Holding

The Governor, in exercise of his powers under Article 200, must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers as a general rule, and the only exceptions are where the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication requires the Governor to act in his discretion, such as under the second proviso to Article 200 or in cases of peril to democratic principles; the Governor cannot exercise a pocket veto or absolute veto, and the first proviso to Article 200 is intrinsically attached to the option of withholding assent, meaning that once the Governor withholds assent, he must follow the procedure in the first proviso and cannot subsequently reserve the bill for the President after it has been reconsidered and repassed.

Summary

The State of Tamil Nadu challenged the Governor's actions in withholding assent to 10 bills and reserving them for the President's consideration after the bills were repassed by the State Legislature. The Supreme Court examined the scope of the Governor's powers under Article 200 of the Constitution, including whether the Governor can reserve a bill after reconsideration, whether there is a time limit for the Governor to act, whether the Governor must act on ministerial advice, and whether such actions are judicially reviewable. The Court held that the Governor has only three options under Article 200: assent, withhold assent (which must be followed by the procedure in the first proviso), or reserve for the President. The Governor cannot reserve a bill for the President after it has been reconsidered and repassed by the legislature. The Court also held that the Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except in limited circumstances, and that the Governor's inaction or improper exercise of power is subject to judicial review. The Court prescribed timelines for the Governor to act under Article 200 and for the President under Article 201. Exercising its powers under Article 142, the Court deemed that the 10 bills had been assented to on the date they were presented after reconsideration, setting aside the Governor's reservation and the President's subsequent actions.

Issues considered

What courses of action are available to the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution.
Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered in accordance with the first proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first instance.
Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time limit within which the Governor is required to act in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution.
Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution can only act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers or whether he has discretion in discharge of his functions under the provision.
Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor in discharge of his functions under Article 200 of the Constitution could be said to be subject to judicial review? If yes, what are the parameters for such judicial review.
What is the manner in which the President under Article 201 of the Constitution is required to act once a Bill has been reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 111, s. 142, s. 143, s. 154, s. 155, s. 159, s. 161, s. 162, s. 163, s. 164, s. 165, s. 166, s. 167, s. 168, s. 174, s. 175, s. 176, s. 196, s. 197, s. 199, s. 200, s. 201, s. 202, s. 203, s. 207, s. 213, s. 233, s. 239, s. 254, s. 288, s. 304, s. 316, s. 31A, s. 31C, s. 324, s. 333, s. 348, s. 356, s. 360, s. 361, s. 371A
Government of India Act, 1919s. 12
Government of India Act, 1935s. 75
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 17A, s. 19
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 8

Headnote

Issue for Consideration a. What courses of action are available to the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution. b. Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered first proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first instance. c. Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time limit within which the Governor is required to act in the exercise of his powers under

Subjects

Constitution of IndiaGovernorPresidentDeemed AssentWithholding of assentPocket vetoAbsolute vetoFederalismCentre-State RelationsSarkaria CommissionPunchhi CommissionTamil NaduBillsArticle 200Article 201Article 142Inherent power of the Supreme CourtDiscretion of the Governor and the President

Judgment

[2025] 4 S.C.R. 985 : 2025 INSC 481

The State of Tamil Nadu
v.
The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1239 of 2023)
08 April 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
a. What courses of action are available to the Governor in
exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution.
b. Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for the consideration
of the President when it is presented to him for assent
after being reconsidered in accordance with the first
proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not
reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first
instance.
c. Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed
time limit within which the Governor is required to act
in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the
Constitution.
d. Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under
Article 200 of the Constitution can only act in accordance
with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council
of Ministers or whether he has discretion in discharge of his
functions under the provision.
e. Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor in
discharge of his functions under Article 200 of the Constitution
could be said to be subject to judicial review? If yes, what
are the parameters for such judicial review.
f. What is the manner in which the President under Article 201
of the Constitution is required to act once a Bill has been
reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article
200 of the Constitution.

* Author
986 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Article 200 – The Governor has three
enumerated options when a bill is presented to him under
Article 200 – Governor can either assent, withhold or reserve
the bill for consideration of the President – Pocket veto is
not available to the Governor while exercising powers under
Article 200 – The Governor cannot keep the bill with him
without deciding on the assent:
Held: There are only three courses of action available to the
Governor to choose from when a bill is presented to him for assent
under Article 200 – The first proviso is not an independent fourth
course of action but intrinsically attached to the option of withholding
of assent – In other words, the first proviso is clarificatory and
only elaborates the procedure to be followed in case the option
of withholding of assent is invoked by the Governor – The use of
the expression “shall” in the substantive part of Article 200 read
with the expression “as soon as possible” used in the first proviso
indicates that there is no pocket veto available to the Governor while
he is exercising the powers under Article 200 – Inaction on part
of the Governor to take a decision when a bill is presented to him
under Article 200 is grossly violative of the constitutional scheme
of expediency which permeates the provision – The Governor, in
exercise of his powers under Article 200, also does not possess
any absolute veto – He is mandated to take a decision from among
the three options that are provided in the substantive part of the
Article 200 – In case of withholding of assent, the Governor is
bound to follow the procedure prescribed under the first proviso
and assent to the bill if it is ultimately presented to him for assent
after being repassed by the State legislature – The Governor may
also reserve certain bills for the consideration of the President –
However, in no case has the Governor been conferred with the
power to veto a bill which is presented to him – He is envisaged
as an intermediary stop in the journey of the bill towards becoming
an Act – When a bill comes to the Governor, he may forthwith
assent to it, or postpone the grant of assent by exercising the
option of withholding of assent but only for so long till the bill
comes back to him after reconsideration, or he may forward the
bill to the President whereupon the procedure prescribed under
Article 201 is to be followed – Thus, in none of these cases can
the Governor permanently keep a bill with him without according
assent to it, nor can he declare a simpliciter withholding of assent
thereby killing the bill. [Paras 194-198]
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 987

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

Constitution of India – Article 200 – The Governor cannot
reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President when it
is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered in
accordance with the first proviso to Article 200:
Held: There is no scope for the Governor to reserve a bill for
the consideration of the President once it is presented to him for
reconsideration after compliance with the procedure laid down in
the first proviso – The first proviso to Article 200 is a complete
code in itself as regards the procedure which is to be followed
once the Governor withholds assent and the rest of the article
has no applicability thereafter – In light of the language of Article
200, and also keeping in mind its interpretation by this Court in
State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab
(2024) 1 SCC 384, there was no room for the Governor to declare
a simpliciter withholding of assent without taking recourse to the
first proviso as that virtually amounts to the exercise of absolute
veto by the Governor, a power which is conspicuously absent from
our constitutional scheme. [Paras 204-211]

Constitution of India – Article 200 – Timelines for the Governor
to act under Article 200 – Courts can prescribe time limits for
the discharge of certain functions, even in cases where no
specific time-limit has been prescribed:
Held: 1. Unlike many countries across the globe wherein a provision
for deemed assent upon the expiry of the specified time period has
been made, there is no such provision in our Constitution – The
only manner in which a temporal imperative has been weaved
into the scheme of Article 200 is by the use of the expression “as
soon as possible” in the first proviso – The said expression, which
also appears in Article 111 of the Constitution, was the subject of
some debate in the Constituent Assembly – Governor’s inaction
with respect to the bills for an unreasonable and prolonged period
of time cannot be held to be permissible within our constitutional
scheme. [Paras 217-225]
2. Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. The Hon’ble Speaker Manipur
Legislative Assembly & Ors. [2020] 2 SCR 132 discussed in the
context of the timeline for the Speaker to decide on the petitions
seeking disqualifications under the Schedule X of the Constitution –
The view adopted by the Court in Keisham Meghachandra (supra)
was that the “reasonable period” for deciding such petitions by the
988 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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Speaker largely depends on the facts of each case yet, where there
are no exceptional circumstances, the Speaker should arrive at
a decision within an outer time-limit of three-months reiterated –
Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1994) 1 SCC
44 discussed wherein it was held that where for exercise of any
power no time-limit has been prescribed, such power has to be
exercised within a reasonable period of time – AG Perarivalan v.
State, Through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT/MMDA, Chennai,
Tamil Nadu and Anr. (2023) 8 SCC 257 discussed wherein it was
held that the inaction of the Governor would be subject to judicial
review and in the absence of any cogent reasons for the delay, it
would be open to the courts to issue directions for a time-bound
decision on a case-to-case basis – Held, what is discernible from
a reading of the decisions discussed above is that despite there
being no prescribed time-limit for the Governor to take a decision
under Article 200, the provision cannot be read in a manner which
allows the Governor to not take action upon bills which are presented
to him for assent and thereby delay and essentially roadblock the
law-making machinery in the State. [Paras 227, 229, 230, 231]
3. Any time limit in the exercise of powers in terms of Article 200 of
the Constitution should not be construed as timelines laid within the
edifice of the provision, rather should be understood as timelines
that would serve as a lodestar for the purpose of exercise of judicial
review by the courts, a benchmark tool to aid and enable the courts
in ascertaining if any inaction or malfeasance has occasioned in
the exercise of such powers – Those timelines no doubt demand
the earnest adherence by the Governor, however, these being
nothing more than tools upon which scrutiny by judicial review is
to be premised, remain as prescriptions within the realm of judicial
review alone and do not transgress into the legislative bounds or
amount to alteration of the text or authority of Article 200 of the
Constitution. [Para 239]
4. Keeping in mind the constitutional significance of Article 200 and
the role it plays in the federal polity of the country, the following
timelines were prescribed: First, if a bill is either withheld or reserved
for the President’s consideration based on the aid and advice of
the State Council of Ministers, the Governor is expected to act
immediately, and in any case, within a maximum period of one
month – Second, if assent is withheld contrary to the advice of the
State Council of Ministers, the Governor must return the bill with
a message within a maximum of three months – Third, if a bill is
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 989

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

reserved for the President’s consideration contrary to such advice,
the Governor must do so within a maximum period of three months –
Finally, when a bill is presented again after reconsideration as per
the first proviso, the Governor is required to grant assent without
delay, and in any event, within one month – Failure to comply with
these timelines would make the inaction of the Governors subject
to judicial review by the courts. [Paras 250-251]

Constitution of India – Article 200 – Governor in the exercise
of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution can only
act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by
the State Council of Ministers – B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India
(2019) 6 SCC 129 held to be per incuriam:
Held: 1. What flows from a study of the Constituent Assembly
debates concerning the appointment of the Governor and the
scope of his discretionary powers is that the Governor plays a
very crucial role in the political structure of the country – He is the
bridge between the governments at the Central and State level, the
proverbial buckle which ties the States with the Centre. [Para 289]
2. The second proviso to Article 200 is an instance under the
Constitution where the Governor has been conferred with the
power to act in his discretion and even against the advice of the
Council of Ministers – However, the logical sequitur to this is that
under Article 200, there is no scope for the Governor acting in his
discretion other than the second proviso. [Para 295]
3. This Court in B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India (2019) 6 SCC 129
took the view that the Constitution has entrusted the Governor with
the discretion of reserving a bill, presented to him for assent, for
the consideration of the President – It also held that the exercise
of the power of reservation of bills for the consideration of the
President could be done by the Governor contrary to the aid and
advice tendered by the Council of Ministers – The Court observed
that such an important responsibility having been conferred upon
a constitutional functionary, its discharge was expected to be
undertaken upon careful reflection and with statesmanship, and
in a manner that does not thwart democratic federalism – On the
nature of bills which may be reserved for the consideration of
the President, the Court held that it was impossible to lay down
with certainty all the situations wherein such a reference may be
warranted – This view held per incuriam since the removal of the
expression “in his discretion” from Section 75 of the Government
of India Act, 1935 when it was being adapted as Article 200
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of the Constitution, clearly indicates that any discretion which
was available to the Governor under the Government of India
Act, 1935 in respect of reservation of bills became unavailable
with the commencement of the Constitution – Held, the views
expressed by the members of the Constituent Assembly, which
are recorded in the debates that took place on Article 175 of the
Draft Constitution, also indicate the same – The same is also in
alignment with the fundamental tenets of responsible government
in a parliamentary democracy – The only exception to the general
principle of the Governor adhering to the aid and advice tendered
by the Council of Ministers can be traced to Article 163(1) and the
second proviso to Article 200 – Held, B.K Pavitra (supra) failed
to take into consideration the larger Bench decisions in Samsher
Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831 and M.P. Special Police
Establishment v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2004) 8 SCC
788. [Paras 303-306]
4. While construing the role of the Governor in the context of Article
200, it must be kept in mind that such a role has been envisaged
not to supplant the opinion of the Council of Ministers, but to infuse
it with his wisdom – However, once the bill is passed by the State
legislature, and presented to the Governor for assent, he must
act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers as a general
rule and only in exceptional situations should he reserve it for the
consideration of the President. [Paras 307-308]
5. The option of withholding of assent, as believed by the framers,
would be invoked in very rare circumstances where the Council of
Ministers discover some error in the legislation or desire to incorporate
certain changes to it so as to meet with the popular opinion outside
the House – The framers did not expect that the Governor would,
as a matter of routine, declare the withholding of assent to bills
casually – The deletion of the expression “in his discretion” from
the first proviso is also an unmistakable indication of the intent of
the framers in vesting no discretion in the Governor as regards the
withholding of assent and returning of the bill along with suggestions
for the introduction of amendments. [Paras 310, 315, 316]
6. The Governor does not possess any discretion in the exercise
of his functions under Article 200 and has to mandatorily abide
by the advice tendered to him by the Council of Ministers – The
only exceptions to this general rule are: (a) Where the bill is of a
description as provided under the second proviso to Article 200,
(b) Where the bill is of a nature covered by Articles 31A, 31C,
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 991

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(a)(ii) etc. wherein assent of the President
is a condition precedent before the bill can take effect as law
or is necessary for the purpose of securing immunity against
the operation of some constitutional provision, and (c) Where
the bill is of a nature that, if allowed to take effect, then it would
undermine the Constitution by placing the fundamental principles
of a representative democracy in peril as described in M.P. Special
Police (supra). [Paras 318-319]

Constitution of India – Article 200 and Article 201– Actions of
the Governor and the President – Amenable to judicial review:
Held: 1. The Governor, by choosing to act in his discretion
under Article 200, has the power to thwart the entire legislative
machinery of the State by reserving a bill for the consideration of
the President – He also has the power to significantly delay the
grant of assent to a bill by withholding assent and returning the
same to the State legislature under the first proviso to Article 200
of the Constitution – The discharge of functions by the President
or the Governor as constitutional and formal heads is undoubtedly
subject to judicial review by virtue of it being an exercise of their
constitutional powers – Decision taken by the Governor under Article
200 would not be shielded from scrutiny of the courts by virtue
of the immunity accorded under Article 361 of the Constitution –
Held, the power of judicial review of the courts would be available
in respect of exercise of all powers by any authority under the
Constitution unless expressly excluded. [Paras 333, 335, 338]
2. The grant of assent to a bill is an exercise which generally
takes place on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and
assenting to the bill is the only practically possible course of action
available to the constitutional heads in most of the common law
jurisdictions – The grant of assent may not be justiciable because,
there exists an unavailability of any material upon which the courts
may be able to undertake a judicial scrutiny – However, the same
would not be the case as regards the withholding of assent or
reservation of the bill for the consideration of the President, which
can only be exercised upon furnishing of detailed reasons for the
same. [Para 358]
3. Where the Governor reserves a bill for the consideration of
the President in his own discretion and contrary to the aid and
advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers, it shall
be open to the State Government to assail such an action before
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the appropriate High Court or this Court – Such a challenge can
be made on the following grounds:
(i) Where the reservation is on the ground that the bill is of a
description falling under the Second Proviso to Article 200 of the
Constitution, it may be assailed on the ground that the bill or any
provision thereof does not so derogate from the powers of the High
Court so as to endanger the position which that court is designed
by the Constitution to fill – The Governor while reserving a bill on
this count shall be expected to provide clear reasons and also
point to the specific provision(s) of the bill which, in his opinion,
attract the Second Proviso – This question being purely of a legal
nature would be completely justiciable and the competent court
would be, after a proper adjudication, fully authorized to approve
or disapprove of such reservation by the Governor – If such a
challenge finds favour with the competent court, then, subject to
any other considerations, it would be a fit case for the issuance of
a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Governor for appropriate
action – If, however, the challenge should fail then the mechanism
envisaged under Article 201 of the Constitution will spring into action.
(ii) Where the reservation is on account of the bill attracting any
provision of the Constitution wherein the assent of the President is
a condition precedent for the proper enactment and enforceability
of such a bill as a law or for the purpose of securing any immunity
(such as under Article 31A) or overcoming any repugnancy that
may exist qua a Central Legislation (under Article 254(2)), then the
Governor is expected to make a specific and clear reference to the
President properly indicating the reasons for such reservation and
inviting his attention as described in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. and
Anr. v. National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. and
Ors. reported in (2002) 8 SCC 182 – Such a reservation can be
assailed by the State Government, if the reference made by the
Governor either fails to indicate the reasons for such reservation as
discussed above or that the reasons indicated are wholly irrelevant,
mala-fide, arbitrary, unnecessary or motivated by extraneous
considerations – Then such a reservation would be liable to be
set aside – This question being purely of a legal nature would be
completely justiciable and the competent court would be after a
proper adjudication fully authorized to approve or disapprove of such
reservation by the Governor – If such a challenge finds favour with
the competent court, then, subject to any other considerations, it
would be fit case for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus
to the Governor for appropriate action – If however, the challenge
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 993

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

should fail then the mechanism envisaged under Article 201 of the
Constitution will spring into action.
(iii) Where the reservation of a bill by the Governor for the
consideration of the President is on the grounds of peril to
democracy or democratic principles or on other exceptional grounds
as mentioned in M.P. Special Police (supra) and Nabam Rebia
& Bamang Felix v. Dy. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative
Assembly reported in (2016) 8 SCC 1 then the Governor would be
expected to make a specific and clear reference to the President
properly indicating the reasons for entertaining such a belief by
pinpointing the specific provisions in this regard and the consequent
effect that may ensue if such a bill were to be allowed to become
a law – The Governor while making such a reference should
also indicate his subjective satisfaction as to why the aforesaid
consequences that may ensue cannot be possibly curtailed or
contained by taking recourse to the constitutional courts of the
country – It shall be open to the State Government to challenge
such a reservation on the ground of failure on part of the Governor
to furnish the necessary reasons as discussed aforesaid or that
the reasons indicated are wholly irrelevant, mala-fide, arbitrary,
unnecessary or motivated by extraneous considerations – This
being a question completely capable of being determined by the
constitutional courts, would be fully justiciable.
(iv) Reservation of a bill on grounds other than the ones mentioned
above, such as personal dissatisfaction of the Governor, political
expediency or any other extraneous or irrelevant considerations is
strictly impermissible by the Constitution and would be liable to be
set-aside forthwith on that ground alone – This will also encompass
reservation of a bill by the Governor after having already exercised
the option of withholding of assent in terms of Article 200 except
in such exceptional circumstance as mentioned in paragraph 204
of this judgment.
(v) Where the Governor exhibits inaction in making a decision
when a bill is presented to him for assent under Article 200 and
such inaction exceeds the time-limit as has been prescribed by
us in paragraph 250 of this judgment then it shall be open to the
State Government to seek a writ of mandamus from a competent
court against the Governor directing expeditious decision on the
concerned bill as is the mandate of the Constitution, however, it is
clarified that the Governor may successfully resist such a challenge
on providing sufficient explanation for the delay caused. [Para 367]
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4. Where the Governor reserves a bill for the consideration of the
President and the President in turn withholds assent thereto then,
it shall be open to the State Government to assail such an action
before this Court – Such a challenge can broadly be made on the
following grounds:
(i) Where a State bill has been reserved by the Governor for the
consideration of the President on the ground that assent of the
President is required for the purpose of making the bill enforceable
or securing some immunity therefore, then in such cases the
withholding of assent by the President would be justiciable to the
limited extent of exercise of such power in an arbitrary or mala
fide manner – Owing to the political nature of the assent of the
President in these categories of bills, the courts would impose a
self-restraint.
(ii) Where a State bill has been reserved by the Governor, in his
discretion, for the consideration of the President on the ground
that the bill appears to be patently unconstitutional for placing the
principles of representative democracy in peril, the withholding of
assent by the President would, in ordinary circumstances, involve
purely legal and constitutional questions and therefore be justiciable
without any impediments imposed by the doctrine of political
thicket – In such cases, it would be prudent for the President to
obtain the advisory opinion of this Court by way of a reference
under Article 143 and act in accordance with the same to dispel
any apprehensions of bias, arbitrariness or mala fides.
(iii) Where the President exhibits inaction in making a decision
when a bill is presented to him for assent under Article 201 and
such inaction exceeds the time-limit as has been prescribed by us
in paragraph 391 of this judgment then it shall be open to the State
Government to seek a writ of mandamus from this Court. [Para 367]
5. Summary of Court’s findings on the judicial review of the
exercise of power by the President under Article 201 in withholding
assent to a bill: (a) where the bill which is under consideration is
pertaining to a provision of the Constitution where primacy has
been given to the Union government in taking a decision keeping
in consideration the desirability of having certain uniform standards
of national policy, then the limited grounds of judicial review would
be based on arbitrariness, mala fides, etc. and (b) where the bill
which is under consideration pertains to a subject matter or domain
within which State legislature has been accorded primacy, and the
reservation of the bill is by the Governor contrary to the aid and
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 995

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

advice of the State Council of Ministers, then in exercise of judicial
review the courts would be competent to look into the reasons for
withholding of assent and whether they are legally tenable or not,
besides the grounds of mala fides and arbitrariness, etc. [Para 368]

Constitution of India – Article 200 – Timelines for the President
under Article 201 to decide on the Bill reserved for his
consideration by the Governor under Article 200:
Held: 1. The Court deems it appropriate to adopt the timeline
prescribed by the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Office
Memorandum dated 04.02.2016 issued by the Ministry of Home,
Government of India, and prescribe that the President is required
to take a decision on the bills reserved for his consideration by
the Governor within a period of three months from the date on
which such reference is received – In case of any delay beyond
this period, appropriate reasons would have to be recorded and
conveyed to the concerned State – The States are also required
to be collaborative and extend co-operation by furnishing answers
to the queries which may be raised and consider the suggestions
made by the Central government expeditiously. [Paras 385-391]
2. After due consultation with the State government, the President
may either declare assent to the bill or he may declare that he
withholds assent thereto – It would not be appropriate for the
President to declare withholding of assent without first seeking
clarifications from the State government as is mentioned in the
guidelines featuring in the Office Memorandums – If, in the course
of discussions, the State government expresses willingness
to make such changes to the bill as may be suggested by the
Central government, then it would be open to the President to
seek reconsideration of the bill by invoking the proviso, and upon
the bill being re-considered and passed with such changes, the
President may grant assent thereto. [Para 401]
3. After the bill is sent with a message to State legislature by the
President and they repass it, with or without amendments, the
President would be empowered to take a final call on the giving or
withholding of assent on the bill concerned – If he chooses to assent
to the bill, it would become law – There is no gainsaying to the fact
that the President under Article 201 is conferred with the power
to withhold a bill during the second round, without activating any
other procedure, effectively bringing the legislative process vis-à-vis
that same bill to an end, in contrast to the scheme of Article 200
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wherein the Governor must mandatorily accord his assent to a Bill
which is presented to him for the second time. [Para 404]
4. However, if he chooses to withhold his assent, the bill will not
take birth as law – It must, however, be noted that even during
the withholding of assent of a bill received on the second round,
the President would be required to assign clear and sufficiently
detailed reasons for arriving at such a decision – Even in the second
round, he has no power whatsoever to exercise absolute veto, as
the Constitution does not provide anywhere that withholding of
assent can be done simpliciter. [Para 405]

Constitution of India – Article 200 – Governor cannot reserve
a reconsidered bill for consideration of the President – Article
142 exercised to grant deemed assent:
Held: 1. The Governor first withheld the ten bills under question and
later despite the said Bills being repassed by the State legislature
and presented before him again under the first proviso to Article
200, still reserved them for the consideration of the President – The
clear language in which the first proviso is couched, there would
never arise, except in extraordinary situations, any occasion for
the Governor to reserve a reconsidered bill for the consideration
of the President – The said bills, in the absence of any message
given by the Governor under the first proviso, were taken up for
reconsideration by the State Assembly and passed in their original
form, and presented to the Governor for his assent – Thus, it was
not open to the Governor to reserve the bills for the consideration of
the President and he ought to have granted assent – Considerable
time has elapsed since these ten Bills were originally passed and
presented to the Governor for assent – Two out of the ten Bills even
date back to 2020 – It is important to keep in mind that the tenure
of the State legislature is of five years and the representatives
are accountable to their electorate as regards the enactment of
legislations addressing the issues faced by the electorate – At
the end of every five years, the elected representatives have to
go back to their electorate and provide a report card, based upon
which the people, in whom the ultimate sovereignty rests, cast their
votes – Bills, if kept pending for long despite their passage by the
State legislature, militate against this very fundamental, essential
to the sustenance of a representative democracy based on direct
elections. [Paras 430-431]
2. The conduct exhibited on part of the Governor, as it clearly
appears from the events that have transpired even during the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 997

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

course of the present litigation, has been lacking in bona fides –
There have been clear instances where the Governor has failed
in showing due deference and respect to the judgments and
directions of this Court – In such a situation, it is difficult to repose
our trust and remand the matter to the Governor with a direction
to dispose of the bills in accordance with the observations made
by the Court in this judgment – Article 142 empowers the Court
to do complete justice and in the facts of the present case, more
particularly, in light of the fact that the option of granting assent to
the repassed bills was the only constitutionally permissible option
available with the Governor, it is deemed absolutely necessary and
appropriate to grant that very relief by exercising our extraordinary
powers – No meaningful purpose would be served by keeping the
bills, some of which have already been pending for incredulously
long periods, pending for more time – The ten Bills deemed to
have assented on the date when they presented to the Governor
after being reconsidered by the State legislature. [Para 432]

Case Law Cited
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India [1994] 2 SCR 644 : (1994) 3 SCC 1;
Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India [2006] 1 SCR 562 : (2006)
2 SCC 1; Kihoto Holohan v. Zachillhu [1992] 1 SCR 686 : (1992)
Supp. 2 SCC 651; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh [1964]
2 SCR 197 : AIR 1963 SC 1618; The State of Telangana v. Secretary
to Her Excellency the Hon’ble Governor for the State of Telangana
& Anr. (2024) 1 SCC 405; Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India
and Ors. [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 558 : (1994) 1 SCC 44; Keisham
Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly
and Ors. [2020] 2 SCR 132 : (2021) 16 SCC 503; M/s North
Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. M/s Ashok Mills,
CA No. 2669 of 2023; Secunderabad Club v. Commissioner of
Income-Tax [2023] 12 SCR 979 : (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1004;
Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala [1962] Supp. 1 SCR
753 : 1961 SCC OnLine SC 361; State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja
Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga [1952] 1 SCR 889 : (1952)
1 SCC 528; Durga Pada Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (1972) 2
SCC 656; Periyammal (Dead) thr. LRs & Ors. v. Rajamani & Anr.
Etc., 2025 INSC 329 : [2025] 3 SCR 540; B.P. Singhal v. Union
of India [2010] 6 SCR 589 : (2010) 6 SCC 331; Maru Ram v.
Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 1196 : (1981) 1 SCC 107; State of
Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta [2013] 1 SCR 1 : (2013) 3 SCC 1; Indra
Sawhney v. Union of India [1992] Supp. 2 SCR 454 : (1992) Supp.
998 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

3 SCC 217; State of Rajasthan v. Union of India [1978] 1 SCR
1 : (1977) 3 SCC 592; Minerva Mills v. Union of India [1981] 1
SCR 206 : (1980) 3 SCC 625; A.K. Kaul v. Union of India [1995]
3 SCR 469 : (1995) 4 SCC 73; Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P.
[2006] Supp. 7 SCR 81 : (2006) 8 SCC 161; Bharat Sevashram
Sangh v. State of Gujarat [1986] 3 SCR 602 : (1986) 4 SCC 51;
In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979] 2 SCR 476 : (1979)
1 SCC 380 – referred to.
State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab
[2023] 15 SCR 777 : (2024) 1 SCC 384; Nabam Rebia & Bamang
Felix v. Dy. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly
[2016] 6 SCR 1 : (2016) 8 SCC 1; Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. and
Anr. v. National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. and
Ors. [2002] Supp. 2 SCR 555 : (2002) 8 SCC 182; Samsher
Singh v. State of Punjab [1975] 1 SCR 814 : (1974) 2 SCC 831;
AG Perarivalan v. State, Through Superintendent of Police CBI/
SIT/MMDA, Chennai, Tamil Nadu and Anr. [2022] 7 SCR 1048 :
(2023) 8 SCC 257 – relied upon.
B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India [2017] 1 SCR 631 : (2017) 4 SCC
620 – held per incuriam.
S. Ramakrishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad
5207 – referred to.
Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 1981
SCC OnLine Can SC 77; Galati v. Governor-General of Canada
[2015] FC 91; Gallant v. The King [1949] 2 DLR 425; Eastgate v.
Rozzoli (1990) 20 NSWLR 188; Regina (Miller) v. Prime Minister
(Lord Advocate and others intervening) [2019] 3 WLR 589; Baker v.
Carr, 1962 SCC OnLine US SC 40; Re Constitutional Reference
No 1 of 2008 [2009] 1 LRC 453; Republic of Vanuatu v Carcasses
[2010] 2 LRC 264 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (May 30, 1949); 8, Constituent
Assemb. Deb, (Jun. 1, 1949); 9, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Aug. 1,
1949); 10, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Oct. 17, 1949); Jessica J.
Richardson, Modernisation of Royal Assent in Canada, 27 Can.
Parliam. Rev.2, 32 (2004), http://www.revparl.ca/27/2/27n2_04e_
Richardson.pdf; Nicholas Barber, Can Royal Assent Be Refused
on the Advice of the Prime Minister?, UK Constitutional Law
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 999

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

Association (Apr. 7, 2025, 9:45 PM), https://ukconstitutionallaw.
org/2013/09/25/nick-barber-can-royal-assent-be-refused-on-the-
advice-of-the-prime-minster/; David Torrance, Royal Assent, House
Of Commons Library (Feb. 26, 2024), https://researchbriefings.files.
parliament.uk/documents/cbp-9466/cbp-9466.pdf; Dept. of Prime
Minister & Cabinet, Austl. Govt., Legislation Handbook (2017); 5,
Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India 6318
(LexisNexis 2009); K.C. Markandan, Centre State Relations The
Perspective 120 (ABS Publications 1986) – reffered to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988;
Representation of the People Act, 1951; Government of India Act,
1935; Government of India Act, 1919; Aundh State Constitution Act,
1939; Government of Mysore Act, 1940; Government of India Act,
1858; United Kingdom: Judicial Committee Act, 1833; Canada: Royal
Assent Act, 2002; Constitution Act, 1867; Strengthening Canadian
Citizenship Act, 2014; United States of America: Constitution of
the United States; New Zealand: Constitution Act, 1852; Australia:
Constitution Act, 1889; Ireland: Constitution of the Ireland; Singapore:
Constitution of Singapore; Sri Lanka: Constitution of Sri Lanka;
Republic of Kiribati: Constitution of Kiribati; Fiji: Constitution of Fiji,
2013; Fiji Independence Order, 1970; Solomon Islands & Antigua
and Barbuda: Constitution of the Soloman Islands; Constitution of
Antigua and Barbuda; Pakistan: Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan; Germany: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of
Germany; Constitution of Berlin; Italy: Constitution of the Italian
Republic; France: Constitution of October 4, 1958.

List of Keywords
Constitution of India; Governor; President; Deemed Assent;
Withholding of assent; Pocket veto; Absolute veto; Federalism;
Centre-State Relations; Sarkaria Commission; Puncchi
Commission; Tamil Nadu; Bills; Article 200; Article 201; Article
142; Inherent power of the Supreme Court; Discretion of the
Governor and the President.

Case Arising From
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1239
of 2023
Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India
1000 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mukul Rohatgi, Rakesh Dwivedi,
P.wilson, Sr. Advs., Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, Mohd. Yasir, Ms. Jahnavi
Taneja, Sabarish Subramanian, Poornachandiran R, Siddarth
Seema, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Apoorv Malhotra, Lokesh Krishna,
Danish Saifi, Aravind A, Saran Raghunadhan S.
Advs. for the Respondents:
R Venkatramani, Attorney General for India, Vikramjit Banerjee,
ASG, Ms. Madhavi Goradia Divan, Nl Rajah, Sr. Advs., Prashant
Rawat, Ms. Rashi Mangal, Kartik Dey, Abhishek Goel, Kanu
Agarwal, Padmesh Mishra, Arkaj Kumar, Chitvan Singhal, Raman
Yadav, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Kartikay Aggarwal, Ms. Ameya
Vikrama Thanvi, Ms. Sonali Jain, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Manoj
Ranjan Sinha, Mrigank Prabhakar, Vishal Agrawal, Siddharth Sahu,
S. Santanam Swaminadhan, Ms. Abhilasha Shrawat, T. Bhaskar
Gowtham, D. Bharat Kumar, Mrs. Aarthi Rajan.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of the exposition, this judgment is divided in
the following parts:

INDEX*

A. FACTUAL MATRIX ..................................................................... 5
i. Factual background with respect to assent to bills. ............. 5
ii. Factual background with respect to accord of sanction
for investigation into cases of corruption against public
servants. ................................................................................. 17
iii. Factual background with respect to the files pertaining to
premature release of prisoners. ............................................ 19
iv. Factual background with respect to the appointments to the
Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC). .............. 20
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1001

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

v. Factual background with respect to dismissal of ministers
and allocation of ministries. ................................................... 22
B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES ............................................. 25
i. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner ............................... 25
ii. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents ......................... 54
C. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION ................................................ 61
D. ASSENT TO BILLS – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............... 65
i. Concept of assent to bills as envisaged by certain historical
documents drafted during the freedom struggle. .................. 79
ii. Debates of the Constituent Assembly on Article 200 of the
Constitution ............................................................................ 91
E. ARTICLE 200 OF THE CONSTITUTION - DEVELOPMENTS
POST THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. ........ 99
i. First Administrative Reforms Commission, 1966................... 100
ii. Rajamannar Commission, 1971............................................. 102
iii. Sarkaria Commission............................................................. 105
iv. Punchhi Commission.............................................................. 121
F. INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON ASSENT TO
BILLS............................................................................................ 128
G. ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 145
i. What courses of action are available to the Governor
in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the
Constitution? .......................................................................... 145
ii. Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for the consideration
of the President when it is presented to him for assent
after being reconsidered in accordance with the first
proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not
reserved it for the consideration of the President in the
first instance? ........................................................................ 168
iii. Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed
time-limit within which the Governor is required to
act in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of
the Constitution? ................................................................... 174
1002 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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iv. Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under
Article 200 can only act in accordance with the aid and advice
tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers?............... 213

a. The Office of the Governor.............................................. 216

b. Constituent Assembly Debates on the mode of Selection
of the Governor............................................................... 218

c. Constituent Assembly Debates on the Exercise of
Discretion by the Governor............................................. 227

d. The decision of this Court in B.K. Pavitra (supra) is per
incuriam........................................................................... 263

v. Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor in
discharge of his functions under Article 200 could be said to
be subject to judicial review? If yes, what are the parameters
for such judicial review?........................................................ 280

vi. What is the manner in which the President under Article 201
of the Constitution is required to act once a Bill has been
reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article
200 of the Constitution?......................................................... 340

vii. On Exercise of Article 142. ................................................... 382

H. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 387

1. While the framers of the Constitution set out with a vision that the
Governor would be a “constitutional head, a sagacious counselor and
adviser to the Ministry”1, someone who can “pour oil over troubled
waters”, what has unfolded before us in the instant litigation has
been quite the opposite, as this Court has been called upon to calm
the troubled waters stirred by the ensuing long-drawn battle of a
high constitutional order between the petitioner and the respondent.

1 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (May 30, 1949) 431.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1003

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

2. The State of Tamil Nadu, being aggrieved by the action of the
Governor on few issues of prime public importance, has invoked the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking
appropriate reliefs as prayed for in the writ petition. The petitioner is
aggrieved by the action, or rather inaction, on part of the Governor
of Tamil Nadu in discharge of the following functions:
(i) Withholding of assent to and reserving for consideration of the
President, by the Governor of 10 Bills enacted by the Legislature
for the State of Tamil Nadu.
(ii) Inaction on files submitted to the Governor for according sanction
to prosecute public servants and investigate various crimes of
corruption involving moral turpitude.
(iii) Pendency of a number of files submitted to the Governor for
premature release of prisoners.
(iv) Pendency of proposals submitted to the Governor for
appointment of members to the Tamil Nadu Public Service
Commission under Article 316 of the Constitution.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX

i. Factual background with respect to assent to bills.
3. The Legislature for the State of Tamil Nadu, between 13.01.2020
and 28.04.2023, enacted and forwarded 12 Bills to the Governor for
grant of assent as per Article 200 of the Constitution. Even though
the present Governor took charge of the office with effect from
18.11.2021, yet he did not take the necessary action on any of the
said Bills forwarded to his office till October 2023. The petitioner,
being aggrieved by the inaction on part of the Governor, had to
ultimately file the present writ petition before this Court. The same
was filed on 31.10.2023.
4. This Court issued notice to the respondents on 10.11.2023. The
Governor, forthwith, took a decision on the 12 Bills on 13.11.2023
by withholding assent simpliciter to 10 bills i.e., he did not convey
any message to the State Legislature for reconsideration of the
said Bills as prescribed under the first proviso to Article 200, and
by reserving two Bills for the consideration of the President. The
1004 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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10 bills for which assent was withheld were returned to the State
Legislature by the Governor.
5. The State Legislature, on 18.11.2023, convened a special session
and repassed the 10 bills which were returned by the Governor after
withholding of assent. The bills were passed without any material
change and were forwarded to the Governor’s Secretariat on the
same day for his assent in accordance with the first proviso to Article
200. This Court, in its order dated 20.11.2023, noted that since the
repassed 10 bills were pending with the Governor, the hearing of the
writ petition be adjourned to 01.12.2023 and issued directions that
this Court shall be apprised of the progress in the matter.
6. On 28.11.2023, the Governor, without the aid and advice of the Council
of Ministers of the State, in exercise of his discretion, reserved the
said repassed Bills for the consideration of the President. The letter
of the Governor to the Union Government referring the said Bills for
the consideration of the President mentioned that the Bills were re-
considered and passed again by the State Legislature. Interestingly,
although the Governor noted that the Bills were intra-vires the
competence of the State Legislature having been legislated under
Entry 66 of List I, Entry 32 of List II and Entry 25 of List III, yet he
reserved the said Bills for the consideration of the President in the
second round on the ground that the Bills suffered from repugnancy
on account of being contrary to Entry 66 of the Union List i.e., List
I. These grounds have been taken by the Governor to reserve the
10 Bills for consideration of the President. For reference, we have
extracted the relevant portion of the letter pertaining to the Tamil
Nadu Fisheries University (Amendment) Bill, 2023 which reads thus:
“I am directed to state that the Tamil Nadu Legislative
Assembly has passed the Tamil Nadu Fisheries University
(Amendment) Bill, 2023 (LA Bill No.15 of 2023) on
21.4.2023 and sent to the Hon’ble Governor for assent.
Hon’ble Governor has returned the Bill with the following
remarks –
“I withhold assent”.
2. The State Government have reconsidered the said Bill
and again passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly
on 18.11.2023 and sent to Hon’ble Governor for assent.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1005

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

3. In this regard, I am directed to inform that a Background
Note on Reserving the Bills for the consideration of
Hon’ble President regarding University Bills which has
been approved by the Hon’ble Governor is enclosed,
since, co-ordination. and determination of standards in
institutions of higher education or research and scientific
and technical institutions Is in Entry No.66 of the Union
List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the Bills
suffer from repugnancy. Hence, the Hon’ble Governor
has reserved the Bill viz. Tamil Nadu Fisheries University
(Amendment) BIii, 2023 (LA Bill No.15 of 2023) for the
consideration of the Hon’ble President.
4. The Bill falls, mainly, within the scope of the following
entries of the Union, State and Concurrent. Lists In the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, namely-
UNION LIST
Entry 66·- Co-ordination and determination of standards in
institutions for higher education or research and scientific
and technical institutions.
STATE LIST
Entry 32 -- Incorporation, regulation and winding up of
corporations, other than those specified in List-I and
Universities;
CONCURRENT LIST
Entry 25 -- Education, including technical education,
medical education and universities and is intra-vires the
State Legislature.
5. I am, therefore, directed. to request to take appropriate
action for the Bill to have consideration of the Hon’ble
President.”
7. The Governor, on 04.12.2023, also sought to clarify that the 10 Bills
to which he had withheld assent simpliciter were not returned to the
Legislature for reconsideration as stipulated in the first proviso of
Article 200. Despite that, the State Government had placed the Bills
before the legislative assembly again. After the Bills were repassed
by the legislative assembly, the State Government sent the same
1006 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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back to the Governor for assent. The Governor clarified that since
the Bills suffered from repugnancy, he was reserving the said Bills
for the consideration of the President. These clarifications were sent
for all the 10 Bills. For reference, we have extracted the relevant
portion of the letter pertaining to the Tamil Nadu Fisheries University
(Amendment) Bill, 2023 which reads thus:
“Kindly refer our letter dated 28.11.2023.
2.⁠ I⁠ am now directed to elaborate further on the circumstances
under which the Bill was requested to be placed before the
Hon’ble President for consideration. When the, The Tamil
Nadu Fisheries University (Amendment) Bill, 2020 (LA
Bill No. 2 of 2020) passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative
Assembly on 09.01.2020 was sent to the Hon’ble Governor
for his essent, the Hon’ble Governor has exercised his
substantive powers under Article 200 of the Constitution
and took decision of withholding his assent to the Bill and
the file was returned to the Law Department of the State
Government, conveying the decision of the Governor
“I Withhold assent”. It is clarified that the Bills was not
returned for re-consideration as stipulated in the proviso
to Article 200 of the Constitution.
3.⁠ ⁠While withholding his assent, the Hon’ble Governor
has relied on the position held by the five member bench
(Constitution Bench) of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union
of India and others Vs. Valluri Basavalah Chowdhary and
others and Maharao Sahit Shri Bhim Singhi Vs. Union of
India and others. (Civil Appeal No’s 1896 of 1976, 265-
300 of 1977, 29-38 of 1977 and 5 of 1977 and W.P. No.
350 of 1977, decided on May 1, 1979) where it has been
stated In Para 19:
“The Governor is, however, made a component part of the
legislature of a State under Article 168, because every Bill
passed by the State Legislature has to be reserved for the
assent under Article 200. Under that article, the Governor
can adopt one of the three courses, namely (i) he may
give his assent to it, in which case the Bill becomes a
law; or (ii) he may, except In the case of a ‘Money Bill’,
withhold his assent therefrom, In which case the Bill
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1007

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

falls through unless the procedure indicated in the first
proviso is followed, I.e. return the Bill to the Assembly for
reconsideration with a message, or (iii) he may (subject
to Ministerial advice) reserve the Bill for the consideration
of the President, in which case the President will adopt
the procedure laid down In Article 201”.
4.⁠ ⁠However, State Government placed the Bill again in
the Legislative Assembly and after getting Assembly’s
endorsement, sent them again to the Hon’ble Governor
on 18.11.2023.
5.⁠ ⁠The Hon’ble Governor had not returned the Bills under
the proviso to Article 200 for re-consideration, however,
State Government has sent them back. Since the Bill
suffers from repugnancy, Hon’ble Governor has reserved
the same for the consideration of the Hon’ble President.”
8. In view of the reservation of the 10 Bills for the consideration of
the President, the petitioner filed the I.A. No. 259020 of 2023 on
11.12.2023, seeking amendment of the prayers of the present writ
petition and prayed for insertion of the following prayer:
“Pass any writ/order or direction to declare that the
action of the Governor of Tamil Nadu/ first Respondent of
reserving the following Bills 1. Bill No 2/2020 namely “A
Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Fisheries University
Act, 2012”, 2. Bill No 12/2020 namely “A Bill further to
amend the Tamil Nadu Veterinary and Animal Sciences
University Act, 1989”, 3. Bill No 24/2022 namely “The bill
to amend the Universities laws. The Vice-Chancellors of
all Universities (except University of Madras)”, 4. Bill No
29/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu
Dr. Ambedkar Law University Act, 1996”, 5. Bill No 39/2022
namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Dr. M.G.R.
Medical University, Chennai, Act, 1987”, 6. Bill No 40/2022
namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil Nadu Agricultural
University Act, 1971”, 7. Bill No 48/2022 namely “A bill
further to amend the Tamil Nadu Universities Laws”, 8.
Bill No 55/2022 namely “A Bill further to amend the Tamil
University Act, 1982”, 9. Bill No 15/2023 namely “A Bill
further to amend the Tamil Fisheries University Act, 2012”,
1008 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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10. Bill No 18/2023 namely “A Bill further to amend the
Tamil Nadu Veterinary and Animal Sciences University Act,
1989” for the consideration of the President qua the Bills
passed and forwarded by the Tamil Nadu State Legislature
to him as unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable
besides malafide exercise of power and/or to quash the
being ultra- vires Articles 14, 19 and 21 read with Article
200 of the Constitution and direct the Respondent-1 to
declare assent to the same.”
9. Thus, what was sought to be conveyed by the aforesaid I.A. was
that the 10 Bills were reconsidered and passed again by the State
Legislature and were thereafter forwarded to the Governor for his
assent in terms of the first proviso to Article 200. However, the
Governor reserved the said Bills for the consideration of the President.
It was alleged that such action on the part of the Governor was
violative of Article 200 and was done with a mala fide intention only
with a view to circumvent the jurisdiction of this Court.
10. Upon the suggestion made by this Court, the Governor, on 12.12.2023
wrote to the Chief Minister for the State of Tamil Nadu inviting him to
a meeting in an attempt to resolve the deadlock. The Governor and
the Chief Minister met on 30.12.2023, pursuant to which the Chief
Minister submitted a representation summarising the following issues:
a. The Bills could not have been reserved for the consideration
of the President after the decision of this Court in State of
Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab
reported in (2024) 1 SCC 384, wherein it was held that once
the Governor decides to exercise the power of withholding
assent to a bill, the operation of the first proviso to Article 200
has to necessarily follow.
b. Article 200 does not confer any power upon the Governor
to exercise the option of reserving a bill for Presidential
consideration after a bill has been reconsidered and repassed
by the State Legislature. Since, the 10 Bills in the present case
were reconsidered and passed again by the State legislature,
the only constitutionally permissible option for the Governor
was to grant assent.
c. The Governor also acted in contravention of the aid and
advice of the Council of Ministers that “the Bill repassed by
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1009

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

the Legislative Assembly should be assented to by the Hon’ble
Governor without withholding assent”, which is ultra vires of
the Constitution.
11. In light of the above representation, the Chief Minister requested
the Governor to:
(i) Recall the 10 Bills reserved for the consideration of the President
and grant assent expeditiously;
(ii) In future, grant assent to Bills passed by the State Legislature
within 30 days and avoid unnecessary reservation of the bills
for the consideration of the President;
(iii) Act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered by the
Council of Ministers.
12. Out of the 10 Bills reserved for her consideration, the President
withheld assent to seven Bills, granted assent to one Bill and is yet
to consider the remaining two Bills.
13. The status of the Bills is summarized below:

S. Bill Details Forwarded Action Re- Action Action
No. to the by the enacted by by the by the
Governor Governor the State Governor President
by the Legislature
State
Legislature

1. Bill No. 2/2020 13.01.2020 Assent 18.11.2023 Reserved for Assent
namely “A withheld on consideration withheld on
Bill further to 13.11.2023. of the 26.02.2024.
amend the Tamil President on
Nadu Fisheries 28.11.2023.
University Act,
2012.

2. Bill No 12/2020 18.10.2020 Assent 18.11.2023 Reserved for Assent is
namely “A Bill withheld on consideration awaited
further to amend 13.11.2023. of the since
the Tamil Nadu President on 28.11.2023.
Veterinary and 28.11.2023.
Animal Sciences
University Act,
1989”
1010 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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3. Bill No 24/2022 28.04.2022 Assent 18.11.2023 Reserved for Assent
namely “The withheld on consideration withheld on
bill to amend 13.11.2023. of the 26.02.2024.
the Universities President on
laws. The Vice 28.11.2023.
Chancellors of
all Universities
(except
University of
Madras) to be
appointed by
the Government
instead of
Governor.”
4. Bill No. 25/2022 28.04.2022 Reserved for - - Status not
namely “A bill to consideration on record.
further amend of the
the Chennai President on
University Act.” 13.11.2023.
5. Bill No. 26/2022 05.05.2022 Reserved for - - Status not
namely “A Bill to consideration on record.
provide for the of the
Establishment President on
and Incorporation 13.11.2023.
of a University
for Siddha
Ayurveda,
Unani, Yoga &
Naturopathy and
Homeopathy in
the State.”
6. Bill No 29/2022 16.05.2022 Assent 18.11.2023 Reserved for Assent
namely “A Bill withheld on consideration withheld on
further to amend 13.11.2023. of the 15.02.2024.
the Tamil Nadu President on
Dr. Ambedkar 28.11.2023.
Law University
Act, 1996”.
7. Bill No 39/2022 16.05.2022 Assent 18.11.2023 Reserved for Assent
namely “A withheld on consideration withheld on
Bill further to 13.11.2023. of the 16.02.2024.
amend the President on
Tamil Nadu Dr. 28.11.2023.
M.G.R. Medical
University,
Chennai, Act,
1987”.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1011

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

8. Bill No 40/2022 16.05.2022 Assent 18.11.2023 Reserved for Assent
namely “A Bill withheld on consideration withheld on
further to amend 13.11.2023. of the 18.02.2024.
the Tamil Nadu President on
Agricultural 28.11.2023.
University Act,
1971”.

9. Bill No 48/2022 27.10.2022 Assent 18.11.2023 Reserved for Assent
namely “A bill withheld on consideration granted on
further to amend 13.11.2023. of the 18.02.2024.
the Tamil Nadu President on
Universities 28.11.2023.
Laws.”

10. Bill No 55/2022 27.10.2022 Assent 18.11.2023 Reserved for Assent
namely “A withheld on consideration withheld on
Bill further to 13.11.2023. of the 18.03.2024.
amend the Tamil President on
University Act, 28.11.2023.
1982.”

11. Bill No 15/2023 28.04.2023 Assent 18.11.2023 Reserved for Assent
namely “A withheld on consideration withheld on
Bill further to 13.11.2023. of the 26.02.2024.
amend the Tamil President on
Nadu Fisheries 28.11.2023.
University Act,
2012.”

12. Bill No 18/2023 28.04.2023 Assent 18.11.2023 Reserved for Assent is
namely “A Bill withheld on consideration awaited
further to amend 13.11.2023. of the since
the Tamil Nadu President on 28.11.2023.
Veterinary and 28.11.2023.
Animal Sciences
University Act,
1989”.

ii. Factual background with respect to accord of sanction
for investigation into cases of corruption against public
servants.
14. Between 10.04.2022 and 15.05.2023, the Government of Tamil
Nadu submitted to the Governor, four files relating to the prosecution
of public servants involved in crimes of moral turpitude under the
1012 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which at the time of filing of the
writ petition remained pending with the Governor.
15. It is only upon the present writ petition being filed and issuance of
notice that the Governor’s office started acting upon the files. The
Governor, on 01.12.2023, submitted the factual position regarding
the bills, files and other cases pending with his office detailing the
actions taken thereupon. The details of the files requesting for sanction
to investigate and prosecute and the Governor’s actions thereupon
are summarised below:

S. Department Subject Request Status of the Files
No. sent by the
State to the
Governor
1. Tamil Request to accord 11.05.2022 Sanction accorded on
Development sanction by the 18.11.2023.
and Hon’ble Governor/
Information Chancellor
Department for initiating
preliminary enquiry
under Section
17A(1)(b) of the
Prevention of
Corruption Act,
1988 against Thiru
G. Bhaskaran,
Former Vice-
Chancellor,
Tanjavur
University.
2. Public (S.C.) Request to accord 12.09.2022 • A duly
Department sanction by the authenticated
Hon’ble Governor investigation report
u/s 19(1) of the was sought from
Prevention of the Government
Corruption Act, on 07.07.2023.
1988 to prosecute
• The Government
Thiru K.C.
sent a reply dated
Veeramani, former
11.07.2023 stating
Minister.
that authenticated
investigation
report has been
submitted.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1013

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

• The Governor
sent back
the file to the
Government on
15.11.2023 with
the observation
that there was no
duly authenticated
investigation
report in the file.
• The Government
re-submitted the
file on 18.11.2023.

3. Public (S.C.) Request to accord 12.12.2022 Sanction accorded
Department sanction by the on 13.11.2023.
Hon’ble Governor
for initiating
prosecution u/s 19
of the Prevention
of Corruption
Act, 1988 against
Thiru B.V.
Ramana @ B.
Venkataramana,
former Minister
for Commercial
Taxes and Dr.
C. Vijayabaskar,
former Minister for
Health & Family
Welfare.

4. Public (S.C.) Request to 15.05.2023 Under consideration
Department accord necessary since May 2023.
sanction by the
Hon’ble Governor
for initiating
prosecution
u/s 19(1)(b) of
PC ACT, 1988
against Thiru M.R.
Vijayabhaskar,
former Minister.
1014 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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iii. Factual background with respect to the files pertaining to
premature release of prisoners.
16. The petitioner forwarded 53 files pertaining to the premature release of
prisoners to the Governor between June and August 2023 requesting
approval thereof.
17. In response to the allegation of delay and pendency on the said files,
the office of the Governor represented before this Court that since
September 2021, i.e., from the date the present Governor assumed
office, 580 proposals regarding premature release of prisoners were
received out of which 362 files were approved, 165 files were rejected
and 53 were under consideration.
18. The Governor informed in the backdrop of the factual position
prevailing on 01.12.2023 that the 53 files that remained pending
were recent proposals sent by the petitioner only between June
and August 2023. This Court has not been apprised of the status
of these files after 01.12.2023 by any of the parties.

iv. Factual background with respect to the appointments to
the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC).
19. It is the case of the petitioner that it was represented before the
Governor by way of various representations that as per Regulation
3 of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission Regulations, 1954,
the Commission shall consist of a Chairman and 14 Members.
However, no heed was paid to such representations. The functioning
strength of TNPSC was of four members on the date of filing of the
present petition.
20. In regard to the aforesaid, the petitioner forwarded representations to
the Governor’s office seeking approval of the proposed names for the
position of members in TNPSC and carrying out their appointments.
The petitioner also sent reminders to the Principal Secretary to the
Governor for acting on the files sent to the Governor’s office in this
respect.
21. The Governor, on 27.09.2023, returned the said files with a note
raising some queries regarding transparency in the selection
process, tenure of the members to be appointed and credentials of
the proposed candidates. The Governor clarified that as the queries
raised by his office were not addressed by the petitioner, the proposal
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1015

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

for appointment of the recommended candidates was being returned
and the same was no longer pending before him. This happened
on 26.10.2023.
22. The petitioner, on the other hand, has averred in its writ petition that
such queries were against the established practices to the selection
of constitutional posts and that the availability of the chairman and
members in the TNPSC was essential to monitor and expedite various
recruitment processes as well as promotions. Delays in appointments
to the TNPSC resulted in non-availability of sufficient members, which
detrimentally affected the functioning of the Executive.
23. The petitioner explained this position and also addressed the queries
raised by the Governor in its clarification note dated 07.10.2023. The
files for approval of appointments were accordingly re-submitted on
10.10.2023, however, the same were returned by the Governor on
27.10.2023 without assigning any reasons.

v. Factual background with respect to dismissal of ministers
and allocation of ministries.
24. On 29.06.2023, the Governor suo moto and contrary to the aid
and advice of the State Council of Ministers recommended the
dismissal and divestment of portfolio of Senthil Balaji, a minister in
the Tamil Nadu Cabinet on the ground that he was arrested by the
Enforcement Directorate and was in judicial custody. However, the
Governor addressed another letter to the Chief Minister on the very
same day informing that he had kept the dismissal of Senthil Balaji
in abeyance till further communication in light of the advice of the
Union Minister of Home Affairs that it would be prudent to seek the
opinion of the Attorney General on the matter.
25. In a similar case, Dr. K. Ponmudy, a minister in the Government
of Tamil Nadu was convicted and sentenced by the Madras High
Court against which, he filed an appeal before this Court. This
Court, vide order dated 11.03.2024, suspended the conviction of
Dr. K. Ponmudy from its operation keeping in view Section 8(3) of
the Representation of People’s Act, 1951 and more particularly for
the reason that he should not suffer disqualification from the office
of Member of Legislative Assembly.
26. Accordingly, on 13.03.2024, the Speaker of the State Legislative
Assembly declared that the disqualification ceased to operate with
1016 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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effect from 19.12.2023. The Election Commission also withdrew the
notification of vacancy for his constituency.
27. The Chief Minister wrote to the Governor on 13.03.2024 to swear
in Dr. K. Ponmudy as a Minister and allot to him the portfolio of
Higher Education. However, the Governor vide the letter dated
17.03.2024, declined the request stating that the conviction order
was suspended from its operation by way of ‘interim relief’ granted
by this Court which meant that the conviction against Dr. Ponmudy,
though existent, had been made non-operative and not set aside.
The Governor also stated that the re-introduction of Dr. K. Ponmudy
in the Cabinet would be against “constitutional morality”.
28. Consequently, the petitioner was constrained to file I.A. No. 69967 of
2024 on 18.03.2024 to amend its prayer in the present writ petition
for including the relief of staying the operation of the Governor’s
letter dated 17.03.2024 and directing him to administer the oath of
office and secrecy to Dr. K. Ponmudy. The amendment sought to
be made reads thus:
“It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble
Court may be pleased to:
a) Grant permission to amend the prayer in the above W.P.
No. 1239 of 2023 and add the following prayer:
“f. Call for the records of the 1st Respondent
pertaining to Letter No. 007/RBTN/ 2024 dated
17.03.2024 and quash the same and direct
the 1st Respondent to act in accordance with
the letter of the Hon’ble Chief Minister of Tamil
Nadu in D.O. Letter No. 952/CMO/2024 dated
13.03.2024 and consequently to appoint Thiru
K. Ponmudi, Member of Tamil Nadu Legislative
Assembly as a Minister of the Government
of Tamil Nadu by administering oath of office
and secrecy with the portfolios specified in the
letter of the Hon’ble Chief Minister of Tamil
Nadu in D.O. Letter No. 952/CMO/2024 dated
13.03.2024 and consequently to change the
portfolios among Hon’ble Ministers”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1017

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

b) Pass such other or further order as this Hon’ble Court
may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances
of the present case.”
29. This Court heard the application on 22.03.2024 and expressed its
displeasure at the reluctance of the Governor to accept the order
of this Court dated 11.03.2024 suspending the sentence of Dr. K.
Ponmudy. This prompted the Governor to swear in Dr. K. Ponmudy as
Minister in the State Cabinet and the I.A. was disposed of accordingly
recording the same.
30. In the aforesaid factual matrix, the petitioner have prayed for a
declaration that the reservation of the bills by the Governor for the
consideration of the President after they were repassed by the
State Legislature and presented before him as illegal. Further, as
a sequitur, the petitioner have prayed that the act of withholding of
assent by the President be declared as void ab-initio. The petitioner
have also prayed for a declaration that the simpliciter withholding of
assent by the Governor without following the procedure prescribed
in the first proviso to Article 200, be also declared to be illegal for
being in contravention to the position of law as laid down in State
of Punjab (supra). The petitioner have also prayed for a direction
to the Governor to accord sanction for prosecution, take prompt
decision on the pending files pertaining to grant of remission and
to clear the proposal for appointment of members to the TNPSC.

B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

i. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner
31. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner, made elaborate submissions on the following aspects:

a) Apparent Constitutional errors committed by the Governor.
i) Pocket veto is not available under the Indian constitutional
scheme. The Governor could not have kept the Bills
submitted to him between the years 2020 and 2023 in a
cold storage without taking any decision on them. The fact
that he entered no discussion with the State Government
or the Chief Minister in relation to the Bills submitted to
him further indicates that the Governor exercised pocket
1018 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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veto in relation to the said Bills, thereby bringing the
constitutional machinery to a standstill. He submitted that
the substantive part of Article 200 uses the expression
“shall declare” which indicates that the function of the
Governor is mandatory. The underlying objective of Article
200 is to make a Bill operative as an Act. Therefore, the
scheme of Article 200 negates the possibility of engaging
in inordinate delay or pocket veto.
ii) The Governor failed to take note of the decision of this Court
in State of Punjab (supra). Although the said decision
held that the first proviso to Article 200 attaches to the
option of withholding assent, yet the Governor recorded a
simpliciter finding of withholding assent without conveying
any message to the State Legislature, as provided under
the first proviso. He submitted that simpliciter withholding
of assent by the Governor is also violative of Article 14
which mandates that the exercise of Constitutional powers
should be based on reason and transparency. The State
Legislature must be told why the assent has been withheld
so as to enable it to reconsider the Bill. He further submitted
that in the absence of any message, it would be open to
the State Legislature to understand that the Governor
wishes the entire Bill to be reconsidered.
iii) On the facts of the present case, Mr. Dwivedi submitted
that having recorded that the Bills submitted to him were
intra vires of the State Legislature, it was not open to
the Governor to reserve the Bills for the consideration of
the President upon being repassed and presented again
before him. He submitted that once the reservation of the
Bills for the consideration of the President is found to be
erroneous in law, any subsequent withholding of assent
by the President would also be legally vitiated.
iv) He submitted that even the withholding of assent by the
President under Article 201 was by way of a non-speaking
order and thus does not comply with the first proviso to the
Article. Similar to Article 200, the withholding of assent under
Article 201 must necessarily result in a message under
the first proviso. He summarised his arguments on this
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1019

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

aspect by submitting that the acts of simpliciter withholding,
reserving for the consideration of the President, delay by
Governor, as well as simpliciter withholding of assent by the
President are all unconstitutional, and hence null and void.

b) Justiciability and Judicial Review.
i) Mr. Dwivedi submitted that no constitutional power vested
in any authority, howsoever high, is beyond the powers
of judicial review of the constitutional courts. The scope
of judicial review may vary, but no power is beyond the
purview of the courts. The Courts may exercise restraint,
but that is not to say that if the power has been exercised
unconstitutionally, manifestly arbitrarily, in breach of
fundamental rights enshrined in Part III or any other
provision of the Constitution, or in a mala fide manner,
the courts would be prohibited from striking down the
exercise of such power.
ii) In furtherance of the aforesaid submission, he drew our
attention to the decision in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India
reported in (1994) 3 SCC 1 wherein the justiciability of a
proclamation under Article 356 was propounded. He also
relied upon the decisions of this Court in Rameshwar
Prasad v. Union of India reported in (2006) 2 SCC 1 and
Kihoto Holohan v. Zachillhu reported in 1992 Supp (2)
SCC 651 wherein the exercise of power of the Governor to
invite the leader of the majority party to form government
and the power of the Speaker under the 10th Schedule
to the Constitution were respectively held to be justiciable
by this Court.
iii) In light of the aforesaid, he submitted that the position
of law as on date, as explained by several Constitutional
Bench decisions, is clear that no exercise of Constitutional
power is outside the ambit of judicial review. No power is
absolute and non-justiciable. Hence, the power exercised
under Article 200 can also be examined by this court to
discern any unconstitutionality.

c) Governor is required to act upon the aid and advice of the
Council of Ministers.
1020 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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i) Mr. Dwivedi submitted that the various provisions of the
Constitution stand in harmony and are interdependent.
They are not isolated silos. They share the ultimate
objective of harmonious Parliamentary governance,
seek welfare of the people and implement Parliamentary
form of democracy within a federal system. Therefore,
interpretation of a Constitutional provision should accord
with these fundamental principles and the basic structure
of the Constitution.
ii) He submitted that this Court has been consistent in its
approach while interpreting the constitutional provisions,
more particularly those that pertain to the Governor or
the President, in light of the fundamental principles of
Parliamentary democracy and federalism. He placed
reliance on the decisions of this Court in Samsher Singh v.
State of Punjab reported in (1974) 2 SCC 831, S.R. Bommai
(supra), Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix v. Dy. Speaker,
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly reported in
(2016) 8 SCC 1 in support of the aforesaid submission.
iii) He further submitted that the discretion of the Governor
under the Indian Constitution is governed solely by Article
163(1) and the interpretation adopted by this Court has
been such which does not make the Governor dominant
over the Chief Minister, who is an elected representative
of the people.
iv) Article 200 embodies an aspect of legislative procedure
so as to make a Bill operative as an Act. Seen thus, it is
imperative that the Governor acts upon the aid and advice
of the Council of Ministers when exercising his power
under Article 200.
v) Taking us through the historical background in which
Article 200 came to be drafted, Mr. Dwivedi submitted
that Section 75 was the provision corresponding to Article
200 in the Government of India Act, 1935. However, in
Section 75 the expressions “Governor in his discretion”
and “Governor may, in his discretion” were deployed in
the substantive part and the proviso respectively. Later
on, when the draft of the Constitution was prepared by
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1021

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

the constitutional advisor, the expression “Governor in
his discretion” was dropped from the substantive part
of Article 147 (predecessor of draft Article 175), but the
expression “Governor may, in his discretion” was retained
in the proviso. The same position continued in Article 175
of the Draft Constitution, 1948 (hereinafter, “the Draft
Constitution”) (predecessor of Article 200) presented
before the Constituent Assembly. However, ultimately, the
expression conferring discretion was dropped and Article
200 came to be adopted in its present form. He submitted
that the reason for this was explained by Dr. Ambedkar
who said that there can be no room for the Governor to
act on his discretion in a responsible form of government.
Further, it was explained by Mr. T.T. Krishnamachari that
the returning of the Bill to the Legislature will only be
upon the advice of the Council of Ministers and not on
the personal discretion of the Governor.
vi) Mr. Dwivedi submitted that issues of repugnance of State
legislation with a Central enactment are not of easy
determination and the only method of discourse between
the Governor and the State Legislature is provided in the
first proviso to Article 200. Hence, simpliciter withholding
of assent without taking recourse to the first proviso ought
to be rejected by the Courts and compliance with the first
proviso ought to be mandated in every case of withholding
of assent. Furthermore, issues of repugnance should be
left for the constitutional courts to decide.
vii) The interpretation of Article 200 must be done in line
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution which
is evident from the Constituent Assembly Debates. The
only instance where this Court adopted an approach
contrary to the one suggested by the Constituent Assembly
pertained to the appointment of Judges to the High Court
and this Court and that approach was adopted to preserve
the independence of the judiciary, which is part of the
basic structure. However, in the present case, there is
no compelling need to diverge from the view adopted
by the Constituent Assembly as that view supports the
fundamental principles of federalism.
1022 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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d) Option of withholding of assent is attached to the first
proviso to Article 200.
i) He submitted that the exercise of power to withhold assent
by the Governor is coupled with the duty of the Governor
to comply with the procedure prescribed in the first proviso
to Article 200 and the same has been recognised in the
decision in State of Punjab (supra).
ii) On the use of the expression “shall declare” in the
substantive part of Article 200, he submitted that this
expression in the main part of Article 200 would, by
necessary implication, require the Governor to mention
the reasons for withholding the assent.
iii) He submitted that the expression “shall not withhold assent
therefrom” in the first proviso to Article 200 takes away
the option of reserving the Bill for the consideration of the
President from the Governor when the Bill is repassed
by the State Legislature and presented before him for
assent. In support of his submission, he argued that the
use of a negative expression renders the course of action
prescribed as mandatory in nature. He further submitted
that the phraseology of the first proviso to Article 200
is different from the proviso to Article 201 inasmuch as
the latter does not oblige the President to mandatorily
assent to the Bill after it has been repassed by the State
Legislature and is presented before him again. Whereas,
in contrast, the first proviso to Article 200 is couched in a
negative language and thus prohibits the Governor from
taking any other recourse than granting assent.

e) Reservation of bills for the consideration of the President.
i) Mr. Dwivedi submitted that the power to reserve the Bill
for the consideration of the President is not open ended.
If specific provision of the Constitution does not require
Presidential assent to the Bill passed by State Legislature,
then such a Bill cannot be reserved for the consideration
of the President.
ii) He submitted that a further limitation on the power to
reserve a Bill is that it can only be reserved on the aid and
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1023

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

advice of the Council of Ministers and the Governor has
no personal discretion in this matter. Articles 31A, 31C,
213, 254, 288, 304(b), 360 and 6th Schedule are the only
provisions which expressly require assent of President. It
is only when these articles are attracted that the Governor
can reserve the Bills for consideration of the President. In
the exclusive domain of Legislation under the State List
or List-II of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution, no assent
of President is needed.
iii) On the aspect of repugnancy, he submitted that the letter of
the Governor informing that the Bills were being reserved
for the consideration of the President fails to specify the
Central law with which States Bills are repugnant. This
indicates non-application of mind. He submitted that in
Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. National Textile
Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. and Ors. reported
in (2002) 8 SCC 182, a Constitution Bench of this Court
held that the Central law with which repugnance exists
must be pointed out by the proposal of State government
specifically. Even the nature of repugnance should be
stated so as to enable the President to consider the nature,
extent, feasibility, practicality and desirability of assenting.
iv) On the aspect of reading in a time limit within the scheme
of Article 200, he submitted that an outer limit of 2 to 3
months needs to be stipulated by this court to obviate
exercise of pocket-veto by the Governors. Delays of over
3 months needs to be curbed.
32. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the petitioner, made detailed submissions broadly on the following
aspects:

a) The Governor in exercise of his functions under Article
200 is required to act on the aid and advice tendered by
the Council of Ministers.
i) The Governor is merely a titular or de jure head
of the State and the task of governing the State is
entrusted to the Chief Minister and his Council of
Ministers who can be said to be the head of the
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State de facto. The powers vested in the Governor
under the Constitution must be exercised on the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by
the Chief Minister.
ii) The Constituent Assembly Debates indicate that the
framers of our Constitution envisaged the position of
the Governor as that of a guide, philosopher and a
friend of the Government and the people in general.
iii) The Constituent Assembly, in its wisdom and in
consonance with the position of the Governor in the
parliamentary form of Government, removed the
phrase “in his discretion” from the substantive part
and the first proviso to Section 75 of the Government
of India Act upon which Article 200 was modelled.
iv) The Constitutional Scheme does not envisage that
the Governor would have the power to veto Bills
duly passed by the State Legislature and would be
capable of supplanting the policies of the Government
with his own discretion. The Governor cannot sit
over the Bills enacted by the Legislature indefinitely
as that would be against the interest of the people
who elect the Government with the aspiration that
the Government would legislate in their interest.
Gubernatorial procrastination is a new phenomenon
and requires judicial intervention for finding a new
solution for it within the Constitutional framework.
v) Placing reliance on the Constitution Bench decision
in Samsher Singh (supra), he submitted that
although the executive power of the State is vested
in the Governor yet it is actually carried on by the
Ministers under the Rules of Business made under
Article 166(3). Further, the President or the Governor
act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers
with the Prime Minister as the head in the case of the
Union and the Chief Minister as the head in the case
of States, in all matters which vest in the Executive,
irrespective of whether those functions are executive
or legislative in character.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1025

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

vi) Referring to the observations made by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in Nabam Rebia (supra), it was
submitted that the Governor cannot be entrusted
with such powers and functions as would assign to
him a dominating position over the State Executive
and the State Legislature. The Governor cannot be
accepted as an all-pervading super-constitutional
authority. It was submitted that an examination of the
executive and legislative functions of the Governor
in the context of the constitutional scheme clearly
brings out that the Governor has not been assigned
any substantive role either in the executive or the
legislative functioning of the State.
vii) It was argued that this Court in Nabam Rabia
(supra) has gone further to say that any exercise of
discretionary powers of the Governor is limited to
situations where a constitutional provision expressly
provides that the Governor should act in his own
discretion. Additionally, a Governor may exercise his
functions in his own discretion in situations where
the constitutional provision concerned cannot be
construed otherwise and in situations where the clear
intent underlying a constitutional provision so requires
i.e., where the exercise of such power on the aid
and advice, would run contrary to the constitutional
scheme, or would be contradictory in terms.
viii) In response to our specific question as regards the
observations made by this Court in B.K. Pavitra v.
Union of India reported in (2019) 6 SCC 129, that
the eventuality in Article 254(2) does not exhaust the
ambit of the power entrusted to the Governor under
Article 200 to reserve a Bill for the consideration of
the President, he submitted that the Governor may
legitimately refer a bill for consideration at the end
of the President upon entertaining a legitimate doubt
about the validity of law. However, such reference
of a bill can only be done with the aid and advice of
the Council of Ministers and not upon the individual
discretion of the Governor.
1026 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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ix) He further submitted that the said observations in B.K.
Pavitra (supra) should be interpreted to mean that even
though the power under Article 200 is entrusted to the
Governor, yet such exercise of power can only be done
with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of
the State. The Governor has no independent discretion
under the substantive part of Article 200 for referring the
bill for the consideration of the President. As is crystal
clear from the Constituent Assembly Debates, there
is no independent discretion vested in the Governor
in exercise of his functions under Article 200 of the
Constitution. Although the power of reserving Bills
for the consideration of the President is a necessary
channel for references under Article 254(2) to save
the competence of the State Legislatures from being
unduly restricted by the operation of the rule of
repugnancy embodied in Clause (1) of the Article 254,
yet such power is also subject to the aid and advice
of the Council of Ministers.

b) The Governor cannot reserve a bill for the consideration of
the President when it is repassed by the State Legislature,
with or without amendments, under the first proviso to
Article 200?
i) Mr. Singhvi submitted that the relevant consideration at
the end of the Governor when a bill is presented before
him for assent broadly should be as follows:
1. The first step is to ascertain whether the Bill is a
Money Bill – In cases of Money Bills, the Governor
has to grant assent.
2. Thereafter, the Governor must ascertain whether
the second proviso to Article 200 is attracted, that
is, whether the Bill, if it became law, would derogate
from the powers of the High Court - If the answer is
yes, then the Governor must reserve the Bill for the
consideration of the President.
3. In all other cases, the Governor has three options to
choose from when the bill is presented before him for
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1027

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

the first time – to either assent, or withhold assent, or
reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President.
ii) He submitted that after the Governor has withheld assent
to a bill and returned the same to the Legislative Assembly,
it is not open to the Governor to reserve the said bill for
the consideration of the President once the Legislative
Assembly re-passes it with or without amendment. If the
Governor wants to reserve any bill for the consideration
of the President, he must do so in the first instance when
the bill is presented to him for assent. The Governor can
choose any one of the three options at the first instance
but if he exercises the option to withhold assent, then
the option of reserving the bill for the consideration of the
President ceases to exist because the next step in such
a case is to follow the procedure prescribed under first
proviso to Article 200.
iii) Explaining the reason for the aforesaid, he submitted that
upon exercising the second option, the third option no
longer remains for the Governor as the first proviso to Article
200 comes into operation. Article 200 does not provide
any scope to the Governor for the reservation of the bill
once the second option has already been exercised. The
decision of the Governor to go down the path of sending
the bill back to the Legislature precludes him from reversing
his constitutional election subsequently, by referring it to
the President after the Bill is returned to him consequent
to repassing by the Legislature.

c) The first proviso to Article 200 is attached to the option
of withholding of assent provided in the substantive part
of the article.
i) The concluding part of the first proviso stipulates that if
the Bill is passed again by the Legislature either with or
without amendments, the Governor shall not withhold
assent therefrom upon presentation. The expression “shall
not withhold assent therefrom” is a clear indicator that the
exercise of the power under the first proviso is relatable
to the withholding of the assent by the Governor to the
bill in the first instance. This phrase constitutes a clear
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and unequivocal constitutional prohibition against the
Governor. The role which is ascribed by the first proviso
to the Governor is recommendatory in nature and it does
not bind the State Legislature.
ii) The first proviso to Article 200 expands upon the second
option to ensure that the object of the Article is not rendered
otiose as without the first proviso, Article 200 would allow
the Governor to indiscriminately veto bills by repetitively
and sequentially withholding the assent and cripple an
elected Government for political reasons.
iii) On the use of the expression “may” in the first proviso to
Article 200, placing reliance on the decision of this Court in
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh reported in AIR
1963 SC 1618 the counsel submitted that in the said decision
while adjudicating the duty of the Governor to refer the
cases relating to Government servants to the Administrative
Tribunal under Rules 4(2) of the Civil Service Rules which
also used the expression “may” this Court had held that
the word “may” is capable of meaning “must” or “shall” in
the light of the context. He further submitted that where
a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled
with an obligation, the word “may” which denotes discretion
should be construed to mean a command. Sometimes, the
legislature uses the word “may” out of deference to the high
status of the authority on whom the power and the obligation
are intended to be conferred and imposed.
iv) The first part of the first proviso is mandatory in nature.
It authorises the Governor to, as soon as possible, after
the presentation for Bill for assent, return the Bill together
with a message requesting the House to reconsider the Bill
with the desirability of introducing any such amendments
as he may recommend in his message. He submitted
that this interpretation was also followed by this Court in
the decision in State of Punjab (supra) by stating that
Governor must mandatorily follow the course of action
indicated in the first proviso of communicating to the State
Legislature “as soon as possible” a message warranting
reconsideration of the Bill.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1029

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

v) The Governor can only return the bill when he has withheld
the assent. The Governor cannot be expected to keep the
bill in his custody after withholding the assent as it would
amount to a “pocket veto” or veto which is contrary to the
intention of the makers of the Constitution. Any acceptance
of such “suspended animation” doctrine of a Bill, supposedly
kept indefinitely pending by a Governor, would be grossly
violative of the Constitutional text, spirit and intent.
vi) The counsel while highlighting the facts of the case at hand,
submitted that the Governor had returned the Bills with
the remarks “I withhold assent” which amounts to a clear
withholding as per the second option of the substantive
part of Article 200. When these Bills were returned to the
Legislative Assembly, the Bills only contained a signed
endorsement by the Governor with the remarks “I withhold
assent” and there was no message for reconsideration. In
such a situation of simpliciter withholding of assent, the
State Legislative Assembly cannot be precluded from re-
considering the Bill and re-passing the Bill as the exercise
of the option of withholding of assent brings into operation
the first proviso whereby such Bills have to be returned
to the State Legislative Assembly.
vii) Once the first proviso comes into operation, the State
Legislature is bound to mandatorily reconsider the Bills and
pass them with or without any amendments as indicated
by the expression “House or Houses shall reconsider the
Bill accordingly” in the second part of the first proviso to
Article 200.

d) A time-limit must be read into the expression “as soon
as possible” appearing in the first proviso to Article
200 to curtail the prevalent practice of gubernatorial
procrastination.
i) He submitted that the expression “as soon as possible”
provided in first proviso to Article 200 does not provide any
strict time limit to be followed by the Governor to decide
upon the Bills presented for assent, but that should not
and cannot mean that the Governor can keep a Bill duly
passed by the State Legislative Assembly “pending” for
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indeterminate periods. This course of action is inconsistent
with the phrase “as soon as possible”.
ii) The counsel placed reliance on the following decisions of
this Court in support of his submission:
• The State of Telangana v. Secretary to Her
Excellency the Hon’ble Governor for the State of
Telangana & Anr. reported in (2024) 1 SCC 405 has
emphasized that the phrase “as soon as possible”
has significant Constitutional content, and must be
borne in mind by Constitutional functionaries.
• Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
reported in (1994) 1 SCC 44 held that where for
exercise of power no time-limit is fixed, it has to
be exercised within a time which can be held to be
reasonable.
• Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker,
Manipur Legislative Assembly and Ors. reported in
(2021) 16 SCC 503 had postulated a “three months
outer limit” for deciding disqualification petitions filed
before the Speaker.
• M/s North Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. &
Anr. v. M/s Ashok Mills - CA No. 2669 of 2023 has
held that where there is no time period prescribed
by the statute, the Court must undertake a holistic
assessment of the facts and circumstances, conduct
of the parties, and the nature of the proceedings to
examine the possibility of delay causing prejudice
to a party.
• AG Perarivalan v. State, Through Superintendent
of Police CBI/SIT/MMDA, Chennai, Tamil Nadu and
Anr. reported in (2023) 8 SCC 257 wherein while
dealing with the delay caused by the Governor in
deciding remission matters, this Court exercised its
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution directing
that the prisoner was deemed to have served the
sentence.
iii) Mr. Singhvi referred to Chapter V of the report of the
Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Administrative
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1031

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

Relations wherein it was suggested that the Governor
should make a declaration under Article 200 within one
month from the date on which the Bill is presented. He
also referred to the Punchhi Committee Report on Centre-
State Relations which recommended “maximum period of
six months after Bill is presented” to be the time limit to
be followed by the Governor under Article 200.

e) The observations made by this Court in its decision in
Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary are not applicable to the
present case
i) Mr. Singhvi submitted that this Court in Valluri Basavaiah
Chowdhary (supra) had no occasion to adjudicate upon the
interpretation of the constitutional powers of the Governor
under Article 200 of the Constitution. Therefore, the
observations of the Court in Para 19 cannot be construed
to be its ratio decidendi. At most, these observations
could be considered as obiter dicta. Indeed, they may not
even constitute obiter but are mere observations, totally
unconnected to and unnecessary for that case.
ii) He relied upon the decision of this Court in Secunderabad
Club v. Commissioner of Income-Tax reported in (2023)
SCC OnLine SC 1004 to submit that in terms of Article 141
of the Constitution, only the ratio decidendi of a judgment,
that is, the reason assigned in support of the conclusion,
is binding. He submitted that this Court has held that what
is binding, therefore, is the principle underlying a decision
which must be discerned in the context of the question(s)
involved in that case from which the decision takes its colour.
In a subsequent case, a decision cannot be relied upon in
support of a proposition that it did not decide. Therefore,
the context or the question, while considering which, a
judgment has been rendered assumes significance.
iii) He submitted that the obiter dictum of the Supreme
Court is binding under Article 141 to the extent of the
observations on points raised and decided by the court in
a case. Although the obiter dictum of the Supreme Court
is binding on all courts yet it only has persuasive authority
as far as the Supreme Court itself is concerned.
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iv) He further submitted that a decision is not an authority
for what can be read into it by implication or by assigning
an assumed intention of the judges and inferring from it a
proposition of law which the judges have not specifically
or expressly laid down in the pronouncement.
v) Lastly, he submitted that even if the decision in Valluri
Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) is interpreted as a binding
precedent, still such interpretation of the Article 200 would
fall foul of the intention envisaged by the Constituent
Assembly.

f) Role of the President under Article 201.
i) On the aspect of the position of the President under Article
201, he submitted that the President is not required to
mandatorily assent to the bill that is presented to him for his
consideration after being repassed by the State Legislature,
once such bill has been sent back by the President under
the proviso to Article 201 in the first instance.
ii) It was submitted that Article 201 does not contain the
expression “shall not withhold assent therefrom” in the
proviso unlike the first proviso to Article 200. He further
submitted that this Court in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra) had
held that the assent of the President envisaged under
Articles 31-A, 31-C, 254(2) and 304(b) of the Constitution
respectively constitutes a distinct class and category of
its own and is different from the assent envisaged under
Articles 111 of the President or Article 200 of the Governor.
A bare perusal of Article 201 indicates that even when the
Houses of the State Legislature re-pass the Bill and present
it for consideration in terms of the proviso to Article 201,
there is no compulsion on the President to accord assent.
iii) Just as the Governor, the President is also bound by the
aid and advice of his Council of Ministers under Article
201 of the Constitution. Such absence of compulsion of
the President to grant assent to the Bill re-considered and
repassed by the State Legislative Assembly is also subject
to the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Whether
the President should grant assent or not would be subject
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1033

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

to the aid and advice by the Council of Ministers. There is
no individual discretion vested in the President in granting
or not granting the assent under Article 201.

g) Malice in law and malice in fact
i) He submitted that the Governor could be said to have
committed violence to the constitutional framework by
not adhering to the mandate under Article 200 of the
Constitution and has also attempted to render the present
Writ Petition infructuous during its pendency.
ii) It was submitted that when the Petitioner had approached
this Court initially, the Governor had kept 12 Bills pending.
Thereafter, the captioned Writ Petitions were heard by
this Court on 10.11.2023 wherein it was observed that the
present Writ Petition raised a matter of serious concern
and issued notice to the Union of India represented by
the Secretary to the Government in the Ministry of Home
Affairs. In light of the aforesaid, the Governor hastily on
13.11.2023 referred two Bills for the consideration of the
President and withheld assent simpliciter to the remaining
10 Bills. On 18.11.2023, a special session of Tamil Nadu
Legislative Assembly was held and the 10 Bills were
reconsidered and passed in the Assembly. These Bills
were sent to the Governor for consideration on the same
day itself. However, the Governor, with a view to render
the present petition infructuous, reserved the 10 Bills for
the consideration of the President.
iii) In the last, the learned counsel submitted that the action of
the Governor has been contrary to what was laid down by
this Court in S.R. Bommai (supra) wherein it was stated
that the Governor is a very high Constitutional functionary
and he is supposed to act fairly and honestly, in a manner
consistent with his oath. It is for this reason that Article
356 places such implicit faith on his report. If, however, in
a given case his report is vitiated by legal mala fides, it is
bound to vitiate the President’s action as well.
33. Mr. P. Wilson, the learned Senior Counsel, made extensive
submissions on behalf of the petitioner. For the sake of brevity,
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we are recording only those submissions which are in addition
to the points already canvassed by Mr. Dwivedi and Mr. Singhvi
respectively:
i) The Constituent Assembly after long and detailed debates
decided to have a nominated Governor in place of an elected
Governor and consciously deleted all expressions from the
Draft Constitution which conferred individual discretion on the
Governor. He referred to certain portions of the report of the
Sarkaria Commission in support of his arguments.
ii) Article 91 of the Draft Constitution, 1948 which enumerated the
assent to bills by the President, had postulated a time limit of
six weeks for the President to provide his assent to the bills
presented to him by the Houses of Parliament.
iii) Relying on the speech of Mr. T.T. Krishnamachari in the
Constituent Assembly, he submitted that Article 200, as finally
enacted, does not vest any discretion in the Governor to withhold
a bill passed by the Legislature except on the express aid and
advice of the Council of Ministers.
iv) He submitted that the Sarkaria Commission in its Report in
Chapter V had observed that the Governor may reserve a
bill for the consideration of President when it clearly violates
Fundamental Rights or transgresses other Constitutional
limitations. The power to reserve Bills could be used only in
rare circumstances. In all other circumstances, the Governor
needs to abide by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
Therefore, Article 200 does not confer general discretion on the
Governor but mandates him to act in accordance with aid and
advice of the Council of Ministers.
v) He submitted that the fear anticipated by Shri H.V. Kamath
as regards the difficulties that may arise due to the use of the
phrase “as soon as possible” during the discussion on draft
Article 91 is exactly what has been happening in the States of
Telangana, Punjab, Kerala as well as in the petitioner State.
Thus, this Court must intervene and put the matter on quietus
by declaring that it is deemed that assent has been granted to
the Bills and declare the action of reserving Bills for assent of
the President as ultra vires.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1035

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

vi) He submitted that the 10 Bills which are the subject matter of
present Writ Petition were dealt with by the Governor during
the pendency of the Writ Petition in the manner referred to
in paragraph 13 and 14 respectively of the third Amendment
application in I.A. No. 216164 of 2024. Therefore, all
unconstitutional acts of the Governor remain for consideration by
this Court as they are actions pendente lite and this Court has
the power to turn the clock back and restore status quo ante.

ii. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents
34. Mr. R. Venkatramani, the learned Attorney General for India, appeared
for the respondents and submitted as follows:
a. The Governor while acting under Article 200 is not acting in
exercise of ordinary discretion but is acting under a constitutional
responsibility. Thus, even if it is assumed that the Governor has
no individual discretion, he may still withhold assent to a bill as
per his constitutional obligation.
b. He submitted that having regard to the high level of responsibilities
entrusted to the Governor in dealing with Bills presented for his
consideration, the Governor may reach out to the Council of
Ministers for advice, in order to know the legislative intent, and
be benefited as well. However, when on the plain understanding
of the bills, the Governor finds constitutional contraventions, or
seriously debatable issues of the Constitution, he may apply his
mind, with or without the aid of the Council of Ministers. This
principle of an area of constitutional deliberation prior to the
Governor taking any call under Article 200, cannot be subjected
to or put into any strait-jacket formula.
c. He submitted that when new issues and concerns of legislation
involving federal structure of the polity of the nation arise, it
is important that the role of the Governor is neither stretched
beyond a point, nor should be allowed to be diminished to a
status of no consequence.
d. He submitted that in the instant case, the Governor was
persuaded by the observations made in Valluri Basavaiah
(supra), which suggest that when assent is withheld, the Bill will
cease to exist. However, if the Governor chooses to follow the
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Supreme Court Reports

procedure under the first proviso, wherever it will be of relevance
and of importance to follow, then the Governor would become
bound by the mandatory stipulation enunciated in the first proviso.
e. He submitted that the single-minded focus of the Governor was
to ensure that a repugnant law, if allowed to be on the statute
book, would open the scope for maladministration of universities
and impede the avowed object and purpose of excellence in
higher education, placing all power in the hands of the State
Government as opposed to the Chancellor. It is only with a view
to avoid such a situation that the Governor withheld assent to
the Bills in question.
f. On the aspect of reservation of the bills for the consideration of
the President, he submitted that there is nothing in Article 200
that suggests that the Governor ceases to have the authority to
refer the matter to the President after he has withheld assent
to the bill in the first instance. If this authority is available at
the time of withholding of assent, the same cannot be taken
away or not made available by the State Government acting
on their own motion under the first proviso.
g. In furtherance of the aforesaid submission, he submitted that
for all practical purposes, the Bills forwarded by the petitioner
State on 18.11.2023 should not to be treated as sent by the
Governor acting under the first proviso. Bills that are sent
outside the procedure contemplated by the first proviso, would
be open for consideration by the Governor for any further course
of action including, reference to the President. The principle of
power coupled with duty underlying Article 200 demands that
recourse to reference to President even after initial withholding
of assent by the Governor, be read into the Article, in order to
make the power effective to achieve its purpose.
h. He submitted that on a proper reading of the substantive part and
the first proviso to Article 200, it will be seen that four courses of
actions are available to the Governor. The observations made
in the State of Punjab (supra) decision may thus warrant a
qualification, or an additional statement to fine-tune the scope
of Article 200.
i. On the issue as regards whether the first proviso is attracted in
all instances of withholding of assent, he submitted that the role
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1037

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

for the first proviso is confined to cases where the bill may not be
hit by any constitutional limitation, is within the competence of the
legislature, but may admit of changes, amendments, etc. Such
amendments or changes that the Governor may thus suggest
within the scope of the first proviso, will not be relatable to
matters such as repugnancy. With the perception of repugnancy,
the focus of the Governor will be outside the first proviso. He
argued that even though this Court in State of Punjab (supra)
has opined that the exercise of power under the first proviso is
relatable to the withholding of the assent by the Governor, yet
this view may require a further qualification that in the context of
repugnancy, unlike any other reason for withholding of assent,
the Governor need not necessarily proceed to act under the first
proviso. The first proviso perhaps cannot be read to be pressed
into service when both the Governor and the State Government
understand the repugnancy dimension. In the event the State
Government desires to clear the repugnancy or any other hurdle,
it may itself seek the assent of the President. In such an event
the State Government may also ask the Governor to refer the
matter to the President for consideration.
j. He submitted that that in the present case as the President has
withheld assent to the Bills in question, therefore in terms of the
statement of law in Hoechst Pharamaceuticals (supra), the
action of the President in withholding assent is not justiciable.
What cannot be directly done by seeking such justiciability
cannot be indirectly achieved by the claim that the action of
the Governor in forwarding the bills in question to the President
was beyond his authority.
k. He submitted that the exposition of Article 200 as done in State
of Punjab (supra) is sub-silentio as the Court while making the
said decision did not take into account the observations made
by the Constitution Bench in Valluri Basavaiah (supra).
l. In the last, he submitted that the matter may be referred to a
larger Bench of this Court so as to harmonise the observations
made in B.K. Pavitra (supra), Valluri Basavaiah (supra) and
State of Punjab (supra).
35. Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, the learned Additional Solicitor General,
appeared for the respondents and submitted as follows:
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a. A reading of Clause (1) of Article 163 categorically provides
that the Governor ordinarily is aided and advised by the Council
of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister, however, there is
an express discretion vested with the Governor for exercising
functions under the Constitution which permeates all of the
provisions that require the Governor to exercise his/her power,
including Articles 200 and 201.
b. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in M.P. Special
Police (supra), he submitted that that the normal rule is that the
Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers
and not independently or contrary to it. But there are exceptions
under which the Governor can act in his own discretion and
the exceptions are not exhaustive or limited but differ as per
the facts of each case. He further submitted that the aforesaid
decision recognised that the concept of the Governor acting in
his discretion or exercising independent judgment is not alien
to the Constitution. There may be situations where, by reason
of peril to democracy or democratic principles, an action may
be compelled which by its very nature is not amenable to
Ministerial advice. An instance of a situation curiously similar
to the present case is discussed where bias was inherent
and manifest in the advice of the Council of Ministers as the
proposed bills sought to fundamentally encroach into the role
of the Governor as the Chancellor by seeking to substitute
“Chancellor” (who is the appointing authority of Vice Chancellors
and also the disciplinary authority) with “Government”. The
State Government has impugned the notifications issued by
the Governor (in the capacity of the Chancellor) for constitution
of Search Committees for appointment of Vice Chancellors
for State Universities. Additionally, the Bills were effectively
aimed at seeking to control the co-ordination and standards
of higher and technical education/research which fall under
Entry 66 of the Union List (under the Seventh Schedule of
the Constitution).
c. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Purushothaman
Nambudiri v. State of Kerala reported in 1961 SCC OnLine
SC 361 he submitted that the idea of reading in a time limit in
Articles 200 and 201 respectively had been deliberated upon
and expressly rejected by this Court in the said decision.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1039

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

C. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
36. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the following questions
of paramount constitutional importance fall for our determination:

I) What courses of action are available to the Governor
in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the
Constitution?
i. Whether the first proviso could be said to provide an
independent course of action available to the Governor in
addition to the three options provided under the substantive
part of Article 200?
ii. In what manner the expression “the Bill falls through
unless the procedure under the first proviso is followed”,
as used in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra), should
be construed?
iii. Whether the decision of this Court in State of Punjab
(supra) could be said to be per incuriam for not having
taken into consideration the observations made in previous
decisions rendered by larger benches of this Court?
iv. Whether the scheme of Article 200 of the Constitution
envisages the exercise of ‘absolute veto’ or ‘pocket veto’
of a bill by the Governor?

II) Whether the Governor can reserve a bill for the consideration
of the President at the time when it is presented to him for
assent after being reconsidered in accordance with the first
proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not
reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first
instance and had declared withholding of assent thereto?
i. Whether the reservation by the Governor, for the
consideration of the President of the ten Bills which were
repassed by the Tamil Nadu State Assembly and presented
to the Governor on 18.11.2023, is erroneous in law and
hence liable to be set aside?

III) Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed
time-limit within which the Governor is required to act
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in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the
Constitution?
i. How is the absence of an express time-limit in Article 200
to be construed for ascertaining the manner in which the
Governor is expected to exercise his powers under the
said provision?
ii. What is the import of the expression “as soon as possible”
appearing in the first proviso to Article 200?
iii. Whether a time-limit can be prescribed by this Court for
ensuring that the exercise of power by the Governor under
Article 200 is in conformity with the object of expediency
underlying the scheme of the said provision?

IV) Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under
Article 200 of the Constitution can only act in accordance
with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council
of Ministers? If not, whether the constitutional scheme has
vested the Governor with some discretion in discharge of
his functions under Article 200?
i. How has the role of the Governor been envisaged under
the constitutional scheme?
ii. Whether the Governor enjoys a certain degree of discretion
in discharge of his functions in contrast to the President?
What is the source of such discretion, if any?
iii. Whether the deletion of the expression “in his discretion”
from Article 175 of the Draft Constitution imply that the
Governor has no discretion available in the exercise of
his powers under Article 200?
iv. Whether the observations of this Court in B.K. Pavitra
(supra) that “a discretion is conferred upon the Governor
to follow one of the courses of action enunciated in the
substantive part of Article 200” could be said to be per
incuriam for having failed to notice the position of law as
laid down by the larger Benches of this Court?

V) Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor in
discharge of his functions under Article 200 could be
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1041

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

said to be subject to judicial review? If yes, what are the
parameters for such judicial review?
i. Whether the discharge of functions by the Governor under
Article 200 of the Constitution in his discretion could be
said to be immune from judicial review?
ii. Whether the withholding of assent by the President under
Article 201 of the Constitution could also be said to be
beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny?
iii. If the aforesaid discharge of functions is subject to judicial
review, whether such discharge of functions could be said
to be non-justiciable in light of the decisions of this Court
in Hoechst (supra), Kaiser-I-Hind (supra), and B.K.
Pavitra (supra)?

VI) What is the manner in which the President under Article
201 of the Constitution is required to act once a bill has
been reserved for his consideration by the Governor under
Article 200 of the Constitution?
i. Whether the decision of the President to withhold assent
under Article 201 of the Constitution could be said to be
justiciable? If yes, what is the extent of justiciability that
the courts can embark upon while undertaking judicial
review of the exercise of powers by the President under
Article 201 of the Constitution?

D. ASSENT TO BILLS – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
37. Article 200 appears in Chapter III of Part VI of the Constitution under
the heading Legislative Procedure. Part VI deals with the States and
Chapter III deals with the State Legislature. The marginal note attached
to Article 200 reads “Assent to Bills” and the article reads as follows:
“200. Assent to Bills. –
When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly
of a State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative
Council, has been passed by both Houses of the Legislature
of the State, it shall be presented to the Governor and the
Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill
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or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves
the Bill for the consideration of the President:
Provided that the Governor may, as soon as possible after
the presentation to him of the Bill for assent, return the Bill
if it is not a Money Bill together with a message requesting
that the House or Houses will reconsider the Bill or any
specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider
the desirability of introducing any such amendments as
he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is
so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider the Bill
accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the House
or Houses with or without amendment and presented to
the Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold
assent therefrom:
Provided further that the Governor shall not assent to,
but shall reserve for the consideration of the President,
any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it
became law, so derogate from the powers of the High
Court as to endanger the position which that Court is by
this Constitution designed to fill.”
38. Section 75 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (for short, “the
GoI Act, 1935”) upon which the Article 200 has been substantially
modelled is reproduced hereinbelow:
“75. Assent to Bills. –
A Bill which has been passed by the Provincial Legislative
Assembly or, in the case of a Province having a Legislative
Council, has been passed by both Chambers of the
Provincial Legislature, shall be presented to the Governor,
and the Governor in his discretion shall declare either that
he assents in His Majesty’s name to the Bill, or that he
withholds assent therefrom, or that he reserves the Bill
for the consideration of the Governor General :
Provided that the Governor may in his discretion return
the Bill together with a message requesting that the
Chamber or Chambers will reconsider the Bill or any
specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider
the desirability of introducing any such amendments as
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is
so returned, the Chamber or Chambers shall reconsider
it accordingly.”
39. A perusal of both the aforesaid provisions indicates that Article 200
of the Constitution corresponds to Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935
except for the following differences:
a. The expression “in his discretion” has been omitted from both
the substantive part of Article 200 as well as the first proviso
thereto.
b. The Governor under Article 200 assents to the bill in his own
name unlike Section 75 wherein the assent was to be granted
in the name of the Crown.
c. The expression “if the Bill is passed again by the House or
Houses with or without amendment and presented to the
Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent
therefrom” has been added to the first proviso to Article 200.
d. The second proviso is a further addition to Article 200 and did
not exist in Section 75 referred to above.
40. D.D. Basu in his Commentary on the Constitution of India (pp. 6311,
8th Ed., 2009) has observed that the omission of the expression
“in his discretion” from Article 200 signifies that the Governor must
exercise his power under the Article according to the advice of his
ministers. Further, the addition of the expression “shall not withhold
assent therefrom” indicates that the Governor has no power to veto
a reconsidered bill and must assent to it whether it is passed in the
original form or with amendments.
41. Article 200 is divided into three parts - the substantive part and two
provisos. A perusal of the substantive part of Article 200 indicates
that the presentation of a bill to the Governor is mandatory after it
is passed by the State legislature. The same is made evident from
the use of the expression “it shall be presented to the Governor”. In
the same breath, Article 200 makes it mandatory for the Governor
to make one of the following declarations:
a. That he assents to the bill; or
b. That he withholds assent to the bill; or
c. That he reserves the bill for the consideration of the President.
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42. It is important to note that the expression “shall” has been used
to qualify the three types of declarations that the Governor can
make upon presentation of the bill to him. Further, the three options
provided in the substantive part of Article 200 are connected by the
conjunction “or” which signifies that the three options are mutually
exclusive of each other, and the Governor can only choose one of
them at a time. In other words, the Governor cannot assent to a bill
and also reserve it for the consideration of the President at the same
time. Similarly, the Governor cannot declare that he withholds assent
and also reserve the bill for the consideration of the President at the
same time. Patanjali Sastri, Chief Justice (as he then was), observed
to this effect in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh reported in
(1952) 1 SCC 528 as follows:
“20. […] It is significant that the article does not contemplate
the Governor giving his assent and thereafter, when the
Bill has become a full-fledged law, reserving it for the
consideration of the President. Indeed, the Governor is
prohibited from giving his assent where such reservation
by him is made compulsory. The Constitution would thus
seem to contemplate only “Bills” passed by the House or
Houses of Legislature being reserved for the consideration
of the President and not “laws” to which the Governor has
already given his assent. […]
Similarly, Article 31(3) must, in my judgment, be understood
as having reference to what, in historical sequence,
having been passed by the House or Houses of the
State Legislature and reserved by the Governor for the
consideration of the President and assented to by the
latter, has thus become a law. If it was intended that
such a law should have the assent of both the Governor
and the President, one would expect to find not only a
more clear or explicit provision to that effect, but also
some reference in Article 200 to the Governor’s power to
reserve a measure for the consideration of the President
after himself assenting to it. On the other hand, as we
have seen, where reservation by the Governor is made
obligatory, he is prohibited from giving his assent.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

43. The first proviso to Article 200 has no application to Money Bills.
For all other bills, it provides that the Governor may, as soon as
possible after the presentation of the bill to him for assent, return
the bill to the House or Houses along with a message requesting
the House or the Houses to reconsider the bill in totality or certain
provisions thereof. He may also recommend the introduction of
certain amendments to the bill. The first proviso further states that
when a bill is returned with such a message, then the House or the
Houses must reconsider the bill accordingly and if the bill is passed
with or without amendments and presented to the Governor for
assent, he shall not withhold assent therefrom.
44. The second proviso to Article 200 provides that if the Governor is
of the opinion that a bill which is presented to him for assent would,
upon becoming law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court
as to endanger the position which that Court is designed to fill by
the Constitution, then he must reserve the bill for the consideration
of the President and not grant assent to it.
45. The heart of the controversy before us lies in the interpretation of
the substantive part of Article 200 and the first proviso to it. The
arguments advanced before us coupled with the factual situation
which we are confronted with, and the broader constitutional and
political consequences that an interpretation of Article 200 entails,
has opened up before us a treasure trove of questions hidden in
the seemingly innocuous and plain language used in Article 200.
46. For a better understanding of Article 200, it is necessary that we
should first understand the concept of assent to bills, how it has
evolved over the centuries and its importance in parliamentary
democracies across the globe. We are undertaking this exercise as
Article 200 cannot be understood fully without having regard to the
context in which it came to be included in the Constitution. While
fidelity to the text of the provision holds paramount consideration in
its interpretation, the context is equally, if not more, important, more
so in light of the fact that Article 200, as its stands today, bears
striking resemblance to Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 and other
important historical documents which were being drafted by Indians
during the course of the freedom struggle.
47. In Westminster styled polities, the Parliament consists of a lower
House, an upper House and the head of state. The Indian Constitution
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has also broadly adopted a similar structure, which becomes evident
from Articles 79 and 168 respectively. Article 79 provides that the
Parliament shall consist of the President and two Houses - the
Council of States and the House of the People. Article 168 provides
that each State shall have a Legislature which shall comprise of the
Governor and either one or two House(s), as the case may be. In
the Westminster system, for a law to be passed by the Parliament,
it must receive the approval of all the three elements - the Lower
House, the Upper House and the Head of the State.
48. Jessica J. Richardson2 in her paper titled “Modernisation of Royal
Assent in Canada”, has traced the historical origins of the practice
of granting assent to bills enacted by the Parliament in the United
Kingdom. She has explained that the practice of signifying royal
assent to bills passed by Parliament began during the reign of Henry
VI (1422-71), when the practice of introducing bills in the form of
petitions was replaced by bills in the form of complete statutes. This
was a time when assent was granted in person. The Sovereign would
attend the Parliament in the House of Lords and give his consent in
person. This practice continued until 1541, when the task of signifying
royal assent was assigned to a Royal Commission in order to spare
King Henry VIII the indignity of having to give royal assent to the Bill
of Attainder, which provided for the execution of his wife Catherine
Howard. It was after this occurrence that the practice of appointing
Lords Commissioners responsible for giving royal assent developed. In
the United Kingdom, the last instance of a monarch giving royal assent
in person was in 1854 when Queen Victoria personally assented to
several bills prior to proroguing the Parliament. However, in Canada,
King George VI gave royal assent in person to bills passed by the
Canadian Parliament in 1939 during a visit to Canada. The use of a
royal assent ceremony continued in the United Kingdom until 1967,
when the British Parliament passed the Royal Assent Act, 1967. The
said legislation repealed the Royal Assent by Commission Act, 1541
and allowed a simple report of royal assent by the Speakers of the
two Houses to give a bill the force of law.
49. In the Canadian context, she explains that the royal assent ceremony
was inherited from the United Kingdom tradition and was used prior

2 Jessica J. Richardson, Modernisation of Royal Assent in Canada, 27 Can. Parliam. Rev.2, 32 (2004),
<http://www.revparl.ca/27/2/27n2_04e_Richardson.pdf>.
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to Confederation in both Lower and Upper Canada and closely
resembled the original ceremony used in the United Kingdom.
Prior to adoption of the new procedure in 2002, Canada was the
only remaining Commonwealth country to still use the traditional
ceremony for royal assent. However, taking inspiration from the
practice prevailing in other Commonwealth countries including
Australia and New Zealand, as well as several Canadian provinces,
the royal assent procedure was modernised by adopting a written
declaration procedure.
50. One of the first instances where the concept of assent to bills appears
in a documented form in the Indian context is the Constitution of India
Bill, 1895 which is also popularly referred to as the Swaraj Bill. The
Bill, which is also termed by the academics as the first articulation
of a constitutional imagination by Indians, besides incorporating
ideas of free speech, equality before law, right to property, etc., also
envisaged a machinery of governance and separation of powers,
albeit within the British Empire. As regards the legislative structure,
the Bill proposed that the Sovereign of Great Britain shall reign and
rule over India and the Viceroy shall be the representative of the
Sovereign in India. It further envisaged that the Viceroy would be
the President of the Parliament and would have the power to veto
any law enacted by the Indian Parliament and initiate legislation.
Article 97 of the Bill provided that no bill would become law until
it received the sanction of the Sovereign. The said provision is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“97. No Bill shall become law unless it has passed by
majority through the Lower House three times and the
Upper House three times and unless it has obtained the
sanction of the Sovereign.”
51. A few years after the ideation of the Swaraj Bill, the demand
for self-government further found expression in the Congress-
League Scheme of 1916 which was a result of deliberations of the
committees constituted jointly by the Indian National Congress and
the All India Muslim League. The document envisioned a federal
polity - with Provincial Legislative Councils for the provinces and
an Imperial Legislative Council at the national level. It is pertinent
to note that as per the scheme, the Governor was envisaged as
the head of the provincial government and any bill passed by the
provincial legislature had to mandatorily receive his assent before
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it became law. Further, the document also conferred upon the
Governor-General the power of vetoing any law passed by the
provincial legislature. Any bill passed by the Imperial Legislative
Council had to receive the assent of the Governor-General before
it became law. The relevant provisions in the said document are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“I. Provincial Legislative Councils

xxx xxx xxx
9. A Bill, other than a Money Bill, may be introduced in
Council in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the
Council itself and the consent of the Government should
not be required therefor.
II. Provincial Governments
1. The head of every Provincial Government shall be a
Governor who shall not ordinarily belong to the Indian Civil
Service or any of the permanent services.

xxx xxx xxx
III. Imperial Legislative Council

xxx xxx xxx
9. All Bills passed by the Council shall have to receive the
assent of the Governor-General before they become law.”
52. In the backdrop of the growing demand for self-government by the
Indian National Movement and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report,
the Government of India Act, 1919 (for short, “the GoI Act, 1919”)
was enacted and received assent of the British Crown in December,
1919. The legislation introduced dyarchy at the provincial level, by
the introduction of the transferred list and the reserved list. The
reserved list consisted of the subject matters on which the Governor
enjoyed exclusive legislative powers. However, what we wish to
draw attention to is the provision contained in the said legislation as
regards assent to bills. Section 12 provided that the Governor had
four options to choose from when a bill was presented to him for
assent - to declare assent, to withhold assent, to return the bill to the
council for reconsideration or to reserve the bill for the consideration
of the Governor-General. Notably, there was no requirement for the
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Governor to mandatorily assent to a bill upon its presentation after
reconsideration. Further, the Governor had the power to veto any
bill passed by the legislative council by a declaration simplicter of
withholding of assent. There was also a provision for the lapse of a
bill reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General if assent
was not granted within a period of six months. Thus, the concept of
both absolute and pocket veto could be said to have been available
to the Governor and the Governor-General under the provisions of
the GoI Act, 1919. The relevant provision is reproduced hereinbelow:
“12. Return and reservation of Bills. –
(1) Where a Bill has been passed by a local legislative
council, the governor, lieutenant-governor or chief
commissioner may, instead of declaring that he assents
to or withholds his assent from the Bill, return the Bill to
the council for reconsideration, either in whole or in part,
together with any amendments which he may recommend,
or, in cases prescribed by rules under the principal Act
may, and if the rules so require shall, reserve the Bill for
the consideration of the Governor-General.
(2) Where a Bill is reserved for the consideration of the
Governor-General, the following provisions shall apply:-
(a) The governor, lieutenant-governor or chief
commissioner may, at any time within six months
from the date of the reservation of the Bill, with
the consent of the Governor- General, return
the Bill for further consideration by the council
with a recommendation that the council shall
consider amendments thereto:
(b) After any Bill so returned has been further
considered by the council, together with any
recommendations made by the governor,
lieutenant-governor or chief commissioner
relating thereto, the Bill, if re-affirmed with or
without amendment, may be again presented
to the governor, lieutenant-governor, or chief
commissioner:
(c) Any Bill reserved for the consideration of the
Governor-General shall, if assented to by the
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Governor-General within a period of six months
from the date of such reservation, become law
on due publication of such assent, in the same
way as a Bill assented to by the governor,
lieutenant-governor or chief commissioner, but, if
not assented to by the Governor-General within
such period of six months, shall lapse and be
of no effect unless before the expiration of that
period either-
(i) the Bill has been returned by the
governor, lieutenant-governor or chief
commissioner, for further consideration by
the council; or
(ii) in the case of the council not being in
session, a notification has been published
of an intention so to return the Bill at the
commencement of the next session.
(3) The Governor-General may (except where the Bill has
been reserved for his consideration), instead of assenting
to or withholding his assent from any Act passed by a
local legislature, declare that he reserves the Act for the
signification of His Majesty’s pleasure thereon, and in such
case the Act shall not have validity until His Majesty in
Council has signified his assent and his assent has been
notified by the Governor- General.”
53. A reading of the aforesaid provision also indicates that at the time
of drafting Article 200, the framers of the Constitution not only had
before them Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 but also Section 12 of
the GoI Act, 1919 as well as other possible variations about which
we shall discuss in the following paragraphs. However, certain
features of Article 200, namely, the absence of automatic lapse upon
not receiving approval, mandatory requirement for the Governor to
not withhold assent to a bill which is presented to him after being
reconsidered by the legislature and absence of the expression “in
his discretion”, must be viewed in the context of gradual dilution of
the role and powers of the Governor in provincial governance as
the country neared independence.
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i. Concept of assent to bills as envisaged by certain historical
documents drafted during the freedom struggle.
54. The concept of assent by the Sovereign found mention in Section 75
of the GoI Act, 1935 and Article 200 as it stands today is predominantly
modelled according to the version which existed therein. However,
before we proceed to discuss Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 and
how it eventually evolved into Article 200 of the Constitution, we
deem it appropriate to briefly shed light on how other aspirational
constitutional documents, drafted during the course of the freedom
struggle, imagined the practice of assent to bills and made certain
modifications to the practice that prevailed in the United Kingdom.
55. The Commonwealth of India Bill, 1925 that was drafted by the
National Convention had a lasting impact on the eventual framing
of our Constitution as regards the idea of royal assent. Article 39 of
the said Bill provided that a bill passed by the Parliament would be
presented to the Viceroy for obtaining the King’s assent. Similarly, for
the provinces, Article 83 provided that the bills passed by the provincial
legislature would be presented to the Governor for obtaining the King’s
assent. However, what is relevant to note is that the provisions were
not elaborate as regards the procedure and scope of powers of the
Sovereign while taking a decision on the aspect of assent.
56. However, the Nehru Report of 1928 shortly followed the Commonwealth
of India Bill, 1925 and was drafted in response to the dissatisfaction
with the Simon Commission. The Report sought to negative the
challenge posed by the British that a constitutional document, which is
agreeable to all, could not be drawn by Indians, and contained elaborate
provisions providing the mechanism for the purpose of assent to bills.
57. As regards the bills passed by the Parliament, it was stipulated in
the Nehru Report that a bill would not become an Act until assent
was granted by the Governor-General. The Governor-General was
provided with three options - to signify assent, to withhold assent or
to reserve the bill for consideration by the British Crown. Notably,
there was no obligation on the Governor-General to signify assent
after a bill was repassed with or without the amendments suggested
by him. The relevant provision is reproduced hereinbelow:
“21. (i) So soon as any bill, shall have been passed, or
deemed to have been passed by both Houses, it shall be
presented to the Governor-General for the signification
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by him, in the King’s name, of the King’s assent, and the
Governor-General may signify such assent or withhold
the same or he may reserve the bill for the signification
of the King’s pleasure.
(ii) A bill passed by both Houses of Parliament shall not
become an Act until the Governor-General signifies his
assent thereto in the King’s name or in the case of a
bill reserved for the signification of the King’s pleasure
until he signifies by speech or message to each House
of Parliament, or by proclamation that it has received
the assent of the King in Council. Provided that the
Governor-General may, where a bill has been passed
by both Houses of Parliament and presented to him
for the signification by him of the King’s assent, or has
been reserved by him for the signification of the King’s
pleasure, return the bill for reconsideration by Parliament
with a recommendation that Parliament shall consider
amendments thereto.
(iii) Any bill so returned shall be further considered by
Parliament together with the amendments, recommended
by the Governor-General, and if re-affirmed with or without
amendments, may be again presented to the Governor-
General for the signification in the King’s name of the
King’s assent.”
58. As regards the provincial legislature, a bill passed by the provincial
legislature had to be assented to by the Governor before it would
become an Act. The Governor had two options - to declare assent
or to withhold assent. Notably, the Governor did not have the option
to reserve the bill for the consideration of the Governor-General.
However, every bill after receiving the assent of the Governor had
to be mandatorily referred to and assented by the Governor-General
failing which the Act would have no validity. Even after receiving the
assent of the Governor-General, the Act could be disallowed by the
King and would thereupon become void. The relevant provisions are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“37. When a bill has been passed by a local Legislative
Council, the Governor may declare that he assents to or
withholds his assent from the bill.
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38. If the Governor withholds his assent from any such
bill, the bill shall not become an Act.
39. If the Governor assents to any such bill, he shall
forthwith send an authentic copy of the Act to the Governor-
General, and the Act shall not have validity until the
Governor-General has assented thereto and that assent
has been signified by the Governor-General to, and
published by the Governor.
40. Where the Governor-General withholds his assent from
any such Act, he shall signify to the Governor in writing
his reason for so withholding his assent.
41. When an Act has been assented to by the Governor-
General it shall be lawful for His Majesty in Council to
signify his disallowance of the Act.
42. Where the disallowance of an Act has been so signified,
the Governor shall forthwith notify the disallowance, and
thereupon the Act, as from the date of the notification shall
become void accordingly.”
59. In 1944, the All India Hindu Mahasabha adopted the Constitution of
Hindustan Free State Act as an aspirational constitutional document.
As regards the procedure of assent by Governor in provinces, the
document contained the following provision:
“93. (1) So soon as any bill shall have been passed by
both Chambers it shall be presented to the Governor for
the signification of his assent, and he may signify such
assent or withhold the same.
(2) A bill passed by both Chambers shall become an Act if
the Governor signifies his assent thereto, and that assent
has been published by him.
(3) In case where the Governor withholds his assent to a
bill passed by both Chambers, he shall return the bill for
reconsideration with his own recommendations thereto.
(4) A bill so returned shall be further considered by both
Chambers together with the recommendations made by the
Governor, and if it is reaffirmed with or without amendments
by both Chambers, it shall be deemed to have been
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assented to by the Governor, but it shall not become an Act
unless and until the President of the Hindusthan Free State
has assented thereto and that assent has been signified
by the President to and published by the Governor.”
60. A perusal of the above indicates that the Governor had the option of
either assenting to or withholding a bill presented before him. However,
in the latter case, the Governor was under an obligation to return the
bill for reconsideration with his own recommendations, whereupon the
provincial legislature was required to reconsider the bill in light of the
recommendations made. Upon being passed again, with or without
amendments, the bill would be deemed to have been assented to
by the Governor. However, it would become an Act only upon being
assented to by the President, who would signify his assent to the
Governor. Thus, the President was vested with the power to veto
any bill which had not been assented to by the Governor and was
passed again after reconsideration with or without the amendments
recommended by the Governor. This was in contrast to the position
with respect to the Federal Legislature, wherein no veto power was
conferred on the President. The relevant provision read as follows:
“30. (1) So soon as any bill shall have been passed by
both Chambers, it shall be presented to the President for
the signification of his assent, and he may signify such
assent or withhold the same.
(2) A bill passed by both chambers shall not become an Act
unless and until the President signifies his assent thereto.
(3) In case where the President withholds his assent to a
bill passed by both Chambers, he shall return the bill for
reconsideration to the originating Chamber with his own
amendments thereto.
(4) A bill so returned shall be further considered by both
Chambers together with the amendments recommended
by the President, and if it is reaffirmed with or without
amendments by both Chambers, it shall be deemed to have
been assented to by the President and shall become an Act.”
61. One more document that we would like to refer to is the “Constitution
of Free India: A Draft” authored by M.N. Roy in 1944. The
document proposed a radically different version of assent to bills as
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distinguished from the scheme prevailing under the GoI Act, 1935 or
other contemporaneous aspirational constitutional documents. The
document vested no authority in the Governor to withhold assent
to a bill passed by the provincial legislature or to veto the same.
However, the document vested power in the Supreme People’s
Legislature, which was a joint sitting of both the chambers of the
Federal Legislature, to veto any provincial legislation. However, this
veto power was subject to judicial review and the provincial government
was given the right to challenge the veto before the Supreme Federal
Court. The relevant provisions are reproduced hereinbelow:
“Article 62.
The Supreme People’s Council will have the right to veto
any provincial legislation in the Federal Union on the
ground that it is repugnant to the Federal Constitution
or contradicts any particular Federal law. Either on the
advice of the Council of Ministers or on his own initiative,
the Governor General will recommend the vetoing of
a Provincial legislation. The Provincial Government
concerned will have the right to appeal to the Supreme
Federal Court against the veto.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 91.
The Governor shall sign and promulgate all laws made
by the Provincial People’s Council.”
62. What is interesting to note is that the imagination of a provision
as regards assent to bills, when the country was on the brink
of becoming independent from the British rule, was significantly
different from the previous versions envisaged in times when the
freedom struggle was focused more on obtaining greater degree
of self-rule while being under the sovereignty of the British Crown,
as can be seen in the versions used in the Nehru Report and
the Constitution of India Bill, 1925. The two documents which
were drafted in 1944, and are referred to above, indicate that the
Governor was vested with lesser powers and discretion, and there
was a clear inclination towards a more unitary arrangement insofar
as assent to bills was concerned. The ideas of judicial review
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of exercise of veto by the President against a state legislation,
mandatory return of the bills for reconsideration upon withholding
of assent, and deemed assent upon reconsideration were being
experimented with among others in the immediate lead up to the
framing of our Constitution.
63. Besides the aspirational constitutional documents referred to above,
it is also pertinent to discuss how assent was envisaged by one of
the first indigenous constitutional documents that was implemented
in practice as well. Section 15 of the Aundh State Constitution Act,
1939 that was purportedly enacted to grant self-rule to the people
of the Aundh princely state, laid down the procedure for assent to
bills. The relevant provision read as follows:
“15. (a) All bills shall be passed by a majority of members
of the Legislative Assembly present and voting and shall
become law only on receiving the assent of Shrimant
Rajasaheb.
(b) If Shrimant Rajasahab, in his discretion, withholds
his assent to a bill which has been duly passed by the
Legislative Assembly, he shall return it to the Legislative
Assembly together with a message requesting that the
Legislative Assembly will reconsider the Bill in the light of
his recommendations, and when a bill is so returned, the
Legislative Assembly shall consider it accordingly.
(c) If the Legislative Assembly accepts the recommendations,
the bill shall forthwith become law; but if it rejects the
recommendations of Shrimant Rajasaheb, he shall have
the right to postpone his assent to the bill till the next
session of the Legislative Assembly. He can so postpone
the said bill for not more than three times. If the said
bill, in its original form, is passed by a simple majority of
the members present on all the three times, it is sent for
reconsideration, it shall forthwith become law.”
64. What is interesting to note in the aforesaid provision is that although
it vested Shrimant Rajasaheb, the King, with the discretion to either
assent to a bill passed by the legislature or to withhold assent thereto,
yet it made it mandatory for him to return the bill to the legislature
with a message requesting them to reconsider the bill in light of his
recommendations if he opted for withholding assent. Further, after a
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maximum of three rounds of reconsideration, the bill would become
law upon being passed with a majority, regardless of receiving assent
of the King or not.
65. On the contrary, the Government of Mysore Act, 1940, gave the King
unfettered powers to veto any bill passed by the Legislative Council.
The relevant provision reads as follows:
“28. (1) When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative
Council, it shall be submitted through the Dewan to His
Highness the Maharaja for assent with a statement of the
opinion expressed by the Representative Assembly on the
principles of the Bill or its general provisions.
(2) No such Bill shall become law until it has received the
assent of His Highness the Maharaja.”
66. Having discussed in detail the inception of the concept of assent
to bills in the Indian context and its interaction with the indigenous
thought prevailing at the time, we shall now proceed to discuss the
provisions pertaining to assent as contained in the GoI Act, 1935
and how it was moulded by the Constituent Assembly into Article
200 of the Constitution.
67. Under the GoI Act, 1935, the Governor was required to act on the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers responsible to the Provincial
legislature. However, the Governor continued to have some special
responsibilities and he also possessed discretionary powers to act
in situations such as prevention of grave menace to the peace or
tranquility of the province, safeguarding the legitimate interests of
minorities and so on. The Governor could also act in his discretion in
specified matters. He functioned under the general superintendence
and control of the Governor-General, whenever he acted in his
individual judgement or discretion.
68. It is interesting to note that while the framing of the Constitution was
being undertaken by the Constituent Assembly, the GoI Act, 1935
as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 was
made applicable for the administration of the country. By way of
paragraph 3 of the said order, the expressions “in his discretion”,
“acting in his discretion” and “exercising his individual judgement”
were removed/deleted from wherever they occurred in the GoI Act,
1935. Paragraph 3 read thus:
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“3.(1) As from the appointed day, the Government of India
Act, 1935, including the provisions of that Act which have
not come into force before the appointed day, and the
India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946,
shall, until other provision is made by or in accordance
with a law made by the Constituent Assembly of India,
apply to India with the omissions, additions, adaptations
and modifications directed in the following provisions of
this paragraph and in the Schedule to this Order.
(2) The following expressions shall be omitted wherever
they occur, namely, “in his discretion”, “acting in his
discretion” and “exercising his individual judgment”. [...]”
69. Article 147 of the Draft Constitution, prepared by the constitutional
adviser, Shri B.N. Rau, dealt with assent to bills passed by the
provincial legislature and read as follows:
“147. A Bill which has been passed by the Provincial
Legislature or, in the case of a Province having a legislative
Council, has been passed by both Houses of the Provincial
Legislature shall be presented to the Governor and the
Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill
or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves
the Bill for the consideration of the President:
Provided that where there is only one House of the
Legislature of a Province and the Bill has been passed by
that House the Governor may, in his discretion, return the
Bill together with a message requesting that the House will
reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in
particular, will reconsider the desirability of introducing any
such amendments as he may recommend in his message
and, when a Bill is so returned the House shall reconsider it
accordingly and if the Bill is passed again by the House with
or without amendments and presented to the Governor for
assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom.”
70. Article 147 as reproduced aforesaid made significant departure from
Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 as follows:
a. The expression “in his discretion” was removed from the
substantive part of the provision. However, the said expression
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continued to be present in the proviso to the substantive
part.
b. While Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 provided for the sending
back of a bill for reconsideration by the legislature in the
provinces having both unicameral and bicameral legislatures,
Article 147 only provided for such reconsideration in the
provinces with a unicameral legislature.
c. Under Section 75, there was no mandate upon the Governor to
mandatorily assent to a bill when the bill was presented to him
for reconsideration. However, in Article 147, the expression “shall
not withhold assent therefrom” was added in the first proviso.
71. Four months after the Draft Constitution was submitted by Shri B.N.
Rau, the Drafting Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar submitted the Draft Constitution to the President of the
Constituent Assembly in February, 1948. Article 147 of the Draft
Constitution submitted by the constitutional advisor was adapted with
certain structural modifications as Article 175 of the Draft Constitution,
however, in essence the provision remained the same.

ii. Debates of the Constituent Assembly on Article 200 of the
Constitution
72. When Article 175 of the Draft Constitution, 1948 was taken up for
consideration by the Constituent Assembly, certain amendments were
moved by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar that came to be accepted, leading to
the adoption of the draft Article 175 as Article 200 of our Constitution.
The amendments were:
a. To remove the expression “in his discretion” appearing in the
first proviso to Article 175;
b. To exclude Money Bills from the purview of the first proviso;
c. To enable the Governor to return the bills in all the States
irrespective of whether there was a unicameral or a bicameral
legislature.
73. With a view to better understand the intention of the framers of the
Constitution, it is of utmost importance that we turn the pages of the
debates that took place in the Constituent Assembly.
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74. On the 30th of July, 1949, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar moved an amendment,
as discussed aforesaid, for the substitution of the first proviso under
draft Article 175, which later came to be successfully adopted by
the Constituent Assembly. While moving for the substitution and
highlighting that predominantly three key changes were sought to
be made to the first proviso, he remarked that the words “in his
discretion” under the draft Article 175 were sought to be deleted
because it was felt that “in a responsible government, there can be
no room for the Governor acting on discretion”3. Shri. Brajeshwar
Prasad was not whole-heartedly in favor of the changes suggested
to the first proviso and contended that they would strip the Governor
of the power to veto a bill or reserve it for the consideration of the
President, in his own discretion or initiative and he would be able
to do so only when so advised by his Cabinet of Ministers. In his
opinion, the change also meant that the Governor would not be able
to veto a bill that has been passed twice by the Legislative Assembly,
which he felt was not acceptable.
75. Shri. Brajeshwar Prasad acknowledged that there are two classes
of cases in which a bill can be reserved for the consideration of the
President – One, where a certain Article of the Constitution requires
the same and two, when the Governor is advised by his Ministry to
do so. However, he advocated for a third category i.e., where the
Governor would possess the power, in his discretion, to veto a bill
passed by the Legislature, irrespective of whether it was passed
once or twice by it. He supported the vesting of discretion in the
hands of the Governor so that he could veto unjust and unsound
legislation while also ensuring that there is a check on potentially
disruptive legislative tendencies. From his standpoint, the fear of
disruptive legislation was not imaginary but real in our country and
he advocated that his proposal was in consonance with the traditions
of the centralized system of Government that existed in our country
until independence. He was of the view that the parliamentary form
of polity was a new experiment to the facts of life in our country and
it was required to be moderated and regulated. Expressing his lack of
confidence in the provincial Ministers, he contended that empowering
the Governor to act in his discretion would not be so objectionable
since the Governor is also the representative of the Government of

3 9, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (July 30, 1949) 41.
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India and it is by virtue of this position that his views must prevail
over those of the State legislature.
76. On the other hand, during the course of the debate, Shri. Shibban
Lal Saxena, addressed the practical realities of assigning such
a discretion to the Governor who is a nominee of the President,
especially when the party in power in the province may not be the
same as the party in power at the Centre. In such a scenario, it was
his opinion that, “it will introduce a very wrong principle to give the
Governor this power to go against the express wish of the Assembly
and even of the council”4.
77. Shri. T.T. Krishnamachari also emphasized that under the newly
proposed draft Article 175, more specifically the first proviso, the
Governor will not be exercising his discretion in the matter of referring
a bill back to the House with a message. The Governor would
exercise his power under the first proviso only upon the advice of
his Council of Ministers. According to him, the first proviso was to
be exercised in situations wherein the House has already accepted
and endorsed a provision, but the Ministry was of the opinion that
certain modifications are required to be made in the said provision. It
is only when such an occasion arises that the procedure envisaged
under the first proviso would be resorted to. The Council of Ministers
would use the Governor to hold up further proceedings of the bill
and remit it to the Lower House with the message informing the
legislature about the modifications sought to be made to the bill by
the Ministry. He drew attention to the words of Dr. Ambedkar on this
aspect and stated as follows:
“[...] If he construes that this Amendment is worse than
the proviso in the draft Article and that it makes for further
dilatoriness in the proceedings of the legislatures in the
provinces or the States as the case may be, I would
ask him to remember one particular point to which Dr.
Ambedkar drew pointed attention, viz., that the Governor
will not be exercising his discretion in the matter of
referring a Bill back to the House with a message. That
provision has gone out of the picture. The governor is no
longer vested with any discretion. If it happens that as

4 9, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Aug. 1, 1949) 61.
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per Amendment No.17 the Governor sends a Bill back for
further consideration, he does so expressly on the advice
of his Council of Ministers. The provision has merely been
made to be used if an occasion arises when the formalities
envisaged in Article 172 which has already been passed,
do not perhaps go through, but there is some point of the
Bill which has been accepted by the Upper House which
the Ministry thereafter finds has to be modified. Then they
will use this procedure; they will use the governor to hold
up the further proceedings of the Bill and remit it back to
the Lower House with his message.”5
78. The first proviso, according to him, was therefore a saving clause
which vested power in the hands of the Ministry to remedy a hasty
action that they might have undertaken with respect to the bill in
question, or, it could also be seen as providing some scope to the
Ministry to take certain additional actions that the Ministry feels should
be taken in order to meet the popular opinion reflected outside the
House in some form or another. Therefore, the operation of the first
proviso does not abridge the power of the Legislature or the Ministry
responsible to it, rather, it further curtails the Governor’s power from
the position that was envisaged in the original first proviso, which is
now sought to be supplanted.
79. In light of the debate which took place as regards the substitution of
the first proviso to draft Article 175, the amendment was put to vote
and the same was successfully adopted by the Constituent Assembly.
80. On 17th of October, 1949, T.T. Krishnamachari moved an amendment
that a second proviso to Article 175 also be added, which later came
to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
elucidated that the second proviso that was proposed to be moved,
was a part of the Instrument of Instructions issued to the Governor of
the provinces under the GoI, 1935. Paragraph 17 of the Instrument
of Instructions read as follows:
“Without prejudice to the generality of his powers as to
reservation of Bills our Governor shall not assent in our
name to, but shall reserve for the consideration of our
Governor-General any Bill or any of the clauses herein

5 9, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Aug. 1, 1949) 61.
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specified, i.e. (b) any Bill which in his opinion would, if
it became law so derogate from the powers of the High
Court as to endanger the position that that Court is, by
the Act, designed to fulfil.”
81. Such a clause was initially supposed to be included in the Fourth
Schedule that separately contained instructions to the Governors
of the States. However, since it was considered unnecessary to
have such a separate Schedule, this particular aspect was sought
to be brought in as second proviso to the draft Article 175. A need
to incorporate the second proviso was felt because the High Courts
were placed under the legislative competence of the Centre as well as
the States. In so far as the organization and territorial jurisdiction of
the High Court was concerned, the power remained with the Centre.
However, with regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction and the jurisdiction
in relation to any of the matters which are mentioned under List II,
the power rests with different States. Therefore, there could arise a
scenario wherein the State legislature would enact a bill which would
derogate from the powers of the High Court. For example, passing a
bill that reduces the pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court by raising
the value of the suit that may be entertained by the High Court. This
would be one method whereby the State legislature would diminish
the authority of the High Court. Furthermore, a bill could also affect
the subject-matter jurisdiction of a High Court. For example, in
enacting any measure under any of the entries contained in List II,
say, debt cancellation, it would be open for the provinces or States
to say that the decree made by any such Court or Board shall be
final and conclusive, and that the High Court should not have any
jurisdiction in the matter at all. In light of such possibilities, it was felt
that the second proviso to draft Article 175 must be added.
82. It was the opinion of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar that any such bill or Act as
illustrated above would amount to a derogation from the authority that
the Constitution confers or intends to confer upon the High Court. This
is why it was felt necessary that before such a law becomes final,
the President must be given an opportunity to examine whether such
a law should be permitted to take effect or not. Such a shield was
considered imperative keeping in mind the important constitutional
position that the High Courts hold in adjudicating disputes. Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar had emphasized on the importance of the second proviso
as follows:
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“I, therefore, submit that in view of the fact that the High
Court is such an important institution intended by the
Constitution to adjudicate between the Legislature and
the Executive and between citizen and citizen such a
power given to the President is a very necessary power to
maintain an important institution which has been created
by the Constitution. That is the purpose for which this
amendment is being introduced.”6

E. ARTICLE 200 OF THE CONSTITUTION - DEVELOPMENTS
POST THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.
If we could roll back History
A century, let’s say,
And start from there,
I’m sure that we
Would find things as to-day:
In all creation’s cosmic range
No vestige of a change”
~ Robert William Service

83. We are tempted to preface this part of our judgment with the
enlightening words of Robert William Service, keeping in mind the
history of our country which has been fraught with instances of friction
in the federal polity from its inception, with the Governor occupying
the center stage in this ongoing saga.
84. As the democratic polity of the country unfolded post-independence,
the predominance of a single party at the union and provincial
level gave way to emergence of new political factions and regional
parties. As a consequence, the position of the Governor, which
had mostly been latent during the era of single-party dominance,
started to assume importance. Allegations also came to be levelled
by a number of State Governments that the Governor in a number

6 10, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Oct. 17, 1949) 394.
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of States was acting as an agent of the Central Government and
the objectivity that was expected of the Governor was not being
displayed, more particularly when it came to reservation of bills
for the consideration of the President or recommendation for the
imposition of emergency under Article 356. In light of the aforesaid,
certain commissions came to be constituted which submitted their
reports after undertaking exhaustive analysis of the working of the
constitutional machinery prescribed for Centre-State relations. One
of the key foci of these reports was the working of Articles 200 and
201 of the Constitution respectively and the scope of exercise of
discretion by the Governors, which we deem appropriate to discuss
hereinafter.

i. First Administrative Reforms Commission, 1966.
85. The First Administrative Reforms Commission (the “ARC”) was
established in January 1966 by a resolution of the Ministry of Home
Affairs to examine the public administration of the country and make
recommendations for reform and reorganization where necessary.
An aspect of this exercise was the examination of Centre-State
relations particularly with respect to the need for national integration,
and for maintaining efficient standards of administration throughout
the country.
86. While examining the various facets of Centre-State relations, the
Commission found it apposite to discuss the role of the Governor
in the political context which existed back then. Taking note of the
skirmishes between the State governments and Governors, the
Commission was of the view that the Governor’s office ceased to be
merely ornamental and ceremonial. This changed role demanded a
scrutiny of the discretionary powers of the Governor.
87. As the discretionary powers of the Governor affect some of the vital
issues in the functioning of democratic governments in the States,
the ARC underscored the importance of evolving guidelines to
enable the exercise of such discretionary powers for the purpose
of preserving and protecting democratic values. It was noted that
such guidelines would serve the purpose of securing uniformity in
action and eliminate all suspicions of partisanship and arbitrariness.
88. The ARC, therefore, recommended the following:
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“Recommendation 9:
We recommend:
Guidelines on the manner in which discretionary powers
should be exercised by the Governors should be formulated
by the Inter-State Council and on acceptance by the Union
issued in the name of the President. They should be placed
before both Houses of Parliament.”
89. However, no such guidelines have been formulated by the Inter-
State Council till date and none of the Commissions on Centre-State
relations constituted thereafter made any recommendations on the
issuance of guidelines for exercise of discretion by the Governor.

ii. Rajamannar Commission, 1971
90. The Rajamannar Commission was set up by the Government of
Tamil Nadu in 1969 under the chairmanship of Dr. P.V. Rajamannar
to look into the question regarding the relationship that should subsist
between the Centre and States in a federal set-up. The Commission
noted that in the changed political circumstances, there can be no
dispute regarding the fact that the Governors have a positive role
to play in the stability and progress of States. This requires that
the authority of the Governor should be clearly spelt out and the
Governors should no longer consider themselves to be instruments
of the Centre under compulsion to act on its directions and in its
political interests.
91. One of the questions on which the Commission addressed itself was
whether the Constitution provides for the exercise of any power by
the Governor in his discretion that is, whether the Governor could
exercise any of his functions without consulting the Ministry or
contrary to the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers.
92. To answer this question, the Commission adverted to the history of the
making of the Constitution and concluded that the Constitution does
not provide for the issue of any instructions to the Governor, nor does
it vest any discretionary powers in express terms in the Governor,
except in relation to certain specified matters. While referring to certain
judicial pronouncements of this Court as well as Granville Austin’s
seminal work on the Indian Constitution, the Commission opined
that the discretion of the Governor must be limited to those matters
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in respect of which there are express provisions in the Constitution.
The relevant portion of the report is reproduced below:
“6. The question as to the discretionary functions of
the Governor was considered by the Supreme Court in
Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1955 8.C. 549 at
page 556). The Supreme Court held that the Governors
were constitutional heads of the executive, and that real
executive power was vested in the Council of Ministers.
A similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court
in T. M. Kanniyan v. 1.T.O., Pondicherry (A.I.R. 1968
S.C. 687). Again, Granville Austin in his book The Indian
Constitution— Cornerstone of a Nation has categorically
stated that the Governor occupies the same position as
the English Monarch and that the Governor has to act in
accordance with the advice of his Cabinet in all matters.
To place the matter beyond doubt, Article 163 (1) may be
modified making it clear that the reference to discretion
is only in relation to the matters in respect of which there
are express provisions, e.g., Assam.”
(Emphasis supplied)

93. The Commission observed that while exercising his functions, the
Governor should not be under any pressure from an external authority.
To explain the position of discretionary powers of the Governor, the
Commission referred to the speech of the former Vice President of
India, Shri G.S. Pathak, which reads thus:
“He is the constitutional head of the State to which he is
appointed, and, in that capacity, he is bound by the advice
of the Council of Ministers of the State except in the sphere
where he is required by the Constitution, expressly or
impliedly, to exercise his discretion. In the sphere in which
he is bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers, for
obvious reasons, he must be independent of the Centre.
‘There may be cases where the advice of the Centre may
clash with the advice of the State Council of Ministers. In
the sphere in which he is required by the Constitution to
exercise his discretion, it is obvious again that it is His
discretion and not that of any other authority and therefore
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his discretion cannot be controlled or interfered with by
the Centre.”
(Emphasis supplied)

94. However, in the same vein, it was also noted that the Governor has
to function in a dual capacity as (1) the appointee of the central
government; and (2) the constitutional head of the State. This is
because the Central Government retains the power to appoint and
remove the Governor, therefore, the Governor cannot but look to
the Central Government for guidance in the discharge of his duties.
95. The Commission was of the opinion that it is necessary to indicate at
least a broad outline of the principles that should guide the Governor
in the exercise of discretion, if any, vested in him. It was observed
that the evolution of rules and guidelines in this respect is especially
important in order to reconcile the actions of the Governor in his
capacity as an agent of the Centre and the head of the State Executive.
96. Having discussed the discretion of the Governor in matters
of constitutional decision-making at length, the Commission
recommended that a specific provision should be inserted in
the Constitution to enable the President to issue Instruments of
Instructions to the Governors laying down guidelines or principles with
reference to which the Governor should act including the occasions
for the exercise of discretionary powers.

iii. Sarkaria Commission
97. In June 1983, the Central government headed by the former Prime
Minister of India, Ms. Indira Gandhi, formally constituted a commission
to examine and review the working of the arrangements between the
Union and States in regard to powers, functions and responsibilities
in all spheres and to recommend such changes or other measures
as may be deemed appropriate. The said commission was formed
under the chairmanship of a former judge of this Court, Justice R.S.
Sarkaria and hence, came to be known as the Sarkaria Commission.
98. The Sarkaria Commission was enjoined with the task of reviewing
the Centre-State relationship and consider the importance of unity
and integrity of the country for promoting the welfare of the people.
One of the facets of such review was to discuss the scope of the
role of the Governor and its impact on the federal polity of India.
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99. For a number of years after the independence of India, the political
scene was dominated by a single party and there was little occasion
for strife between the central and state governments. The role of
the Governor, therefore, remained latent. However, post-1967,
the emergence of new regional political parties led to a discord
between the central government and those state governments that
came to be led by such new regional parties. These developments
engendered political instability in several states, as a result of which,
the Governors were called upon to exercise their discretionary powers
more frequently, particularly in recommending President’s rule and
in reserving State bills for the consideration of the President.
100. The role of the Governor in giving assent to State bills, withholding
assent therefrom or reserving such bills for the consideration of the
President, thus, assumed importance. By virtue of Articles 200 and
201 of the Constitution respectively, the office of Governor became
a major stakeholder for the maintenance of a cordial relationship
between the central and state governments. The Sarkaria Commission
was, therefore, tasked with providing recommendations regarding
the interpretation of the said Articles and amendments therein to
strengthen the federal polity of India.
101. To the limited extent of studying the issues arising from the exercise
of powers under Articles 200 and 201 respectively, the Commission
addressed itself on the following broad points:
(i) Scope of Governor’s discretion under Article 200;
(ii) Interplay of Articles 200 and 254 respectively of the Constitution;
(iii) Scope of Union Executive’s discretion under Article 201;
(iv) Impropriety of conditional assent by the President;
(v) Essentials for a “reference” of State bills to the President for
his consideration;
(vi) Delays in disposal of State bills;
(vii) Withholding of assent by the President.
102. A discussion of the recommendations of the Commission in this
regard would be beneficial to our examination of Articles 200 and
201 respectively and the role of the Governor in the contemporary
federal polity.
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a. Scope of Governor’s Discretion Under Article 200
103. The Commission observed that the rule is that the Governor shall
perform his functions on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers
of the State and the exercise of discretionary powers by him is the
exception. The Commission envisaged that discretionary powers of
reservation of a bill under Article 200 should be exercised by the
Governor only in rare cases where a bill is patently unconstitutional
in his opinion. However, the Governor should not act contrary to the
aid and advice of the Council of Ministers merely because he, in his
personal capacity, does not favour the policy embodied in the bill.
The relevant observations of the Commission are reproduced below:
“5.6.13 We are, therefore, of the view that:
(i) Normally, in the discharge of the functions under Article
200, the Governor must abide by the advice of his Council
of Ministers. However, in rare and exceptional case, he may
act in the exercise of his discretion, where he is of opinion
that the provisions of the Bill are patently unconstitutional,
such as, where the subject-matter of the Bill is ex-facie
beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature,
or where its provisions manifestly derogate from the
scheme and framework of the Constitution so as to
endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of the nation;
or clearly violate Fundamental Rights or transgress other
constitutional limitations and provisions.
(ii) In dealing with a State Bill presented to him under Article
200, the Governor should not act contrary to the advice
of his Council of Ministers merely because, personally, he
does not like the policy embodied in the Bill.”
104. According to the Commission, the scheme of the Constitution
indicates that the Governor’s opinion at best, is persuasive. The
Governor cannot, in any circumstance, exercise dictatorial powers
to override or veto the decisions or proposals of his Council of
Ministers. The scope of discretionary powers should be construed
in the context of a parliamentary democracy with a responsible
government. In such a form of government, the role of a formal head
of the State cannot be enlarged at the cost of the real executive,
which enjoys the confidence of the people as it is responsible to
the State legislature.
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105. Discretion, in exercise of powers under Article 200, therefore, should
be dictated by reason, actuated by good faith and tempered by
caution. Discretionary functions should be performed in public interest
and cannot be discharged at the dictation of any outside authority
unless so authorized by and under the Constitution.
106. While addressing suggestions of some State governments that the
discretionary powers of the Governor must be curtailed or removed
as it presents a potential threat to the autonomy of the States, the
Commission observed that the makers of the Constitution advisedly
refrained from putting such discretionary powers in a straitjacket
rigid definition. It noted that the Constitution is ever evolving and the
ways in which its provisions and principles may be tampered with
or circumvented, cannot be foreseen. Therefore, the office of the
Governor should be afforded enough flexibility to react in any situation
and his discretion to approach a matter cannot be pre-determined.

b. Interplay of Articles 200 And 254 respectively of the
Constitution.
107. Article 246(2) endows the Parliament as well as the State legislatures
with the competence to legislate on entries under List III i.e., the
concurrent list. The provision under Article 254 is appurtenant to the
concurrent exercise of legislative competence by the Parliament and
State legislature insofar as there is any inconsistency or repugnancy
between the laws of the respective legislatures.
108. Article 254(1) saves the power of the State legislatures to make laws
with respect to matters in the concurrent list from being automatically
superseded by the operation of the doctrine of repugnancy. Article
254(2) allows a law enacted by the State legislature and repugnant
to the central law on the same subject-matter, to operate and prevail
in that State provided that such State law receives the assent of the
President.
109. The Commission highlighted that clause (2) of Article 254 is applicable
only when the following two conditions are cumulatively met:
(a) There is a valid Union law on the same subject-matter occupying
the same field in the Concurrent List to which the State legislation
relates.
(b) The State legislation is repugnant to the Union law. That is to
say, there is a direct conflict between the provisions of the two
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laws, or the Union law is intended to be an exhaustive code
on the subject-matter in question.
It is upon satisfaction of both these conditions that the Governor
can reserve a bill for Presidential consideration under Article 254(2).
110. It was noted by the Commission that the assent by the President to
the State bills had been withheld on certain occasions on the ground
that the Union was contemplating a more comprehensive legislation
on the same subject matter. However, withholding of assent on such
a premise at the level of the Union may unnecessarily delay or defeat
the measures sought to be taken by the State legislature. Since
the Parliament retains the power to amend, vary or repeal such a
State legislation, even after its enactment, by passing a subsequent
law inconsistent therewith, the Commission recommended that
Presidential assent should not ordinarily be withheld on the ground
that the Union is contemplating a comprehensive law in future on
the same subject-matter.

c. Scope of Union Executive’s Discretion under Article 201
111. As per the report of the Commission, a State bill, once reserved for
the consideration of the President (upon the aid and advice of the
Council of Ministers), is made subject to the procedure prescribed
under Article 201 and the Union Executive is entitled to examine it
from all angles such as, inter alia, conformity to legislative or executive
policy of the Union, harmony with the scheme and provisions of the
Constitution, vires of the bill, etc.
112. On the question of the Union Executive’s discretion to withhold
assent to a State bill on the ground of non-conformity with its
policy, the Commission sounded a note of caution saying that policy
considerations should not ordinarily be treated as a valid ground
for withholding Presidential assent. Article 201 confers supervisory
powers on the Union Executive to enable it to secure a broad
uniformity across central and state legislations in the interests of
the social and economic unity of the country. However, the said
provision cannot act as a measure for the Union Executive to bring
to a grinding halt a State bill by withholding assent thereto if such
a bill does not conform to its policy in general.
113. Further, the Union Executive is required to exercise utmost caution,
circumspection and restraint in the exercise of supervisory powers
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under Article 201, especially in respect of the bills on subject
matters that fall within the State List. In this regard, the Commission
recommended that as a matter of convention, the President should
not withhold assent only on consideration of policy differences on
matters relating, in pith and substance, to the State List, except on
the grounds of patent unconstitutionality.
114. The Commission did not make any specific prescription in respect
of Article 143 of the Constitution, which enables the President and
by extension, the Union Council of Ministers to seek the opinion of
the Supreme Court in respect of bills which may be deemed to be
unconstitutional and left the decision up to the President to make
such a reference in appropriate cases.

d. Impropriety of Conditional Assent by the President
115. The Commission noted that the scheme of the Constitution providing
for reservation of State legislations for the consideration and assent
of the President, is intended to subserve the broad purpose of
cooperative federalism in the realm of Union-State legislative relations.
Therefore, the practice of according assent to a State bill by the
President on the reciprocal assurance that the changes suggested
by him (or the Union Executive) will be carried out by way of an
ordinance, was not considered to be ideal especially when there
exists a constitutional remedy under the proviso to Article 201 itself.
116. Since, conditional assent may become a tool for the Centre to dictate
its policies to the States by attaching conditions to Presidential
assent, the Commission, in cognizance of the impropriety of such a
practice, recommended that in cases where the Union Government
is of the opinion that some amendments to a State bill are essential
before it becomes a law, such bill should be returned through the
Governor to the State legislature for reconsideration in terms of the
proviso to Article 201.

e. Essentials for a “Reference” of State Bills to the President
for his Consideration
117. The Commission, cognizant of the misgivings and irritations in Union-
State relations due to delays in the process of securing Presidential
assent, recommended that the procedure of making a reference
to the President by the State Government through the Governor
and the consideration thereof by the Union Government must be
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streamlined. It was also endorsed that the Governments at both
the Centre and State level may benefit from a prior consultation at
the stage of drafting of the bill itself and prescribing time-limits for
disposal, which ought to be made convention and practice.
118. As regards the suggestion of streamlining the procedures involved
in reserving a State bill for consideration of the President, the
Commission recommended that every reference from the State should
be complete and clearly established. Such reference should set out
precise material facts, points for consideration and the reason for
making a reference to the President. Accordingly, the Commission
recommended the following information to be necessarily provided
for ensuring that the reference to the President is self-contained:
“5.15.01— To facilitate its speedy examination by the Union
Executive, every reference of a State Bill from the State
should be self-contained, setting out precisely the material
facts, points for consideration and the ground on which
reference has been made. It should contain information
on the following points:
a. The relevant provisions of the Constitution
attracted or applicable, with reasons.
b. If the reference is made under Article 254(2),
clear identification of the provisions of the
Bill which are considered repugnant to, or
inconsistent with, the specific provisions of a
Union law or an existing law.
c. Urgency, if any, of passing the law within a
certain time-limit.
d. A clear statement that the Bill is being reserved
as per the advice of the Council of Ministers, or
in the exercise of his discretion by the Governor,
with reasons for the same.
e. A lucid explanatory note on the intended policy
behind the legislation instead of merely referring
to the objects and reasons of the Bill.
f. An indication whether the Bill was sent for prior
scrutiny of the Union Government, and if so,
deviations, if any, from the prior reference.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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f. Delays in Disposal of State Bills
119. The question whether there was a requirement of introducing time-
limits in Article 201 was necessary or not was also looked into by
the Commission. It was reiterated that streamlining the procedure of
reserving a State bill for Presidential consideration and enabling a
mechanism for high-level discussions between the Union and State
at the stage of drafting such bill may effectively reduce procedural
delays at the level of the Union Government. Nevertheless, it was
recommended that the Union and State Governments should adopt
definite timelines for processing State bills and disposing of their
references to the President.
120. With regard to prescription of such timelines, the Commission
proposed the following timelines to be treated as salutary conventions:

STAGE OF THE BILL PROPOSED TIMELINE
i. Reserving the bill for consideration of I m m e d i a t e l y u p o n
the President, by the Governor under presentation of the bill to
Article 200 (on the aid and advice of the Governor.
the State Council of Ministers).
ii. Reserving the bill for consideration of Within one month from the
the President, by the Governor under date on which the bill is
Article 200 (in exercise of his discretion presented to the Governor.
in exceptional circumstances).
iii. Decision on the bill by the President Within four months from the
under Article 201 (in case the proviso date on which the reference
to Article 201 is not being exercised). is received by the Union
Government.
iv. Returning the bill for consideration Within two months from the
of the State legislature in case the date on which the original
proviso to Article 201 is exercised by reference is received by the
the President. Union Government.
v. Decision on the bill by the President, Within four months of
once received with clarifications from the date on which the
the State legislature under proviso to reconsidered bill is received
Article 201. by the Union Government.

121. With a view to ensure that the timelines so suggested are not
frustrated by lack of clarity and comprehensiveness in a reference,
the Commission underscored the importance of a self-contained
communication by the President to the State legislature for clarification
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or reconsideration of the bill. It was emphasized that clarifications to be
sought by way of the proviso to Article 201 should not be piecemeal.
122. While the Commission noted the significance of clear timelines for
the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201 respectively, it did
not recommend any amendments to the said Articles for introducing
concrete time periods within the constitutional scheme and left its
recommendations in this regard at the stage of conventions only.

g. Withholding of Assent by the President
123. As regards the withholding of Presidential assent, the Commission
laid great emphasis that the Union Government ought to communicate
to the State government, the reasons therefor. It was noted that the
Union Government should enter into the practice of discussing the
issues present in the bill with the State Government and making
an effort to present its point of view to the State Government with
reasons.

h. Recommendations given by the Commission
124. Before concluding the discussion on the aspect of reservation of bills
by the Governor for consideration of the President, the Commission
noted that needless reservation of bills should be avoided. The
constitutional scheme does not envisage indiscriminate reservation of
bills, especially when it is being done in his discretion, as the same
would be subversive of the federal principle and the supremacy of
the State legislature.
125. The Commission classified State bills to be reserved for the
consideration of the President as follows:
“5.1.05 State Bills reserved for President’s consideration
under the Constitution, may be classified as follows: —
i. Bills which must be reserved for President’s
consideration
In this category come Bills —
(i) which so derogate from the powers of the High Court,
as to endanger the position which that Court is by
this Constitution designed to fill (Second Proviso to
Article 200);
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(ii) which relate to imposition of taxes on water or
electricity in certain cases, and attract the provisions
of Clause (2) of Article 288; and
(iii) which fall within clause (4) (a) (ii) of Article 360, during
a Financial Emergency.
ii. Bills which may be reserved for President’s
consideration and assent for specific purposes
(i) To secure immunity from operation of Articles 14 and
19. These are Bills for—
(a) acquisition of estates, etc. [First Proviso to Article
31A(I)];
(b) giving effect to Directive Principles of State Policy
(Proviso to Article 31C).
(ii) A Bill relating to a subject enumerated in the Concurrent
List, to ensure operation of its provisions despite their
repugnancy to a Union law or an existing law, by
securing President’s assent in terms of Article 254(2).
(iii) Legislation imposing restrictions on trade and
commerce requiring Presidential sanction under the
Proviso to Article 304(b) read with Article 255.
iii. Bills which may not specifically fall under any
of the above categories, yet may be reserved by
the Governor for President’s consideration under
Article 200.”
(Emphasis supplied)

126. The Commission recommended that bills should be reserved only
if required for specific purposes falling in the first two classes as
extracted hereinabove.

iv. Punchhi Commission
127. Another Commission on Centre-State relations was constituted by
the Government of India in 2007 under the chairmanship of Justice
Madan Mohan Punchhi, the former Chief Justice of India. The
Commission was tasked with the mandate of reviewing the existing
arrangements between the Union and States as per the Constitution
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of India in regard to powers, functions and responsibilities in all
spheres including legislative relations, administrative relations, role
of Governors, emergency provisions, etc. and recommending such
changes as may be appropriate keeping in view practical difficulties,
growing challenges of ensuring good governance and the need for
strengthening the unity and integrity of the country.
128. The Commission, inter alia, looked at the original scheme of the
Centre-State relations as laid down by the Constitution, examined the
friction points in the working thereof and reviewed the adequacy of
the constitutional arrangements for promoting social welfare and good
governance. One aspect of this study involved looking minutely into
the role of the Governor in the federal polity of India. The Commission
noted that the role of the Governor became important as he had to
balance the political considerations between the Centre and State
and be as impartial as possible.
129. However, as regional political powers grew at the State level, the
role of the Governor came to be a point of contention between the
Centre and States with the latter leveling allegations of partiality and
lack of objectivity in exercise of the Governor’s discretionary powers.
As a result, the Commission was enjoined with the task of providing
recommendations for better working of the office of the Governor.

a. Role of the Governor
130. The Commission observed that the nature and scope of rights and
powers of the Governor should be understood in the context of a
Cabinet system of government. Under such system, the Governor
performs a multi-faceted role. First, as constitutional head of the
State, he has a right to be consulted, to warn and encourage. In
performance of this role, the Constitution makers ideated the office
of Governor to perform the role of a “a friend, philosopher and guide”
to his Council of Ministers. Secondly, the Governor functions as a
sentinel of the Constitution and acts as the Union’s representative
in the State. As observed by this Court in Rameshwar Prasad &
Ors. v. Union of India reported in (2006) 2 SCC 1, the Governor
discharges “dual responsibility” to the Union and State.
131. Further, the Constitution affords the Governor only a persuasive
role and not dictatorial powers to override or veto the decisions or
proposals of his Council of Ministers. The Commission observed that
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the Governor, at best, has powers of giving advice or counselling for
further reflection of the decision taken by the Council of Ministers. The
Governor only flags a need for caution for the purpose of bridging
the understanding between the Government and opposition (if there
are different governments at the central and state level).
132. The Governor is not amenable to the directions of the Union
government, nor does the Constitution make him accountable to
the Centre for the manner in which he carries out his functions
and duties. The office of Governor is an independent constitutional
office. The Governor, by virtue of Article 163, however, is bound
by the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers. Therefore,
in the event of a conflict between the aid and advice of the State
Council of Ministers and the dictates of the Central Government,
the scheme of the Constitution indicates that the Governor must
adhere to the former.
133. With the broad tenets of the role of the Governor under the
constitutional scheme, the Commission, while appraising the existing
framework of Centre-State relations, observed that a major point of
friction between the Centre and States is the power of the Governor
to reserve any State bill for the consideration of the President,
sometimes even for an indefinite period.

b. Discretionary Powers of the Governor
134. Upon a perusal of Article 163(2), the Commission was of the view
that the said provision gives the impression that the Governor has
a wide and undefined area of discretionary powers. However, the
scope of the discretionary powers of the Governor has to be narrowly
construed. The language of Article 163(2) cannot be taken to mean
that the Governor has a general discretionary power to act against
the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
135. In continuation to the Sarkaria Commission’s views on the question
of discretionary powers of the Governor, the Punchhi Commission
report also asserts that the area for the exercise of discretion is limited
and even in this limited area, the Governor’s choice of action should
neither be nor appear to be arbitrary or fanciful. It must be a choice
dictated by reason, actuated by good faith and tempered with caution.
136. The Commission further emphasized the necessity of prescribing
time limits for the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201
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respectively in order to ensure that discretionary powers are not
exercised by the Governor or the President in a manner that
undermines the State legislature and the will of the people.

c. Expediency in Disposal of Bills – Timelines Suggested by
the Report of the Commission
137. The Commission suggested that definite timelines ought to be
adopted as salutary conventions for the Governor to either provide
assent or reserve the bill for the consideration of the President.
Similarly, there should be a time limit for the President to take
a decision on the State bill under Article 201 of the Constitution.
The Commission was of the view that concrete timelines are sine
qua non for the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201
respectively so as to avoid dissensions between the Central and
State governments.
138. The Commission noted that the substantive part of Article 200 does not
stipulate time period within which the Governor has to either assent,
withhold assent or reserve the bill for Presidential consideration.
The requirement of expediency is incumbent upon the Governor
only when he decides to return the bill to the State legislature for
reconsideration. The same was considered to be evident from the
expression “as soon as possible”.
139. The Commission noted that while the expression “as soon as possible”
is mentioned in Article 200 albeit only in the first proviso thereof,
there is no such compulsion on the President under Article 201. As a
result, the President or the Union Government may kill the bill by not
taking a decision on the same, sometimes for the entire duration of
the State legislature. This increases the scope for abuse of discretion
by the Union government based on political considerations particularly
when the ruling party in the State concerned is different from the
one enjoying power at the Union level. The lack of a reasonable
timeline allows the executive fiat to make inroads into the legislative
power of the State thereby thwarting the democratic will of the State
legislature. Such invasion of the powers of the State legislature by
the Union Executive is questionable in the context of ‘basic features’
of the Constitution.
140. Therefore, the Commission suggested that a period of six months
should be prescribed in Article 201 for the President to decide on
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assenting or withholding assent to a bill reserved for consideration
of the President. In case the President on the aid and advice of the
Union Council of Ministers, is unable to give assent to a State bill
under Article 201, it is desirable for him to make a reference to the
Supreme Court under Article 143 for an opinion. Such reference
should be done as a matter of practice in order to avoid allegations
of political bias, while securing the dignity and authority of the State
legislature.

d. Recommendations
141. Having considered the challenges in the exercise of powers under
Articles 200 and 201 respectively, the Commission reiterated the
recommendations of the National Commission to Review the Working
of the Constitution (“NCRWC”), which are reproduced hereinbelow:
“After considering the suggestions given by the Sarkaria
Commission, the National Commission to Review
the Working of the Constitution gave the following
recommendations:
(a) Prescribe a time-limit - say a period of four months -
within which the Governor should take a decision whether
to grant assent or to reserve it for the consideration of
the President;
(b) Delete the words “or that he withholds assent therefrom”.
In other words, the power to withhold assent, conferred upon
the Governor, by Article 200 should be done away with;
(c) If the Bill is reserved for the consideration of the
President, there should be a time-limit, say of three months,
within which the President should take a decision whether
to accord his assent or to direct the Governor to return
it to the State Legislature or to seek the opinion of the
Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the Act
under Article 143 (as it happened in the case of Kerala
Education Bill in 1958);
(d) When the State Legislature reconsiders and passes
the Bill (with or without amendments) after it is returned
by the Governor pursuant to the direction of the President,
the President should be bound to grant his assent;
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(e) To provide that a “Money Bill” cannot be reserved by
the Governor for the consideration of the President;
(f) In the alternative it may be more advisable to delete
altogether the words in Article 200 empowering the
Governor to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the
President except in the case contemplated by the second
proviso to Article 200 and in cases where the Constitution
requires him to do so. Such a course would not only
strengthen the federal principle but would also do away
with the anomalous situation, whereunder a Bill passed by
the State Legislature can be ‘killed’ by the Union Council of
Ministers by advising the President to withhold his assent
thereto or just by cold-storaging it.”
(Emphasis supplied)

142. The report of the Punchhi Commission advocated for the immediate
implementation of the above-mentioned recommendations by way
of a Constitutional Amendment.

F. INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON ASSENT TO BILLS
143. The tenets of parliamentary democracy demand that while the head
of state must act on the advice of ministers, the ministers, in turn,
must uphold their responsibility to the people when providing that
advice. Indeed, the very raison d’être of a democratic government
is to uphold the primacy of the Parliament by ensuring executive
accountability. This has been aptly put forth by Nicholas Barber,
Professor of Constitutional Law and Theory at the Oxford University,
in his work ‘Can Royal Assent Be Refused on the Advice of the Prime
Minister?’7 wherein he argues:
“The point of the convention on royal assent is to uphold
the primacy of the democratic element of the constitution
in the making of law. But just as it would be undemocratic
to allow one person – the Monarch – to veto legislation,
so too it would be undemocratic to give this power to the
Prime Minister. In short, when presented with a bill that has

7 Nicholas Barber, Can Royal Assent Be Refused on the Advice of the Prime Minister?, UK Constitutional
Law Association (Apr. 7, 2025, 9:45 PM), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/09/25/nick-barber-can-
royal-assent-be-refused-on-the-advice-of-the-prime-minster/.
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passed through Parliament in a proper manner, the duty of
the Monarch is to give assent – irrespective of the advice
of her Ministers. There is no room for discretion. On its best
interpretation, this is what the convention requires: if the
Monarch were to accept the advice of her Prime Minister
on this issue, she would be acting unconstitutionally.”

a. United Kingdom
144. The position in the United Kingdom is that once a bill has passed through
all parliamentary stages in both Houses, it is poised for the conferment
of ‘royal assent’. Historically, the Sovereign granted assent to bills in
person in the House of Lords, attended by the Lords Commissioners.
This formal ceremony was known as the ‘Royal Assent ceremony’.
The Royal Assent ceremony continued until 1967, when the British
Parliament passed the Royal Assent Act wherein the requirement of
grant of assent in person by the monarch was made voluntary. Although
granting assent is a personal prerogative of the monarch, yet it has long
been an established convention that the monarch does not withhold it
for a bill that has received approval from both Houses. The process of
Royal Assent comprises two stages: first, the signification of the royal
assent to a bill via the Royal Sign Manual on Letters Patent issued
under the Great Seal of the Realm; and secondly, the communication of
the King’s Assent to both Houses of Parliament. In the United Kingdom
(UK), royal assent is regarded as a formality and has not been refused
to a bill since Queen Anne’s reign in 1707.
145. In Parliament of the UK, the procedure for obtaining Royal Assent
begins with officials in the Public Bill Office of the House of Lords
that manages and assists the processes relating to the House’s
consideration of public legislation. First, a list of bills is prepared by
the Clerk of the Parliaments. Thereafter, once a date for Royal Assent
has been set, all the bills approved by both Houses are presented
before the monarch for assent. In this regard, the monarch has no
power to withhold assent to a bill, regardless of any instructions
from the Government or anyone else.8 In Scotland, a period of four
weeks is allowed before a bill is presented to the Queen for assent,
during which any legal objections may be raised.

8 David Torrance, Royal Assent, House of Commons Library (Feb. 26, 2024), HTTPS://
RESEARCHBRIEFINGS.FILES.PARLIAMENT.UK/DOCUMENTS/CBP-9466/CBP-9466.PDF.
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146. The only ground on which assent may be withheld, that too solely on
ministerial advice, is if the bill has failed to comply with mandatory
procedural requirements or if there has been a change in government
between the bill’s approval and its presentation for assent. Section
4 of the Judicial Committee Act, 1833 provides that the Sovereign
may refer a bill to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for an
advisory opinion on whether such bill contravenes a fundamental
constitutional principle. However, the position in the UK does not
clarify whether the Sovereign can initiate such a referral independently.

b. Canada
147. Canada’s Royal Assent ceremony traces its origins to the United
Kingdom. Traditionally, once a bill was passed in identical form by
both the Senate and the House of Commons, the Governor General,
as the Crown’s representative, attended the Parliament to provide
Royal Assent to such bill. In absence of the Governor General, a
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada acting as Deputy to the
Governor General is presented the bills for Royal Assent. The
Governor General signs a Declaration of Royal Assent, witnessed
by the Clerk of the Parliaments.
148. Section 3 of the Royal Assent Act, 2002 (Can) provides that assent
may be given ‘in Parliament assembled’ or through a written
declaration, provided it is witnessed by more than one member
from each House. The Act stipulates that the Royal Assent must
be given in the Senate Chamber at least twice a year and for the
first appropriation bill of each session of the Parliament. In all other
cases, such assent may be granted by the Governor General or her
Deputy by written consent. At the provincial level, assent is given
by the Lieutenant Governor, who is appointed by the Governor
General. As per Section 57 of the Constitution Act, 1867, when bills
are reserved for Queen’s pleasure, she acts upon ministerial advice
rather than the advice of the Houses.
149. The Supreme Court of Canada in Reference Re Amendment of
the Constitution of Canada, reported in 1981 SCC OnLine Can
SC 77, recognized that, by convention, neither the Queen nor the
vice-regal representative (equivalent of a Governor in India) may,
on their own, refuse assent to a bill passed by both Houses of the
Parliament on the grounds of opposition to or disapproval of its
policy. The relevant portion of the judgment in reference reads thus:
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“As a matter of law, the Queen, or the Governor General or
the Lieutenant Governor could refuse assent to every bill
passed by both Houses of Parliament or by a Legislative
Assembly as the case may be. But by convention they
cannot of their own motion refuse to assent to any such
bill on any ground, for instance because they disapprove
of the policy of the bill. We have here a conflict between
a legal rule which creates a complete discretion and a
conventional rule which completely neutralizes it. But
conventions, like laws, are sometimes violated. And if
this particular convention were violated and assent were
improperly withheld, the courts would be bound to enforce
the law, not the convention. They would refuse to recognize
the validity of a vetoed bill. This is what happened in
Gallant v. The King, a case in keeping with the classic
case of Stockdale v. Hansard where the English Court of
Queen’s Bench held that only the Queen and both Houses
of Parliament could make or unmake laws. The Lieutenant
Governor who had withheld assent in Gallant apparently
did so towards the end of his term of office. Had it been
otherwise, it is not inconceivable that his withholding of
assent might have produced a political crisis leading to his
removal from office which shows that if the remedy for a
breach of a convention does not lie with the courts, still the
breach is not necessarily without a remedy. The remedy
lies with some other institutions of government; furthermore
it is not a formal remedy and it may be administered with
less certainty or regularity than it would be by a court.”
150. In Galati v. Governor-General of Canada, reported in [2015] FC
91, the Federal Court of Canada was faced with the question of
whether the grant of royal assent by the Governor General to the
Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, 2014 could be set aside
by the court on the ground that enactment of the same was outside
the legislative competence of the Parliament. It was contended by
the applicants that the Governor General exceeded the scope of
his discretion as well as his authority under the Royal Assent Act of
Canada by assenting to the said bill. The Federal Court, however,
dismissed the application and held that the Governor General’s act
of affixing royal assent to the bill was a legislative act. Therefore, the
issue of whether the Governor General exceeded his constitutional
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authority in granting royal assent to the said bill was not justiciable.
The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below for ready
reference:
“The courts exercise a supervisory jurisdiction once a law
has been enacted. Until that time, a court cannot review,
enjoin or otherwise engage in the legislative process unless
asked by way of a reference framed under the relevant
legislation. To conclude otherwise would blur the boundaries
that necessarily separate the functions and roles of the
legislature and the courts. To review the Governor General’s
act of granting royal assent, as the applicants request, would
conflate the constitutionally discreet roles of the judiciary
and the legislature, affecting a radical amendment of the
Constitution Act, 1867 and the conventions which underlie
our system of government, notably the right of Parliament
to consider and pass legislation. The applicants’ arguments
turn this principle on its head. On the theory advanced,
the judiciary would adjudicate on the constitutionality of
proposed legislation before it became law. That line, once
crossed, would have no limit.”
151. The views of the Federal Court in Galati (supra) that the grant of
royal assent by the Governor-General was a legislative act and
hence, non-justiciable was in line with the view of the Court in
Gallant v. The King, [1949] 2 DLR 425 wherein it was noted that
the Lieutenant-Governor is a part of the legislature and the act of
providing royal assent is also a legislative action.

c. United States of America
152. The Constitution of the United States, more particularly, Article I,
Section 7, Clause 2 thereof states that once a bill has been passed by
the House of Representatives and the Senate, it must be presented
to the President. If the President approves, he may sign the bill;
otherwise, he may return it with his objections for reconsideration.
If, after reconsideration, two-thirds of both the Houses passes
the bill, it becomes law. Further, if the President does not sign a
bill within ten days of presenting the same, while Congress is in
session, the bill automatically becomes law. Therefore, in this limited
circumstance, the concept of pocket veto is not available to the
President. However, if Congress adjourns while the bill is awaiting
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assent and the President does not sign the bill within ten days, the
bill does not become law.

d. New Zealand
153. The colonial legislative framework of New Zealand under the
Constitution Act, 1852, vested structured discretion in provincial
authorities while maintaining the supremacy of the Crown. Section
27 of the Constitution Act, 1852 stipulated that every bill passed
by the Provincial Council must be presented to the Superintendent
who was an elected head of each Provincial Council, for the assent
of the Governor who was the representative of the monarch. The
Superintendent, in his discretion, could have either granted assent on
behalf of the Governor or withheld assent or reserved the bill for the
Governor’s pleasure. For a bill to become law, Superintendent had
to signify Governor’s assent. Further, her Majesty, with the advice of
her Privy Council could issue instructions to the Governor to guide
him in exercise of his powers to assent to, dissent from, or reserve
bills for her Majesty’s pleasure. The Governor was required to act
in obedience to these instructions.
154. By the introduction of the Constitution Act, 1986, the Sovereign
began to act on the advice of the Executive Council which is the
part of the executive branch of government. It states that a bill
passed by the House of Representatives becomes law when the
Sovereign or the Governor-General grants assent. Section 3 of
the Act states that the power conferred on the Governor-General
are royal powers exercised on behalf of the Sovereign. These
powers may be exercised either by the Sovereign in person or by
the Governor-General. Additionally, any reference in an Act to the
Governor-General in Council also includes the Sovereign acting
with the advice and consent of the Executive Council. The Prime
Minister-designate is appointed as the Executive Councillor and he
advises the Governor-General to appoint other Councillors. Section
3A removes any discretion of the Sovereign or the Governor-General,
stating that they may exercise a power on the advice and with the
consent of the Executive Council.

e. Australia
155. The structure of governance in Australia reflects a nuanced distribution
of the Queen’s powers through her representatives at both national
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and state levels. The Queen of Australia is the formal Head of State.
At the national level, the Queen’s powers and functions qua the
Government of Australia are exercised by the Governor-General of
Australia. At the State level, her powers are exercised by the Governor
of the State. As per Section 2(1) of the Constitution Act, 1889, the
legislative powers were vested in the Sovereign and exercised by
her colonial Governors, subject to the advice of legislators. At the
national level, Governor-General is not given ministerial advice on
assent, the Presiding Officer of the House requests for assent and
the Attorney General provides a certificate to the Governor-General
regarding whether the bill needs to be reserved for the Queen’s
assent or regarding any corrections.9
156. It is said that the role of the Governor-General is to ensure due process
– that the bill was passed in Houses following the procedure. He is
not concerned with the contents of the legislation as the act of the
Governor-General is executive. However, in the context of Governor
(state level), the Court of Appeal in Eastgate v. Rozzoli, reported in
(1990) 20 NSWLR 188, noted that while giving assent the Australian
State Governor acts as a constituent part of the Parliament. If a bill is
reserved for Queen’s pleasure, she acts upon the advice of Australian
Commonwealth Ministers. The power to refer bills back to Parliament
can be exercised only upon ministerial advice. At the states, the
parliamentary officers seek State Governor’s assent. Ordinarily, the
State Governors assent to bills without any ministerial advice, only
South Australia endeavors to provide executive advice to the Governor.

f. Ireland
157. Ireland’s constitutional order provides a unique provision enabling
the President to refer bills to the Supreme Court for its view on
the constitutionality of the bills. Article 26 of the Constitution of the
Ireland confers a power on the President, who, after consultation
with the Council of State, may refer any bill to the Supreme Court
for a decision on whether any provisions of the bill are repugnant
to the Constitution. Such reference must be within seven days from
the presentation of the bill to the President. If the Supreme Court
holds that any provision of the bill is repugnant to the Constitution,
the President declines to sign such bill.

9 Dept. of Prime Minister & Cabinet, Austl. Govt., Legislation Handbook (2017).
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g. Republic of Singapore
158. The Constitution of Singapore establishes a structured framework
for the exercise of presidential discretion, setting clear time limits
for decision-making while also ensuring safeguards against
legislative overreach. Article 21A of the Constitution stipulates the
general time limit for the President to exercise his discretionary
powers. It provides that when the Constitution grants the President
discretion in granting or refusing assent, concurrence, approval,
or confirmation, he must signify his decision within the specified
period after it is sought. The time period specified for granting
assent ranges from thirty days to six weeks. However, it may be
extended contingent upon any agreement between the President
and the Cabinet.
159. Article 22H applies in cases where the bill or any provision seeks to
curtail discretionary powers of the President. If, within thirty days, the
President neither withholds assent nor refers the bill to the tribunal
for its opinion on whether the bill curtails the President’s discretionary
powers, then the President is deemed to have assented. Even
when the tribunal is of the opinion that the bill does not curtail the
discretionary powers conferred on the President, the President is
still deemed to have assented.

h. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
160. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, more particularly, Article 154H,
stipulates that upon the presentation of a statute enacted by the
Provincial Council, the Governor shall either assent to it or return it
for reconsideration as soon as possible. The Provincial Council may
then pass the statute with or without amendments. If the statute is
presented to the Governor again, he may reserve it for reference
by the President to the Supreme Court within one month of its
second time, seeking a determination as to whether is inconsistent
with the Constitution. If the Supreme Court holds the statute to be
consistent, the Governor must grant assent. If it is held inconsistent,
the Governor may withhold assent. It can be concluded that, upon
the first presentation of a bill, the Governor has only two options:
granting assent or returning it for reconsideration. On the second
presentation, the Governor may only reserve the bill, referring it to
the President for submission to the Supreme Court. He does not
have the discretion to withhold assent independently.
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i. Republic of Kiribati
161. The constitutional framework of Kiribati is similar to the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. It provides powers to withhold assent
only in exceptional situations. Section 66 of the Constitution of Kiribati
allows the Beretitenti, that is the head of the state and head of the
government, to withhold assent to a bill only if he believes the bill
to be inconsistent with the Constitution. In such a case, the bill is
returned to the Parliament for amendment, and if it is presented
again and the Beretitenti still believes that the bill is inconsistent
with the Constitution, he is required to refer it to the High Court for
a declaration. If the Court declares that the bill is not consistent with
the Constitution, the Beretitenti must grant assent forthwith. If the
Court declares the bill to be inconsistent, it is sent back to Parliament.
The Constitution of Zimbabwe under Section 131 provides a time
period of twenty-one days to either assent to the bill or refer it for
reconsideration.

j. Republic of Fiji
162. The Constitution of Fiji, 2013 also does not vest discretionary power
in the President. While Section 53 of the Fiji Independence Order,
1970 and Constitution of Fiji granted the Governor-General the power
to grant assent or withhold assent, the Constitution of Fiji, 2013,
removed any discretion on the part of the President. Section 48 of
the Constitution stipulates that once a bill is passed, the Speaker
must present it to the President for assent, which must be granted
within seven days; otherwise, the bill is deemed to have received
assent.

k. Solomon Islands & Antigua and Barbuda
163. Both the Solomon Islands and Antigua and Barbuda have constitutional
provisions that mandate the Governor-General to grant assent to
bills passed by Parliament. In the Solomon Islands, Section 59(2)
of the Constitution of the Soloman Islands provides that when a
bill has been passed by the Parliament it shall be presented to
the Governor-General who shall assent to it forthwith on behalf of
the Head of the State. Whereas Section 52(2) of the Constitution
of Antigua and Barbuda states that when a bill is presented to the
Governor-General for assent in accordance with this Constitution,
he shall signify that he assents thereto.
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l. Islamic Republic of Pakistan
164. In our neighboring country, Article 75 of the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan provides that when a bill is presented
to the President, he must either assent within ten days or return it
to Parliament with a request for reconsideration. If the bill is passed
again by a majority, whether amended or not, the President must grant
assent within ten days, failing which it will be deemed to have received
assent. Whereas Article 105 stipulates that the Governor shall act in
accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Chief Minister. The
Governor may, however, require the Cabinet or the Chief Minister to
reconsider the advice. Following such reconsideration, the Governor
must act in accordance with the advice tendered within ten days.

m. Federal Republic of Germany
165. The legislative process in Germany is governed by both federal and
state constitutional provisions. Article 76 of the Basic Law for the
Federal Republic of Germany states that bills are to be introduced
in Bundestag (house elected by the people) by the Federal
Government or by the Bundesrat (federal council). The provision
grants the Bundesrat a period of six weeks to comment on bills for
Federal Government bills. The Federal Government submits the bills,
alongwith its views, to the Bundestag within six weeks alongwith its
views. Article 78 provides that a bill adopted by the Bundestag become
the law if the Bundesrat consents to it. Laws enacted in accordance
with the provisions of the Basic Law, after being countersigned, are
certified by the Federal President. Furthermore, Section 60, Section
V, the Constitution of Berlin stipulates that the bills shall be signed
by the President of the House of Representatives without delay and
then promulgated by the Governing Mayor within two weeks.

n. Italian Republic
166. The legislative process in Italy is shaped by constitutional provisions
that define the President’s role in the promulgation of laws and the
scope of legislative urgency. Article 73 of the Constitution of the
Italian Republic mandates that laws be promulgated by the President
within one month of their approval. However, if the Chambers (the
Parliament consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of
the Republic), by a majority vote, declare a bill to be urgent, it shall
be promulgated within the time specified by the bill itself. Article 74
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empowers the President to request a new deliberation by means of
a message stating the reasons for such a request. It is important
to take note that if the Chambers pass the bill once again, then the
law must to be promulgated.

o. French Republic
167. In France, the promulgation of legislation is subject to defined
constitutional timelines. Article 10 of the Constitution of October 4,
1958, stipulates that the President of the Republic must promulgate
Acts of Parliament within fifteen days after the final passage of an
Act. It also empowers the President to request Parliament to reopen
the debate on the Act, or any specific sections thereof, and such a
request for reopening of debate shall not be refused.

p. Japan
168. As per the Japanese constitutional framework, the Diet (Parliament of
Japan) is the sole law-making organ of the State. Article 59 envisages
that if a bill passed by the House of Representatives is rejected by
the House of Councillors, it becomes a law when passed a second
time by the House of Representatives by a two-thirds majority of the
members present. Article 74 states that all laws and cabinet orders
must be signed by the competent Minister of State and countersigned
by the Prime Minister.

G. ANALYSIS

i. What courses of action are available to the Governor in
exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution?
169. A plain reading of Article 200 of the Constitution indicates that when
a bill is passed by the legislature of a State, it is mandatorily required
to be placed before the Governor for his assent. This is because
without receiving the assent of the President, a bill cannot become
an Act. However, when a bill is presented to the Governor for his
assent, the Governor is required to make a declaration from the
three options available to him under the substantive part of Article
200, that is, to assent, to withhold assent, or to reserve the bill for
the consideration of the President.
170. The first proviso prescribes a mechanism whereby the Governor may
return a bill, which is not a Money Bill, back to the State legislature
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requesting them to reconsider the bill or certain provisions thereof or
consider the possibility of making certain amendments to it. Once a
bill is so returned by the Governor, the State legislature is required to
take note of the suggestions made by the Governor and reconsider
the bill accordingly. If the bill, after such reconsideration by the State
Legislature is again passed and presented to the Governor, then in
such circumstances as per the first proviso, the Governor would then
be prohibited from withholding his assent to the bill.
171. The second proviso provides for a specific situation wherein the
Governor is mandated to reserve a bill for the consideration of
the President if, in his opinion, the bill upon becoming law, would
so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger
the position which the High Court has been designed to fill by the
Constitution.
172. One of the principal contentions advanced by the learned Attorney
General before us was that the first proviso to Article 200 provides
an independent fourth course of action to the Governor besides the
three other options available to him under the substantive part of
the Article. To put it differently, his argument was that the Governor
may either withhold assent to a bill simpliciter, as provided under
the substantive part of Article 200, or he may invoke the procedure
prescribed under the first proviso and return the bill back to the
State legislature along with such a message as is mentioned in the
first proviso. In other words, he contended that where the Governor
declares a simpliciter withholding of assent, the same would be an
absolute veto of the bill, and the State legislature would have no
occasion to reconsider the bill in such a scenario. As a corollary the
first proviso would have no applicability and the State legislature
would not be entitled to reconsider the bill on its own motion.
173. He argued that in cases where the bill suffers from some gross
and manifest unconstitutionality, the Governor need not invoke the
procedure mentioned in the first proviso and it would be sufficient
if he declares a simpliciter withholding of the bill. As a corollary, he
submitted that the procedure prescribed under the first proviso may be
followed by the Governor when he is of the belief that the bill, which
is otherwise constitutional, may benefit from certain amendments
and in such a case he may send a message to the State legislature
suggesting certain amendments to the bill.
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174. In other words, his contention was that simpliciter withholding is to
be opted for by the Governor in his position as a custodian of the
Constitution in the State, while the procedure prescribed in the first
proviso is to be followed by him in his role as a friend, philosopher
and guide of the State Government, with a view to improve an
otherwise constitutionally innocuous piece of legislation.
175. The aforesaid contention of the Attorney General was met by the
petitioner by placing reliance on the recent decision of this Court
in State of Punjab (supra) wherein it was held that the option of
withholding of assent under the substantive part of Article 200 is
attached with the first proviso. The petitioner contended that in light
of the said observation, it is not open for the Governor to undertake
any simpliciter withholding of a bill presented to him and he must
mandatorily resort to the procedure indicated in the first proviso if
he decides to withhold assent to a bill.
176. The Attorney General, on the other hand, raised doubts as regards
the correctness of the decision in State of Punjab (supra) and
argued that the said decision was rendered without having regard
to the earlier decisions given by larger Benches of this Court. In
particular, he placed reliance on certain observations made by the
Constitution Bench in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) to
support his contention.
177. In response, the petitioner argued in favour of the decision in State
of Punjab (supra) and submitted that the observations made in
Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) were made in a case where
this Court was not dealing with the interpretation of Article 200 of
the Constitution. Thus, the observations made therein as regards
Article 200 could be said to be obiter dicta at best. Mr. Dwivedi went
to the extent of submitting that the observations of this Court being
relied upon by the Attorney General cannot be construed as obiter
dicta as they were mere passing remarks irrelevant to the lis before
the Court in that case.
178. It is in this backdrop that we are called upon to ascertain whether the
observations made in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) can be
reconciled with the decision of this Court in State of Punjab (supra).
The consequence of this inquiry would be that it would determine
whether the constitutional scheme of Article 200 envisages a simpliciter
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withholding of assent by the Governor. In other words, if the decision
in State of Punjab (supra) is found to be per incuriam, it would mean
that the Governor under Article 200 has the power of exercising an
absolute veto upon any bill which is presented to him for assent.
179. Before going into the question of whether the observations made
in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) could be said to be the
ratio, obiter or irrelevant to the lis, we deem it necessary to reproduce
the observations relied upon by the Attorney General in support of
his submission:
“19. The Governor is, however, made a component part of
the legislature of a State under Article 168, because every
Bill passed by the State legislature has to be reserved
for the assent under Article 200. Under that article, the
Governor can adopt one of the three courses, namely
(i) he may give his assent to it, in which case the Bill
becomes a law; or (ii) he may, except in the case of a
“Money Bill”, withhold his assent therefrom, in which case
the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the
first proviso is followed i.e. return the Bill to the Assembly
for reconsideration with a message, or (iii) he may (subject
to Ministerial advice) reserve the Bill for the consideration
of the President, in which case the President will adopt
the procedure laid down in Article 201. The first proviso
to Article 200 deals with a situation where the Governor is
bound to give his assent when the Bill is reconsidered and
passed by the Assembly. The second proviso to that article
makes the reservation for consideration of the President
obligatory where the Bill would, “if it becomes law”, derogate
from the powers of the High Court. Thus, it is clear that a
Bill passed by a State Assembly may become law if the
Governor gives his assent to it, or if, having been reserved
by the Governor for the consideration of the President, it is
assented to by the President. The Governor is, therefore,
one of the three components of a State legislature. The
only other legislative function of the Governor is that of
promulgating Ordinances under Article 213(1) when both
the Houses of the State legislature or the Legislative
Assembly, where the legislature is unicameral, are not in
session. The Ordinance-making power of the Governor is
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similar to that of the President, and it is co-extensive with
the legislative powers of the State legislature.”
(Emphasis supplied)

180. The crux of the controversy as regards whether the first proviso provides
an independent course of action to the Governor lies in the use of the
expression “in which case the Bill falls through unless the procedure
indicated in the first proviso is followed”. However, what is interesting
to note is that this expression did not come to be used for the first
time in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra). Much prior to the said
decision, Justice S.R. Das (as his lordship then was), in a concurring
opinion in State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh
of Darbhanga reported in (1952) 1 SCC 528 observed as follows:
“235. [...] The procedure to be followed after a Bill is passed
by the State Assembly is laid down in Article 200. Under
that article the Governor can do one of three things, namely,
he may declare that he assents to it, in which case the Bill
becomes a law, or he may declare that he withholds assent
therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless the
procedure indicated in the proviso is followed, or he may
declare that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of
the President, in which case the President will adopt the
procedure laid down in Article 201. Under that article the
President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill in
which case the Bill will become law or that he withholds
assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless
the procedure indicated in the proviso is followed. Thus it is
clear that a Bill passed by a State Assembly may become
a law if the Governor gives his assent to it or if, having
been reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the
President, it is assented to by the President. In the latter
event happening, the argument of the learned counsel for
the petitioners will require that what has become a law by
the assent of the President will, in order to be effective, have
to be again reserved for the consideration of the President
a curious conclusion I should be loath to reach unless I
am compelled to do so. Article 200 does not contemplate
a second reservation by the Governor. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)
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181. The same expression also came to be used by a three-Judge Bench
in Hoechst (supra) wherein it was observed thus:
“85. The constitutional position of a Governor is clearly
defined. The Governor is made a component part of the
legislature of a State under Article 168 because every Bill
passed by the State legislature has to be reserved for
the assent of the Governor under Article 200. Under that
Article, the Governor can adopt one of the three courses,
namely: (1) He may give his assent to it, in which case
the Bill becomes a law; or (2) He may except in the case
of a ‘Money Bill’ withhold his assent therefrom, in which
case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated
in the first proviso is followed i.e. return the Bill to the
Assembly for consideration with a message; or (3) He may
“on the advice of the Council of Ministers” reserve the
Bill for the consideration of the President, in which case
the President will adopt the procedure laid down in Article
201. The first proviso to Article 200 deals with a situation
where the Governor is bound to give his assent and the
Bill is reconsidered and passed by the Assembly. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

182. This Court in State of Punjab (supra) wherein one of us (J.B.
Pardiwala J.) was part of the Bench, observed that the second proviso
to Article 200 is in the form of an exception as it restricts the choice
that the Governor otherwise has under the substantive part of Article
200. It observed that the use of the expression “shall not assent to,
but shall reserve for the consideration of the President” makes it
abundantly clear that the Governor has no choice but to reserve a bill
for the consideration of the President if the bill is of the description
given in the second proviso. This Court further held that unlike the
second proviso, which is in the form of an exception, the first proviso
is in the form of an explanation and the same is made clear from the
use of the expression “may” in the first proviso. The Court observed
that the expression “may” has been used because the first proviso
attaches with the option of withholding of assent and it is a matter
of choice for the Governor if he wants to withhold assent to a bill
or if he wishes to exercise the other two options available to him,
namely, declaring assent or reserving the bill for the consideration
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of the President. Taking note of the expression “shall not withhold
assent therefrom” used in the first proviso, the Court observed that
the expression signified that the first proviso was attached to the
option of withholding of assent alone. In lieu of this, the Court held
that upon withholding of assent to a bill, the Governor is mandatorily
required to follow the procedure prescribed in the first proviso. The
relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“20. The present case turns upon how the first proviso is
to be construed. In construing the first proviso, it needs to
be noted that the substantive part of Article 200 provides
the Governor with three options : an option to assent; an
option to withhold assent; and an option to reserve the
Bill for the consideration of the President. The first proviso
opens with the expression “the Governor may” in contrast
to the second proviso which begins with the expression
“the Governor shall not assent”. The “may” in the first
proviso is because the first proviso follows the substantive
part which contains three options for the Governor. The
first proviso does not qualify the first option (where the
Governor assents to the Bill) nor the third option reserving
the Bill for consideration of the President. The first proviso
attaches to the second option (withholding of assent) and
hence begins with an enabling expression, “may”. By the
mandate of the second proviso, there is an embargo on
the Governor assenting to a Bill which derogates from
the powers of the High Court under the Constitution. The
Governor is by the mandate of the Constitution required
to reserve such a Bill for consideration of the President.
21. The second proviso impacts upon the option which
is provided by the substantive part of Article 200 to the
Governor to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the
President by making it mandatory in the situation envisaged
there. The option of reserving a Bill for the consideration of
the President is turned into a mandate where the Governor
has no option but to reserve it for the consideration of the
President. The second proviso is, therefore, in the nature of
an exception to the option which is granted to the Governor
by the substantive part of Article 200 to reserve any Bill
for the consideration of the President.
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22. A proviso, as is well settled, may fulfil the purpose
of being an exception. Sometimes, however, a proviso
may be in the form of an explanation or in addition to the
substantive provision of a statute. The first proviso allows
the Governor, where the Bill is not a Money Bill to send it
back to the legislature together with a message. In terms
of the message, the legislature may be requested by the
Governor to reconsider the entirety of the Bill. This may
happen for instance where the Governor believes that the
entirety of the Bill suffers from an infirmity. Alternatively,
the Governor may request the legislature to reconsider any
specific provision of the Bill. While returning the Bill, the
Governor may express the desirability of introducing an
amendment in the Bill. The desirability of an amendment
may arise with a view to cure an infirmity or deficiency in
the Bill. The concluding part of the first proviso however
stipulates that if the Bill is passed again by the legislature
either with or without amendments, the Governor shall
not withhold assent therefrom upon presentation. The
concluding phrase “shall not withhold assent therefrom” is
a clear indicator that the exercise of the power under the
first proviso is relatable to the withholding of the assent
by the Governor to the Bill in the first instance. That is
why in the concluding part, the first proviso indicates that
upon the passing of the Bill by the legislature either with
or without amendments, the Governor shall not withhold
assent. The role which is ascribed by the first proviso to
the Governor is recommendatory in nature and it does not
bind the State Legislature.
23. This is compatible with the fundamental tenet of a
parliamentary form of Government where the power to
enact legislation is entrusted to the elected representatives
of the people. The Governor, as a guiding statesman,
may recommend reconsideration of the entirety of the Bill
or any part thereof and even indicate the desirability of
introducing amendments. However, the ultimate decision
on whether or not to accept the advice of the Governor
as contained in the message belongs to the legislature
alone. That the message of the Governor does not bind
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the legislature is evident from the use of the expression
“if the Bill is passed again …with or without amendments”.
24. The substantive part of Article 200 empowers the
Governor to withhold assent to the Bill. In such an event,
the Governor must mandatorily follow the course of action
which is indicated in the first proviso of communicating to
the State Legislature “as soon as possible” a message
warranting the reconsideration of the Bill. The expression
“as soon as possible” is significant. It conveys a
constitutional imperative of expedition. Failure to take a call
and keeping a Bill duly passed for indeterminate periods
is a course of action inconsistent with that expression.
Constitutional language is not surplusage. In State of
Telangana v. Governor of Telangana [State of Telangana v.
Governor of Telangana, (2024) 1 SCC 405] this Court
observed that “The expression ‘as soon as possible’ has
significant constitutional content and must be borne in mind
by constitutional authorities.” The Constitution evidently
contains this provision bearing in mind the importance
which has been attached to the power of legislation which
squarely lies in the domain of the State Legislature. The
Governor cannot be at liberty to keep the Bill pending
indefinitely without any action whatsoever.
25. The Governor, as an unelected Head of the State,
is entrusted with certain constitutional powers. However,
this power cannot be used to thwart the normal course of
law-making by the State Legislatures. Consequently, if the
Governor decides to withhold assent under the substantive
part of Article 200, the logical course of action is to pursue
the course indicated in the first proviso of remitting the Bill
to the State Legislature for reconsideration. In other words,
the power to withhold assent under the substantive part of
Article 200 must be read together with the consequential
course of action to be adopted by the Governor under
the first proviso. If the first proviso is not read in
juxtaposition to the power to withhold assent conferred
by the substantive part of Article 200, the Governor as
the unelected Head of State would be in a position to
virtually veto the functioning of the legislative domain by
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1101

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

a duly elected legislature by simply declaring that assent
is withheld without any further recourse. Such a course
of action would be contrary to fundamental principles of a
constitutional democracy based on a Parliamentary pattern
of governance. Therefore, when the Governor decides to
withhold assent under the substantive part of Article 200,
the course of action which is to be followed is that which
is indicated in the first proviso. The Governor is under
Article 168 a part of the legislature and is bound by the
constitutional regime.
26. Insofar as Money Bills are concerned, the power of
the Governor to return a Bill in terms of the first proviso
is excluded from the purview of the constitutional power
of the Governor. Money Bills are governed by Article 207
in terms of which the recommendation of the Governor is
required for the introduction of the Bill on a matter specified
in sub-clauses (a) to (f) of clause (1) of Article 199.”
(Emphasis supplied)

183. Placing reliance on the expression “unless the procedure indicated in
the first proviso is followed” the learned Attorney General submitted that
the decision as regards whether the procedure prescribed under the
first proviso is to be invoked or not, is the discretion of the Governor.
It is only when the Governor decides to return the withheld bill along
with a message that the first proviso would come into play. In other
words, if the Governor believes that the bill is constitutionally infirm and
beyond any remedial changes, then he may choose not to return the
bill along with a message and may simply declare that he is withholding
assent to the bill, in which case the bill would “fall through” or lapse.
184. Although the argument is seemingly lucrative and appealing, and
the petitioner also could not provide a concrete reply to the same
during the course of the arguments and instead took shelter under
the semantics of obiter-dicta and ratio-decidendi, yet we deem it
necessary to explain how the argument is short-sighted, half-baked
and suffers from an inherent fallacy.
185. As the observation made by this Court in the three decisions referred
to above holds that the Bill would fall through unless the procedure
prescribed in the first proviso is followed, we first need to understand
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the procedure that is prescribed in the first proviso. The proviso
stipulates that when any bill, other than a Money Bill, is presented
to the Governor for assent, he may, as soon as possible, return it
to the State legislature, together with a message. As regards the
contents of the message, the proviso stipulates that the Governor
may request the House(s) of the State legislature to reconsider the
bill or certain parts of it, and also explore the desirability of introducing
certain amendments as may be suggested by the Governor in the
message. Once the bill is so returned together with the message,
the House(s) are required to reconsider the bill in accordance with
the recommendations contained in the message of the Governor.
If the bill is then passed again by the House(s), with or without
amendments, and presented to the Governor, then the Governor
cannot withhold assent from such a bill.
186. A close reading of the first proviso reveals that the action of
returning the bill to the State legislature by the Governor is qualified
by the expression “as soon as possible”. However, once the bill
has been returned to the State legislature by the Governor, there
is no such expediency required on part of the State legislature in
reconsidering the bill. Further, once the bill is reconsidered and
passed again by the State legislature, there is again a mandate
on the Governor not to withhold assent to such a bill. The only
obligation upon the State legislature is to mandatorily take into
consideration the suggestions contained in the message sent by
the Governor along with the bill. However, the State Legislature is
not under an obligation to mandatorily introduce any amendments
suggested by the Governor and it may proceed to repass the bill
without any amendments.
187. Since there is no obligation on the State legislature to repass the
bill returned by the Governor under the first proviso, the expression
“falls-through” can only refer to those situations where the State
legislature elects not to pass the bill for reconsideration again, and
in such circumstances causing the bill to lapse. There is nothing in
the first proviso which gives the Governor the discretion to initiate
the procedural machinery described therein. Therefore, the first
proviso, cannot be treated as an independent course of action
severable from the option of withholding of assent. The use of the
expression “as soon as possible” in the first proviso makes it clear
that the Constitution has imposed a sense of urgency upon the
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

Governor and expects him to act with expediency if he decides to
declare the withholding of assent. At the same time, that the use of
the expression “may” in the first proviso, as explained in State of
Punjab (supra) does not confer a discretion upon the Governor to
decide whether to act in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
the first proviso. On the contrary, it only denotes that the first proviso
would be applicable only when the option of withholding of assent
is exercised. In other words, the expression “may” is used keeping
in mind that there are three options that the Governor may choose
from when a bill is presented to him for assent. Therefore, there is
no requirement for construing the expression “may” as “shall” as was
vehemently urged on behalf of the petitioner, and the interpretation
provided in State of Punjab (supra) and further explained by us does
not merit construing the use of “may” as “shall”, as it would result in
a logical absurdity insofar as it would make the compliance with the
procedure laid down in the first proviso mandatory in the exercise
of all three options available to the Governor under the substantive
part of Article 200 of the Constitution.
188. It is also remarkable to take note of the expression “if the bill is
passed again” which signifies that the ultimate discretion to decide
whether the State legislature wants to repass the bill or not continues
to remain the prerogative of the State legislature alone. Similarly,
the use of the expression “with or without amendment” denotes
that even if the State legislature decides to reconsider the bill, the
discretion to repass it with or without the amendments suggested by
the Governor again continues to be their sole prerogative. In order to
obviate any further confusion, we deem it appropriate to clarify that
the use of the expression “shall reconsider the bill accordingly” does
not indicate that it is obligatory for the State legislature to take up
the bill for reconsideration. The word “shall” used in this expression
must be read in conjunction with the word “accordingly”. The use of
“shall” in this context is only for the limited purpose that if the State
legislature in its discretion does decide to not allow the bill to “fall
through” by taking it up for reconsideration, then the scope of such
reconsideration must at the very least encompass the suggestions
communicated by the Governor in his message. The word “shall”
used herein cannot be singled out and construed devoid of its context.
189. The structure of Article 200 is also helpful in discerning the meaning
of the content that it holds. There is a substantive part of the
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provision and there are two provisos to the substantive part. In the
substantive part, there are three options for the Governor to choose
from, each separated by the conjunction “or” thereby indicating the
mutual exclusivity of the three options. If the Governor opts for the
first option and grants assent to the bill presented to him, the first
proviso doesn’t come into consideration. Similarly, if the Governor
chooses the third option and reserves the bill for the consideration of
the President, there is no occasion for the operation of first proviso.
The second proviso is overarching in nature and provides that in the
situation as described therein, the Governor can only exercise one
option, that is, reserve the bill for the consideration of the President.
190. The use of the expression “shall declare” in the substantive part
of Article 200 indicates that the Governor is required to make
a declaration from the three choices provided to him under the
substantive part and there cannot be any fourth course of action.
As soon as assent is granted, the bill becomes an Act and there
is no scope thereafter for reservation for the consideration of the
President or returning back to the State legislature. If reservation
for the consideration of the President is declared then thereafter no
returning of the bill to the State legislature can take place, unless
the President so directs under the proviso to Article 201. Thus, it
is only upon the declaration of withholding of assent that the first
proviso is animates into action.
191. Another important aspect that may be pointed out is that the
observations made in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) and
Hoechst (supra), respectively state that except in the case of a Money
Bill, the Governor may withhold assent. A bare reading of Article
200 indicates that there is no restriction in the substantive part that
prohibits the Governor from declaring that he withholds assent to a
Money Bill, and it is only under the first proviso that such a restriction
can be found. Therefore, it is only when the option of the withholding
of assent in the substantive part of Article 200 is read along with the
first proviso that Money Bills could be said to be excluded from the
purview of withholding of assent under the substantive part of Article
200. Thus, rather than fortifying the argument of the learned Attorney
General, the observations made in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary
(supra) and reiterated in Hoechst (supra) only reinforce the intricate
and inseparable connection between the exercise of the option of
withholding of assent by the Governor and coming into operation
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

of the procedure prescribed in the first proviso. The dictum of the
above mentioned two decisions in no way renders the decision in
State of Punjab (supra) per-incuriam, and rather bolsters the line
of reasoning adopted by this Court therein.
192. Therefore, the use of the expression “the Bill falls through unless the
procedure indicated in the first proviso is followed” should be construed
in the context of the entire procedure described in the first proviso.
Seen thus, it would mean that the bill would fall-through if the bill,
having been returned by the Governor, is not passed again by the
State legislature and presented again to the Governor for his assent.
The fallacy of the argument canvassed by the learned Attorney General
lies in the very fact that he has construed the observations of this
Court, pertaining to compliance with the procedural requirement under
the first proviso, to mean that the mechanism under the first proviso
can only be initiated upon the desire and discretion of the Governor.
193. This Court in Nambudiri (supra) explained as to how the State
legislature may cause a bill to fall through with which they no longer
intend to proceed by not reconsidering and repassing it, once it has
been returned by the Governor with the deceleration of withholding
of assent. This Court held that the stage of assent could only be
arrived at after the stage of reconsideration and repassing by the
State legislature has been successfully crossed. The relevant
observations read as under: -
“16. […] Similarly, when it is said that if the Bill is passed
again the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom
it does not postulate the existence of the same House
because even if it is the successor House which passes it it
is true to say that the Bill has been passed again because
in fact it had been passed on an early occasion. Besides, if
the effect of Article 196 is that the Bills pending assent do
not lapse on the dissolution of the House then the relevant
provisions of Article 200 must be read in the light of that
conclusion. In our opinion, there is nothing in the proviso
to Article 201 which is inconsistent with the basic concept
of democratic Government in asking a successor House
to reconsider the Bill with the amendments suggested by
the President because the proviso makes it perfectly clear
that it is open to the successor House to throw out the Bill
altogether. It is only if the Bill is passed by the successor
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House that the stage is reached to present it to the
Governor or the President for his assent, not otherwise.”
194. There is one another way of looking at Article 200. The procedure,
as prescribed under the scheme of the provision, involves and
envisages the actual motion of a bill from one constitutional authority
to another. The Article starts with the requirement of the bill having to
be mandatorily presented to the Governor after it has been passed
by the State legislature. Thereafter, there is an obligation on the
Governor to make a choice from one of the three options provided in
the substantive part of the Article and also declare such a decision.
Here, if assent is declared, then the bill becomes an Act and the
Government may thereafter take steps to notify the same in the
official Gazette. If the Governor declares that bill is being reserved for
consideration of the President as per the second proviso or otherwise,
then the bill travels from the Governor to the President, whereupon
Article 201 comes into play. The mechanism provided in the first
proviso also envisages the movement of the bill from the Governor
to the State legislature and then back to the Governor upon being
passed again. The expression “as soon as possible” appearing in
the first proviso infuses a sense of urgency and expediency in the
mechanism of returning of bills by the Governor. It goes without saying
that the scheme of Article 200 is characterized by the movement of
the bill from one constitutional authority to another and that too with
a sense of expediency. It is trite to say that Article 200 occupies an
important role of giving the bills passed by the State legislature the
authority of an Act. Without the procedure envisaged under Article
200, the bills remain mere pieces of paper, skeletons without any
flesh or lifeblood flowing through their veins, mere documentation of
the aspirations of the people without any possibility of bringing them
to fruition. The only way by which the option of withholding of assent
provided in the substantive part of Article 200 can be reconciled
with the scheme permeating the remainder of the provision is by
reading it in conjunction with the first proviso. It is only when the
withholding of assent is tempered with the requirement of following
the procedure prescribed in the first proviso that the constitutional
object of ensuring that the law-making machinery at the State level
keeps on running unhindered can be fulfilled.
195. Any other reading of the provision that construes the option of
withholding of assent without attaching it to the mechanism prescribed
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1107

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

in the first proviso would render the very idea of smooth functioning of
the law-making process nugatory and would vest with the Governor
untrammeled powers of thwarting the legislative machinery and
in effect the will and aspirations of the people whose voices the
legislature represents.
196. Thus, in light of the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that
there are only three courses of action available to the Governor to
choose from when a bill is presented to him for assent under Article
200. The first proviso is not an independent fourth course of action
but intrinsically attached to the option of withholding of assent. In
other words, the first proviso is clarificatory and only elaborates the
procedure to be followed in case the option of withholding of assent
is invoked by the Governor.
197. The use of the expression “shall” in the substantive part of Article
200 read with the expression “as soon as possible” used in the first
proviso indicates that there is no pocket veto available to the Governor
while he is exercising the powers under Article 200. As we have also
discussed in the subsequent parts of this judgment, inaction on part
of the Governor to take a decision when a bill is presented to him
under Article 200 is grossly violative of the constitutional scheme of
expediency which permeates the provision.
198. The Governor, in exercise of his powers under Article 200, also
does not possess any absolute veto. He is mandated to take a
decision from among the three options that are provided in the
substantive part of the Article 200. In case of withholding of assent,
the Governor is bound to follow the procedure prescribed under
the first proviso and assent to the bill if it is ultimately presented
to him for assent after being repassed by the State legislature.
The Governor may also reserve certain bills for the consideration
of the President. However, in no case has the Governor been
conferred with the power to veto a bill which is presented to him.
He is envisaged as an intermediary stop in the journey of the bill
towards becoming an Act. When a bill comes to the Governor,
he may forthwith assent to it, or postpone the grant of assent by
exercising the option of withholding of assent but only for so long till
the bill comes back to him after reconsideration, or he may forward
the bill to the President whereupon the procedure prescribed under
Article 201 is to be followed. Thus, in none of these cases can
the Governor permanently keep a bill with him without according
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assent to it, nor can he declare a simpliciter withholding of assent
thereby killing the bill.

ii. Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for the
consideration of the President when it is presented to
him for assent after being reconsidered in accordance
with the first proviso to Article 200, more particularly,
when he had not reserved it for the consideration of the
President in the first instance?
199. As discussed in the preceding issue, the Governor, in exercise of
his powers under Article 200, has three options to choose from. The
use of the conjunction “or” between the three options signifies that
the options are mutually exclusive and once one of the options is
exercised by the Governor, the other options become unavailable
to choose from. Kameshwar Singh (supra) held that there can be
no reservation for the consideration of the President once assent
is declared and similarly, there is no requirement for the Governor
to assent to the bill, once the bill, having been reserved for the
consideration of the President, has received his assent.
200. We have also discussed in line with the decision in State of Punjab
(supra) that the option of withholding of assent is attached with the
first proviso and once the Governor declares the withholding of assent,
the entire mechanism which is laid down in the first proviso itself
has to follow suit. Thus, the first proviso to Article 200 is a complete
code in itself as regards the procedure which is to be followed once
the Governor withholds assent and the rest of the article has no
applicability thereafter.
201. It is also interesting to note that the expression “withhold assent”
has been employed in the substantive part of Article 200. The
literal meaning of the expression ‘withhold’ as defined in a number of
dictionaries is to keep back; to keep in one’s possession what belongs
to or is due to others; to hinder; to prevent; to defer; to postpone; to
detain; to keep under control; to retain; to keep from doing something;
to refrain from doing something. Thus, it would not be incorrect to
construe that the option of withholding of assent has been provided
to the Governor under the substantive part only with a view to defer
or to postpone the grant of assent to a bill. Withholding of assent
cannot be construed to be the same as denying of assent or as
conferring a power in the Governor to veto a legislation passed by
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1109

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

the State legislature, which would be against the very fundamentals
of a representative democracy.
202. Further, the scope of this deferment of assent by the Governor has
been made subject to the procedure laid down in the first proviso. The
procedure laid down in the first proviso ensures that the withholding of
assent does not become analogous to a pocket veto. The use of the
expression “if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with
or without amendment” in the first proviso clearly indicates that the
role of the Governor under the first proviso has been characterized
as recommendatory in nature and that his suggestions do not bind
the legislature. Further, the expression “the Governor shall not
withhold assent therefrom” in the first proviso leaves no scope for
the Governor to take any course of action other than discontinuing
the withholding of assent, which by necessary implication means to
accord assent to the bill. The expression also indicates that there is
strict constitutional prohibition against the Governor to not withhold
assent to the bill.
203. What follows from the aforesaid discussion is that once the option of
withholding of assent is exercised by the Governor, the mechanism
under the first proviso is set into motion to the exclusion of everything
else envisaged under the article. This is in view of the maxim Expressio
Unius Est Exclusio Alterius i.e., the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another. Once the mechanism under the first proviso
is set into motion and the various stages are complied with, the
only possible manner in which the mechanism prescribed under
the first proviso can conclude is by the Governor granting assent to
the bill. Thus, there is no scope for the Governor to reserve a bill
for the consideration of the President once it is presented to him
for reconsideration after compliance with the procedure laid down
in the first proviso.
204. However, for the sake of completeness, we deem it necessary to
discuss a possible scenario wherein the Governor may have the
power to reserve the bill for the consideration of the President even
after it is repassed by the State legislature and presented to him
for assent. Say, for instance, in a particular case, the Governor
withholds assent to a bill which is presented to him and returns it
to the House or the Houses together with a message requesting
them to reconsider certain aspects of the bill or introduce certain
amendments desirable thereto. However, the House or the Houses,
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in the process of reconsideration, introduce certain changes which
were not suggested by the Governor in the message which he sent
together with the bill. In such a scenario, the House or Houses
cannot be said to have “reconsidered the Bill accordingly” which is
a mandatory condition prescribed under the first proviso. If the bill
which is presented to the Governor for assent in the second round
could be said to have been reconsidered by the House or Houses on
wholly different and new grounds, and if those changes are of such
a nature where a reservation for the consideration of the President
may be desirable, then the Governor would not be precluded from
reserving the bill for the consideration of the President.
205. However, if the bill is repassed by the House or Houses without
amendments, or only with such amendments as were suggested by
the Governor in his message, then the procedure prescribed under the
first proviso could be said to be fully complied with and the Governor
would be bound to signify his assent thereto and would be precluded
from reserving the bill for the consideration of the President.
206. We say so because the procedure laid down in the first proviso cannot
be construed as giving the State legislature the unfettered power to
introduce changes to the bill which alter its very nature, or which, for
instance, fall foul of the second proviso to Article 200. In such a scenario,
the Governor would have all the three options which are available
to him when a bill is presented to him in the first instance. However,
whenever the House or Houses reconsider the bill “accordingly”, that
is, in accordance with the suggestions of the Governor and pass it
with or without amendments, the Governor is bound to act as per the
clear constitutional directive laid down in the first proviso.
207. As we shall also discuss later, any reservation of a bill by the Governor
for the consideration of the President on the ground that the bill was
not reconsidered as per the procedure prescribed in the first proviso
would be subject to judicial scrutiny.
208. Coming to the facts of the present case, out of twelve bills which are
the subject matter of the present petition, two were reserved by the
Governor for the consideration of the President in the first instance
of their presentation. As regards the remaining ten bills, the Governor
declared a withholding of assent, however, the bills were returned
without any message as is envisaged under the first proviso. What
stands out as a glaring omission on the part of the Governor is
that the day on which the withholding of assent was declared, the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1111

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

decision in State of Punjab (supra) had already been passed and
even the notice in the present petition had been issued. Thus, it was
expected of the Governor that he would not declare a simpliciter
withholding of assent of the bills without specifying the reasons
for such withholding and also without making recommendations as
regards the desirability of introducing any amendments by the State
legislature while reconsidering the bills.
209. In light of the language of Article 200, and also keeping in mind its
interpretation by this Court in State of Punjab (supra), there was no
room for the Governor to declare a simpliciter withholding of assent
without taking recourse to the first proviso as that virtually amounts
to the exercise of absolute veto by the Governor, a power which is
conspicuously absent from our constitutional scheme.
210. In the absence of any message under the first proviso by the Governor,
the State legislature was left with no other option but to proceed on
the assumption that the bills were required to be reconsidered in its
entirety. The State legislature proceeded on this assumption and the
said 10 Bills were reconsidered in a special sitting and were passed
without any material changes and presented to the Governor on the
same day. Thereafter, the Governor, rather than giving his assent
to the Bills, went on to reserve the Bills for the consideration of the
President on the ground that the Bills were repugnant to Entry 66
of the List I of the Schedule VII to the Constitution.
211. For the reasons that we have assigned in our foregoing discussion,
we are of the view that the Governor could not have reserved
the Bills for the consideration of the President once they were
reconsidered by the State legislature and presented to him without
any amendments, particularly when the Governor sent back the
Bills to the State legislature without any message on an earlier
occasion. As a natural consequence of the reservation of the bills
for the consideration of the President having been found to be in
contravention of the procedure prescribed under Article 200 of the
Constitution and thus, illegal and void, any subsequent decision
taken by the President on those Bills would also be non-est and is
thus declared to be void ab-initio.

iii. Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed
time-limit within which the Governor is required to act in the
exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution?
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212. It was argued by the petitioner that the Governor in exercise of his
powers under Article 200 is required to act promptly and the absence
of any prescribed time period should not be construed as allowing
the Governor the liberty to act on his own free will and volition. It was
also submitted that the expression “as soon as possible” appearing in
the first proviso places an obligation on the Governor to act promptly
and with expedience.
213. The petitioner also placed reliance on the recommendations made
by the Sarkaria Commission and the Punchhi Commission to argue
that the Court should read in some time-limit into the scheme of
Article(s) 200 and 201 respectively to prevent inaction on the part
of the Governor and the President.
214. Refuting the contention of the petitioner, the learned Attorney General
argued that in the absence of any prescribed time-limit in the text
of the provision, it would not be open to the Court to read in a time-
limit and the only way to do so would be by way of a constitutional
amendment. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in
Nambudiri (supra) to argue that this Court had expressly rejected
the idea that there is a time limit which circumscribes the exercise
of functions of the Governor under Article 200.
215. The arguments advanced before us present an interesting question
whether it would be open to the courts to read in a time limit for the
exercise of a power by a constitutional authority where no such limit
is prescribed by the Constitution. We have expressly held during the
course of answering the previous issue that the scheme of Article 200
does not envisage either the exercise of a pocket or an absolute veto
by the Governor. The use of the expression “shall” in the substantive
part indicates that the Governor is under an obligation to choose from
one of the three options that are made available to him. By virtue of
the first proviso attaching itself to the option of withholding of assent,
as discussed earlier, the possibility of an absolute veto is also ruled
out as the Governor must assent to the bill once it is presented to him
after the procedure prescribed in the first proviso is complied with.
216. However, unlike many countries across the globe wherein a provision
for deemed assent upon the expiry of the specified time period has
been made, there is no such provision in our Constitution. The only
manner in which a temporal imperative has been weaved into the
scheme of Article 200 is by the use of the expression “as soon as
possible” in the first proviso. The said expression, which also appears
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

in Article 111 of the Constitution, was the subject of some debate in
the Constituent Assembly.
217. Article 111, which provides for the President’s assent to bills passed
by Parliament was originally numbered as Article 91 under the Draft
Constitution and it provided a time-limit of six-weeks to the President
to send back the bill to the House(s) for reconsideration. The Draft
article read as follows:
“When a Bill has been passed by the Houses of Parliament,
it shall be presented to the President, and the President
shall declare either that he assents to the Bill, or that he
withholds assent therefrom:
Provided that the President may, not later than six weeks
after the presentation to him of a Bill for assent, return the
Bill if it is not a Money Bill to the Houses with a message
requesting that they will reconsider the Bill or any specified
provision thereof, and, in particular, will consider the
desirability of introducing any such amendments as he
may recommend in his message, and the Houses shall
reconsider the Bill accordingly.”
218. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar moved
an amendment to substitute the expression “not later than six weeks”
with “as soon as possible”. Further in the debate, Shri Naziruddin
Ahmad advocated for a change in the aforesaid amendment and
sought to substitute the term “as soon as possible” with “as soon
as may be”. His contention rested on the reasoning that the phrase,
“as soon as possible” which was introduced by Dr. Ambedkar in his
amendment in place of the original wording used in Article 91, that
is, “not later than six weeks”, imposed an unduly stringent obligation
upon the President. He was of the opinion that “as soon as possible”
mandates immediate action, thereby curtailing the President’s scope
to engage in a careful and deliberate review of the bill presented
for assent. He expressed concern that such a rigid constraint could
give rise to hasty decisions, devoid of any careful examination of the
presented bill. In his view, the formulation ran the risk of undermining
the quality of the President’s judgment under Article 111. He expressed
his opinion as follows:
“[...] The Proviso is to the effect that “the President may,
as soon as possible, after the presentation of the Bill,
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return the Bill,” and so on. I want to make it “as soon as
may be”. If we leave it exactly as Dr. Ambedkar would
have it, it leaves no margin. ‘As soon as possible’ means
immediately. Possibility which means physical possibility
is the only test. It may leave no breathing time to the
President. The words ‘may be’ give him a reasonable
latitude. It would mean, “reasonably practicable”. This is
the obvious implication. That is the only reason why I have
suggested amendment.”10
219. To avoid the aforesaid possibilities, Shri Naziruddin Ahmad proposed
the adoption of “as soon as may be”, which he interpreted to mean “as
soon as is reasonably practicable”. In his opinion, this change would
allow the President greater flexibility and sufficient time to thoroughly
examine the provisions of the bill presented to him. Such freedom
would prove particularly valuable when the President contemplates
returning the bill to the House(s) for reconsideration, especially in
circumstances where amendments might be recommended. The
essence of Shri Ahmad’s amendment was to safeguard the President’s
ability to render well-reasoned and thoughtful decisions without any
rigid time constraints.
220. Shri P.S. Deshmukh expressed his opposition to the amendment
proposed by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, deeming the suggested substitution
of the words as unnecessary. He, on the other hand, argued that the
original phrasing, particularly the expression “not later than six weeks”,
ought to remain unaltered, as it established a precise time frame for
the President to act accordingly. He further argued that this specific
time frame mandated that the President must convey his decision to
return the bill for reconsideration as expeditiously as possible, and
in no event beyond six-weeks. He opined that preserving the words
“not later than six weeks” was quintessential to ensure timely action,
thereby preventing undue delays in the legislative process to send
the bills back to the House(s) for reconsideration.
221. Shri H.V. Kamath vehemently opposed the amendment put forward
by Dr. Ambedkar. Advocating for expeditious and timely action, he
argued that, “in human nature, if you will permit me to say so, unless
there is a compelling sense of duty or service, there is always a

10 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (May 20, 1949) 192.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1115

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

tendency to procrastinate”.11 It was his opinion that such tendencies
to procrastinate must be rooted out by infusing a standard of duty or
service to ensure timely action on part of the President. He further
opined that there exists no assurance that every President of India
will consistently adhere to the principle of timely action in legislative
processes. Therefore, according to him, it was very necessary that the
“Constitution should provide specifically a time limit for a contingency
of this nature”12. He believed the phrase “as soon as possible” to be
vague, purposeless and meaningless, and argued that such vague
phrases have no place in a provision of such an important nature.
222. In light of the debate which took place on 20th May 1949, the proposed
amendment to Article 91 was adopted by the Assembly, thereby
substituting the expression “not later than six weeks” with “as soon
as possible” and the same came to be added to the Constitution.
223. What can be postulated from this discussion of the relevant
Constituent Assembly debates is that although our constitutional
makers expressed their concerns for the possibility of an undue
delay in the legislative process on account of the human nature to
procrastinate, yet they nevertheless proceeded to adopt the phrase
“as soon as possible” in the original Article 91. This adoption and
amendment of draft Article 91 reflects a sense of inherent trust reposed
by the Constituent Assembly that the President would execute his
functions as enshrined under Article 111 of the Constitution in a
timely and efficient manner.
224. The expression also came to be adopted mutatis mutandis in
Article 200. The experience of the working of the Constitution,
more particularly, Article 200, has shown that the apprehensions
expressed by some of the members of the Constituent Assembly
have unfortunately proven to be prophecy. As we have discussed in
the preceding paragraphs, one of the prominent grievances of the
State governments as recorded by the Sarkaria Commission and
Punchhi Commission reports was that the exercise of the power
under Article 200 by the Governor, not being a time-bound process,
leads to significant legislative delay and that certain bills are withheld
in the Governor’s secretariat for years.

11 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb, (May 20, 1949) 194.
12 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb. (May 20, 1949) 195.
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225. Not taking any action on the bills for an unreasonable and prolonged
period of time virtually vests the Governor with the power of pocket
veto and the same cannot be held to be permissible within our
constitutional scheme. Dr. Singhvi had submitted during the course
of his arguments that there is no scope for the Governor to decide
not to decide. Article 200, being the final step in the process of the
birth of a legislative enactment, the stage wherein life is breathed into
an otherwise lifeless document, cannot be interpreted in a manner
which allows the Governor to remain silent and exhibit inaction
upon the bills which are submitted to him after having received the
approval of the majority of the State legislature.
226. This Court in Durga Pada Ghosh v. State of West Bengal reported
in (1972) 2 SCC 656 whilst dealing with a writ in the nature of
habeas corpus was called upon to examine the meaning and
import of the expression “as soon as may be” appearing in Article
22(5) of the Constitution and its significance in communication of
the grounds of detention and disposal of the representation of the
detenu. In the said case, the detenu came to be arrested and put
in preventive detention in December, 1971. The detenu moved a
representation which was received in early January, 1972. However,
his representation came to be considered by the State government
therein only in February, 1972 and his detention was confirmed
and communicated in March, 1972. The detenu challenged the
order of preventive detention passed against him on the ground
that there was an inordinate delay of almost two months on part
of the State government in considering his representation even
though the same had been received in January itself. This Court
held that the aforesaid expression must be seen in the context of
the scheme underlying Article 22, more particularly, the importance
that it occupies in the constitutional set-up as regards the personal
freedom of an individual and in a manner whereby the provision
does not lose both its purpose and meaning. The words “as soon
as may be” in such context implies anxious care on the part of the
authority concerned to perform its duty in this respect, as early as
practicable, without avoidable delay. The course of action which is
expected from the concerned authority; being communication of the
grounds of arrest and disposal of the representation, was required
to be considered with a sense of urgency and must be done with
due promptitude or expedition and with reasonable dispatch. It was
further held that although there is no definite time-limit which can be
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1117

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

laid down within which such actions must be done, yet at the same
time, whether the appropriate authority had disposed of its obligation
as expeditiously as possible ought to be looked into keeping in mind
the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. It further held
that such constitutional obligations cannot be ignored or justified on
reasons of administrative delay except where it is shown that ample
arrangements were made to cope with the situation that led to a
delay and a certain degree of priority was accorded. The relevant
observations read as under:
“7. Now it is not disputed before us that on the question
of delay in considering the representation by the State
Government no hard and fast rule can be laid down and
it is a matter which falls for decision on the facts and
circumstances of each case. It may in this connection be
pointed out that in Jayanarayan case the writ petition was
referred to a Bench of five Judges to consider as to what
would be the question of period within which the State
Government could dispose of the representation of the
detenu because it was felt that there was an apparent
conflict between Shyamal Chakraborty v. Commissioner
of Police, Calcutta and Khairul Haque v. State of West
Bengal. After considering the various decisions on the
point this Court expressly concluded thus:
“No definite time can be laid down within which
a representation of a detenu should be dealt
with save and except that it is a constitutional
right of a detenu to have his representation
considered as expeditiously as possible. It will
depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case whether the appropriate Government
has disposed of the case as expeditiously as
possible for otherwise in words of Shelat, J.,
who spoke for this Court in the case of Khairul
Haque : ‘it is obvious that the obligation to furnish
the earliest opportunity to make a representation
loses both its purpose and meaning’.”
8. The scheme underlying Article 22 of the Constitution
highlights the importance attached in our constitutional set-
up to the personal freedom of an individual. Sub-articles (1)
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and (2) refer to the protection against arrest and detention
of a person under the ordinary law. Persons arrested or
detained under a law providing for preventive detention
are dealt with in sub-articles (4) to (7). Sub-article (5) says
that when a person is detained in pursuance of an order
under a law providing for preventive detention the grounds
on which the order is made have to be communicated to
the person concerned as soon as may be and he has
to be afforded earliest opportunity to represent against
the order. The object of communicating the grounds is
to enable the detenu to make his representation against
the order. The words “as soon as may be” in the context
must imply anxious care on the part of the authority
concerned to perform its duty in this respect as early as
practicable without avoidable delay. Similarly, when the
representation is made it is in the fitness of things that the
said representation should be considered with the same
sense of urgency with which the grounds are intended to
be communicated to the detenu. That is the only way in
which the purpose, for which the earliest communication
of the grounds to the person concerned is provided,
can be achieved. The representation must, therefore,
be considered with due promptitude or expedition and
without avoidable delay, in other words with reasonable
dispatch. As held by this Court in Jayanarayan case, the
representation should be considered as expeditiously
as possible. As the question of delay in considering the
representation falls for determination on the facts and
circumstances of each case the binding force of a past
precedent for a later case would largely depend on the
degree of close similarity of the circumstances dealt with
therein. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

227. In Keisham (supra) the question that arose before this Court was
whether courts can direct the Speaker to decide disqualification
petitions pending before it within a reasonable period of time, and
this Court speaking eruditely through R.F. Nariman, J., answering
the aforesaid question in an affirmative held as under:
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1119

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

(i) First, that the Speaker, being the quasi-judicial authority for
the purposes of the Tenth Schedule, is duty bound to take a
decision on disqualification petitions within a reasonable time.
Any failure of the Speaker in exercising his jurisdiction or
refraining from deciding such petition within a reasonable time
would be an error that would attract the scrutiny of the courts
in judicial review, notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction to
the exclusion of the courts that has been conferred upon the
Speaker in terms of Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule. The
relevant observations read as under: -
24. It is clear from a reading of the judgment in
Rajendra Singh Rana and, in particular, the underlined
portions [italicised herein] of paras 40 and 41 that
the very question referred by the two-Judge Bench
in S.A. Sampath Kumar has clearly been answered
stating that a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in
a Speaker cannot be covered by the shield contained
in Para 6 of the Tenth Schedule, and that when a
Speaker refrains from deciding a petition within a
reasonable time, there was clearly an error which
attracted jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise
of the power of judicial review.
(Emphasis supplied)

(ii) Secondly, it observed that although Paragraph 6 of the Tenth
Schedule vests the Speaker with an exclusive jurisdiction to
decide disqualification petitions and ousts the reach of courts
in such matters, yet it does not mean that there is no scope
of judicial review by the courts or that the power to pass any
direction(s) to the Speaker acting under the Tenth Schedule
does not exist. It was observed that the true purport of such
exclusive jurisdiction was only to ensure that no obstacle comes
in the way of the Speaker in deciding such petitions by way of
injunctions from the courts. However, it by no means interdicts
the exercise of judicial review in aiding a prompt decision
on such disqualification petitions to ensure that the Speaker
decides these issues within a reasonable period. The relevant
observations read as under:
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“30. A reading of the aforesaid decisions, therefore,
shows that what was meant to be outside the pale
of judicial review in para 110 of Kihoto Hollohan
are quia timet actions in the sense of injunctions
to prevent the Speaker from making a decision on
the ground of imminent apprehended danger which
will be irreparable in the sense that if the Speaker
proceeds to decide that the person be disqualified, he
would incur the penalty of forfeiting his membership
of the House for a long period. Paras 110 and 111
of Kihoto Hollohan do not, therefore, in any manner,
interdict judicial review in aid of the Speaker arriving
at a prompt decision as to disqualification under
the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. Indeed, the
Speaker, in acting as a tribunal under the Tenth
Schedule is bound to decide disqualification petitions
within a reasonable period. [...]”
(iii) Lastly, it held that although what would be a ‘reasonable period’
for deciding such petitions by the Speaker largely depends
on the facts of each case yet, where there are no exceptional
circumstances, the Speaker should arrive at a decision within an
outer time-limit of three-months so that the avowed constitutional
objective of anti-defection under the Tenth Schedule is not
defeated. The relevant observations read as under:
“30. [...] What is reasonable will depend on the facts of
each case, but absent exceptional circumstances for
which there is good reason, a period of three months
from the date on which the petition is filed is the outer
limit within which disqualification petitions filed before
the Speaker must be decided if the constitutional
objective of disqualifying persons who have infracted
the Tenth Schedule is to be adhered to. This period
has been fixed keeping in mind the fact that ordinarily
the life of the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly
of the States is 5 years and the fact that persons who
have incurred such disqualification do not deserve
to be MPs/MLAs even for a single day, as found
in Rajendra Singh Rana, if they have infracted the
provisions of the Tenth Schedule.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1121

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

228. The aforesaid view was reiterated in State of Telangana v. Governor
of Telangana reported in (2024) 1 SCC 405 wherein this Court whilst
dealing with a similar issue pertaining to the pendency of a few bills
before the Governor of Telangana, held that the expression “as soon
as possible” in Article 200 has significant constitutional content and
must be borne in mind by the constitutional authorities. The relevant
observations read as under:
“2. The first proviso to Article 200 states that the Governor
may “as soon as possible after the presentation” of the Bill
for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill together
with a message for reconsideration to the House or Houses
of the State Legislature. The expression “as soon as
possible” has significant constitutional content and must
be borne in mind by constitutional authorities.”
(Emphasis supplied)

229. In Ram Chand (supra) certain parcels of land had been demarcated
and declared for compulsory acquisition vide a notification, sometime
between the years 1959-1965. However, the awards for compensation
came to be passed almost fourteen-years later in the year 1980.
These awards came to be challenged before this Court on the
ground that since the statute in question provides for payment of
compensation in respect of the acquisition made at the market value
of the land, as it stood, at the time of publication of the notification
for declaration, the same necessarily meant that compensation
ought to be paid expeditiously and without delay. This Court held
that although the legislature by way of an amendment has now
prescribed a time-limit for making an award, yet it does not mean
that prior to such amendment there was no time-limit for payment of
compensation or that an award could be passed by the authorities
at their own pace and leisure. It held that where for exercise of any
power no time-limit has been prescribed, such power has to be
exercised within a reasonable period of time. It further held that sans
any fixed time-limit, such powers cannot be exercised or subjected
to delay in a manner that violates or circumvents the object of the
statute and the constitutional mandate under Article 31A of timely
acquisition and adequate compensation, respectively. The relevant
observations read as under:
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“14. The Parliament has recognized and taken note of the
inaction and non-exercise of the statutory power on the part
of the authorities, enjoined by the provisions of the Act to
complete the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable
time and because of that now a time-limit has been fixed
for making of the award, failing which the entire proceeding
for acquisition shall lapse. But, can it be said that before
the introduction of the aforesaid amendment in the Act, the
authorities were at liberty to proceed with the acquisition
proceedings, irrespective of any schedule or time-frame
and to complete the same as and when they desired? It
is settled that in a statute where for exercise of power no
time-limit is fixed, it has to be exercised within a time which
can be held to be reasonable. This aspect of the matter
can be examined in the light of second proviso to Article
31-A of the Constitution, which in clear and unambiguous
terms prohibits making of any law which does not contain
a provision for payment of compensation at a rate, which
shall not be less than the market value thereof. The Act is
consistent with the second proviso to Article 31-A, because
it provides for payment of compensation at the market
value of the land acquired. But, whether the constitutional
and statutory requirement of the payment of the market
value to the persons, whose lands have been compulsorily
acquired, is not being circumvented and violated by keeping
the land acquisition proceedings pending for more than a
decade and half, without making the awards and paying
the compensation, which has been pegged to the dates
of notifications under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the
Act, which in the present cases had been issued 14 to 21
years before the making of the awards. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

230. In A.G. Perarivalan (supra) the facts germane for our discussion
are that the appellant convict therein had filed a mercy petition
under Article 161 to the Governor in December, 2015. The State
Cabinet recommended the grant of remission to the Governor in
2018. However, the Governor did not take any decision on the
mercy petition for two years despite receiving the recommendation
of the State Cabinet. Thereafter, upon a direction of this Court, the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1123

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

Governor in 2021, by an order, forwarded the mercy petition of the
appellant to the President citing that the Union is the appropriate
authority to decide the same. This reference came to be challenged
before this Court wherein it was held as under:
(i) First, it was held that the “limits within which the executive
Government can function under the Indian Constitution can be
ascertained without much difficulty by reference to the form of
the executive which our Constitution has set up”. The Court
observed that although the Governor is the head of the executive
in the State, yet in actuality, it is the Council of Ministers that
carries on the executive Government. It held that as per Article
163, the Governor shall exercise his functions provided under
different provisions of the Constitution only under the aid and
advice of the Council of Ministers except where he under the
Constitution has been expressly authorised to exercise such
functions in his discretion. This Court, speaking through L.
Nageswar Rao, J., described this relation of the Governor and
the Council of Ministers as “a hyphen which joins, a buckle
which fastens the legislative part of the State to the executive
part”. The relevant observations read as under:
“18. The power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites
or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit
or commute the sentence of any person convicted
of an offence against any law related to which the
executive power of the State extends is vested in
the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution.
Article 162 makes it clear that the executive power
of the State shall extend to matters with respect to
which the legislature of the State has power to make
laws. Article 163 of the Constitution provides that
there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief
Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor
in the exercise of his functions, except insofar as he
is by or under this Constitution required to exercise
his functions or any of them in his discretion.
19. The limits within which the executive Government
can function under the Indian Constitution can be
ascertained without much difficulty by reference to
the form of the executive which our Constitution
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has set up. Our Constitution, though federal in its
structure, is modelled on the British parliamentary
system where the executive is deemed to have
the primary responsibility for the formulation of
governmental policy and its transmission into law
though the condition precedent to the exercise of
this responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the
legislative branch of the State. The Governor occupies
the position of the head of the executive in the State
but it is virtually the Council of Ministers in each
State that carries on the executive Government. In
the Indian Constitution, therefore, we have the same
system of parliamentary executive as in England and
the Council of Ministers consisting, as it does, of the
members of the legislature is, like the British Cabinet,
“a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the
legislative part of the State to the executive part
20. Under the Cabinet system of Government as
embodied in our Constitution the Governor is the
constitutional or formal head of the State and he
exercises all his powers and functions conferred on
him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice
of his Council of Ministers, save in spheres where the
Governor is required by or under the Constitution to
exercise his functions in his discretion. Wherever the
Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or
the Governor for the exercise of any power or function
by the President or the Governor, as the case may be,
as for example in Articles 123, 213, 311(2) proviso (c),
317, 352(1), 356 and 360, the satisfaction required by
the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the
President or of the Governor but is the satisfaction of
the President or of the Governor in the constitutional
sense under the Cabinet system of Government. It is
the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers on whose
aid and advice the President or the Governor generally
exercises all his powers and functions.
21. Even though the Governor may be authorised to
exercise some functions, under different provisions
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1125

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

of the Constitution, the same are required to be
exercised only on the basis of the aid and advice
tendered to him under Article 163, unless the
Governor has been expressly authorised, by or under
a constitutional provision, to discharge the function
concerned, in his own discretion.”
(ii) Secondly, it observed that the law is clear and explicit – the
advice of the State Cabinet is binding on the Governor when
it comes to the exercise of powers under Article 161. In the
absence of any other provision under the Constitution or any
statute in this regard, the Governor could not have deviated
from the binding recommendations of the State Cabinet and
referred the mercy petition to the President. It was held that
such an action is contrary to the constitutional scheme. The
relevant observations read as under:
“24. The law laid down by this Court, as detailed
above, is clear and explicit. The advice of the State
Cabinet is binding on the Governor in matters relating
to commutation/remission of sentences under Article
161. No provision under the Constitution has been
pointed out to us nor any satisfactory response
tendered as to the source of the Governor’s power to
refer a recommendation made by the State Cabinet
to the President of India. In the instant case, the
Governor ought not to have sent the recommendation
made by the State Cabinet to the President of
India. Such action is contrary to the constitutional
scheme elaborated above. [...] It is relevant to point
out that the recommendation made by the State
Cabinet was on 9-9-2018, which remained pending
before the Governor for almost two-and-a-half years
without a decision being taken. It was only when
this Court started enquiring about the reason for the
decision being delayed, the Governor forwarded the
recommendation made by the State Government for
remission of the appellant’s sentence to the President
of India.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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(iii) Thirdly, as regards the inaction of the Governor in deciding
the mercy petition for more than two-years, this Court held that
although there is a certain degree of immunity with respect to the
exercise of powers by the Governor under the Constitution, yet
it is an equally settled position that the courts have the power
to judicially review the functioning of the Governor on certain
grounds. It held that a non-exercise of these powers, such as,
under Article 161 is one such ground for the exercise of judicial
review as the said provision pertains to the liberty of individuals
and any inexplicable delay not on account of the prisoners, is
inexcusable. The relevant observations read as under:
“24. [...] It is relevant to point out that the
recommendation made by the State Cabinet was
on 9-9-2018, which remained pending before the
Governor for almost two-and-a-half years without
a decision being taken. It was only when this
Court started enquiring about the reason for the
decision being delayed, the Governor forwarded the
recommendation made by the State Government for
remission of the appellant’s sentence to the President
of India.
25. We are fully conscious of the immunity of the
Governor under the Constitution with respect to the
exercise and performance of the powers and duties
of his office or for any act done or purported to be
done by him in the exercise and performance of
such powers and duties. However, as held by this
Court in numerous decisions, this Court has the
power of judicial review of orders of the Governor
under Article 161, which can be impugned on certain
grounds. Non-exercise of the power under Article
161 is not immune from judicial review, as held by
this Court in Epuru Sudhakar v. State of A.P. Given
petitions under Article 161 pertain to the liberty of
individuals, inexplicable delay not on account of the
prisoners is inexcusable as it contributes to adverse
physical conditions and mental distress faced by
a prisoner, especially when the State Cabinet has
taken a decision to release the prisoner by granting
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1127

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

him the benefit of remission/commutation of his
sentence.”
(Emphasis supplied)

(iv) Lastly, as regards the contention of the respondents that the
decision of the Governor to forward the mercy petition to the
President was done in exercise of his discretion owing to the
irrational recommendation of the Cabinet in line with the ratio of
M.P. Special Police (supra), this Court held that the aforesaid
decision would not be applicable, since there is nothing to make
out a case of irrational or non-consideration of relevant factors
by the State government to warrant the Governor exercising
his discretion and deviating from their recommendations as laid
down in M.P. Special Police (supra). The relevant observations
read as under:
“29. We are afraid that the judgment of this Court in
M.P. Special Police Establishment is not applicable
to the facts of the present case. No arguments have
been put forth to make out a case of non-consideration
of relevant factors by the State Cabinet or of the
State Cabinet having based its recommendation on
extraneous considerations. Moreover, in the said
case, the Governor had taken a decision which
was subsequently challenged, unlike the present
case, where the Governor has merely forwarded the
recommendation made by the State Cabinet to the
President of India.”
Accordingly, this Court held as under:
“38. In conclusion, we have summarised our findings
below:
38.1. The law laid down by a catena of judgments of
this Court is well settled that the advice of the State
Cabinet is binding on the Governor in the exercise
of his powers under Article 161 of the Constitution.
38.2. Non-exercise of the power under Article 161
or inexplicable delay in exercise of such power not
attributable to the prisoner is subject to judicial review
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by this Court, especially when the State Cabinet has
taken a decision to release the prisoner and made
recommendations to the Governor to this effect.
38.3. The reference of the recommendation of
the Tamil Nadu Cabinet by the Governor to the
President of India two-and-a-half years after such
recommendation had been made is without any
constitutional backing and is inimical to the scheme
of our Constitution, whereby “the Governor is but a
shorthand expression for the State Government” as
observed by this Court.
38.4. The judgment of this Court in M.P. Special
Police Establishment has no applicability to the
facts of this case and neither has any attempt been
made to make out a case of apparent bias of the
State Cabinet or the State Cabinet having based its
decision on irrelevant considerations, which formed
the fulcrum of the said judgment. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

231. What is discernible from a reading of the decisions discussed above
is that despite there being no prescribed time-limit for the Governor
to take a decision under Article 200, the provision cannot be read
in a manner which allows the Governor to not take action upon
bills which are presented to him for assent and thereby delay and
essentially roadblock the law-making machinery in the State. As held
in A.G. Perarivalan (supra), the inaction of the Governor would be
subject to judicial review and in the absence of any cogent reasons
for the delay, it would be open to the courts to issue directions for
a time-bound decision on a case-to-case basis.
232. In Purushothaman Nambudiri (supra), two questions fell for the
consideration of this Court; first, whether a bill which has been
pending for assent before the President or the Governor could be
said to have lapsed with the dissolving or dissolution of the State
legislative assembly and secondly, whether Article 200 mandates that
a bill sent back by the President or the Governor for reconsideration
must be looked into by the very same House that originally passed it.
Before looking into the effect of the dissolution of the House on bills
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1129

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

pending before the Governor for assent, the Court, while examining
the effect of prorogation of the House on the bills pending before the
State legislature, observed that Article 196 of the Constitution that
deals with the introduction and passing of bills in the State legislature
reinforces that the parliamentary form of government established
under the Constitution is markedly different from the Parliament in
England inasmuch as clause (3) of Article 196 explicitly stipulates that
a bill pending in the legislature of a State will not lapse by reason
of the prorogation of the House or Houses thereof.
233. Thereafter, the Court observed that Article 196(5) provides for three
categories of cases where a bill pending before a Legislative Assembly
would lapse upon its dissolution. Those are as follows:
a. A bill pending before the Legislative Assembly of a unicameral
State legislature;
b. A bill pending before the Legislative Assembly of a bicameral
State legislature; or
c. A bill which originated in the Legislative Assembly and is yet
to reach the Legislative Council.
234. In light of the aforesaid, the Court reached the conclusion that
since Article 196 only stipulates as to when a bill pending in the
State legislature could be said to have lapsed, be it the Legislative
Assembly or the Legislative Council, any bill which has been passed
by the State legislature and is pending assent of the Governor or
President, would be outside the ambit of the doctrine of lapse of
pending business as contained in Article 196(5) of the Constitution.
Had the intent of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise, a
specific provision to that effect providing for lapse of a bill awaiting
assent would have been inserted. The natural corollary of the
omission of the aforesaid is that Article 196(5) is exhaustive in
nature, and only the circumstances enumerated therein would result
in any lapse of a pending bill, as otherwise there was no need for
inserting clause (5) in Article 196 after having already provided the
situations where a bill would not lapse in clause(s) (3) and (4) of
the Constitution respectively.
235. Thereafter, the Court adverted to Articles 200 and 201 of the
Constitution respectively in order to determine the effect of dissolution
on bills pending the assent of the Governor or the President. Adverting
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to the procedure prescribed under Articles 200 and 201 respectively,
the Court noted that both the Articles do not prescribe a time-limit
within which the Governor or President are required to come to a
decision on the bill presented to him unlike other provisions in the
Constitution where it was felt necessary and expedient to prescribe
a time-limit such as Articles 197(1)(b) and (2)(b) respectively. This,
in the opinion of the Court, necessarily meant that the omission in
prescribing a time-limit within which the Governor or the President
should reach a decision under Articles 200 and 201 respectively
suggests that the framers of the Constitution knew that a bill pending
the assent of the Governor or the President does not stand the
risk of getting lapsed on the dissolution of the Assembly. Any other
contrary view would lead to a chilling effect whereby a fair number
of bills which may have been passed by the Assembly during the
last months of its existence, may be exposed to the risk of lapse,
consequent to the dissolution of the Assembly, unless assent is either
withheld or granted before the date of the dissolution, which could not
have been the intention in the absence of a time-limit under Articles
200 and 201 respectively. The relevant observations read as under:
“15. It is clear that if a Bill pending the assent of the Governor
or the President is held to lapse on the dissolution of the
Assembly it is not unlikely that a fair number of Bills which
may have been passed by the Assembly, say during the
last six months of its existence, may be exposed to the risk
of lapse consequent on the dissolution of the Assembly,
unless assent is either withheld or granted before the date
of the dissolution. If we look at the relevant provisions of
Articles 200 and 201 from this point of view it would be
significant that neither Article provides for a time limit within
which the Governor or the President, should come to a
decision on the Bill referred to him for his assent. Where it
appeared necessary and expedient to prescribe a time limit
the Constitution has made appropriate provisions in that
behalf (vide : Article 197(1)(b) and (2)(b)). In fact the proviso
to Article 201 requires that the House to which the Bill is
remitted with a message from the President shall reconsider
it accordingly within a period of six months from the date of
the receipt of such message. Therefore, the failure to make
any provision as to the time within which the Governor or
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

the President should reach a decision may suggest that
the Constitution-makers knew that a Bill which was pending
the assent of the Governor or the President did not stand
the risk of lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly. That is
why no time limit was prescribed by Articles 200 and 201.
Therefore, in our opinion, the scheme of Articles 200 and
201 supports the conclusion that a Bill pending the assent
of the Governor or the President does not lapse as a result
of the dissolution of the Assembly, and that incidentally
shows that the provisions of Article 196(5) are exhaustive.”
(Emphasis supplied)

236. What is clearly discernible from a plain reading of the aforesaid
decision is that the observations as regards the absence of a time-limit
under Articles 200 and 201 respectively were made in the context of
the impact of dissolution of the State legislature on the bills which
were pending assent from the Governor. Applying the doctrine of
constitutional continuity of the State legislature as an institution and
the absence of any specific time-limit prescribed under Article 200,
the Court arrived at a finding that such bills would not lapse by virtue
of dissolution of the State legislature. It is important to note that the
observations in Nambudiri (supra) were not made in the context
of the expediency with which the Governor is expected to act in
discharge of his duties under Article 200. Further, while this Court
said that there was no prescribed time-limit in Article 200, it held that
the reason for this was that the framers of the Constitution knew
that such a bill would not lapse automatically with the dissolution
of the House. It was never observed or even remotely indicated by
this Court that the exercise of power by the Governor under Article
200 was not of an urgent or expedient character and thus, could be
exercised even beyond reasonable time.
237. It is crucial to understand that the prescription of a general time-limit
by this Court within which the ordinary exercise of power by the
Governor under Article 200 must take place, is not the same thing as
amending the text of the Constitution to read in a time-limit, thereby
fundamentally changing the procedure and mechanism of Article 200.
This is because, reading such a time-limit into the provision neither
militates against the underlying object of the said provision nor does
it alter the procedure that is envisaged therein. On the contrary, it
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only reinforces the sense of expediency and urgency that has been
time and again emphasized since the adoption of the Constitution.
The reason why the prescription of a time-limit does not tantamount
to an alteration or amendment is because the time-limit that is being
prescribed by cannot be understood to be a hanging sword on the
Governor whereby even an unavoidable non-compliance would
automatically ensue consequences of ‘assent’. The nature of such
prescription is quite different which may be better explained through
the concept of judicial review.
238. For the exercise of judicial review, the existence of a certain set
of definitive standards against which the courts can embark upon
their scrutiny, is quintessential. Without these standards, the power
of judicial review could be said to be ineffective in certain contexts
which shall be elucidated upon in the latter parts of the judgment.
The doctrine of stare-decisis is not just concerned with ensuring that
decisions of higher courts or of larger benches are duly adhered to
and questions of law already settled and put to quietus by higher
judicial authorities are not disturbed. The idea is also to infuse a
sense of judicial comity within the intertwined hierarchical courts in
the manner of their functioning. Additionally, one of the core precepts
of stare-decisis is that not only the decisions but the very decision-
making process of the courts are predicated upon a discernible
standard, often coined as ‘judicially manageable standards’. We
shall discuss this in more detail in the later parts of this judgment.
239. Any time-limit in the exercise of powers in terms of Article 200 of
the Constitution should not be construed as timelines laid within the
edifice of the provision, rather should be understood as timelines
that would serve as a lodestar for the purpose of exercise of judicial
review by the courts, a benchmark tool to aid and enable the courts
in ascertaining if any inaction or malfeasance has occasioned in
the exercise of such powers. These timelines no doubt demand the
earnest adherence by the Governor, however, these being nothing
more than tools upon which scrutiny by judicial review is to be
premised, remain as prescriptions within the realm of judicial review
alone and do not transgress into the legislative bounds or amount
to alteration of the text or authority of Article 200 of the Constitution.
The reason why these time-lines do not immolate the very fabric of
Article 200 is because the said provision even with the infusion of
these time-limit still remains markedly different from its counterpart
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provisions where such time-limits are legislatively prescribed. For
instance, Article 75 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan or Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution, where if no
decision is taken within the stipulated time-limit by the President
then the bills are deemed to have been assented to.
240. Thus, it is important to take note of this very fine but pertinent
distinction that the prescription of a time-limit by this Court into Article
200 of the Constitution does not fundamentally change the procedure
which has been envisaged. While the reading in of a time-limit under
Article 200 would have meant that there would be deemed assent
upon failure of the Governor to comply with the said timeline, the
prescription of a reasonable time period does not introduce any such
mechanism or deeming fiction in Article 200.
241. What emerges from the above is that the fine but pertinent distinction
between the time-limits that are expressly prescribed and those that
are judicially evolved is only that in the former the consequence of
deemed assent emanates from the provision itself whereas in the
latter there could be no such consequence except to the extent that
the courts judicially reviewing the action or inaction can direct a
decision to be taken within a time-bound manner, or in exceptional
cases like the one at hand, deem the assent to have been granted
under Article 142 of the Constitution, which we shall again discuss
in the later parts of this judgment.
242. When prescribing such a time-limit for the exercise of power under
Article 200, we are guided by the inherent expedient nature of the
procedure prescribed thereunder and the well-settled legal principle
that where no time-limit for the exercise of a power is prescribed, it
should be exercised within a reasonable period.
243. What would be a reasonable period would vary from situation to
situation, however, in the present case, taking guidance from the
timelines that have been prescribed by the Sarkaria and the Punchhi
Commission, we have arrived at the view that in the absence of any
exceptional circumstances, the Governor would be able to exercise
his powers under the Article within the maximum period prescribed
by us.
244. While the reading in of an absolute time-limit would have left the
Governor with no choice but to comply with it, the prescription of the
judicially evolved time-limits by us leaves it open for the Governor
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to justify the delay caused by providing reasonable grounds. Delay
caused by the Governor beyond the prescribed time-limits would
be justiciable and the courts, with deference to applicable judicial
principles, would be fully competent to ascertain whether the delayed
exercise of power by the Governor under Article 200 was based on
any reasonable grounds or not.
245. The prescription of a time-limit is with a view to ensure that the
Governor is not conferred with the power of exercising a pocket veto
under the scheme of Article 200, and hinder the law-making process
in the State without the existence of any reasonable grounds. While
the decision in Nambudiri (supra) does not make the prescription of
such a time-limit by the Court impermissible, the decisions, adverted
to above, vest this Court with sufficient power to ensure that the
procedure prescribed under Article 200 is followed by the Governor
in a constitutionally permissible manner and in line with the principles
of parliamentary democracy keeping in mind the nature of the power.
Such an approach also ensures that the State governments are not
left remediless in cases of malicious, arbitrary or capricious exercise
of power by the Governor under Article 200.
246. We also deem it necessary to prescribe a timeline for the discharge
of functions by the Governor under Article 200. The Sarkaria and
Punchhi Commissions in their reports adopted this view, keeping in
mind the importance of an expeditious decision under Article 200
for the smooth functioning of electoral democracy in the States. An
elected government gets the mandate of the people for a limited
period of five-years within which it is expected to legislate on issues
pertaining to the electorate. If the Governor, for whatsoever reasons,
exhibits reluctance or lethargy in decision making, particularly when
it is concerned with the assent to bills, it severely impacts the ability
of the government to act upon its mandate and deliver to the people
who brought them into power. Any obstacle created by the Governor,
whether advertently or inadvertently, severely impacts the perception
of the elected government in the subsequent elections and thereby
also negatively affecting their chances of coming back into power.
The problem is further exacerbated when the political party in power
in the State is different from the one at the Centre, and the Governor
should be more cautious and non-partisan in the exercise of his
functions in such a scenario. Any deliberate inaction on part of the
Governor in assenting to bills or reserving them for the consideration
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

of the President, thus, has to be viewed as a serious threat to the
federal polity of the country and the aggrieved governments cannot
be left remediless, desperately waiting for a decision at the hands
of the Governor.
247. This Court in State of Punjab (supra) held that the Constitution
terms any inaction on part of the Governor as deplorable and that
he cannot indefinitely keep the bills passed by the State legislature
on a chokehold. The relevant observations read as under:
“24. [...] The Constitution evidently contains this provision
bearing in mind the importance which has been attached
to the power of legislation which squarely lies in the
domain of the State Legislature. The Governor cannot be
at liberty to keep the Bill pending indefinitely without any
action whatsoever.”
(Emphasis supplied)

248. It is not unusual for this Court to prescribe time-limits for the discharge
of certain functions, even in cases where no specific time-limit has
been prescribed. Recently, in Periyammal (Dead) thr. LRs & Ors.
v. Rajamani & Anr. Etc. reported in 2025 INSC 329, a two-Judge
Bench of this Court, of which one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.) was a
part, directed all the High Courts to issue directions to all the District
Courts to decide pending execution petitions within a period of six-
months without fail. The directions read as follows:
“75. In view of the aforesaid, we direct all the High Courts
across the country to call for the necessary information
from their respective district judiciary as regards pendency
of the execution petitions. Once the data is collected by
SLP (C) Nos. 8490, 8491 & 8492 of 2020 Page 77 of 78
each of the High Courts, the High Courts shall thereafter
proceed to issue an administrative order or circular,
directing their respective district judiciary to ensure that
the execution petitions pending in various courts shall be
decided and disposed of within a period of six months
without fail otherwise the concerned presiding officer would
be answerable to the High Court on its administrative side.
Once the entire data along with the figures of pendency
and disposal thereafter, is collected by all the High Courts,
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the same shall be forwarded to the Registry of this Court
with individual reports.”
249. We have already discussed that in Keisham (supra), a three-Judge
Bench of this Court fixed an outer time-limit of three-months for
the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions under the Tenth
Schedule. The Court pertinently observed that the said period
was fixed “keeping in mind the fact that ordinarily the life of the
Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly of the States is five-
years”. This Court has also, in a number of decisions, set down
and reiterated that the High Courts must pronounce judgments
on reserved matters within a period of six-months. Inaction on
part of any constitutional authority being subject to judicial review,
it is important that there are reasonably laid down standards of
justiciability of such inaction, and the timelines prescribed by us
serve that purpose. Even the Constituent Assembly had initially
laid down a period of six-weeks for the President to take action
on bills submitted to him under Article 111. However, that was
later changed to account for any exceptional circumstance that
may arise in the discharge of functions by the President or the
Governor. However, the expression “six-months” was replaced with
“as soon as possible”, which though not determinable, envisages
an expeditious disposal of bills, unless in cases where some
impossibility exists. The prescription of timelines by us balances
the objective of expediency as well as the desirability of having
some flexibility in cases of existence of an impossibility in discharge
of functions in an expeditious manner. Flexibility in the discharge
of a function cannot be allowed to be stretched to an extent that
renders the very object underlying such function otiose, resulting
into the proverbial snapping of the constitutional machinery.
250. Keeping in mind the constitutional significance of Article 200 and the
role it plays in the federal polity of the country, the following timelines
are being prescribed. Failure to comply with these timelines would
make the inaction of the Governors subject to judicial review by the
courts:
(i) In case of either withholding of assent or reservation of the bill
for the consideration of the President upon the aid and advice
of the State Council of Ministers, the Governor is expected to
take such an action forthwith subject to a maximum period of
one-month;
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

(ii) In case of withholding of assent contrary to the advice of the
State Council of Ministers, the Governor must return the bill
together with a message within a maximum period of three-
months;
(iii) In case of reservation of bills for the consideration of the
President contrary to the advice of the State Council of Ministers,
the Governor shall make such reservation within a maximum
period of three months;
In case of presentation of bill after reconsideration in
accordance with the first proviso, the Governor must grant
assent forthwith, subject to a maximum period of one-month.
251. Failure to comply with the timelines prescribed above would make
the inaction on part of the Governor amenable to judicial review. We
shall also deal with the necessity of expeditiously disposing of the
references under Article 201 by the President in subsequent parts
of this judgment.

iv. Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under
Article 200 of the Constitution can only act in accordance
with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council
of Ministers?
252. Significant time was spent during the course of the arguments on
the key issue of the scope of discretion enjoyed by the Governor
in exercise of his powers under Article 200, more particularly, as
regards the reservation of bills for the consideration of the President.
253. Mr. Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the act of the
Governor amounts to a subversion of the Constitution. He further
emphatically submitted that it indeed amounted to a subversion of
the Constitution.
254. He also submitted that there was no discretion available to the
Governor under the scheme of Article 200 of the Constitution and
the only exception to the same was provided in the second proviso
to Article 200 itself. In other words, he contended that the Governor
could only reserve a bill against the advice tendered to him by the
Council of Ministers, if the bill was of a description as provided in the
second proviso. He submitted that in all other cases, the reservation
of a bill for the consideration of the President had to take place strictly
in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers.
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255. This argument was also endorsed by Dr. Singhvi, who added that the
observations made in B.K. Pavitra (supra) as regards the discretion
of the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution have to be
understood in the context of the reservation taking place on the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers.
256. Mr. Dwivedi, placing reliance on the deletion of the expression “in
his discretion” from both the substantive part of Article 200 as well
the first proviso by the Constituent Assembly, proposed an even
stricter interpretation of Article 200. He argued that the deletion of
the expression “in his discretion” indicated that the intention of the
framers of the Constitution was crystal clear that the Governor should
have no semblance of discretion while exercising his powers under
Article 200 and he should act in accordance with the advice rendered
by the Council of Ministers. He further submitted that it is not just
reservation of the bills for the consideration of the President, but the
grant of assent, as well as the decision to send the bill back to the
State legislature together with a message upon the withholding of
assent, which must be taken strictly in accordance with the advice
of the Council of Ministers.
257. The Attorney General, per contra, argued that while exercising his
powers under Article 200, the Governor is discharging an important
constitutional obligation, and even if he does not exercise individual
discretion, he may still act against the aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers if he is so required to, in the discharge of his constitutional
duties.
258. An answer to the aforesaid question cannot be arrived at without
first answering the following sub-questions:
a. How has the office of the Governor been envisaged by the
constitutional scheme? In what manner does he play a dual
role in the federal polity of the country?
b. Whether the Governor enjoys a certain degree of discretion
in discharge of his duties under the Constitution? What is the
source of such discretion?
c. Does the deletion of the expression “in his discretion” from
Article 175 of the Draft Constitution imply that the Governor
has no discretion available in the exercise of his powers under
Article 200?
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a. The Office of the Governor
259. With the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1858, the
administration of India transitioned from the East India Company to the
British Crown, bringing about a new administrative framework wherein
the Governor, as an agent of the Crown, operated under the general
supervision of the Governor-General. While this structure prevailed,
the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, which culminated into the
GoI Act, 1919, marked the early stirrings of responsible government,
albeit in a nascent form. Despite this shift, the Governor remained
central to the provincial administration, continuing to wield significant
authority.
260. The GoI Act, 1935, ushered in the era of provincial autonomy and
formally required the Governor to act on the advice of the Ministers
who were accountable to the provincial legislature by abolishing the
system of dyarchy at the provincial level, while introducing it at the
central level. However, the Act also conferred upon the Governor
certain special responsibilities, such as maintaining peace and
tranquility within the province and safeguarding minority interests.
These responsibilities necessitated the exercise of discretion by the
Governor in specific matters. Further, the autonomy of the Governor
in such cases remained subject to the general superintendence and
control of the Governor-General, ensuring oversight over the exercise
of his individual judgment.
261. The declaration of Independence brought about a fundamental
transformation in the role of the Governor. Until the Constitution came
into effect, the provisions of the GoI Act, 1935, as modified by the
India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 (for short, the “Adaptation
Order”), governed the administration of the country. Significantly, the
Adaptation Order omitted the expressions ‘in his discretion’, ‘acting
in his discretion’, and ‘exercising his individual judgment’ from the
Act, signaling a departure from the colonial framework.
262. One of the key decisions that the framers of the Constitution had to
take was to decide the mode of selection of the Governor - whether
he should be elected by way of a direct election, or selected from
a panel of names suggested by the State legislature, or nominated
by the President. While in the early days, the Constituent Assembly
leaned towards having an elected Governor, as the framing of the
Constitution neared its conclusion, there was increasing support in
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favour of having a Governor nominated by the President. Jawaharlal
Nehru attributed this shift of opinion to the bitter experience of
partition, which, according to him, opened the eyes of the Constituent
Assembly to the dangers of separatism and the need for having a
political structure which focused more on the character of the nation
as a Union of States rather than a federation.

b. Constituent Assembly Debates on the mode of Selection
of the Governor
263. The speeches made by some of the members of the Constituent
Assembly on Article 155 of the Constitution broadly encapsulate
the ideas which were debated and rejected before nomination was
selected as the mode of appointment for the Governor.
264. Speaking in favour of appointment of Governors by Presidential
nomination, Shri. H.V. Kamath was of the opinion that the concept
of an elected Governor would undermine the structure of the country
as a Union of States, since a Governor elected directly by the people
on the basis of adult suffrage would place more emphasis on India
being a federation. However, according to him, “the emphasis today
is more upon the Union pattern of our State than upon its Federal
aspect”13. He believed that an elected Governor, being a partisan
figure, would inevitably clash with the Chief Minister, thereby
disrupting the functioning of a cabinet-style government. According
to him, the role of a constitutional head should be impartial and
symbolic, and the nomination system was better suited to uphold
these principles. He further elaborated on the potential tussle that
would ensue between an elected Governor and the Chief Minister
of the State as follows:
“[...] If the Governor were to be elected by the direct vote
of all voters in a province he is very likely to be a party-
man with strong views of his own, and considering that he
will be elected by the whole province—by the entire adult
population of the province— he will think that he is a far
superior man and a far more powerful man that the Chief
Minister or Premier of the State who will be returned from
one constituency only, but because he happens to be the

13 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (May 30, 1949) 428.
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leader of the majority party, he will be nominated Premier
by the Governor. There will be two conflicting authorities
within the State : one is the Premier, whom, under this
Constitution which we are considering today, we have
invested with executive authority so far as the State is
concerned, and the other is the Governor, who, though the
Constitution does not confer on him very substantial powers
and functions, will arrogate much to himself, because he
will say that “I have been elected by the people of the
whole province and as such I am persona gratia with the
people and not the Chief Minister”. Therefore, there will
be in the administration of the province at every turn—if
not at every turn, then very often—points of conflicts or
friction between the elected Governor and the elected Chief
Minister. Therefore, I think we have done very wisely in
deleting or in doing away with the system of election for
the Provincial Governor.”14
265. Shri. Hukam Singh, opting for the middle path, acknowledged the
difficulties inherent in both pure election and pure nomination for
the purpose of appointment of Governors. While agreeing with Shri.
H.V. Kamath on the drawbacks of an elected Governor, such as the
potential for conflict with the Chief Minister and the high costs involved
in conducting elections, he proposed a balanced alternative, suggesting
that a panel of candidates be nominated by the State legislature and a
Governor be chosen from the said panel. This method, while allowing
for some discretion would also ensure public accountability since the
merits of those individuals who had been recommended in the panel
would be publicly available and if the right person was not chosen,
then the selection would also be criticized publicly. In his view, this
approach would reduce favoritism, enhance transparency, and provide
a safeguard against the abuse of power, striking a middle ground
between the extremes of election and direct nomination.
266. Shri. Rohini Kumar Chaudhari opposed the nomination of Governors,
cautioning that a Centre-appointed Governor belonging to a different
political party than the provincial government could lead to discord
and undermine provincial autonomy. The friction that would result

14 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (May 30, 1949) 428-429.
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from adopting a system wherein Governors are elected would also
exist, according to him, when a Governor is nominated, since the
nominee of the President would not work in harmonious tandem
with the Ministry of the State which belongs to a different political
party than the one which enjoys power at the Centre. He argued that
electing Governors would ensure that they are more attuned to the
needs of all communities, including marginalized groups like tribal
populations in States where the Governor would have an even more
important role to play. He criticized the reliance on British precedents
and advocated for a more democratic process, such as election or
selection from a panel, to reflect the will of the people and to also
safeguard provincial interests.
267. Shri. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar was of the view that since the
Governor is merely a constitutional head of the province and the real
executive power had been vested in a ministry responsible to the
Lower House of the different States, it seemed rather unnecessary,
under such circumstances, to adopt the method of election based
on universal suffrage for the appointment of the Governors. The
nomination of Governors by the President would, in his opinion,
mitigate constitutional conflicts and foster harmonious relations
between the Governor and the provincial Cabinet. He argued that an
elected Governor, deriving authority from universal suffrage, might
assert dominance over the Cabinet, leading to significant constitutional
risks. He specifically remarked that, “In the normal working of the
Government also there is danger of a clash between the Minister and
the Governor, whereas the whole basis of the constitutional structure
we are erecting depends upon the harmony between the legislature
and the executive, and between the executive and the formal head
of the Government”.15 Drawing inspiration from the Canadian model,
he suggested that the President’s appointment of Governors, guided
by the advice of the provincial Cabinet, would ensure stability and
sound governance. Furthermore, according to him, “Nowhere does
the system of election of the Governor exist where the Institution of
responsible government is the main feature of the Constitution”.16
He believed that this system would better serve the interests of the
provinces and the nation as a whole.

15 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb, (May 30, 1949) 431.
16 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (May 30, 1949) 431.
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268. It was his belief that while the method of nomination was the most
appropriate one, a convention of appointing Governors in consultation
with the State government would grow. This, when read with the
other discussions which took place in the Constituent Assembly,
indicate that the framers of the Constitution reposed trust that the
Governor would not be a cipher of the Central government, would
be a person above party politics and would not attempt to override
the State government with his actions. He also supported the idea of
having nominated Governors on the ground that the intervention of
the Governor would be required only in extraordinary situations, and
an elected Governor may come in conflict with the provincial Cabinet
by trying to override their decisions. His words are reproduced below:
“I see no objection to the appointment of the Governor being
left to the President of the Union who has necessarily to
act on the advice of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. A
convention, of consulting the provincial Cabinet might easily
grow up. Such a convention, as the House is aware, has
grown up in the appointment of Governors in Canada. In
Australia too, though under a different Constitution, a similar
convention has grown up and the Governor of a State is
appointed on the advice of the provincial Cabinet. […]
There is another aspect also which the House might take
into consideration. In our Constitution we must try every
method by which harmony could be secured between the
Centre and the provinces. If you have a person who is not
elected by the province or the State but you have a person
appointed by the President of the Union with the consent,
I take it, of the provincial Cabinet, you will add a close link
between the Centre and the provinces and a clash between
the provinces and the Centre will be avoided which will
otherwise occasionally result. Then there is another point.
It is said that the Governor may occasionally have to use
his extraordinary powers. This point is more in favour of
nomination rather than in favour of election. If the person
who is elected on the basis of universal suffrage is to
come into clash with the provincial Cabinet and if he is to
set himself above the provincial Cabinet, there will be a
greater constitutional danger. Even if circumstances arise
when intervention by the Governor is necessary it will be
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only on extraordinary occasions. Even for that intervention
a person who is nominated or appointed by the President
with the concurrence of the provincial Cabinet is likely
to take far greater care than a person who is elected by
the people. On the whole, in the interest of harmony, in
the interests of good working, in the interests of sounder
relations between the provincial Cabinet and the Governor,
it will be much better if we adopt the Canadian model and
have the Governors appointed by the President with the
convention growing up that the Cabinet at the Centre would
also be guided by the advice of the provincial Cabinet.”
(Emphasis supplied)

269. Shri. P.S. Deshmukh was of the opinion that there exist a few
fundamental considerations which have to be kept in mind while
discussing the appointment of the Governor. The first of these
fundamental considerations was that, “if we decide that the Governor
should be elected by the province on the basis of adult franchise,
then it follows logically that he should be a real executive authority.
On the other hand, if you want him to be mere figurehead, if you
want him to have exactly the same position as he has today under
the 1935 Act and which is exactly the position which is assigned
to him under the Draft Constitution, you cannot but have him
appointed by the President.”17. In light of this, he buttressed his
view that Governors must be nominated and not elected. Regarding
the concern that adopting a system of nominating the Governor
would give undue power to the Prime Minister and the President,
he opined that the Prime Minister would also be a popular Prime
Minister and that he can only be there as long as he has the support
of the Parliament elected by the people at large. Therefore, his view
was that we must not hesitate in giving powers of patronage to the
Prime Minister or the President. He also expressed concerns about
the potential discord between an elected Governor and the Chief
Minister or Premier, which could disrupt governance. Apart from the
very real possibility of conflicts between the elected Governor and
the Chief Minister which necessitated appointment via nomination,
he argued, on the other hand that, if there was no conflict and there

17 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (May 30, 1949) 433.
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was perfect agreement or collusion between the Governor and the
Chief Minister, they could agree in defying the Centre altogether and
that would put the Centre in a precarious position where they would
be completely blocked out from the States. Therefore, he remarked
that, “But apart from the conflict, if there is no conflict and there is
perfect agreement, if these two gentlemen set the Centre at naught,
what will be the position?”18. Hence, in his opinion, the appointment of
Governors by the President would maintain a balance of power and
ensure some degree of Central influence over provincial matters. He
further suggested that Governors should serve at the pleasure of the
President, thereby eliminating the need for impeachment provisions
and also reinforcing the oversight of the Centre.
270. Shri. Hriday Nath Kunzru highlighted the potential for friction between
Governors and their Cabinets, specifically with reference to Article
175 of the Draft Constitution, which has now been adopted as
Article 200. By drawing comparisons to the Canadian model, he
argued that empowering the President to disallow provincial bills
directly by overriding the assent of the Governor within a certain
prescribed period of time from the date of such assent, rather than
relying on the Governors as intermediaries who refer the bill for the
consideration of the President, would centralize responsibility with
the Central Executive and reduce conflicts at the provincial level. In
his view, this approach would align with the principles of responsible
government and ensure smoother governance.
271. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized the need to foster unity and
avoid separatist tendencies within the nation. He believed that an
elected Governor could exacerbate provincial divisions and weaken
ties with the Centre. In his opinion, “Nevertheless a certain convention
and practice helps or hinders the growth of separatist tendencies. I
feel that if we have an elected Governor that would to some extent
encourage that separatist provincial tendency more than otherwise.
There will be far fewer common links with the Centre.”19 He argued
that duplicating the electoral process for the office of Governor would
be unnecessary and counterproductive, leading to conflicts, wastage
of resources, and disruptive tendencies. Supporting the nomination

18 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (May 30, 1949) 434.
19 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (May 31, 1949) 455.
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of Governors, he asserted that this approach would align with the
parliamentary system of democracy and strengthen the relationship
between the provinces and the Centre.

c. Constituent Assembly Debates on the Exercise of Discretion
by the Governor
272. The other key question which fell for the consideration of the
Constituent Assembly was whether any discretion would be made
available to the Governor as the constitutional head of the State.
Article 163(1) of the Constitution, which describes the nature of such
discretionary powers, reads as follows:
“(1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief
Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the
exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or
under this Constitution required to exercise his functions
or any of them in his discretion.”
273. To understand the true import and the scope of this discretion which
exists with the Governor, it would be apposite for us to look into the
Constituent Assembly debates pertaining to this Article in some detail.
Article 163 which provides for the Council of Ministers to aid and
advice the Governor was earlier numbered as Article 143 under the
Draft Constitution. Two amendments were sought to be moved to
draft Article 143 on the 1st of July 1949; however, those did not gain
the approval of the Constituent Assembly and the original version
of draft Article 143 came to be later adopted as Article 163 as we
see it today.
274. Of the two amendments, one of which was moved by Shri. H.V.
Kamath sought to delete the expression, “except in so far as he is
by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or
any of them in his discretion”. Shri. H.V. Kamath was of the opinion
that the draft Article had been blindly copied from the GoI Act, 1935,
without any mature consideration. He further remarked that, “There
is no strong or valid reason for giving the Governor more authority
either in his discretion or otherwise vis-a-vis his ministers, than has
been given to the President in relation to his ministers”20. Investing

20 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Jun. 1, 1949) 489.
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such wide discretionary powers on the Governor was all the more
problematic, according to him, since Governors are nominated to
their positions and not elected. No departure from the principles of
a constitutional government must be favored except for reasons
of emergency and therefore, he advocated for these discretionary
powers to be done away with.
275. However, Shri. T. T. Krishnamachari pointed out that there existed
specific provisions under the Draft Constitution wherein the Governor
was in fact empowered to act in his discretion, irrespective of the
advice tendered by his Council of Ministers. Therefore, according
to him, there were two ways of drafting which would capture the
aforesaid underlying idea: One, would be to make a mention of this
exception under draft Article 143 itself and enumerate the specific
scenarios where the Governor would be able to exercise his discretion
in the subsequent relevant articles or; Two, would be to leave out
any mention of this discretionary power under draft Article 143 and
only state it in the appropriate article that will follow. In the case of
draft Article 143, according to him, it was only that the former method
had been followed. Therefore, the general proposition or the default
rule would be that “the Governor has normally to act on the advice
of his Ministers except in so far as the exercise of his discretions
covered by those Articles in the Constitution in which he is specifically
empowered to act in his discretion.”21
276. As an illustration, Shri. T.T. Krishnamachari referred to draft Article
188 which related to the proclamation of Emergency in States by
the Governor under his discretion. It was his opinion that if such a
discretionary power can be given under draft Article 188, there is
no harm in the mention of discretion under draft Article 143 either.
He understood the scheme of the draft Constitution to mean that
unless there is a specific mention of discretion under any subsequent
Article, the discretionary power mentioned under draft Article 143
cannot at all be exercised.
277. Shri. Brajeshwar Prasad was not in favor of the amendment that
was put forth since he was of the opinion that the Governor should
be vested not only with the power to act in his discretion but also
with the power to act in his individual judgement. He was of the

21 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb, (Jun. 1, 1949) 491.
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view that there was a dearth of leadership in the provinces wherein
competent men were not available and unless the Governor is vested
with large powers, it would be difficult to effect any improvement in
the provincial administration. He went to the extent of saying that
though such a procedure may be considered as undemocratic, it
would be in the interest of the country. He remarked that, “I cannot
allow democracy to jeopardize the vital interests of the country […]
The masses who ought to be the rulers of this land are down-trodden
and exploited in all ways. Under these circumstances there is no
way left open but for the Government of India to take the Provincial
administrations in its own hands”22. In his opinion, federalism could
not succeed in a country which was passing through a transitory
period and therefore, he subscribed to the view that power must be
vested at the Centre and as a natural corollary, the Governor must
be able to act in his discretion.
278. Shri. Mahavir Tyagi was also in agreement with the view that the
Governor must be granted discretion. In his opinion, the State must
be kept linked together with the Centre and the Governor would be
the agent who guards the Central policy in the provinces/States.
There would be certain subject-matters which affect the whole body
politic and the provinces/States cannot be left free of the policy at
the Centre. Since the policy which is evoked in the Centre must
be followed by all the States, and if the Governors were to be in
the hands of the provincial Ministers, then there will be various
policies in various provinces and ministers of various types having
different party labels and programmes would push their own agenda.
Therefore, it was his view that, “The Governor being the agency
of the Centre would be the only guarantee to integrate the various
provinces/States”23. According to him, this is why the Governor’s
discretionary powers should not be interfered with. He went on to
remark that democratic trends are like a wild beast and that it goes
by the whims and fancies of the parties and the masses. There must
be some machinery which would keep this wild beast under control.
It is in such a reality that the Governor exercising his discretion acts
as a guardian of the Central policy on one side and the Constitution
on the other.

22 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Jun. 1, 1949) 492.
23 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Jun. 1, 1949) 495.
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279. Shri. B.M. Gupta was of the view that if certain powers had to be
given to the Governor, our endeavor must be to restrict them as far
as possible so that the Governor’s position as a constitutional head
may be maintained.
280. Shri. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar echoed the stance taken by Shri T.T.
Krishnamachari. He stated that, in the first place, a general principle
under Article 143 is laid down, namely, the principle of ministerial
responsibility that the Governor in the various spheres of executive
activity should normally act on the advice of his ministers. Then, the
Article goes on to carve out an exception as regards the matters under
which the Governor is required to exercise certain functions under
his own discretion. Therefore, it was his conclusion that as long as
there are articles under the Constitution which enable the Governor
to act in his discretion, the draft Article 143 as it was framed was
perfectly in order. In certain circumstances, this exercise of discretion
may be to override the Cabinet or to refer to the President. If later
on, the Constituent Assembly were to arrive at the conclusion that
those subsequent Articles which enable the Governor to act in his
discretion in specific cases must be deleted, it would be open to revise
draft Article 143. But as long as there are Articles occurring later in
the Constitution which permit the Governor to act in his discretion
and not on ministerial responsibility, the present draft Article 143
was drafted rightly.
281. The only other question, in his opinion, was to see whether the
Constituent Assembly had to first make a provision under draft
Article 143 that the Governor shall mandatorily act on ministerial
responsibility and then go on to provide “Notwithstanding anything
contained in Article 143, [...] he can do this” or that “Notwithstanding
anything contained in Article 143, he can act in his discretion” in
the subsequent relevant Articles. However, he favored the method
of drafting that had already been adopted i.e., to provide in draft
Article 143 itself that the Governor shall always act on ministerial
responsibility excepting in particular or specific cases where he is
empowered to act in his discretion. If, of course, the Constituent
Assembly came to the conclusion that in no case the Governor
shall act in his discretion, and that he shall in every case act only on
ministerial responsibility, then there will be a consequential change
to this Article.
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282. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava adopted the notion that the Governor
“shall be a guide, philosopher and friend of the Ministry as well as
the people in general, so that he will exercise certain functions some
of which will be in the nature of unwritten conventions and some will
be such as will be expressly conferred by this Constitution.”24 The
Governor’s role would transcend party politics and he would look at
the Minister and the State government from a detached standpoint.
He would also be able to influence the ministers and members of
the legislature in such a manner that the administration would run
smoothly. In such a circumstance, to say that he is merely a dummy,
an automaton or a dignitary without powers would be gravely wrong.
According to his conception of a constitutional Governor, the Governor
would have to accept the advice of his ministers in many matters but
there may also exist many other matters in which such an advice will
either be unavailable or wherein he will not be bound to accept that
advice. Another illustration, according to him, of when the Governor
would act in his discretion would be under draft Article 147 (Article
167 as it stands today) where the Governor can exercise his power
of calling for certain information from the Chief Minister. Under this
Article, the Governor is competent to ask the Chief Minister to place
any matter before the Council of Ministers which only one minister
might have decided. When he calls for such information, he will be
acting in the exercise of his discretion and may call for any kind
of information with a view to control and restrain the ministry from
undertaking irresponsible acts. Therefore, he remarked that, “In my
opinion taking the Governor as he is conceived to be under the
Constitution, he will exercise very important functions and therefore
it is very necessary to retain the words relating to his discretion in
article 143”25.
283. Shri. Rohini Kumar Chaudhuri put forth the alternate view that it
is always better to be governed by the will of the people than to
be governed by the will of a single person who could act in his
discretion. He remarked that, “If this Governor is given the power
to act in his discretion there is no power on earth to prevent him
from doing so. He can be a veritable King Stork.”26. Furthermore,

24 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Jun. 1, 1949) 497.
25 Ibid.
26 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Jun. 1, 1949) 499.
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the draft Article 143 itself states that wherever the Governor
thinks that he is acting in his discretion, he cannot be questioned.
According to him, in this day and age, we must not countenance
such a state of affairs.
284. While concluding the debate on draft Article 143, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar
elaborated that the main and crucial question under this draft Article
was whether the Governor must have certain discretionary powers
or not. During the course of the debate, it was pointed out that the
retention of discretionary powers in the Governor was contrary to
responsible government in the States/provinces. It was also stated
that the same mimicked the GoI Act, 1935, which was largely assailed
as being undemocratic. However, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar was of the
undoubted view that “the retention in or the vesting the Governor
with certain discretionary powers is in no sense contrary to or in no
sense a negation of responsible government.”27 He cited Section 55
of the Canadian Constitution which read as follows:
“Section 55. –
Where a Bill passed by the House of Parliament is
presented to the Governor-General for the Queen’s assent,
he shall, according to his discretion, and subject to the
provisions of this Act, either assent thereto in the Queen’s
name, or withhold the Queen’s assent or reserve the Bill
for the signification of the Queen’s pleasure.”
285. He conveyed that the Canadians and the Australians had not found
it necessary to delete these provisions even in this day and age and
that they were quite satisfied with its retention. This, he argued, was
demonstrative of the fact that the grant of such a discretion to the
Governor is fully compatible with a responsible government. If they
had felt otherwise, they had the fullest right to abrogate this provision
and would have done so. Therefore, the existence of a provision
vesting a certain amount of discretion in the Governor cannot be
questioned. Furthermore, the draft Article reads that, “Except in
so far as he is by or under this Constitution” and not that “except
wherever he thinks that he should exercise this power of discretion

27 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Jun. 1, 1949) 500.
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against the wishes or against the advice of the ministers”28. Therefore,
the clause is very limited in nature and would have to be read in
conjunction with such other Articles which specifically reserve the
discretionary power for the Governor. It must not be construed as
a general clause which gives the Governor the power to disregard
the advice of his ministers in any matter in which he finds that he
could disregard their opinion.
286. Now moving on to how an Article providing for a certain amount
of discretionary powers to the Governor is to be framed, Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar elaborated that there are several ways in which the same
can be done. One way could be to omit the words from draft Article
143 and to add to draft Articles 175 (presently Article 200), 188, or
such other provisions, an express mention which vests the Governor
with discretionary power. Those Articles would then mention that
notwithstanding draft Article 143, the Governor would have a certain
discretionary power. Another way would be to state in draft Article
143 itself that “except as provided in draft Articles 175, 188 etc.”,
the Governor shall act in accordance with the aid and advice of the
Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head. However,
irrespective of what method of drafting is adopted, the essential point
that would remain is that the Governor’s discretionary power must
be acknowledged in some form.
287. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar was open and quite willing to concede to the
position of those members who were of the view that the last portion
of clause (1) of draft Article 143 must be amended to mention the
specific Articles under which the Governor shall exercise discretion,
if at that stage of the Constituent Assembly debates the provisions
intended for such vesting were already determined. The difficulty was
that the Constituent Assembly had not yet arrived at a stage where
they could discuss draft Articles 175 or 188, nor had they exhausted
all the possibilities of other provisions being made which vested the
Governor with discretionary power. If all those possibilities were
already known, draft Article 143 could have been amended and those
specific Articles could have been mentioned or listed out. Therefore,
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar was firmly of the view that no wrong could be
done if the words as they stood in the draft Article were retained.

28 8, Constituent Assemb. Deb., (Jun. 1, 1949) 501.
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288. While acknowledging that there exists a material difference between
draft Article 61(1) (Article 74(1) as it stands today) relating to the
executive functions of the President vis-à-vis his Ministers and the
draft Article 143, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar elucidated that it was not the
intention of the drafters to vest any discretionary power upon the
President. It is because the provincial governments are required
to work in subordination to the Central government and in order to
ensure that they do act in such subordination, the Governor would
reserve certain matters, thereby giving the President an opportunity to
see that they are broadly in compliance with the policy of the Central
government. Through this mechanism, the President would be able
to ensure that the rules under which the provincial governments
are supposed to act, according to the Constitution, are observed.
Therefore, the vesting of discretionary powers in the post of the
Governor was considered crucial to enable this administrative dialogue
between the Centre and the provinces.
289. What flows from a study of the Constituent Assembly debates
concerning the appointment of the Governor and the scope of his
discretionary powers is that the Governor plays a very crucial role
in the political structure of the country. He is the bridge between the
governments at the Central and State level, the proverbial buckle
which ties the States with the Centre. The Punchhi Commission
Report also acknowledged this dual role of the Governor – one as
the custodian of the Constitution in the States and a representative of
the Union, and the other as the constitutional head of the State and
a “friend, philosopher and guide” of the State government as well as
the people. The position of the Governor and how it differs from that
of the President were discussed by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar as we have
elaborated in the preceding paragraphs. This difference was also
taken note of by Krishna Iyer J., in his opinion in Samsher Singh
(supra) as we will discuss subsequently. We are of the firm view that
this unique position of the Governor must be kept in mind whenever
we set out to interpret any provision of the Constitution pertaining
to any gubernatorial powers or functions. It is not terminologies
like “federal”, “quasi-federal” or “unitary” which should guide our
interpretation of the Constitution. In turn, the words and ideas of the
wise artisans, who carefully weaved the fabric of the Constitution
with threads borrowed from across the world after dying them in
colors uniquely Indian, that we should look towards, when in doubt
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about the fundamental ideas of our Constitution. The framers of the
Constitution were cognizant of the fact that vesting the Centre with
excessive powers would not be healthy for the country’s polity. In
this regard we may refer to the observations made by the Sarkaria
Commission – “there is considerable truth in the saying that undue
centralization leads to blood pressure at the Centre and anemia at
the periphery. The inevitable result is morbidity, and inefficiency.
Indeed, centralization does not solve but aggravates the problems of
the people.” Therefore, the curtailing of the powers of the Governor
under the Constitution as distinguished from the GoI Act, 1935 was
done keeping in mind that the Centre does not arrogate all powers
to itself by utilizing the Governor as an intermediary of the Centre
at the State.
290. Arijit Pasayat, J., in his dissenting opinion in the decision of this
Court in Rameshwar Prasad (supra), observed thus on the role of
the Governor:
“270. As noted above, the Governor occupies a very
important and significant post in the democratic set-up.
When his credibility is at stake on the basis of allegations
that he was not performing his constitutional obligations
or functions in the correct way, it is a sad reflection on the
person chosen to be the executive head of a particular
State. A person appointed as a Governor should add
glory to the post and not be a symbolic figure oblivious
of the duties and functions which he has and is expected
to carry out. It is interesting to note that the allegations of
favouritism and mala fides are hurled by other parties at
the Governors who belonged or belong to the ruling party
at the Centre, and if the Governor at any point of time was
a functionary of the ruling party. The position does not
change when another party comes to rule at the Centre.
It appears to be a matter of convenience for different
political parties to allege mala fides. This unfortunate
situation could have been and can be avoided by acting
on the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission and
the Committee of the National Commission to review the
working of the Constitution in the matter of appointment
of Governors. This does not appear to be convenient
for the parties because they want to take advantage of
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the situation at a particular time and cry foul when the
situation does not seem favourable to them. This is a
sad reflection on the morals of the political parties who
do not lose the opportunity of politicising the post of the
Governor. Sooner the remedial measures are taken would
be better for democracy.
271. It is not deficiency in the Constitution which is
responsible for the situation. It is clearly attributable to
the people who elect (sic appoint) the Governors on
considerations other than merit. It is a disturbing feature,
and if media reports are to be believed, Raj Bhavans are
increasingly turning into extensions of party offices and
the Governors are behaving like party functionaries of a
particular party. This is not healthy for democracy.
272. The key actor in the Centre-State relations is
the Governor who is a bridge between the Union and
the State. The founding fathers deliberately avoided
election to the office of the Governor, as is in vogue in
the USA to insulate the office from linguistic chauvinism.
The President has been empowered to appoint him as
executive head of the State under Article 155 in Part VI,
Chapter II. The executive power of the State is vested in
him by Article 154 and exercised by him with the aid and
advice of the Council of Ministers, the Chief Minister as
its head. Under Article 159 the Governor shall discharge
his functions in accordance with the oath to protect and
defend the Constitution and the law. The office of the
Governor, therefore, is intended to ensure protection and
sustenance of the constitutional process of the working of
the Constitution by the elected executive and giving him
an umpire’s role. When a Gandhian economist member
of the Constituent Assembly wrote a letter to Gandhiji of
his plea for abolition of the office of the Governor, Gandhiji
wrote to him for its retention; thus, the Governor had been
given a very useful and necessary place in the scheme
of the team. He would be an arbiter when there was a
constitutional deadlock in the State and he would be able
to play an impartial role. There would be administrative
mechanism through which the constitutional crisis would
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be resolved in the State. The Governor thus should play
an important role. In his dual undivided capacity as head
of the State he should impartially assist the President. As
a constitutional head of the State Government in times of
constitutional crisis he should bring about sobriety. The
link is apparent when we find that Article 356 would be put
into operation normally based on the Governor’s report.
He should truthfully and with high degree of constitutional
responsibility, in terms of his oath, inform the President
that a situation has arisen in which the constitutional
machinery in the State has failed and the Government
of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution, with necessary detailed
factual foundation.”
(Emphasis supplied)

291. A Constitution Bench of this Court in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India
reported in (2010) 6 SCC 331 observed that the Governor is neither
an employee of the Union nor the agent of the party in power. The
relevant observations are extracted below:
“40. It is thus evident that a Governor has a dual role. The
first is that of a constitutional head of the State, bound
by the advice of his Council of Ministers. The second is
to function as a vital link between the Union Government
and the State Government. In certain special/emergent
situations, he may also act as a special representative
of the Union Government. He is required to discharge
the functions related to his different roles harmoniously,
assessing the scope and ambit of each role properly.
He is not an employee of the Union Government, nor
the agent of the party in power nor required to act under
the dictates of political parties. There may be occasions
when he may have to be an impartial or neutral umpire
where the views of the Union Government and the State
Governments are in conflict. His peculiar position arises
from the fact that the Indian Constitution is quasi-federal
in character.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1157

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

292. The question of whether the Governor is bound to act on the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers in all circumstances fell for
the consideration of this Court in Samsher Singh (supra). Speaking
for the majority, A.N. Ray C.J., observed as follows:
“20. Articles where the expression “acts in his discretion” is
used in relation to the powers and functions of the Governor
are those which speak of special responsibilities of the
Governor. These articles are 371-A(1)(b), 371-A(1)(d), 371-
A(2)(b) and 371-A(2)(f). There are two paragraphs in the
Sixth Schedule, namely 9(2) and 18(3) where the words
“in his discretion” are used in relation to certain powers
of the Governor. Para 9(2) is in relation to determination
of amount of royalties payable by licensees or lessees
prospecting for, or extracting minerals, to the District
Council. Paragraph 18(3) has been omitted with effect
from January 21, 1972.
21. The provisions contained in Article 371-A(1)(b) speak
of the special responsibility of the Governor of Nagaland
with respect to law and order in the State of Nagaland
and exercise of his individual judgment as to the action
to be taken. The proviso states that the decision of the
Governor in his discretion shall be final and it shall not
be called in question.
22. Article 371-A(1)(d) states that the Governor shall in
his discretion make rules providing for the composition of
the Regional Council for the Tuensang District.
23. Article 371-A(2)(b) states that for periods mentioned
there the Governor shall in his discretion arrange for an
equitable allocation of certain funds, between the Tuensang
District and the rest of the State.
24. Article 371-A(2)(f) states that the final decision on all
matters relating to the Tuensang District shall be made
by the Governor in his discretion.

xxx xxx xxx
28. Under the Cabinet system of Government as embodied
in our Constitution the Governor is the constitutional or
formal head of the State and he exercises all his powers
1158 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution
on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers save in
spheres where the Governor is required by or under the
Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion.

xxx xxx xxx
54. The provisions of the Constitution which expressly
require the Governor to exercise his powers in his
discretion are contained in articles to which reference has
been made. To illustrate, Article 239(2) states that where
a Governor is appointed an administrator of an adjoining
Union territory he shall exercise his functions as such
administrator independently of his Council of Ministers.
The other articles which speak of the discretion of the
Governor are paragraphs 9(2) and 18(3) of the Sixth
Schedule and Articles 371-A(1)(b), 371-A(1)(d) and 371-
A(2)(b) and 371-A(2)(f). The discretion conferred on the
Governor means that as the constitutional or formal head
of the State the power is vested in him. In this connection,
reference may be made to Article 356 which states that
the Governor can send a report to the President that a
situation has arisen in which the government of the State
cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of
this Constitution. Again Article 200 requires the Governor
to reserve for consideration any Bill which in his opinion
if it became law, would so derogate from the powers of
the High Court as to endanger the position which the High
Court is designed to fill under the Constitution.
55. In making a report under Article 356 the Governor will
be justified in exercising his discretion even against the aid
and advice of his Council of Ministers. The reason is that
the failure of the constitutional machinery may be because
of the conduct of the Council of Ministers. This discretionary
power is given to the Governor to enable him to report to
the President who, however, must act on the advice of his
Council of Ministers in all matters. In this context Article
163(2) is explicable that the decision of the Governor in
his discretion shall be final and the validity shall not be
called in question. The action taken by the President on
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1159

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

such a report is a different matter. The President acts on
the advice of his Council of Ministers. In all other matters
where the Governor acts in his discretion he will act in
harmony with his Council of Ministers. The Constitution
does not aim at providing a parallel administration within
the State by allowing the Governor to go against the advice
of the Council of Ministers.
56. Similarly, Article 200 indicates another instance where
the Governor may act irrespective of any advice from the
Council of Ministers. In such matters where the Governor
is to exercise his discretion, he must discharge his duties
to the best of his judgment. The Governor is required to
pursue such courses which are not detrimental to the State.”
(Emphasis supplied)

293. A reading of the observations reproduced above indicates that the
Court identified that the Governor was required to act on his discretion
when performing his functions, inter alia, under Articles 356 and
200 of the Constitution respectively. However, it is pertinent to note
that under Article 200, only the reservation of bills falling under the
second proviso was observed by the Court to be an exercise which
must be undertaken by the Governor independent of the advice of
the Council of Ministers.
294. Furthermore, this Court laid down a general rule that the Governor, in
the Cabinet form of government envisaged by the Constitution, acts
as a constitutional head performing all his functions and exercising all
his powers on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in
a limited area. This limited area of discretion, too, is provided by the
Constitution under the specific provisions wherein such exercise of
discretion is permissible. The Court gave certain illustrative examples
where the expression “acts in his discretion” was used and observed
that such provisions indicated that a special responsibility on the
Governor has been entrusted upon by the Constitution.
295. It is pertinent to observe the observations made by the Court in
paragraphs 54, 55 and 56 of Samsher Singh (supra) which are
reproduced above. In paragraph 54, while giving illustrations of
the provisions where the Governor is expressly required by the
Constitution to act in his discretion, the Court made reference to
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Articles 356 and 200 respectively. In the context of Article 200, the
Court observed that the limited area where express discretion has
been conferred upon the Governor falls under the second proviso.
Thereafter, in paragraph 55, the Court elaborated upon the exercise
of discretion by the Governor under Article 356. In paragraph 56,
the Court elaborated upon the exercise of discretion under Article
200 and observed that Article 200 “indicates another instance where
the Governor may act irrespective of any advice from the Council of
Ministers”. It is important to read the observations made in paragraph
56 along with paragraph 54 of the judgment. A conjoint reading of
these two paragraphs, it becomes clear, without a cavil of doubt, that
the second proviso to Article 200 is an instance under the Constitution
where the Governor has been conferred with the power to act in his
discretion and even against the advice of the Council of Ministers.
However, the logical sequitur to this is that under Article 200, there
is no scope for the Governor acting in his discretion other than the
second proviso.
296. Speaking for himself and P.N. Bhagwati J., the redoubtable Krishna
Iyer J., in Samsher Singh (supra) observed as follows:
“100. The first broad proposition of the appellants is that the
President —and the Governor — are not just constitutional
cousins of the British Queen, but real wielders of power,
bestowed on them expressly by the terms of the text,
almost next of kin to their American counterparts with
similar designations. The issue is so fundamental that its
resolution is necessary to know not only who can declare a
probationer’s fitness but who can declare a war in national
defence or proclaim a breakdown of the State constitutional
machinery or assent to a Bill passed by Parliament. For, if
under Article 311 the President must be personally satisfied
for certain small steps he must surely be individually
convinced regarding the far more momentous spectrum
of functions he is called upon to discharge under a big
bunch of other provisions. And this reasoning regarding
disposal of gubernatorial business or discharge of official
responsibilities will equally apply to Governors.

xxx xxx xxx
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1161

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

113. If the ‘inner voice’ of the founding fathers may be
any guide, it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
President and, a fortiori, the Governor enjoys nothing more
and nothing less than the status of a constitutional head
in a Cabinet-type Government — a few exceptions and
marginal reservations apart.

xxx xxx xxx
139. Of course, there is some qualitative difference
between the position of the President and the Governor.
The former, under Article 74 has no discretionary powers;
the latter too has none, save in the tiny strips covered
by Articles 163(2), 371-A(1)(b) and (d), 371-A(2)(b) and
(f), VI Schedule, para 9(2) [and VI Schedule, para 18(3),
until omitted recently with effect from January 21, 1972].
These discretionary powers exist only where expressly
spelt out and even these are not left to the sweet will
of the Governor but are remote-controlled by the Union
Ministry which is answerable to Parliament for those
actions. Again, a minimal area centering round reports to
be despatched under Article 356 may not, in the nature
of things, be amenable to Ministerial advice. The practice
of sending periodical reports to the Union Government is
a pre-constitutional one and it is doubtful if a Governor
could or should report behind the back of his Ministers.
For a Centrally appointed constitutional functionary to keep
a dossier on his Ministers or to report against them or to
take up public stances critical of Government policy settled
by the Cabinet or to interfere in the administration directly
— these are unconstitutional faux pas and run counter to
Parliamentary system. In all his constitutional ‘functions’ it
is the Ministers who act; only in the narrow area specifically
marked out for discretionary exercise by the Constitution,
he is untramelled by the State Ministers’ acts and advice.
Of course, a limited free-wheeling is available regarding
choice of Chief Minister and dismissal of the Ministry, as
in the English practice adapted to Indian conditions.

xxx xxx xxx
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154. We declare the law of this branch of our Constitution
to be that the President and Governor, custodians of
all executive and other powers under various articles
shall, by virtue of these provisions, exercise their formal
constitutional powers only upon and in accordance
with the advice of their Ministers save in a few well-
known exceptional situations. Without being dogmatic or
exhaustive, these situations relate to (a) the choice of Prime
Minister (Chief Minister), restricted though this choice is by
the paramount consideration that he should command a
majority in the House; (b) the dismissal of a Government
which has lost its majority in the House, but refuses to quit
office; (c) the dissolution of the House where an appeal to
the country is necessitous, although in this area the head
of State should avoid getting involved in politics and must
be advised by his Prime Minister (Chief Minister) who will
eventually take the responsibility for the step. We do not
examine in detail the constitutional proprieties in these
predicaments except to utter the caution that even here the
action must be compelled by the peril to democracy and
the appeal to the House or to the country must become
blatantly obligatory. We have no doubt that de Smith’s
statement [ Constitutional and Administrative Law — by
S.A. De Smith — Peguin Books on Foundations of Law]
regarding royal assent holds good for the President and
Governor in India:
“Refusal of the royal assent on the ground
that the Monarch strongly disapproved of a
Bill or that it was intensely controversial would
nevertheless be unconstitutional. The only
circumstances in which the withholding of the
royal assent might be justifiable would be if
the Government itself were to advise such a
course — a highly improbable contingency — or
possibly if it was notorious that a Bill had been
passed in disregard to mandatory procedural
requirements; but since the Government in the
latter situation would be of the opinion that the
deviation would not affect the validity of the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1163

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

measure once it had been assented to, prudence
would suggest the giving of assent.”
(Emphasis supplied)

297. Interestingly, as can be seen from the paragraphs reproduced
above, while describing the limited nature of the scope of exercise
of discretion by the President and the Governor, Krishna Iyer, J.,
referred to an excerpt on how refusal of royal assent to a bill passed
by the Parliament could only be done on the advice of the Ministers
and not on the personal discretion of the monarch, regardless of how
controversial the monarch found the bill to be. He further observed
that the discretionary powers of the Governor existed only where they
were expressly spelt out in the Constitution, and even the exercise
of such discretion was remote-controlled by the Union Ministry.
298. Referring to the decision in Samsher Singh (supra), Krishna Iyer
J., in Maru Ram v. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 107,
again, reiterated the position of the President and the Governor as
figureheads in the constitutional scheme. However, he observed that
they acted in accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers “save in a narrow area of power” and that the “Governor
vis-à-vis his Cabinet is no higher than the President save in a narrow
area which does not include Article 161”, thereby implying that there
is a small area of discretion available with the Governor, which
however does not include Article 161. The relevant observations are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“61. [...] It is fundamental to the Westminster system that
the Cabinet rules and the Queen reigns being too deeply
rooted as foundational to our system no serious encounter
was met from the learned Solicitor-General whose sure
grasp of fundamentals did not permit him to controvert
the proposition, that the President and the Governor, be
they ever so high in textual terminology, are but functional
euphemisms promptly acting on and only on the advice of
the Council of Ministers save in a narrow area of power.
The subject is now beyond controversy, this Court having
authoritatively laid down the law in Shamsher Singh case
[Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831 :
1974 SCC (L&S) 550 : (1975) 1 SCR 814]. So, we agree,
even without reference to Article 367(1) and Sections 3(8)
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(b) and 3(60)(b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, that,
in the matter of exercise of the powers under Articles 72
and 161, the two highest dignitaries in our constitutional
scheme act and must act not on their own judgment but in
accordance with the aid and advice of the ministers. Article
74, after the 42nd Amendment silences speculation and
obligates compliance. The Governor vis-à-vis his Cabinet is
no higher than the President save in a narrow area which
does not include Article 161. The constitutional conclusion
is that the Governor is but a shorthand expression for the
State Government and the President is an abbreviation
for the Central Government.”
(Emphasis supplied)

299. A Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with the issue of
discretionary powers of the Governor in M.P. Special Police (supra)
and explaining the import of Article 163(2) of the Constitution,
observed that even if discretion was not expressly granted upon the
Governor by a specific provision of the Constitution, it was open to
him to act in his discretion in certain exceptional situations where
by reason of threat to democratic principles, he could not act on the
advice of the Council of Ministers. The relevant observations are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“8. The question for consideration is whether a Governor
can act in his discretion and against the aid and advice of
the Council of Ministers in a matter of grant of sanction for
prosecution of Ministers for offences under the Prevention
of Corruption Act and/or under the Penal Code, 1860.

xxx xxx xxx
11. Mr Sorabjee submits that even though normally the
Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers, but there can be cases where the Governor
is, by or under the Constitution, required to exercise his
function or any of them in his discretion. The Constitution
of India expressly provides for contingencies/cases where
the Governor is to act in his discretion. Articles 239(2),
371-A(1)(b), 371-A(2)(b), 371-A(2)(f) and paras 9(2) and
18(3) of the Sixth Schedule are some of the provisions.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1165

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

However, merely because the Constitution of India
expressly provides, in some cases, for the Governor to act
in his discretion, can it be inferred that the Governor can
so act only where the Constitution expressly so provides?
If that were so then sub-clause (2) of Article 163 would
be redundant. A question whether a matter is or is not
a matter in which the Governor is required to act in his
discretion can only arise in cases where the Constitution
has not expressly provided that the Governor can act in
his discretion. Such a question cannot arise in respect of a
matter where the Constitution expressly provides that the
Governor is to act in his discretion. Article 163(2), therefore,
postulates that there can be matters where the Governor
can act in his discretion even though the Constitution has
not expressly so provided.
12. […] Thus, as rightly pointed out by Mr Sorabjee, a
seven-Judge Bench of this Court has already held that the
normal rule is that the Governor acts on the aid and advice
of the Council of Ministers and not independently or contrary
to it. But there are exceptions under which the Governor
can act in his own discretion. Some of the exceptions are
as set out hereinabove. It is, however, clarified that the
exceptions mentioned in the judgment are not exhaustive. It
is also recognised that the concept of the Governor acting
in his discretion or exercising independent judgment is not
alien to the Constitution. It is recognised that there may
be situations where by reason of peril to democracy or
democratic principles, an action may be compelled which
from its nature is not amenable to Ministerial advice. Such
a situation may be where bias is inherent and/or manifest
in the advice of the Council of Ministers.

xxx xxx xxx
19. Article 163 has been extracted above. Undoubtedly, in
a matter of grant of sanction to prosecute, the Governor is
normally required to act on aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers and not in his discretion. However, an exception
may arise whilst considering grant of sanction to prosecute
a Chief Minister or a Minister where as a matter of propriety
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the Governor may have to act in his own discretion. Similar
would be the situation if the Council of Ministers disables
itself or disentitles itself.

xxx xxx xxx
32. If, on these facts and circumstances, the Governor
cannot act in his own discretion there would be a complete
breakdown of the rule of law inasmuch as it would then
be open for Governments to refuse sanction in spite of
overwhelming material showing that a prima facie case
is made out. If, in cases where a prima facie case is
clearly made out, sanction to prosecute high functionaries
is refused or withheld, democracy itself will be at stake.
It would then lead to a situation where people in power
may break the law with impunity safe in the knowledge
that they will not be prosecuted as the requisite sanction
will not be granted.”
(Emphasis supplied)

300. The decision in this case was a step forward from the general rule
laid down by the larger Bench in Samsher Singh (supra). However,
what is essential to note is that the Court did not dilute the general
rule laid down earlier, and only allowed for a very limited scope of
discretion for the Governor in certain exceptional situations in light of
Article 163(2). The extraordinary nature of the exceptional situations
envisaged by the Court can be gauged from the use of the expressions
“peril to democracy or democratic principles”, “bias is inherent and/or
manifest in the advice of the Council of Ministers”, “Council of Ministers
disables itself or disentitles itself” and “there would be a complete
breakdown of the rule of law”. Whenever the situation arises for the
Governor to exercise discretion in discharge of a function which is
ordinarily to be exercised upon the aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers, it is these exceptional circumstances that the Governor
must take into account before rejecting the aid and advice tendered
to him. Courts too, when judicially reviewing the exercise of discretion
by the Governor in such cases, must be guided by the situations as
described in the decision in M.P. Special Police (supra). Article 200,
being a provision where the Governor must act on ministerial advice
as a general rule, the aforesaid exposition would squarely apply to
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1167

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

this provision as well, thereby severely curtailing any possibility of
exercise of discretion by the Governor.
301. Another Constitution Bench of this Court in Nabam Rebia (supra)
had the occasion to discuss at length the nature of the position of
the Governor in the constitutional scheme, along with the source
and scope of his discretionary powers. The Court held that the
discretionary powers of the Governor could be traced back to Article
163(1), that is, he could act in exercise of his discretionary powers
only where expressly provided for under the Constitution, or where
the interpretation of a constitutional provision could not be construed
otherwise, or in cases where this Court has declared the exercise of
powers to be done by the Governor in his discretion notwithstanding
ministerial advice. Further, the Court held that the finality expressed
under Article 163(2) was only in respect of those situations where
the exercise of discretion by the Governor was permissible under the
framework of Article 163(1) and any exercise of discretion beyond the
jurisdiction provided by the Constitution would be subject to judicial
review. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“147.1 [...] Article 163 further warrants that the Governor
would exercise his functions, on the aid and advice of the
Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head.
The above edict is not applicable, in situations where the
Governor is expressly required to exercise his functions,
“[...] by or under this Constitution…”, “… in his discretion”.
The question that will need determination at our hands is,
whether the underlying cardinal principle, with reference
to the discretionary power of the Governor, is to be traced
from Article 163(1) or from Article 163(2). [...] All in all, it is
apparent, that the Governor is not assigned any significant
role in the executive functioning of the State.
147.2. [...] Insofar as the legislative process is concerned,
the only function vested with the Governor is expressed
through Article 200 which, inter alia, provides that a Bill
passed by the State Legislature, is to be presented to the
Governor for his assent. And its ancillary provision, namely,
Article 201 wherein a Bill passed by the State Legislature
and presented to the Governor, may be reserved by the
Governor for consideration by the President. [...] All in all, it
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is apparent that the Governor is not assigned any significant
role even in the legislative functioning of the State.
148. The above position leaves no room for any doubt that
the Governor cannot be seen to have such powers and
functions, as would assign to him a dominating position,
over the State Executive and the State Legislature. The
interpretation placed on Article 163(2), on behalf of the
respondents, has just that effect, because of the following
contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents. Firstly,
whenever a question arises, whether in discharging a
particular function, the Governor can or cannot act in his
own discretion. According to the respondents, the discretion
of the Governor, on the above question, is final. Secondly,
since the provision itself postulates, that “… the decision
of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the
validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be
called in question on the ground that he ought or ought
not to have acted in his discretion …”, according to the
respondents, makes the Governor’s orders based on his
own discretion, immune from judicial review. Accepting
the above position, will convert the Governor into an all-
pervading super-constitutional authority. This position is not
acceptable because an examination of the executive and
legislative functions of the Governor, from the surrounding
provisions of the Constitution clearly brings out that the
Governor has not been assigned any significant role
either in the executive or the legislative functioning of the
State. The position adopted on behalf of the appellants,
on the other hand, augurs well in an overall harmonious
construction of the provisions of the Constitution. Even
on a cursory examination of the relevant provisions of
the Constitution, we are inclined to accept the contention
advanced on behalf of the appellants.
149. In our considered view, a clear answer to the
query raised above, can inter alia emerge from the
Constituent Assembly Debates with reference to draft
Article 143, which eventually came to be renumbered
as Article 163 in the Constitution. It would be relevant
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1169

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

to record that from the queries raised by H.V. Kamath,
T.T. Krishnamachari, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, and
from the response to the same by Dr B.R. Ambedkar, it
clearly emerges that the general principle with reference
to the scope and extent of the discretionary power of the
Governor, is provided for through Article 163(1). It also
becomes apparent from Article 163(1), which provides
for the principle of Ministerial Responsibility. The crucial
position that gets clarified from a perusal of the Constituent
Assembly Debates, arises from the answer to the query,
whether the Governor should have any discretionary
power at all? The Debates expound, that the retention
of discretionary power with the Governor was not, in any
way, contrary to the power of responsible Government,
nor should the same be assumed as a power akin to
that vested with a Governor under the Government of
India Act, 1935. And from that, emerges the answer that
the retention and vesting of discretionary powers with
the Governor, should not be taken in the sense of being
contrary to, or having the effect of negating the powers of
responsible Government. Significantly, with reference to
the Governor’s discretionary powers, it was emphasised
by Dr B.R. Ambedkar, that: (CAD Vol. 8, p. 501)
“The Hon’ble Dr B.R. Ambedkar.— … The clause
is a very limited clause; it says: ‘except insofar
as he is by or under this Constitution’. Therefore,
Article 163 will have to be read in conjunction
with such other articles which specifically reserve
the power to the Governor. It is not a general
clause giving the Governor power to disregard
the advice of his Ministers, in any matter in
which he finds he ought to disregard. There,
I think, lies the fallacy of the argument of my
Hon’ble friend ….”
In our considered view, the Constituent Assembly
Debates leave no room for any doubt that the Framers
of the Constitution desired to embody the general and
basic principle, describing the extent and scope of the
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discretionary power of the Governor, in clause (1) of Article
163, and not in clause (2) thereof, as suggested by the
learned counsel for the respondents.

xxx xxx xxx
154. We are, therefore, of the considered view that insofar
as the exercise of discretionary powers vested with the
Governor is concerned, the same is limited to situations,
wherein a constitutional provision expressly so provides
that the Governor should act in his own discretion.
Additionally, a Governor can exercise his functions in
his own discretion, in situations where an interpretation
of the constitutional provision concerned, could not be
construed otherwise. We, therefore, hereby reject the
contention advanced on behalf of the respondents, that the
Governor has the freedom to determine when and in which
situation, he should take a decision in his own discretion,
without the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his
Council of Ministers. We accordingly, also turn down the
contention, that whenever the Governor in the discharge
of his functions, takes a decision in his own discretion, the
same would be final and binding, and beyond the purview
of judicial review. We are of the view that finality expressed
in Article 163(2) would apply to functions exercised by the
Governor in his own discretion, as are permissible within the
framework of Article 163(1), and additionally, in situations
where the clear intent underlying a constitutional provision,
so requires i.e. where the exercise of such power on the
aid and advice, would run contrary to the constitutional
scheme, or would be contradictory in terms.
155. We may, therefore, summarise our conclusions as
under:
155.1. Firstly, the measure of discretionary power of the
Governor, is limited to the scope postulated therefor, under
Article 163(1).
155.2. Secondly, under Article 163(1) the discretionary
power of the Governor extends to situations, wherein a
constitutional provision expressly requires the Governor
to act in his own discretion.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1171

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

155.3. Thirdly, the Governor can additionally discharge
functions in his own discretion, where such intent emerges
from a legitimate interpretation of the provision concerned,
and the same cannot be construed otherwise.
155.4. Fourthly, in situations where this Court has declared
that the Governor should exercise the particular function
at his own and without any aid or advice because of the
impermissibility of the other alternative, by reason of
conflict of interest.
155.5. Fifthly, the submission advanced on behalf of the
respondents, that the exercise of discretion under Article
163(2) is final and beyond the scope of judicial review
cannot be accepted. Firstly, because we have rejected the
submission advanced by the respondents, that the scope
and extent of discretion vested with the Governor has to be
ascertained from Article 163(2), on the basis whereof the
submission was canvassed. And secondly, any discretion
exercised beyond the Governor’s jurisdictional authority,
would certainly be subject to judicial review.”
(Emphasis supplied)

302. This Court in State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta reported in (2013)
3 SCC 1 placing reliance on the decision in B.P. Singhal (supra)
observed that the expression “required” appearing under Article
163(1) indicated that it is only in situations where there is express
stipulation or necessary implication that the Governor can act in his
own discretion. The term “required” also indicates an element of
compelling necessity. The Court also observed that Article 200 was
one such provision where the Governor is expected to act upon
ministerial advice and not in his discretion. The relevant observations
are reproduced hereinbelow:
“35. However, the power to grant pardon or to remit sentence
(Article 161), the power to make appointments including that
of the Chief Minister (Article 164), the Advocate General
(Article 165), the District Judges (Article 233), the Members
of the Public Service Commission (Article 316) are in the
category where the Governor is bound to act on the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers. Likewise, the power
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to prorogue either House of Legislature or to dissolve the
Legislative Assembly (Article 174), the right to address or
send messages to the Houses of the Legislature (Article 175
and Article 176), the power to assent to Bills or withhold such
assent (Article 200), the power to make recommendations for
demands of grants [Article 203(3)], and the duty to cause to
be laid every year the annual budget (Article 202), the power
to promulgate ordinances during recess of the Legislature
(Article 213) also belong to this species of power. Again, the
obligation to make available to the Election Commission,
requisite staff for discharging functions conferred upon it by
Article 324(1) and Article 324(6), the power to nominate a
member of the Anglo-Indian community to the Assembly
in certain situations (Article 333), the power to authorise
the use of Hindi in proceedings in the High Court [Article
348(2)], are illustrative of the functions of the Governor,
qua the Governor.

xxx xxx xxx
49. The exceptions carved out in the main clause of
Article 163(1), permit the legislature to entrust certain
functions to the Governor to be performed by him, either
in his discretion, or in consultation with other authorities,
independent of the Council of Ministers. The meaning of
the words “by or under” is well settled. The expression
“by an Act”, would mean by virtue of a provision directly
enacted in the statute in question and that which is
conceivable from its express language or by necessary
implication therefrom. The words “under the Act”, would
in such context, signify that which may not directly be
found in the statute itself, but which is conferred by virtue
of powers enabling such action(s) e.g. by way of laws
framed by a subordinate law-making authority competent
to do so under the parent Act. (Vide Indramani Pyarelal
Gupta v. W.R. Natu [AIR 1963 SC 274].)
50. This Court in Rameshwar Prasad (6) v. Union of India
[(2006) 2 SCC 1] held : (SCC p. 82, para 57)
“57. The expression ‘required’ found in Article
163(1) is stated to signify that the Governor
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

can exercise his discretionary powers only if
there is a compelling necessity to do so. It
has been reasoned that the expression ‘by or
under the Constitution’ means that the necessity
to exercise such powers may arise from any
express provision of the Constitution or by
necessary implication. The Sarkaria Commission
Report further adds that such necessity may
arise even from rules and orders made ‘under’
the Constitution.””
(Emphasis supplied)

d. The decision of this Court in B.K. Pavitra (supra) is per
incuriam
303. Placing reliance on the aforesaid decision in Nabam Rebia (supra),
this Court in B.K. Pavitra (supra) while dealing with the reservation
of bills for the consideration of the President under Article 200
observed thus:
“66. Where a Bill is not a Money Bill, the Governor may
return the Bill for reconsideration upon which the House or
Houses, as the case may be, will reconsider the desirability
of introducing the amendments which the Governor has
recommended. If the Bill is passed again by the House
(or Houses as the case may be), the Governor cannot
thereafter withhold assent. The second proviso to Article
200 stipulates that the Governor must not assent to a
Bill but necessarily reserve it for the consideration of the
President if the Bill upon being enacted would derogate
from the powers of the High Court in a manner that
endangers its position under the Constitution. Save and
except for Bills falling within the description contained in the
second proviso (where the Governor must reserve the Bill
for consideration of the President), a discretion is conferred
upon the Governor to follow one of the courses of action
enunciated in the substantive part of Article 200. Aside from
Bills which are covered by the second proviso, where the
Governor is obliged to reserve the Bill for the consideration
of the President, the substantive part of Article 200 does
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not indicate specifically, the circumstances in which the
Governor may reserve a Bill for the consideration of the
President. The Constitution has entrusted this discretion to
the Governor. The nature and scope of the discretionary
power of the Governor to act independent of, or, contrary
to aid and advice of Council of Ministers under Article 163
was discussed in Nabam Rebia [Nabam Rebia and Bamang
Felix v. Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016)
8 SCC 1] , J.S. Khehar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice
then was) held thus : (SCC p. 159, para 154)
“154. We are, therefore, of the considered view
that insofar as the exercise of discretionary powers
vested with the Governor is concerned, the same
is limited to situations, wherein a constitutional
provision expressly so provides that the Governor
should act in his own discretion. Additionally, a
Governor can exercise his functions in his own
discretion, in situations where an interpretation
of the constitutional provision concerned, could
not be construed otherwise.”
Dipak Misra, J. (as the learned Judge then was), observed
thus : (SCC p. 244, para 375)
“375. [...] The Governor is expected to function in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution
(and the history behind the enactment of its
provisions), the law and the rules regulating his
functions. It is easy to forget that the Governor
is a constitutional or formal head—nevertheless
like everybody else, he has to play the game in
accordance with the rules of the game—whether
it is in relation to the Executive (aid and advice
of the Council of Ministers) or the Legislature
(Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business
of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly).
This is not to say that the Governor has no
powers—he does, but these too are delineated
by the Constitution either specifically or by
necessary implication.”
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67. The Framers carefully eschewed defining the
circumstances in which the Governor may reserve a Bill
for the consideration of the President. By its very nature
the conferment of the power cannot be confined to
specific categories. Exigencies may arise in the working
of the Constitution which justify a recourse to the power
of reserving a Bill for the consideration of the President.
They cannot be foreseen with the vision of a soothsayer.
The power having been conferred upon a constitutional
functionary, it is conditioned by the expectation that
it would be exercised upon careful reflection and for
resolving legitimate concerns in regard to the validity
of the legislation. The entrustment of a constitutional
discretion to the Governor is premised on the trust that the
exercise of authority would be governed by constitutional
statesmanship. In a federal structure, the conferment of this
constitutional discretion is not intended to thwart democratic
federalism. The State Legislatures represent the popular
will of those who elect their representatives. They are the
collective embodiments of that will. The act of reserving
a Bill for the assent of the President must be undertaken
upon careful reflection, upon a doubt being entertained
by the Governor about the constitutional legitimacy of the
Bill which has been passed.

xxx xxx xxx
71. These decisions are specifically in the context of Article
254. Article 254(1) postulates inter alia, that in a matter
which is governed by the Concurrent List, a law which
has been enacted by the Legislature of a State shall be
void to the extent of its repugnancy with a law enacted
by Parliament. Clause (2) of Article 254 obviates that
consequence where the law has been reserved for the
consideration of the President and has received assent.
Article 254(1) is made subject to clause (2), thereby
emphasising that the assent of the President will cure
a repugnancy of the State law with a law enacted by
Parliament in a matter falling in the Concurrent List. It is
in this context, that the decisions of this Court hold that
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the assent of the President should be sought in relation
to a repugnancy with a specific provision contained in a
Parliamentary legislation so as to enable due consideration
by the President of the ground on which assent has been
sought. Article 200 contains the source of the constitutional
power which is conferred upon the Governor to reserve
a Bill for the consideration of the President. Article
254(2) is an illustration of the constitutional authority
of the Governor to reserve a law enacted by the State
Legislature for consideration of the President in a specified
situation — where it is repugnant to an existing law or
to a Parliamentary legislation on a matter falling in the
Concurrent List. The eventuality which is specified in
Article 254(2) does not exhaust the ambit of the power
entrusted to the Governor under Article 200 to reserve
a Bill for the consideration of the President. Apart from
a repugnancy in matters falling in the Concurrent List
between State and Parliamentary legislation, a Governor
may have sound constitutional reasons to reserve a Bill
for the consideration of the President. Article 200, in its
second proviso mandates that a Bill which derogates from
the powers of the High Court must be reserved for the
consideration of the President. Apart from Bills which fall
within the description set out in the second proviso, the
Governor may legitimately refer a Bill for consideration of
the President upon entertaining a legitimate doubt about
the validity of the law. By its very nature, it would not be
possible for this Court to reflect upon the situations in which
the power under Article 200 can be exercised. This was
noticed in the judgment of this Court in Hoechst [Hoechst
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45 :
1983 SCC (Tax) 248] . Excluding it from judicial scrutiny,
the Court held : (SCC pp. 100-101, para 86)
‘86. [...] There may also be a Bill passed by the
State Legislature where there may be a genuine
doubt about the applicability of any of the
provisions of the Constitution which require the
assent of the President to be given to it in order
that it may be effective as an Act. In such a case,
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

it is for the Governor to exercise his discretion
and to decide whether he should assent to the
Bill or should reserve it for consideration of
the President to avoid any future complication.
Even if it ultimately turns out that there was no
necessity for the Governor to have reserved a
Bill for the consideration of the President, still
he having done so and obtained the assent of
the President, the Act so passed cannot be held
to be unconstitutional on the ground of want
of proper assent. This aspect of the matter, as
the law now stands, is not open to scrutiny by
the courts. In the instant case, the Finance Bill
which ultimately became the Act in question
was a consolidating Act relating to different
subjects and perhaps the Governor felt that it
was necessary to reserve it for the assent of
the President. We have no hesitation in holding
that the assent of the President is not justiciable,
and we cannot spell out any infirmity arising out
of his decision to give such assent.’”
(Emphasis supplied)

304. This Court in B.K. Pavitra (supra) took the view that the Constitution
has entrusted the Governor with the discretion of reserving a bill,
presented to him for assent, for the consideration of the President.
It also held that the exercise of the power of reservation of bills for
the consideration of the President could be done by the Governor
contrary to the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers.
The Court observed that such an important responsibility having
been conferred upon a constitutional functionary, its discharge
was expected to be undertaken upon careful reflection and with
statesmanship, and in a manner that does not thwart democratic
federalism. On the nature of bills which may be reserved for the
consideration of the President, the Court held that it was impossible
to lay down with certainty all the situations wherein such a reference
may be warranted.
305. We find ourselves in disagreement with the view taken in B.K.
Pavitra (supra) that the Constitution confers a discretion upon the
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Governor insofar as the reservation of bills for the consideration of
the President is concerned. We say so because the removal of the
expression “in his discretion” from Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935
when it was being adapted as Article 200 of the Constitution, clearly
indicates that any discretion which was available to the Governor
under the GoI Act, 1935 in respect of reservation of bills became
unavailable with the commencement of the Constitution. The views
expressed by the members of the Constituent Assembly, which are
recorded in the debates that took place on Article 175 of the Draft
Constitution, also indicate the same29. We are also of the view
that the same is also in alignment with the fundamental tenets of
responsible government in a parliamentary democracy. The only
exception to the general principle of the Governor adhering to the
aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers can be traced
to Article 163(1) and the second proviso to Article 200.
306. Pertinently, the Court in B.K. Pavitra (supra) failed to take into
consideration the larger Bench decisions in Samsher Singh
(supra) and M.P. Special Police (supra). As we have discussed
above, paragraphs 54 to 56 of the decision in Samsher Singh
(supra) make it clear beyond any doubt that there is no express
requirement under the Constitution for the exercise of discretion by
the Governor in discharge of his functions under Article 200, except
to the limited extent of the second proviso where the expression
“in his opinion” is employed for the Governor. This is also apparent
from the conscious decision of the Constituent Assembly in removing
the expression “in his discretion” while enacting Article 200. Thus,
the only express stipulation where the Governor may exercise
discretion for reservation of bills is in the second proviso to Article
200. Even when looked at from the perspective of necessary
implication, the discretion of the Governor in reserving the bills for
the consideration of the President can be said to be present only
in those cases where the Constitution has envisaged a mandatory
approval of the Government, before the law can become enforceable
in the State. The Sarkaria Commission mentioned three categories
where reservation of a bill for the consideration of the President is
envisaged:

29 9, Constituent Assemb. Deb. (Aug 1, 1949) 59-62; 10, Constituent Assemb. Deb. (Oct. 17, 1949)
392-394.
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a. First, where the bill pertains to the second proviso of Article
200, Article 288(2) or Article 360(4)(a)(ii) of the Constitution,
reservation for the President is a mandatory condition as the
bill will not become effective without his assent;
b. Secondly, where the bill pertains to Articles 31A(1) or 31C,
presidential assent is compulsory for securing immunity from
the operation of Articles 14 and 19. Similarly, where the law is
repugnant to a Union legislation on a Concurrent list subject-
matter, presidential assent is required to make the law effective
in the State. Further, laws made under Article 304(b) would not
be enforceable if they were introduced without the previous
sanction of the President and having been introduced and
passed by the State legislature, have not received the assent
of the President. This position can be derived from a reading
of Article 255;
c. Thirdly, there may be laws falling outside the aforesaid
categories which may be reserved by the Governor for the
President. However, the scope of discretion in such category of
laws would be extremely limited and only when an exceptional
situation of the nature described by this Court in M.P. Special
Police (supra) and in Nabam Rebia (supra) as explained by
us in paragraph 300 of this judgment arises that there would be
scope for the Governor to reserve the bill for the consideration
of the President.
307. While construing the role of the Governor in the context of Article
200, we must keep in mind that such a role has been envisaged not
to supplant the opinion of the Council of Ministers, but to infuse it
with his wisdom. The role of a friend, philosopher and guide which
a Governor is to play under the Constitution is played by him at
various stages of administrative and legislative functioning of the
State. Article 167 makes it mandatory for the Chief Minister to share
with the Governor, inter alia, the proposals of legislations that the
government wishes to introduce in the State legislature. This means
that the Governor is made well aware of any legislation that the State
government is planning to enact much before it is introduced in the
State legislature and sent to him for assent. Thus, the advisory role of
the Governor is best played by engaging with the Council of Ministers
even before the legislation is introduced in the State legislature. He
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is well within his rights, and in fact, it is his bounden duty to put to
use his experience and wisdom by making constructive suggestions
to the Cabinet regarding the legislative proposals. The Council of
Ministers would also do good to take into consideration the advice
of the Governor and deliberate upon it so that the legislation and
ultimately, public interest is benefitted.
308. However, once the bill is passed by the State legislature, and
presented to the Governor for assent, he must act on the aid and
advice of the Council of Ministers as a general rule and only in
exceptional situations which have been illustrated in paragraph 300
of this judgment, should he reserve it for the consideration of the
President. A look at Rule 48 of the Tamil Nadu Government Business
Rules, 1978 makes it clear that once a draft bill is approved by the
Minister-in-Charge, a copy of it is supplied to the Governor. Rule
48 reads thus:
“48. (1) If the tentative draft Bill is approved by the Minister
in charge, it shall be circulated to the other Ministers and
a copy supplied to the Governor and unless the Chief
Minister directs otherwise, the tentative draft Bill shall be
brought before a meeting of the Council. Proposals for any
substantial or important amendments in the draft Bill after
its approval shall also be dealt with similarly.”
309. After circulation of the bill to the Governor, any suggestions made
by the Governor may be looked into and incorporated. Thereafter,
a final copy of the bill as approved by the Law Department is also
circulated to the Governor. Rule 51(b) which provides for it reads thus:
“b) The originating Department shall also prepare a notice
of motion to introduce a Bill and shall, after obtaining the
signature of the Minister in charge, forward the notice to
the Secretary to the Chamber of the Legislature to which
it is proposed to introduce the Bill. The department will
be in charge of the Bill in all its subsequent stages. The
originating department, shall while giving notice of motion to
the Assembly or Council Department submit a copy of the
Bill as finalised by the Law Department to the Governor.”
310. As our discussion on the Constituent Assembly debates also reveals,
the option of withholding of assent, was believed by the framers,
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

would be invoked in very rare circumstances where the Council of
Ministers discover some error in the legislation or desire to incorporate
certain changes to it so as to meet with the popular opinion outside
the House. The framers did not expect that the Governor would,
as a matter of routine, declare the withholding of assent to bills
casually. The deletion of the expression “in his discretion” from the
first proviso is also an unmistakable indication of the intent of the
framers in vesting no discretion in the Governor as regards the
withholding of assent and returning of the bill along with suggestions
for the introduction of amendments.
311. B.K. Pavitra (supra) made a reference to paragraph 375 of the
decision in Nabam Rebia (supra) to support the idea that the
Governor is entrusted with discretion in the exercise of his powers
under Article 200. However, it is pertinent to note that in the said
paragraph, the Court observed that “The Governor is expected to
function in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (and
the history behind the enactment of its provisions)”. The history
behind the enactment of Article 200 is loud and clear and speaks
for itself as regards the intention of the framers of the Constitution,
as we have discussed in detail.
312. What also needs to be remembered is that whenever a provision
of the Constitution prescribes for the assent of the President for the
purpose of enforceability or securing immunity, any State government
would, in all likelihood, advice the Governor to reserve the bill for the
consideration of the President. Even the Tamil Nadu Government
Business Rules, 1978 prescribe the procedure for pre-consultation
with the Central government whenever a subject-matter falling in
the Concurrent list or certain other constitutional provision, is being
legislated upon. As we have also discussed, the position settled by
Kaiser-I-Hind (supra) is that the reference to the President needs to
be detailed and specific so as to enable him to undertake an effective
“consideration” of the reserved bill. In the practical working of a Cabinet
form of government, it is the Council of Ministers who would be best
equipped to make such detailed references to the President, and the
Governor would act as the bridge connecting the two. It is only in rare
cases, where in spite of the evident requirement for the President’s
assent in order to make the bill effective as an Act (as observed in
paragraph 86 of Hoecsht (supra)), the Council of Ministers has failed
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to advice the Governor to reserve the bill for the President, should the
Governor decide to reserve the bill on his own motion.
313. Reference must also be made at this point to the observation made
by this Court in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhari (supra) wherein it
was observed thus:
“19. The Governor is, however, made a component part
of the legislature of a State under Article 168, because
every Bill passed by the State legislature has to be
reserved for the assent under Article 200. Under that
article, the Governor can adopt one of the three courses,
namely (i) he may give his assent to it, in which case the
Bill becomes a law; or (ii) he may, except in the case of
a “Money Bill”, withhold his assent therefrom, in which
case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated
in the first proviso is followed i.e. return the Bill to the
Assembly for reconsideration with a message, or (iii) he
may (subject to Ministerial advice) reserve the Bill for
the consideration of the President, in which case the
President will adopt the procedure laid down in Article
201. The first proviso to Article 200 deals with a situation
where the Governor is bound to give his assent when the
Bill is reconsidered and passed by the Assembly. The
second proviso to that article makes the reservation for
consideration of the President obligatory where the Bill
would, “if it becomes law”, derogate from the powers of
the High Court. Thus, it is clear that a Bill passed by a
State Assembly may become law if the Governor gives his
assent to it, or if, having been reserved by the Governor
for the consideration of the President, it is assented to
by the President. The Governor is, therefore, one of the
three components of a State legislature. The only other
legislative function of the Governor is that of promulgating
Ordinances under Article 213(1) when both the Houses
of the State legislature or the Legislative Assembly,
where the legislature is unicameral, are not in session.
The Ordinance-making power of the Governor is similar
to that of the President, and it is co-extensive with the
legislative powers of the State legislature.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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314. As discussed earlier, D.D. Basu has also taken a similar view in his
commentary on the Constitution of India30. The position prevailing in
a number of international jurisdictions as discussed in the preceding
parts of this judgment, also lends credence to this view.
315. The deletion of the expression “in his discretion” both from the
substantive part of Article 200 as well as from the first proviso to
it signifies that the intention of the framers of the Constitution was
to ensure that the ordinary exercise of the Governor’s function
under Article 200 was to be in accordance with the aid and advice
tendered to him by the Council of Ministers. The view expressed by
Shri. Brajeshwar Prasad that the Governor should be conferred with
some veto to negate an unsound legislation was expressly rejected
by the Constituent Assembly. Further, it was explained by Mr. T.T.
Krishnamachari that the first proviso was in the form of a saving
clause where the Council of Ministers could ask the Governor to
hold up a bill in which certain errors were discovered subsequent
to its passage in the House(s), or to suitably respond to the popular
sentiment expressed after such passage. Pertinently, during the
course of the debates, it was observed by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar that
in a responsible form of government, there can be no room for the
Governor to act in his discretion.
316. The deletion of the words “in his discretion” from Section 75 of the GoI
Act, 1935 before adapting it as Article 200 of the Constitution must
be understood in the right context. The GoI Act, 1919 introduced an
element of provincial autonomy in the administration of the country,
however, the Governor remained at the center of administration
having reserve as well as emergency powers. With the advent of
the GoI Act, 1935, the dyarchy at the provincial level was abolished,
but the Governor, as the agent of the British Crown, continued to
have the discretion to veto any legislation passed by the provincial
legislature. The Governor could also in his discretion reserve any
bill for the consideration of the Governor-General. This power of
the Governor was to be essentially exercised in accordance with
the directions of the Governor-General. However, with the dawn
of independence, and the framing of the Constitution, the model of
governance which was adopted allowed the States to be supreme in

30 5, Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India 6318 (LexisNexis 2009).
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their respective fields, with certain powers having been reserved for
the Union to ensure the integrity of the nation and uniformity of policy
in certain key areas. The Governor was no more required to have an
all-pervasive control over the State and their responsibility towards
the Union was to the extent of ensuring that the administration in the
State was being done in conformity with the principles enshrined in
the Constitution. It is in this context that the power of the Governor
to submit a report to the President under Article 356 and also the
power under Article 200 to reserve a bill for the consideration of the
President, is to be understood.
317. The Governor under the constitutional scheme is no longer envisaged
as the Governor under the GoI Act, 1935, having the ultimate power
to veto any legislation and subvert the collective will of the people
being expressed through the legislature. If the power to withhold
assent to bills or to reserve them for the consideration of the
President is construed as falling within the exclusive discretionary
domain of the Governor, who would be free to decide a course of
action notwithstanding the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers,
it would have the potential of turning him into a super-constitutional
figure, having the power to bring to a complete halt, the operation
of the legislative machinery in the State. The Governor cannot be
vested with such a power, the exercise of which would enable him
to collude with the Union Cabinet and ensure the death of any and
all legislation initiated by the State merely by reserving it for the
consideration of the President, who under Article 201 is not bound
to give assent to any legislation reserved for his consideration.
318. Thus, we are of the view that the Governor does not possess any
discretion in the exercise of his functions under Article 200 and has
to mandatorily abide by the advice tendered to him by the Council
of Ministers. The only exceptions to this general rule are as follows:
a. Where the bill is of a description as provided under the second
proviso to Article 200;
b. Where the bill is of a nature covered by Articles 31A, 31C,
254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(a)(ii) etc. wherein assent of the President
is a condition precedent before the bill can take effect as law
or is necessary for the purpose of securing immunity against
the operation of some constitutional provision;
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c. Where the bill is of a nature that, if allowed to take effect, then
it would undermine the Constitution by placing the fundamental
principles of a representative democracy in peril as described
in M.P. Special Police (supra).
319. Exception (a) as mentioned above is one which is expressly
provided by the Constitution to fall within the ambit of discretionary
powers of the Governor. Exception (b) flows from a reading of those
provisions which require the mandatory assent of the President to a
bill passed by the State legislature and thus are to be construed in
light of the observations made in Nabam Rebia (supra) as instances
“where such intent emerges from a legitimate interpretation of the
provision concerned, and the same cannot be construed otherwise.”
Exception (c) has to be construed and understood in the context of
the observations made by this Court in M.P. Special Police (supra)
as covering such “situations where by reason of peril to democracy
or democratic principles, an action may be compelled which from
its nature is not amenable to Ministerial advice.”

v. Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor
in discharge of his functions under Article 200 of the
Constitution could be said to be subject to judicial review?
If yes, what are the parameters for such judicial review?
“Be your ever so high, the law is above you”
~ Thomas Fuller

320. We have extensively discussed in the preceding section that the
Governor under the scheme of Article 200 would, as a general rule,
be expected to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers
as provided for under Article 163(1). The deletion of the expression
“in his discretion” by the framers of the Constitution during the course
of adapting Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 into Article 200, is a clear
indication of their intent to make the ordinary exercise of powers of
the Governor under Article 200 subject to the aid and advice of the
Council of Ministers. However, the aforesaid ordinary exercise of
power by the Governor is subject to certain exceptions where the
Governor may act in his own discretion, contrary to the advice of
the Council of Ministers. There are two broad circumstances under
which it would be permissible for the Governor to act in his own
discretion under Article 200:
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a. Where the Governor is by or under the Constitution required to
act in his discretion. The only situation in which such exercise
of discretion has been explicitly laid down in the Constitution is
the second proviso to Article 200, that is, where, in the opinion
of the Governor, the bill, if assented to, would so derogate from
the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which
the High Court is designed to fill by the Constitution;
b. Where the Governor is by necessary implication required to
act in his own discretion. This would include:
(i) Where a bill attracts such a provision of the Constitution
which requires the mandatory assent of the President for
securing immunity or making the law enforceable. Exercise
of discretion is permissible in these cases. For instance,
Article(s) 31A, 31C, 254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(a)(ii) etc.
(ii) Situations where the exceptional conditions as described in
M.P. Special Police (supra) and Nabam Rebia (supra) are
applicable i.e., the State Council of Ministers has disabled
or disentitled itself; possibility of complete breakdown
of the rule of law or by reason of peril to democracy/
democratic principles respectively, as a consequence of
which an action may be compelled which, by its nature is
not amenable to ministerial advice.
321. The question which naturally follows is whether the exercise of
discretion by the Governor, in the exceptional situations as discussed
aforesaid, would be amenable to judicial review. The importance
of this question lies in the high constitutional importance of the
role which the Governor plays under Article 200. The Governor, by
choosing to act in his discretion under Article 200, has the power to
thwart the entire legislative machinery of the State by reserving a
bill for the consideration of the President. He also has the power to
significantly delay the grant of assent to a bill by withholding assent
and returning the same to the State legislature under the first proviso
to Article 200 of the Constitution.
322. It was contended by the petitioner that no exercise of power under
the Constitution could be said to be beyond the scope of judicial
review as every authority, howsoever high, is expected to perform its
functions within the constitutional framework. It was submitted that if
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

the exercise of powers by the Governor under Article 200 is held to
be outside the scope of judicial review, then that would render him
to be a super-constitutional figure in the State, who would be able to
override the legislature and the government elected by the people,
at his whims and fancies and without any checks and balance.
323. Refuting the contention of the petitioner, the Attorney General for India
placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Hoechst (supra),
Kaiser-I-Hind (supra), and B.K. Pavitra (supra) to argue that the
grant of assent under Articles 200 and 201 respectively has been
previously held to be non-justiciable by this Court.
324. Essentially, the questions that fall for our consideration are as follows:
(i) First, whether the discharge of functions by the Governor under
Article 200 of the Constitution, in his discretion could be said
to be immune from judicial review?
(ii) Secondly, whether the withholding of assent by the President
under Article 201 of the Constitution, could also be said to be
beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny?
(iii) Thirdly, if the aforesaid discharge of functions is subject to
judicial review, whether such discharge of functions could be
said to be non-justiciable in light of the decisions of this Court
in Hoechst (supra), Kaiser-I-Hind (supra), and B.K. Pavitra
(supra)?
325. Samsher Singh (supra) in paragraph 54 observed that “The discretion
conferred upon the Governor means that as the constitutional or
formal head of the State the power is vested in him”. We have also
discussed in detail, in the preceding sections, that the source of all
discretion for the Governor is to be found within Article 163(1) of
the Constitution alone. Thus, what falls for us to decide is whether
the exercise of this constitutional power by the Governor could
be said to be amenable to judicial review where such exercise is
assailed on the ground that it transgresses the boundaries set by
the Constitution. This Court has had the occasion of discussing the
concept of judicial review in a catena of cases. We are of the view
that for a better exposition and enlightenment on this issue, it would
be prudent and beneficial to make a reference to all these decisions.
326. In Maru Ram (supra) this Court speaking eruditely through the
inimitable Krishna Iyer, J., observed that all public power including
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constitutional powers of pardon, commutation and release under
Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution respectively, cannot run riot
or be exercisable irrationally or arbitrarily. Any action under these
provisions must be informed by the finer canons of constitutionalism.
In his words, “the rule of law, under our constitutional order, transforms
all public power into responsible, responsive, regulated exercise
informed by high purposes and geared to people’s welfare”. It held
that all the powers entrusted by the Constitution must, in its exercise,
eschew any form of arbitrariness and stem from an intelligible and
well-reasoned criterion that is predicated on an earnest purpose. It
further categorically held that – “while constitutional power is beyond
challenge, its actual exercise may still be vulnerable” – to judicial
review. In the last, Krishna Iyer, J., further cautioned that such power
ought not to be vulgarized or abused by personal vanity and the
notions of those exercising such powers. The relevant observations
read as under:
“62. An issue of deeper import demands our consideration
at this stage of the discussion. Wide as the power of pardon,
commutation and release (Articles 72 and 161) is, it cannot
run riot; for no legal power can run unruly like John Gilpin
on the horse but must keep sensibly to a steady course.
Here, we come upon the second constitutional fundamental
which underlies the submissions of counsel. It is that all
public power, including constitutional power, shall never be
exercisable arbitrarily or mala fide and, ordinarily, guidelines
for fair and equal execution are guarantors of the valid
play of power. We proceed on the basis that these axioms
are valid in our constitutional order.
63. The jurisprudence of constitutionally canalised power
as spelt out in the second proposition also did not meet
with serious resistance from the learned Solicitor-General
and, if we may say so rightly. Article 14 is an expression
of the egalitarian spirit of the Constitution and is a clear
pointer that arbitrariness is anathema under our system. It
necessarily follows that the power to pardon, grant remission
and commutation, being of the greatest moment for the
liberty of the citizen, cannot be a law unto itself but must be
informed by the finer canons of constitutionalism. [...] It is
the pride of our constitutional order that all power, whatever
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its source, must, in its exercise, anathematise arbitrariness
and obey standards and guidelines intelligible and intelligent
and integrated with the manifest purpose of the power. From
this angle even the power to pardon, commute or remit
is subject to the wholesome creed that guidelines should
govern the exercise even of presidential power.

xxx xxx xxx
65. Pardon, using this expression in the amplest
connotation, ordains fair exercise, as we have indicated
above. Political vendetta or party favouritism cannot but
be interlopers in this area. The order which is the product
of extraneous or mala fide factors will vitiate the exercise.
While constitutional power is beyond challenge, its actual
exercise may still be vulnerable. Likewise, capricious
criteria will void the exercise. For example, if the Chief
Minister of a State releases everyone in the prisons in his
State on his birthday or because a son has been born to
him, it will be an outrage on the Constitution to let such
madness survive. [...]
Push this logic a little further and the absurdity will be
obvious. No constitutional power can be vulgarised
by personal vanity of men in authority. Likewise, if an
opposition leader is sentenced, but the circumstances
cry for remission such as that he is suffering from cancer
or that his wife is terminally ill or that he has completely
reformed himself, the power of remission under Articles
72/161 may ordinarily be exercised and a refusal may be
wrong-headed. If, on the other hand, a brutal murderer,
bloodthirsty in his massacre, has been sentenced by a
court with strong observations about his bestiality, it may
be arrogant and irrelevant abuse of power to remit his
entire life sentence the very next day after the conviction
merely because he has joined the party in power or is a
close relation of a political high-up. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

327. This Court, speaking through nine-Judges in Indra Sawhney v. Union
of India reported in (1992) Supp (3) SCC 217 held that the yardstick
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of subjecting an act or a decision to judicial review is not whether
it is a legislative act or an executive decision on a policy matter but
whether it violates any constitutional guarantee or the rights under
Part III of the Constitution. The Court further held that the doctrine of
political thicket does not apply in the Indian constitutional framework.
It is not that the courts avoid entering into a political question because
of the doctrine of separation of power, but because of desirability of
avoiding entering into a political question. The relevant observations
are reproduced hereinbelow:
“557 [...] The political questions doctrine, however, does
not mean, that anything that is tinged with politics or even
that any matter that might properly fall within the domain
of the President or the Congress shall not be reviewable,
for that would end the whole constitutional function of
the court” [ Samuel Krislov : The Supreme Court in the
Political Process, p. 96]. Under our Constitution, the
yardstick is not if it is a legislative act or an executive
decision on a policy matter but whether it violates any
constitutional guarantee or has potential of constitutional
repercussions as enforcement of an assured right, under
Chapter III of the Constitution, by approaching courts is
itself a fundamental right. The “constitutional fiction” of
political question, therefore, should not be permitted to
stand in way of the court to, “deny the Nation the guidance
on basic democratic problems” [ C. Herman Pritchett :
The American Constitution, p. 154 (quoted in The Judicial
Review of Legislative Acts by Dr Chakradhar Jha, p. 355)] .
Avoidance of entering into a political question may be
desirable and may not be resorted to, “not because
of doctrine of separation of power or lack of rules but
because of expediency” [ Charles Gordon Post, pp.
129-130 : The Supreme Court Questions (quoted in ‘The
Judicial Review of Legislative Acts’ by Dr Chakradhar
Jha, p. 351)] in larger interest for public good but
legislatures, too, have, “their authority measured by the
Constitution”. Therefore absence of norms to examine
political question has rarely any place in the Indian
constitutional jurisprudence [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)
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328. Further, this Court in B.P. Singhal (supra) upon examining a catena
of decisions on the scope and evolution of the power of judicial
review of the courts observed that, although under the English Law,
the prerogative powers of the monarch such as the power to make
treaties, grant mercy or to dissolve the parliament etc. are traditionally
not subject to judicial review due to the very nature of such powers
falling outside the expertise and competence of the courts, yet such
preclusion of the power of judicial review is by no means a blanket
rule. It observed that even prerogative powers, insofar as the questions
of legality, rationality or procedural propriety are concerned, would
always be amenable to judicial review, because the safeguarding
of such considerations in the exercise of any prerogative powers is
the domain, responsibility and duty of the courts as the sentinel on
the qui vive. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in State
of Rajasthan v. Union of India reported in (1977) 3 SCC 592 it
held that the courts, as the protector and ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution, not only have the power but an obligation to determine
the power conferred on each branch of the government, the extent
and limits of such powers and whether the exercise of such power
exceeds those limits or not, irrespective of whether such powers are
the exclusive prerogative of any one branch of the government or
such questions are inherently political in complexion. The relevant
observations read as under:
“72. The traditional English view was that prerogative
powers of the Crown conferred unfettered discretion which
could not be questioned in courts. Lord Ruskill attempted
to enumerate such prerogative powers in Council of Civil
Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service [1985 AC 374 :
(1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL)] : (AC p. 418)
“[...] Prerogative powers such as those relating
to the making of treaties, the defence of the
realm, the prerogative of mercy, the grant of
honours, the dissolution of Parliament and
the appointment of ministers as well as others
are not, I think, susceptible to judicial review
because their nature and subject-matter are
such as not to be amenable to the judicial
process. The courts are not the place wherein to
determine whether a treaty should be concluded
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or the armed forces disposed in a particular
manner or Parliament dissolved on one date
rather than another.”
However, the contemporary English view is that in principle
even such “political questions” and exercise of prerogative
power will be subject to judicial review on principles of
legality, rationality or procedural impropriety. [See decision
of House of Lords in: R. (Bancoult) v. Secy. of State for
Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [(2009) 1 AC
453 (HL)] .] In fact, De Smith’s Judicial Review (6th Edn.
2007, p. 15) states:
“Judicial review has developed to the point
where it is possible to say that no power—
whether statutory or under the prerogative—is
any longer inherently unreviewable. Courts are
charged with the responsibility of adjudicating
upon the manner of the exercise of public power,
its scope and its substance. As we shall see,
even when discretionary powers are engaged,
they are not immune from judicial review.”
73. In State of Rajasthan v. Union of India [(1977) 3 SCC
592] , this Court (Bhagwati, J. as he then was) held: (SCC
pp. 660-62, para 149)
“149. … But merely because a question has a
political complexion, that by itself is no ground
why the Court should shrink from performing its
duty under the Constitution if it raises an issue
of constitutional determination. … the Court
cannot fold its hands in despair and declare
‘Judicial hands off’. So long as a question arises
whether an authority under the Constitution
has acted within the limits of its power or
exceeded it, it can certainly be decided by
the Court. Indeed it would be its constitutional
obligation to do so. … This Court is the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution and to this Court
is assigned the delicate task of determining
what is the power conferred on each branch
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

of Government, whether it is limited, and if so,
what are the limits and whether any action of
that branch transgresses such limits. It is for
this Court to uphold the constitutional values
and to enforce the constitutional limitations.
That is the essence of the rule of law. … Where
there is manifestly unauthorised exercise of
power under the Constitution, it is the duty of
the Court to intervene. Let it not be forgotten,
that to this Court as much as to other branches
of Government, is committed the conservation
and furtherance of democratic values. The
Court’s task is to identify those values in the
constitutional plan and to work them into life in
the cases that reach the Court. … The Court
cannot and should not shirk this responsibility,
[...]”
In the said decision, Chandrachud, J. (as he then was)
observed thus: (SCC p. 645, para 132)
“132. [...] They may not choose to disclose them
but if they do, as they have done now, they
cannot prevent a judicial scrutiny thereof for the
limited purpose of seeing whether the reasons
bear any rational nexus with the action proposed.
I am inclined to the opinion that the Government
cannot claim the credit at the people’s bar
for fairness in disclosing the reasons for the
proposed action and at the same time deny to
this Court the limited power of finding whether
the reasons bear the necessary nexus or are
wholly extraneous to the proposed action. The
argument that ‘if the Minister need not give
reasons, what does it matter if he gives bad
ones’ overlooks that bad reasons can destroy
a possible nexus and may vitiate the order on
the ground of mala fides.”
329. Furthermore, B.P. Singhal (supra) categorically held that unlike
England, all powers that have been conferred upon the President and
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the Governor by the Constitution are not a matter of prerogative but a
constitutional responsibility and its exercise, a matter of performance
of an official duty of the highest sanctity, and thus, unquestionably
amenable to judicial review. It observed that the sufficiency of the
attending facts and circumstances necessitating the exercise of such
powers is to be decided by the President or the Governor. However,
the question of whether such exercise is predicated upon all relevant
cogent materials and falls within the limitations of the constitutional
scheme and is not a result of an arbitrary or malafide exercise, would
be subject to the judicial review of the courts. Placing reliance on
Maru Ram (supra) it held that the exercise of such powers by the
President only carries with it a notional presumption of a careful
and proper exercise based on objective considerations, but, by no
stretch of imagination can it be construed to confer an immunity
from judicial review. It further explained, in the context of Article 72
of the Constitution, the standard of judicial review that the courts
are expected to apply when scrutinizing the exercise of such power
by the President. It held that where reasons have been given for
the exercise of such power, there the courts may interfere only if
the reasons are based on irrelevant or extraneous considerations.
However, where no reasons have been given, there the courts may
interfere only if the exercise is vitiated by a flawed understanding of
the ambit of such power by misjudgment or is otherwise arbitrary,
discriminatory or malafide. The relevant observations read as under: -
“76. This Court has examined in several cases, the scope
of judicial review with reference to another prerogative
power—power of the President/Governor to grant pardon,
etc. and to suspend, remit or commute sentences. The
view of this Court is that the power to pardon is a part
of the constitutional scheme, and not an act of grace
as in England. It is a constitutional responsibility to be
exercised in accordance with the discretion contemplated
by the context. It is not a matter of privilege but a matter
of performance of official duty. All public power including
constitutional power, shall never be exercisable arbitrarily
or mala fide. While the President or the Governor may be
the sole judge of the sufficiency of facts and the propriety
of granting pardons and reprieves, the power being an
enumerated power in the Constitution, its limitations must
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

be found in the Constitution itself. The Courts exercise
a limited power of judicial review to ensure that the
President considers all relevant materials before coming
to his decision. As the exercise of such power is of the
widest amplitude, whenever such power is exercised, it is
presumed that the President acted properly and carefully
after an objective consideration of all aspects of the
matter. Where reasons are given, the Court may interfere
if the reasons are found to be irrelevant. However, when
reasons are not given, the Court may interfere only where
the exercise of power is vitiated by self-denial on wrong
appreciation of the full amplitude of the power under
Article 72 or where the decision is arbitrary, discriminatory
or mala fide (vide Maru Ram v. Union of India [(1981) 1
SCC 107 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 112] , Kehar Singh v. Union
of India [(1989) 1 SCC 204 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 86] , etc.).”
(Emphasis supplied)

330. In Keisham (supra), this Court had held that a Speaker acting under
the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution would be duty bound to decide
the disqualification petitions made before him within a reasonable
time and that any failure in exercising this jurisdiction conferred upon
him or reluctancy in acting in a time-bound manner would be a fit
ground for the courts to engage in an exercise of judicial review of
his actions, irrespective of the fact that it is the Speaker who has
the prerogative to adjudicate such petitions. It held that even where
the jurisdiction of the courts to embark upon an examination on the
merits of such prerogative powers has been ousted, the same does
not curtail or inhibit the power of judicial review over the manner of
exercise or non-exercise of such prerogative powers.
331. Similarly, in A.G. Perarivalan (supra), this Court reiterated that any
inexplicable or inexcusable non-exercise of a prerogative or sovereign
power would be amenable to judicial review and that the manner of
exercise of such powers by the Governor could not be said to be
impervious to judicial scrutiny.
332. From the above exposition of law, it becomes clear as a noon day,
that no exercise of power under the Constitution is beyond the pale
of judicial review. Thus, we find no reason to exclude the discharge
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of functions by the Governor or the President under Articles 200 and
201 of the Constitution respectively.
333. It could be argued that the decision taken by the Governor under Article
200 would be shielded from the scrutiny of the courts by virtue of the
immunity accorded under Article 361 of the Constitution. However,
in this regard, we may only refer to the observations made by this
Court in Rameshwar Prasad (supra) which leaves no doubt that the
immunity enshrined in Article 361 of the Constitution does not preclude
or prohibit the courts in any manner from looking into the actions of
the Governor which by necessary implication would include his actions
under Article 200 as well. The relevant observations are as follows:
“173. A plain reading of the aforesaid article shows that
there is a complete bar to the impleading and issue of notice
to the President or the Governor inasmuch as they are not
answerable to any court for the exercise and performance
of their powers and duties. Most of the actions are taken
on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The
personal immunity from answerability provided in Article
361 does not bar the challenge that may be made to their
actions. Under law, such actions including those actions
where the challenge may be based on the allegations of
mala fides are required to be defended by the Union of
India or the State, as the case may be. Even in cases
where personal mala fides are alleged and established,
it would not be open to the Governments to urge that
the same cannot be satisfactorily answered because of
the immunity granted. In such an eventuality, it is for the
respondent defending the action to satisfy the Court either
on the basis of the material on record or even filing the
affidavit of the person against whom such allegation of
personal mala fides are made [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

334. The High Court of Madras in S. Ramakrishnan v. State of Tamil
Nadu reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 5207 was in seisin of a
similar issue involving a bill passed by the State Legislative Assembly
which remained pending for two months before the Governor for grant
of assent. When the High Court posed a question as regards the
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inaction on the part of the Governor, the Advocate General referred
to Article 361 of the Constitution. The Court interpreted Article 361
in light of Article 200 and observed that the protection granted to the
Governor under the Constitution was to perform his constitutional
duties expeditiously. It also underscored the obligation of the courts
to perform their constitutional duties and subjecting unconstitutional
actions to judicial scrutiny in public interest. The relevant observations
are as follows:
“6. A perusal of Article 200 - Assent to Bills, would reveal
that the Constitutional Authority has to take a decision,
if a Bill is presented for Assent, as soon as possible.
The protection has been given by the Framers of the
Constitution, with hope and trust in the Appointees that
they would perform their constitutional functioning promptly
and there would not be any situation, wherein they would
be called for to give explanation or they will be questioned
by the Court of law.
7. When situation changes and present kind of situation
arises, a different approach has to be taken by the Courts
in the interest of the Public. It is well settled law that
“Extraordinary situation requires extraordinary remedies”.
When public interest requires, this Court has to do its
constitutional duties and to address the situation. However,
this Court is of the opinion that such a situation would not
arise to pass any order in this matter.”
(Emphasis supplied)

335. Thus, what is discernible from above is that the discharge of functions
by the President or the Governor as constitutional and formal heads
is undoubtedly subject to judicial review by virtue of it being an
exercise of their constitutional powers. However, could it at the same
time be said that nevertheless it would be improper for the courts
to examine such actions of the President or the Governor as the
actions are essentially political in nature and hence non-justiciable for
the reason that no judicial standard can be evolved for the scrutiny
of such actions. In this regard, we may make reference to certain
decisions rendered by this Court as well as few landmark decisions
of other international jurisdictions.
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336. In Minerva Mills v. Union of India reported in (1980) 3 SCC 625, this
Court held that the jurisdiction of courts is not ousted merely because
a question has a political colour. Every constitutional question,
irrespective of the political complexion or make thereof, falls within the
jurisdiction of the courts. The Court held that whether the legislature
or the executive has acted within the limits of its authority or not, is
for the courts to decide. The relevant observations are as follows:
“98. It is axiomatic that if a question brought before the court
is purely a political question not involving determination
of any legal or constitutional right or obligation, the court
would not entertain it, since the court is concerned only
with adjudication of legal rights and liabilities. But merely
because a question has a political complexion, that by
itself is no ground why the court should shrink from
performing its duty under the Constitution, if it raises an
issue of constitutional determination. There are a large
number of decisions in the United States where the
Supreme Court has entertained actions having a political
complexion because they raised constitutional issues:
vide Gomellion v. Lightfoot [364 US 339 (1960) : 5 L Ed
2d 110] and Baker v. Carr [369 US 186 (1962) : 7 L Ed
2d 663]. The controversy before the court may be political
in character, but so long as it involves determination of a
constitutional question, the court cannot decline to entertain
it. This is also the view taken by Gupta, J., and myself in
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India [(1977) 3 SCC 592 :
AIR 1977 SC 1361]. I pointed out in my judgment in that
case and I still stand by it, that merely because a question
has a political colour, the court cannot fold its hands in
despair and declare “judicial hands off”. So long as the
question is whether an authority under the Constitution
has acted within the limits of its power or exceeded it, it
can certainly be decided by the court. Indeed it would be
its constitutional obligation to do so. I have said before,
I repeat again that the Constitution is suprema lex, the
paramount law of the land, and there is no department or
branch of government above or beyond it. Every organ of
government, be it the executive or the legislature or the
judiciary, derives its authority from the Constitution and it
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has to act within the limits of its authority and whether it
has done so or not is for the court to decide. The court is
the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and when there
is manifestly unauthorised exercise of power under the
Constitution, it is the duty of the court to intervene. Let it
not be forgotten, that to this Court as much as to other
branches of government, is committed the conservation
and furtherance of constitutional values. The court’s task
is to identify those values in the constitutional plan and to
work them into life in the cases that reach the court [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

337. The nine-Judge Bench decision of this Court in S.R. Bommai (supra)
observed that the concept of justiciability is not synonymous with
judicial review. It noted that even while exercising the power of
judicial review, courts can decline to exercise such power as being
non-justiciable. It categorically observed that though judicial review
may be avoided on questions of political nature, yet legal questions
camouflaged with a political cloak will be justiciable. The relevant
observations have been reproduced hereinbelow:
“201. Judicial review must be distinguished from
justiciability. The two concepts are not synonymous.
The power of judicial review goes to the authority of the
court, though in exercising the power of judicial review,
the court in an appropriate case may decline to exercise
the power as being not justiciable. The Constitution is
both the source of power as well as it limits the power of
an authority, ex necissitate. Judiciary has to decide the
source, extent, limitations of the power and legitimacy in
some cases of the authority exercising the power. There
are no hard and fast fixed rules as to justiciability of a
controversy [...]

xxx xxx xxx
258. Justiciability is not a legal concept with a fixed
content, nor is it susceptible of scientific verification. Its
use is the result of many pressures or variegated reasons.
Justiciability may be looked at from the point of view of
common sense limitation. Judicial review may be avoided
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on questions of purely political nature, though pure legal
questions camouflaged by the political questions are always
justiciable. The courts must have judicially manageable
standards to decide a particular controversy. Justiciability
on a subjective satisfaction conferred in the widest terms
to the political coordinate executive branch created by the
constitutional scheme itself is one of the considerations to
be kept in view in exercising judicial review [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

338. This Court in A.K. Kaul v. Union of India reported in (1995) 4
SCC 73 also elucidated the distinction between judicial review and
justiciability. It observed that, in a written Constitution, the bounds
within which the various organs of the State are delineated, the
same implicitly casts a duty upon the courts to test the validity of
every action of such constitutional organ, through judicial review,
to ensure that such exercise of power is within the confines of the
Constitution. It thus, held that the power of judicial review of the
courts would be available in respect of exercise of all powers by any
authority under the Constitution unless expressly excluded. It further
held that, although judicial review is the norm, yet the unavailability
of judicially manageable standards in certain aspects of the power,
whose exercise is in question, may render the judicial review of such
exercise of power non-justiciable. It explained that justiciability refers
to the question whether a particular field could be said to fall within
the purview of the power of judicial review. The relevant observations
are as follows:
“12. It is, therefore, necessary to deal with this question
in the instant case. We may, in this context, point out that
a distinction has to be made between judicial review and
justiciability of a particular action. In a written constitution
the powers of the various organs of the State are limited
by the provisions of the Constitution. The extent of those
limitations on the powers has to be determined on an
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
Since the task of interpreting the provisions of the
Constitution is entrusted to the Judiciary, it is vested with
the power to test the validity of an action of every authority
functioning under the Constitution on the touchstone of the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1201

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

Constitution in order to ensure that the authority exercising
the power conferred by the Constitution does not transgress
the limitations placed by the Constitution on exercise of that
power. This power of judicial review is, therefore, implicit
in a written constitution and unless expressly excluded
by a provision of the Constitution, the power of judicial
review is available in respect of exercise of powers under
any of the provisions of the Constitution. Justiciability
relates to a particular field falling within the purview of the
power of judicial review. On account of want of judicially
manageable standards, there may be matters which are
not susceptible to the judicial process. Such matters are
regarded as non-justiciable. In other words, during the
course of exercise of the power of judicial review it may
be found that there are certain aspects of the exercise of
that power which are not susceptible to judicial process
on account of want of judicially manageable standards
and are, therefore, not justiciable.”
(Emphasis supplied)

339. This Court in Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P. reported in (2006)
8 SCC 161, speaking in the context of Articles 72 and 161 of the
Constitution respectively, observed that the determining factor in
deciding whether a sovereign or prerogative power would be subject to
judicial review is the subject-matter of such power and not its source.
It held that the exercise of every prerogative power is subject to the
rule of law and the rule of law cannot be made subservient to political
expediency. The Court defined that ‘manageable standards’ refer to
certain discernible standards expected in a functioning democracy. It
also held that exercise of any prerogative power cannot be placed in a
straitjacket formula and manageable standards would vary depending
on the nature of the power. The relevant observations are as follows:
“66. Granting of pardon is in no sense an overturning of a
judgment of conviction, but rather it is an executive action
that mitigates or sets aside the punishment for a crime. It
eliminates the effect of conviction without addressing the
defendant’s guilt or innocence. The controlling factor in
determining whether the exercise of prerogative power is
subject to judicial review is not its source but its subject-
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matter. It can no longer be said that prerogative power
is ipso facto immune from judicial review. An undue exercise
of this power is to be deplored. Considerations of religion,
caste or political loyalty are irrelevant and fraught with
discrimination. These are prohibited grounds. The Rule of
Law is the basis for evaluation of all decisions. The supreme
quality of the Rule of Law is fairness and legal certainty.
The principle of legality occupies a central plan in the Rule
of Law. Every prerogative has to be subject to the Rule of
Law. That rule cannot be compromised on the grounds of
political expediency. To go by such considerations would
be subversive of the fundamental principles of the Rule of
Law and it would amount to setting a dangerous precedent.
The Rule of Law principle comprises a requirement of
“Government according to law”. The ethos of “Government
according to law” requires the prerogative to be exercised
in a manner which is consistent with the basic principle of
fairness and certainty. Therefore, the power of executive
clemency is not only for the benefit of the convict, but while
exercising such a power the President or the Governor,
as the case may be, has to keep in mind the effect of
his decision on the family of the victims, the society as a
whole and the precedent it sets for the future.”

xxx xxx xxx
69. In conclusion, it may be stated that, there is a clear
symmetry between the constitutional rationale for review of
statutory and prerogative power. In each case, the courts
have to ensure that the authority is used in a manner which
is consistent with the Rule of Law, which is the fundamental
principle of good administration. In each case, the Rule of
Law should be the overarching constitutional justification for
judicial review. The exercise of prerogative power cannot be
placed in straitjacket formula and the perceptions regarding
the extent and amplitude of this power are bound to vary.
However, when the impugned decision does not indicate
any data or manageable standards, the decision amounts
to derogation of an important constitutional principle of
Rule of Law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1203

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

340. In Regina (Miller) v. Prime Minister (Lord Advocate and others
intervening) reported in [2019] 3 WLR 589, the Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom was dealing with the justiciability of the power
of prorogation. It was held that, although the courts cannot decide
political questions, yet, the fact that a dispute arises from a matter
of political controversy would not restrain the courts completely from
looking into it, in exercise of judicial review. It further noted that
almost all decisions by the executive have a political hue to them,
yet, the courts in the past have exercised a supervisory jurisdiction.
The Court held that a threat to parliamentary sovereignty constitutes
as a significant ground for justiciability of prerogative powers.
341. In the seminal decision of Baker v. Carr, reported in 1962 SCC
OnLine US SC 40, the Supreme Court of the United States of
America examined whether questions of legislative apportionment
were essentially political questions and hence, not justiciable. The
Court in this case laid down six heavily overlapping indicia of a non-
justiciable matter. These were as follows: (i) a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to another political branch;
or (ii) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it, or (iii) a need to make an initial policy determination
clearly for non-judicial discretion, or (iv) the impossibility of a decision
by the court without expressing lack of respect due to co-ordinate
branches of Government; or (v) an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or (vi) the potentiality
for embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. It was emphatically held that, save
the aforesaid considerations, no other issue is liable for dismissal
on ground of a lack of justiciability.
342. Before proceeding further, we deem it appropriate to refer to all the
aforesaid decisions of this Court where the justiciability of assent has
been discussed. The first in line is the Constitution Bench decision in
Kameshwar Singh (supra) where M.C. Mahajan, J., (as his lordship
then was), in the context of Article 31A of the Constitution, observed
that the assent of the President, once given to a bill reserved for
his consideration, is non-justiciable. The relevant observations are
as follows:
“266. [...] The provisions of Article 31(2) therefore, do not
stand repealed by Article 31-A. On the other hand, they are
kept alive. The difference is that persons whose properties
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fall within the definition of the expression “estate” in Article
31-A are deprived of their remedy under Article 32 of
the Constitution and the President has been constituted
the sole judge of deciding whether a State law acquiring
estates under compulsory power has or has not complied
with the provisions of Article 31(2). The validity of the law
in those cases depends on the subjective opinion of the
President and is not justiciable. Once the assent is given,
the law is taken to have complied with the provisions of
Article 31(2).”
(Emphasis supplied)

343. The aforesaid observations would indicate that the grant of assent
by the President to a State legislation falling under Article 31A was
held to be non-justiciable only on the ground that the first proviso
to Article 31A confers the power on the President to take a decision
as regards whether assent is to be granted or not.
344. The next decision where the justiciability of assent was discussed is
the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Hoechst (supra) wherein,
inter alia, one of the grounds of challenge to the legislation under
consideration was that since the subject matter of the bill fell
under List II of the Seventh Schedule, there was no occasion for
the Governor to have reserved the bill for the consideration of the
President. It is on this ground that the subsequent grant of assent
by the President was called into question. Negativing the contention,
the Court observed thus:
“86. There is no provision in the Constitution which lays
down that a Bill which has been assented to by the President
would be ineffective as an Act if there was no compelling
necessity for the Governor to reserve it for the assent of
the President. A Bill which attracts Article 254(2) or Article
304(b) where it is introduced or moved in the Legislative
Assembly of a State without the previous sanction of the
President or which attracted Article 31(3) as it was then
in force, or falling under the second proviso to Article 200
has necessarily to be reserved for the consideration of the
President. There may also be a Bill passed by the State
Legislature where there may be a genuine doubt about
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1205

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

the applicability of any of the provisions of the Constitution
which require the assent of the President to be given to
it in order that it may be effective as an Act. In such a
case, it is for the Governor to exercise his discretion and
to decide whether he should assent to the Bill or should
reserve it for consideration of the President to avoid any
future complication. Even if it ultimately turns out that there
was no necessity for the Governor to have reserved a Bill
for the consideration of the President, still he having done
so and obtained the assent of the President, the Act so
passed cannot be held to be unconstitutional on the ground
of want of proper assent. This aspect of the matter, as the
law now stands, is not open to scrutiny by the courts. In the
instant case, the Finance Bill which ultimately became the
Act in question was a consolidating Act relating to different
subjects and perhaps the Governor felt that it was necessary
to reserve it for the assent of the President. We have no
hesitation in holding that the assent of the President is not
justiciable, and we cannot spell out any infirmity arising out
of his decision to give such assent.”
(Emphasis supplied)

345. It is important to note that the aforesaid observations were made
by this Court in response to the argument that the grant of assent
by the President, in a case where it was not necessary for the
Governor to reserve the bill for the consideration of the President,
would vitiate the assent given by the President. On the contrary,
the case at hand involves a totally different factual situation wherein
the State Government is aggrieved by the reservation of bills by the
Governor in exercise of his discretion and not in accordance with
the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The further grievance
of the petitioner is that such reservation of bills by the Governor
is not guided by constitutional principles but is impelled by lack of
bonafides and political reasons. The applicability of the ratio laid
down in the aforesaid decisions of Kameshwar Singh (supra) and
Hoechst (supra) and also the other decisions of this Court as regards
the questions of justiciability and judicial review, would have to be
decided keeping in mind the peculiar facts of the case at hand which
we have been called upon to deal with.
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346. The decision in Hoechst (supra) was referred to in the decision of
this Court in Bharat Sevashram Sangh v. State of Gujarat reported
in (1986) 4 SCC 51 wherein one of the challenges to the validity
of the legislation was that the bill had received conditional assent
from the President, and such partial or conditional assent not being
permissible under the Constitution, was thus erroneous in law. While
the Court referred to the observations made in Hoechst (supra), it
also looked into the materials on record and arrived at a conclusion
that there was no infirmity in the grant of assent by the President.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the decision of the Court was based
on the non-justiciability of assent alone as the Court arrived at the
finding after the actual satisfaction on the validity of assent upon
a perusal of the relevant materials. The relevant observations are
reproduced below:
“6. The contention relating to the alleged invalidity of the
assent given by the President is formulated by the learned
counsel for the petitioners/appellants thus. The Bill was
passed by the legislature of the State on February 15,
1973 and it was immediately thereafter forwarded to the
Governor for his assent. The Governor reserved the Bill for
the consideration of the President under Article 200 of the
Constitution and the subsequent events according to the
learned counsel showed that the President did not either
give his assent or withhold his assent as contemplated
under Article 201 of the Constitution but he gave a qualified
or conditional assent which was not contemplated under
Article 201 of the Constitution. It is argued that since the
President did not give absolute assent but only a qualified
or conditional assent the Bill in question had not become
a law. In reply to these averments in the petitions the
Under Secretary to the Government of Gujarat, Education
Department has stated in his counter-affidavit that the
Bill was presented to the Governor of Gujarat after it
was passed by the Assembly. The Governor of Gujarat
reserved the Bill for the consideration of the President
under Article 200 of the Constitution since he felt that
in view of clause 33 of the Bill which provided for taking
over of the management of a school for a limited period
in public interest it was necessary to reserve the Bill
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1207

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

for the consideration of the President. Accordingly the
Bill was referred to the President. At the meeting held
in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India on
August 3, 1973 to discuss the Bill it was suggested by
the representatives of the Central Government that the
provisions of the Bill which did not exclude institutions
established or administered by the minorities from their
scope were repugnant to Article 30 of the Constitution
and therefore the Bill should be suitably amended. It
was also suggested to the representatives of the State
Government that it would be better to carry out the
requisite amendments by promulgating an ordinance.
Accordingly the draft of the ordinance which was ultimately
promulgated as Ordinance 6 of 1973 was forwarded for
the instructions of the President under Article 213(1) of
the Constitution. Thereafter the draft of the Ordinance
and the Bill were both considered by the President and
he assented to the said Bill and issued instructions as
required by the proviso to Article 213 of the Constitution
for the promulgation of the said Ordinance on September
28, 1973. Accordingly the said Bill became law on its
publication on the very same day. The Ordinance was
issued on September 29, 1973. In the circumstances it
cannot be said that the assent which was given by the
President was conditional. The records relating to the
above proceedings were also made available to the court.
On going through the material placed before us we are
satisfied that the President had given assent to the Act
and it is not correct to say that it was a qualified assent.
The Act which was duly published in the official Gazette
contains the recital that the said Act had received the
assent of the President on September 28, 1973. Moreover
questions relating to the fact whether assent is given by
the Governor or the President cannot be agitated also in
this manner. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

347. Hoechst (supra) was also referred to and relied upon by this Court
in B.K. Pavitra (supra) wherein it was observed that owing to the
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sovereign nature of the power of the Governor to reserve a bill for
the consideration of the President under Article 200, it would not be
possible for this Court to reflect upon the situations in which such
a power of reference may be exercised by the Governor. It was
further observed by the Court that the decision in Hoechst (supra)
has excluded the exercise of this power from the scope of judicial
scrutiny. The relevant observations read as under: -
“71. [...] The eventuality which is specified in Article 254(2)
does not exhaust the ambit of the power entrusted to
the Governor under Article 200 to reserve a Bill for the
consideration of the President. Apart from a repugnancy
in matters falling in the Concurrent List between State
and Parliamentary legislation, a Governor may have
sound constitutional reasons to reserve a Bill for the
consideration of the President. Article 200, in its second
proviso mandates that a Bill which derogates from the
powers of the High Court must be reserved for the
consideration of the President. Apart from Bills which fall
within the description set out in the second proviso, the
Governor may legitimately refer a Bill for consideration of
the President upon entertaining a legitimate doubt about
the validity of the law. By its very nature, it would not be
possible for this Court to reflect upon the situations in which
the power under Article 200 can be exercised. This was
noticed in the judgment of this Court in Hoechst [Hoechst
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45 :
1983 SCC (Tax) 248] [...]
72. Hoechst [Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of
Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 248] is an
authority for the proposition that the assent of the President
is non-justiciable. Hoechst [Hoechst Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45 : 1983 SCC
(Tax) 248] also lays down that even if, as it turns out, it
was not necessary for the Governor to reserve a Bill for
the consideration of the President, yet if it was reserved
for and received the assent of the President, the law as
enacted cannot be regarded as unconstitutional for want
of “proper” assent.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1209

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

73. The above decisions essentially answer the submissions
which were urged by Dr Dhavan. The law as propounded in
the line of precedents adverted to above must negate the
submissions which were urged on behalf of the petitioners.
Once the Bill (which led to the Reservation Act, 2018)
was reserved by the Governor for the consideration of
the President, it was for the President to either grant or
withhold assent to the Bill. The President having assented
to the Bill, the requirements of Article 201 were fulfilled. The
validity of the assent by the President is non-justiciable. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

348. We find it difficult to express our agreement with the view taken in
B.K. Pavitra (supra) that the exercise of power to reserve a bill for
the consideration of the President by the Governor is beyond the
pale of judicial scrutiny, even in cases where it is exercised in his
own discretion and against the aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers. We have discussed in the previous sections of this judgment
that the Governor under Article 200 is ordinarily expected to act in
accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and
it is only in certain very exceptional situations that he should resort
to the exercise of discretion. Further, the limits of such discretion are
to be derived from Article 163(1). The exercise of such discretion
by the Governor, if excluded from judicial scrutiny, would militate
against the fundamental constitutional principle that exercise of
all power must be within the confines of the Constitution. Absolute
exclusion of judicial scrutiny would also confer upon the Governor
an absolute power to disregard the will of the people expressed
through the State legislature and government. While it is true that
there may be situations in which the exercise of discretion by the
Governor under Article 200 would be permissible, this does not imply
that this Court would be precluded from determining the legality and
propriety of the exercise of such discretion in a given case. In fact, it
is owing to the impossibility of the task of exhaustively charting out
such situations wherein discretion would be allowed to be exercised,
that it becomes all the more crucial for the power of judicial review
to exist with the courts. This would keep in line any bonafide action
on the part of the Governor which is disguised under the garb of
legitimate exercise of discretion.
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349. The two-fold observations in B.K. Pavitra (supra) vesting the
Governor with unfettered discretion to reserve bills for the
consideration of the President under Article 200, and at the same
time excluding such exercise of discretion from judicial scrutiny
essentially has the effect of safeguarding the actions of the Governor
in a lead casket which cannot be permeated even in cases of
breach of the constitutional framework within which the Governor
is expected to function.
350. The Constitution Bench in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra) had the occasion
to consider in detail whether the assent of the President sought with
regard to a State law would be limited only to the repugnancy of the
laws to which the attention of the President was drawn to whilst seeking
his assent or would such assent be qua all other laws enacted by the
Parliament to which the State law in question may also be repugnant to.
In other words, whether the assent granted by the President to a State
legislation would be deemed to be an assent qua all earlier enactments
made by the Parliament on the subject. This Court whilst answering
the aforesaid question in the negative, held that the “consideration”
by the President and his “assent” under Article 254(2) is limited to the
proposal made by the State government and, the State legislation would
prevail only qua the laws for which repugnancy was pointed out and
the “assent” of the President was sought for. The Court, inter alia, held
that the words “reserved for consideration” indicate the requirement
of an active application of mind by the President to the repugnancy
pointed out between the proposed State law and the earlier law made
by the Parliament and the necessity of having such a law in the State,
keeping in mind the peculiar facts, the attending circumstances and
the backdrop in which such law was made by the State government.
Similarly, the word “consideration” indicates the requirement of careful
thinking and due application of mind regarding the necessity of having
a State law which is repugnant to the law(s) made by the Parliament.
Lastly, the term “assent” implies an expressed agreement of mind to
what is proposed by the State i.e., knowledge of the President as to
the repugnancy between the State law and the earlier law(s) made
by Parliament on the same subject-matter, as well as agreement to
the reason and attending circumstances, regarding the necessity of
having such State law.
351. As regards justiciability, it was held by the Court that the examination
of the records to ascertain the extent to which assent was sought for,
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1211

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

would not amount to deciding whether assent was rightly or wrongly
given. Thus, it could not be said that the Court was determining
the validity of the assent granted by the President. The relevant
observations made by M.B., Shah J.,, speaking for the majority, are
reproduced below:
“25. In our view, for finding out whether the assent was
given qua the repugnancy between the State legislation and
the earlier law made by Parliament, there is no question of
deciding validity of such assent nor the assent is subjected
to any judicial review. That is to say, merely looking at
the record, for which assent was sought, would not mean
that the Court is deciding whether the assent is rightly,
wrongly or erroneously granted. The consideration by the
Court is limited to the extent that whether the State has
sought assent qua particular earlier law or laws made by
Parliament prevailing in the State or it has sought general
assent. In such case, the Court is not required to decide
the validity of the “assent” granted by the President. In
the present case, the assent was given after considering
the extent and nature of repugnancy between the Bombay
Rent Act and the Transfer of Property Act as well as the
Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. Therefore, it would be
totally unjustified to hold that once the assent is granted
by the President, the State law would prevail qua earlier
other law enacted by Parliament for which no assent was
sought for nor which was reserved for the consideration
of the President.

xxx xxx xxx
29. We further make it clear that granting of assent under
Article 254(2) is not exercise of legislative power of the
President such as contemplated under Article 123 but
is part of the legislative procedure. Whether procedure
prescribed by the Constitution before enacting the law is
followed or not can always be looked into by the Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)

352. Doraiswamy Raju, J., in a concurring opinion, laid strong emphasis
on the requirement that a reference to the President for the purpose
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of Article 254(2) must be precise and specific as regards the extent
of protection sought for the State legislation. He observed that
keeping in mind the serious implications of the grant of assent of the
President to a repugnant State law, the making of such reference to
the President cannot be exercised in a routine manner. He further
observed that the non-justiciability of the assent of the President
would not preclude the constitutional courts from examining the
sufficiency and justifiability of the predominance sought for the State
legislation over the Central legislation. The relevant observations
are reproduced below:
“72. [...] The exception engrafted in clause (2) to enable
the State law to prevail in that State, the legislature of
which has enacted it, notwithstanding its repugnancy, as
above, as long as both the laws deal with a concurrent
subject, will enure to its benefit, “if it has been reserved
for the consideration of the President and has received
his assent”, under the said provision of the Constitution
of India. Thus, the sweep of mandate and serious nature
of the result flowing from the assent renders, in my view,
the very exercise of power by the President and the
attendant formalities whereof, as of great significance and
vitally important, and not a mere routine or mechanical
exercise. Despite such assent having been obtained,
power of Parliament to enact, at any time, any law with
respect to the same matter including a law adding to,
amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the
legislature of the State, with the assent envisaged under
clause (2) of Article 254 has also been conserved and
preserved in the proviso to the said clause. In substance,
Parliament has undisputed power to undo the effect
or consequences flowing from the Presidential assent
obtained under clause (2), by enacting a subsequent law
creating once more a “repugnancy” and thereby override
or repeal impliedly, to the extent of such repugnancy,
the State law.
73. The assent of the President envisaged under Article
254(2) is neither an idle or empty formality, nor an automatic
event, necessitated or to be given for the mere asking,
in whatever form or manner and whether specific, vague,
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1213

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

general or indefinite — in the terms sought for to claim that
once sought and obtained as well as published, a curtain
or veil is drawn, to preclude any probe or contention for
consideration that what was sought and obtained was
not really what should and ought to have been, to claim
the protection envisaged under clause (2) in respect of
a particular State law vis-à-vis or with reference to any
particular or specified law on the same subject made by
Parliament or an existing law, in force. The repugnancy
envisaged under clause (1) or enabled under clause (2)
to get excepted from under the protective coverage of the
assent obtained from the President, is such that there is a
legislation or legislative provision(s), covering and operating
on the same field or identical subject-matter made by both
the Union and the State, both of them being competent to
enact in respect of the same subject-matter or legislative
field, but the legislation by Parliament has come to occupy
the entire field. Necessarily, in the quasi-federal structure
adopted for the nation, predominance is given to the law
made by Parliament and in such circumstances only the
State law which secured the assent of the President under
clause (2) of Article 254 comes to be protected, subject of
course to the powers of Parliament under the proviso to the
said clause. Therefore, the President has to be apprised of
the reasons at least as to why his assent is being sought,
the need or necessity and the justification or otherwise
for claiming predominance for the State law concerned.
This itself would postulate an obligation, inherent in the
scheme underlying as well as the very purpose and object
of seeking the assent under clause (2) of Article 254, to
enumerate or specify and illustrate the particular Central
law or provision with reference to which the predominance
is desired. The absence of any standardized or stipulated
form in which it is to be sought for, should not detract the
State concerned, to disown its obligation to be precise and
specific in the extent of protection sought having regard to
the serious consequences which thereby inevitably follow
i.e. the substitution of the Union law in force by the State
law, in the territorial limits of the State concerned, with
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drastic alteration or change in the rights of citizen, which
it may, thereby bring about.
74. The mere forwarding of a copy of the Bill may
obviate, if at all, only the need to refer to each one of the
provisions therein in detail in the requisition sent or the
letter forwarding it, but not obliterate the necessity to point
out specifically the particular Central law or provisions
with reference to which, the predominance is claimed or
purported to be claimed. The deliberate use of the word
“consideration” in clause (2) of Article 254, in my view, not
only connotes that there should be an active application
of mind, but also postulates a deliberate and careful
thought process before taking a decision to accord or not
to accord the assent sought for. If the object of referring
the State law for consideration is to have the repugnancy
resolved by securing predominance to the State law, the
President has to necessarily consider the nature and
extent of repugnancy, the feasibility, practicalities and
desirabilities involved therein, though may not be obliged
to write a judgment in the same manner, the courts of
law do, before arriving at a conclusion to grant or refuse
to grant or even grant partially, if the repugnancy is
with reference to more than one law in force made by
Parliament. Protection cannot be claimed for the State
law, when questioned before courts, taking cover under
the assent, merely asserting that it was in general form,
irrespective of the actual fact whether the State claimed
for such protection against a specific law or the attention
of the President was invited to at least an apprehended
repugnancy vis-à-vis the particular Central law. In the
teeth of innumerable Central laws enacted and in force
on concurrent subjects enumerated in List III of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and the hoard of
provisions contained therein, artificial assumptions based
on some supposed knowledge of all those provisions and
the presumed regularity of official acts, cannot be blown
out of proportion, to do away with an essential exercise,
to make the “assent” meaningful, as if they are empty
formalities, except at the risk of rendering Article 254
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1215

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

itself a dead letter or merely otiose. The significant and
serious alteration in or modification of the rights of parties,
both individuals or institutions resulting from the “assent”
cannot be overlooked or lightly brushed aside as of no
significance, whatsoever. In a federal structure, peculiar
to the one adopted by our Constitution it would become
necessary for the President to be apprised of the reason as
to why and for what special reason or object and purpose,
predominance for the State law over the Central law is
sought, deviating from the law in force made by Parliament
for the entire country, including that part of the State.
When this Court observed in Gram Panchayat of Village
Jamalpur v. Malwinder Singh [(1985) 3 SCC 661] that
when the assent of the President is sought for a specific
purpose the efficacy of the assent would be limited to that
purpose and cannot be extended beyond it, and that if
the assent is sought and given in general terms so as to
be effective for all purposes different considerations may
legitimately arise, it cannot legitimately be contended that
this Court had also declared that reservation of the State
law can also be by mere reference to Article 254(2) alone
with no further disclosures to be made or that with mere
forwarding of the Bill, no other information or detail was
either a permissible or legalized and approved course to
be adopted or that such course was held to be sufficient,
by this Court, to serve the purpose of the said article. The
expression “general terms” needs to be understood, in my
view, a reference to a particular law as a whole in contrast
to any one particular or individual in the said law and not
that, it can be even without any reference whatsoever.
The further observation therein, (SCC p. 669, para 12)
“not only was the President not apprised in the
instant case that his assent was sought because
of the repugnancy between the State Act and
the pre-existing Central Act on the vesting of
evacuee properties but, his assent was sought
for a different, specific purpose altogether”,
would belie any such claim. Per contra, it would only
reinforce the principle that the consideration as well as
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the decision to accord consent should be a conscious
one, after due application of mind, relevant and necessary
for the purpose. Though, submission of a thesis on the
various aspects of repugnancy involved may not be the
requirement, the reservation for “consideration” would
necessarily obligate an invitation of the attention of the
President as to which of the pre-existing Central enactments
or which provisions of those enactments are considered
or apprehended to be repugnant, with reference to which
the assent envisaged in Article 254(2) is sought for. This
becomes all the more necessary also for the reason that
the repugnancy in respect of which predominance is sought
to be secured must be shown to exist or apprehended, on
the date of the State law and not in a vacuum to cure any
and every possible repugnancy in respect of all laws —
irrespective of whether it was in the contemplation or not
of the seeker of the assent or of the President at the time
of “consideration” for according assent.
75. This Court has, no doubt, held that the assent accorded
by the President is not justiciable, and courts cannot spell
out any infirmity in the decision arrived at, to give the
assent. Similarly, when the President was found to have
accorded assent and the same was duly published, it
cannot be contended that the assent was not really that of
the President, as claimed. It is also not given to anyone to
challenge the decision of the President according assent,
on merits and as to its legality, propriety or desirability. But
that is not the same thing as approving an attempt to draw
a blanket or veil so as to preclude an examination by this
Court or the High Court as to the justifiability and sufficiency
or otherwise of the protection or predominance claimed
for the State law over the law made by Parliament or the
existing law, based upon the assent accorded, resulting at
times in substantial alteration, change or modification in the
rights and obligations of citizen, including the fundamental
rights. When the Constitution extends a form of protection
to a repugnant State law, permitting predominance and
also to hold the field in the place of the law made by the
Centre, conditioned upon the reservation of the State law
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1217

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

for consideration of the President and obtaining his assent,
it is to be necessarily viewed as an essential prerequisite to
be effectively and meticulously fulfilled before ever availing
of the protection and the same cannot be viewed merely
as a ceremonial ritual. If such a vitally essential procedure
and safeguard is to be merely viewed as a routine formality
which can be observed in whatever manner desired by
those concerned and that it would be merely enough, if
the assent has been secured howsoever obtained, it would
amount to belittling its very importance in the context of
distribution of legislative powers and the absolute necessity
to preserve the supremacy of Parliament to enact a law on
a concurrent topic in List III, for the entire country. It would
also amount to acceptance of even a farce of compliance
to be actual or real compliance. Such a course could not
be adopted by courts except by doing violence to the
language, as well as the scheme, and the very object
underlying Article 254(2).
76. Different provisions of the Constitution envisage the
grant of assent by the President as well as the Governor of
a State. Article 111 provides for the assent of the President
to a Bill passed by the Houses of Parliament, in the same
manner in which Article 200 empowers the Governor of a
State in respect of a Bill passed by the Legislative Assembly
or by the Houses of the legislature where there is a
Legislative Council in addition to the Assembly. Parliament
for the Union consists of the President and two Houses as
the legislature of States consists of the Governor and the
House or Houses, as the case may be (vide Articles 79
and 168). The policy-making executive power of the Union
also vests with the President, as the executive power of
the State vests with the Governor, and those powers have
to be exercised with the aid and advice of the Council
of Ministers, for the Union headed by the Prime Minister
and for the State to be headed by the Chief Minister. The
President or the Governor, as the case may be, as and
when a Bill after having been passed is presented, may
accord assent or as soon as possible thereafter return the
Bill to the Houses with a message requesting to reconsider
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the Bill or any provisions thereof, including the introduction
of any amendment as recommended in his message and if
thereafter the Houses on reconsideration of the Bill, pass
the Bill again with or without amendment and present the
same for the assent, the President/Governor, as the case
may be, shall not withhold his assent. Being an exercise
pertaining to expression of political will, apparently, the will
of the people expressed through the legislation passed
by their elected representatives is given prominence
by specifically providing for a compulsory consent or
assent. The same could not be said with reference to
the “assent” of the President envisaged under Articles
31-A, 31-C, 254(2) and 304(b) of the Constitution. In my
view, the “assent” envisaged in these articles by the very
nature and character of the powers conferred constitute
a distinct class and category of their own, different from
the normal “assent” envisaged under Articles 111 of the
President or Article 200 of the Governor. Article 201 also
would indicate that even when for the second time the
Houses of the State Legislature pass the Bill and present
for “consideration”, there is no compulsion for the President
to accord assent. Therefore, the reservation of any Bill/Act
for the “consideration” of the President for according his
assent, keeping in view, also the avowed object envisaged
under Article 254(2), renders it qualitatively different from
the ordinary assent to be given by the President to a Bill
passed by Parliament or that of the Governor to a Bill
passed by the legislature(s) of the State concerned.
77. The assent of the President or the Governor, as the
case may be, is considered to be part of the legislative
process only for the limited purpose that the legislative
process is incomplete without them for enacting a law
and in the absence of the assent the Bill passed could
not be considered to be an Act or a piece of legislation,
effective and enforceable and not to extend the immunity
in respect of procedural formalities to be observed inside
the respective Houses and certification by the presiding
officer concerned of their due compliance, to areas or
acts outside and besides those formalities. The powers
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1219

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

actually exercised by the President, at any rate under
Articles 31-A, 31-C, 254(2) and 304(b) are a special
constituent power vested with the Head of the Union, as
the protector and defender of the Constitution and safety
valve to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens and
federal structure of the country’s polity as adopted in the
Constitution. A genuine, real and effective consideration
would depend upon specific and sufficient information
being provided to him inviting, at any rate, his attention
to the Central law with which the State law is considered
or apprehended to be repugnant, and in the absence of
any effort or exercise shown to have been undertaken,
when questioned before courts, the State law cannot
be permitted or allowed to have predominance or an
overriding effect over that Central enactment of Parliament
to which no specific reference of the President at all has
been invited to. This, in my view, is a must and an essential
requirement to be satisfied; in the absence of which the
“consideration” claimed would be one in a vacuum and
really oblivious to the hoard of legislations falling under
the Concurrent List in force in the country and enacted
by Parliament. To uphold as valid the claim for any such
blanket assent or all-round predominance over any and
every such law — whether brought to the notice of the
President or not, would amount to legitimization of what
was not even in the contemplation or consideration on
the basis of some assumed “consideration”. In order to
find out the real state of affairs as to whether the “assent”
in a given case was after a due and proper application
of mind and effective “consideration” as envisaged by
the Constitution, this Court as well as the High Court
exercising powers of judicial review are entitled to call for
the relevant records and look into the same. This the courts
have been doing, as and when considered necessary,
all along. No exception therefore could be taken to the
High Court in this case adopting such a procedure, in
discharge of its obligations and exercise of jurisdiction
under the Constitution of India.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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353. It is pertinent to note that it was observed by Doraiswamy, J., that
the assent of the President under Article 254(2) is not of the same
nature as the assent of the President or the Governor under Article
111 and 200 of the Constitution respectively. He placed strong
emphasis on the use of the expression “consideration” in Article
254(2) to hold that such a consideration by the President would be
meaningless in the absence of a clear and specific reference made
to him pointing out the repugnancy between the Central law and the
proposed State law.
354. While the observations made in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra) as regards
the import of the expression “consideration” were in the context
of Article 254(2), the same would apply to every bill reserved
for the consideration of the President under Article 201 as the
expression “consideration” finds a mention in Article 201 as well.
Thus, the reservation for the consideration of the President must
be accompanied by a reference which contains specific details as
regards the purpose why the consideration of the President is sought.
355. The reason why this Court in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra) insisted that the
requirement of delineating the reasons necessitating the reservation
of a bill by the Governor rests upon the State government is because
it is the State through its Council of Ministers who are objectively
better equipped in doing so, by virtue of the fact that the genesis of
such bills is normally spearheaded by the Council of Ministers. Their
close involvement in the deliberations that culminated into the bill,
their crucial role as part of the members of the house of legislature
and them being reposed with the responsibility of overall governance
and well-being of the State, provides them the necessary expertise
to assign robust reasons in making a reference. The State Council
of Ministers being uniquely positioned to understand the legislative
requirements of the State, the policy imperatives prevailing therein,
and the socio-economic conditions demanding redressal, can better
voice the reasons that ought to accompany such a reference which
the Governor otherwise may not be capable of reasonably and
comprehensively ascertaining if not for the aid and advice of the
council of ministers.
356. It is in this background that we are of the view that the Governor
would be duty bound to give careful deference to the aid and advice
of the State Council of Ministers and only in the limited of exceptional
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1221

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

circumstances may he deviate from such advice tendered to him,
subject to the reference being in tune with the aforesaid principles
enunciated in the preceding paragraphs.
357. We have given some thought to the observations made in the
aforesaid decisions as regards the non-justiciability of the assent of
the President. As per the settled principles of parliamentary democracy
across the world, the grant of assent to legislations is construed as
a power of the head of state which is to be exercised only upon the
aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. As per Articles 74(2) and
163(3) of the Constitution respectively, the question whether any, and
if so what, advice was tendered by the Ministers to the President or
the Governor, shall not be inquired into by any court. A perusal of
Articles 111, 200 and 201 respectively makes it clear that no reasons
are required to be provided by the President or the Governor for
according assent to bills. However, if the President or the Governor
exercise the option of withholding of assent under Article 111 or
200 respectively, then there is a requirement to communicate the
reasons for such withholding in the form of a message to the House
or Houses of the legislature. Similarly, as has been discussed with
great emphasis in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra), if there is any reservation
of Bills for the consideration of the President by the Governor, then
the same must be reflected by way of a specific and clear reference
providing details as to why the reservation has been made so as
to enable the President to “consider” the desirability of according
assent to the bill so reserved.
358. The grant of assent to a bill is an exercise which generally takes
place on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and assenting
to the bill is the only practically possible course of action available
to the constitutional heads in most of the common law jurisdictions.
The grant of assent may not be justiciable because, there exists an
unavailability of any material upon which the courts may be able to
undertake a judicial scrutiny. However, the same would not be the
case as regards the withholding of assent or reservation of the bill
for the consideration of the President, which can only be exercised
upon furnishing of detailed reasons for the same.
359. The majority opinion of the Court in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra) held that
the legislative procedure to be followed before the enactment of a
legislation would always be amenable to judicial review and thus
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it would be open to the Courts to examine the reference which is
made by the State government to the President seeking his assent.
Applying the same logic, it could be said that the reservation of bills
by the Governor for the consideration of the President is also part
of legislative procedure and thus the Courts would not be precluded
from examining such reference to determine its legality and its
constitutional veracity.
360. In the Canadian decision in Galati (supra) the grant of royal assent
to a bill was held as non-justiciable on the ground of separation of
powers, the grant of assent having been characterised as a legislative
act. However, it must be kept in mind that the characterisation of
the grant of assent as a legislative act was in the context of the well
settled constitutional convention of a responsible government that
assent must be granted in accordance with the advice of the Prime
Minister. Further, as we have discussed in the preceding paragraphs,
it is not the source of power, but the contents thereof which determine
the scope of judicial review under the Constitution.
361. On the contrary, Anne Twomey writes that in cases where a
Constitution is prescriptive, and a constitutional breach is involved,
a court is more likely to hold the breach to be a justiciable issue,
even if it relates to the grant of assent to a bill. She refers to the
opinion of Millhouse, J. in Re Constitutional Reference No 1 of
2008 reported in [2009] 1 LRC 453, which held that where a country
has a written Constitution, the courts always have the jurisdiction
to remedy breaches of the Constitution. The said decision was also
accepted by the Court of Appeal of Vanuatu in Republic of Vanuatu
v Carcasses reported in [2010] 2 LRC 264 which held that while a
court will not otherwise inquire into or adjudicate upon issues arising
in Parliament, it would be empowered to interpret and determine
whether there has been a breach of a constitutional right.
362. As described in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra), the role of the President
under Article 201 is a sui-generis one, tailor made to fit the quasi-
federal constitutional scheme. The role of the Governor in reserving
bills for the consideration of the President is also intrinsically linked
with this constituent role of the President. It was also observed
that the grant of assent is considered a legislative act only for the
limited purpose that without it a bill cannot become law and also for
extending immunity to certain formalities to be followed within the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1223

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

legislature. This immunity does not extend to other aspects of the legal
procedure which fall beyond the ambit of these limited formalities.
Thus, compliance with the prescribed legislative procedure leading
up to assent is open to judicial scrutiny in appropriate cases. Further,
as we have discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the reservation
of bills for the consideration of the President by the Governor is
warranted only in certain limited situations.
363. The observations in the aforesaid decisions as regards the non-
justiciability of the assent of the President under Article 201 cannot
be construed to mean that the withholding of assent and reservation
of bills by the Governor under Article 200, as well as withholding of
assent by the President under Article 201 are beyond the scope of
judicial review. The observations of non-justiciability of assent of the
President under Article 201 can be explained in light of the assent
under Article 201 being predominantly a matter of federal policy of
the Union government. On certain subject matters prescribed in
various provisions of the Constitution, and on subject matters falling
in the Concurrent List, the Constitution has accorded primacy to the
Centre over the States. On issues of repugnancy, for illustration,
it is only on the approval of the President, that a State law which
is repugnant to a Central legislation can become enforceable. No
obligation is placed on the President to grant assent under Article 201
and it is to be decided by the President on the aid and advice of the
Union Council for Ministers. It is in view of this position and for the
limited extent of judicially manageable standards of evaluation that
the assent under Article 201 has been described as non-justiciable.
364. However, the same is not the case when the courts have to consider
the withholding of assent or reservation of bills by the Governor under
Article 200. Our discussion on the scope of discretion available to
the Governor makes it clear that the Governor exercises discretion
in a very limited domain when discharging his functions under
Article 200. He may reserve the bills for the consideration of the
President only for achieving certain predetermined purposes and
his personal views, disliking for the policy, or the views of the Union
government are not grounds on which he may reserve a bill under
Article 200. The nature of constitutional function prescribed for the
Governor under Article 200 being such, the exercise of such function
can be subjected to judicial review on the standard of being within
constitutional bounds. Reserving a bill for the consideration of the
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President is a part of the legislative procedure and must invariably
be subjected to judicial review in cases where the constitutionally
prescribed procedure is not complied with, or misused.
365. The discharge of functions by the President under Article 201 stands
on a different footing than that of the Governor under Article 200.
While there is no political hue to the limited discretion conferred
upon the Governor under Article 200, and any exercise of such
discretion has to be solely on constitutional grounds, the grant of
assent under Article 201 has an element of political hue by virtue
of the fact that the President under Article 201 has been given the
prerogative to decide whether the grant of assent in certain cases
would be desirable or not. However, at the same time, what must
be remembered is that it is only in those areas where the primacy
has been given to the Union would this political consideration be
permissible. Additionally, this political hue is not owing to the difference
in opinion or political views of the governments at the Centre and
the State but is attributable to the desirability of vesting the Union
government to exercise certain discretion in matters pertaining to
broader issues where uniformity in national policy may be desirable.
In such a case, the scope of justiciability under Article 201 would be
limited to questions of arbitrariness, malafides and inaction.
366. As a logical sequitur of the above, any exercise of Article 201 in a
manner which does not align with this fundamental object underlying
Article 201 would be liable to a greater degree of judicial scrutiny.
Thus, wherever a bill which falls within the exclusive domain of the
State legislature is being referred to the President for his consideration
on the ground that it attracts one of the exceptional situations where
the Governor may exercise his discretion as mentioned in paragraph
300 of this judgment, it would not be open to the President to withhold
assent without ascribing reasons as regards the doubt raised by
the Governor to such a bill. In such a case, the ideal course for the
President would be to obtain legal opinion as regards the bill, in
appropriate cases, by making reference to this Court under Article
143, and only thereafter declare the grant or withholding of assent.
Where the grounds of withholding of assent are not concerned
with policy areas in which the Union has primacy, the courts would
have a greater degree of judicial scrutiny. We say this because on
questions of legality, it is the constitutional courts which have been
conferred with the power of arriving at a final decision and the object
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1225

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

of Article 201 is not to thwart the legislative procedure of the States
by withholding of assent even in areas falling within the exclusive
domain of the States on grounds of legality.
367. We summarise our findings on the judicial review of the exercise
of power by the Governor under Article 200 and by the President
under Article 201 of the Constitution as follows:
a. Where the Governor reserves a bill for the consideration of the
President in his own discretion and contrary to the aid and advice
tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers, it shall be
open to the State Government to assail such an action before
the appropriate High Court or this Court. Such a challenge can
broadly be made on the following grounds:
(i) Where the reservation is on the ground that the bill is of
a description falling under the Second Proviso to Article
200 of the Constitution, it may be assailed on the ground
that the bill or any provision thereof does not so derogate
from the powers of the High Court so as to endanger the
position which that court is designed by the Constitution to
fill. The Governor while reserving a bill on this count shall
be expected to provide clear reasons and also point to the
specific provision(s) of the bill which, in his opinion, attract
the Second Proviso. This question being purely of a legal
nature would be completely justiciable and the competent
court would be, after a proper adjudication, fully authorized to
approve or disapprove of such reservation by the Governor.
If such a challenge finds favour with the competent court,
then, subject to any other considerations, it would be a fit
case for the issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus
to the Governor for appropriate action. If, however, the
challenge should fail then the mechanism envisaged under
Article 201 of the Constitution will spring into action.
(ii) Where the reservation is on account of the bill attracting
any provision of the Constitution wherein the assent of the
President is a condition precedent for the proper enactment
and enforceability of such a bill as a law (such as under
Article 364A2) or for the purpose of securing any immunity
(such as under Article 31A) or overcoming any repugnancy
that may exist qua a Central Legislation (under Article
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254(2)), then the Governor is expected to make a specific
and clear reference to the President properly indicating
the reasons for such reservation and inviting his attention
as described in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra). Such a reservation
can be assailed by the State Government, if the reference
made by the Governor either fails to indicate the reasons
for such reservation as discussed above or that the
reasons indicated are wholly irrelevant, mala-fide, arbitrary,
unnecessary or motivated by extraneous considerations.
Then such a reservation would be liable to be set aside.
This question being purely of a legal nature would be
completely justiciable and the competent court would be
after a proper adjudication fully authorized to approve or
disapprove of such reservation by the Governor. If such
a challenge finds favour with the competent court, then,
subject to any other considerations, it would be fit case
for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the
Governor for appropriate action. If however, the challenge
should fail then the mechanism envisaged under Article
201 of the Constitution will spring into action.
(iii) Where the reservation of a bill by the Governor for the
consideration of the President is on the grounds of peril to
democracy or democratic principles or on other exceptional
grounds as mentioned in M.P. Special Police (supra)
and Nabam Rebia (supra) then the Governor would be
expected to make a specific and clear reference to the
President properly indicating the reasons for entertaining
such a belief by pinpointing the specific provisions in
this regard and the consequent effect that may ensue
if such a bill were to be allowed to become a law. The
Governor while making such a reference should also
indicate his subjective satisfaction as to why the aforesaid
consequences that may ensue cannot be possibly curtailed
or contained by taking recourse to the constitutional courts
of the country. It shall be open to the State Government
to challenge such a reservation on the ground of failure
on part of the Governor to furnish the necessary reasons
as discussed aforesaid or that the reasons indicated are
wholly irrelevant, mala-fide, arbitrary, unnecessary or
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1227

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

motivated by extraneous considerations. This being a
question completely capable of being determined by the
constitutional courts, would be fully justiciable.
(iv) Reservation of a bill on grounds other than the ones
mentioned above, such as personal dissatisfaction of the
Governor, political expediency or any other extraneous or
irrelevant considerations is strictly impermissible by the
Constitution and would be liable to be set-aside forthwith
on that ground alone. This will also encompass reservation
of a bill by the Governor after having already exercised
the option of withholding of assent in terms of Article 200
except in such exceptional circumstance as mentioned in
paragraph 204 of this judgment.
(v) Where the Governor exhibits inaction in making a decision
when a bill is presented to him for assent under Article
200 and such inaction exceeds the time-limit as has been
prescribed by us in paragraph 250 of this judgment then
it shall be open to the State Government to seek a writ of
mandamus from a competent court against the Governor
directing expeditious decision on the concerned bill as is
the mandate of the Constitution, however, it is clarified that
the Governor may successfully resist such a challenge
on providing sufficient explanation for the delay caused.
b. Where the Governor reserves a bill for the consideration of the
President and the President in turn withholds assent thereto
then, it shall be open to the State Government to assail such
an action before this Court. Such a challenge can broadly be
made on the following grounds:
(i) Where a State bill has been reserved by the Governor
for the consideration of the President on the ground that
assent of the President is required for the purpose of
making the bill enforceable or securing some immunity
therefor, then in such cases the withholding of assent by
the President would be justiciable to the limited extent
of exercise of such power in an arbitrary or malafide
manner. Owing to the political nature of the assent of the
President in these categories of bills, the courts would
impose a self-restraint.
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(ii) Where a State bill has been reserved by the Governor, in
his discretion, for the consideration of the President on the
ground that the bill appears to be patently unconstitutional
for placing the principles of representative democracy in
peril, the withholding of assent by the President would,
in ordinary circumstances, involve purely legal and
constitutional questions and therefore be justiciable without
any impediments imposed by the doctrine of political thicket.
In such cases, it would be prudent for the President to obtain
the advisory opinion of this Court by way of a reference
under Article 143 and act in accordance with the same to
dispel any apprehensions of bias, arbitrariness or mala fides.
(iii) Where the President exhibits inaction in making a decision
when a bill is presented to him for assent under Article
201 and such inaction exceeds the time-limit as has been
prescribed by us in paragraph 391 of this judgment then
it shall be open to the State Government to seek a writ
of mandamus from this Court.
368. We summarise our findings on the judicial review of the exercise of
power by the President under Article 201in withholding assent to a
bill as follows:
a. Where the bill which is under consideration is pertaining to a
provision of the Constitution where primacy has been given to the
Union government in taking a decision keeping in consideration
the desirability of having certain uniform standards of national
policy, then the limited grounds of judicial review would be
based on arbitrariness, malafides, etc.
b. Where the bill which is under consideration pertains to a
subject matter or domain within which State legislature has
been accorded primacy, and the reservation of the bill is by the
Governor contrary to the aid and advice of the State Council of
Ministers, then in exercise of judicial review the courts would
be competent to look into the reasons for withholding of assent
and whether they are legally tenable or not, besides the grounds
of malafides and arbitrariness, etc.
369. We clarify that the possible situations illustrated by above are not
meant to be exhaustive and in the specific facts of a given case,
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1229

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

the courts may evolve new standards of judicial scrutiny to ensure
that the constitutionally prescribed procedure is adhered to in letter
and spirit.

vi. What is the manner in which the President under Article
201 of the Constitution is required to act once a Bill has
been reserved for his consideration by the Governor under
Article 200 of the Constitution?
370. As we have discussed, Article 200 provides three courses of action to
the Governor when a bill is presented to him - to assent, to withhold
assent or to reserve the bill for the consideration of the President.
If he declares assent, then the bill becomes an Act of the State
legislature. If he withholds assent, then the procedure prescribed
under the first proviso springs into motion. However, the procedure
which is to be followed once a bill is reserved for the consideration
of the President is provided in Article 201 of the Constitution. Article
201 was adopted without any debate in the Constituent Assembly
on 01st August, 1949. It reads as follows:
“201. Bills reserved for consideration.
When a Bill is reserved by a Governor for the consideration
of the President, the President shall declare either that he
assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom:
Provided that, where the Bill is not a Money Bill, the
President may direct the Governor to return the Bill to
the House or, as the case may be, the Houses of the
Legislature of the State together with such a message
as is mentioned in the first proviso to article 200 and,
when a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall
reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months
from the date of receipt of such message and, if it is
again passed by the House or Houses with or without
amendment, it shall be presented again to the President
for his consideration.”
371. A plain reading of Article 201 indicates that once a bill is reserved
by the Governor for the consideration of the President, the President
has two options to choose from - he may either assent to the bill,
which would bring the legislative process to a conclusion and
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the bill would become an act, or he may withhold his assent to
the bill.
372. The proviso to Article 201 provides that in case of bills other than
money bills, the President may direct the Governor to return the bill
to the State legislature together with a message as is mentioned in
the first proviso to Article 200. Once the bill is so returned, the State
legislature is required to reconsider the bill in light of the suggestions
of the President within a period of six months and if the Bill is passed
again, with or without amendments, it shall be presented again to
the President for his consideration.
373. There are some features of Article 201 which are markedly different
from Articles 111 and 200. The proviso to Article 111 as well as the
first proviso to Article 200 mandate the President and the Governor
respectively to assent to a bill which has been reconsidered by the
Parliament and State legislature respectively and presented to them
for the second time. However, the proviso to Article 201 does not
place any such obligation on the President to mandatorily accord
assent to a bill which is placed before him after reconsideration by the
State legislature. This is evident from the absence of the expression
“shall not withhold assent therefrom” in the proviso to Article 201.
This is also brought out from the difference between the language
employed in Articles 111 and 200 vis-a-vis that employed in Article
201. The first proviso to Article 111 uses the expression “and if the
Bill is passed again by the Houses with or without amendment and
presented to the President for assent”. Similarly, the first proviso to
Article 200 also uses the expression “and if the Bill is passed again
by the House or Houses with or without amendment and presented
to the Governor for assent”. However, the proviso to Article 201
uses the expression “and, if it is again passed by the House or
Houses with or without amendment, it shall be presented again to
the President for his consideration”. Instead of the expression
“for assent”, the proviso to Article 201 uses the expression “for his
consideration” thereby indicating that the President is not bound
to accord assent to a bill even when it is presented to him for the
second time. In other words, the object behind presentation of the
bill for the second time after reconsideration under Articles 111 and
200 respectively is to obtain assent, whereas under Article 201,
the object of the presentation is to yet again present the bill for the
consideration of the President.
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

374. Further, the proviso to Article 201 places an obligation on the State
legislature to reconsider the bill in accordance with the suggestions of
the President within a period of six months from the date of receipt of
the message containing the suggestions. There is no similar obligation
on the Parliament or the State legislature to reconsider the bill within
a stipulated time period under Articles 111 and 200 respectively. This
absence of this six-month time period under Articles 111 and 200
respectively could also be seen as an indication of the primacy which
is accorded to the Parliament and State Legislature as regards the
bill which is presented for assent under the said provisions. They
may choose to repass the Bill after taking into account the message
which has been sent without being bound by the rigours of a time-
limit. This is because it is they who ultimately decide whether the bill
would see the light of day or not, as far as Articles 111 or 200 are
concerned. As discussed by us in the preceding paragraphs, under
Articles 111 and 200 respectively, the bill would only “fall through”
if the Parliament or the State Legislature chooses or elects not to
repass the concerned bill after it has been returned to them and the
trust of expediency has been reposed on the constitutional head
of the country and State, being the President and the Governor
respectively. However, under Article 201, the prescription of the
time-limit of six months for the State legislature to reconsider the
bill returned to them, is indicative of the fact that the requirement to
act expediently is also placed on the State legislature.
375. Any symptoms of lethargy exhibited by the State legislature which
is the recipient of a bill sent after the procedure under Article 201
is adopted, is viewed strictly by the Constitution. Here, inaction
by the State legislature or delayed action by them in terms of
repassing of the bill would cause the bill to “fall through” instead.
The consequences of the failure to act promptly and in a punctual
manner is more grave and severe for the State legislature under
Article 201 since the premise is that the occasion for the reservation
of a bill for the consideration of the President by the Governor may
arise where a constitutional provision makes the assent of the
President a condition precedent to a State legislation becoming
enforceable or for the purpose of conferring some immunity upon
the State legislation. Such a requirement can be found in Articles
31A, 31C, 254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(a)(ii) etc. The second proviso
to Article 200 also makes reservation for the consideration of the
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President mandatory. As we have also discussed, there may be
certain other legitimate situations where the Governor may, in
exercise of his discretion, reserve a bill for the consideration of the
President. The matters attracting the aforesaid provisions require the
procedure in Article 201 to be initiated since they pertain to areas
wherein the Centre could be said to have precedence or an edge
over the State governments. This is because the considerations
herein involve questions pertaining to the larger economic policy
of the Union, safeguarding the fundamental rights of citizens and
maintaining the integrity of the country as a whole. For example,
the uniformity of policy across States for matters falling under the
Concurrent List would be a valid arena wherein the interest of the
Union might need to be paid heed to in comparison with those
of the States. Hence, a higher degree of the power of scrutiny of
the President would be implicit in such matters and he, having
consulted the Union Council of Ministers, could be said to have
the final say which has the effect of overriding those wishes of the
State legislature.
376. The special object fulfilled by Article 201 and the important position
it occupies in maintaining the quasi-federal structure of the country
has been explained in detail by this Court in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra)
as follows:
“76. [...] The same could not be said with reference to
the “assent” of the President envisaged under Articles
31-A, 31-C, 254(2) and 304(b) of the Constitution. In my
view, the “assent” envisaged in these articles by the very
nature and character of the powers conferred constitute
a distinct class and category of their own, different from
the normal “assent” envisaged under Articles 111 of the
President or Article 200 of the Governor. Article 201
also would indicate that even when for the second time
the Houses of the State Legislature pass the Bill and
present for “consideration”, there is no compulsion for the
President to accord assent. Therefore, the reservation
of any Bill/Act for the “consideration” of the President
for according his assent, keeping in view, also the
avowed object envisaged under Article 254(2), renders
it qualitatively different from the ordinary assent to be
given by the President to a Bill passed by Parliament or
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1233

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

that of the Governor to a Bill passed by the legislature(s)
of the State concerned.
77. [...] The powers actually exercised by the President, at
any rate under Articles 31-A, 31-C, 254(2) and 304(b) are
a special constituent power vested with the Head of the
Union, as the protector and defender of the Constitution
and safety valve to safeguard the fundamental rights of
citizens and federal structure of the country’s polity as
adopted in the Constitution. A genuine, real and effective
consideration would depend upon specific and sufficient
information being provided to him inviting, at any rate, his
attention to the Central law with which the State law is
considered or apprehended to be repugnant, and in the
absence of any effort or exercise shown to have been
undertaken, when questioned before courts, the State
law cannot be permitted or allowed to have predominance
or an overriding effect over that Central enactment of
Parliament to which no specific reference of the President
at all has been invited to. This, in my view, is a must and
an essential requirement to be satisfied; in the absence
of which the “consideration” claimed would be one in a
vacuum and really oblivious to the hoard of legislations
falling under the Concurrent List in force in the country
and enacted by Parliament. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

377. Dr. K.C. Markandan writes that Article 201 seeks to serve the same
purpose in the legislative sphere as Article 365 seeks to do in the
administrative sphere, namely, make the Constitution “unfederal”
in character, to establish the fact that the distribution of legislative
power between the Centre and the States is not on an exclusive
basis but that the exercise of legislative power of the State is subject
to the overall responsibility of the Centre and its legislative ambit.
He states that no other explanation can justify the inclusion of this
provision in the Constitution.31

31 K.C. Markandan, Centre State Relations The Perspective 120 (ABS Publications 1986).
1234 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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378. It is in such a background and context that the prescription of the
six-month time limit upon the State legislature for re-passing the Bill
and presenting it before the President for his consideration assumes
more significance. Non-adherence or any absence of deference
to this time-limit would prove to be detrimental to the cause of
the State itself since the balance of power is inherently skewed
in favour of the Union on such matters. Having said so, and also
conscientiously discussed by us in the preceding paragraphs, this
is why the reference by the Governor of bills for the consideration
of the President must be strictly by and under the strength of clear
provisions of the Constitution.
379. The features of Article 201 which have been the cause of differences
in Centre-State relations over the years are as follows:
a. There is no time-limit within which the President is required to
declare the grant or withholding of assent under Article 201
once the bill is reserved for his consideration by the Governor.
Unlike Articles 111 and 200 respectively, the expression “as soon
as possible” is also not used. Owing to this, a number of bills
enacted by the legislatures of various States remain pending
with the President awaiting a decision.
b. There being no obligation upon the President to mandatorily
assent to a bill under Article 201, if a bill is reserved for the
consideration of the President by the Governor acting in his
discretion, then it has the effect of rendering the enactment of
the bill by the State legislature nugatory, if the President keeps
the bill pending with him or declares the withholding of assent
to such a bill.
380. As regards the issue of delay under Article 201, as we have discussed
in the preceding paragraphs, the Sarkaria Commission observed
that the delay in the expeditious disposal of bills reserved for the
consideration of the President was one of the major causes of strain
in Centre-State relations. It also recommended that definite timelines
must be adopted for facilitating the efficient disposal of references
under Article 201. The timelines suggested by the Commission are
indicated in paragraph 120 of this judgment.
381. Besides prescribing timelines, the Commission also suggested that
the reference being made by the Governor must be self-contained
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1235

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

and contain all necessary information. We have discussed that the
same was also observed by this Court in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra) in the
context of references being made under Article 254(2). The reading of a
timeline in Article 201 was also suggested by the Punchhi Commission.
382. While the language of Article 201 does not provide for any timelines
within which the President is required to act, the absence of a
time limit cannot be construed as indicating that the discharge of
functions by the President under the said Article can be done without
due deference to the important nature of the role they occupy as
regards the legislative machinery of the State. Any bill(s) reserved
for the consideration of the President cannot become an act unless
it receives the assent as is mentioned in Article 201, and thus, long
and undue delays in the disposal of references by the President
would have the effect of keeping the bill(s), which are an expression
of the popular will embodied by the State legislature, in an indefinite
and uncertain state of abeyance.
383. Although we are cognisant of the fact that in discharge of his powers
under Article 201, the President is expected to “consider” the bill and
such “consideration” may be difficult to be bound by strict timelines,
yet it cannot be a ground to justify inaction on part of the President.
384. We have discussed in detail in the preceding paragraphs that where
no time for the exercise of a power has been stipulated, such power
must be exercised in a reasonable time, so as to not render the
subject matter nugatory or dilute the purpose sought to be achieved.
The delay on part of the President in deciding a reference under
Article 201, without any justification or necessity, would fall foul of
the basic constitutional principle that the exercise of a power must
not be arbitrary and capricious. The implications of inaction being
of a serious nature and detrimental to the federal fabric of the
Constitution, there should be no scope for unnecessary delay on
part of the President under Article 201 as well.
385. At this juncture, we deem it apposite to refer to the office
memorandum issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government
of India dated 04.02.2016 to all the Ministries/Departments of the
Government of India regarding the expeditious disposal of State bills
reserved for the assent of the President. The same is reproduced
hereinbelow:
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“
Urgent
State Bill
File No. 23/18/2015-Judl & PP (Part III)
Government of India/Bharat Sarkar Ministry of Home
Affairs/Grih Mantralaya (Judicial & PP Section)
NDCG-II Building, 4” Floor Jai Singh Road,
New Delhi-110001
The February 4th of 2016
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Subject: Guidelines on State Legislations - regarding.
The undersigned is directed to invite to this Ministry’s D.O.
letter no: 23/33/1992-Judi dated 22.09.1992 duly conveying
the guidelines formulated and approved by the Cabinet
for disposal of State legislative proposals. Despite these
clear guidelines, it is observed that undue delay is caused
in taking a final decision on such Bills.
2. The matter has been recently reviewed and a set of
supplementary guidelines for expeditious examination
and disposal of State Legislative proposals by the Central
Ministries / Departments / State Governments has been
formulated. These are stated below for strict adherence:
State Bills/Legislative proposals are to be examined
in such a way that objections/views of the concerned
Central Departments/Ministries, if any, be meaningful as
addressing the unreasonable queries/observations delays
the entire process.
ii). A time limit of maximum 3 months be strictly adhered
to for finalizing the Bills after their receipt from the State
Governments.
iii). The Ministry concerned should communicate their
view on substantive issues within 15 days from the date
of receipt of communication and if they are not able to
communicate, they should mention the reasons for the
delay. In case Departments/Ministries are not able to
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1237

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

communicate their comments/views in a period of one
month, it will be construed that they have no comments
to offer on the proposal.
iv). The substantive issues involved in the Bills should be
dealt by the Ministries concerned and issues relating to
language/drafting and Bill’s constitutional validity should
be checked by the Ministry of Law.
v). As regards Ordinances, which are of urgent nature
and are promulgated in view of the urgency, presently a
time limit of 2 weeks has been permitted to the Ministries/
Departments concerned for offering their views, but often
the comments are not received within the prescribed time
limit. Hence, as in the case of State Bills, if the Ministries /
Departments are not able to communicate their comments/
views on the Ordinances in a period of two weeks, it will
be construed that they have no comments to offer on the
proposal, and MHA will process in consultation with D/o
Legal Affairs of the M/o Law and Justice so as to dispose
the Ordinances off within a period of one month from the
date of their receipt in the MHA.
3. It is requested that all State Bills / Ordinances be
processed in the light of aforesaid guidelines and within
the time limit as specified. All the currently pending Bills
/Ordinances may be reviewed urgently in terms of above
guidelines in order to ensure their disposal within three
weeks’ time.
4. The receipt of this letter may kindly be acknowledged.
Sd/-
Thangkholun Haokip
Under Secretary to the Govt. of India
Tel./Fax : 011-23438095”
(Emphasis supplied)

386. The aforesaid memorandum indicates that the procedure involved
after a reference is made to the President by the Governor is that
the Union Ministry of Home Affairs as the nodal Ministry would
refer the substantive issues involved in the bill to the appropriate
Ministry at the Centre which is concerned with the subject matter
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and issues pertaining to the bill’s language, drafting or constitutional
validity to the Law Ministry at the Centre. In this process, the Office
Memorandum lays down strict guidelines directing the concerned
Central Departments or Ministries that the objections or views that
they may have to the bill must be meaningful and precise. Such a
stipulation has been laid down because the making of unreasonable
queries or observations only serves to delay the entire process of
consideration of a bill by the President under Article 201. The Ministry
concerned with the substantive issues as regards the bill is required
to communicate their views to the Home Ministry within 15 days
from the date of receipt of the bill. If there is a deviation from the
said time restriction, they must assign reasons for the delay that has
ensued on their part. The failure to indicate so within a maximum
period of one month, is construed strictly and understood to mean
that the concerned Ministry may have no comments whatsoever to
offer on the proposal. A perusal of the aforesaid also makes it clear
that a timeline of three months has been prescribed for the decision
on bills reserved for the President. A time limit of three weeks has
been prescribed for the disposal of ordinances of an urgent nature.
387. Another office memorandum was issued by the Ministry of Home
Affairs to all the States/UTs on the same date in this regard and is
reproduced below:
“
Urgent
State Bill
File No. 23/18/2015-Judl & PP (Part III)
Government of India/Bharat Sarkar Ministry of Home
Affairs/Grih Mantralaya (Judicial & PP Section)
NDCG-II Building, 4” Floor Jai Singh Road, New Delhi-
110001
The February 4th of 2016
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Subject: Guidelines on State Legislations - regarding.
The undersigned is directed to say that the Ministry
of Home Affairs is the nodal Ministry for processing
and conveying a final decision with respect to State
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1239

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

Legislations under Article 201 read with Article 254(2)
of the Constitution; State Legislations requiring previous
sanction of the President under Article 304(b) of the
Constitution and Ordinances for the instructions of the
President under Article 213(1) etc.
2. On receipt of such a reference, this Ministry examines
and seeks the views of the concerned Central Departments/
Ministries. Once the views of the Central Departments/
Ministries concerned are obtained, these are again examined
and in case of any objections, the same are shared with
the State Government concerned seeking their views/
clarifications so that the Central Departments/Ministries
concerned can be apprised of the clarifications of the
State Government. This is an integral part of the present
processing system. However, it has been observed that State
Governments do not send requisite clarifications/views on
the comments made by the Central Departments/Ministries
and thus, a decision in the matter gets unduly delayed.
3. Recently, the matter has been reviewed and a timeline
of maximum three months has been fixed for disposing
State Bills/cases of previous instructions/ Ordinances
from the date of their receipt from the State Government.
A maximum period of one month has been kept for Inter-
Ministerial consultation and next one month has been
kept for obtaining the comments/clarifications of the State
Government on the views as conveyed by the Central
Departments/Ministries. Since a time bound disposal
of State Legislations etc. is in the interest of the State
Governments, it is requested that appropriate instructions
may be issued to all concerned to adhere to the timeline
of one month for responding to the comments/views of the
Central Departments/ Ministries as conveyed by the MHA.
If the requisite clarifications/views are not received from the
State Government within the stipulated one month’s time,
it will be construed that the State Government agrees with
the observation and has no comments to offer.
4. It has also been observed that many a time the Bill etc,
contains drafting errors and State Governments, despite
repeated persuasion, do not withdraw such Bills. Since a
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Bill containing errors cannot be presented to the President,
State Governments are requested to kindly verify and check
that a Bill is free from any drafting/typographical error. It
is also observed that many a time the State Governments
agree to make amendments as per the suggestions of
Central Ministries/Departments, but still keeps on insisting
for assent of the Bill in its original form. It is therefore
requested that once the State Government tends to agree
with the objections/ views of the Central Departments/
Ministries, the State Government may consider sending a
consolidated proposal alongwith suggested amendments/
modifications instead of insisting for assent of the Bill in
their original form
4. It is requested that all concerned may be instructed
to follow the aforesaid guidelines scrupulously. All the
existing cases pending with the State Government may
kindly be reviewed in the light of these guidelines in a
time-bound manner.
5. The receipt of this letter may kindly be acknowledged.
Sd/-
Thangkholun Haokip
Under Secretary to the Govt. of India
Tel./Fax : 011-23438095”
388. The aforesaid memorandum then clarifies that when the appropriate
Ministry at the Centre, which is concerned with the substantive issues,
makes any objections, the same is then shared with the concerned
State government for further seeking their views or clarifications on
the matter. This is done with the object of apprising the concerned
Central Ministry of the clarifications of the State government on the
matter. A time-limit of one month has been prescribed for the same.
As aspect of concern highlighted herein was the inaction or delayed
action on part of the State government to furnish these relevant
clarifications which further has the ripple effect of postponing the
decision of the Centre on the matter. It was further prescribed that the
State Governments must rectify any drafting or typographical errors
pointed out by the Central Government and once the suggestions
of the Central Government are accepted, the State governments
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1241

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

should send a consolidated proposal containing the amendments
rather than insisting on the assent to bill in the original form.
389. It becomes clear upon the perusal of the guidelines that in recognition
of the urgent and important nature of Article 201, the Central
Government has framed clear guidelines as regards the time limits
and the manner in which references under Article 201 are expected
to be disposed of. The guidelines also lay down that any delay
caused in the seeking of clarifications and making of suggestions
by any Ministry would have to be explained by furnishing reasons,
in the absence of which, it would be assumed that they have no
objections. It would be apposite for us to observe here that the idea
of imposing timelines on the various stakeholders would not be
antithetical or alien to the procedure that surrounds the discharge
of constitutional functions under Article 201. The existence of the
aforesaid two Office Memorandums further substantiates such an
interpretation. Afterall, no memorandum which is contrary to the
substance and spirit of Article 201 can be allowed to command
any procedure between the Union and the States The factum of its
existence and acceptance reveals that the requirement of expeditious
or even a strict time-bound action would be consistent with the aim
and object of Article 201.
390. The recommendations made by the Sarakaria and Punchhi
Commissions respectively and the guidelines framed by the Central
government taken collectively indicate the expediency involved in the
disposal of references under Article 201 along with the importance
of the role of the President. In this backdrop, it must be made clear
that the Courts would not be powerless to intervene in cases where
the exercise of function by a constitutional authority is not being done
within# a reasonable time.
391. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to adopt the timeline prescribed
by the Ministry of Home Affairs in the aforesaid guidelines, and
prescribe that the President is required to take a decision on the
bills reserved for his consideration by the Governor within a period
of three months from the date on which such reference is received.
In case of any delay beyond this period, appropriate reasons

# Ed. Note: “within” instead of “without” in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
1242 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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would have to be recorded and conveyed to the concerned State.
The States are also required to be collaborative and extend co-
operation by furnishing answers to the queries which may be raised
and consider the suggestions made by the Central government
expeditiously.
392. We may now advert ourselves to the question on the nature of the
proviso to Article 201 and whether it is intrinsically attached to the
option of withholding of assent available to the President under
Article 201, similar to how the first proviso is fastened to the option
of withholding assent available to the Governor under Article 200.
Furthermore, how and in what scenarios would the President resort
to directing the Governor to return the bill to the House or Houses
together with a message?
393. This Court in State of Punjab (supra) had reached the conclusion
that the option of withholding of assent under the substantive part of
Article 200 would be tethered to the first proviso thereto, predominantly
because of the clear use of the expression “shall not withhold assent
therefrom” therein. It is limpid that an identical expression remains
absent in the proviso to Article 201. Despite this, we must not lose
sight of the fact that it was also authoritatively laid down in the same
decision that a proviso may fulfil the purpose of being an exception
or, explanation/addition to the substantive provision of a statute.
Therefore, despite the absence of a similar expression mandating
the President to not withhold assent in the proviso to Article 201,
constitutional principles would require us to read the proviso in
conjunction with the option of withholding assent which the President
is empowered to choose from.
394. We say so because the scheme under which the constitutional
heads of both the country and the State respectively are required
to operate, does not contemplate the idea of an ‘absolute veto’,
thereby meaning that there can be no withholding of assent without
furnishing of reasons. This is owing to the fact that the simpliciter
withholding of assent both by the President and the Governor would
be impermissible within the fundamental principles of a constitutional
democracy.
395. Since the notion of ‘simpliciter withholding’ is an anathema to Article
200 of the Constitution, there cannot be any gainsaying that any
‘withholding of assent’ in terms of Article 201 must also only take
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1243

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

place on the strength of a specific provision of the Constitution that
envisages the requirement of assent of the President in the first place
i.e., those traceable to instances envisaged under Article(s) 31A,
31C, 254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(i)(a), etc. but also must be accompanied
by sound and specific reasons that necessitate the withholding, by
clearly outlaying the policy considerations on which such an action
is predicated.
396. While in the preceding paragraphs we have elaborated that the
Governor does not hold the power to exercise ‘absolute veto’ on
any bill, we see no reason why the same standard would also not
apply to the President under Article 201 as well. The President is
not an exception to this default rule which permeates throughout
our Constitution. Such unbridled powers cannot be said to remain in
either of these constitutional posts. The only exception that has been
carved out by the Constitution as regards the exercise of powers by
the Governor and that of the President under Article(s) 200 and 201
of the Constitution is that in the former, the Governor once having
withheld assent from a bill would then be bound to assent upon the
reconsideration of such bill, whereas in the latter no such compulsion
is constitutionally imagined for the President, owing to the very
fact that the grant or withholding of assent in terms of Article 201
is not the ordinary law-making procedure so far as the States are
concerned, it is an extraordinary situation that only arises wherever
policy considerations are involved in an otherwise State legislation
but nevertheless having the propensity of a pan-country effect that
is necessitated by the very quasi-federal nature of our polity.
397. The natural corollary of the constitutional abhorrence to the notion
of simpliciter withholding of assent within our Constitution is that a
requirement and responsibility of assigning reasons to the withholding
of assent is cast upon the President. What follows from this is that
the reasons assigned by the President for withholding of assent
must be communicated to the State government concerned. Such
an inference is legitimate since there remains no logic in assigning
reasons if the same cannot be responded to and addressed by the
State government. Putting the State government to proper notice of
the reconsiderations or amendments to the bill, which the Council
of Ministers at the Centre may have, is also an essential obligation
inhered in such situations. In the absence of such communication,
there exists a real and grave danger of denying the State government
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the knowledge of the reasons due to which the bill passed by the
State legislature had not been assented to. Furthermore, there may
exist situations where the State governments may be amenable to
some remedial changes or amendments. However, in the absence of
any communication, they may be robbed of any chance to undertake
those changes and ensure that the bill becomes law in their State.
The State governments must not be prevented from entertaining
or possibly incorporating the changes or amendments to the bill
which was originally referred to the President, solely due to the
absence of a transparent information sharing mechanism, which the
State government may be said to be entitled to in a federal polity.
Entertaining such a dialogue assumes importance since the fulcrum
of a healthy Centre-State relations, in a constitutional democracy,
is the transparent collaboration and cooperation between the Union
and the States.
398. The mandate for an effective and purposeful dialogue has been
constitutionally recognised and approved through the proviso to Article
201. Making the exercise of this proviso optional or subjecting it to
the discretion of the President to use wherever and whenever he
deems fit would deprive the States of an important safeguard which
has been clearly laid down in the Constitution. Although we are not
oblivious to the fact that the Office Memorandums referred by us
above provide an opportunity for the State government to respond
to the objections that the concerned Ministry at the Centre may
have, we must remember that such an Office Memorandum cannot
be used to bypass a procedure already laid down in the text of the
Constitution. Furthermore, the sending of objections and receipt of
clarifications to and from the State government while the proposed
bill is under consideration of the President through the concerned
Ministry at the Centre, is to enable and infuse an informed decision
making in the entire process to avoid any haste or non-application
of mind, before taking any decision of either grant of assent or
withholding thereof in the first place.
399. However, at this stage we may clarify, that although the Memorandum
mandates that there must be a channel of transparent and purposeful
communication between the State Government and the Central
Government, yet this does not mean that the requirement of sending
a message in terms of the proviso to Article 201 is eliminated. Mere
existence of any communication that may take place prior to any
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1245

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

decision being taken under Article 201 is no reason to shirk the
constitutional responsibility of officially communicating the message
to the concerned State legislature. There lies a very fundamental
difference between the communication envisaged under the
Memorandum and that under the proviso to Article 201. The former
is only to address any preliminary objections or doubts as regards
the proposed bill and which prevent a meaningful decision from being
taken by the President under Article 201 whereas under the latter,
the idea is to communicate the reasons as to how the President
arrived at his decision to withhold assent along with specifying the
provisions of the proposed bill that should be reconsidered by the
State legislature.
400. In other words, the sending of preliminary objections under the
Memorandum cannot be equated to the message under the proviso
to Article 201, which is used to communicate the aspects of the
proposed bill to be reconsidered and how they may be reconsidered
by the State legislature. Unlike the memorandum, the message under
Article 201 of the Constitution is of seminal significance inasmuch as
it facilitates the repassing of the bill by the State legislature. What
emerges from the aforesaid is that when the President declares
the withholding of assent of the State legislature’s proposed bill, it
would be his constitutionally bounden duty to also set into motion
the proviso to Article 201.
401. In short, after due consultation with the State government, the
President may either declare assent to the bill or he may declare
that he withholds assent thereto. It would not be appropriate for
the President to declare withholding of assent without first seeking
clarifications from the State government as is mentioned in the
guidelines featuring in the Office Memorandums. If, in the course
of discussions, the State government expresses willingness to
make such changes to the bill as may be suggested by the Central
government, then it would be open to the President to seek
reconsideration of the bill by invoking the proviso, and upon the bill
being re-considered and passed with such changes, the President
may grant assent thereto.
402. At this stage, it would be prudent for the President while choosing
to withhold assent to the bill and setting the proviso into motion, to
address the issues, views, changes, amendments or recommendations
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that he may have comprehensively and in one go. Piecemeal exercise
of the proviso to Article 201 must be dissuaded. This is to prevent
the endless loop of sending and re-sending of the bill that may
ensue between the President acting under the proviso to Article
201 and the House or Houses of the State Legislature. A purposive
interpretation of Article 201 does not in any manner envisage a
never-ending cycle of communications between the President and
the State Government. Such conduct would tantamount to abusing
the essence of the proviso which embodies fostering a collaborative
spirit between the Union and the States. Therefore, the exercise of
the power under the proviso must also be done in good faith and
in a bona fide manner.
403. The object underlying Article 201 and the significance it holds for
the enforceability of a State legislation would be frustrated if the
procedure therein is reduced to an endless cycle of back and forth
without any chance for fruition of the aspirations of the people of the
State on mere technicalities. Therefore, the President is expected to
follow the procedure envisaged under the proviso with a sense of
responsibility whenever necessary. In the ordinary course of action, a
bill must be sent back for the reconsideration of the State legislature
under the proviso to Article 201, only once.
404. After the bill is sent with a message to State legislature by the
President and they repass it, with or without amendments, the
President would be empowered to take a final call on the giving or
withholding of assent on the bill concerned. If he chooses to assent
to the bill, it would become law. There is no gainsaying to the fact
that the President under Article 201 is conferred with the power to
withhold a bill during the second round, without activating any other
procedure, effectively bringing the legislative process vis-à-vis that
same bill to an end, in contrast to the scheme of Article 200 wherein
the Governor must mandatorily accord his assent to a Bill which is
presented to him for the second time.
405. However, if he chooses to withhold his assent, the bill will not take birth
as law. It must, however, be noted that even during the withholding
of assent of a bill received on the second round, the President
would be required to assign clear and sufficiently detailed reasons
for arriving at such a decision. Even in the second round, he has
no power whatsoever to exercise absolute veto, as the Constitution
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1247

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

does not provide anywhere that withholding of assent can be done
simpliciter. Hence, the decision to choose the option of withholding
assent after having set into motion the proviso to Article 201 must
not be misconstrued to mean that he is exercising an ‘absolute veto’
or a power of a similar nature. We say so because first, the decision
has not been arrived at in the first instance without communicating
reasons to the State legislature and providing them with an opportunity
to reconsider the bill, and secondly, the President is mandated to
declare the withholding of assent to the repassed bill with cogent
and sufficient reasons at this stage as well.
406. In cases where the reservation is on the ground of repugnancy of
the State legislation with a Central legislation, or under one of the
provisions where the assent of President has been envisaged for the
purpose of enforceability or imparting immunity to the legislation, it
would be a matter where the President would decide the question
of grant of assent keeping in mind the desirability of having a
uniformity in the policy across the country on the subject matter
involved. This, as was held in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra), is evident from
the fact that the assent under Article 201 is not the same as the
assent to be granted under Articles 111 and 201, and the President
has been given supremacy under the Constitution as regards the
bills covered under Article 201 by virtue of his constituent powers.
In this regard, the observations of the Sarkaria Commission may
be referred to as guiding principles by the President wherein it
was observed thus:
“5.10.02 While we agree that the scrutiny by the Union
Government need not be confined to the general
constitutionality of the Bill or conformity with constitutional
provisions under which the Bill has been reserved, we
would sound a note of caution that non-conformity of a
State Bill to the policy of the Union Government is not
always a safe ground for withholding Presidential assent
from it. In this connection it is necessary to bear in
mind the general principles that underlie the division of
legislative powers between the Union and the States with
reference to Lists I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule. All
matters in the Concurrent List are manifestly of common
interest to the Union and the States. The supervisory
powers conferred on the Union under Articles 201—
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and 254(2) enable it to secure a broad uniformity in the
main principles of the laws on Concurrent List subjects
throughout the country.
5.10.03 From a functional angle, all matters in List II cannot
be said to be exclusively of State or local concern. Several
Entries in List II are either expressly subject to certain
entries in List I or overlap to some extent matters in List
I or List III. Securing uniformity and coordinating policy
on the basic aspects of such matters in List II, having an
interface with those in List I, cannot be extraneous to the
functions exercised by the President in considering State
Bills, under Article 201.
5.10.04 Articles 31A(1), 31C, 288(2) and 304(b) provide
for reservation of certain types of State Bills for the
consideration and assent of the President. These
provisions, read with Article 201—, enable the Union
Executive to ensure, on the basic aspects of these special
matters, a certain degree of uniformity in the interests of
the social and economic unity of the country. Examination
of the State Bills of this special category, from the point
of their compatibility with the settled policy of the Union,
therefore, does not involve any impropriety.

President should not withhold assent merely on
consideration of policy differences with respect to
matters in List II
5.10.05 Apart from all such matters on which a measure
of uniform coordinated policy is desirable, there remains
in List II an area which is purely of local or domestic
concern to the States. It is with respect to Bills falling within
this area of exclusive State concern that utmost caution,
circumspection and restraint on the part of the Union
Executive is required in the exercise of its supervisory
powers under Article 201—. This is all the more necessary
if the Bill has been reserved by the Governor in the
exercise of his discretion, contrary to the advice of his
Ministers. It may not be prudent to veto such a Bill merely
on the ground that the legislative policy of the Bill, though
otherwise constitutional, does not conform with what the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1249

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

Union Government thinks should be its policy with respect
to the subject-matter of the Bill.
5.10.06 We recommend that as a matter of convention,
the President should not withhold assent only on the
consideration of policy differences on matters relating, in
pith and substance, to the State List, except on the grounds
of patent unconstitutionality such as those indicated in
para 5.6.13 above.”
407. Where the ground of reservation of a bill is patent unconstitutionality
of a nature described in the exceptional situations in M.P. Special
Police (supra), that is where the bill upon becoming law would be a
peril to democracy, the decision of the President must be guided by
the fact that it is the constitutional courts that have been conferred
with the ultimate authority of interpretation of the Constitution and
the laws.
408. When a legislation is apprehended to be patently unconstitutional of
the nature described in the above paragraph, the courts as the sentinel
on qui vive have been empowered by the Constitution to test the vires
of such legislation and there is no bar or limitation to the power of
judicial review of the courts in this regard. This is in consonance with
the constitutional scheme of checks and balances between the three
wings of the Government so as to ensure that absolute power does
not vest in one authority. Therefore, the power of judicial review by
design acts as more than a sufficient safeguard against the enactment
of an unconstitutional legislation by the legislature.
409. However, in cases of challenge to legislations duly passed by the
legislature and assented to by the executive, the constitutional courts
temper their judicial review with the presumption that such legislation
is constitutional. This is because the courts deem it appropriate to
not interfere with an enactment that has been passed in the wisdom
of the legislature and symbolises the political will of our people. It is
in this context, that we find it worthwhile to note the remarks of the
eminent constitutional jurist, Nani Palkhivala on the object of assent
by the executive to a bill – “The object of enacting these provisions
[Articles 200 and 201] was perhaps that while the constitutionality of
a law can be challenged in a court, its wisdom cannot be and that it
would be better to prevent a clearly unconstitutional legislation from
becoming law than to have it invalidated by a court later.” However,
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the aforesaid statement should not be construed devoid of its context,
more particularly in ignorance of Article 143 of the Constitution which
we shall now discuss.
410. We are in agreement that one of the object of Article 201 is also
to prevent a bill that is perilous to democratic principles. However,
we are also of the view that a bill appearing to be unconstitutional
must be assessed by a judicial mind. It is for this reason that both
the Sarkaria Commission and the Punchhi Commission categorically
recommended the President to seek the opinion of this Court under
Article 143 in respect of bills that may be apprehended to be patently
unconstitutional.
411. Article 143 confers on the President the power to consult this Court
any time when it appears to the President that a question of law or
fact has arisen, or is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and of
such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of
this Court upon it. Therefore, the President is not just precluded but
constitutionally expected to refer the question of vires of a bill to this
Court as the apex judicial institution to ascertain the constitutionality
thereof and accordingly enable the President to take action in respect
of the said bill under Article 201.
412. We are of the considered view that although the option to refer a
bill to this Court under Article 143 may not be mandatory, yet the
President, as a measure of prudence, ought to seek an opinion
under the said provision in respect of bills that have been reserved
for the consideration of the President on grounds of perceived
unconstitutionality. This is all the more necessary as there is no
mechanism at the State level for the Governor to refer bills to the
constitutional courts for their advice or opinion thereupon. Under the
scheme of the Constitution as we see it, there is only one possible
way for the Governor to ascertain the palpable constitutionality of a bill,
which is by way of reserving it for the consideration of the President
who in turn is then expected to invoke Article 143. The Constitution is
not a maze, but a labyrinth. Although both may semantically appear
to be one and the same, yet there is a very fine but discernible
difference between the two. The difference lies in the fact that in a
maze one may lose their way within the multiple overlapping paths,
with the possibility of each of them leading to a dead-end, however
in a labyrinth one eventually finds the way and in the process also
come out more enlightened. Similarly, any questions emanating
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1251

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

from the Constitution or pertaining thereto such as the constitutional
vires of a law must be uncovered through the foresightedness of our
Constitution. Wherever, a bill is reserved by the Governor for the
President on the ground of patent unconstitutionality of the nature
wherein the exercise of discretion by the Governor is permissible
under Article 163(1), the Constitution expects the President to be
the soothsayer, easing the sails for the Governor.
413. This very same constitutional obligation cast on the President is also
provided in Article 154H of the Constitution of Sri Lanka wherein if
the Governor is of the opinion that a statute enacted by a provincial
council is unconstitutional, then he may refer the bill to the President
who in turn is obligated to make a reference to the Supreme Court
of Sri Lanka for obtaining pronouncement on the constitutional
vires of such bill. Where the Supreme Court holds the statute to be
constitutional, then the Governor is bound to grant assent. A similar
framework is followed in the Republic of Kiribati where Section
66 of the Constitution of Kiribati allows the Beretitenti, who is the
constitutional head of the State, to withhold assent to a bill only if he
believes that such bill is inconsistent with the constitution. In such a
case, he may return the bill back to the Parliament however, if the
bill is passed again then the only option left with the Beretitenti is to
either assent or to refer its vires to the High Court for a declaration.
If the court declares the bill to be constitutional then the assent must
be granted forthwith.
414. The object of Article 143 in context of reference of bills, whose
constitutionality is under consideration by the President under Article
201, has been explained by the N.L. Untwalia, J., In Re: The Special
Courts Bill, 1978 reported in (1979) 1 SCC 380. The relevant portion
of his judgment is reproduced below:
“143. [...] I see no harm in adopting the method of giving
some suggestions from the Court which may obliterate a
possible constitutional attack upon the vires of a Bill. It may
not be necessary or even advisable to adopt such a course
in all References under Article 143 of the Constitution.
But if in some it becomes expedient to do so, as in my
opinion in the instant one it was so, I think, it saves a lot
of public time and money to remove any technical lacuna
from the Bill if the Government thinks that it can agree to
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do so. Of course the Bill by itself is not a law. It would be
a law when passed by the Parliament. But even at the
stage of the Bill when opinion of this Court is asked for,
it seems to me quite appropriate in a given case to make
some suggestions and then to answer the Reference on
the footing of acceptance by the Government of such of
the suggestions as have been accepted. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

415. The view taken In Re: Special Courts (supra) was that consultative
jurisdiction under Article 143 may avoid any possible challenges to
the vires of a bill if it becomes an Act. On basis of the dictum in the
said reference, we are of the considered view that constitutional
courts are not precluded from making suggestions or opining about
the constitutional validity of a bill before the same becomes a law.
This is because preventing a patently unconstitutional bill from
being enacted saves not only public resources but also respects the
wisdom of the legislature by providing the constitutional functionaries
associated with the process of passage of a legislation, to review
the bill and take appropriate actions. However, the approach of
prevention before cure cannot be stretched to such extent, that the
very process of reservation becomes a resort for thwarting the very
legislative powers of the States. The President’s recourse to Article
143 also palliates any apprehensions of bias or mala fides in the
Central government’s approach to bills reserved under Article 200.
416. The approach to be adopted by the courts in answering references
under Article 143 in respect of reserved bills also requires a perusal
of constitutional provisions viz. Articles 31A, 31C, 254, 288, 360,
etc. that place a requirement of assent to a bill by the President,
either expressly or by necessary implication. The scope of these
Articles is largely centred around social, economic and political
objectives that are sought to be achieved by a State. The necessity
for Presidential assent in case of legislations under these Articles
is for enabling the Central government to streamline policies and
ensure uniformity in socio-economic and welfare measures across
States. In contemplation of the bills under these Articles, the central
government, more often than not, has policy considerations in mind
and the reasons for assent or withholding thereof may not be on
purely legal grounds.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1253

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

417. It is in such situations that the court has to be mindful as to whether
the reference received from the President under Article 143 pertains
to pure legal questions regarding interpretation of the Constitution or
questions that are in the nature of a policy consideration. In case of
the latter, the Supreme Court, having regard to the relevant facts and
circumstances, can refuse to express its advisory opinion upon being
satisfied that the questions presented to it are purely socio-economic
or political questions and have no relation to the Constitution.
418. The exercise of a self-imposed restraint by the court in matters
involving purely political considerations is in consonance with the
doctrine of political thicket, that is, the courts do not venture into
areas of governance in which the Constitution gives a prerogative
solely to the executive. For instance, the question whether a State
legislation repugnant to a central law should be assented to by the
President or not under Article 254(2) is largely a policy decision on
part of the Union Government. In such matters, the court has its
hands tied and does not attempt to encroach into the functions of
the executive wing.
419. However, in certain exceptional circumstances, the Governor may
reserve a bill for consideration of the President on grounds that the
bill is perilous to the principles of democracy and an interpretation
of the Constitution is necessary to ascertain whether such legislation
should be granted assent or not. In such cases where a bill has been
reserved majorly on the grounds of not being in consonance with
the constitutional principles and involves questions of constitutional
validity, the executive is supposed to exercise restraint. It is expected
that the Union executive should not assume the role of the courts
in determining the vires of a bill and should, as a matter of practice,
refer such question to the Supreme Court under Article 143. We have
no qualms in stating that the hands of the executive are tied when
engaging with purely legal issues in a bill and only the constitutional
courts have the prerogative to study and provide recommendations
as regards the constitutionality of a bill.
420. Since the constitutionality of a bill is a matter which falls within the
exclusive domain of the courts, the opinion rendered by the Supreme
Court under Article 143 holds high persuasive value and should
ordinarily be accepted by the legislature and the executive. We are
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no strangers to the arguments as regards the non-binding nature
of the advisory jurisdiction of this Court and that even though a bill
may be referred to this Court by the President under Article 143, yet
the opinion delivered thereunder may not be heeded to. However,
merely because the jurisdiction under Article 143 is not binding does
not undermine the principles used by this Court to determine the
constitutionality of the bill. This Court in Re Special Courts (supra)
has held thus:
“34. Learned counsel for the interveners who oppose the
reference urged as one of the planks of attack on the
reference that it is futile for us to consider the constitutional
validity of the Bill because whatever view we may take,
it will still be open to the Parliament to discuss the Bill
and to pass or not to pass it as it pleases. This argument
proceeds upon an unrealistic basis, its assumption being
that the Parliament will not act in a fair and proper manner.
True, that nothing that we say in this opinion can defer the
Parliament from proceeding with the Bill or dropping it. That
is because, no court will issue a writ or order restraining
the Parliament from proceeding with the consideration
of a Bill pending before it. But we cannot assume, what
seems to us to be unfair to that august body, that even
if we hold that the Bill is unconstitutional, the Parliament
will proceed to pass it without removing the defects from
which it is shown to suffer. Since the constitutionality of
the Bill is a matter which falls within the exclusive domain
of the courts, we trust that the Parliament will not fail to
take notice of the court’s decision.”
(Emphasis supplied)

421. In our considered view, the only reason for which the legislative or
the executive wing may not take note of the opinion delivered by
the Supreme Court under Article 143 is when the grounds on which
a State bill was reserved for the consideration of the President,
are not purely legal but also involve certain policy considerations,
which may outweigh the issue of constitutionality. In such cases, if
the President acts contrary to the advice of this Court and withholds
assent to a bill, he must record cogent reasons and materials that
justify not granting assent.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1255

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

422. A lack of reasons or even insufficiency thereof may do violence to the
concept of ‘limited government’ on which the edifice of our Constitution
has been built. The whys and wherefores of the President’s actions
provide a basis for judicial review and allow the courts to assess
the validity of the decision as well as ensure accountability between
the three pillars of government which is in consonance with the idea
of checks and balances in the constitutional set-up of our country.
423. In this context, we are of the considered view that the expression of
intention by the President through a declaration of reasons supporting
his actions under Article 201 is of paramount importance and this
Court is not inhibited in any manner to make a presumption that
the President and by extension, the Central government, may not
have acted in a bona fide manner at the time when it exercises its
powers of judicial review.
424. We would also like to make a reference to Rule 48 of the Tamil
Nadu Government Business Rules, 1978. The said Rule provides
that whenever there is legislative proposal for a subject matter falling
within the Concurrent List, the concerned administrative department
should consult the Ministry of Home Affairs, whenever possible. Similar
requirement is laid down for the legislations falling under Articles
31A, 31B and 31C of the Constitution. The rules read as follows:
“(2) If a Bill which is proposed to be introduced in the
Legislature falls within the concurrent Legislative Field,
the administrative department principally concerned shall,
whenever possible, consult the Ministry of Home Affairs
of the Government of India on the proposed legislation.
Consultation with the Government of India shall also be
necessary in cases where a Bill may seek to amend a law
falling within the concurrent legislative field, even though
such law applies only to the State of Tamil Nadu. Such
consultation should be made after the stage indicated in
clause (1).
(3) If a Bill which is proposed to be introduced in the
Legislature attracts the provisions of clause (2) of
Article 31, clause (1) of Article 31-A or Article 31-C, of
the Constitution or it is a Bill on Land Re-forms, the
Administrative department principally concerned with the
subject matter shall consult the Ministry of Home Affairs
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of the Government of India before the introduction of the
Bill (in the Legislature:
Provided that the procedure in sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3)
need not be followed when the need for action is so urgent
that prior consultation is not possible. In such cases,
Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India shall
be informed as soon as possible.”
425. Thus, as a matter of prudence, the States should enter into
pre-legislation consultation with the Central government before
introducing legislations on matters pertaining to those provisions of
the Constitution where the assent of the President may be required.
Likewise, the Central government, should consider the legislative
proposals sent by the State governments with due regard and
expediency. Such a practice reduces friction between Centre-State
relations and also ensures that future roadblocks are overcome in
the beginning itself, thereby promoting public welfare.

vii. On Exercise of Article 142.
426. Article 142 of the Constitution empowers this Court, in the exercise
of its jurisdiction to, pass such decree or make such order as is
necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending
before it.
427. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in A.G. Perarivalan (supra) was
dealing with the inaction on the part of the Governor of Tamil Nadu
in deciding the remission petition of the petitioner therein. Despite
the resolution passed by the State government in favour of granting
remission to the petitioner, the Governor first kept the matter pending
with him for a long duration and thereafter, without taking a decision
thereupon, referred the same to the President.
428. The Court, taking into consideration the huge delay caused by inaction
on the part of the Governor, and also the adverse impact of such
inaction on the liberty of the petitioner therein, exercised its powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution and deemed the petitioner to
have served his sentence and ordered his release forthwith. The
Court observed thus:
“Given that his petition under Article 161 remained pending
for two-and-a-half years following the recommendation
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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

of the State Cabinet for remission of his sentence and
continues to remain pending for over a year since the
reference by the Governor, we do not consider it appropriate
to remand the matter for the Governor’s consideration.
In the absence of any other disqualification and in the
exceptional facts and circumstances of this case, in
exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution,
we direct that the appellant is deemed to have served the
sentence in connection with Crime No. 329 of 1991. The
appellant, who is on bail, is set at liberty forthwith.”
(Emphasis supplied)

429. The Court, while summarizing its observations, further observed
that the reference made by the Governor to the President had no
constitutional backing and therefore the reference having been
declared erronoeus, and the Council of Ministers having advised
in the favour of remission, there was no requirement to remand
the matter to the Governor for taking a decision thereupon. The
observations read thus:
“38.3. The reference of the recommendation of the Tamil
Nadu Cabinet by the Governor to the President of India
two-and-a-half years after such recommendation had been
made is without any constitutional backing and is inimical
to the scheme of our Constitution, whereby “the Governor
is but a shorthand expression for the State Government”
as observed by this Court [Maru Ram v. Union of India,
(1981) 1 SCC 107 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 112].”
430. Coming to the facts of the present case, the Governor first withheld the
ten bills under question and later despite the said Bills being repassed
by the State legislature and presented before him again under the
first proviso to Article 200, still reserved them for the consideration
of the President. We have elaborated in detail that owing to the clear
language in which the first proviso is couched, there would never arise,
except in extraordinary situations, any occasion for the Governor to
reserve a reconsidered bill for the consideration of the President.
The said bills, in the absence of any message given by the Governor
under the first proviso, were taken up for reconsideration by the State
Assembly and passed in their original form, and presented to the
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Governor for his assent. Thus, undoubtedly, it was not open to the
Governor to reserve the bills for the consideration of the President
and he ought to have granted assent.
431. Considerable time has elapsed since these ten Bills were originally
passed and presented to the Governor for assent. Two out of the ten
Bills even date back to 2020. It is important to keep in mind that the
tenure of the State legislature is of five years and the representatives
are accountable to their electorate as regards the enactment of
legislations addressing the issues faced by the electorate. At the
end of every five years, the elected representatives have to go back
to their electorate and provide a report card, based upon which the
people, in whom the ultimate sovereignty rests, cast their votes.
Bills, if kept pending for long despite their passage by the State
legislature, militate against this very fundamental, essential to the
sustenance of a representative democracy based on direct elections.
432. The conduct exhibited on part of the Governor, as it clearly appears
from the events that have transpired even during the course of
the present litigation, has been lacking in bonafides. There have
been clear instances where the Governor has failed in showing
due deference and respect to the judgments and directions of this
Court. In such a situation, it is difficult for us to repose our trust
and remand the matter to the Governor with a direction to dispose
of the bills in accordance with the observations made by us in this
judgment. Article 142 empowers this Court to do complete justice
and in the facts of the present case, more particularly, in light of the
fact that the option of granting assent to the repassed bills was the
only constitutionally permissible option available with the Governor,
we deem it absolutely necessary and appropriate to grant that very
relief by exercising our extraordinary powers. No meaningful purpose
would be served by keeping the bills, some of which have already
been pending for incredulously long periods, pending for more time.
Therefore, we deem the assent to have been granted.
433. Constitutional authorities are creatures of the Constitution and are
bound by the limitations prescribed by it. No authority, in exercise of its
powers, or to put it precisely, in discharge of its duties, must attempt
to breach the constitutional firewall. The office of the Governor is no
exception to this supreme command. Whenever there is an attempt
by any authority to move beyond the bounds of the Constitution, this
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Court has been entrusted with the responsibility to act as the Sentinel
on the qui vive and bring back the authority within the constitutionally
permissible limits by exercising judicial review. We are not exercising
our power under Article 142 in a casual manner, or without giving a
thought to it. On the contrary, it is only after deepest of deliberations,
and having reached at the firm conclusion that the actions of the
Governor - first in exhibiting prolonged inaction over the bills; secondly
in declaring a simplicter withholding of assent and returning the bills
without a message; and thirdly in reserving the bills for the President in
the second round - were all in clear violation of the procedure envisaged
under the Constitution, that we have decided to declare the deeming of
assent to the ten bills, considering it to be our constitutionally bounden
duty. In our view, that is the only way to ensure that complete justice
is done with the parties without any delay, and without possibility of
any further delay due to any inaction on the part of the Governor, or
lack of deference on his part to this judgment.

H. CONCLUSION
434. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions of law
formulated by us as under:
(I) In discharge of his functions under Article 200, the Governor
has three options to choose from when a bill passed by the
State legislature is presented to him –
i. First, to assent;
ii. Secondly, to withhold assent; or
iii. Thirdly, to reserve the bill for the consideration of the
President.
(II) The first proviso to Article 200 should be read in conjunction with
the option of withholding of assent provided in the substantive
part of Article 200. It is not an independent course of action
and has to be mandatorily initiated by the Governor in cases
where the option of withholding of assent is to be exercised.
The decision of this Court in State of Punjab (supra) lays down
the correct position of law in this regard.
(III) The expression “the bill falls through unless the procedure
under the first proviso is followed” as used in Valluri Basavaiah
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Chowdhary (supra) signifies that once the Governor declares
withholding of assent and returns the bill to the House or Houses,
the bill would lapse or fall through unless the House or Houses
reconsider the bill in accordance with the suggestions made by
the Governor in his message and present it to him after repassing.
The expression “unless the procedure under the first proviso
is followed” cannot be construed to mean that the Governor
exercises discretion in setting the machinery prescribed under the
first proviso in motion. Once the Governor exercises the option
of withholding assent, he is under an obligation to follow the
procedure prescribed in the first proviso “as soon as possible”.
(IV) The decision of this Court in State of Punjab (supra) cannot be
said to be per incuriam. The observations made in the decision
as regards attaching of the first proviso with the option of
withholding of assent are supported by the observations made
in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra).
(V) Neither the concept of ‘pocket veto’ nor that of ‘absolute veto’
finds place within the constitutional scheme and mechanism
envisaged under Article 200 of the Constitution. The substantive
part of Article 200 consciously uses the expression “shall
declare” to signify that there is no scope of inaction, and
whenever a bill is presented to the Governor, he is under a
constitutional obligation to adopt one of the three courses of
action available therein. Further, the expression “as soon as
possible” in the first proviso permeates Article 200 with a sense
of expediency and does not allow the Governor to sit on the
bills and exercise pocket veto over them. Similarly, by virtue
of the first proviso being intrinsically and inextricably attached
to the option of withholding of assent, there is no scope for
the Governor to declare a simpliciter withholding of assent,
meaning thereby that ‘absolute veto’ is also impermissible
under Article 200.
(VI) It goes without saying that the scheme of Article 200 is
characterized by the movement of the bill from one constitutional
authority to another and that too with a sense of expediency.
It is trite to say that Article 200 occupies an important role of
giving the bills passed by the State legislature the authority of
an Act. Without the procedure envisaged under Article 200, the
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bills remain mere pieces of paper, skeletons without any flesh
or lifeblood flowing through their veins, mere documentation of
the aspirations of the people without any possibility of bringing
them to fruition.
(VII) As a general rule, it is not open for the Governor to reserve a
bill for the consideration of the President once it is presented
to him in the second round, after having been returned to
the House previously as per the first proviso. The use of the
expression “shall not withhold assent therefrom” appearing in
the first proviso places a clear embargo on the Governor and
is a clear enunciation of the requirement that the Governor
must assent to a bill which is presented to him after complying
with the procedure laid down in the first proviso. The only
exception to this general rule is when the bill presented in the
second round is materially different from the one presented to
the Governor in the first instance, as discussed in paragraph
204 of this judgment. In such a scenario, it would be open for
the Governor to choose from the three options provided in the
substantive part of Article 200.
(VIII) In the facts of the present case, the reservation by the Governor
of the ten Bills for the consideration of the President in the second
round was illegal, erroneous in law and is thus liable to be set
aside. As a result, any subsequent action taken upon the said
Bills by the President also does not survive and is thus set aside.
(IX) The Bills, having been pending with the Governor for an unduly
long period of time, and the Governor having acted with clear
lack of bona fides in reserving the Bills for the consideration
of the President, immediately after the pronouncement of the
decision of this Court in State of Punjab (supra), are deemed
to have been assented to by the Governor on the date when
they were presented to him after being reconsidered.
(X) There is no expressly specified time-limit for the discharge
of the functions by the Governor under Article 200 of the
Constitution. Despite there being no prescribed time-limit,
Article 200 cannot be read in a manner which allows the
Governor to not take action upon bills which are presented
to him for assent and thereby delay and essentially roadblock
the law-making machinery in the State.
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(XI) The use of the expression “as soon as possible” in the first
proviso makes it clear that the Constitution infuses a sense
of urgency upon the Governor and expects him to act with
expediency if he decides to declare the withholding of assent.
(XII) The settled position of law is that where no time-limit for the
exercise of a power is prescribed, the same must be exercised
in a reasonable time period. Guided by the decisions of this
Court in A.G. Perarivalan (supra) and Keisham (supra), we
find that it is no more res-integra that the courts are well-
empowered to prescribe a time-limit for the discharge of any
function or exercise of any power which, by its very nature,
demands expediency.
(XIII) Prescription of a general time-limit by this Court, within which
the ordinary exercise of power by the Governor under Article
200 must take place, is not the same thing as amending the
text of the Constitution to read in a time-limit which would
fundamentally change the procedure and mechanism stipulated
by Article 200. Prescription of such time-limits within the scheme
of Article 200 is with a view to lay down a determinable judicial
standard for ascertaining the reasonable exercise of such power
and to curtail any arbitrary inaction. This Court while prescribing
a time-limit for the exercise of power, is guided by the inherent
expedient nature of the procedure prescribed under Article 200.
(XIV) Keeping in mind the constitutional significance of Article 200
and the role it plays in the federal polity of the country, the
following timelines are being prescribed. Failure to comply
with these timelines would make the inaction of the Governors
subject to judicial review by the courts:
(i) In case of either withholding of assent or reservation of
the bill for the consideration of the President, upon the aid
and advice of the State Council of Ministers, the Governor
is expected to take such an action forthwith, subject to a
maximum period of one-month;
(ii) In case of withholding of assent contrary to the advice of
the State Council of Ministers, the Governor must return
the bill together with a message within a maximum period
of three-months;
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(iii) In case of reservation of bills for the consideration of the
President contrary to the advice of the State Council of
Ministers, the Governor shall make such reservation within
a maximum period of three months;
(iv) In case of presentation of a bill after reconsideration in
accordance with the first proviso, the Governor must grant
assent forthwith, subject to a maximum period of one-month.
(XV) As the general rule, the Governor in exercise of his functions
under Article 200 is required to abide by the aid and advice
tendered by the Council of Ministers. The only exceptions to
this rule can be traced to the second proviso to Article 200
and Article 163(1) of the Constitution. Thus, only in instances
where the Governor is by or under the Constitution required
to act in his discretion, would he be justified in exercising
his powers under Article 200 contrary to the advice of the
Council of Ministers. Further, any exercise of discretion by
the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 is
amenable to judicial review.
(XVI) We declare the view taken in B.K. Pavitra (supra) to be
per incuriam to the extent of the following two observations
made therein – First, that the Constitution confers discretion
upon the Governor insofar as the reservation of bills for the
consideration of the President is concerned and; Secondly,
that the exercise of discretion by the Governor under Article
200 is beyond judicial scrutiny.
The removal of the expression “in his discretion” from Section
75 of the GoI Act, 1935 when it was being adapted as Article
200 of the Constitution clearly indicates that any discretion
which was available to the Governor under the GoI Act, 1935
in respect of reservation of bills became unavailable with the
commencement of the Constitution.
The decision of B.K. Pavitra (supra) is not in consonance
with the observations made by the larger bench decision of
this Court in Samsher Singh (supra). The majority opinion
in Samsher Singh (supra) in paragraph 28 observed that
“Governor is the constitutional or formal head of the State and
he exercises all his powers and functions conferred on him by
or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council
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of Ministers save in spheres where the Governor is required
by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his
discretion” At the cost of repetition, we again reiterate “and
he exercises all his powers and functions conferred on
him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice
of his Council of Ministers”.
The decision in Samsher Singh (supra) illustrated certain
provisions of the Constitution which expressly required the
Governor to exercise his powers in his discretion. The second
proviso to Article 200 was one such illustration. Thus, it is
amply clear from the dictum in Samsher Singh (supra) that
the seven-Judge Bench, after taking into consideration the
scheme of Article 200, observed that the second proviso to
Article 200 was the only instance where the Governor had
been entrusted with the power to act in his own discretion.
Subsequent Constitution Bench decisions in M.P. Special
Police (supra) and Nabam Rebia (supra) clarified that
besides the instances where the Governor has been expressly
conferred with discretionary powers, there may still be certain
exceptional circumstances wherein it would be legitimate for
him to act in his own discretion as indicated by us in paragraph
300. However, the general rule remains that the Governor acts
upon the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers.
Under Article 200 of the Constitution, the Governor does not
possess any discretion in the exercise of his functions and
has to mandatorily abide by the advice tendered to him by
the Council of Ministers. The only exceptions to this general
rule are as follows:
(i) Where the bill is of a description as provided under the
second proviso to Article 200;
(ii) Where the bill is of a nature covered by Articles 31A,
31C, 254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(a)(ii) etc. wherein assent of
the President is a condition precedent before the bill can
take effect as law;
(iii) Where the bill is of a nature that if allowed to take effect
then it would undermine the Constitution by placing the
fundamental principles of a representative democracy in
peril.
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The observations made in B.K. Pavitra (supra) that “a
discretion is conferred upon the Governor to follow one of the
courses of action enunciated in the substantive part of Article
200” do not take into consideration the decision of Samsher
Singh (supra) and is for this reason per incuriam. It failed to
consider that Article 200 which had been duly considered by
Samsher Singh (supra) was found to contain only one instance
where the exercise of discretion was expressly provided, that
being the second proviso thereto. Besides this, as already
aforestated, it failed to notice the removal of the expression
“in his discretion” from Section 75 of the GoI Act, 1935 which
ultimately culminated into Article 200.
(XVII) Under Article 201, the occasion for the reservation of a bill
for the consideration of the President by the Governor may
arise where a constitutional provision makes the assent of the
President to be a condition precedent to a State legislation
becoming enforceable or for the purpose of securing some
immunity to the State legislation. Such a requirement can be
found in Articles 31A, 31C, 254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(a)(ii) etc.
The second proviso to Article 200 also makes reservation for
the consideration of the President mandatory. As we have also
discussed, there may be certain other situations where by
peril to fundamental principles of representative democracy,
the Governor may, in exercise of his discretion, reserve a bill
for the consideration of the President.
(XVIII) There is no ‘pocket veto’ or ‘absolute veto’ available to
the President in discharge of his functions under Article
201. The use of the expression “shall declare” makes it
mandatory for the President to make a choice between the
two options available under the substantive part of Article
201, that is, to either grant assent or to withhold assent to
a bill. The constitutional scheme does not, in any manner,
provide that a constitutional authority can exercise its
powers under the Constitution arbitrarily. This necessarily
implies that the withholding of assent under Article 201 is
to be accompanied by the furnishing of reasons for such
withholding. We cannot say for a moment that the President
would be allowed to not exercise the proviso to Article 201
and not communicate reasons for the withholding of assent
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to the State legislature, as doing so would make the very
inclusion of the proviso in Article 200 redundant. Thus, the
proviso to Article 201 could be said to attach with the option
of withholding of assent.
(XIX) The position of law is settled that even where no time-limit is
prescribed for the exercise of any power under a statute, it
should be exercised within a reasonable time. The exercise
of powers by the President under Article 201 cannot be said
to be immune to this general principle of law. Keeping in mind
the expedient nature of the provision and having regard to
the reports of Sarkaria and Puncchi Commissions, as well as
the Memorandum dated 04.02.2016 issued by the Ministry of
Home Affairs, we prescribe that the President is required to
take a decision on the bills reserved for his consideration by
the Governor within a period of three months from the date
on which such reference is received. In case of any delay
beyond this period, appropriate reasons would have to be
recorded and conveyed to the concerned State.
(XX) Whenever, in exercise of the powers under Article 200 of
the Constitution, a bill is reserved for the consideration of
the President on grounds of patent unconstitutionality that
are of such a nature so as to cause peril to the principles of
representative democracy, the President, must be guided by
the fact that it is the constitutional courts which have been
entrusted with the responsibility of adjudicating upon the
questions of constitutionality and legality of an executive or
legislative action. Therefore, as a measure of prudence, the
President ought to make a reference to this Court in exercise
of his powers under Article 143 of the Constitution.
(XXI) Judicial review and justiciability are not synonymous concepts.
The power of judicial review in a written constitution is implicit.
Unless expressly excluded by a provision of the Constitution,
the power of judicial review is available in respect of exercise
of powers under any of the provisions of the Constitution. On
the other hand, justiciability relates to a particular field falling
within the purview of the power of judicial review.
(XXII) The determining factor in deciding whether a power would
be subject to judicial review is the subject-matter of such
power and not its source. Indra Sawhney (supra) observed
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that the yardstick of subjecting an act or a decision to
judicial review is not whether it is a legislative act or an
executive decision on a policy matter but whether it violates
any constitutional guarantee or the rights under Part III of
the Constitution. The Governor, wherever he acts in his
discretion under the Constitution, does so by virtue of his
position as the constitutional and formal head of the State.
It has been held in a catena of decisions that exercise of
any power under the Constitution must conform to the limits
set by the Constitution itself. Article 200 is no exception to
this general rule.
(XXIII) In light of this, the observations made by this Court in Hoechst
(supra) that the assent of the President is non-justiciable,
cannot be stretched to mean that as a general rule, the exercise
of powers by the Governor under Article 200 in his discretion
would also be immune from judicial review. While grant of
assent by the Governor or the President, being acts which
are generally taken upon the aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers, may not be justiciable, the withholding of assent or
reservation of bills for the consideration of the President by
the Governor in exercise of his discretion which is subject to
the limits defined by the Constitution, would be justiciable on
the touchstone of judicially determinable standards.
(XXIV) We summarise our findings on judicial review of the exercise
of power by the Governor under Article 200 and the exercise
of power by the President under Article 201 as follows:
a. Where the Governor reserves a bill for the consideration
of the President in his own discretion and contrary to the
aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of
Ministers, it shall be open to the State Government to
assail such an action before the appropriate High Court
or this Court. Such a challenge can broadly be made on
the following grounds:
(i) Where the reservation is on the ground that the bill
is of a description falling under the Second Proviso
to Article 200 of the Constitution, it may be assailed
on the ground that the bill or any provision thereof
does not so derogate from the powers of the High
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Court so as to endanger the position which that court
is designed by the Constitution to fill. The Governor
while reserving a bill on this count shall be expected
to provide clear reasons and also point to the specific
provision(s) of the bill which, in his opinion, attract
the Second Proviso. This question being purely of a
legal nature would be completely justiciable and the
competent court would be, after a proper adjudication,
fully authorized to approve or disapprove of such
reservation by the Governor. If such a challenge
finds favour with the competent court, then, subject
to any other considerations, it would be a fit case for
the issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus to
the Governor for appropriate action. If, however, the
challenge should fail then the mechanism envisaged
under Article 201 of the Constitution will spring into
action.
(ii) Where the reservation is on account of the bill
attracting any provision of the Constitution wherein
the assent of the President is a condition precedent
for the proper enactment and enforceability of such
a bill as a law (such as under Article 364A2) or for
the purpose of securing any immunity (such as under
Article 31A) or overcoming any repugnancy that may
exist qua a Central Legislation (under Article 254(2)),
then the Governor is expected to make a specific and
clear reference to the President properly indicating
the reasons for such reservation and inviting his
attention as described in Kaiser-I-Hind (supra).
Such a reservation can be assailed by the State
Government, if the reference made by the Governor
either fails to indicate the reasons for such reservation
as discussed above or that the reasons indicated are
wholly irrelevant, mala-fide, arbitrary, unnecessary
or motivated by extraneous considerations. Then
such a reservation would be liable to be set aside.
This question being purely of a legal nature would
be completely justiciable and the competent court
would be after a proper adjudication fully authorized
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to approve or disapprove of such reservation by
the Governor. If such a challenge finds favour with
the competent court, then, subject to any other
considerations, it would be fit case for issuance of a
writ in the nature of mandamus to the Governor for
appropriate action. If however, the challenge should
fail then the mechanism envisaged under Article 201
of the Constitution will spring into action.
(iii) Where the reservation of a bill by the Governor for the
consideration of the President is on the grounds of
peril to democracy or democratic principles or on other
exceptional grounds as mentioned in M.P. Special
Police (supra) and Nabam Rebia (supra) then the
Governor would be expected to make a specific and
clear reference to the President properly indicating the
reasons for entertaining such a belief by pinpointing the
specific provisions in this regard and the consequent
effect that may ensue if such a bill were to be allowed
to become a law. The Governor while making such
a reference should also indicate his subjective
satisfaction as to why the aforesaid consequences that
may ensue cannot be possibly curtailed or contained
by taking recourse to the constitutional courts of the
country. It shall be open to the State Government to
challenge such a reservation on the ground of failure on
part of the Governor to furnish the necessary reasons
as discussed aforesaid or that the reasons indicated
are wholly irrelevant, mala-fide, arbitrary, unnecessary
or motivated by extraneous considerations. This
being a question completely capable of being
determined by the constitutional courts, would be fully
justiciable.
(iv) Reservation of a bill on grounds other than the ones
mentioned above, such as personal dissatisfaction
of the Governor, political expediency or any other
extraneous or irrelevant considerations is strictly
impermissible by the Constitution and would be
liable to be set-aside forthwith on that ground alone.
This will also encompass reservation of a bill by the
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Governor after having already exercised the option of
withholding of assent in terms of Article 200 except
in such exceptional circumstance as mentioned in
paragraph 204 of this judgment.
(v) Where the Governor exhibits inaction in making a
decision when a bill is presented to him for assent
under Article 200 and such inaction exceeds the
time-limit as has been prescribed by us in paragraph
250 of this judgment then it shall be open to the
State Government to seek a writ of mandamus from
a competent court against the Governor directing
expeditious decision on the concerned bill as is the
mandate of the Constitution, however, it is clarified
that the Governor may successfully resist such a
challenge on providing sufficient explanation for the
delay caused.
b. Where the Governor reserves a bill for the consideration
of the President and the President in turn withholds assent
thereto then, it shall be open to the State Government to
assail such an action before this Court. Such a challenge
can broadly be made on the following grounds:
(i) Where a State bill has been reserved by the Governor
for the consideration of the President on the ground
that assent of the President is required for the purpose
of making the bill enforceable or securing some
immunity therefor, then in such cases the withholding
of assent by the President would be justiciable to the
limited extent of exercise of such power in an arbitrary
or malafide manner. Owing to the political nature of
the assent of the President in these categories of
bills, the courts would impose a self-restraint.
(ii) Where a State bill has been reserved by the
Governor, in his discretion, for the consideration of
the President on the ground that the bill appears
to be patently unconstitutional for placing the
principles of representative democracy in peril, the
withholding of assent by the President would, in
ordinary circumstances, involve purely legal and
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constitutional questions and therefore be justiciable
without any impediments imposed by the doctrine of
political thicket. In such cases, it would be prudent
for the President to obtain the advisory opinion of
this Court by way of a reference under Article 143
and act in accordance with the same to dispel any
apprehensions of bias, arbitrariness or mala fides.
(iii) Where the President exhibits inaction in making a
decision when a bill is presented to him for assent under
Article 201 and such inaction exceeds the time-limit
as has been prescribed by us in paragraph 391 of this
judgment then it shall be open to the State Government
to seek a writ of mandamus from this Court.
435. For all the foregoing reasons we have reached the following
conclusion:
a. The reservation of the ten Bills which are the subject-matter
of challenge in the present petition by the Governor for the
consideration of the President on 28.11.2023 after their due
reconsideration by the State legislature in terms of the first
proviso to Article 200 being in contravention of the procedure
prescribed under Article 200 as explained by us hereinabove
is declared to be erroneous in law, non-est and thus, is hereby
set-aside.
b. As a result of the above, any consequential steps that might
have been taken by the President on these ten Bills is equally
non-est and is hereby set-aside.
c. Having regard to the unduly long period of time for which these
Bills were kept pending by the Governor before the ultimate
declaration of withholding of assent and in view of the scant
respect shown by the Governor to the decision of this Court in
State of Punjab (supra) and other extraneous considerations
that appear to be writ large in the discharge of his functions,
we are left with no other option but to exercise our inherent
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution for the purpose
of declaring these ten Bills as deemed to have been assented
on the date when they were presented to the Governor after
being reconsidered by the State legislature i.e., on 18.11.2023.
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436. We are in no way undermining the office of the Governor. All we
say is that the Governor must act with due deference to the settled
conventions of parliamentary democracy; respecting the will of
the people being expressed through the legislature as-well as the
elected government responsible to the people. He must perform his
role of a friend, philosopher and guide with dispassion, guided not
by considerations of political expediency but by the sanctity of the
constitutional oath he undertakes. In times of conflict, he must be
the harbinger of consensus and resolution, lubricating the functioning
of the State machinery by his sagacity, wisdom and not run it into a
standstill. He must be the catalyst and not an inhibitor. All his actions
must be impelled keeping in mind the dignity of the high constitutional
office that he occupies.
437. The Governor before he assumes office undertakes an oath to
discharge his functions to the best of his ability in order to preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution and the rule of law, along with
avowing to devote himself to the service and well-being of the
people of the State. Therefore, it is imperative that all his actions
be guided in true allegiance to his oath and that he faithfully
executes his functions that he is entrusted with by and under the
Constitution. There is a reason why a specific reference is made
to the well-being of the people of the State in his oath, there is
a reason why he is sworn in to pledge himself to the service of
the same people; the Governor as the constitutional head of the
State is reposed with the responsibility to accord primacy to the
will and welfare of the people of the State and earnestly work in
harmony with the State machinery, as his oath not only makes
this mandate anything but clear but rather also demands it of the
Governor owing to the intimate and delicate nature of the functions
that he performs and the potency of the ramifications that could
ensue or be unleashed upon the State. Due to this, the Governor
must be conscious to not create roadblocks or chokehold the State
Legislature in order to thwart and trade the will of the people for
political edge. The members of the State Legislature having been
elected by the people of the State as an outcome of the democratic
expression are better attuned to ensure the wellbeing of the people
of the State. Hence, any action contrary to the express choice of
the people, in other words, the State legislature would be a renege
of his constitutional oath.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1273

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

438. Before we part with the matter, we find it apposite to observe that
constitutional authorities occupying high offices must be guided by
the values of the Constitution. These values that are so cherished by
the people of India are a result of years of struggle and sacrifice of
our forefathers. When called upon to take decisions, such authorities
must not give in to ephemeral political considerations but rather
be guided by the spirit that underlies the Constitution. They must
look within and reflect whether their actions are informed by their
constitutional oath and if the course of action adopted by them
furthers the ideals enshrined in the Constitution. If the authorities
attempt to deliberately bypass the constitutional mandate, they are
tinkering with the very ideals revered by its people upon which this
country has been built.
439. We take this opportunity to quote Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s concluding
speech in the Constituent Assembly, which is as relevant today as
it was in 1949 – “However good a Constitution may be, it is sure to
turn out bad because those who are called to work it, happen to be
a bad lot. However bad a Constitution may be, it may turn out to be
good if those who are called to work it, happen to be a good lot”.
440. It is our duty as the highest constitutional court to recognize such evil
and increasingly strengthen our initiative to remove them. In the last,
we may say with the utmost responsibility and all the humility at our
command that it is only when the constitutional functionaries exercise
their powers by and under the Constitution that they show deference
to the people of India who have given the Constitution to themselves.
441. The soul of India is its Constitution. Our Republic, the foresight
of dynamic visionaries. What a great edifice, they built, ensuring
sovereignty with democratic values. The Constitution is our bedrock
ensuring our safety and security. It outlines a process that keeps
us rooted in values. We read it for reference and for every policy
decision. Without it, we would be lost and make many mistakes. It
is now seventy-five years old, but we still keep turning to it, why?
Because it guarantees our rights and sets benchmarks for our
responsibilities. The laws and rules that uplift all people sprout from
its pristine womb, welfare of all is its primary concern, but its sanctity
and safety should be our prime concern.
442. We would also like to refer to a snippet of history from the days
of infancy of the Constitution and the Indian Republic, which has
1274 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

been narrated in the “Eminent Parliamentarians Monograph Series
on Dr. Rajendra Prasad” published by the Lok Sabha Secretariat
in 1990 (pp. 102). In the matter concerning the constitutional role
of the President in legislative processes, an issue arose during the
deliberations on the Hindu Code Bill, wherein the first President of
India, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, expressed reservations and sought to
assert his independent authority to withhold assent to the legislation. A
reference was made to the first Attorney General for India, M.C.
Setalvad, who clarified that the role of the President under the Indian
Constitution was analogous to that of the British monarch and he
was expected to serve as a constitutional figurehead. The Attorney
General opined that the President does not possess the authority to
act contrary to the advice of the Council of Ministers. The opinion of
the Attorney General was, with respect and magnanimity, accepted
by the President and thus the ensuing controversy between the
Prime Minister and the President was laid to rest.
443. Such was the commitment shown by the stalwarts to upholding the
spirit of the Constitution.
444. We hope and trust that the Governor and the State Government
would work in tandem and harmoniously keeping the interests and
well-being of the people as their paramount consideration.
445. We direct the Registry to send one copy each of this judgment to
all the High Courts and the Principal Secretaries to the Governors
of all States.
446. In the result, the present writ petition stands disposed of in the
aforesaid terms.
447. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Writ Petition disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Mukund P Unny, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)