THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESHversusSHILPA JAIN & ORS.

                 [2024] 4 S.C.R. 372 : 2024 INSC 278

                    The State of Madhya Pradesh
                                  v.
                         Shilpa Jain & Ors.
                (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1565-1567 of 2024)
                                05 April 2024
           [Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]

                          Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court is correct in exercising its jurisdiction
       under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR filed against
       Respondents.

                                 Headnotes
       Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s. 482 – Whether High Court
       proceeded on false premise that the Suit Property did not
       vest in State of Madhya Pradesh – Consequently proceeded
       to quash the FIR against Respondents:
       Held: The Trial Court categorically found that the Suit Property
       belonged to the State of Madhya Pradesh while dismissing the
       Civil Suit – This finding was upheld by the High Court – The
       facts of the case reveal that the High Court chose to exercise
       its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC on the erroneous
       assumption that the Suit Property did not vest in the State of
       Madhya Pradesh – Undoubtedly, the genesis of the present
       dispute emanates from civil proceedings qua the possession of
       the Suit Property, however, the dispute in its current avatar has
       certainly undergone a metamorphosis into a criminal dispute
       – Having considered the materials on record, it is clear that
       neither does the present case satisfy any of the parameters
       laid down by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992
       Supp (1) SCC 335, warranting the exercise of jurisdiction under
       Section 482 of the CrPC vis-à-vis the quashing of an FIR; and
       nor can the allegation(s) levelled against the accused person(s)
       be classified as ‘purely civil in nature’ or merely ‘cloaked as a
       criminal offence’ – In view of aforesaid, the appeals succeed
       and are allowed – The Impugned Order passed by High Court
       is hereby set aside. [Para 6,9,11,12]


* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                               373

           The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shilpa Jain & Ors.


     Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – s. 482 – Whether Revenue
     proceedings confer rights, title, or interest in relation to
     property – Examined:
     Held: Revenue records are not documents of title; and nor would
     any findings pursuant to revenue proceedings under the Madhya
     Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 confer any rights, title or interest
     upon the Respondents in relation to the Suit Property – Title can
     only be determined by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. [Para 7]

                               Case Law Cited
           State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1990] Supp. 3 SCR
           259 : (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335; Mohd. Ibrahim v.
           State of Bihar [2009] 13 SCR 1254 : (2009) 8 SCC
           751 — referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Indian Penal Code, 1860; Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; The
     Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959.

                              List of Keywords
     Quashing of FIR under Section 482 CrPC; Offence related to
     government property; Revenue Proceedings to contend title of
     Property; Civil dispute undergone a metamorphosis into a criminal
     dispute; Exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC; Interplay
     between civil disputes and criminal proceedings; Parameters for
     quashing of FIR.

                             Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.1565-
     1567 of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 14.01.2016 of the High Court of
     M.P at Indore in MCRC No. 6972, 6981 and 7663 of 2015
                          Appearances for Parties
     Padmesh Mishra, Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Mirza Kayesh Begg,
     Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Astik Gupta, Ms. Akanksha Tomar, Argha
     Roy, Ms. Ojaswini Gupta, Ms. Ruby, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Puneet Jain, Mrs. Christi Jain, Mann Arora, Ms. Akriti Sharma, Ms.
     Lisha Bhati, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Advs. for the Respondents
374                                                            [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment
       Satish Chandra Sharma, J.
       Introduction
1.     The present appeals arise out of a common order dated 14.01.2016
       passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (the “High Court”) in
       Miscellaneous Criminal Case bearing numbers (i) 6972 of 2015; (ii)
       6981 of 2015; and (iii) 7663 of 2015, whereunder the High Court in
       exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
       Procedure (“CrPC”) quashed (i) a First Information Report bearing
       number 551 of 2015 dated 25.07.2015 registered at PS Khategaon,
       Dewas (the “FIR”) under Section(s) 420, 466, 467, 468, 471 and
       120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (the “IPC”); and (ii) the criminal
       proceedings emanating thereof (the “Impugned Order”).
       Factual Background
2.     The facts and proceedings germane for contextual understanding
       of the present lis, are as follows:
       2.1 An underlying dispute ensued between the Nagar Palika,
           Khategaon (the “Original Plaintiff”) and the Respondents in
           relation to an identified property situated at Kasba Khategaon,
           Dewas, Madhya Pradesh (the “Suit Property”). Accordingly,
           a civil suit bearing number 114A of 1988 seeking inter alia
           possession of the Suit Property was preferred by the Original
           Plaintiff before the 2nd Additional District Judge, Dewas (the
           “Trial Court”) (the “Civil Suit”). Subsequently, vide an order
           dated 23.01.1991, the Civil Suit came to be dismissed observing
           inter alia that the Original Plaintiff failed to prove its’ title qua
           the Suit Property (the “Underlying Decree”).
       2.2 Thereafter, an appeal i.e., First Appeal No. 102 of 1991 was
           preferred by the Original Plaintiff before the High Court (the
           “Appeal”). Vide an order dated 07.04.1998, the High Court
           upheld the Underlying Decree and held that the Suit Property
           was constructed on land originally vested in the erstwhile Holkar
           State which subsequently came to be recorded in the revenue
           records as nazul land belonging to the State Government of
           Madhya Pradesh (the “Underlying Order”). Pertinently, the
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                          375

           The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shilpa Jain & Ors.


           Underlying Order was assailed before a Division Bench of the
           High Court by way of Letter Patent Appeal (“LPA”) No. 357 of
           2005, however vide an order dated 07.09.2005, the aforesaid
           LPA came to be dismissed.
     2.3 The dispute between the parties seemingly attained finality,
         however, pursuant to a complaint received on 17.02.2015,
         an investigation was carried out by the Tehsildar, Khategaon,
         whereunder it was revealed that 11 (eleven) sale transactions
         had been carried out by private persons in respect of the Suit
         Property i.e., nazul land belonging to the State Government of
         Madhya Pradesh. Notably, the investigation also revealed that
         the aforesaid transactions were carried out fraudulently i.e., (i)
         without the requisite documentation and / or on the basis of
         forged and fabricated documentation; (ii) on the basis of an
         erroneous certificate dated 21.06.2010 issued by the Original
         Plaintiff; and (iii) in connivance with certain identified government
         officials. Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid, a complaint dated
         25.07.2015 came to be furnished by the Tehsildar, Khategaon
         to the investigating agencies (the “Complaint”).
     2.4 In furtherance of the Complaint, the FIR came to be registered
         by the investigating agencies against 22 (twenty-two) persons
         including inter alia the Respondents. Aggrieved by the registration
         of the FIR, application(s) came to be preferred under Section
         482 CrPC before the High Court seeking the quashing of the
         FIR (the “Quashing Petition”). Vide the Impugned Order, the
         High Court quashed the FIR and the proceeding(s) emanating
         thereof. The operative paragraph(s) of the Impugned Order are
         reproduced as under:
                “05. Considering the above submissions and
                the evidence on record in the form of the
                judgments of the trial Court as well as the
                appellate Court that the respondent-state has
                been unable to prove its title. The suit as well as
                the appeal have been dismissed and in this light
                filing of criminal proceedings as alleged by the
                Counsel for the petitioners is nothing but a ploy to
                subjugate the petitioners. It has ben consistently
                stated by the Counsel for the petitioners that the
376                                                [2024] 4 S.C.R.

            Digital Supreme Court Reports


       petitioners are in possession of the said land for
       more than 90 years and Counsel has relied on
       several judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court as
       well as this Court in the matter of Mohammed
       Ibrahim and others Vs. State of Bihar and
       another [(2009) 8 SCC 751], Ramesh Dutt and
       others Vs. State Punjab and others [(2009)
       15 SCC 429], Rajib Ranjan and others Vs. R
       Vijaykumar [(2005) 1 SCC 513], Mr. Stephen
       V. Gomes and another [2015 (II) MPWN 149],
       Savitri Pandey and another v. State of UP
       and others [AIR 2015 SC 2501], AK Sharma
       (Cdr.) vs. State of MP 2015(3) JLJ 213 and
       Chandran Ratnaswami Vs. KC Palanisamy
       and others [2013 (6) SCC 740] to state that
       the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Hon’ble
       Court have repeatedly held and quashed FIR
       and criminal proceedings relating to a dispute
       of title of property and other civil disputes and
       Counsel prayed for quashment of the FIR.
       06. Besides Counsel also submitted that
       there was no allegation against the petitioners
       regarding their having forged any document
       or their having manipulated any documents
       or cheating. Then under the circumstances
       offences could not be made out against the
       petitioners. Counsel has vehemently urged that
       the action of the Tehsildar in lodging the FIR and
       registration of the offences is a gross misuse
       of the power and invoking the criminal law and
       procedure is purely contrary to the principles of
       natural justice as well as the provisions of the
       law since civil proceedings established title and
       the State has lost on both these counts.
       07. Hence, I find that a judicial process
       should not be an instrument of oppression, or,
       needless harassment. The Apex Court has in
       several cases warned that Authorities should
       be circumspect and judicious in exercising
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                       377

           The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shilpa Jain & Ors.


                discretion and should take all relevant facts
                and circumstances into consideration before
                issuing process; otherwise the process would
                become a mere instrument in the hands of
                the private complainant to seek vendetta and
                short circuit a procedure of law. Especially,
                in the present case the civil matters are still
                pending consideration and placing reliance on
                Suneet Gupta Vs. Anil Triloknath Sharma
                and others 2008 (11) SC 670 I find that the
                FIR needs to be quashed primarily on the
                ground that the dispute is purely civil in nature
                and the complaint amounts to an abuse the
                process of law.
                The impugned FIR stands hereby quashed. The
                petitions are, therefore, allowed.”
     2.5 Aggrieved by the aforesaid Impugned Order, the present appeal
         came to be preferred by the Appellant.
     2.6 It would also be apposite to mention that during the pendency
         of the present appeal, certain proceeding(s) ensued before the
         Revenue Court i.e., eviction proceedings under Section 248 of
         the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (the “Code”)
         came to be instituted by the Tehsildar, Khategaon against certain
         Respondents. The aforesaid proceedings were decided against
         the Respondents by (i) the Tehsildar, Khategaon; (ii) the Sub-
         Divisional Commissioner; and (iii) the Additional Commissioner.
         Thereafter a revision petition i.e., revision no. 3140/2019/
         Devas/L.R,was preferred before the Board of Revenue, Madhya
         Pradesh. Accordingly, vide an order dated 26.10.2018, the
         aforesaid proceedings came to be decided in favour of the
         Respondents (the “Revenue Board Order”). Subsequently, a
         rectification order dated 02.09.2020 came to be passed by the
         Ld. Sub-Divisional Office, Khategaon, Dewas, Madhya Pradesh
         whereunder the Suit Property was directed to be recorded as
         ‘abadi land’ as against ‘nazul government land’ in the relevant
         revenue records (the “SDO Order”) (hereinafter (i) the Revenue
         Board Order; and (ii) the SDO Order shall collectively be referred
         to as the “Revenue Proceedings”).
378                                                         [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


       Contentions
3.     Mr. Padmesh Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
       Appellant i.e., the State of Madhya Pradesh, urged the following:
       3.1 The High Court proceeded on an erroneous premise i.e., that
           the State of Madhya Pradesh was unable to prove its title
           qua the Suit Property in the Civil Suit; and consequently, on
           the aforesaid flawed premise, the High Court proceeded to
           quash the FIR and the proceedings emanating thereof by
           labelling the same as vexatious. Whereas, on the contrary,
           the Underlying Decree passed in the Civil Suit categorically
           recorded that the Suit Property vested in the State of Madhya
           Pradesh.
       3.2 The allegations levelled against the accused persons in the
           FIR, prima facie reveal the commission of a cognizable offence
           - which ought not to have been scuttled by the High Court
           exercising its jurisdiction under 482 of the CrPC in view of the
           seriousness of the allegation(s).
       3.3 Mr. Puneet Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
           Respondents, brought forth the following contentions
       3.4 The underlying dispute was of a civil nature which stood
           adjudicated in favour of the Respondents i.e., in this regard,
           reliance was placed upon the Revenue Proceedings to contend
           that the Suit Property was rightly determined to form a part
           of private land which was validly transferred inter se the
           Respondents.
       3.5 The foundation of the FIR contemplated that the Suit Property
           belonged to State of Madhya Pradesh – however the aforesaid
           premise is no longer valid - as according to Mr. Jain, the
           title of the Suit Property has been adjudicated to vest in the
           Respondents by the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh and
           the SDO in the Revenue Proceedings.
       Analysis and Findings
4.     Having heard the learned counsel(s) appearing on behalf of the
       parties; and having perused the materials on record, we find ourselves
       tasked with determining whether the High Court ought to have
       exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR?
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                          379

           The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shilpa Jain & Ors.


5.   As a precursor, it would be relevant to refer to the principles governing
     the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of
     the CrPC vis-à-vis the quashing of an FIR. This Court in State of
     Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 observed as under:
           “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
           relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
           the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
           of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
           power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
           Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
           reproduced above, we give the following categories of
           cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
           exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
           court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
           may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
           and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
           rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
           kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
           (1)   Where the allegations made in the first information
                 report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
                 their face value and accepted in their entirety do
                 not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
                 a case against the accused.
           (2)   Where the allegations in the first information report
                 and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR
                 do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
                 investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
                 of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
                 within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
           (3)   Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
                 or complaint and the evidence collected in support
                 of the same do not disclose the commission of any
                 offence and make out a case against the accused.
           (4)   Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
                 a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
                 cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
                 a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
                 contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
380                                                             [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                        Digital Supreme Court Reports


            (5)   Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
                  are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
                  basis of which no prudent person can ever reach
                  a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
                  proceeding against the accused.
            (6)   Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
                  of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
                  (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
                  institution and continuance of the proceedings and/
                  or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
                  the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
                  the grievance of the aggrieved party.
            (7)   Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
                  with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
                  maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
                  wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
                  to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
            103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that
            the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be
            exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that
            too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be
            justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability
            or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
            FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent
            powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court
            to act according to its whim or caprice.”
6.     We have carefully perused the Underlying Order passed by the High
       Court in the Appeal. The Civil Suit was initiated by the Original Plaintiff
       i.e., Nagar Palika, Khategaon, against 2 (two) private individuals.
       Accordingly, vide the Underlying Decree, the Trial Court dismissed
       the Civil Suit, however, categorically found that the Suit Property
       belonged to the State of Madhya Pradesh. This finding was upheld
       by the High Court in the Underlying Order.
7.     At this juncture it would also be appropriate to deal with the reliance
       placed by Mr. Jain on the Revenue Proceedings to contend that
       title qua the Suit Property now vested with the Respondents and
       accordingly it was submitted that, reopening and / or initiating criminal
       proceedings would result in an abuse of process of law. However,
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                          381

           The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shilpa Jain & Ors.


     we find ourselves unable to accept Mr. Jain’s contention qua the
     title of the Suit Property. It is trite law that revenue records are not
     documents of title; and nor would any findings pursuant to revenue
     proceedings under the Code confer any rights, title or interest upon
     the Respondents in relation to the Suit Property. It is a settled legal
     position that questions of title can only be determined by a civil
     court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, the reliance placed on the
     Revenue Proceedings is misplaced and would be of no assistance
     to the Respondents.
8.   The sequitur to the aforesaid discussion is that the High Court
     proceeded on an erroneous assumption i.e., that the State of Madhya
     Pradesh failed to prove its title qua the Suit Property.
9.   In the aforesaid context, we now must proceed to deal with the issue
     framed by us in Paragraph 4 of this Judgement. The facts of the case
     reveal that the High Court chose to exercise its jurisdiction under
     Section 482 of the CrPC on the assumption that the Suit Property
     did not vest in the State of Madhya Pradesh. However, as we have
     held to the contrary, we consider it appropriate to independently
     consider whether the allegations levelled against the Respondents
     under the FIR would satisfy any of the indicative parameters laid
     down by this Court in Bhajan Lal (Supra) warranting interference
     by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482
     of the CrPC vis-à-vis the quashing of an FIR.
10. Additionally, we are conscious of the interplay between civil disputes
    and criminal proceedings, in this regard we find it appropriate to
    refer to a decision of this Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar,
    (2009) 8 SCC 751, wherein this Court observed as under:
           “8. This Court has time and again drawn attention to
           the growing tendency of the complainants attempting to
           give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are
           essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to
           apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards
           the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment.
           Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it
           are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to
           settle civil disputes. U (See G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.
           [(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513] and Indian Oil
           Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. [(2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3
382                                                         [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


            SCC (Cri) 188] ) Let us examine the matter keeping the
            said principles in mind.”
11. Having considered the materials on record, we are of the considered
    opinion that neither does the present case satisfy any of the
    parameters laid down by this Court in Bhajan Lal (Supra) warranting
    the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC vis-à-
    vis the quashing of an FIR; and nor can the allegation(s) levelled
    against the accused person(s) be classified as ‘purely civil in nature’
    or merely ‘cloaked as a criminal offence’. Undoubtedly, the genesis
    of the present dispute emanates from civil proceedings qua the
    possession of the Suit Property, however, the dispute in its current
    avatar i.e. as is discernible from the allegation levelled against the
    Respondents in the FIR, has certainly undergone a metamorphosis
    into a criminal dispute which ought not to have been scuttled at the
    threshold, and in fact ought to have been considered on its own
    merits, in accordance with law.
       Directions and Conclusions
12. In view of aforesaid, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The
    Impugned Order passed by High Court is hereby set aside. The
    Appellant i.e., State of Madhya Pradesh is directed to proceed in
    accordance with law in relation to the FIR bearing number 551 of
    2015 dated 25.07.2015 registered at PS Khategaon, Dewas.
13. It is clarified that the observations made in this judgement are relevant
    for the purpose of testing the correctness of the Impugned Order.
    None of the observations made by us shall have any bearing on the
    consequential criminal proceedings (if any).
14. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending applications,
    if any, shall also stand disposed of.

       Headnotes prepared by:                             Result of the case:
       Gaurav Upadhyay, Hony. Associate Editor             Appeals allowed.
       (Verified by: Raju Ramchandran, Sr. Adv.)