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Supreme Court of India

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESHversusKANHA @ OMPRAKASH

Citation
2019 INSC 130
Decided
4 February 2019
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

A conviction under Section 307 IPC does not require proof of grievous or life‑threatening injury; intent to murder can be established from the nature of the weapon and the circumstances of the attack.

Summary

The State of Madhya Pradesh appealed against the High Court's conversion of the trial court's conviction of Kanha @ OmpraKash from Section 307 (attempt to murder) to Section 324 (voluntarily causing hurt) of the Indian Penal Code. The facts revealed that on 8 October 2003 the accused shot Dashrath Singh with a firearm, inflicting eleven punctured, bleeding wounds, indicating multiple shots. The issue was whether the nature of the injuries, though not proved to be grievous or life‑threatening, could still satisfy the elements of Section 307. The Supreme Court held that proof of grievous injury is not essential; intent to murder can be inferred from the weapon used, multiplicity of wounds, and surrounding circumstances. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside and the trial court's conviction under Section 307, along with the three‑year rigorous imprisonment and fine, was restored.

Issues considered

  • Whether the absence of forensic proof of grievous or life‑threatening injury precludes conviction under Section 307 IPC.
  • Whether the injuries caused by a firearm, though simple hurt, satisfy the second part of Section 307 IPC.
  • Whether the High Court erred in converting a conviction for attempt to murder to a conviction for voluntarily causing hurt.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Attempt to murderSection 307 IPCIntention to killFirearm injuriesConversion of convictionSimple hurt vs grievous hurtSupreme Court interpretation

Judgment

1074                      [2019]REPORTS
                SUPREME COURT   1 S.C.R. 1074                [2019] 1 S.C.R.


 A                   THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                         v.
                           KANHA @ OMPRAKASH
                        (Criminal Appeal No. 1589 of 2018)
 B                              FEBRUARY 04, 2019
                   [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD
                              AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
              Penal Code, 1860 – ss.307 and 324 – Conversion of
       conviction u/s.307 to s.324 – When perverse – As per prosecution,
 C     altercation took place between two parties – Respondent with
       intention to kill one ‘DS’, shot him with a fire-arm and caused
       bleeding injuries on his right thigh – Respondent convicted u/s.307,
       IPC – High Court converted the conviction of the respondent from
       that u/s.307 to s.324, IPC – Propriety of – Held: Evidence establishes
 D     that the injuries were caused by a fire-arm – Multiplicity of wounds
       indicate that the respondent fired at the injured more than once, the
       fact that hurt has been caused by the respondent is sufficiently proven
       – Proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non
       for the offence u/s. 307, IPC – Lack of forensic evidence to prove
       grievous or life-threatening injury cannot be a basis to hold that
 E     s.307, IPC is inapplicable – In the present case, the nature of the
       injuries shows that there were eleven punctured wounds – Weapon
       of offence was a firearm – Presence of 11 punctured and bleeding
       wounds as well as the use of a fire arm leave no doubt that there
       was an intention to murder – Thus, the second part of s.307, IPC is
 F     attracted in the present case – Judgment of the High Court overlooks
       material parts of the evidence and suffers from perversity –
       Judgement of the High Court set aside and the order of conviction
       by the Trial court u/s.307, IPC is restored.
             Allowing the appeal, the Court
 G           HELD: 1.1 The evidence establishes that the injuries were
       caused by a fire-arm. The multiplicity of wounds indicates that
       the respondent fired at the injured more than once. The fact that
       hurt has been caused by the respondent is sufficiently proven.
       Proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for
       the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The lack of
 H
                                        1074
      THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. KANHA @                          1075
                    OMPRAKASH

forensic evidence to prove grievous or a life-threatening injury      A
cannot be a basis to hold that Section 307 is inapplicable. The
intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury,
if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other
things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the
blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent. [Paras 11,
                                                                      B
16][1080-D; 1081-D-E]
      1.2 In the present case, the nature of the injuries shows
that there were eleven punctured wounds. The weapon of offence
was a firearm. The presence of 11 punctured and bleeding wounds
as well as the use of a fire arm leave no doubt that there was an
intention to murder. Thus, the second part of Section 307 of the      C
Penal Code is attracted in the present case. The judgement of
the High Court overlooks material parts of the evidence and
suffers from perversity. The judgement of the High Court is set
aside and the order of conviction by the Trial court under Section
307 of the Penal Code is restored. [Paras 17, 18][1082-C-D]           D
      State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil (1983) 2
      SCC 28; State of M P v. Saleem (2005) 5 SCC 554 :
      [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 562; Jage Ram v. State of Haryana
      (2015) 11 SCC 366 : [2015] 11 SCR 1004; Pasupuleti
      Siva Ramakrishna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh                 E
      (2014) 5 SCC 369 : [2014] 1 SCR 1139 – relied on.
                       Case Law Reference
      (1983) 2 SCC 28                 relied on       Para 11
      [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 562         relied on       Para 11         F
      [2015] 11 SCR 1004              relied on       Para 11
      [2014] 1 SCR 1139               relied on       Para 16
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1589 of 2018.
                                                                      G
     From the Judgment and Order dated 02.12.2011 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No. 830 of
2004
     Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, Raghunatha Sethupathy, Gagan Narang,
Ms. Arshiya Ghose, B.N. Dubey, Mukesh Kumar, Santanu Singh,           H
1076            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 1 S.C.R.


 A             Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Advs. for the Appellant.
              Prashant Shukla, Ms. Anushree Mishra, Digant Kallol Deo,
       Akshay Kumar, Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Advs. for the Respondent.
               The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 B            DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J. 1. Delay
       condoned.
               2. This appeal is by the State against the judgment and order
       dated 2 December 2011 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at its
       Gwalior Bench. The High Court converted the conviction of the
 C     respondent under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (‘Penal Code’)
       to Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to
       imprisonment for forty days, undergone by him, with a fine of Rs 3,000.
                3. According to the prosecution, on 8 October 2003, an
       altercation took place between two parties. The respondent, with an
 D     intention to kill one Dashrath Singh, shot him with a fire-arm and caused
       bleeding injuries on his right thigh. The brother of Dashrath Singh filed a
       complaint on the same day at the Gwalior Police Station. It was stated in
       the complaint that there was enmity between the parties over a love
       marriage which was opposed by the families as well as a dispute over a
       disc cable connection business. The allegation against the accused was
 E     that armed with deadly weapons, they formed an illegal assembly with a
       common motive of causing harm to the injured. The charge-sheet was
       filed under Sections 147 and 307 read with 149 and 323 of the Penal
       Code. The respondent was found guilty of the offence under Section
       307 of the Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo rigorous
 F     imprisonment for three years along with a fine of Rs 1,000 by the Trial
       Court. Seven other co-accused were acquitted of all the charges levelled
       against them.
               4. The respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court.
       The High Court converted the conviction of the respondent from that
       under Section 307 to Section 324 of the Penal Code and sentenced him
 G
       to imprisonment for forty days, which had already been undergone by
       him, with a fine of Rs 3,000.
               5. The State has preferred this appeal, by Special Leave.
               6. We have heard learned counsel for the State and learned
 H     counsel appearing for the respondent.
     THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. KANHA @                                   1077
  OMPRAKASH [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

       7. Learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the          A
High Court based its judgment on a manifestly incorrect appreciation of
the evidence. Eleven punctured wounds of sizes varying from 0.4 x 0.5
cm to 0.4 x 0.6 cm were found on the body of the injured by Dr P K
Mishra (PW 1). These injuries were stated to have been caused by a
firearm six hours prior to the medical examination. It is urged by the
                                                                              B
learned counsel for the State that the High Court has failed to consider
the evidence before it. The nature of injuries as well as the weapon of
offence clearly prove an intention to commit murder and the hurt caused
satisfies the ingredients of Section 307 of the Penal Code. Hence the
appeal deserves to be allowed.
       8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent     C
submits that the nature of the injuries was not explained in the evidence
of the prosecution. Neither Dr PK Mishra (PW1) nor Dr Amar Mukund
Tiwari (PW2) gave their opinion about the nature of the injuries and
there was no evidence to prove that the injuries caused to Dashrath
Singh were grievous in nature or life-threatening. Hence, it is urged by      D
the learned counsel that they are simple injuries. It was further submitted
that since the injuries were caused by an instrument of shooting, the
offence will fall under Section 324 instead of 307 of the Penal Code.
       9. The High Court accepted the contention of the respondent that
the nature of injuries was not conclusively proved. The High Court held       E
that in the absence of evidence that the injuries were grievous or
dangerous to life, they were simple in nature. In the view of the High
Court, the offence will fall under Section 324 instead of Section 307 of
the Penal Code.
      10. Section 307 of the Penal Code reads thus:                           F
      “307.Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such
      intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he
      by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be
      punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
      may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if       G
      hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be
      liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is
      hereinbefore mentioned.
      Attempts by life convicts.—When any person offending under
      this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if
                                                                              H
1078               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2019] 1 S.C.R.


 A              hurt is caused, be punished with death.
                                             Illustrations
                (a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such
                circumstances that, if death ensued, A would be guilty of
                murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.
 B
                (b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender
                years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence
                defined by this section, though the death of the child does not
                ensue.

 C              (c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not
                yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed
                the offence defined in this section, and, if by such firing he
                wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter
                part of the first paragraph of this section.

 D              (d) A, intending to murder Z, by poison, purchases poison and
                mixes the same with food which remains in A’s keeping; A has
                not yet committed the offence in this section. A places the food
                on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servants to place it on Z’s
                table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.”
             The first part of Section 307 refers to “an act with such intention
 E
       or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused
       death, he would be guilty of murder”. The second part of Section 307,
       which carries a heavier punishment, refers to ‘hurt’ caused in pursuance
       of such an ‘act’.
             11. Several judgements of this Court have interpreted Section 307of
 F
       the Penal Code. In State of Maharashtra v Balram Bama Patil1, this
       Court held that it is not necessary that a bodily injury sufficient under
       normal circumstances to cause death should have been inflicted:
                “9...To justify a conviction under this section it is not essential that
                bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted.
 G              Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give
                considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention
                of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other
                circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained
       1
           (1983) 2 SCC 28
 H
       THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. KANHA @                                    1079
    OMPRAKASH [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

         without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes        A
         a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if
         any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as
         the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be
         cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section.
         It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the
                                                                                 B
         victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary
         circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted.
         What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its
         result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under
         circumstances mentioned in this section. An attempt in order to
         be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law,   C
         if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in
         execution thereof.”
                                                        (Emphasis supplied)
      This position in law was followed by subsequent benches of this
Court. In State of M P v Saleem2, this Court held thus:                          D

         “13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if
         there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution
         thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing
         death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction
         between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court        E
         has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was
         done with the intention or knowledge and under
         circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an
         accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted
         merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in             F
         the nature of a simple hurt.”
                                                        (Emphasis supplied)
        In Jage Ram v State of Haryana3, this Court held that to establish
the commission of an offence under Section 307, it is not essential that
a fatal injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted:              G
         “12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the
         prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder;
         and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the
2
    (2005) 5 SCC 554
3
    (2015) 11 SCC 366                                                            H
1080            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 1 S.C.R.


 A           prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder
             of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended
             to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts
             and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under
             Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of
             causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of
 B
             injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding
             as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be
             adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused
             is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the
             weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident,
 C           motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was
             caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given,
             etc.”
               The above judgements of this Court lead us to the conclusion that
       proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the
 D     offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The intention of the accused
       can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from
       surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon
       used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer
       intent.
 E             12. The Trial court based its conviction on the evidence adduced
       at the trial. PW1, Dr P K Mishra had examined the injured on 8 October
       2003 and found 11 punctured wounds of sizes varying from 0.4 x 0.5 cm
       to 0.4 x 0.6 cm. The injuries were bleeding, but no blackness was present.
       He noted that the wounds were caused by a fire arm and were inflicted
       in six hours before the examination. The witness stated that the
 F     confirmation of the injuries depended on the X-Ray report and expert
       opinion of the ward doctor. The report of the Radiologist (PW2) stated
       that he had observed multiple small rounded radio paque shadows of
       metallic density. This is indicative of the presence of firearm injuries.
              13. Based on the evidence of the witnesses, the Trial court came
 G     to the conclusion that the injuries were caused by the respondent.
       Dashrath Singh (PW11) deposed that the respondent shot at him in the
       right thigh with a country rifle. The complainant (PW12) stated that the
       respondent fired at PW11 with a deliberate intention to kill him. The
       ocular evidence is cogent and corroborated by the medical evidence.
 H
       THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. KANHA @                                     1081
    OMPRAKASH [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

      14. Based on the evidence on record, the Trial court held that it           A
could not be proved that the other accusedhad a common intention of
causing injuries or death upon Dashrath Singh. Thus, the co-accused
were acquitted of charges.
       15. The Trial court found that PW4, PW8 and PW13, who were
present near the place of incident, had sustained injuries. The witnesses         B
had admitted that they were hit by bullet shots. The court concluded that
it was established that at the date, time and venue of the said incident, a
fire arm had been used and the afore-mentioned witnesses had also
suffered bullet injuries. The Court held that it was substantiated that the
shots fired by the respondent first hit the injured Dashrath Singh. The
injured Dashrath Singh had stated that the house of the respondent was            C
40-50 metres from the spot where the incident took place. It was held
that in such circumstances if a fire arm is shot at such a distance, the
shot gets dispersed and may hit persons in the vicinity. There existed a
longstanding dispute between the parties with regard to the business of
cable discs and an altercation took place with regard to it. In the quarrel       D
that ensued, the respondent fired at Dashrath Singh, injuring him.
        16. The evidence establishes that the injuries were caused by a
fire-arm. The multiplicity of wounds indicates that the respondent fired
at the injured more than once. The fact that hurt has been caused by the
respondent is sufficiently proven. The lack of forensic evidence to prove         E
grievous or a life-threatening injury cannot be a basis to hold that Section
307 is inapplicable. This proposition of law has been elucidated by a
two-judge bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Siva Ramakrishna Rao v
State of Andhra Pradesh4:
         “18. There is no merit in the contention that the statement of           F
         medical officer that there is no danger to life unless there is
         dislocation or rupture of the thyroid bone due to strangulation
         means that the accused did not intend, or have the knowledge,
         that their act would cause death. The circumstances of this case
         clearly attract the second part of this section since the act resulted
         in Injury 5 which is a ligature mark of 34 cm × 0.5 cm. It must be       G
         noted that Section 307 IPC provides for imprisonment for
         life if the act causes “hurt”. It does not require that the
         hurt should be grievous or of any particular degree. The
         intention to cause death is clearly attributable to the accused since
4
    (2014) 5 SCC 369
                                                                                  H
1082            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 1 S.C.R.


 A           the victim was strangulated after throwing a telephone wire around
             his neck and telling him that he should die. We also do not find any
             merit in the contention on behalf of the accused that there was no
             intention to cause death because the victim admitted that the
             accused were not armed with weapons. Very few persons would
             normally describe the Thums up bottle and a telephone wire used,
 B
             as weapons. That the victim honestly admitted that the accused
             did not have any weapons cannot be held against him and in favour
             of the accused.”                               (Emphasis supplied)
              17. In the present case, the nature of the injuries shows that there
       were eleven punctured wounds. The weapon of offence was a firearm.
 C     The circumstances of the case clearly indicate that there was an intention
       to murder. The presence of 11 punctured and bleeding wounds as well
       as the use of a fire arm leave no doubt that there was an intention to
       murder. Thus, the second part of Section 307 of the Penal Code is
       attracted in the present case. The judgement of the High Court overlooks
 D     material parts of the evidence and suffers from perversity.
              18. Hence, we set aside the judgement of the High Court and
       restore the order of conviction by the Trial court under Section 307 of
       the Penal Code as well as the sentence awarded of rigorous imprisonment
       of 3 years and a fine of Rs 1000. The appeal is, accordingly allowed.
 E     The respondent shall forthwith surrender to serve out the sentence. A
       copy of the judgment shall be forwarded by the Registry to the Chief
       Judicial Magistrate concerned to secure compliance.


       Divya Pandey                                                  Appeal allowed.
 F




 G




 H


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