 did not contain a provision corresponding to the
proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 46 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922,

D
the arrears of tax due from the firm cannot be recovered from an erstwhile
partner.

Sri B.B. Ahuja, learned counsel for the appellant-Revenue, assailed
the correctness of the judgment under appeal and also that of the Full
-
Bench decision of the Kerala High Court aforesaid. Learned counsel
pointed out that the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sahu Rajesh-
war Nath, (1964) 54 I.T.R. 755 which was dissented from by the Full Bench
E of the Kerala High Court has actually been affirmed by this Court in Sahu
Rajeshwar Nath v. Income Tax Officei; C-Ward, Meentt & Anr., (1969) 72
I.T.R. 617 and that the reasoning and approach of the Allahabad High
Court and of this Court is clearly at variance with the reasoning of the
judgment under appeal. Since the respondent-assessee was unrepresented,
we requested Mrs. Ramachandran to assist us in this matter, to which she
F
has agreed gracefully. We are grateful for her valuable assistance. Learned
counsel supported the reasoning and conclusion of the Madras and Kerala
High Courts. Learned counsel submitted that the decision of this Court in
Sahu Rajeshwar Nath does not in any manner affect the correctness of the
reasoning contained in judg_ment under appeal.
G
Clause (23) of Section 2 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (1961 Act) says
that 11 'firm', 'partner' and 'partnership' have the meanings respectively
assigned to them in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932; but the expression
'partner' shall also include any person who, being a minor has been
H admitted to the benefits of partnership". (Since we are concerned with the
nm Ill l.T.O. v. ARUNAGIRI CHETTIAR [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 465
position obtaining prior to April 1, 1989 (i.e., prior to the introduction of A
Section 188-A by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989) we shall
refer to the relevant provisions as they stood Prior to April 1, 1989.)
Chapter XVI contains special provisions applicable to firms. Section 182
provides for assessment of registered firms while Section 183 provides for
assessment of un-registered firms. Section 184 provides for application for B
registration and Section 185 prescribes the procedure to be followed on
receipt of such application. Section 186 deals with cancellation of registra-
tion. Sections 187 to 189 deal with changes in the constitution of the firm,
succession of one firm by another and with the dissolution of the firm.
Sub-section (1) of Section 187 provides that "where at the time of making
an assessment under section 143 or section 144, it is found that a change C
has occurred in the constitution of a firm, the assessment shall be made on
the firm as constituted at the time making the assessment". Sub-section (2)
of Section 187 specifies what does the expression "change in the constitu-
tion of the firm 11 mean in the said section.

Section 156 provides for issuance of a notice of demand upon the D
assessee specifying the sum payable. If the tax is not paid pursuant to the
notice of demand, it has to be recovered in accordance with the Rules
contained in the second Schedule to the Act.

In the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (1922 Act), Section 46 provided E
that the arrears of income tax shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue
by the Collector. The proviso to sub-section (2) provided that "without
prejudice to any other powers of the Collector in this behalf, he shall, for
the purpose of recovering the said amount, have the powers which under
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), a civil court has for the
purpose of the recovery of an amount due under a decree .......... '". Sub- F
Rules (1) and (2) of Rule 50 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure
prescribe the mode of execution of a decree obtained against a firm. Rule
50 reads:

"50. Execution of decree againstfinn. - (1) Where a decree has been G
passed against a firm, execution may be granted--

(a) against any property of the partnership;

(b) against any person who has appeared in his own name
under Rule 6 or Rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be,
a partner;

(c) against any person who has been individually served as a
partner with a summons and has failed to appear;

B Provided that nothing in this sub,rule shall be deemed to limit
or othernose affect the provisions of Section 30 of the Indian
Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of l932).

(2) Where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the
decree to be executed against any per>on other than such a person
c as is referred to in sub-rule (1), clauses (b) and (c). as being a
partner in the firm, he may apply to the Court which passed the
decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such Court
may grant such leave, or, \Vhert:- such Jiability is disputed, may order
that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any
D inanner in which any issue in a suit inay be tried and detern1ine<l.

(3) Where the liability of any person has been tried and determined
under sub-rule (2), the order made thereon shall have the same
force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or
otherwise as if it were a decree.
E
(4) Save as against any property of the partnership, a decree
against a firm shall not release, render liable or otherwise affect
any partner therein unless he has been served \vith a summons to
appear and ans\vcr.

F (5) Nothing in this rule shall apply to a decree passed against a
Hindu undivided family by virtue of the provisions of Rule 10 of
Order XXX."

Section 25 of the Partnership Act may also be referred to in this
G connection. "Every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners and
also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner", says the
section.

The question in this case, to repeat, is whether the respondent who
was a partner of the aforesaid firm during the accounting years relevant lo
H Assessment Years 1962-63 and 1963-64 is liable to pay the arrears of tax
THE III I. T.O. v. ARUNAGIRI CHETI1AR [B.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J.] 467

- due from the said firm notwithstanding his retirement from the said firm
on and with effect from April 19, 1963. Before we answer this question, we
may well ask which is the provision in the Act which says that the partners
(i.e., continuing partners) are liable to pay the tax due from the firm which
A

is continuing. Neither Sri Ahuja, learned counsel for the Revenue, nor Mrs.
Ramachandral1, learned counsel for the a'5essee, could point out any
B
provision stating expressly that the partners are liable to pay, whether
jointly or severally, the tax due from the firm. It is true that the tax due
frow the firm will be recovered in the first instance by proceeding against
the assets of the firm but it may happen that either the firm has no assets
or the assets of the firm are not sufficient to satisfy the demand. Jn such a
case, can the said demand be enforced against the partners, i.e., against c
persons who were partners during the period to which the demand relates
and who are continuing as partners even at the time of the demand and
recovery. Because there is no express provision in the 1961 Act making the
partners liable for the tax due from the firm, it is not suggested by Mrs.
Ramachandran - nor can it be suggested - that they are not liable. But then D
the q.~estion immediately arises, under which provision arc they being
made liable. The ans\Ver obviously is because of the very nature and
characteristics of a partnership firm, as explained in various decisions of
this Court (See Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa [1966] 3
S.C.R. 400 and Malabar Fisheries Company v. Commissioner of Income Tax,
Kera/a, [1979] 120 l.T.R: 49 and the provisions of the Partnership Act. In E
Malabar Fisheries, this Court discussed the nature and character of the
partnership under the Indian Law and held that "a partnership firm under
the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, is not a distinct legal entity apart from
the partners constituting it and equally in law the firm as such has no
separate rights of its own in the partnership assets and when one talks of F
the firm's property or fitm'.s assets all that is meant is property or assets in
11
which all partners have a joint or con1mon interest In particular, the Court
•

held that Indian law in this respect is akin to English Law - and different
from the Scottish law-and quoted several passages from Lindley on Pmtner-
ship (12th Edn.) to indicate the relationship between the firm and the
partners. The following passage from one of the extracts is relevant. It G
reads :

11
The firm is not recognised by English ]a\vyers as distinct from the
members composing it. In t<:1king partnership accounts and in
administering partnership assets, courts have to some extent H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A adopted the mercantile view, and actions may now, speaking
generally, be brought by or against partners in the name of their
firm; but, speaking generaily, the firm as such has no legal recog-
nition. The law, ignoring >he firm, looks to the partners composing
it; any change amongst them destroys the identity of the firm; what
is called the property of the firm is their property, and what are
B
called the debts and liabilities of the firm arc their debts and their
liabilities. In point of law, a partner may be the debtor or the
creditor of his co-partners, but he cannot be either debtor or
creditor of the firm of which he is himself a member, nor can he
be employed by his firm, for a man cannot be his own employer."
c
Section 25 of the Partnership Act expressly states that every partner
is liable, jointly with all the other partners, and also severally, for all acts
of the firm done while he is a partner. It is worthy of note that Section 25
does not make a distinction bct\Vecn a continuing partner and an erst\vhile
D partner. Its principle is clear and specific, viz., that every partner is liable
for all the acts of the firm done while he is a partner jointly along with
other partners and also severally. If a continuing partner is liable to pay
the tax due from the firm relating to the period when he was a partner of
the firm, we see no reason, in principle, to hold that the said liability ceases
merely because a partner has ceased to be a partner subsequent to the said
E period. We do not think that the absence of a provision corresponding to
the proviso to Section 46(2) of the 1922 Act in the present Act (We may
remind that we are dealing with the provisions obtaining prior to April 1,
1989, i.e., prior to the introduction of Section 188-A) makes any difference
to the position, since the liability of the partners to pay the dues of the
firm does not arise by virtue of Order XX! Rule 50 of the Code of Civil
F
Procedure, which is attracted by virtue of the said proviso, but on account
of the basic premise mentioned hcrcinabove. Order XX! Rule 50 merely
reiterates the said basic premises; it docs not create a new liability.

In this connection, it would be relevant to refer to the reasoning of
G the Allahabad High Court in Sahu Rajeshwar Nath, (1964) 54 l.T.R. 755.
R.S. Pathak, J ., speaking for the Bench, observed :

"It is true that under the Income-tax law a firm is treated as an
entity distinct from its partners, but that is so only for the purposes
H of assessment. The procedure relating to assessnient concludes ivhen
TIIEIIIl.T.,O. v. ARUNAGIRICHETTIAR(B.P.JEEVANREDDY,J.] 469

a11 assessme11t order has bee11 made and the tax liability co11seque11t A
upo11 that assessme11t has been detem1i11ed. Whe11 a 11otice of
demand is issued requi1i11g the payment of the tax liability, the stage
of assessme11t has bee11 left behind, and with it the distinction between
the jinn and its pmtners......... The liability of the partners of the
firm is joint and several, and it is open to a creditor of the firm to B
proceed to recover a debt of the firm from any one or more of the
partners. In Simon's Income Tax (2nd edition), volume j, page 337,
paragraph 510, the law is thus stated :

'The tax assessed in the firm name is a partnership debt for which
all who were partners at the time when the debt was incurred , or c
who have held themselves out to the Revenue to be such, are jointly
liable. This means that any or all of those persons may be sued for
the whole of the tax due (when the assessment becomes final)
without reference to their respective shares under the partnership
agreement' : See also Stevens v. B1itten, [1954] 3 All. E.R. 385."
D
Jn our considereCl-opinion, the aforesaid statement represents the
!'9rrect understanding of law. In the appeal preferred against the said
judgment (Sahu Rajeshwar Nath v: Income· Tax Officer, the first contention
urged by the appellant-asses.."e before this Court was that unless a
separate notice of attachment is issped in the name of the partner of the E
firm, the tax arrears due from an un-registered firm cannot be recovered
from the partner. This contention was rejected by this Court. We are,
however, not concerned with this aspect in this case and, therefore, we
need not go into the question whether there is any distinction in this behalf
between the 1922 Act and the present Act. No contention was raised in F
this case that no demand notice was served upon the respondent. We must
presume that such a notice was served before attaching his properties. The
second contention urged on behalf of the assessee in the said appeal was
that since the certificate of recovery mentions only the arrears of tax due
from the firm, they cannot be recovered from the partner. This argument
was rejected with reference to the proviso to Section 46(2) of the Act which G
conferred upon the Collector the powers of a civil court in the matter of
recovery of the amount due under a decree. The court also referred to
Rule 50 of Order XX! in this behalf. And then observed : "in the present
case, we see no reason why the Collector should not execute the certificate
for demand of income-tax against the appellant who admits that he was a H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A partner of the unregistered firm for the relevant accounting year..... It is
manifest that the provisions of Order XX!, Rule 50(2) apply to the present
case mutatis mutandis and since the appellant does not dispute that he was
a partner of the unregistered firm for the relevant accounting year, the
Collector could lawfully proceed to execute the certificate under section
46(2) of the act against the appellant and recover the income-tax arrears
B
from him". The above observations cannot be read as holding that but for
the proviso to Section 46(2)', the arrears of tax due from the partnership
cannot be recovered from the partner, for the reasons set out by us in
extcnso hereinabove. The liability of a partner to pay the dues of the
partnership does nut arise from Order XX! Rule 50 C.P.C. but from the
c very nature and character of a partnership firm.

We are also of the opinion that the discussion in the judgment of this
Court in Sahu Rajeshwar Nath in the para (beginning on 620 and ending
on 621) dealing with the contention based upon Section 29 of the 1922 Act
D cannot be read as disapproving the reasoning of the Allahabad High Court,
quoted by us supra. It is, therefore, not possible for us to agree with the
reasoning of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court - which has been
adopted in the judgment under appeal - that where an assessment is made
on the firm, the firm alone is the assessee and that any default in paying
the tax assessed in that of the firm alone. It is also not possible for us to
E agree that merely because a separate assessment is made on the partner
the liability imposed on the firm cannot be treated as the liability of the
individual partners by importing the general principles of Partnership Act.
In our opinion, this would be making a distinction between the firm and
its partners, which is at variance with the accepted notion and, at any rate,
F does not follow from the decision of this Court in Sahu Rajeshwar Nath.
Similarly, the reliance by the Full Bench upon the decision of this Court in
Income Tax Officer v. Radha IVishan, 66 I.T.R. 590 is equally of no avail.
That decision only says that tax due from one partner on his share income
cannot be recovered from the other partner. To repeat, the firm is treated
G as an entity only for certain purposes. It is not a separate juristic entity
distinct from its partners. A firm cannot be equated to a corporate body.

Jn this view of the matter, it makes little difference that Section
189(3) is not attracted in the facts of the case to make the respondent
H liable.
THE III I.T.O. v. ARUNAGIRI CHETTlAR 113.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J.] 471

We may mention that by \Ortue of introduction of Section 188-A with A
effect from April 1, 1989, the controversy of the present nature would not
arise \vherc the proceedings for recovery are initiated on or after April l,
1989. Section 188-A reads :

"Joint and several liability of pmtners j(Jr tax payable by Jinn.
B
188.A. Every person who \Vas, during the previous year, a partner
of a firm, and the legal representative of any such person who is
deceased, shall be jointly and severally liable along with the firm
fur the amount of tax, penalty or other sum payable by the firm
for the assessment year to \vhich such previous year is relevant,
and all the provisions of this Act, so far as may be, shall apply to c
the assessment of such tax or imposition or levy of such penalty or
other sum. 11

This section explicitly provides what was implicit hitherto.

For the above reasons these appeals are allowed. The judgment of D
the High Court is set aside. The writ petitions filed by the respondent in
the High Court shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.

v.s.s. Appeals allowed.