THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANRversusUMESH

574            SUPREME COURT
                         [2022]REPORTS
                                2 S.C.R. 574                 [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A                   THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR
                                         v.
                                     UMESH
                     (Civil Appeal Nos. 1763-1764 of 2022 )
B                               MARCH 22, 2022
              [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
                        SURYA KANT, JJ.]
             Service Law: Disciplinary Enquiry – Respondent working as
      a village accountant was charged for demanding bribery – Criminal
C
      complaint registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption
      Act 1988 – Special Judge granted benefit of doubt to him and
      acquitted him of all charges – However, disciplinary authority held
      that the misconduct was proved and imposed penalty of compulsory
      retirement – Tribunal upheld the order of compulsory retirement –
D     High Court, however, u/Art.226 set aside compulsory retirement –
      On appeal, held: While exercising judicial review, Court does not
      act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary
      authority – Court does not re-appreciate the evidence which forms
      the basis of finding of misconduct in the course of a disciplinary
      enquiry – The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict
E
      its review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice were
      complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct was based on some
      evidence; (iii) the statutory rules were observed; and (iv) the findings
      of the disciplinary authority suffered from perversity; and (vi) the
      penalty was disproportionate to the proven misconduct – None of
F     the above tests were applied by High Court – High Court exceeded
      its jurisdiction under Art.226 and trenched upon a domain which
      fell within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer – Enquiry
      was conducted in accordance with natural justice – The acquittal
      of the respondent in the course of the criminal trial did not impinge
      upon the authority of the disciplinary authority – Judgment of High
G
      court set aside – Finding of misconduct and punishment of
      compulsory retirement restored.
            Service Law: Principles governing disciplinary enquiry:
      Distinction between disciplinary enquiry and criminal trial –
      Purpose of a disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire
H
                                        574
          THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR v. UMESH                          575


into an allegation of misconduct by an employee which results in         A
a violation of the service rules governing the relationship of
employment – Unlike a criminal prosecution, a charge of
misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of
probabilities – The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
does not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of
                                                                         B
disciplinary jurisdiction.
      Allowing the appeals, the Court
      HELD: 1. The principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry
are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a
prosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law, the        C
burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the
offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a
presumption of innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary
proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of
misconduct by an employee which results in a violation of the
service rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike           D
a criminal prosecution where the charge has to be established
beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge
of misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of
probabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial
are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary enquiry. The         E
acquittal of the accused in a criminal case does not debar the
employer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinary
jurisdiction. [Para 13][585-E-H]
      2. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act
as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary              F
authority. The court does not re-appreciate the evidence on the
basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in
the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of
judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether: (i)
the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the finding
of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules       G
governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been
observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary
authority suffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is

                                                                         H
576           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     disproportionate to the proven misconduct. However, none of
      the above tests for attracting the interference of the High Court
      were attracted in the present case. The Administrative Tribunal
      having exercised the power of judicial review found no reason to
      interfere with the award of punishment of compulsory retirement.
      The Division Bench of the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction
B
      under Article 226 and trenched upon a domain which falls within
      the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer. The enquiry was
      conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
      The findings of the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority
      are sustainable with reference to the evidence which was adduced
C     during the enquiry. The acquittal of the respondent in the course
      of the criminal trial did not impinge upon the authority of the
      disciplinary authority or the finding of misconduct in the
      disciplinary proceeding. [Para 17][589-G-H; 590-A-D]
           State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh (1977) 2 SCC 491;
D          State of Rajasthan v. B K Meena; (1966) 6 SCC 417;
           Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah
           Mazdoor Sangh (2004) 8 SCC 200; Ajit Kumar Nag v.
           Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.; (2005) 7 SCC 764 : [2005]
           3 Suppl. SCR 314; CISF v Abrar Ali (2017) 4 SCC
           507; Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar (2009) 12
E          SCC 78 : [2009] 10 SCR 124; State of Karnataka v. N.
           Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423; Union of India v. G.
           Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR
           549; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC
           749 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644; R.S. Saini v State of
F          Punjab (1999) 8 SCC 90 – relied on.
           Commissioner of Police, Delhi v. Narender Singh AIR
           2006 SC 1800 : [2006] 3 SCR 872; State of Punjab v.
           Madan Mohan Lal Verma (2013) 14 SCC 153 : [2013]
           7 SCR 113 – referred to.
G                           Case Law Reference
      [2006] 3 SCR 872               referred to            Para 5
      [2013] 7 SCR 113               referred to            Para 10

H
           THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR v. UMESH                             577


(1977) 2 SCC 491                   relied on                 Para 14         A
(1966) 6 SCC 417                   relied on                 Para 14
(2004) 8 SCC 200                   relied on                 Para 14
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 314            relied on                 Para 14
(2017) 4 SCC 507                   relied on                 Para 14         B
[2009] 10 SCR 124                  relied on                 Para 15
(2020) 3 SCC 423                   relied on                 Para 16
(1997) 7 SCC 463                   relied on                 Para 17
                                                                             C
(1995) 6 SCC 749                   relied on                 Para 17
(1999) 8 SCC 90                    relied on                 Para 17
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1763-
1764 of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2017 of the High Court         D
of Karnataka at Kalaburagi Bench in Writ Petition No.202250-251 of
2016 (S-KAT).
      V. N. Raghupathy, Md. Apzal Ansari, Advs. for the Appellants.
       Ashwin V. Kotemath, Ms. E. R. Sumathy, Nishant Bhardwaj, Advs.
                                                                             E
for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHADRACHUD, J.
       1. The appeals arise from a judgment dated 29 November 2017
of a Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at the Kalaburagi         F
Bench. The High Court set aside the judgment of the Karnataka
Administrative Tribunal dated 25 April 2016 directing the compulsory
retirement of the respondent from service following a disciplinary enquiry
on charges of bribery.
       2. The respondent was working as a Village Accountant at              G
Revathagao in Indi Taluka of Bijapur District in Karnataka. The charge
against the respondent is that he demanded a bribe for deleting the name
of a person from Column No. 11 of the RTC with regard to land bearing
Survey No. 54, situated at Shirdona Village. A criminal complaint was
registered with the Lokayukta police against the respondent for the          H
578               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     commission of an offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1) (d)
      read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. After
      the investigation, a charge sheet was submitted against the respondent
      by the Lokayukta police in Special Case No. 20 of 2011 in the Court of
      Special Judge at Bijapur. During the course of the trial before the Special
      Judge at Bijapur, the prosecution examined seven witnesses. Twenty-
B
      two exhibits were marked in evidence. The respondent examined one
      witness and an exhibit was marked at his behest. By a judgment dated
      23 October 2013, the Special Judge gave the benefit of doubt to the
      respondent and acquitted him of all charges.

C            3. A disciplinary enquiry was initiated under Section 7(2) of the
      Karnataka Lokayukta Act 1984. Taking note of the complaint, and the
      fact that the phenolphthalein powdered currency notes were seized from
      the respondent, the Karnataka Upa Lokayukta-1 held that a prima facie
      case was established. By an order dated 23 April 2012, exercising powers
      under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act 1984 and Rule 14-
D     A of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
      Rules 1957 1, the Upa Lokayukta-1 recommended the initiation of
      disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. On 7 August 2012, the
      Government of Karnataka entrusted the case to the Upa-Lokayukta for
      enquiry under Rule 14 (A) of 1957 Rules. By an order dated 14 August
E     2012, the Upa Lokayukta nominated the Additional Registrar of Enquiries
      in the Karnataka Lokayukta as the inquiry officer for framing the charge
      and conducting the inquiry. The following article of charge was framed
      in the course of the enquiry:
               “That you, Sri Umesh Vittala Biradara (here in after referred to
F              as Delinguent Government Official, in short DGO), while working
               as the village Accountant Revathagao Saja, Indi Taluk, Bijapur
               District demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs 5000/- on 11/05/
               2011 from complainant Sri. Gajana S/o Shireppa Poojari, R/o:
               Shiradona, Indi Taluk, Bijapur District for getting deleted the name
               of one Sri. Nagappa S/o Annappa Muttinavar from Col. No. 11 of
G
               RTC in respect of the land bearing Sy. No. 54 measuring 4 acres
               3 guntas of Shirdona Village of Indi Taluk, that is for doing an
               official act, and thereby you failed to maintain absolute integrity
               and devotion to duty and committed an act which is unbecoming

      1
H         “1957 Rules”
                 THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR v. UMESH                          579
                   [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHADRACHUD, J.]

         of a Government Servant and thus you are guilty of misconduct          A
         under Rule 3(1)(1) to (iii) of KCS (Conduct) Rules 1966.
                                                 (Anand R Deshpande)
                                         Additional Registrar (Enquiries-3)
                                         Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore”
                                                                                B
       4. By an order dated 22 January 2015, the Lokayukta held that
the charge against the respondent was proved and recommended the
penalty of compulsory retirement from service under Rule 8(vi) of the
1957 Rules. On 20 February 2015, the disciplinary authority issued a
show cause notice to the respondent. The respondent contended in his
reply that the money seized was not received as a bribe but was for             C
repayment of a loan borrowed by the brother-in-law of the complainant.
The respondent also contended that since the Special Judge acquitted
him on the same set of facts and evidence, there was no ground for him
to hold him guilty of misconduct in the disciplinary proceedings. On 25
June 2015, the disciplinary authority held that the misconduct was proved
and imposed a penalty of compulsory retirement. Aggrieved by the penalty,       D
the respondent moved the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal. Before
the Tribunal, the respondent urged that:
         (i)      The prosecution before the Special Judge, Bijapur was on
                  the same set of facts on which he was acquitted by the
                  judgment dated 23 October 2013;                               E
         (ii)     The Upa-Lokayukta is not conferred with the power to
                  recommend the quantum of punishment;
         (iii)    The Upa-Lokayukta and disciplinary authority had ascribed
                  undue weight to the evidence of the investigating officer
                  and the shadow witness which resulted in a miscarriage of     F
                  justice; and
         (iv)     The disciplinary authority did not consider the explanation
                  submitted by the respondent in a proper perspective.
     5. By its order dated 5 April 2016, the Tribunal upheld the order of
compulsory retirement. The Tribunal held that:                                  G
         (i)      Disciplinary proceedings are not dependant on the verdict
                  in a parallel criminal case ( Commissioner of Police,
                  Delhi v. Narender Singh2);
2
    AIR 2006 SC 1800                                                            H
580                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A              (ii)     Strict rules of evidence do not apply to disciplinary
                        proceedings and even hearsay evidence is acceptable if it
                        has nexus with the facts of the case. (State of Haryana v.
                        Rattan Singh3); and
               (iii)    The contention of the respondent that his reply to the second
B                       show cause notice was not considered by the disciplinary
                        authority before passing the order dated 25 June 2015 is
                        erroneous.
             6. This led to the institution of proceedings before the High Court
      under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Division Bench framed the
C     principal issue in the following terms:
               “Whether the order of the Disciplinary authority in holding the
               petitioner guilty of charges despite a finding by a criminal Court
               acquitting him of the similar charges on the basis of similar set of
               evidence was justified.”
D
               7. The petition was allowed by the Division Bench on the ground
      that:
               (i)      The Disciplinary authority while observing that the
                        respondent had improved his statement while deposing that
E                       the money was from DW1, did not properly assess the
                        evidentiary material;
               (ii)     After the ‘hand wash’ of the respondent turned pink,
                        indicating that he touched the tainted currency, his
                        explanation was that the money was a loan being returned;
F
               (iii)    There is no corroborative evidence to prove the commission
                        of the offence; and
               (iv)     The exercise undertaken by the Enquiry Officer was based
                        on the averments made in the complaint and the deposition
G                       of the shadow witness. The respondent did not dispute the
                        possession of the tainted notes. The finding of the enquiry
                        officer and the competent authority is not based on tangible
                        evidence.

      3
H         1977 (1) SCR 750
              THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR v. UMESH                              581
                [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHADRACHUD, J.]

      8. Mr V N Raghupathy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of               A
the appellant submitted that:
      (i)      An acquittal in a criminal proceeding will not preclude the
               exercise of the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority in a
               departmental enquiry in view of the consistent position of
               law enunciated in the judgments of this Court;                    B
      (ii)     In interfering with the award of penalty following the
               disciplinary enquiry, the Division Bench of the High Court
               has transgressed the limitation on the power of judicial
               review;
      (iii)    The High Court noted that the finding of guilt recorded by        C
               the inquiry officer was based on the complaint and the
               evidence of the shadow witness. Though the respondent
               had not disputed the possession of the tainted currency notes,
               the explanation furnished by the respondent has erroneously
               been accepted; and                                                D
      (iv)     In the course of the criminal trial, the complainant turned
               hostile. Moreover, PW2 stated that the respondent was not
               a competent person to pass an order for deletion in the
               revenue record. On the other hand, in the course of the
               disciplinary enquiry there was sufficient evidence which was      E
               brought on the record to sustain the finding of misconduct.
      9. Mr Ashwin V Kotemath, learned counsel, on the other hand,
has urged that the finding of misconduct is without an application of
mind and is perverse for the following reasons:
      (i)       In the course of the disciplinary enquiry, the respondent        F
               examined DW 1 who is the brother-in-law of the
               complainant. He stated that the amount of rupees five
               thousand represented a loan which was received by him from
               the respondent for the purchase of manure in March 2011;
      (ii)      The defence and explanation of the respondent on 11 May          G
               2011, and on the date of trap before the Inquiry Officer
               was that in the month of March 2011, a hand loan of rupees
               five thousand was given to the brother-in-law of the
               complainant and it was the repayment of the loan which
               was demanded and accepted by the respondent;
                                                                                 H
582                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A              (iii)   The inquiry officer had no authority to recommend the
                       quantum of punishment;
               (iv)    Since 11 May 2011, the respondent has been out of service.
                       The High Court has correctly appreciated the nature of
                       misconduct while directing reinstatement without back
B                      wages; and
               (v)      In the alternative, the punishment of compulsory retirement
                       may be substituted by any other punishment such as the
                       stopping of increments in the interest of justice.
             10. During the course of the criminal trial, among other witnesses,
C     the prosecution led the evidence of PW1 (the complainant), PW2 (the
      shadow witness), and PW4 (the Village Assistant who was working
      under the respondent). PW 1 and PW 4 turned hostile and did not support
      the case of the prosecution. The respondent led the evidence of DW1,
      the brother-in-law of the complainant. The trial judge came to the
D     conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges levelled
      against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Among other reasons,
      the Special Judge also weighed the fact that the investigating officer
      assisted the complainant in the trap which is contrary to the law laid
      down in State of Punjab v. Madan Mohan Lal Verma4.The Special
      Judge, Bijapur by the judgment dated 23 October 2013 held that:
E
               “20. In this case paying the amount of Rs.5,000/- to the accused
               in his private office room by the complainant is not in dispute. The
               accused has stated that he has not demanded and accepted any
               bribe amount from the complainant. By seeing the photos it is
               clear that there was an altercation between the accused and the
F              complainant at the time of trap. So considering the principles stated
               in the said decisions and the evidence placed before this Court,
               come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove
               that the accused demanded and accepted the bribe amount of
               Rs.5,000/- as gratification from the complainant. In this case there
G              is no trustworthy evidence regarding the demand and acceptance
               of bribe amount by the accused as gratification.”
            11. During the course of the disciplinary enquiry, the complainant
      deposed as PW 1 but did not support the article of charge. However,

      4
H         (2013) 14 SCC 153
            THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR v. UMESH                               583
              [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHADRACHUD, J.]

PW2 who was the shadow witness furnished a detailed account of the              A
recovery of the tainted notes from the possession of the respondent.
Besides this, he furnished an account of the tape recorded conversation
with the accused. During the course of the disciplinary enquiry, the
respondent urged in his defense that the amount of rupees five thousand
recovered from him on the date of the trap represented the loan which
                                                                                B
was advanced by him to DW1. The complainant stated in the course of
his evidence that he got lands in his village in survey No.54 admeasuring
4.03 acres and that he had met the respondent in connection with the
deletion of the name of the holder from column 11 of the RTC. Though
the complainant did not support the case of the department in regard to
the demand of a bribe, he admitted his signatures on the complaint (Exhibit     C
P1), the signature on the pre-trap mahazar (Exhibit P2) and the trap
mahazar (Exhibit P3). The complainant also admitted that the police had
taken photographs of the scene (Exhibit P4). In this backdrop, the inquiry
officer noticed that the evidence of PW2 who was the shadow witness
was “very important” as he was present at the time of the demand and
                                                                                D
acceptance of the bribe by the respondent. The investigating officer
was examined as PW3 in the disciplinary enquiry. The investigating officer
corroborated the version of PW2 about the filing of a complaint by PW1,
conducting of pre-trap formalities in the presence of panchas and the trap
formalities. The relevant extract from the enquiry report is extracted below:
                                                                                E
      “In the light of the said evidence of PW.1, the evidence of PW.2
      is very important. PW.2 is the shadow panch witness, who is said
      to have been present at the time of demand and acceptance of
      bribe by DGO from CW .1. He has categorically stated in his
      evidence that on 11. 05.2011, Bijapur police secured him to their
      office and at that time CW.1 and 3 were there and the police              F
      introduced CW.1 to them and told about the contents of the
      complaint given by PW.1 and the complaint was against the OGO.
      Then CW.1 produced Rs.5000/- in the denomination of 3 notes of
      Rs.1000/- and 4 notes of Rs.500/- and then police smeared
      phenolphthalein powder to the said notes and they were kept in            G
      the left side shirt pocket of CW.1. He also speaks about further
      procedure of conducting pre-trap formalities by writing mahazar
      as per Ex.P.2.
      PW.2 further goes to say in his evidence that Lokayukta police
      took them all to the village Chadachana at about 1.00 PM and he
                                                                                H
584      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     and CW.1 went to the office of OGO and OGO was in the office.
      The police and others were waiting outside. He was standing
      near the door, then CW.1 asked DGO about his work, then DGO
      asked CW.1 whether he has brought the money which he had
      told yesterday, then CW.1 took the amount from his shirt pocket
      and handed over to DGO requesting to do his work, then DGO
B
      received the bribe amount from right hand and kept in his shirt
      pocket and he observed the said transaction. Then CW.1 went
      and gave pre-arranged signal to the police. Then police and CW.3
      came and CW. 1 showed DGO to the police, police washed both
      hands of DGO with some solution and said wash turned into pink
C     colour and the same was collected in bottle and sealed. Then
      DGO took out the bribe amount from his shirt pocket and note
      numbers were compared with the numbers recorded and they
      were tallying. Then police seized the said amount. He also says
      that then by providing alternate shirt, police got removed the shirt
      of DGO and shirt pocket was washed in some solution and said
D
      wash turned into pink colour. Then police conducted mahazar as
      per Ex.P.5
      PW. 3 is the Investigating Officer who corroborated the version
      of PW.2 about filing of complaint by PW.1 and conducting of pre-
      trap formalities in the presence of panchas and also about the
E     trap formalities. He made clear in his evidence after conducting
      pre-trap procedure, he took CW.1 to 3 in their vehicle to the private
      office of DGO. CW1 and 2 went inside the private office of DGO
      and after receipt of signal from CW.1, he and CW.3 went inside
      and CW.1 showed that DGO has accepted the bribe. Then he washed
F     both hands of DGO in sodium carbonate solution seperately and
      the said wash turned into pink colour and same was collected in
      bottle and sealed. He has speaks about washing of shirt pocket of
      DGO with sodium carbonate solution and other formalities.
      On careful perusal of evidence of PW.2 and PW.3, it can be held
G     that PW.1 (CW.1) has intentionally turned hostile and not supported
      the case of the disciplinary authority to held the DGO. The evidence
      of DW.1 appears to be a story created for the purpose of this
      case to escape from the clutches of law. PW.1 in his evidence
      has admitted the signature found on the complaint. If really DGO
      has not demanded any bribe and PW.1 returned the loan amount
H     to DGO as stated by DW.1, there was no necessity for PW.1 to
           THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR v. UMESH                              585
             [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHADRACHUD, J.]

      go Lokayukta office and give and sign the complaint. He was             A
      also present for the pre-trap and trap mahazars and put his
      signatures. PW.2 has made clear in his evidence that explanation
      given by DGO as per Ex. P.3 with regard to the alleged loan is
      false. PW.2 and 3 have nothing against DGO to depose falsely
      before this authority. Their evidence appears to be cogent and
                                                                              B
      reliable and I do not find any reason to disbelieve their evidence.
      In their cross-examination also, defense counsel failed to elicit
      any material contradictions to discard their evidence. The defense
      of DGO that he received loan amount from PW.1 advanced by
      him to his brother-in-law cannot be accepted.”
       12. The enquiry report concluded in this backdrop that the             C
misconduct was established on the basis of the evidence of PW2 and
PW3. Referring to the evidence of the complainant, the inquiry officer
held that if in truth the respondent had not demanded a bribe and PW1
was returning a loan amount to the respondent as stated by DW 1, there
was no necessity for the complainant to visit the office of the Lokayukta     D
and to sign a complaint. The complainant was also present for the pre-
trap and trap mahazar and appended his signatures. The enquiry report
finds that there was no reason for PW2 and PW3 to depose falsely. No
material inconsistencies were elicited during the cross examination by
the respondent. Consequently, the defense that the amount which was
recovered from the respondent represented a loan was disbelieved and          E
the misconduct was held to be proved.
       13. The principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry are distinct
from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an offence
punishable under the criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to
establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The         F
accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The purpose of a
disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of
misconduct by an employee which results in a violation of the service
rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal
prosecution where the charge has to be established beyond reasonable          G
doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be
established on a preponderance of probabilities. The rules of evidence
which apply to a criminal trial are distinct from those which govern a
disciplinary enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case does
not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinary
jurisdiction.                                                                 H
586                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A           14. In a judgment of a three judge Bench of this Court in State of
      Haryana v. Rattan Singh5, Justice V R Krishna Iyer set out the principles
      which govern a disciplinary proceedings as follows:
               “4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and
               sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act
B              may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for
               a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay
               evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It
               is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals
               must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly
C              swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian
               Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite
               decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through
               case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The
               essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous
               materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural
D              justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or
               arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate
               the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic
               tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below
               misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who
E              had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before
               the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residuum’
               rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon
               certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to
               that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such
               rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some
F              evidence or was there no evidence — not in the sense of the
               technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair
               commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom
               will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof
               of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence
G              of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for
               the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent
               on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal,
               Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has

      5
H         (1977) 2 SCC 491
            THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR v. UMESH                            587
              [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHADRACHUD, J.]

       relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore,   A
       we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.”
                                                     (emphasis supplied)
      These principles have been reiterated in subsequent decisions of
this Court including State of Rajasthan v. B K Meena6; Krishnakali
Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh7; Ajit Kumar                B
Nag v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.8; and CISF v Abrar Ali9.
       15. In the course of the submissions, the respondents placed
reliance on the decision in the Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar10.
In that case, six charges were framed against the respondent. One of
the charges was that he demanded a commission of 1% for paying the           C
railway staff. The enquiry officer found all the six charges proved. The
disciplinary authority agreed with those findings and imposed the
punishment of reversion to a lower rank. Allowing the petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court observed that there was
no evidence to hold that he was guilty of the charge of bribery since the    D
witnesses only said that the motive/reason for not making the payment
could be the expectation of a commission amount. The respondent placed
reliance on the following passages from the decision:
       “21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires to be proved to
       the hilt as it brings both civil and criminal consequences upon the   E
       employee concerned. He would be liable to be prosecuted and
       would also be liable to suffer severest penalty awardable in such
       cases. Therefore, such a grave charge of quasi-criminal nature
       was required to be proved beyond the shadow of doubt and to the
       hilt. It cannot be proved on mere probabilities.
                                                                             F
       31. […] wherein it has been held that the punishment should
       always be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. However,
       in a case of corruption, the only punishment is dismissal from
       service. Therefore, the charge of corruption must always be dealt
       with keeping in mind that it has both civil and criminal
       consequences.”                                                        G

6
  (1966) 6 SCC 417
7
  (2004) 8 SCC 200
8
  (2005) 7 SCC 764
9
  (2017) 4 SCC 507
10
   (2009) 12 SCC 78                                                          H
588            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A            The observations in paragraph 21 are not the ratio decidendi of
      the case. These observations were made while discussing the judgment
      of High Court. The ratio of the judgment emerges in the subsequent
      passages of the judgment, where the test of relevant material and
      compliance with natural justice as laid down in Rattan Singh (supra)
      was reiterated:
B
            “”35. …an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving
            strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural
            justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details
            of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiry
C           can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conducted
            fairly, objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be
            perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on
            conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and
            suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent
            cannot be a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for
D           arriving at the finding of fact in the context of the statue defining
            the misconduct.”
            36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against the respondent appears
            to be the outcome of anguish of superior officers as there had
            been an agitation by the railway staff demanding the payment of
E           pay and allowances and they detained the train illegally and there
            has been too much hue and cry for several hours on the railway
            station. The enquiry officer has taken into consideration the
            non-existing material and failed to consider the relevant
            material and finding of all facts recorded by him cannot be
F           sustained in the eye of the law.”
                                                            (emphasis supplied)
             On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in the above
      decision that there was no relevant material to sustain the conviction of
      the respondent since there was only hearsay evidence where the
G
      witnesses assumed that the motive for not paying the railway staff “could
      be” corruption. Therefore, the standard that was applied by the Court
      for determining the validity of the departmental proceedings was whether
      (i) there was relevant material for arriving at the finding; and (ii) the
      principles of natural justice were complied with.
H
           THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR v. UMESH                              589
             [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHADRACHUD, J.]

     16. In Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v.                  A
C. Nagaraju, this Court has held:
      “9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer
      from exercising the power to conduct departmental proceedings
      in accordance with the rules and regulations. The two proceedings,
      criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in      B
      different fields and have different objectives. In the disciplinary
      proceedings, the question is whether the Respondent is guilty of
      such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser
      punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal
      proceedings, the question is whether the offences registered against
      him under the PC Act are established, and if established, what          C
      sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the
      mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and trial in both
      the cases are significantly distinct and different.”
      The Court also held that:
                                                                              D
      “Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the
      Appellant and the Respondent No.1, we are of the view that
      interference with the order of dismissal by the High Court was
      unwarranted. It is settled law that the acquittal by a Criminal Court
      does not preclude a Departmental Inquiry against the delinquent
      officer. The disciplinary authority is not bound by the judgment of     E
      the Criminal Court if the evidence that is produced in the
      Departmental Inquiry is different from that produced during the
      criminal trial. The object of a Departmental Inquiry is to find out
      whether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct
      rules for the purpose of determining whether he should be
                                                                              F
      continued in service. The standard of proof in a Departmental
      Inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of
      dismissal which is based on the evidence before the Inquiry Officer
      in the disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidence
      available to the Criminal Court, is justified and needed no
      interference by the High Court.”                                        G
      17. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an
appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court
does not re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of
misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry.
The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to      H
590              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied
      with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the
      statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have
      been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority
      suffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is disproportionate to the
      proven misconduct.11 However, none of the above tests for attracting
B
      the interference of the High Court were attracted in the present case.
      The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal having exercised the power of
      judicial review found no reason to interfere with the award of punishment
      of compulsory retirement. The Division Bench of the High Court
      exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 and trenched upon a domain
C     which falls within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer. The enquiry
      was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The
      findings of the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority are sustainable
      with reference to the evidence which was adduced during the enquiry.
      The acquittal of the respondent in the course of the criminal trial did not
      impinge upon the authority of the disciplinary authority or the finding of
D
      misconduct in the disciplinary proceeding.
            18. For these reasons, we allow the appeals and set aside the
      impugned judgment and order of the High Court of Karnataka at the
      Kalaburagi Bench dated 29 November 2017 in Writ Petition Nos. 202250-
      251/2016 (S-KAT). The Petition instituted by the respondent under Article
E     226 of the Constitution shall stand dismissed. The finding of misconduct
      and the punishment of compulsory retirement are restored.
             19. There shall be no order as to costs.
             20. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
F
      Devika Gujral                                                   Appeals allowed.




G


      11
        State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423; Union of India v. G.
      Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC
      749; R.S. Saini v State of Punjab (1999) 8 SCC 90; and CISF v Abrar Ali (2017) 4
H     SCC 507.