THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.versusPREM SARUP
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 1059
- Decided
- 18 September 2008
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the department failed to prove that the hostile witnesses were examined and won over in the departmental proceedings, so the exception under Rule 16.3(1)(b) did not apply and the disciplinary order stands.
Summary
Constable Prem Sarup was convicted under Section 170 IPC for an offence in 1974, but the conviction was set aside in 1979 because the principal prosecution witnesses turned hostile. The Punjab Police nevertheless initiated disciplinary proceedings under Rule 16.3(1)(b) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, imposing a two‑year forfeiture of salary. Sarup challenged the punishment in civil suit; the trial court dismissed his suit, the appellate court upheld the disciplinary order, and the High Court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the department had satisfied the condition that the hostile witnesses were examined and won over in the departmental inquiry, as required by Rule 16.3(1)(b). Finding no evidence that the witnesses were re‑examined and noting that the criminal charge had not been proved, the Court held that the department failed to establish the exception and therefore dismissed the appeal, leaving the disciplinary order intact.
Issues considered
- Whether a departmental proceeding can be sustained against a police officer who has been acquitted criminally when the prosecution witnesses turned hostile, invoking Rule 16.3(1)(b) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934.
- Whether the employer must demonstrate that the hostile witnesses were examined and won over in the departmental inquiry to invoke the exception under Rule 16.3(1)(b).
- Whether the passage of time since the alleged offence bars interference with the disciplinary order.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Section 170
- Punjab Police Rules, 1934s. Rule 16.25(1), s. Rule 16.3
Subjects
Judgment
[2008] 13 S.C.R. 682
A THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.
v.
PREM SARUP
(Civil Appeal No. 5812 of 2008)
SEPTEMBER 18, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ]
Service Law:
Punjab Police Rules, 1934:
c
r. 16.3(1)(b) - Disciplinary proceedings - Constable in
Punjab Police - Conviction by trial court u/s 70 /PC but ac-
quittal by appellate court holding that prosecution witnesses
did not support its case and were declared hostile - Disciplin-
D ary proceedings initiated against Constable - Punishment of
forfeiture of salary for two years - Suit by Constable seeking
to set aside disciplinary proceedings - Decreed by appellate
court - Decree affirmed by High Court in second appeal -
Plea of Department that principal prosecution witnesses hav-
ing been won over, criminal charge could not be proved and,
E therefore, disciplinary proceedings underr.16.3(1)(b) could not
be set aside - HELD: Department has not been able to show
that the witnesses who turned hostile before the criminal court
have been examined in departmental proceedings, and no
material is brought on record to prove that - No case has been ; .
F made out for interference with impugned judgment- Even oth-
erwise, the charges against the respondent had not been
proved - Furthermore, the occurrence took place in the year
1974 and the Constable was acquitted in the year 1979, and
thus, at this distant point of time, no interference with the im-
G pugned judgment is warranted, particularly, when the Depart-
ment has not placed any foundational fact in support of its
plea that Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of s.16.3 of the Rules
would be attracted in the case.
H 682
~ THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. v. 683
PREM SARUP
Union of India and Ors. vs. Naman Singh Shekhawat 2008 A
=:I. (5) SCR 137 = (2008) 4 SCC 1; and Commissioner of Po-
=
lice, New Delhi vs. Narender Singh 2006 (3) SCR 872 (2006)
4 sec 265 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
B
2008 (5) SCR 137 referred to para 12
2006 (3) SCR 872 referred to para 13
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5812
of 2008
c
From the final Judgment and Order dated 22.11.2005 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA
No. 1581 of 1988
Ajay Pal and Sanjay Jain for the Appellants.
D
Subramonium Prasad, Varuna Bhandari Gugnani and
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for the Respondent.
The following Order of the Court was delivered
1
' Leave granted. E
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 22.11.2005 passed by a learned Single Judge of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular Second Appeal
No.1581/1988 whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred
t
by the appellants herein from a judgment and decree dated F
5.1.1988 passed by the Additional District Judge, Patiala re-
l
versing the judgment and decree dated 29.10.1985, for decla-
ration that the order of the Senior Superintendent of Police dated
1.7.1981 endorsing and reviving that order as also that of the
disciplinary authority thereby punishing the respondent herein G
by imposing a punishment'of forfeiture of service on the respon-
dent for a period of two years and the order of the D.l.G., the
appellate authority as also the Inspector General of Police,
Revisional authority were illegal.
H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R. ~
A 2. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.
3. Respondent was a police constable. For commission
of the alleged offence under Section 170 of the Indian Penal
Code in the year 1974, he was prosecuted in the year 1979. He
was convicted. However, a criminal appeal was preferred by
B him. By a judgment and order dated 8.1.1979, the learned Ad-
•
ditional Sessions Judge, Patiala allowed the said appeal, hold-
ing:
"The learned P.P. has frankly conceded that he is unable
c to support the judgment of the learned Magistrate. Both
P.W.1 Sant Singh and P.W.2 Prem Singh did not support
the prosecution version at trial and consequently they were
declared hostile. The learned Magistrate recorded
conviction of the appellants on the basis of evidence given
by Shri Jaswant Singh and Investigating Officer Shri .,..
D
Mohinder Singh. But their alleged guilt. The charge under
Section 170 IPC that the appellant Such a Singh pretended
to hold office of DTO Ropar and did traffic checking partly
could not be established in the absence of evidence of
PW Prem Singh and PW Sant Singh. There witnesses
E stated that they did not know anything in this respect. That
being so, the conviction of the appellant under Section
170 IPC could not be recorded."
4. A disciplinary proceeding, however, was initiated
i .
F against respondent on the same allegations wherein a punish-
ment of forfeiture of salary was imposed upon him.
5. He filed Suit in the Court of Sub-Judge, llnd Class, Patiala
in the year 1982 contending that as the respondent was acquit-
ted after giving benefit of doubt and, thus, his acquittal was not
G on merit, the order of punishment in the disciplinary proceeding
should also be set aside.
6. The said suit was dismissed by a judgment and decree
dated 29.10.1985. Respondent herein preferred an appeal,
thereagainst, which was allowed 'Jy the learned District Judge,
H
THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. v. 685
.,,; PREM SARUP
Patiala by a judgment and decree dated 5.1.1988. As noticed A
hereinbefore, the Second Appeal preferred by the appellants
has been dismissed by the High Court by reason of the im-
pugned judgment.
7. The only contention which has been raised before us is
~
that as the perusal of the judgment dated 8.1. 79 passed by the B
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala in Criminal Appeal
No. 125 of 1979 would show that the principal prosecution wit-
nesses were won over, the criminal charges could not be proved
and, thus, the matter comes within the purview of Rule 16.3 of
the Police Rules, 1934 which reads as under: c
· "16.3. Action following on judicial acquittal:
(1) When a police officer has been tried and acquitted by
criminal court he shall not be punished departmentally on
the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence D
cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not unless:.
a) the criminal charges has failed on technical ground; or
b) In the opinion of the Court or of the Superintendent
of Police, the prosecution witnesses have been won E
over, or
c) the court has held in its judgment that an offence was
actually committed and that suspicion rests upon the
police officer concerned, or
t F
d) the evidence cited in the criminal case discloses
facts unconnected with the charge before the Court
which justify departmental proceedings on a different
charges;
e) Additional evidence admissible under Rule 16.25 G
(1) in departmental proceedings is available .. "
T 8. The report of the Inquiry Officer is not before us. The or-
der imposing penalty by the disciplinary authority has also not
been produced. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only plea
H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A taken by appellant in the aforementioned suit filed by the respon-
dent was that he was acquitted by grant of benefit of doubt.
Even in the Memo of Second Appeal, it was contended as
under:
B " 4. That the learned Lower Appellate Court has failed to
appreciate that acquittal of the respondent/plaintiff was
not on merits, rather he was acquitted of the charge by
giving the benefit of doubt and the authority relied upon by
the learned Lower Appellate Court cannot be invoked in
c the present proposition as under Rule 16.3(1) enquiry
proceedings can be initiated on the same charges if the
acquittal is not on merits and the same exception is
attracted in the present case."
9. Application of Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 16.3 of
D the Police Rules, 1934, thus, had only been the bone of conten-
tion of the appellants in the said civil suit.
10. We, therefore, are of the opinion that no case has been
made out to interfere with the impugned judgment.
E 11. There cannot be any doubt, whatsoever, that in a given
situation, it is open to the employer to initiate a departmental
proceeding despite the fact that the delinquent officers on simi-
lar charges have been acquitted.
{ See: Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs. Narender
F Singh (2006) 4 sec 265] i
12. Our attention, however, has been drawn by Mr. S.
Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respon-
dent to a recent decision of this Court in Union of India and Ors.
G Vs. Naman Singh Shekhawat -(2008) 4 SCC 1 wherein this
Court. inter alia, on the premise that the inquiry officer was bi-
ased upheld the judgment of the High Court and set aside the
order of the disciplinary authority imposing punishment.
13. We, however, do not agree with the contention of Mr.
H Prasad, learned counsel that this Court has taken a view differ-
THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. v. 687
PREM SARUP
ent from the one taken in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi A
Vs. Narender
Singh - (2006) 4 SCC 265 as therein also this Court cat-
egorically stated the law to be as under:
"12. It is not in dispute that the standard of proof required B
in recording a finding of conviction in a criminal case and
in a departmental proceeding are distinct and different.
Wheres in a criminal case, it is essential t9 prove a charge
beyond all reasonable doubt, in a departmental proceeding
preponderance of probability would serv~ the purpose( See c
Kamaldevi Agarwal Vs. State of W.B.- (2002) 1 SCC 555).
13. It is now well settled by reason of a catena of decisions
of this Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a
criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground
not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to D
drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed."
14. In view of the fact that the appellants before us have ·
not been able to show that those witnesses who turned hostile
before the criminal Court have been examined in the depart-
mental proceedings and, furthermore, as no material is brought E
on record to prove that; even otherwise, the charges against
the respondent had not been proved, we are of the opinion that
no case has been made out for our interference with the im-
pugned judgment. Furthermore, as noticed, hereinbefore the
t occurrence took place in the year 1974 and the respondent was F
acquitted in the year 1979 and, thus, at this distant point of time,
no interference with the impugned judgment is warranted, par-
ticularly, in view of the fact that the appellants have not placed
before us any foundational fact in support of its plea that Clause
(b) of Sub-section(1) of Section 16.3 of the Police Rules, 1934 G
would be attracted in this case.
·T
15. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed.
No costs.
R.P. Appeal dismissed. H
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