Holding

A child witness is competent if able to understand and answer questions rationally, s.106 does not shift the prosecution’s burden, and the High Court erred in discarding the child’s testimony, so the conviction is restored.

Summary

The State of Madhya Pradesh prosecuted Balveer Singh for the murder, concealment and conspiracy to murder his wife, relying heavily on the testimony of the 7‑year‑old daughter, Rani, as the sole eye‑witness. The High Court acquitted the accused, holding that the child’s delayed statement and residence with an inimical relative rendered her testimony unreliable and possibly tutored. The Supreme Court examined the competence of child witnesses under s.118 Evidence Act, the need for a preliminary examination, and the proper application of s.106 which does not shift the prosecution’s burden of proof. It held that a child witness is competent if capable of understanding questions and that the trial court must record its satisfaction of this, but the testimony should not be discarded merely for delay or alleged tutoring absent concrete proof. The Court also clarified that s.106 is an exception to the general burden rule and does not absolve the prosecution from proving the crime. Finding no indication of tutoring and noting the child’s credible, lengthy cross‑examination, the Court set aside the High Court’s acquittal and restored the trial court’s conviction.

Issues considered

Whether the Evidence Act, 1872 prescribes a specific age as a determinative factor for witness competence
Whether a child witness is to be treated on the same footing as an adult witness
Whether the trial court must record its opinion and satisfaction that a child witness understands the duty to speak the truth before recording testimony
Whether s.106 of the Evidence Act should be applied with care and whether it shifts the evidential burden to the accused
Whether s.106 absolves the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed
Whether the High Court erred in acquitting the accused by discarding the child witness’s testimony

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 174
Evidence Act, 1872s. 101, s. 106, s. 118, s. 165, s. 4
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 34

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Does the Evidence Act, 1872 prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent witness; Does the Evidence Act treat evidence of a child on the same footing as any other witness; Before the evidence of the child witness is recorded, Court to record its opinion and satisfaction that the child witness understands the duty of speaking the truth; Whether the Court should apply s.106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution; Does s.106 of the Evidence Act absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that

Subjects

Death under suspicious circumstancesUnnatural death reportChild witnessSole eye-witnessMorgue enquiry proceedingsMorgue enquiry reportCremation in clandestine mannerTutored testimonyDeposing falselyDelay in recording witness statementTestimony of witness who is at inimical terms with accusedPreliminary examination of child witnessCompetent to testifyDangerous witnessWitnesses liable to be influenced easilyTutored part separated from untutored partTrial judge not a mute spectatorDelay due to routine manner of investigationEvidence not to be discarded on procedural technicalitiesImprovisationFabricationDoctored or false statementTwin conditions of fabricationOpportunity of tutoring child witnessWholly reliable testimonyWholly unreliable testimonyNeither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable testimonyOcular evidenceMinor discrepanciesPhotographic memoryPower of observationWitness not a human tape recorderPiercing court examinationRule of prudenceMinimum age of witnessDemeanour of child witnessFactum probandumFactum probansCircumstantial evidenceChain of evidenceEx vi terminiUnnatural conduct of accusedAbsconding accusedFacts especially in knowledge of the accusedShifting of burden of proofEvidential burdenPersuasive burdenPositive and negative factsPrima facie caseCrimes committed in secrecy of the houseCrimes committed in four walls of the houseCrime against women

Judgment

[2025] 2 S.C.R. 836 : 2025 INSC 261

The State of Madhya Pradesh
v.
Balveer Singh
(Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2012)
24 February 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and Manoj Misra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Does the Evidence Act, 1872 prescribe any particular age as a
determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent witness;
Does the Evidence Act treat evidence of a child on the same footing
as any other witness; Before the evidence of the child witness is
recorded, is it necessary for the Trial Court to record its opinion and
satisfaction that the child witness understands the duty of speaking
the truth; Whether the Court should apply s.106 of the Evidence Act
in criminal cases with care and caution; Does s.106 of the Evidence
Act absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was
committed; In the instant case, whether the High Court committed
any error in acquitting the respondent of offences u/ss. 302, 201,
and 34 of Penal Code, 1860.

Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.118 – No prescription of any particular
age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a
competent one:
Held: The Evidence Act does not prescribe any particular age as a
determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one – On
the contrary, s.118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons
shall be competent to testify, unless the court considers that they
are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or
from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender
years, extreme old age, disease - whether of mind, or any other
cause of the same kind – A child of tender age can be allowed to
testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and
give rational answers thereto. [Para 26]

* Author
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 837

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

Evidence Act, 1872 – Principles pertaining to the appreciation
of evidence of a child witness – Discussed. [Para 34]

Evidence Act, 1872 – Child witness is deemed to be on the
same footing as any other witness – Precaution needs to be
taken by the Court:
Held: The evidence of a child witness for all purposes is deemed
to be on the same footing as any other witness as long the child
is found to be competent to testify – The only precaution which
the court should take while assessing the evidence of a child
witness is that such witness must be a reliable one due to the
susceptibility of children by their falling prey to tutoring – However,
this in no manner means that the evidence of a child must be
rejected outrightly at the slightest of discrepancy, rather what is
required is that the same is evaluated with great circumspection –
While appreciating the testimony of a child witness the courts are
required to assess whether the evidence of such witness is its
voluntary expression and not borne out of the influence of others
and whether the testimony inspires confidence – At the same time,
one must be mindful that there is no rule requiring corroboration
to the testimony of a child witness before any reliance is placed
on it. [Para 35]

Evidence – Tutored testimony – Two broad effects in testimony;
(i) improvisation or (ii) fabrication – Discussed. [Paras 50-54]

Evidence – Testimony – Classification of categories:
Held: Irrespective of whether the testimony of a witness is tutored
or not, the same, generally may be classified into three categories: -
(i) wholly reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; (iii) neither wholly reliable
nor wholly unreliable. [Para 55]

Evidence – Appreciation of testimony – The judicially evolved
principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal
case – Discussed. [Para 56]

Evidence – Assessing the value of the evidence of the
eyewitnesses – Two principle considerations:
Held: In assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses,
two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of
838 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of
occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them
to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there
is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence –
In respect of both these considerations, the circumstances either
elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other
evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the
veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value
which a Court would attach to their evidence. [Para 57]

Evidence – Evidence of child witness – Opinion and satisfaction
of trial Court:
Held: Before the evidence of the child witness is recorded, the
Trial Court must record its opinion and satisfaction that the child
witness understands the duty of speaking the truth and must clearly
state why he is of such opinion – The questions put to the child in
the course of the preliminary examination and the demeanour of
the child and their ability to respond to questions coherently and
rationally must be recorded by the Trial Court – The correctness
of the opinion formed by the Trial Court as to why it is satisfied
that the child witness was capable of giving evidence may be gone
into by the appellate court by either scrutinizing the preliminary
examination conducted by the Trial Court, or from the testimony
of the child witness or the demeanour of the child during the
deposition and cross-examination as recorded by the Trial Court.
[Paras 58 (iii), (iv)]

Evidence – Circumstantial Evidence:
Held: In a case of circumstantial evidence, the judgment remains
essentially inferential – The inference is drawn from the established
facts as the circumstances lead to particular inferences – The Court
has to draw an inference with respect to whether the chain of
circumstances is complete, and when the circumstances therein are
collectively considered, the same must lead only to the irresistible
conclusion that the accused alone is the perpetrator of the crime
in question – All the circumstances so established must be of a
conclusive nature, and consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused. [Para 64]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Burden of proving fact especially
within knowledge:
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 839

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

Held: S.106 of the Evidence Act provides that when any fact
is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden
of proving that fact is upon him – The word “especially” means
facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge
of the accused – The ordinary rule that applies to the criminal
trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused is not in any way modified by the rule of facts
embodied in s.106 of the Evidence Act – s.106 of the Evidence
Act is an exception to s.101 of the Evidence Act – S.101 with its
illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case
the burden of proof is on the prosecution and s.106 is certainly
not intended to relieve it of that duty – On the contrary, it is
designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would
be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the
prosecution to establish the facts which are, “especially within
the knowledge of the accused and which, he can prove without
difficulty or inconvenience”. [Para 68]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Application with care and caution:
Held: The court should apply s.106 of the Evidence Act in criminal
cases with care and caution – It cannot be said that it has no
application to criminal cases – The ordinary rule which applies to
criminal trials in this country that the onus lies on the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by
the provisions contained in s.106 of the Evidence Act. [Para 75]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – s.106 does not absolve the
prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was
committed:
Held: Section 106 cannot be invoked to make up the inability of
the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to
the guilt of the accused – This section cannot be used to support
a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by
proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence – It
does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a
crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within
the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden
on the accused to show that no crime was committed – To infer
the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable explanation
in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves
enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its
840 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

legitimate burden – So, until a prima facie case is established by
such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused. [Para 76]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Explanation by accused:
Held: s.106 obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the accused
is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution unless
the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his
knowledge which would render the evidence of the prosecution
nugatory – If in such a situation, the accused offers an explanation
which may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the
accused gets the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may
not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the
explanation – But if the accused in such a case does not give any
explanation at all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation, this
by itself is a circumstance which may well turn the scale against
him. [Para 77]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Crimes committed in secrecy:
Held: The crimes that are generally committed in complete secrecy
inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to
lead evidence – No member of the family like in the case on board,
even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose
against another family member – If an offence takes place inside
the four walls of a house and in such circumstances where the
accused has all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at
the time and in the circumstances of its choice, it will be extremely
difficult for the prosecution to lead direct evidence to establish the
guilt of the accused – It is to resolve such a situation that s.106 of
the Evidence Act exists in the statute book. [Paras 86, 87]

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201 and 34 – Evidence Act, 1872
– ss.118, 106 – Prosecution case was that on the night of
incident respondent-accused killed his wife by choking her
neck with his leg – Thereafter, he cremated the body in the
night itself – Prosecution examined 8 witnesses – PW-6 (minor
daughter of deceased) was examined as a sole eye-witness
to the incident – Trial Court convicted respondent u/ss. 302,
201 r/w. s.34 of the IPC relying on the testimony of PW-6 –
However, the High Court acquitted the respondent discarding
the testimony of PW-6 – Correctness:
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 841

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

Held: There is nothing on record to indicate that PW-6 was a
tutored witness – Trial Court recorded in its judgment, wherein
it has been noted that PW-6 was cross examined at length for
approximately 1.5 hours, and her demeanour throughout the same
was believable, with nothing to indicate that she had been tutored
or was deposing falsely – It also has taken note of the fact that
in the entire cross examination no significant contradictions were
found – Thus, the High Court committed an egregious error in
discarding the testimony of PW-6 – The incriminating circumstances
emerging from the evidence on record are (i) The failure on the
part of the respondent accused in not explaining in any manner
as to what had actually happened to his wife i.e., the deceased or
how she died on the fateful night of the incident, more particularly
when he did not dispute that he was in the company of his wife
at the relevant point of time; (ii) The unnatural conduct of the
respondent accused in not informing the family members either
about the death of their daughter or the cremation of her body,
despite the fact that her family members were residing in the
very same village; (iii) The fact that the respondent-accused after
clandestinely cremating the deceased’s body fled away and could
not be found either at the house or in the field where the body
had been burnt as stated by PW-3 and PW-6, respectively, again
raises suspicion about the cause of death of the deceased; (iv) The
suspicious circumstances under which the deceased died coupled
with the fact that the accused had a fight with the deceased two to
three days before the incident; their strained relationship and the
accused frequently treating the deceased cruelly, as deposed by
PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, and PW-6, respectively, further raise concerns
and points towards the involvement of the respondent accused in the
alleged crime; (v) It is also not the case of the respondent accused
that the deceased was suffering from any ailment nor is there any
evidence worth the name to suggest the possibility of her death
occurring due to any health issue – Thus, in this regard, it was all
the more important for the respondent accused to explain in what
circumstances and in what manner his wife suddenly died on the
fateful night of the incident – The aforementioned circumstances
constitute more than a prima facie case to enable the prosecution
to invoke s.106 of the Evidence Act and shift the burden on the
accused husband to explain what had actually happened on the
day & date his wife died – Thus, the impugned judgment and order
of acquittal passed by the High Court is hereby set aside, and
842 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court is
restored. [Paras 59, 65, 89, 91]
Evidence Act, 1872 – Delay in recording police statement –
The High Court, in the impugned judgment allowed the appeal
of the accused and acquitted him holding that the testimony
of PW-6 did not inspire confidence particularly in view of the
inordinate delay of 18-days in recording her police statement –
Correctness:
Held: There is nothing on record that would lead to the inference
that the delay in recording the statement of PW-6 was done
deliberately in order to manipulate or concoct the case against
the respondent accused herein, and rather such delay appears
to be inadvertent with no sinister motive or design in mind – The
statement of PW-6 was recorded on the same date as the statement
of PW-5 – If at all the investigating agency intended to allow the
doctoring of the testimony of PW-6 then it would have only delayed
the examination of the child witness (PW-6) and not of PW5 as-
well, thus this delay in examination appears to be attributable to
the routine manner in which the IO proceeded with the course of
investigation and the overall investigation inertia and not to give
effect to any unfair practice. [Para 44]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.165 – Duty of Judge – There was delay
in recording statement of PW-6 by IO – Accused also failed in
putting a question in regard to delay in examination of PW-6:
Held: While it is true that primarily it was for the accused to question
the IO to explain the delay in recording the statement of PW-6,
but at the same time the Trial Judge should not have remained
a mute spectator, acting like a robot or a recording machine to
just deliver whatever stands feeded by the parties – The role of a
judge in dispensation of justice after ascertaining the true facts no
doubt is very difficult one – Thus, even if the accused had failed in
putting a question in regards to delay in examination of PW-6, the
presiding judge was duty bound to put this question to the IO in
exercise of his powers u/s. 165 of the Evidence Act. [Paras 42, 43]

Case Law Cited
Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 5 SCC 341;
Pradeep v. State of Haryana [2023] 10 SCR 1021 : 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 777; Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 843

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

(2004) 1 SCC 64; Panchhi v. State of U.P [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 40:
(1998) 7 SCC 177; Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka [2001] 1
SCR 1 : (2001) 9 SCC 129; Arbind Singh v. State of Bihar (1995)
Supp 4 SCC 416; Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh
[2019] 2 SCR 844 : (2019) 4 SCC 522; State of M.P. v. Ramesh
(2011) 4 SCC 786; Ranbir & Ors. v. State of Punjab [1974] 1 SCR
102 : (1973) 2 SCC 444; State of U.P. v. Satish [2005] 1 SCR
1132 : (2005) 3 SCC 114; Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of
Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404; Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar (2021)
10 SCC 725; Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra [2012] 7 SCR 1083 : (2012) 10 SCC 373; Trimukh
Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra [2006] Supp. 7 SCR 156 :
(2006) 10 SCC 681; State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and
Ors. [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 712 : (2000) 8 SCC 382; Ram Gulam
Chaudhary & Ors. v. State of Bihar (2001) 8 SCC 311 – relied on.
Munna Pandey v. State of Bihar, 2023 INSC 793 : [2023] 11 SCR
1005; V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand (2015) 9 SCC 588;
Ramratan and others v. State of Rajasthan [1962] 3 SCR 590 :
AIR 1962 SC 424; Guli Chand and others v. State of Rajasthan
AIR 1974 SC 276; Badri v. State of Rajasthan [1976] 2 SCR
339 : AIR 1976 SC 560; Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State
of Gujarat [1983] 3 SCR 280 : AIR 1983 SC 753; Leela Ram v.
State of Haryana [1999] Supp. 3 SCR 435 : AIR 1999 SC 3717;
Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 875 : AIR
1959 SC 1012; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
(1984) 4 SCC 116; Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [2023] 12
SCR 815 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1261; Anees v. State Govt. of
NCT 2024 INSC 368 : [2024] 6 SCR 164; Dharm Das Wadhwani
v. State of U.P. (1974) 4 SCC 267 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
A Treatise on Judicial Evidence, Jeremy Bentham; An Essay on
the ‘Principles of Circumstantial Evidence’ by William Wills by T.
and J.W. Johnson and Co. 1872; Professor Glanville Williams –
Proofs of Guilt; Kenny's outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn. 1958;
Webster's Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.) – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Evidence
Act, 1872.
844 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

List of Keywords
Death under suspicious circumstances; Unnatural death report;
Child witness; Sole eye-witness; Morgue enquiry proceedings;
Morgue enquiry report; Cremation in clandestine manner; Tutored
testimony; Deposing falsely; Delay in recording witness statement;
Testimony of witness who is at inimical terms with accused;
Preliminary examination of child witness; Competent to testify;
Dangerous witness; Witnesses liable to be influenced easily;
Tutored part separated from untutored part; Trial judge not a mute
spectator; Delay due to routine manner of investigation; Evidence
not to be discarded on procedural technicalities; Improvisation;
Fabrication; Doctored or false statement; Twin conditions of
fabrication; Reasonable likelihood of tutoring; Opportunity of
tutoring child witness; Wholly reliable testimony; Wholly unreliable
testimony; Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable testimony;
Ocular evidence; Minor discrepancies; Photographic memory;
Power of observation; Witness not a human tape recorder; Piercing
court examination; Rule of prudence; Minimum age of witness;
Demeanour of child witness; Factum probandum; Factum probans;
Circumstantial evidence; Chain of evidence; Ex vi termini; Unnatural
conduct of accused; Absconding accused; Facts especially in
knowledge of the accused; Shifting of burden of proof; Evidential
burden; Persuasive burden; Positive and negative facts; Prima
facie case; Crimes committed in secrecy of the house; Crimes
committed in four walls of the house; Crime against women.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1669 of 2012
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.06.2010 of the High Court
of M.P. at Jabalpur in CRLA No. 524 of 2004

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Sarthak Raizada, Mirza Kayesh Begg,
Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Ms. Akanksha Tomar, Argha Roy.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Lakhan Singh Chauhan, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Akhileshwar Jha,
Amit Kumar Chawla, Anil Shrivastav.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 845

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:-
INDEX*

A. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION ...................................... 2

i. The Incident. .............................................................. 2

ii. Oral Evidence on Record. ........................................ 6

iii. Trial Court’s Judgment & Order. ............................. 18

B. IMPUGNED ORDER ......................................................... 28

C. ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 34

i. Evidence of Child Witness and Test for parsing
Tutored Testimony. ................................................... 35

ii. Principles of Law relating to appreciation of
Circumstantial Evidence. ........................................ 70

a. Incriminating Circumstances emerging from the
evidence on record. ............................................. 73

iii. Principles of Law governing the Applicability of
Section 106 of the Evidence Act. ............................ 76

iv. What is “prima facie case” (foundational facts) in
the context of Section 106 of the Evidence Act? . 88

D. CONCLUSION .................................................................. 93

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
846 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

1. This appeal is at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh and
is directed against the judgment and order dated 29.06.2010 passed
by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh of judicature at Gwalior in
Criminal Appeal No. 524 of 2004 (‘Impugned Order’) whereby the
High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent herein and
acquitted him of the offence under Section(s) 302, 201 and 34
respectively of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, the ‘IPC’).

A. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION
2. The deceased, namely, Birendra Kumari was married to the
respondent accused. In the wedlock, two sons and a daughter
named Rani were born. Rani at the time of the incident in 2003,
was seven years of age.

i. The Incident.
3. On 15.07.2003 sometime during the midnight, Bhoora Singh alias
Yashpal i.e., the complainant along with his father Bharat Singh; the
maternal cousin brother of the deceased’s father, heard cries and
screams of the deceased coming from the house of the accused.
After some time, the screams of the deceased stopped. At about
in the morning, they learnt from the other inhabitants of the village
that the deceased had died during the night and that her body had
been cremated.
4. Accordingly, the complainant along with his father went to the Indar
Police Station at around 9:00 AM and lodged an unnatural death
report / information under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short, the ‘Cr.P.C.’) in connection with the
death of the deceased under suspicious circumstances, which was
registered in entry no. 404 of the general diary as Morgue No. 07
of 2003 dated 16.07.2003. In the said report, the Complainants
stated that on the fateful night of the incident, at around 12:00 AM,
they heard the cries and screams of the deceased which eventually
ceased. Shortly, thereafter they saw the accused along with his
family members cremating the deceased in their field. It was further
stated that when they went to the house of the accused to inquire
about the incident, the daughter of the deceased (Rani) informed
that her mother had died. The said unnatural death information
report reads as under: -
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 847

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

“Informant Bhoora @ Yashpal along with his companion
father Bharat Singh came to the police station and orally
reported that tonight at around 12 o’ clock from the house
of Balveer Yadav of their village, the noise of her wife
Virendra Kumari crying and screaming were coming out,
after some time, the noise stopped coming, thereafter,
around 3 o’clock in the night Balveer and his family
members were cremating Virendra Kumari in their field,
then I went to Balveer’s house and inquired from her
daughter Rani why dear, what happened, then she told
that Mummy has died, then I got to know that Virendra
Kumari has died, her body has been burnt, therefore I am
reporting that an investigation be conducted. The report
was read over and heard and has been written in the
same manner as it was stated.
Based on the aforesaid statement, Marg No. 7/03
under Section 174 Cr.P.C. was registered, taken under
investigation, and the investigation was entrusted to ASI
MP Singh.”
5. Upon receiving the information, enquiry was undertaken by ASI
Mahendra Singh Chauhan. In the course of the enquiry, it was
revealed that the respondent accused on the night of the incident
had killed his wife i.e., the deceased in the porch on the first floor
by throwing her to the ground and thereafter choking her neck with
his leg. The enquiry further revealed that thereafter the body was
cremated in the night itself with the help of his sister, Jatan Bai.
6. In view of the aforesaid, first information report bearing no. 142 of
2003 dated 20.07.2003 came to be registered against the respondent
accused herein and her sister, Jatan Bai for the offence punishable
under Section(s) 302, 201 read with 34 respectively of the IPC. The
relevant contents of the FIR are reproduced below: -
“I am posted as Station in charge at Police Station Indar.
On 16/7/03, on the basis of information received from
Informant Bhoora @ Yashpal S/o Bharat Singh Yadav R/o
Village Singharai, Marg No. 7/03 was registered in the
General Diary Entry No. 404 and taken under investigation.
Its investigation was conducted by ASI Mahendra Singh,
on receiving the investigation report, it was attested by
848 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

me, where offence under Section 302, 201, 34 IPC were
found proven against Balvir Singh Yadav and Jatan Bhai,
therefore, Crime No. 142/03 registered against both the
accused under relevant offence sections and taken under
investigation. Copy of Marg Intimation and Inquiry Report
is as follows:
Informant Bhoora @ Yashpal along with his companion
father Bharat Singh came to the police station and orally
reported that tonight at around 12 o’ clock from the house
of Balveer Yadav of their village, the noise of her wife
Virendra Kumari crying and screaming were coming out,
after some time, the noise stopped coming, thereafter,
around 3 o’clock in the night Balveer and his family
members were cremating Virendra Kumari in their field,
then I went to Balveer’s house and inquired from her
daughter Rani why dear, what happened, then she told
that Mummy has died, then I got to know that Virendra
Kumari has died, her body has been burnt, therefore I
am reporting that an investigation be conducted. The
report was read over and heard and has been written in
the same manner as it was stated. Sd/- Yashpal Singh.
Based on above information, Marg No. 7/03 under Section
174 Cr.P.C. was registered and taken under investigation
and investigation was entrusted to ASI M.S. Chauhan.
Investigation Report – Respected SO Police Station Indar
Subject: In relation to the commission of offence under
Section 302, 201, 34 IPC on the investigation of Marg
No. 7/03 Section 174 Cr.P.C., it is stated that on the basis
of order issued by his good-self, I ASI Mahendra Singh
conducted the investigation of Marg No. 7/03 under Section
174 Cr.P.C. after reaching the spot Village Singharai,
during the course of investigation, recorded the statement
of complainant Bhoora @ Yashpal Singh Yadav, Kumari
Rani, D/o Balvir Singh Yadav, Bharat Singh Yadav R/o
Village Singharai and Badal Singh Yadav, Police Station
Badarvas. On spot map of the place of incident was
prepared and seizure proceedings were conducted, from
the investigation up till now and the statement of Kumari
Rani Yadav, it has been found that Balvir Singh Yadav
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 849

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

husband of the deceased Virendra Kumari murdered her
by slamming Virendra Kumari on the floor of the porch of
the house and choked her neck by pressing his foot and
Kumari Jatan Singh helped her brother Balvir Singh in
the murder, later on, during the night itself, Balvir Singh
Yadav took the dead body of his wife on his shoulders to
his field and discreetly burnt it. Therefore, prima facie the
offence under Section 302, 201, 34 IPC has been found to
be proven against Balvir Singh Yadav S/o Samadar Singh
Yadav, Jatan Bhai D/o Samadar Singh Yada, residents
of Singharai. Therefore, it is requested, the investigation
report for further action along with case diary is forwarded
to you. Mahendra Singh ASI Police Station Indar.”
7. In the course of the investigation, the statement of the complainant
and his father were recorded, spot map / site plan of the place of
occurrence was prepared along with the seizure memo for the bones
and burnt bangles found at the place of cremation of the deceased
along with a plastic diesel can in the presence of the complainant
and the village watchman; Narain Singh. Accordingly, on 22.07.2003
the respondent accused was arrested.
8. Upon conclusion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed on
30.07.2003 against the respondent accused, Balveer Singh and
the co-accused; Jatan Bai for the offences Section(s) 302, 201
read with 34 of the IPC. On 03.08.2003, the police statement of the
child witness; Rani i.e., the daughter of the respondent accused
and deceased was recorded. The investigation revealed that the
co-accused at the time of incident was a juvenile, accordingly, her
trial was separated. The case against the respondent accused was
committed for trial to the Court of Session and registered as S.T. No.
197 of 2003. Charge was framed against the respondent accused for
the offence enumerated above by the Addl. Session Judge to which
the respondent accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

ii. Oral Evidence on Record.
9. The prosecution examined a total of 8 witnesses in support of
the charge. Narain Singh (PW2) the watchman of the village was
examined as a panch witness to the seizure memo and for establishing
the accounts of the fateful night of the incident. Bhoora Singh alias
850 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Yashpal (PW3) and Bharat Singh (PW4) were examined to establish
the chain of events when the incident occurred along with Badal
Singh (PW5), the father of the deceased to prove the harassment
caused by the respondent accused towards his deceased wife. Rani
(PW6) the daughter of the respondent accused and the deceased was
examined as the sole eye-witness to the incident. Mahender Singh
Chauhan (PW7) and Rajender Kumar Chhari (PW8) were examined
to prove the contents of the unnatural death report, the FIR and the
seizure memos. Mahesh Kumar Mishra (PW1) the Patwari of the
village was also examined to establish the place of occurrence and
cremation of the deceased.
10. Rani (PW6), the daughter of the accused and deceased and the
sole eye-witness to the incident deposed that on the fateful night
of the incident, the deceased was sleeping in the open courtyard
of the house. She deposed that at that time, the deceased, her
two infant brothers and her aunt Jatan i.e., the co-accused were
present in the house. At that time, the respondent accused came
and grabbed the deceased from her neck and hit a blow on her
body with a stick causing her to fall. Thereafter, the respondent
accused exerted pressure on her neck with his feet and as a result
the deceased screamed for help. When she ran to help her mother,
the respondent accused slapped her and the co-accused pulled her
away. She deposed that she did not witness what happened next
but later she saw her mother dead and her body being taken by the
respondent accused to the barn. She further deposed that early in
the morning she found the body of her mother burning. She deposed
that she had informed Bhoora Singh (PW3) in the morning that the
deceased had been killed. In her cross examination, she denied the
suggestion of being tutored at the instance of PW3 or PW4. She
denied that Bhoora Singh and Bharat Singh had told her to repeat
or memorize the police statement given by her. She admitted not
having told the police about the respondent hitting the deceased
with a stick before attempting to choke her. She further denied the
suggestion that the deceased was suffering from ailment, clarifying
that her mother had fallen sick only once i.e., three-months before
the incident took place. She further revealed that when her mother
asked the respondent accused to take her for treatment, the accused
hit her. Apart from this, nothing substantial was elicited through her
cross-examination.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 851

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

11. Mahesh Kumar Mishra (PW1), the village patwari deposed that he
had assisted the police in preparation of the site-map of the place of
incident and identified his signatures on the same. In his cross, he
stated that there are around 5-6 houses between the house of the
Complainant and the accused. He further stated that there is also
a Basti between the two houses where approximately 100 people
live. In the last, he admitted that cremations are often done by the
people of the village in their own fields or barns, wherever they find
space. Apart from this, nothing substantial could be elicited from his
cross-examination.
12. Narain Singh (PW2), the village chowkidar deposed that when the
police checked the verandah of the deceased, they could find nothing
and that the bangles belonging to the deceased were recovered and
collected from the place where the body was burnt. He identified
his signatures on the seizure memo drawn of the ashes, bones and
bangles belonging to the deceased as-well as a green coloured diesel
cannister. In his cross, he stated that the house of the Complainant
is 5-6 furlongs away from the accused’s house making it impossible
for any noise of shouting to travel between them. He further admitted
that there are houses of 150 people approx. between the two places.
In his cross he also stated that, 4-5 years ago, there had been a
dispute between the complainant and the accused, because of which
they were not on talking terms. He also deposed that there is no
designated area for cremation, and people usually hold it in their
own fields. In the last, he also admitted that when he went to the
house of the accused, nothing incriminating was noticed.
13. Bhoora Singh (PW3) deposed that the respondent accused and the
deceased got married sometime in 1990 but their relationship turned
sour about a year later. He deposed that the respondent accused
had demanded a motorcycle, for which the deceased’s father i.e.,
PW5 had arranged a certain sum of money. He further deposed
that the deceased had also previously instituted a case seeking
maintenance from the accused. He deposed that he lived near the
house of the deceased and the accused and that on the fateful
night of the incident, he and his father heard the cries and screams
of the deceased for about an hour, and assumed that there had
been a quarrel between the two. When the screams stopped, they
thought that the altercation had ended. However, the next morning
they came to learn that the deceased had died in the night and that
852 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

her body had been cremated in the accused’s field. When he along
with his father reached the spot where the body of the deceased
was burning, the other inhabitants of the village gathered around.
He deposed that the cremation of the deceased was unusually
suspicious as typically the entire village would be called to attend
the cremation, which was not the case here. He also recounted
that two-three days before the incident, he had met the deceased
who in turn had requested him to inform her father that there had
been a fight between her and the accused. In the last, he deposed
that, when the police reached the place of incident, they collected
the ashes and remains of the deceased, her bangles and a diesel
canister. In the cross, he denied the suggestion that he could not
have heard the cries of the deceased due to the distance between
their houses, and stated to have heard the screams between 12:00
to 1:00 AM. He admitted not calling the other village inhabitants
upon hearing the screams as it was common for the accused and
the deceased to often fight. He denied having gone to the house
of the accused at 3:00AM in the night and further denied stating so
when confronted with his statement recorded in the morgue enquiry
proceedings. He deposed that he came to know that the deceased
had died only in the morning after he was informed by other people
residing in the village at around 5:00 AM. He further deposed that
when he reached the spot at around 6:00 AM with his father, the
accused was not present however, he noticed that the other village
inhabitants had already gathered. He admitted that he was not
able to remember their names. He further deposed that the body of
the deceased had been burned in the night itself but admitted not
knowing who was responsible for it. He deposed that he only saw
the burnt body of the deceased in morning and further admitted that
none of the other villagers raised any issue. He stated that he met
the daughter of the deceased i.e., PW6 after returning from the field.
He in the last denied the suggestion that he was falsely deposing
on account of an ongoing enmity.
14. Bharat Singh, PW4, deposed that within two years of marriage the
relationship between the deceased and accused turned sour. The
accused would often harass the deceased with demands for dowry.
The accused had already obtained a ring and a sum of money for
a motorcycle from her father. He further deposed, that on the date
of incident, they had heard cries and screams of the deceased in
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 853

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

the night. When the screams eventually stopped, he along with his
son went off to sleep. Later they came to know that the deceased
had been killed. He deposed that they saw the wood and ashes
lying near the field of the accused from a distance. He deposed that
they then went to the police to file a report, after which he spoke to
the deceased’s daughter who informed that the accused had killed
the deceased. In the last, he deposed that usually cremation is not
performed during the night hours and that all the inhabitants of the
village would join the funeral. However, that was not the case and
the accused surreptitiously burnt the body of the deceased on the
fateful night of the incident. In his cross when confronted with his
police statement, he denied the suggestion that he had not stated
before police about the ring given to the accused. He admitted that
he had not personally seen the money being given to the accused
and rather had only heard about it from PW5. He acknowledged that
there are a couple of houses between his place and the accused’s
house. He further admitted that, he could not identify whose screams
they heard on the night of the incident, but later came to know from
other villagers that it was the deceased. He denied the suggestion
that he and his son had gone to the accused’s house at night and
reiterated that they learnt about the incident only in the morning. He
further admitted to have only seen the wood pyre burning from a
distance and as such was unable to recollect who all had gathered.
He deposed that he had spoken to the deceased’s daughter, after
they brought the police with them, who then recorded his statement
along with the statements of PW3 and PW6 respectively. He further
denied the suggestion that there was no designated crematorium
in the village. He also denied the suggestion that he was deposing
falsely due to the strained relations with the accused, however, he
admitted that two to four months before the incident, although the
accused had stopped visiting him yet he used to meet the accused’s
father occasionally. Apart from this, nothing substantial was elicited
from his cross-examination.
15. Badal Singh, PW5 deposed that the accused had made demands
for a motorcycle within 10-12 days of the marriage, for which he
gave him a sum of Rs. 45,000/-. He further stated that the accused
initially took care of the deceased but later began harassing her to
the extent he used to beat her. He stated that he had filed a case
against the accused when he had threatened to kill the deceased,
854 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

and further identified the certified copy of the same in the exhibits.
He also deposed bringing medicines and food for the deceased. He
had also filed a maintenance case and identified the certified copy of
the same in the exhibits. He deposed that on the day of the incident,
the deceased had already been cremated by the time he arrived. In
the cross, he admitted not mentioning to the police about the gold
ring given towards dowry as it was a customary practice. He further
deposed that on one occasion the accused had beaten the deceased
in front of the PW3 & PW4 respectively, which had prompted them to
take her to the police to lodge a complaint. He admitted that there is
a village settlement or basti of approximately 100 lodgings between
the house of the Complainant and the accused. He admitted that
his relationship with the accused had strained due to the latter’s
constant demands and torturing of the deceased. Apart from this,
nothing significant could be elicited through his cross-examination.
16. Mahendra Singh, PW7, the Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI), stated in his
deposition that on 16.07.2003 he was entrusted with the investigation
of case under Morgue No. 07/2003. He further stated, that later on the
same day, he prepared the site-map of the place of incident based
on PW6’s indications. He further seized and sealed pieces of broken
bangles belonging to the deceased and the soil near the place of
occurrence. He deposed that he then reached the field where the
body of the deceased had been burnt, and collected her remains in
the form of ashes and burnt pieces of bangles along with a diesel
cannister. He further deposed that he then proceeded to record the
statements of PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW6 respectively. In the last, he
deposed that after the investigation he prepared a report prima facie
opining that the deceased had died under suspicious circumstances
and thereby suggesting the commission of offence under Section(s)
302, 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC by the accused persons.
He further deposed that he accordingly handed over the report along
with the morgue case diary to PW8, the Sub-Inspector, for further
action. In his cross, he admitted that the statements recorded during
the morgue enquiry were not produced along with the challan as
he had carried out investigation only till 17.02.2003 after which the
investigation was undertaken by PW8. He further admitted that he
did not record the statements of both the brothers of PW6 as they
could not be found. Apart from this, nothing substantial could be
elicited through his cross-examination.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 855

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

17. Rajendra Kumar Chhari, PW8, the Sub-Inspector (SI), deposed
that upon completion of the investigation of case under Morgue No.
07/2003, he registered the First Information Report (FIR) as Crime
No. 142 of 2003 against the accused persons. He further stated that
during the investigation, he recorded the statements of PW3, PW4,
PW5 and PW6 respectively, and that he neither added nor deleted
anything from their police statement. In his cross, he stated that the
statements recorded in morgue case diary by PW7 were handed
over to him. He further admitted that the statements of PW6 Rani
and her two younger brothers were not recorded during the morgue
enquiry as well as in the course of the investigation as they were just
3-4 years old and found to be not competent. He further stated that
the police statement of PW6 had been recorded on 03.08.2003 at
the house of her maternal grandfather i.e., PW5. When confronted
with the contradiction brought on record in PW3’s testimony with his
police statement, he stated that the PW3 had categorically stated in
his police statement visiting the house of the accused at night and
inquiring with PW6 as regards her mother’s death and thus proving
the said contradiction. He further admitted in his cross, that PW4
had not mentioned anything about the accused taking a ring from
the deceased’s father in his police statement. He also admitted, that
PW6 in her police statement had neither mentioned that the accused
hit the deceased with a stick nor was any such stick recovered.
However, he confirmed that PW6 in her statement had mentioned
about the accused placing his leg on the neck of the deceased, but
admitted that she did not use the word ‘shoe’ or indicate whether the
accused was wearing one. Nevertheless, he reiterated that PW6 had
mentioned in her statement that she was sleeping with the deceased
in the veranda and that the accused had placed his leg on the neck
of the deceased. In the last, he further admitted that PW6 had not
stated in her police statement that the accused’s mother had mixed
something in the food and had offered it to the deceased.
18. Upon completion of the recording of oral as well as documentary
evidence, the further statement of the accused was recorded under
Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., in which he claimed himself to be innocent
and had been falsely implicated in the alleged crime. When asked
about PW6’s testimony that she saw him reach the courtyard where
the deceased was allegedly sleeping and the incident took place,
the respondent accused answered that all the family members were
856 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

sleeping inside the house. When questioned about PW6’s deposition
that she saw him pressing the deceased’s neck with his leg on
the night of the incident, the respondent accused answered that it
was wrong. Similarly, the respondent accused refuted the PW6’s
deposition that she saw the deceased die at the spot and later
found her body cremated the following morning, and dismissing it
as wrong. The relevant extracts of the respondent accused’s further
statement read as under:-
“Que. No. 25: Witness Rani (PW-06) states that Birender
Kumari was her mother you are her father. What do you
want to say?
Ans: It is right.
Que. No. 26: This witness further states that on the day of
incident her mother was sleeping in the corridor and this
witness was not sleeping by that time. You came from the
Khera in the night. What do you want to say?
Ans: It is wrong.
Que. No. 27: This witness further states that she was
sleeping nearby in the Tibbara. What do you want to say?
Ans: It is wrong.
Que. No. 28: This witness further states that you caught
8 Birender Kumari from her neck. Then her mother rant
towards the door. You attempted a blow of Lathi on her
which hit her on her back so her mother fell down. Then
you caught her mother from the neck. What do you want
to say?
Ans: It is wrong.
Que. No. 29: This witness further states that her mother
had fell down in the Dehri and you kept your leg on her
neck. You were wearing shoes. What do you want to say?
Ans: It is wrong.
Que. No. 30: This witness further states that her mother
said, “Rani save me”. So, this witness rant towards here
and you slapped on her cheek. What do you want to say?
Ans: It is wrong.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 857

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

Que. No. 31: This witness further states that then her
Bua Jatan caught this witness. What do you want to say?
Ans: It is wrong.
Que. No. 32: This witness further states that you 9 reached
in the courtyard and Bua was also sleeping in the courtyard
at that time. What do you want to say?
Ans: All were sleeping in the house.
Que. No. 33: This witness further states that her mother
died on the spot. She saw the dead body of her mother.
What do you want to say?
Ans: I don’t know.
Que. No. 34: This witness further states that you took the
dead body of her mother in the Kher during the night to
cremate her and after cremating her you fled away from
there. What do you want to say?
Ans: It is wrong.
Que. No. 35: This witness further states that you caught
her mother before this witness and when she went to the
field in the morning her mother was burning there. What
do you want to say?
Ans: It is wrong.

xxx xxx xxx
Que. No. 48: Why do the witnesses speak against you?
Ans: They are afraid of the police.
Que. No. 49: Do you want to adduce defence witness?
Ans: Yes, Sir.
Que. No. 50: What do you want to say in defence?
Ans: I am falsely implicated in the case.”

iii. Trial Court’s Judgment & Order.
19. Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence
on record, the Trial Court vide its final judgment and order dated
858 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

09.08.2004 passed in Sessions Trial No. 197 of 2003 reached the
conclusion that the respondent accused herein was guilty of the
offence punishable under Sections 302, 201 read with 34 of the IPC.
The findings recorded by the Trial Court in its judgment and order
of conviction can be better understood in five parts: -
(i) First, it took note of the fact that the deceased was cremated
in the night itself without informing her family members and
the villagers too. This fact stood proved through the testimony
of PW6 who had deposed to have seen the accused take the
deceased away. The Trial Court believed the version of the PW3
and PW4 who later found the body of the deceased burning
in the field of the accused in the morning and also the say
of the PW7, the ASI who conducted the inquest enquiry. The
clandestine manner in which the body of the deceased came
to be cremated was taken by the Trial Court as one of the
incriminating circumstances against the accused establishing
the death of the deceased was not natural. The Trial Court
considered the strained relations of the accused with the
deceased. Another incriminating circumstance against the
accused that was looked into was the fact that the accused fled
away from the place of incident after cremating the deceased.
The relevant observations read as under:-
“13. In evidence this fact is proved that the deceased
Birender Kumari who is the wife of the accused,
her cremation was done in the night in the fields of
Samunder Singh and in evidence it has come that
without informing the villagers or the family of the
deceased she had been cremated.

xxx xxx xxx
20. [...] The witness has stated that when her paternal
aunt caught hold off her, after that she does not know
what happened to her mother. She had seen her
mother dead. Her father took her mother to the fields
to burn her body which is at a little distance from the
house. In the night itself her other was burnt after
which her father ran away. The witness has stated
that in her presence only her mother had been taken
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 859

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

away but she was not burnt in her presence. When
she went to the fields in the morning at that time her
mother was burning there. [...]

xxx xxx xxx
22. PW-3 Bhoora has stated that Birender Kumari is his ..
sister being the daughter of his maternal uncle. On the day
of incident in the night he and his father were sleeping in
their house upon which they had heard voices of Birender
Kumari crying. [...] In the morning when he and his father
got up then they came to know that Birender Kumari
has died and that she has been burnt by the accused
clandestinely in their fields itself. When he and his father
and the entire village went to see then the dead body was
burning which fact is confirmed by Bharat Singh also. [...]
The accused used to harass and the motorcycle had not
been given. He used to give beatings upon which the
deceased used to come to him. Once the accused beat
her very badly and did- not give her anything to eat also.
Upon whiCh she had filed a case of maintenance in the
JMFC Court, Kolaras of which the certified copy is Ex.P-8.
The girl had been given beatings, the true copy of which
report is Ex.P-9.

xxx xxx xxx
25. The deceased Birender Kumari in the night itself was
taken to the fields and she was cremated which fact is
confirmed apart from PW-3 Bhoora and PW-4 Bharat Singh,
from the statement of Mahender Singh also that after the
enquiry of report Ex.P-7 he had gone on the spot. The
dead body of deceased Birender Kumari which was burnt
in the fields of Balvir and Samunder Singh in which the
bones of the deceased, her ashes and the burnt pieces
of bangles were seized from the spot.

xxx xxx xxx
29. The accused had carried Birender Kumari to the fields
in relation to which direct evidence has not come. It has
come in the statement of Rani that the accused took her
860 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

mother to the fields and Jatan had told that her mother
had been taken for cremation. In the fields the deceased
was cremated in the night which circumstance also goes
against the accused. If the death of deceased Birender
Kumari was of ordinary nature then what was the reason
that in the night without informing the reason to the family
of the deceased she was cremated in the night especially
when prior to the incident itself the mutual relations of the
accused and deceased were not good and according to
Ex.P-8 & P-9 the case in relation to not giving beatings and
maintenance had been filed by the deceased in the Court.
Another circumstance which indicate the involvement of the
accused in the incident is that after cremation, according
to Bhoora and Bharat the accused was not present in
the fields. It has also come in the statement of Rani that
accused and Jatan had fled from the spot. According to the
arrest memo the accused has been arrested on 22.08.03.
If in actual the accused was innocent then he would not
have cremated the dead body of his wife clandestinely
in the night without informing anyone nor he would have
fled from the spot.”
(Emphasis supplied)

(ii) Secondly, the Trial Court in order to ascertain how and in what
manner the incident had taken place which led to the death
of the deceased, accepted the testimony of PW6 to be true,
trustworthy and reliable. The Trial Court believed the version
of PW6 that her mother was sleeping in the courtyard, when
the accused came and caught hold of her. The deceased tried
to escape but fell down upon which the accused compressed
her neck with his leg. The Trial Court recorded that PW6 had
in clear terms categorically deposed that she saw her mother
die on the spot itself, however had no idea what transpired
thereafter except that the accused carried her body to the field.
The relevant observations read as under: -
“19. Now it has to be seen whether according to the
version of the prosecution what incident had taken
place in the room of the accused and in what manner
the incident took place, in relation to it the evidence
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 861

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

which has been led from it whether the version of
the prosecution can be believed or not?
20. Rani (PW6) aged about is aged about 7-8 years
and is the daughter of deceased and accused. This
witness has stated in her chief that on the date
of incident she was sleeping with her mother and
brothers Sandeep and Chotu. Her mother was in the
courtyard and she herself was sleeping in the open
room. The accused caught hold off her mother by her
neck upon which her mother ran towards the door
upon which her father· caught hold off her and L gave
a lathi blow to her mother which landed on her back.
Her mother fell down upon which, her father caught
hold off the neck of her mother. Her mother fell on
the threshold. Her father put his leg on the neck of
her mother. Her mother shouted “save me Rani” upon
which she ran to save her but her father / accused
gave her a slap. Her Bua/paternal aunt caught hold
off her. The witness has stated that when her father
came at the courtyard, at that time her paternal aunt
was also sleeping in the courtyard and she does not
know what happened after it. The police had come
in the morning. Her mother had died there itself.
The witness has stated that when her paternal aunt
caught hold off her, after that she does not know what
happened to her mother. She had seen her mother
dead. Her father took her mother to the fields to burn
her body which is at a little distance from the house.”
(Emphasis supplied)

(iii) Thirdly, the Trial Court found that although there had been a
delay in recording the statement of PW6 under Section 161 of
the Cr.P.C., yet the same, by itself, cannot be a ground to reject
or doubt her testimony as an afterthought or unbelievable. No
question was put by the accused to the IO in this regard nor any
suggestion was put to the IO that he deliberately recorded as
belated statement only to create evidence against the accused.
It further noted that the testimony of both the PW5 as-well as
PW6 had been recorded on the same day. The Trial Court
862 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

observed that even before recording of statement of PW6, the
morgue case No. 70/2003, the enquiry report and the FIR had
mentioned PW6 as the main witness to the incident. Thus, it
held that it cannot be said that there was any attempt to falsely
project her as an eye-witness to the incident. The relevant
observations read as under: -
“18. [...] In his cross examination the witness has
stated that the IO investigating the morgue had
given the morgue diary with the enquiry report.
The-statement of Rani has been recorded by the IO
on 03.08.03. On the same day the statement of his
maternal grandfather PW-5 Badal Singh had also
been recorded the statement of both of them had
been recorded in the house of Badal Singh. The
registration of the case on the morgue enquiry report
after delay by the IO or in relation to the recording
of the statement of Rani after delay on 03.08.03 no
questions have been put. Therefore, only on this
ground that the IO recorded the statement of Rani
on 03.08.03 and that her statement is an afterthought
and on the basis of it the accused is not guilty, this
statement is not believable and I do not agree with
this argument. [...] in relation to the IO recording the
statement of Rani after delay no question has been
put, therefore, no benefit from the same can be given
to the IO. [...] There are no such facts in the evidence
that the IO deliberately recorded the statement of Rani
after delay under section 161 Cr.P.C., so that she may
be projected as an eye witness as is mentioned in
the morgue intimation Ex.P-7, morgue enquiry Report
Ex.P-11 and the FIR Ex.P-12 that Rani is the main
witness in the incident.”

(Emphasis supplied)

(iv) Fourthly, the Trial Court upon evaluation of the testimony of
PW6 found the same to be reliable and inspiring confidence.
It found that the presence of PW6 as an eye-witness to the
incident was natural and believable, as it is common for a child
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 863

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

of her age to be sleeping with her mother in the night. It further
noted that the PW6 had been cross examined at length for
approximately 1.5 hours, and her demeanour all throughout was
observed and the same suggested that she was not tutored or
deposing falsely. In the absence of any contradictions in the form
of material omissions, her testimony cannot be discarded solely
because she resides with her maternal grandfather or that she
hates the accused. It further found that although the statement
given by her during the morgue enquiry had not been produced
by the prosecution, yet the same, by itself, is not fatal as no
demand had been made by the accused to bring the same on
record. Moreover, the Trial Court found that in both morgue
inquiry report and the FIR the factum of PW6 stating that the
accused killed the deceased by putting his leg on her neck is
clearly recorded. The relevant observations read as under: -
“17. First of all Rani was present on the spot and
whether she is actually an eye witness to the incident,
this fact has to be seen. In the statement of Rani
in para no.1 it has come that Birender Kumari was
her mother. On the day of incident her mother was
sleeping in the courtyard and near her in open room
this witness was sleeping. This witness has stated
that she has two younger brothers of whom the elder
is Sandeep who used to sleep with Jatan and the
younger is Chotu who used to sleep with her mother
and she used to sleep alone. At the time of incident
her mother was feeding milk to her younger brother
when her father came. Rani was present with her
mother on· the date of incident. There appears to
be no reason to disbelieve her ·statement which
is natural that a minor child was sleeping with his
mother in the night.
18. The statement of Rani during investigation was
recorded by PW-7 Mahender Singh. It is correct that
the statements recorded during morgue enquiry have
not been produced in evidence but Mahender Singh
during his cross has stated that in the statement during
morgue enquiry which he had recorded, his police
diary is with the police. On behalf of the accused no
864 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

demand has been made for the bringing on record
of those statements in the case diary that statement
is annexed according to which the statement of Rani
has been recorded on 16.02.2003. After that on the
morgue enquiry report the crime was registered on
20.02.2003. As has been stated by PW-8 Rajender
Chhari that after recording the FIR Ex. P-12, its copy
was sent to JMFC, Kolaras U/s 157 Cr.P.C. which is
Ex.P-13. This fact has not been challenged during
cross examination.

xxx xxx xxx
27. Here it will be proper to mention that PW-6 Rani
has been cross examined at length and according
to the record her statement was started at 12:45PM
and she was cross-examined till 02:30PM and
her cross examination no such fact has come
which may warrant that she has deposed falsely
or that she has been tutored. She has been found
to be present on the spot. [...] there are no clear
contradictions in the statements of PW-6 Rani. Her
evidence appears to be believable. Her present on
the spot and the circumstances of the incident are
substantially proved. Only on the ground that the
Rani resides with her maternal grandfather and hates
her father and does not want to reside with her and
after the death of mother she is residing with her
maternal grandfather only, her statement cannot be
disbelieved. The statement of Rani was recorded
immediately after the incident at the time of morgue
enquiry which fact is proved from evidence. Even if
on behalf of the accused her statement has not been
called in evidence, after that the statement of Rani
was recorded during the investigation on 03.08.03
as it has come alone. The reason of delay has not
been asked from the IO . Only on that ground her
statement given in the Court cannot be disbelieved.
28. The statement given by Rani in the Court where
the incident is stated to have taken place and the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 865

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

manner in which the accused caused the death of
Birender Kumari, there is no reason to disbelieve the
same. It is correct that Bhoora was not told by Rani
that the death of Biren·der Kumari has been caused
by the accused or that in what manner, her death
was caused but in the morgue enquiry report, FIR
and statement section 161 Cr.P.C. Rani had stated
the manner in which the accused put his leg on the
neck of the deceased and caused her death which
fact is confirmed from the statement of Rani given
in the Court.”

(Emphasis supplied)

(v) Lastly, the Trial Court also found the testimony of PW6 to be
sufficiently corroborated with the other materials on record.
It noted that the version of PW6 that the deceased stopped
screaming after the accused pressed her neck with his leg is
corroborated with the testimony of PW3 and PW4 respectively.
Similarly, her version, that in the morning she told PW3 that
the deceased had been killed and that she had found the burnt
bangles of the deceased stands corroborated with the testimony
of PW3. The relevant observations read as under: -
“16. [...] It is clear that on the statement of a child
witness reliance should not be placed in the absence
of corroboration. In relation to the statement of a
child witness the real test is that as to what extent
a child witness remains constant on his statement
and in what manner a child witness faces the
cross-examination and what extent the statement
given by him find a suitable place in the other evidence
and the circumstances of the case. In view of these
principles the investigation of the evidence given by
PW-6 Rani is necessary.

xxx xxx xxx
20. [...] When she went to the fields in the morning at
that time her mother was burning there. The witness
has also· stated that she had met Bhoora who is the
866 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

nephew of the maternal grandfather upon which she
had told him that “mother has been killed”. She had
told this fact to Bhoora in the morning when the police
had come. The witness has stated that the bangles
of her mother were lying in the courtyard. [...]

xxx xxx xxx
26. Rani has also stated that the accused on the
day of incident after putting his leg on the neck of
mother had pressed it and she had seen her mother
dead, upon which there is no reason to disbelieve
the same. From the statement of PW-7 Mahender
Singh as it has come above, he had recorded the
statement of Rani during morgue enquiry and it has
come in para 4 of the statement of Bharat Singh that
the police had talked with Ranj- and had recorded
her statement on the same day. This statement of
Rani that she told to Bhoora that her mother has died
is confirmed from the statement of Bhoora. [...] The
statement of Rani that when her mother had stopped
screaming, this fact is confirmed from the statements
of Bhoora and Bharat also that in the night the cries
of Birender Kumari was heard and after sometime
the voice has stopped.”

(Emphasis supplied)

20. Accordingly, the Trial Court vide its judgment and order dated
09.08.2004 in ST No. 197 of 2003 held that the prosecution had
succeeded in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and
convicted the respondent accused for the offence punishable under
Sections 302, 201 read with 34 of the IPC. The operative portion of
the order reads as under: -
“30. In view of the abovementioned entire facts Rani
who is the eye witness of the incident and in view of the
circumstantial evidence in which the deceased has been
cremated, the prosecution has succeeded in proving its
case the accused Balvir pressed the neck of his wife
with his leg due to which she died and in order to hide
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 867

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

that evidence he along with the co accused went to the
fields with the dead body of the deceased Birender and
cremated her without informing anyone.

xxx xxx xxx
32. In view of the abovementioned facts I find the accused
guilty of the offence punishable under section 302 read
with section 201/34 IPC. In order to hear the accused
persons on the question of sentence, at this stage the
decision is deferred.”
21. The Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence punishable
under Section 302 IPC and four years of rigorous imprisonment along
with fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the offence punishable under Section
201 of the IPC.

B. IMPUGNED ORDER
22. The accused convict being dissatisfied with the judgment and order
passed by the Trial Court, went in appeal before the High Court
by way of Criminal Appeal No. 524 of 2004. The High Court vide
its impugned final judgment and order dated 29.06.2010 allowed
the appeal and acquitted the respondent accused. The impugned
judgment and order of the High Court is in three-parts. In other words,
the High Court allowed the appeal of the accused and set aside the
Trial Court’s order of conviction on three grounds: -
(i) First, the High Court held that although PW6 was found to be
competent to depose, yet her testimony appeared to be very
shaky not inspiring confidence, more particularly, in view of the
inordinate delay of 18-days in recording her police statement
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The High Court took the view that
the Investigating Officer (for short, the “I.O.”) was aware that
PW6 was a very important witness, yet for reasons unknown,
her statement was not recorded immediately. Considering the
delay, the High Court took the view that the possibility of tutoring
cannot be ruled out, more particularly, since PW6 was at that
time residing with PW3 i.e., the Complainant who is at inimical
terms with the accused. It also held that even in the morgue
inquiry report, PW6 never mentioned anything that would point a
868 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

finger against the accused herein, thus, reinforcing the fact that
PW6 had been tutored, as otherwise she would have mentioned
about the accused killing the deceased in the said report, and
this explains why PW6 had earlier simply stated that “her mother
had died”. The relevant observations read as under: -
“15. In the present case, from the testimony of the
sole eye-witness Rani who has been examined as
PW6 and who is daughter of the deceased and
appellant, it is borne out that at the relevant point of
time her age was seven years. We have no scintilla
of doubt that the child witness is competent witness
and his/her evidence cannot be thrown out just like a
waste paper in a dustbin, merely because the witness
happened to be a child witness, but, it is equally true
that the testimony of the . child witness should be
found to be clear, cogent and trustworthy and he or
she should not have been tutored or her testimony
should not be unnatural. By keeping this proposition
in our mind we would like to scan the testimony of
this witness Rani (PW.6).
16. [...] The case diary statement of this witness
(Ex.D.2) was recorded on 3.8.2003 viz. after 18
days of the incident. At this juncture, we would like
to mention that on the very next date of the incident
i.e. 16.7.2003 it already came into the knowledge
of the investigating agency that after enquiring the
incident by complainant Bhura alias Yashpal (PW.3)
from this child withess the merg report (Ex.P. 7) was
lodged at 9:45 AM. Hence, why the statement of this
witness was not recorded earlier to it, we are unable
to digest. The case diary statement (Ex.D.2) of this
witness was recorded after considerable long period
on 3.8.2003, and hence, it cannot be ruled out that
this child witness was tutored particularly when she
was residing with her maternal uncle and it is borne
out from the testimony of complainant Bhura alias
Yashpal (PW.3) who is also the maternal uncle of
this witness that they are in inimical terms with the
appellant.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 869

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

17. [...] Since it is borne out from the testimony of
complainant Bhura alias Yashpal (PW.3) that there
is enmity between appellant and his in-laws and the
case · diary statement (Ex.D.2) of Rani (PW.6) was
recorded on 3.8.2003 at the residence of’ her maternal
grandfather, according to us, the possibility of tutoring
her cannot be ruled out, and therefore, according to
us, it would be hazardous to place reliance on the
statement of this witness and to convict the appellant
on her solitary statement. [...]

xxx xxx xxx
19. [...] Bhura alias Yashpal (PW.3) (who is in inimical
terms with appellant) has stated in the merg report that
he saw appellant and his family members cremating
the deceased at 3:00 in the late night and thereafter
he went to the house of the appellant and enquired
from the child witness Rani (PW.6) that what has
happened and this much only was told by her that her
mother had died. Nowhere in the merg report it has
been mentioned that Rani (PW.6) has stated anything
accusing the appellant since it did not find place in
the merg report. For this reason also we find that if
the case diary statement (Ex.D.2) of Rani (PW.6)
was recorded on 3.8.2003 she was already tutored
because if she would have stated of the same night
that appellant had killed the deceased, certainly this
fact should have· been mentioned in the merg report.”

(Emphasis supplied)

(ii) Secondly, the High Court observed that although the police
had recorded PW6’s statement during the morgue inquiry
immediately after the incident, yet the accused never came
to be arrested on the strength of the said statement. It further
observed that the respondent accused came to be arrested on
22.08.2003, only after the statement of PW6 had been recorded
under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. on 03.08.2003. This according
to the High Court indicates that prior to 03.08.2003 there was
no evidence against the accused sufficient enough to effect his
870 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

arrest. This necessarily would lead to a legitimate inference
that the statement of PW6 recorded during the morgue enquiry
must have been unfavourable to the prosecution & therefore,
was suppressed during the trial. The relevant observations
read as under: -
“17. In the present case the appellant was arrested
on 22.8.2003 as it is borne out from the judgment of
the learned Trial Court, and therefore, according to
us till 3.8.2003 thee was no material and evidence
against the appellant with the investigating agency to
arrest him. It is borne out from the testimony of the
investigating officer that the merg statements were
recorded and, according to us, since the appellant
was arrested only on 22.8.2003 and earlier to the
statement recorded under section 161 of Cr.P.C. of
Rani (PW.6) on 3/8/2003, there was no evidence
against the appellant with the investigating agency,
and therefore, in these state of . affairs, according
to us, the merg statements were quite relevant
and the same have been suppressed by the
investigating agency because they must be, against
the prosecution. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

(iii) Lastly, the High Court held that apart from the oral evidence
of PW6, being unreliable there were other reasons to extend
the benefit of doubt to the accused, more particularly the
contradictions in the form of material omissions in the testimony
of PW3 and the fact that he was at inimical terms with the
accused. It observed that the PW3 when confronted with his
statement in the morgue report, he denied having stated that he
went to the house of the accused at 3:00 AM in the night. He
had further stated that during the cremation of the deceased,
the other inhabitants of the village were also present and that
none of them entertained any doubt over the death of the
deceased nor did he interact with the accused. Thus, the High
Court took the view that it was difficult to hold that the deceased
had been cremated in the night or that she had been killed by
the accused. Furthermore, placing reliance on the testimony
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 871

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

of PW1 and PW2, the High Court held that it is equally difficult
to hold that the Complainant could have heard the screams of
the deceased, particularly considering the distance between
his house and that of the accused. The relevant observations
read as under: -
“20. [...] Later-on in the same para this witness
says that at 6:00 in the morning he went to the field
of appellant along with his father, but they never
interacted with appellant that how the deceased had
died. In very specific words this witness has stated
that earlier to 6:00 AM he did not go to the ‘ house
of appellant where he was informed by the child
witness Rani (PW.6) that the deceased had died. In
very specific words this witness is saying that he did
not go in the night at 3:00 to the house of appellant
and he never saw his sister (the deceased) · being
cremated in the field. [...]
This witness was confronted with his merg report
(Ex.P.7) and he admitted that it bears his signature,
however, ,he has specifically stated that in the merg
report (Ex.P. 7) he did not state to the police that at
3:00 in the night he went to the house of the appellant
and if such type of statement is written in the merg
report he cannot say how it has been written. Further
he says that he did not . inform the police personnels
that he made enquiry from the child witness Rani
(PW.6) at 3:00 in the night [...]
21. Hence, it is difficult to hold that during the odd ‘
hours in the night the deceased was cremated. If the
testimony of complainant Bhura alias Yashpal (PW.3)
is taken into consideration in proper perspective it
is difficult to hold that during the odd hours in the
night the deceased was cremated and she was not
cremated during the dawn hours. It is also borne out
from the testimony of this witness that during the
cremation the inhabitants of the village were also
present because specifically he is saying that when
the deceased was being cremated no dispute raised
872 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

by the inhabitants of the village [...] And therefore, if
the deceased was cremated in presence of inhabitants
of the village, it is difficult to hold that the deceased
was killed by the appellant.
22. The testimony of complainant Bhura alias Yashpal
(PW.3) who keep inimical terms with the appellant
is further more doubtful because in his statement
he has admitted that he heard the sound of hue
and cry during the late hours at 12:00 in the night
in his house which is 4 to 5 furlongs far away from
the house of appellant. In this context, para 4 of
the cross examination of this witness may be seen.
But, if this piece of evidence of this witness is kept
in juxtaposition to the testimony of independent eye
witness Narayan (PW.2) who is village chowkidar, who
in para 2 of his cross-examination has categorically
stated that the distance between the house of
appellant and the complainant Bhura Singh alias
Yashpal is 5 to 6 furlongs and if somebody would shout
from the house of appellant the persons residing in
the · house of appellant the persons residing in the
house of complainant Bhura alias Yashpal would not
hear the sound. It is borne out from the testimony of
Patwari of the village namely Mahesh Kumar Mishra
(PW.1) as well as Narayan (PW.2), who is chowkidar
of the village that village people happen to cremate
the dead body in the field itself and because there
is no separate cremation ground, and therefore, if
the deceased was cremated’ in the field it was not
an unnatural act.”

(Emphasis supplied)

23. In such circumstances, referred to above, the appellant State is here
before this Court with the present appeal.

C. ANALYSIS
24. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 873

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
error in passing the impugned judgment and order.

i. Evidence of Child Witness and Test for parsing Tutored
Testimony.
25. The High Court, while setting aside the conviction, found the testimony
of the child witness, Rani (PW6), to be unreliable and tutored. Before
we proceed to undertake the analysis of PW6, Rani’s oral evidence
it is essential to understand how the testimony of a child witness
should be looked into and appreciated.
26. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, the “Evidence Act”) does
not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat
a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary, Section 118 of
the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent
to testify, unless the court considers that they are prevented from
understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational
answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old
age, disease - whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind.
A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual
capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto.
27. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra reported in
(1997) 5 SCC 341 this Court held that as long as a child witness is
found to be competent to depose i.e., capable of understanding the
questions put to it and able to give rational answers, the testimony
of such witness can be considered as evidence in terms of Section
118 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of their tender age or absence
of any oath. The only additional factor to be considered is that the
witness must be found to be reliable, exhibiting the demeanour of
any other competent witness, with no likelihood of having been
tutored. It further clarified that there is no requirement or condition
that the evidence of a child witness must be corroborated before it
can be considered, and rather the insistence of any corroboration is
only a rule of prudence that would depend upon the peculiar facts
and circumstances of each case. The relevant observation reads
as under: -
“5. [...] A child witness if found competent to depose to
the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the
basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence
874 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered
under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such
witness is able to understand the questions and able to
give rational answers thereof. The evidence of a child
witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the
circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the
court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of
a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one
and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent
witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored. There
is no rule or practice that in every case the evidence of
such a witness be corroborated before a conviction can be
allowed to stand but, however as a rule of prudence the
court always finds it desirable to have the corroboration to
such evidence from other dependable evidence on record.”
(Emphasis supplied)

28. Similarly in Pradeep v. State of Haryana reported in 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 777 this Court emphasized on the importance of
preliminary examination of a child witness. It held that although oat
cannot be administered to a child witness under 12-years of age yet,
as per Section 118 of the Evidence Act it is the duty of a Trial Judge
to conduct a preliminary examination before recording the evidence
of the child witness to ascertain if the child is able to understand the
questions put to him and that he is able to give rational answers to
the questions put to him. It held that the Trial Judge must record its
opinion and satisfaction that the child witness understands the duty
of speaking the truth and state why he is of the opinion that the child
understands the duty of speaking the truth. It further held that the
questions put to the child in the preliminary examination must also
be recorded so that the appellate court can go into the correctness
of the opinion of the Trial Court. The relevant observations read as
under: -
“8. Under the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 4,
it is laid down that in case of a child witness under 12
years of age, unless satisfaction as required by the said
proviso is recorded, an oath cannot be administered to
the child witness. In this case, in the deposition of PW-1
Ajay, it is mentioned that his age was 12 years at the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 875

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

time of the recording of evidence. Therefore, the proviso
to Section 4 of the Oaths Act will not apply in this case.
However, in view of the requirement of Section 118 of
the Evidence Act, the learned Trial Judge was under a duty
to record his opinion that the child is able to understand
the questions put to him and that he is able to give rational
answers to the questions put to him. The Trial Judge must
also record his opinion that the child witness understands
the duty of speaking the truth and state why he is of the
opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking
the truth.
9. It is a well-settled principle that corroboration of the
testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of
caution and prudence. A child witness of tender age is easily
susceptible to tutoring. However, that by itself is no ground
to reject the evidence of a child witness. The Court must
make careful scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness.
The Court must apply its mind to the question whether
there is a possibility of the child witness being tutored.
Therefore, scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness is
required to be made by the Court with care and caution.
10. Before recording evidence of a minor, it is the duty
of a Judicial Officer to ask preliminary questions to
him with a view to ascertain whether the minor can
understand the questions put to him and is in a position
to give rational answers. The Judge must be satisfied
that the minor is able to understand the questions and
respond to them and understands the importance of
speaking the truth. Therefore, the role of the Judge who
records the evidence is very crucial. He has to make a
proper preliminary examination of the minor by putting
appropriate questions to ascertain whether the minor is
capable of understanding the questions put to him and is
able to give rational answers. It is advisable to record the
preliminary questions and answers so that the Appellate
Court can go into the correctness of the opinion of the
Trial Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
876 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

29. In Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat reported in
(2004) 1 SCC 64, this Court explained that although child witnesses
are considered as dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable
to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded yet it is an accepted
norm that if after careful scrutiny their testimony is found to inspire
confidence and truthful, then there is no obstacle in accepting the
evidence of such child witness. The relevant observation reads as
under: -
“7. [...] The decision on the question whether the child
witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with
the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent
possession or lack of intelligence, and the said Judge may
resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his
capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of
the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court
may, however, be disturbed by the higher court if from what
is preserved in the records, it is clear that his conclusion
was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because
child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live
in a world of make-believe. Though it is an established
principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as
they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped
and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after
careful scrutiny of their evidence the court comes to the
conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is
no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a
child witness.”
30. In Panchhi v. State of U.P. reported in (1998) 7 SCC 177, this Court
held that the evidence of a child witness should not be outrightly
rejected but the evidence must be evaluated carefully and with
greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed
by what others tell him and an easy prey to tutoring. The relevant
observations read as under: -
“11. Shri R.K. Jain, learned Senior Counsel, contended that
it is very risky to place reliance on the evidence of PW 1,
he being a child witness. According to the learned counsel,
the evidence of a child witness is generally unworthy of
credence. But we do not subscribe to the view that the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 877

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

evidence of a child witness would always stand irretrievably
stigmatized. It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his
evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. The
law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated
more carefully and with greater circumspection because
a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell
him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring.
12. Courts have laid down that evidence of a child witness
must find adequate corroboration before it is relied on. It
is more a rule of practical wisdom than of law.”
31. This Court in Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka reported in
(2001) 9 SCC 129 held that the evidence of a child witness who has
withstood the test of cross-examination should not be rejected per se
if his testimony is found to be free from any infirmity. It reiterated that
corroboration to the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a
measure of caution and prudence. The Court further held that while
assessing the evidence of a child witness, courts must rule out the
possibility of tutoring. However, in the absence of any allegation of
tutoring or an attempt to use the child witness for ulterior purposes
by the prosecution, the courts must rely on the confidence-inspiring
testimony of such a witness in determining the guilt or innocence of
the accused. The relevant observation reads as under: -
“5. [...] The evidence of the child witness cannot be rejected
per se, but the court, as a rule of prudence, is required to
consider such evidence with close scrutiny and only on
being convinced about the quality of the statements and
its reliability, base conviction by accepting the statement
of the child witness. The evidence of PW 2 cannot be
discarded only on the ground of her being of tender age.
The fact of PW 2 being a child witness would require the
court to scrutinise her evidence with care and caution. If
she is shown to have stood the test of cross-examination
and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution
can rightly claim a conviction based upon her testimony
alone. Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is
not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some
discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be
made the basis for discarding the testimony. Discrepancies
878 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend
credence to the testimony of a child witness who, under
the normal circumstances, would like to mix-up what the
witness saw with what he or she is likely to imagine to have
seen. While appreciating the evidence of the child witness,
the courts are required to rule out the possibility of the child
being tutored. In the absence of any allegation regarding
tutoring or using the child witness for ulterior purposes of
the prosecution, the courts have no option but to rely upon
the confidence inspiring testimony of such witness for the
purposes of holding the accused guilty or not.”
(Emphasis supplied)

32. In Arbind Singh v. State of Bihar reported in (1995) Supp (4) SCC
416 this Court found the testimony of the child witness therein to be
tutored due to the various inconsistencies and contradiction in her
statements as regards the cause of death of the deceased therein,
and due to the fact that the child witness was residing with her
maternal uncle immediately after the incident occurred. This Court
further held that implicit faith and reliance cannot be placed on a
testimony that betrays traces of tutoring and the court must look for
corroboration before relying on the same. The relevant observation
reads as under: -
“3. The entire case hinges on the evidence of the child
witness PW 2 Poonam Kumari, the daughter of the deceased
and appellant Arbind Singh. The incident occurred late in
the night and she claims she was awakened by the noise
of quarrelling. She further claims to have seen her father
tying and nailing her mother before hanging her. At the
date of the incident she was aged about 5 years. When her
evidence was recorded she was aged about 9 years. The
learned Trial Judge did not undertake a ‘voir dire’ before
recording her evidence on oath although he notes that
she was capable of understanding and answering the
questions. Be that as it may, the fact remains that there
was a gap of 4 years between the incident and the date
on which her evidence was recorded. Immediately after
the incident she was interrogated but as she was weeping
her statement was not recorded. Thereafter her statements
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 879

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

were recorded on October 25, 1984, October 28, 1984 and
November 5, 1984, the last being under Section 164 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. In her first statement she
did not say that her mother was hanged. Subsequently
she said she was hanged by electric wire. She later said
she was hanged with the help of a jute string. In her
statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure on November 5, 1984, she stated
that her father had thrown a jute string around the neck
of her mother and killed her. It will, therefore, appear from
these statements that she has not been consistent in her
version. That apart, we have carefully perused the evidence
of this witness and we find traces of tutoring on certain
aspects of the case. It appears from her evidence that she
was very close to her maternal uncle with whom she was
living when her mother had gone to Deoghar for training.
Immediately after the incident she was taken away by her
maternal uncle who happens to be a fairly important figure.
In her evidence she stated that there used to be quarrels
between her father and mother and the former used to
ill-treat the latter without any rhyme or reason. Then she
adds that her father wanted to remarry and, therefore,
he was ill-treating her mother. Now the case put up was
that the husband was ill-treating the wife as he wanted
to sell her jewellery to purchase a scooter. Therefore, the
statement made by PW 2 that her father was ill-treating
her mother because he wanted to remarry could only be
the result of tutoring. She also tried to involve all the other
family members including her uncle Shambhoo whom
she could not even recognize in the dock. This she could
have done only at the behest of someone else. She also
stated that neither her father nor her grandfather met her
mother’s expense at Deoghar, a fact of which ordinarily
a child under five years of age would not be aware. She
even tried to involve her father’s sister whose name she
had not mentioned earlier. There are also certain other
statements made in the course of her deposition which
would suggest that possibility of tutoring could not be ruled
out. Having taken a careful look at the evidence of this
880 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

child witness we are of the opinion that implicit faith and
reliance cannot be placed on her testimony since it is not
corroborated by any independent and reliable evidence. It
is well-settled that a child witness is prone to tutoring and
hence the court should look for corroboration particularly
when the evidence betrays traces of tutoring. We, therefore,
think that appellant 1 was entitled to benefit of doubt.”
(Emphasis supplied)

33. Similarly in Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh reported
in (2019) 4 SCC 522 this Court discarded the testimony of the child
witness therein on the ground of being tutored as it found the same
to be fraught with inconsistencies and in direct contradiction of the
ocular evidence of other prosecution witnesses.
34. This Court in State of M.P. v. Ramesh reported in (2011) 4 SCC 786
summarized the principles pertaining to the appreciation of evidence
of a child witness as under: -
(i) First, it held that that a child witness must be able to understand
the sanctity of giving evidence on oath and the import of the
questions that were being put to him. The evidence of a child
witness must reveal that he was able to discern between right
and wrong, and the court may ascertain his suitability as a
witness through either cross-examination or by putting questions
to the child in terms of Section 165 of the Evidence Act or by
determining the same from the evidence or testimony of the
child itself. The relevant observation reads as under: -
“11. The evidence of a child must reveal that he
was able to discern between right and wrong and
the court may find out from the cross-examination
whether the defence lawyer could bring anything
to indicate that the child could not differentiate
between right and wrong. The court may ascertain
his suitability as a witness by putting questions to
him and even if no such questions had been put, it
may be gathered from his evidence as to whether
he fully understood the implications of what he was
saying and whether he stood discredited in facing a
stiff cross-examination. A child witness must be able
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 881

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

to understand the sanctity of giving evidence on oath
and the import of the questions that were being put
to him. (Vide Himmat Sukhadeo Wahurwagh v. State
of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 712.)”
(Emphasis supplied)

(ii) Secondly, if the evidence of the child explains the relevant
events of the crime without improvements or embellishments,
and the same inspire confidence of the court, his deposition
does not require any corroboration whatsoever. The relevant
observation reads as under: -
“12. In State of U.P. v. Krishna Master (2010) 12 SCC
324 this Court held that there is no principle of law
that it is inconceivable that a child of tender age would
not be able to recapitulate the facts in his memory. A
child is always receptive to abnormal events which
take place in his life and would never forget those
events for the rest of his life. The child may be able to
recapitulate carefully and exactly when asked about
the same in the future. In case the child explains the
relevant events of the crime without improvements
or embellishments, and the same inspire confidence
of the court, his deposition does not require any
corroboration whatsoever. The child at a tender age
is incapable of having any malice or ill will against
any person. Therefore, there must be something on
record to satisfy the court that something had gone
wrong between the date of incident and recording
evidence of the child witness due to which the witness
wanted to implicate the accused falsely in a case of
a serious nature.”
(Emphasis supplied)

(iii) Thirdly, even if the courts find that the child witness had been
tutored, even then the statement of a child witness can be relied
upon if the tutored part can be separated from the untutored part
and the remaining untutored part inspires confidence. In such
cases, the untutored part can be believed or at least taken into
882 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

consideration for the purpose of corroboration as in the case of
a hostile witness. The relevant observation reads as under: -
“13. Part of the statement of a child witness, even if
tutored, can be relied upon, if the tutored part can
be separated from the untutored part, in case such
remaining untutored part inspires confidence. In such
an eventuality the untutored part can be believed
or at least taken into consideration for the purpose
of corroboration as in the case of a hostile witness.
(Vide Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab (2006) 13
SCC 516.)”
(Emphasis supplied)

(iv) Lastly, it held that an inference as to whether child has been
tutored or not, can be drawn from the contents of his deposition.
If the deposition of a child witness inspires the confidence
of the court and there is no embellishment or improvement
therein, the court may rely upon his evidence. The evidence of
a child witness must be evaluated more carefully with greater
circumspection because he is susceptible to tutoring. Only in
case there is evidence on record to show that a child has been
tutored, the court can reject his statement partly or fully and look
for corroboration. The relevant observation reads as under: -
“14. In view of the above, the law on the issue can
be summarised to the effect that the deposition of a
child witness may require corroboration, but in case
his deposition inspires the confidence of the court and
there is no embellishment or improvement therein, the
court may rely upon his evidence. The evidence of a
child witness must be evaluated more carefully with
greater circumspection because he is susceptible to
tutoring. Only in case there is evidence on record to
show that a child has been tutored, the court can reject
his statement partly or fully. However, an inference
as to whether child has been tutored or not, can be
drawn from the contents of his deposition.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 883

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

35. From the above exposition of law, it is clear that the evidence of a
child witness for all purposes is deemed to be on the same footing as
any other witness as long the child is found to be competent to testify.
The only precaution which the court should take while assessing the
evidence of a child witness is that such witness must be a reliable
one due to the susceptibility of children by their falling prey to tutoring.
However, this in no manner means that the evidence of a child must
be rejected outrightly at the slightest of discrepancy, rather what is
required is that the same is evaluated with great circumspection.
While appreciating the testimony of a child witness the courts are
required to assess whether the evidence of such witness is its
voluntary expression and not borne out of the influence of others
and whether the testimony inspires confidence. At the same time,
one must be mindful that there is no rule requiring corroboration to
the testimony of a child witness before any reliance is placed on it.
The insistence of corroboration is only a measure of caution and
prudence that the courts may exercise if deemed necessary in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
36. In Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak (supra) this Court observed that
merely because a child witness is found to be repeating certain parts
of what somebody asked her to say is no reason to discard her
testimony as tutored, if it is found that what is in substance being
deposed by the child witness is something that he or she had actually
witnessed. It added that a child witness who has withstood his or
her cross-examination at length and able to describe the scenario
implicating the accused in detail as the author of crime, then minor
discrepancies or parts of coached deposition that have crept in will
not by itself affect the credibility of such child witness. The relevant
observation reads as under: -
“8. The learned trial Judge has elaborately analysed the
evidence of the eyewitness. There is no reason as to
why she would falsely implicate the accused. Nothing has
been brought on record to show that she or her father had
any animosity so far as the accused is concerned. The
prosecution has been able to bring home its accusations
beyond the shadow of a doubt. Further, the trial court on
careful examination was satisfied about the child’s capacity
to understand and to give rational answers. That being
the position, it cannot be said that the witness (PW 11)
884 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

had no maturity to understand the import of the questions
put or to give rational answers. This witness was cross-
examined at length and in spite thereof she had described
in detail the scenario implicating the accused to be the
author of the crime. The answers given by the child
witness would go to show that it was only repeating what
somebody else asked her to say. The mere fact that the
child was asked to say about the occurrence and as to
what she saw, is no reason to jump to a conclusion that
it amounted to tutoring and that she was deposing only
as per tutoring what was not otherwise what she actually
saw. The learned counsel for the accused-appellant has
taken pains to point out certain discrepancies which are
of very minor and trifle nature and in no way affect the
credibility of the prosecution version.”
(Emphasis supplied)

37. Similarly in State of M.P. v. Ramesh reported in (2011) 4 SCC 786 it
was held that even if the statement of a child witness is found to be
tutored it can be relied upon, if the same is found to be believable or
inspire confidence after separating the tutored part from the untutored
portion. The relevant observation reads as under: -
“13. Part of the statement of a child witness, even if
tutored, can be relied upon, if the tutored part can be
separated from the untutored part, in case such remaining
untutored part inspires confidence. In such an eventuality
the untutored part can be believed or at least taken into
consideration for the purpose of corroboration as in the
case of a hostile witness.”
38. In the case at hand, the High Court held that the police statement of
the child witness, Rani (PW6) under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. had
been recorded after a delay of more than 18-days, due to which the
possibility of tutoring could not be ruled out, more particularly because
PW6 at the time of recording of her statement was residing with PW3
i.e., the Complainant who was at inimical terms with the accused.
39. Indisputably the police statement of PW6 came to be recorded
after 18-days of the incident. Although the police was well aware
that she was a vital witness to the entire case and could guide the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 885

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

investigation in the right direction, yet to mechanically discard her
testimony solely on the ground of delay alone was not warranted in
the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, particularly when
no question in this regard was put to the IO so as to give him an
opportunity to explain the reason for such delay.
40. In Ranbir & Ors. v. State of Punjab reported in (1973) 2 SCC 444
this Court observed that the factum of delayed examination of a
witness ought to be specifically put to the IO so as to enable him to
explain the reasons therefor. It further held that delay in examining a
witness during investigation would be material only if it is indicative
and suggestive of some unfair practice by the investigating agency
for the purpose of introducing a got-up witness to falsely support
the prosecution case. The relevant observation made therein reads
as under: -
“7. [...] The appellants’ counsel also faintly contended
that Tota Ram PW 7 was examined by the police after
considerable delay, the suggestion being that his evidence
must be looked at with suspicion. We are not impressed
by this submission. The fact of delayed examination of
Tota Ram should, in our opinion, have been put to the
investigating officer so as to enable him to explain the
undue delay, if any, in examining Tota Ram. The question of
delay in examining a witness during investigation is material
only if it is indicative and suggestive of some unfair practice
by the investigating agency for the purpose of introducing
a got-up witness to falsely support the prosecution case. It
is, therefore, essential that the investigating officer should
be asked specifically about the delay and the reasons
therefor. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

41. In State of U.P. v. Satish reported in (2005) 3 SCC 114 this Court
held that before the delay in examination of any particular witness
can be taken into consideration to impeach their credibility, the IO
must be first asked by the accused to explain the delay by putting a
question in this regard. The relevant observation reads as under: -
“20. It is to be noted that the explanation when offered
by the IO on being questioned on the aspect of delayed
886 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

examination by the accused has to be tested by the
court on the touchstone of credibility. If the explanation is
plausible then no adverse inference can be drawn. On the
other hand, if the explanation is found to be implausible,
certainly the court can consider it to be one of the factors
to affect credibility of the witnesses who were examined
belatedly. It may not have any effect on the credibility of the
prosecution’s evidence tendered by the other witnesses.”
(Emphasis supplied)

42. While it is true that primarily it was for the accused to question
the IO to explain the delay in recording the statement of PW6,
but at the same time the Trial Judge should not have remained a
mute spectator, acting like a robot or a recording machine to just
deliver whatever stands feeded by the parties. The role of a judge
in dispensation of justice after ascertaining the true facts no doubt
is very difficult one. In the pious process of unravelling the truth so
as to achieve the ultimate goal of dispensing justice between the
parties the judge cannot keep himself unconcerned and oblivious
to the various happenings taking place during the progress of trial
of any case. The presiding judge cannot afford to remain a mute
spectator totally oblivious to the various happenings taking place
around him, more particularly, concerning a particular case being
tried by him. The fair trial is possible only when the court takes active
interest and elicit all relevant information and material necessary so
as to find out the truth for achieving the ultimate goal of dispensing
justice with all fairness and impartiality to both the parties. In Munna
Pandey v. State of Bihar reported in 2023 INSC 793 this Court held
that a presiding judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere
recording machine and become a participant in the trial by evincing
intelligent active interest by putting questions to witnesses in order
to ascertain the truth.
43. Thus, even if the accused had failed in putting a question in regards
to delay in examination of PW6, the presiding judge was duty bound
to put this question to the IO in exercise of his powers under Section
165 of the Evidence Act. Since in the present case no question
whatsoever was put to the IO to explain the reason for the delay in
examination of Rani, PW6, we should not willingly jump to discard
the testimony of PW6 on the ground of delay alone, and ought to
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 887

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

be circumspect while scrutinizing the effect of such delay. The court
in such a situation would be required to carefully see whether there
is anything palpable on the face of it to indicate any malice at the
end of the investigating agency in belatedly examining such witness.
44. There is nothing on record that would lead to the inference that the
delay in recording the statement of PW6 was done deliberately in
order to manipulate or concoct the case against the respondent
accused herein, and rather such delay appears to be inadvertent
with no sinister motive or design in mind. We say so because,
the statement of PW6 had been recorded on the same date as
the statement of PW5. If at all the investigating agency intended
to allow the doctoring of the testimony of PW6 then it would have
only delayed the examination of the child witness, Rani (PW6) and
not of PW5 as-well, thus this delay in examination appears to be
attributable to the routine manner in which the IO proceeded with
the course of investigation and the overall investigation inertia and
not to give effect to any unfair practice.
45. One another reason for the High Court to discard the testimony of
PW6 on the ground of being tutored was due to the fact that at the
time of recording of her statement, PW6 was residing with PW3,
the complainant herein who is her maternal uncle and was also at
inimical terms with the accused. However, the High Court appears
to have lost sight of the fact that PW6 at the relevant point of time
was only of seven years of age. She had not only lost her mother
but had also been abandoned by her father i.e., the respondent
accused herein who went absconding. In such circumstances, the
only option available to PW6 was to reside with her maternal uncle.
Where else does the High Court expect a child of such tender age
in such circumstances to reside? How could the High Court even
possibly expect such child to go to the police station unaccompanied
by any adult family member to give her statement? The testimony
of PW6 could not have been discarded solely on the ground that it
was recorded in the presence of PW3, an interested witness who
is at inimical terms with the accused, especially in view of the facts
narrated above. The courts are expected to deal with such cases
in a more realistic manner and not discard evidence on account of
procedural technicalities, perfunctory considerations or insignificant
lacunas.
888 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

46. In the last what weighed with the High Court whilst discarding the
testimony of PW6 was the fact that in the morgue inquiry report there
was nothing to indicate that the witness had mentioned anything to
implicate the respondent accused herein, as she had simply stated
that “her mother had died”. The High Court further observed that
because the respondent accused came to be arrested only after the
statement of PW6 had been recorded which according to the High
Court meant that the earlier statement of PW6 made during the
morgue enquiry must have been unfavourable to the prosecution
which is why it was also never brought on record.
47. The incident is alleged to have occurred on 15.07.2003. On the very
next date i.e., 16.07.2003, the inquest proceedings under Section
174 of the Cr.P.C. were carried out based on the information given
by PW3. On that very date, PW7 recorded the statements of PW3,
PW4, PW5 and PW6, respectively based on which the morgue report
was submitted opining that the deceased had died under suspicious
circumstances and suggesting the commission of offence under
Section(s) 302, 201 read with 34 of the IPC by the accused persons.
Accordingly, on 20.07.2003, the FIR came to be registered against
the respondent accused herein.
48. No doubt, in the inquest report it has been mentioned that PW6 only
stated that her “mother had died”, however, this does not mean that
her subsequent statements implicating the accused were tutored.
This is because as per the testimony of PW7, the death report that
was prepared upon conclusion of the inquest proceedings specifically
implicated the accused herein for the suspicious death of the
deceased. In the FIR that was lodged, not only has the respondent
been named as an accused but it also specifically mentions that
from the statement of PW6 in the inquest proceedings, it has been
found that the respondent accused, the husband of the deceased
murdered her by slamming Virendra Kumari on the floor of the porch
of the house and choked her to death by pressing his foot on her
neck. At the cost of repetition, the relevant contents of the FIR are
again reproduced hereunder: -
“[...]on the investigation of Marg No. 7/03 Section 174
Cr.P.C., it is stated that on the basis of order issued
by his good-self, I ASI Mahendra Singh conducted the
investigation of Marg No. 7/03 under Section 174 Cr.P.C.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 889

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

after reaching the spot Village Singharai, during the course
of investigation, recorded the statement of complainant
Bhoora @ Yashpal Singh Yadav, Kumari Rani, D/o Balvir
Singh Yadav, Bharat Singh Yadav R/o Village Singharai
and Badal Singh Yadav, Police Station Badarvas. On spot
map of the place of incident was prepared and seizure
proceedings were conducted, from the investigation up till
now and the statement of Kumari Rani Yadav, it has been
found that Balvir Singh Yadav husband of the deceased
Virendra Kumari murdered her by slamming Virendra
Kumari on the floor of the porch of the house and choked
her neck by pressing his foot and Kumari Jatan Singh
helped her brother Balvir Singh in the murder, later on,
during the night itself, Balvir Singh Yadav took the dead
body of his wife on his shoulders to his field and discreetly
burnt it. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

49. Thus, although the statement of PW6 that was recorded during the
course of the inquest proceedings was never produced before the
court, yet it does not mean that the suppression was due to the
same being unfavourable, particularly when the respondent accused
neither sought for its production during the course of trial nor did it
question the relevant witnesses as to its contents. As regards the
timing of arrest of the respondent accused, the High Court seems to
have completely overlooked the fact that at the time of the incident,
the accused was absconding. Both PW3 and PW6, respectively had
deposed that after cremating the deceased, the respondent accused
fled away, and even the Trial Court had taken a note of this. Thus,
from the sequence of events narrated above, and the contents of
the FIR, there is no doubt in our minds that the implication of the
respondent accused was not an afterthought.
50. In order to obviate any confusion, we take this opportunity to explain
what is meant by a “tutored testimony” and the test for determining
or ascertaining a tutored testimony. Where there has been tutoring
of any witness, the same can possibly produce two broad effects in
their testimony; (i) improvisation or (ii) fabrication.
51. Improvisation refers to instances where the tutored witness in question
adds new details, alters facts, or provides an inconsistent version
890 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

of events that were not previously stated in their initial statements,
such as those given to the police in their statement under Section
161 of the Cr.P.C. In such situations, the improvisation by way of
tutoring must be eradicated only in the manner envisaged under
Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. read with Section 145 of the Evidence
Act. The principle of law in this regard is that the witness who has
improvised its testimony must be first confronted with that part of
its previous statement that omits or contradicts the improvisation
by bringing it to its notice and give the witness an opportunity to
either admit or deny the omission or contradiction. Where such
witness admits such omission or contradiction, there is no further
need to prove the contradiction through the IO and its effect would
be looked into while appreciating the evidence. If he denies having
made that part of the statement, his attention must be drawn to
that statement and must be mentioned in the deposition. By this
process the contradiction is merely brought on record, but it is yet
to be proved. Thereafter when the investigating officer is examined
in the court, his attention should be drawn to the passage marked
for the purpose of contradiction. It will then be said to have been
proved in the deposition of the investigating officer who again by
referring to the police statement will depose about the witness having
made that statement. The process again involves referring to the
police statement and culling out that part with which the maker of
the statement was intended to be contradicted. [See: V.K. Mishra
v. State of Uttarakhand reported in (2015) 9 SCC 588]
52. However, where the allegation of tutoring pertains to fabrication –
meaning that certain portions of both the testimony and the previous
statement of a particular witness have been doctored or falsified –
in such circumstances twin conditions would have to be proved,
namely; (i) the possibility or opportunity of the witness being tutored
AND (ii) the reasonable likelihood of the tutoring.
53. The first condition, namely the ‘possibility or opportunity of the witness
being tutored’ can be established by demonstrating or laying down
certain foundational facts that suggest the probability that a part
of the testimony of the witness might have been tutored. This may
be done either by showing that there was a delay in recording the
statement of such witness or that the presence of such witness was
doubtful, or by imputing any motive on the part of such witness to
depose falsely, or the susceptibility of such witness in falling prey
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 891

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

to tutoring. A mere bald assertion that there is a possibility of the
witness in question being tutored is not sufficient.
54. The second condition ‘reasonable likelihood of tutoring’ requires
that the foundational facts established in the first step be further
proven or cogently substantiated before any portion of the witness’s
testimony can be deemed tutored. This may be done by leading
evidence to prove a strong and palpable motive to depose falsely
that was imputed to the witness, or by establishing that the delay in
recording the statement is not only unexplained but is indicative and
suggestive of some unfair practice by the investigating agency for
the purpose of falsely supporting the case of the prosecution as held
in Ranbir (supra), or by proving that the witness fell prey to tutoring
and was influenced by someone else either by cross-examining
such witness at length that leads to either material discrepancies or
contradictions, or exposes a doubtful demeanour of such witness rife
with sterile repetition and confidence lacking testimony, or through
such degree of incompatibility of the version of the witness with the
other material on record and attending circumstances that negates
their presence as unnatural.
55. Irrespective of whether the testimony of a witness is tutored or not,
the same, generally may be classified into three categories: -
(i) wholly reliable;
(ii) wholly unreliable;
(iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in
coming to its conclusion either way - it may convict or may acquit on
the testimony of a single witness. If it is found to be beyond approach
or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subordination. In
the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming
to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court
has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material
particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is
another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of
the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were
to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be
indirectly encouraging subordination of witnesses. Situations may
arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give
892 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh
carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is
reliable and free from all taints, which tend to render oral testimony
open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony.
The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to
depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of
the prosecution. [See: Ramratan and others v. State of Rajasthan
reported in AIR 1962 SC 424; Guli Chand and others v. State of
Rajasthan reported in AIR 1974 SC 276; Badri v. State of Rajasthan
reported in AIR 1976 SC 560]
56. The appreciation of testimony of a witness is a hard task. There
is no fixed or straight jacket formula for appreciation of the ocular
evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular
evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: -
a. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach
must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole
appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed,
it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the
evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,
drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a
whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the
general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether
the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render
it unworthy of belief.
b. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the
opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of
evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had
not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation
of evidence by the Trial Court and unless there are reasons
weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the
evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the
matter of trivial details.
c. When eye-witness is examined at length it is quite possible
for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear
in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a
witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version
that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 893

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

d. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of
the case, hyper technical approach by taking sentences torn out
of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance
to some technical error committed by the investigating officer
not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit
rejection of the evidence as a whole.
e. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in
the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence
of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same
witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.
f. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a
photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident.
It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.
g. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events.
The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so
often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore
cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.
h. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What
one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might
emboss its image on one person’s mind whereas it might go
unnoticed on the part of another.
i. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation
and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them.
They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is
unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.
j. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of
an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess
work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation.
And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable
estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense
of individuals which varies from person to person.
k. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately
the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession
or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or
mixed up when interrogated later on.
894 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

l. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the
court atmosphere and the piercing cross examination by counsel
and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding
sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the
spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness
sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish
or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and
honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.
m. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the
evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to
contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to
discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at
variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful
to contradict that witness.
n. The evidence of an interested and/or related witnesses should
not be examined with a coloured vision simply because of their
relationship with the deceased. Though it is not a rule of law, it
is a rule of prudence that their evidence ought to be examined
with greater care and caution to ensure that it does not suffer
from any infirmity. The court must satisfy itself that the evidence
of the interested witness has a ring of truth. Only if there are
no contradictions and the testimony of the related/interested
witness is found to be credible, consistent and reasonable, can
it be relied upon even without any corroboration. At the end of
the day, each case must be examined on its own facts. There
cannot be any sweeping generalisation.
[See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat
reported in AIR 1983 SC 753; Leela Ram v. State of Haryana
reported in AIR 1999 SC 3717; Tahsildar Singh v. State of
UP reported in AIR 1959 SC 1012]
57. To put it simply, in assessing the value of the evidence of the
eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the
circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at
the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible
for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly,
whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their
evidence. In respect of both these considerations, the circumstances
either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 895

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit
the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value
which a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where
the plea of the accused is a mere bald assertion of tutoring, yet the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its
own merits, where the accused raises a definite plea or puts forward
a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution,
the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of
it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value
of the prosecution evidence.
58. We summarize our conclusion as under: -
(I) The Evidence Act does not prescribe any minimum age for a
witness, and as such a child witness is a competent witness
and his or her evidence and cannot be rejected outrightly.
(II) As per Section 118 of the Evidence Act, before the evidence of
the child witness is recorded, a preliminary examination must
be conducted by the Trial Court to ascertain if the child-witness
is capable of understanding sanctity of giving evidence and the
import of the questions that are being put to him.
(III) Before the evidence of the child witness is recorded, the Trial
Court must record its opinion and satisfaction that the child
witness understands the duty of speaking the truth and must
clearly state why he is of such opinion.
(IV) The questions put to the child in the course of the preliminary
examination and the demeanour of the child and their ability
to respond to questions coherently and rationally must be
recorded by the Trial Court. The correctness of the opinion
formed by the Trial Court as to why it is satisfied that the child
witness was capable of giving evidence may be gone into by the
appellate court by either scrutinizing the preliminary examination
conducted by the Trial Court, or from the testimony of the child
witness or the demeanour of the child during the deposition and
cross-examination as recorded by the Trial Court.
(V) The testimony of a child witness who is found to be competent
to depose i.e., capable of understanding the questions put to
it and able to give coherent and rational answers would be
admissible in evidence.
896 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(VI) The Trial Court must also record the demeanour of the child
witness during the course of its deposition and cross-examination
and whether the evidence of such child witness is his voluntary
expression and not borne out of the influence of others.
(VII) There is no requirement or condition that the evidence of a
child witness must be corroborated before it can be considered.
A child witness who exhibits the demeanour of any other
competent witness and whose evidence inspires confidence
can be relied upon without any need for corroboration and can
form the sole basis for conviction. If the evidence of the child
explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements
or embellishments, the same does not require any corroboration
whatsoever.
(VIII) Corroboration of the evidence of the child witness may be
insisted upon by the courts as measure of caution and prudence
where the evidence of the child is found to be either tutored or
riddled with material discrepancies or contradictions. There is no
hard and fast rule when such corroboration would be desirous
or required, and would depend upon the peculiar facts and
circumstances of each case.
(IX) Child witnesses are considered as dangerous witnesses as
they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and
moulded and as such the courts must rule out the possibility
of tutoring. If the courts after a careful scrutiny, find that there
is neither any tutoring nor any attempt to use the child witness
for ulterior purposes by the prosecution, then the courts must
rely on the confidence-inspiring testimony of such a witness
in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the
absence of any allegations by the accused in this regard, an
inference as to whether the child has been tutored or not, can
be drawn from the contents of his deposition.
(X) The evidence of a child witness is considered tutored if their
testimony is shaped or influenced at the instance of someone
else or is otherwise fabricated. Where there has been any
tutoring of a witness, the same may possibly produce two broad
effects in their testimony; (i) improvisation or (ii) fabrication.
(i) Improvisation in testimony whereby facts have been altered
or new details are added inconsistent with the version
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 897

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

of events not previously stated must be eradicated by
first confronting the witness with that part of its previous
statement that omits or contradicts the improvisation by
bringing it to its notice and giving the witness an opportunity
to either admit or deny the omission or contradiction. If such
omission or contradiction is admitted there is no further
need to prove the contradiction. If the witness denies
the omission or contradiction the same has to be proved
in the deposition of the investigating officer by proving
that part of police statement of the witness in question.
Only thereafter, may the improvisation be discarded from
evidence or such omission or contradiction be relied upon
as evidence in terms of Section 11 of Evidence Act.
(ii) Whereas the evidence of a child witness which is alleged to
be doctored or tutored in toto, then such evidence may be
discarded as unreliable only if the presence of the following
two factors have to be established being as under: -
• Opportunity of Tutoring of the Child Witness
in question whereby certain foundational facts
suggesting or demonstrating the probability that a
part of the testimony of the witness might have been
tutored have to be established. This may be done
either by showing that there was a delay in recording
the statement of such witness or that the presence
of such witness was doubtful, or by imputing any
motive on the part of such witness to depose falsely,
or the susceptibility of such witness in falling prey to
tutoring. However, a mere bald assertion that there is
a possibility of the witness in question being tutored
is not sufficient.
• Reasonable likelihood of tutoring wherein
the foundational facts suggesting a possibility of
tutoring as established have to be further proven or
cogently substantiated. This may be done by leading
evidence to prove a strong and palpable motive to
depose falsely, or by establishing that the delay in
recording the statement is not only unexplained but
indicative and suggestive of some unfair practice
898 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

or by proving that the witness fell prey to tutoring
and was influenced by someone else either by
cross-examining such witness at length that leads
to either material discrepancies or contradictions,
or exposes a doubtful demeanour of such witness
rife with sterile repetition and confidence lacking
testimony, or through such degree of incompatibility
of the version of the witness with the other material
on record and attending circumstances that negates
their presence as unnatural.
(XI) Merely because a child witness is found to be repeating certain
parts of what somebody asked her to say is no reason to
discard her testimony as tutored, if it is found that what is in
substance being deposed by the child witness is something
that he or she had actually witnessed. A child witness who has
withstood his or her cross-examination at length and able to
describe the scenario implicating the accused in detail as the
author of crime, then minor discrepancies or parts of coached
deposition that have crept in will not by itself affect the credibility
of such child witness.
(XII) Part of the statement of a child witness, even if tutored, can
be relied upon, if the tutored part can be separated from the
untutored part, in case such remaining untutored or untainted
part inspires confidence. The untutored part of the evidence of
the child witness can be believed and taken into consideration
or the purpose of corroboration as in the case of a hostile
witness.
59. As discussed in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, there
is nothing on record to indicate that PW6 was a tutored witness.
We may also refer to one finding of the Trial Court recorded in
its judgment, wherein it has been noted that PW6 was cross
examined at length for approximately 1.5 hours, and her demeanour
throughout the same was believable, with nothing to indicate that
she had been tutored or was deposing falsely. It also has taken
note of the fact that in the entire cross examination no significant
contradictions were found. Thus, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court committed an egregious error in discarding the
testimony of PW6.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 899

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

i. Principles of Law relating to appreciation of Circumstantial
Evidence.
60. In ‘A Treatise on Judicial Evidence’, Jeremy Bentham, an English
Philosopher included a whole chapter upon what lies next when
the direct evidence does not lead to any special inference. It is
called Circumstantial Evidence. According to him, in every case, of
circumstantial evidence, there are always at least two facts to be
considered; (i) the Factum Probandum, or say, the principal fact
the existence of which is supposed or proposed to be proved; and
(ii) the Factum Probans or the evidentiary fact or the fact from the
existence of which that of the factum probandum is inferred.
61. Although there can be no straight jacket formula for appreciation of
circumstantial evidence, yet to convict an accused on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, the Court must follow certain tests which
are broadly as follows: -
(i) Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be
drawn must be cogently and firmly established;
(ii) Those circumstances must be of a definite tendency unerringly
pointing towards guilt of the accused and must be conclusive
in nature;
(iii) The circumstances, if taken cumulatively, should form a chain
so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that
within all human probability the crime was committed by the
accused and none else; and
(iv) The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must
be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis
than that of the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent
with his innocence. In other words, the circumstances should
exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved.
[See: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported
in (1984) 4 SCC 116]
62. In an Essay on the ‘Principles of Circumstantial Evidence’ by William
Wills by T. and J.W. Johnson and Co. 1872, it has been explained
that circumstantial evidence implies the existence of a certainty in the
relation between the facts and the inferences stemming therefrom.
The relevant extract reads as under: -
900 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

“In matters of direct testimony, if credence be given to the
relators, the act of hearing and the act of belief, though
really not so, seem to be contemporaneous. But the
case is very different when we have to determine upon
circumstantial evidence, the judgment in respect of which
is essentially inferential. There is no apparent necessary
connection between the facts and the inference; the facts
may be true, and the inference erroneous, and it is only
by comparison with the results of observation in similar
or analogous circumstances, that we acquire confidence
in the accuracy of our conclusions.
The term PRESUMPTIVE is frequently used as synonymous
with CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; but it is not so
used with strict accuracy, The word” presumption,” ex
vi termini, imports an inference from facts; and the
adjunct “presumptive,” as applied to evidentiary facts,
implies the certainty of some relation between the facts
and the inference. Circumstances generally, but not
necessarily, lead to particular inferences; for the facts
may be indisputable, and yet their relation to the principal
fact may be only apparent, and not real; and even when
the connection is real, the deduction may be erroneous.
Circumstantial and presumptive evidence differ, therefore,
as genus and species.
The force and effect of circumstantial evidence depend
upon its incompatibility with, and incapability of, explanation
or solution upon any other supposition than that of the
truth of the fact which it is adduced to prove; the mode
of argument resembling the method of demonstration by
the reductio ad absurdum.”
63. It is settled principle of law that an accused can be punished if he is
found guilty even in cases of circumstantial evidence provided, the
prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the complete
chain of events and circumstances which definitely points towards
the involvement or guilt of the accused. The accused will not be
entitled to acquittal merely because there is no eye witness in the
case. It is also equally true that an accused can be convicted on
the basis of circumstantial evidence subject to satisfaction of the
expected principles in that regard.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 901

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

64. Thus, in view of the above, the court must consider a case of
circumstantial evidence in light of the aforesaid settled legal
propositions. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the judgment
remains essentially inferential. The inference is drawn from the
established facts as the circumstances lead to particular inferences.
The Court has to draw an inference with respect to whether the
chain of circumstances is complete, and when the circumstances
therein are collectively considered, the same must lead only to the
irresistible conclusion that the accused alone is the perpetrator of
the crime in question. All the circumstances so established must be
of a conclusive nature, and consistent only with the hypothesis of
the guilt of the accused.

a. Incriminating Circumstances emerging from the evidence
on record.
65. We take note of the following circumstances emerging from evidence
on record: -
a. The failure on the part of the respondent accused in not
explaining in any manner as to what had actually happened
to his wife i.e., the deceased or how she died on the fateful
night of the incident, more particularly when he did not dispute
that he was in the company of his wife at the relevant point of
time. Though the respondent accused in his statement under
Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. admitted that at the time of the
incident everyone was sleeping in the house, yet, surprisingly,
he maintained a complete silence in regards to the cause of
death of the deceased. At the cost of repetition, the relevant
portion of the further statement of the accused is reproduced
hereunder: -
“Que. No. 32: This witness further states that you
reached in the courtyard and Bua was also sleeping in
the courtyard at that time. What do you want to say?
Ans: All were sleeping in the house.”
b. The unnatural conduct of the respondent accused in not
informing the family members either about the death of their
daughter or the cremation of her body, despite the fact that her
family members were residing in the very same village.
902 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

c. The fact that the respondent-accused after clandestinely
cremating the deceased’s body fled away and could not be
found either at the house or in the field where the body had
been burnt as stated by PW3 and PW6, respectively, again
raises suspicion about the cause of death of the deceased.
Prosecution Witness No. 3 – Bhoora @ Yashpal
“I saw the dead body burnt in the morning. The villagers
did not create any ruckus and Balvir was not present there.
Who burnt the dead body of Virendra Kumari, we do not
know. Because we did not see it getting burn”
Prosecution Witness No. 6 – Rani
“When the police came home, no one from the house was
there. My father had ran away, and so had my aunt. My
grandfather had also run away. I was the only one there
and my brother. And my old grandfather was there. My
mother’s father in law, who is my grandfather was there.”
d. The suspicious circumstances under which the deceased
died coupled with the fact that the accused had a fight with
the deceased two to three days before the incident; their
strained relationship and the accused frequently treating the
deceased cruelly, as deposed by PW3, PW4, PW5, and PW6,
respectively, further raise concerns and points towards the
involvement of the respondent accused in the alleged crime.
This is corroborated by the certified copies of the maintenance
case and the complaint lodged by the deceased, which were
exhibited and read into evidence. The relevant observations
made by the Trial Court in this regard are reproduced herein
below: -
“22. PW-3 Bhoora has stated that Birender Kumari
is his .. sister being the daughter of his maternal
uncle. On the day of incident in the night he and his
father were sleeping in their house upon which they
had heard voices of Birender Kumari crying. [...] In
the morning when he and his father got up then they
came to know that Birender Kumari has died and that
she has been burnt by the accused clandestinely in
their fields itself. When he and his father and the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 903

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

entire village went to see then the dead body was
burning which fact is confirmed by Bharat Singh also.
[...] The accused used to harass and the motorcycle
had not been given. He used to give beatings upon
which the deceased used to come to him. Once the
accused beat her very badly and did- not give her
anything to eat also. Upon whiCh she had filed a case
of maintenance in the JMFC Court, Kolaras of which
the certified copy is Ex.P-8. The girl had been given
beatings, the true copy of which report is Ex.P-9.

xxx xxx xxx
29. The accused had carried Birender Kumari to the
fields in relation to which direct evidence has not
come. It has come in the statement of Rani that the
accused took her mother to the fields and Jatan had
told that her mother had been taken for cremation.
In the fields the deceased was cremated in the night
which circumstance also goes against the accused.
If the death of deceased Birender Kumari was of
ordinary nature then what was the reason that in the
night without informing the reason to the family of the
deceased she was cremated in the night especially
when prior to the incident itself the mutual relations
of the accused and deceased were not good and
according to Ex.P-8 & P-9 the case in relation to
not giving beatings and maintenance had been filed
by the deceased in the Court. Another circumstance
which indicate the involvement of the accused in the
incident [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

e. It is also not the case of the respondent accused that the
deceased was suffering from any ailment nor is there any
evidence worth the name to suggest the possibility of her death
occurring due to any health issue. Thus, in this regard, it was
all the more important for the respondent accused to explain
in what circumstances and in what manner his wife suddenly
died on the fateful night of the incident.
904 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

66. The High Court whilst passing the impugned judgment and order
completely failed to advert to and refer to Section 106 of the Evidence
Act, which was crucial in a case involving circumstantial evidence
of such nature as aforementioned.

iii. Principles of Law governing the Applicability of Section
106 of the Evidence Act.
67. At this stage it would be apposite to refer to Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, which states as under: -
“106. Burden of proving fact especially within
knowledge.—
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any
person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
Illustration:
(a) When a person does an act with some intention other
than that which the character and circumstances of the act
suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.
(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket.
The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.”
68. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that
when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person,
the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word “especially”
means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the
knowledge of the accused. The ordinary rule that applies to the
criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the rule of facts
embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 of the
Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act.
Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general rule that
in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and
Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the
contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which
it would be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for
the prosecution to establish the facts which are, “especially within
the knowledge of the accused and which, he can prove without
difficulty or inconvenience”.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 905

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

69. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer reported in AIR
1956 SC 404, this Court while considering the word “especially”
employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act speaking through
Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: -
“9. [...] The word “especially” stresses that it means
facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his
knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it
would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder
case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did
not commit the murder because who could know better
than he whether he did or did not.
It is evident that that cannot be the intention & the Privy
Council has twice refused to construe this section, as
reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean
that the burden lies on an accused person to show that
he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These
cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23)
(A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 All ER 36 AT P. 49 (B).”
70. The aforesaid decision of Shambhu Nath (supra) has been referred
to and relied upon in Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar reported in
(2021) 10 SCC 725, wherein this Court observed as under: -
“22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to
those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in
establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference
can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts
which are within the special knowledge of the accused.
When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about
the existence of said other facts, the court can always
draw an appropriate inference.
23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the
accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge
of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional
link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed
by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances
which is required to be established by the prosecution is
not established, the failure of the accused to discharge
906 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not
relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of
the defence is no ground to convict the accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)

71. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra
reported in (2012) 10 SCC 373, this Court observed as under: -
“23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a rule in
law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be
inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring
the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts,
the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches
a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The
above position is strengthened in view of Section 114
of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to
presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely
to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have
regard to the common course of natural events, human
conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these
circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of
the Evidence Act can also be utilised. We make it clear
that this section is not intended to relieve the prosecution
of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the
prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a
reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence
of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his
special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any
explanation which might drive the court to draw a different
inference. It is useful to quote the following observation in
State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Ors. [(2000) 8
SCC 382 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1516] : (SCC p. 393, para 38)
“38. Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of
the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional
cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution
to establish certain facts which are particularly within the
knowledge of the accused. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v.
The State of Ajmer [AIR 1956 SC 404 : 1956 Cri LJ 794]
the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus :
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 907

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

‘11. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case
the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section
106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On
the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional
cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate
disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish
facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the
accused and which he could prove without difficulty or
inconvenience.
The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that
are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.’””
(Emphasis supplied)

72. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2006)
10 SCC 681, this Court was considering a similar case of homicidal
death in the confines of the house. The following observations are
considered relevant in the facts of the present case: -
“14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house
and in such circumstances where the assailants have all
the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time
and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely
difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the
guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial
evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts.
A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see
that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides
to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public
duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions
[1944 AC 315 : (1944) 2 All ER 13 (HL)] — quoted with
approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail
Singh [(2003) 11 SCC 271 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 135].) The law
does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence
of such character which is almost impossible to be led or
at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the
prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable
of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances
of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section
106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is
908 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden
of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended
to this section throws some light on the content and scope
of this provision and it reads:
“(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket.
The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.”
15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy
inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case
would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature
and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the
charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in
other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would
be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section
106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding
burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent
explanation as to how the crime was committed. The
inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping
quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise
that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the
prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to
offer any explanation.

xxx xxx xxx
22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the
murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading
evidence to show that shortly before the commission of
crime they were seen together or the offence takes place
in the dwelling home where the husband also normally
resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused
does not offer any explanation how the wife received
injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be
false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he
is responsible for commission of the crime. …”
(Emphasis supplied)

73. The question of burden of proof, where some facts are within the
personal knowledge of the accused, was examined by this Court
in the case of State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Ors.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 909

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

reported in (2000) 8 SCC 382. In this case, the assailants forcibly
dragged the deceased from the house where he was taking shelter
on account of the fear of the accused, and took him away at about
2:30 in the night. The next day in the morning, his mangled body was
found lying in the hospital. The Trial Court convicted the accused
under Section 364, read with Section 34 of the IPC, and sentenced
them to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The accused preferred an
appeal against their conviction before the High Court and the State
also filed an appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused for the
charge of murder. The accused had not given any explanation as to
what happened to the deceased after he was abducted by them. The
Sessions Judge, after referring to the law on circumstantial evidence,
had observed that there was a missing link in the chain of evidence
after the deceased was last seen together with the accused persons,
and the discovery of the dead body in the hospital, and concluded
that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of murder
against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. This Court
took note of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and
laid down the following principles in paras 31 to 34 of the report: -
“31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not
be taken as a recognized doctrine as though it admits no
process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption
is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper
of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating
to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be
wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious
offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society
would be the casualty.
32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in
establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court
has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption
is a course recognized by the law for the court to rely on
in conditions such as this.
33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence
of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless
the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact
is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful
910 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When
inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved
facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and
reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position.
The above principle has gained legislative recognition in
India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence
Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of
any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that
process the court shall have regard to the common course
of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the
facts of the case.
34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that
Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him
out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened
to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered
within a short time after the abduction the permitted
reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the
presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such
inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the
Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he
was in their custody.”
(Emphasis supplied)

74. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court while maintaining the
conviction under Section 364 read with Section 34 of the IPC,
reversed the order of acquittal under Section 302 read with Section
34 of the IPC, and convicted the accused under the said provision
and sentenced them to imprisonment for life.
75. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is evident that the
court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases
with care and caution. It cannot be said that it has no application to
criminal cases. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials in
this country that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused is not in any way modified by the provisions contained
in Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
76. Section 106 cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the
prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt
of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 911

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the
elements necessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the
prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even
though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the accused
and it does not throw the burden on the accused to show that no
crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence
of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances
are not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve
the prosecution of its legitimate burden. So, until a prima facie case is
established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused.
77. Section 106 obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the accused
is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution unless
the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his
knowledge which would render the evidence of the prosecution
nugatory. If in such a situation, the accused offers an explanation
which may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the
accused gets the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may not be
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the explanation.
But if the accused in such a case does not give any explanation
at all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation, this by itself is
a circumstance which may well turn the scale against him. In the
language of Prof. Glanville Williams:
“All that the shifting of the evidential burden does at the
final stage of the case is to allow the jury (Court) to take
into account the silence of the accused or the absence
of satisfactory explanation appearing from his evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)

78. To recapitulate the foregoing : What lies at the bottom of the various
rules shifting the evidential burden or burden of introducing evidence
in proof of one’s case as opposed to the persuasive burden or burden
of proof, i.e., of proving all the issues remaining with the prosecution
and which never shift is the idea that it is impossible for the prosecution
to give wholly convincing evidence on certain issues from its own
hand and it is therefore for the accused to give evidence on them if
he wishes to escape. Positive facts must always be proved by the
prosecution. But the same rule cannot always apply to negative facts.
It is not for the prosecution to anticipate and eliminate all possible
912 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

defences or circumstances which may exonerate an accused. Again,
when a person does not act with some intention other than that
which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, it is not
for the prosecution to eliminate all the other possible intentions. If
the accused had a different intention that is a fact especially within
his knowledge and which he must prove (see Professor Glanville
Williams—Proof of Guilt, Ch. 7, page 127 and following) and the
interesting discussion—para 527 negative averments and para
528 — “require affirmative counter-evidence” at page 438 and foil,
of Kenny’s outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn. 1958.
79. But Section 106 has no application to cases where the fact in
question, having regard to its nature, is such as to be capable of
being known not only to the accused but also to others, if they
happened to be present when it took place. The intention underlying
the act or conduct of any individual is seldom a matter which can
be conclusively established; it is indeed only known to the person in
whose mind the intention is conceived. Therefore, if the prosecution
has established that the character and circumstance of an act suggest
that it was done with a particular intention, then under illustration (a)
to this section, it may be assumed that he had that intention, unless
he proves the contrary.
80. A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and the
burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of
proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established
as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of
evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to
the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has
offered evidence, which if believed by the court, would convince them
of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused, if
in a position, should go forward with countervailing evidence, if he
has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge
of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such
facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one. He
is not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been
established, for the court must still find that he is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt before it can convict. However, the accused's failure
to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded by the court as
confirming the conclusion indicated by the evidence presented by
the prosecution or as confirming presumptions which might arise
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 913

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

therefrom. Although not legally required to produce evidence on his
own behalf, the accused may therefore as a practical matter find it
essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of
proof resting upon the prosecution [See: Balvir Singh v. State of
Uttarakhand reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1261 and Anees v.
State Govt. of NCT reported in 2024 INSC 368]
iv. What is “prima facie case” (foundational facts) in the context
of Section 106 of the Evidence Act?
81. The Latin expression prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first
view”, or “based on first impression”. According, to Webster’s Third
International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case
established “prima facie” by evidence which in turn means “evidence
sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact
in question unless rebutted”. In both civil and criminal law, the term
is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has
sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal
proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a
burden to prove, which requires them to present prima facie evidence
for each element of the case or charges against the defendant. If
they cannot present prima facie evidence, the initial claim may be
dismissed without any need for a response by other parties.
82. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the
prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from
which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding guilt of the
accused.
83. The presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one
fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such
inference is disproved.
84. To explain what constitutes a prima facie case to make Section 106
of the Evidence Act applicable, we should refer to the decision of this
Court in Mir Mohammad (supra), wherein this Court has observed
in paras 36 and 37 respectively as under:
“36. In this context we may profitably utilize the legal
principle embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act
which reads as follows: “When any fact is especially within
the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that
fact is upon him.”
914 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

37. The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution
of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. But the section would apply to cases
where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts
from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding
the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused
by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts,
failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court
to draw a different inference.”
(Emphasis supplied)

85. We should also look into the decision of this Court in the case of
Ram Gulam Chaudhary & Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in (2001)
8 SCC 311, wherein this Court made the following observations in
para 24 as under: -
“24. Even otherwise, in our view, this is a case where
Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply. Krishnanand
Chaudhary was brutally assaulted and then a chhura-blow
was given on the chest. Thus chhura-blow was given after
Bijoy Chaudhary had said “he is still alive and should
be killed”. The appellants then carried away the body.
What happened thereafter to Krishnanand Chaudhary is
especially within the knowledge of the appellants. The
appellants have given no explanation as to what they did
after they took away the body. Krishnanand Chaudhary
has not been since seen alive. In the absence of an
explanation, and considering the fact that the appellants
were suspecting the boy to have kidnapped and killed
the child of the family of the appellants, it was for the
appellants to have explained what they did with him after
they took him away. When the abductors withheld that
information from the court, there is every justification for
drawing the inference that they had murdered the boy.
Even though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be
intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the
section would apply to cases like the present, where the
prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which
a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 915

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

The appellants by virtue of their special knowledge must
offer an explanation which might lead the Court to draw
a different inference. We, therefore, see no substance in
this submission of Mr. Mishra.”
(Emphasis supplied)

86. Cases are frequently coming before the Courts where the husbands,
due to strained marital relations and doubt as regards the character,
have gone to the extent of killing the wife. These crimes are generally
committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very
difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family
like in the case on board, even if he is a witness of the crime, would
come forward to depose against another family member.
87. If an offence takes place inside the four walls of a house and in such
circumstances where the accused has all the opportunity to plan and
commit the offence at the time and in the circumstances of its choice,
it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead direct evidence
to establish the guilt of the accused. It is to resolve such a situation
that Section 106 of the Evidence Act exists in the statute book. In
the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra), this Court observed that
a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no
innocent man is punished. The Court proceeded to observe that a
Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both
are public duties. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution
to lead evidence of such character, which is almost impossible to
be led, or at any rate, extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the
prosecution is to lead such evidence, which it is capable of leading,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
88. We are of the view that the following foundational facts, duly
established by the prosecution, justify the invocation of the principles
enshrined under Section 106 of the Evidence Act: -
a) The offence took place inside the four walls of the house in which
the respondent accused, the deceased and their 7-year-old
daughter were living. The respondent accused has not disputed
his presence in the house at the time of the alleged incident.
b) The failure on the part of the accused to inform the family
members about the death of their daughter and the clandestine
916 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

manner in which her body was cremated, more particularly when
her family members were residing in the very same village. By
the time the Investigating Officer reached the place of incident
the body of the deceased was fully burnt.
c) The dubious conduct of the respondent accused in fleeing
away from home leaving behind his minor daughter of seven
years age all alone.
d) The untimely death of the deceased in suspicious circumstances,
occurring shortly after a fight with the respondent-accused two
to three days before the incident, coupled with evidence of their
strained relationship.
e) The respondent accused maintained complete silence. In
other words, has failed to explain any of the incriminating
circumstances pointing a finger against him.
89. We are of the view that the aforementioned circumstances constitute
more than a prima facie case to enable the prosecution to invoke
Section 106 of the Evidence Act and shift the burden on the accused
husband to explain what had actually happened on the day & date
his wife died.
90. This appeal reminds us of Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer’s observations
in Dharm Das Wadhwani v. State of U.P. reported in (1974) 4 SCC
267: “The rule of benefit of reasonable doubt does not imply a frail
willow bending to every whiff of hesitancy. Judges are made of sterner
stuff and must take a practical view of legitimate inferences flowing
from evidence, circumstantial or direct.” The role of courts in such
circumstances assumes greater importance and it is expected of the
courts to deal with like one on hand, cases in a more realistic manner
and not allow the criminals to go scot-free on account of procedural
technicalities, perfunctory investigation or insignificant lacunas in the
evidence as otherwise serious crimes would go unpunished. The courts
are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women.

D. CONCLUSION
91. In the result, the present appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the High
Court is hereby set aside, and the judgment and order of conviction
passed by the Trial Court in S.T. No. 197 of 2003 stands restored.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 917

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh

92. The respondent accused shall surrender before the Trial Court
within a period of four weeks from today to undergo the sentence
as imposed by the Trial Court.
93. Pending application(s) if any, also stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan