THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDversusKAHLON @ JASMAIL SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER

                        [2021] 8 S.C.R. 469                              469


      THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED                             A
                                  v.
    KAHLON @ JASMAIL SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED)
    THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE NARINDER
          KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER
                                                                         B
                   (Civil Appeal No. 4800 of 2021)
                         AUGUST 16, 2021
       [NAVIN SINHA AND R. SUBHASH REDDY, JJ.]
        Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: s. 166 (a) – Compensation – Injuries
                                                                         C
caused in a motor accident – Claimant suffered 100 per cent physical
disability in a motor accident – Claim for compensation – Award of
Rs. 1,00,000/- with 9% interest – Appeal before the High Court –
During pendency of the appeal, death of claimant, not attributed to
injuries suffered in the accident – Substitution of name of claimant’s
daughter in the appeal – High Court enhanced the compensation            D
to Rs 37,81,234/- – On appeal, held: The Act is a beneficial and
welfare legislation – If the legal heirs can pursue claims in case of
death, the legal representatives can also pursue claims for loss of
property akin to estate of the injured if he is deceased subsequently
for reasons other than attributable to the accident or injuries under
                                                                         E
Clause 1(c) of s.166 – Such a claim would be completely distinct
from personal injuries to the claimant and which may not be the
cause of death – Such claims of personal injuries would undoubtedly
abate with the death of the injured – Insurer has a statutory
obligation to pay compensation in motor accident claim cases –
This obligation cannot be evaded behind the defence that it was          F
available only for personal injuries and abates on his death
irrespective of the loss caused to the estate of the deceased because
of the injuries – Total compensation reassessed as Rs.28,42,175/-
with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition,
till its realisation.
                                                                         G
      Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 The Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation.
Section 166(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for a
statutory claim for compensation arising out of an accident by the
person who has sustained the injury. Under Clause (b),                   H
                              469
470           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A     compensation is payable to the owner of the property. In case of
      death, the legal representatives of the deceased can pursue the
      claim. Property, under the Act, will have a much wider connotation
      than the conventional definition. If the legal heirs can pursue
      claims in case of death, there is no reason why the legal
      representatives cannot pursue claims for loss of property akin to
B
      estate of the injured if he is deceased subsequently for reasons
      other than attributable to the accident or injuries under Clause
      1(c) of Section 166. Such a claim would be completely distinct
      from personal injuries to the claimant and which may not be the
      cause of death. Such claims of personal injuries would undoubtedly
C     abate with the death of the injured. What would the loss of estate
      mean and what items would be covered by it are issues which has
      to engage the attention. The appellant has a statutory obligation
      to pay compensation in motor accident claim cases. This obligation
      cannot be evaded behind the defence that it was available only
      for personal injuries and abates on his death irrespective of the
D
      loss caused to the estate of the deceased because of the injuries.
      [Para 9][475-E-H; 476-A]
             1.2 The injuries suffered by the deceased in the accident
      required prolonged hospitalization for six months. The extent of
      disability suffered was assessed on 16.06.2000 as 100%. The
E     extent of disability, pursuant to physiotherapy was reassessed as
      75% on 08.08.2002. In the interregnum, the injured resigned
      his job on 30.09.2001 at the age of 53 years as he found movement
      difficult and inconvenient without an attendant as distinct from
      complete immobility. The injured was possessing professional
F     qualifications in labour laws and Industrial relations along with a
      Diploma in Personnel Management. He may have had to suffer
      some handicap in also practicing before the labour court, but
      cannot be held to have suffered 100% physical disability as his
      capacity for rendering advisory and other work coupled with
      movement on a wheel chair with the aid of an attendant could still
G     facilitate a reduced earning capacity. It cannot be held that the
      injured was completely left with no source of livelihood except to
      deplete his estate. In assessing, what has been described as a
      ‘Just Compensation’ under the Act, all factors including
      possibilities have to be kept in mind. [Para 17][478-C-F]
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  THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. KAHLON @ JASMAIL                471
   SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
            NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER


      1.3 The tribunal, on technicalities rejected his claim for            A
salary, medical expenses and percentage of disability and granted
a measly compensation of Rupees one lakh only by a cryptic order.
Therefore, while the claim for personal injuries may not have
survived after the death of the injured unrelated to the accident
or injuries, during the pendency of the appeal, but the claims for
                                                                            B
loss of estate caused was available to and could be pursued by
the legal representatives of the deceased in the appeal. [Para
18][478-F-H]
       1.4 Loss of estate would include expenditure on medicines,
treatment, diet, attendant, Doctor’s fee, etc. including income
and future prospects which would have caused reasonable                     C
accretion to the estate but for the sudden expenditure which had
to be met from and depleted the estate of the injured,
subsequently deceased. However, the compensation under the
head pain and suffering being personal injuries is held to be
unsustainable and is disallowed. The High Court has not awarded             D
anything towards medical expenses despite hospitalisation for
six months being an admitted fact. Therefore, a sum of
Rs.1,00,000/- is awarded towards medical expenses. Hence, the
reassessed total compensation would be Rs.28,42,175/-. The
appellant is thus, directed to pay to respondent no.1 within a
period of four weeks Rs.28,42,175/- along with interest @ 9%                E
p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition, till its realisation.
[Para 20-22][479-B-E; 480-A]
      Kanamma v. Deputy General Manager, ILR 1990
      Karnataka 4300; Uttam Kumar v. Madhav and Another,
      ILR 2002 Karnataka 1864; Umedchand Golcha v.                          F
      Dayaram and Others, 2002(1) MPLJ 249; Pravabati
      Gosh and Another v. Gautam Das and Others, 2009(4)
      GLR 64; Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Another, (2011)
      1 SCC 343 : [2010] 13 SCR 179; Surpal Singh
      Ladhubha Gohil v. Raliyatbahen Mohanbhai Savlia                       G
      and Ors., 2009(2) GLH 217; Munni Devi and Others
      v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 103 (2003) DLT 464;
      Venkatesan v. Kasthuri, 2014 ACJ 1621; Maimuna
      Begum and Others v. Taju and Others, 1989 MhLJ 352;
      Parmindar Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. &
                                                                            H
472             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A             Ors., (2019) 7 SCC 217 : [2019] 8 SCR 986; Kajal v.
              Jagdish Chand & Ors., (2020) 4 SCC 413; Madhuben
              Maheshbhai Patel v. Joseph Francis Mewan and
              Others, 2015 (2) GLH 499; Joti Ram v. Chamanlal, AIR
              1985 P&H 2; Thailammai v. A.V. Mallayya Pillai, 1991
              ACJ 185 (Mad) – referred to.
B
                               Case Law Reference
      ILR 1990 Karnataka 4300              referred to        Para 4
      ILR 2002 Karnataka 1864              referred to        Para 4

C     2009(4) GLR 64                       referred to        Para 4
      [2010] 13 SCR 179                    referred to        Para 5
      103 (2003) DLT 464                   referred to        Para 5
      [2019] 8 SCR 986                     referred to        Para 5
D     (2020) 4 SCC 413                     referred to        Para 5
      2002 (1) MPLJ 249                    referred to        Para 10
      1989 MhLJ 352                        referred to        Para 11
      2014 ACJ 1621                        referred to        Para 12
E     2009(2) GLH 217                      referred to        Para 13
      2015 (2) GLH 499                     referred to        Para 14
      AIR 1985 P&H 2                       referred to        Para 14
      1991 ACJ 185 (Mad)                   referred to        Para 15
F             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.4800 of
      2021.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 27.08.2019 of the High Court
      of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in FAO No.1386 of 2007.

G             H. Chandra Sekhar, Adv. for the Appellant.
              Nikhil Goel, Adv. for the Respondents.




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  THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. KAHLON @ JASMAIL                   473
   SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
            NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER


      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                               A
      NAVIN SINHA, J.
      1. Leave granted.
       2. A claim arising out of injuries caused in a motor accident
that has reached its fruition more than 20 years later before this Court,      B
which we find extremely distressing. The original claimant and his wife,
both did not survive the ordeal to see the fruits of the litigation which is
now being pursued by their daughter.
      3. The facts of the case in a nutshell are that the original claimant
was severely injured in a motor accident on 02.05.1999. He filed a claim       C
for compensation under Section 166(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal on 02.11.2006 awarded him a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- only with
9% interest. Dissatisfied, the original claimant preferred an appeal before
the High Court. Unfortunately, he was deceased on 06.11.2015 during
the pendency of the appeal, not attributed to the injuries suffered in the     D
accident. The daughter of the claimant, who was an unmarried girl aged
21 years at the time of the accident, was substituted in the appeal. The
High Court substantially enhanced the compensation.
        4. Shri H. Chandra Sekhar, learned counsel on behalf of the
appellant, submits that the cause of action being personal to the injured      E
abates on his death, which was not caused due to the accident. The legal
heir is entitled only to such compensation which forms part of the estate
of the deceased. Loss of salary, future prospects, pain and suffering
along with attendant charges do not form part of the estate of the
deceased. The compensation could not have been fixed by application            F
of multiplier as it was not a case of death caused or occasioned by or
due to the accident. The amount awarded by the Tribunal would alone
form part of the estate of the deceased. Reliance in support of the
submissions has been placed on two Full Bench decisions of the
Karnataka High Court in Kanamma vs. Deputy General Manager,
ILR 1990 Karnataka 4300, Uttam Kumar vs. Madhav and Another,                   G
ILR 2002 Karnataka 1864, Umedchand Golcha vs. Dayaram and
Others, 2002(1) MPLJ 249, Pravabati Gosh and another vs. Gautam
Das and others, 2009(4) GLR 64. The respondent being a married
daughter is not entitled to any claim for any other loss of estate of the
deceased as she was not dependent on the deceased. It is lastly submitted
                                                                               H
474             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A     that the High Court has erred in not deducting 1/3 rd of the compensation
      amount towards personal expenses by the deceased.
              5. Shri Nikhil Goel, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent
      no.1, submits that no deduction towards personal expenses can be made
      as the deceased actually incurred expenses during his lifetime. The
B     deduction is to be made hypothetically only in a case where death has
      occurred, relying on Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar and another, 2011(1)
      SCC 343. The submission of Shri Goel is that it is only a claim for personal
      injuries that will abate with the death of the deceased. The claims such
      as loss of income, medical expenses etc. will survive as part of the loss
      to the estate. He relies upon Surpal Singh Ladhubha Gohil vs.
C     Raliyatbahen Mohanbhai Savlia and Ors., 2009(2) GLH 217, Munni
      Devi and Others vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 103(2003) DLT
      464, Venkatesan vs. Kasthuri, 2014 ACJ 1621 and Maimuna Begum
      and others vs.Taju and Others, 1989 MhLJ 352. Shri Goel next submits
      that the High Court has committed no error in awarding loss of income
D     along with future prospects with a multiplier of 11 relying on Parmindar
      Singh vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2019) 7 SCC 217
      and Kajal vs. Jagdish Chand & Ors., (2020) 4 SCC 413. The injured
      had suffered 100 per cent physical disability. He was unable to pursue
      his life and career and had to leave his job and shift to his home town
      Punjab. Despite being a law graduate and professionally qualified with a
E     Diploma in Labour Laws, he was unable to pursue any independent
      career thereafter because of complete physical disability. The
      compensation as enhanced by the High Court is, therefore, not on
      account of personal injuries, but as loss of the estate of the deceased,
      and therefore, calls for no interference.
F            6. We have considered submissions on behalf of the parties. The
      original claimant was travelling with his wife and unmarried daughter
      when their vehicle was hit by a lorry driven rashly and negligently on
      02.05.1999. The claimant was taken to the Government Hospital,
      Trivandrum but the severity of the injuries required him to be shifted to
G     the Apollo Hospital, Chennai the next day for professionalized
      management where he remained under treatment till 24.11.1999. He
      suffered spinal shock, with cervical cord injury and quadriplegia with
      respiratory failure. He was resuscitated and put on ventilator support
      for skull traction. His right ankle needed surgery. He required further
      treatment for anterior decompression, disc excision and bone grafting.
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  THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. KAHLON @ JASMAIL                   475
   SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
     NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER [NAVIN SINHA, J.]


His physical activity was by way of wheel chair mobilisation. The disability   A
certificate dated 16.06.2000 issued to him by the Government Headquarter
Hospital, Cuddalore opined 100 per cent permanent motor system
disability with operative scar on the right-side neck, right ankle, healed
scar on the left side forehead frontal region and parietal region and that
he was unable to lift all four limbs which were vested with sensory loss
                                                                               B
present in certain places classified as quadriplegic orthopedically.
        7. The claimant was a law graduate with a Diploma in Personal
Management and Labour Welfare from the Punjab University. Because
of the injuries, he found it difficult and inconvenient to continue with his
job as Deputy General Manager and resigned pre-maturely on 30.09.2001
at the age of 53 years before his scheduled superannuation on 30.04.2006.      C
Unable to pursue his life and career with the burden of treatment and
family expenses in the changed circumstances in Cuddalore, he moved
this Court in T.P.(C) No. 1043 of 2003 for transfer of the claim case
filed by him in Cuddalore in the year 2000 which was allowed on
25.02.2004. The proceedings were shifted to Gurdaspur in Punjab.               D
      8. The Tribunal in a very cursory and cryptic manner awarded a
compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- along with 9% interest. The claimant
then moved the High Court which has enhanced the compensation to
Rs.37,81,234/- by taking into account his annual salary with future
prospect applying the multiplier of 11 including pain and suffering,           E
attendant’s charges.
        9. The Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. Section 166(1)
(a) of the Act provides for a statutory claim for compensation arising out
of an accident by the person who has sustained the injury. Under Clause
(b), compensation is payable to the owner of the property. In case of          F
death, the legal representatives of the deceased can pursue the claim.
Property, under the Act, will have a much wider connotation than the
conventional definition. If the legal heirs can pursue claims in case of
death, we see no reason why the legal representatives cannot pursue
claims for loss of property akin to estate of the injured if he is deceased
subsequently for reasons other than attributable to the accident or injuries   G
under Clause 1(c) of Section 166. Such a claim would be completely
distinct from personal injuries to the claimant and which may not be the
cause of death. Such claims of personal injuries would undoubtedly abate
with the death of the injured. What would the loss of estate mean and
what items would be covered by it are issues which has to engage our           H
476             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A     attention. The appellant has a statutory obligation to pay compensation in
      motor accident claim cases. This obligation cannot be evaded behind
      the defence that it was available only for personal injuries and abates on
      his death irrespective of the loss caused to the estate of the deceased
      because of the injuries.
B            10. In Umed Chand (supra), giving a broad liberal interpretation
      to the provisions of the Act so that legal representatives do not suffer
      injustice, it was observed that the claim for personal injuries will not
      survive on death of the injured unrelated to the accident but the legal
      representatives could pursue the claim for enhancement of the claim
      for loss of the estate which would include expenditure on medical
C     expenses, travelling, attendant, diet, doctor’s fee and reasonable monthly
      annual accretion to the estate for a certain period. It is trite that the
      income which a person derives compositely forms part of the expenditure
      on himself, his family and the savings go to the estate. The unforeseen
      expenses as aforesaid naturally have to be met from the estate causing
D     pecuniary loss to the estate.
              11. In Maimuna Begum (supra) the defence under Section 306
      of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 on the old English Common Law
      maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona” was rejected opining
      that it would be unjust to non-suit the heirs on that ground.
E            12. In Venkatesan (supra), the injured claimant preferred an appeal
      dissatisfied, but was deceased during the pendency of the appeal.
      Compensation came to be awarded under the Act for loss of estate
      keeping in mind the nature of the injuries, the treatment, the expenditure
      incurred and loss of income.
F            13. In Surpal Singh (supra), Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan, C.J.
      (as he then was), observed that the Act was a social welfare legislation
      providing for compensation by award to people who sustain bodily injuries
      or get killed. The grant of compensation had to be expeditious as
      procedural technicalities could not be allowed to defeat the just purpose
G     of the act. The Courts in construing social welfare legislations had to
      adopt a beneficial rule of construction which fulfils the policy of the
      legislation favorable to those in whose interest the Act has been passed.
      Judicial discipline demanded that the words of a remedial statutes be
      construed so far as they reasonably admit so as to secure that relief
      contemplated by the statute and it shall not be denied to the class intended
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  THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. KAHLON @ JASMAIL                   477
   SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
     NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER [NAVIN SINHA, J.]


to be relieved. Rejecting the maxim of “actio personalis moritur cum           A
persona” on the premise that it was an injury done to the person and
the claim abated with his demise it was observed:
      “11. The question as to whether injury was personal or otherwise
      is of no significance so far as the wrong doer is concerned and he
      is obliged to make good the loss sustained by the injured. Legal         B
      heirs and legal representatives would have also suffered
      considerable mental pain and agony due to the accident caused to
      their kith and kin. Possibly they might have looked after their dear
      ones in different circumstances, which cannot be measurable in
      monetary terms. We are therefore in full agreement with the view
      expressed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Gujarat           C
      State Road Transport Corporation’s case (supra) that even after
      death of the injured, the claim petition does not abate and right to
      sue survives to his heirs and legal representatives.”
     14. This view has subsequently been followed in a decision authored
by brother Justice M.R. Shah J., (as he then was) in Madhuben                  D
Maheshbhai Patel vs. Joseph Francis Mewan and Others, 2015 (2)
GLH 499, holding as follows:
      “12….Considering the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench
      of this Court in the case of Surpal Singh Ladhubha Gohil (supra);
      decisions of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of       E
      Jenabai Widow of Abdul Karim Musa (supra) and in the case of
      Amrishkumar Vinodbhai (supra); and aforesaid two decisions of
      the learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, we are of
      the opinion that maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona” on
      which Section 306 of the Indian Evidence Act (sic Indian                 F
      Succession Act) is based cannot have an applicability in all actions
      even in an case of personal injuries where damages flows from
      the head or under the head of loss to the estate. Therefore, even
      after the death of the injured claimant, claim petition does not abate
      and right to sue survive to his heirs and legal representatives in so
      far as loss to the estate is concerned, which would include personal     G
      expenses incurred on the treatment and other claim related to loss
      to the estate. Under the circumstances, the issue referred to the
      Division Bench is answered accordingly. Consequently, it is held
      that no error has been committed by the learned Tribunal in
      permitting the heirs to be brought on record of the claim petition       H
478             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A           and permitting the heirs of the injured claimant who died
            subsequently to proceed further with the claim petition. However,
            the claim petition and even appeal for enhancement would be
            confine to the claim for the loss to the estate as observed
            hereinabove.”
B           15. Similar view has been taken by the Punjab & Haryana High
      Court in Joti Ram vs. Chamanlal, AIR 1985 P&H 2 and the Madras
      High Court in Thailammai vs. A.V. Mallayya Pillai, 1991 ACJ 185 (Mad).
            16. The view taken in Kanamma (supra) and Uttam Kumar
      (supra) that the claim would abate is based on a narrow interpretation of
C     the Act which does not commend to us. The reasoning of the Gujarat
      High Court is more in consonance with aim, purpose and spirit of the
      Act and furthers its real intent and purpose which we therefore approve.
             17. The injuries suffered by the deceased in the accident required
      prolonged hospitalization for six months. The extent of disability suffered
D     was assessed on 16.06.2000 as 100%. The extent of disability, pursuant
      to physiotherapy was reassessed as 75% on 08.08.2002. In the
      interregnum, the injured resigned his job on 30.09.2001 at the age of 53
      years as he found movement difficult and inconvenient without an
      attendant as distinct from complete immobility. The injured was possessing
      professional qualifications in labour laws and Industrial relations along
E     with a Diploma in Personnel Management. He may have had to suffer
      some handicap in also practicing before the labour court, but cannot be
      held to have suffered 100% physical disability as his capacity for rendering
      advisory and other work coupled with movement on a wheel chair with
      the aid of an attendant could still facilitate a reduced earning capacity. It
F     cannot be held that the injured was completely left with no source of
      livelihood except to deplete his estate. In assessing, what has been
      described as a ‘Just Compensation’ under the Act, all factors including
      possibilities have to be kept in mind.
             18. The Tribunal, on technicalities rejected his claim for salary,
G     medical expenses and percentage of disability and granted a measly
      compensation of Rupees one lakh only by a cryptic order. We are,
      therefore, of the opinion that while the claim for personal injuries may
      not have survived after the death of the injured unrelated to the accident
      or injuries, during the pendency of the appeal, but the claims for loss of
      estate caused was available to and could be pursued by the legal
H     representatives of the deceased in the appeal.
  THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. KAHLON @ JASMAIL                  479
   SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
     NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER [NAVIN SINHA, J.]


       19. In Parminder Singh (supra) compensation on the basis of            A
complete loss of income, the percentage of disability, future prospects
were granted applying the relevant multiplier. Again, in Kajal (supra)
the injured was assessed as 100 per cent disabled, considering all of
which compensation was awarded on the notional future prospects along
with relevant multiplier. The loss of income to the injured in the facts of
                                                                              B
the present case has to be assessed at 75%. In view of Raj Kumar
(supra) there shall be no deduction towards personal expenses.
       20. We see no reason to deviate from the consistent judicial view
taken by more than one High Court that loss of estate would include
expenditure on medicines, treatment, diet, attendant, Doctor’s fee, etc.
including income and future prospects which would have caused                 C
reasonable accretion to the estate but for the sudden expenditure which
had to be met from and depleted the estate of the injured, subsequently
deceased.
       21. However, the compensation under the head pain and suffering
being personal injuries is held to be unsustainable and is disallowed.        D
The High Court has not awarded anything towards medical expenses
despite hospitalisation for six months being an admitted fact. We therefore
award a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- towards medical expenses. Hence, the
reassessed total compensation would be Rs.28,42,175/-, calculated
hereunder:                                                                    E




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                                                                              G




                                                                              H
480                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A             22. The appellant is therefore directed to pay to respondent no.1
      within a period of four weeks Rs.28,42,175/- along with interest @ 9%
      p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition, till its realisation.
              23. The appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above.

B
      Nidhi Jain                                             Appeal partly allowed.




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D




E




F




G




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