THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.versusRAJMATI SINGH

410                      [2022]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    14 S.C.R. 410              [2022] 14 S.C.R.


A                THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
                                        v.
                               RAJMATI SINGH
                         (Civil Appeal No. 9329 of 2022)
B                            DECEMBER 07, 2022
              [SURYA KANT AND J. K. MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
              Service Law – Termination – Claim for reinstatement – Belated
      claim – Termination of Respondent in the year 1974 – She made
      several representations, one after the other, but did not approach
C
      any judicial or quasi-judicial forum – After enactment of Right to
      Information Act, 2005, whereunder the State Information
      Commission came to be constituted, the respondent moved before
      the said Commission – The Commission passed an Order on
      05.03.2009 asking the appellant-authorities to communicate the
D     decision on the representations of respondent – In this backdrop
      communication dated 04.06.2009 was issued by the District Basic
      Education Officer, which according to respondent revived her
      pending claim – Held: On facts, claim of respondent was stale, highly
      belated, time barred – The same ought not to have been entertained
      by the State Public Services Tribunal or the High Court after a span
E
      of over three decades – Respondent like any vigilant citizen,
      especially given that she does not belong to economically or socially
      backward segments of the society, was expected to assert her rights
      before an appropriate forum within a reasonable time – Repeated
      representations neither give rise nor revive the cause of action, if it
F     had already arisen in the past – Respondent was required to seek a
      declaration of her continuity or have a writ of mandamus issued
      for her reinstatement – She did not do either – State Information
      Commission is not a forum which either could declare the rights of
      the respondent or grant any service benefits – Respondent’s move
      before the State Information Commission was thus an exercise in
G
      futility – Respondent slept over her rights for a long duration of
      over 33 years – She waived her rights to raise objections in this
      regard and is deemed to have abandoned her employment –
      Challenge of respondent to the deemed order of termination or
      abandonment of employment before the State Public Services
H     Tribunal in 2010 was hopelessly time-barred u/s 5 of the 1976 Act –
                                       410
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJMATI SINGH                        411


However in the circumstances of the case, appellants also partially       A
responsible for engendering hope in respondent at a juncture when
she was nearing the age of superannuation – Appellants to pay a
lump-sum compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- – U.P. Public Services
(Tribunal) Act, 1976 – s.5 – Right to Information Act, 2005.
      Service Law – Judicial approach in service matters – Held:          B
Undue sympathy and a perceived liberal approach by a judicial
forum can lead to significant adverse consequences – It not only
gives rise to illegitimate expectations in the mind of fence sitting
employees, but also leads to undue burdens on the public exchequer
– Indulgence shown by a Court solely on equitable considerations,
dehors the law, breeds indiscipline in public services and incorrigible   C
employees start looking for a dividend on the period of their absence
or for dereliction of duty.
       Service Law – Service disputes – Appropriate forum – Held:
State Information Commission is not a forum to adjudicate service
disputes – Right to Information Act, 2005.                                D

      C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and Other
      (2008) 10 SCC 115 : [2008] 14 SCR634 – relied on.
      Basic Shiksha Parishad and Another v. Sugna Devi
      (Smt.) and Others (2004) 9 SCC 68 : [2003] 6 Suppl.                 E
      SCR 759 and Union of India and Ors. v. Tarsem Singh
      (2008) 8 SCC 652 : [2008] 12 SCR 903 – referred to.
                       Case Law Reference
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 759         referred to                 Para 16
                                                                          F
[2008] 12 SCR 903               referred to                 Para 18
[2008] 14 SCR634                relied on                   Para 19
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9329
of 2022.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 24.01.2017 of the High Court     G
of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Service Bench
No.826 of 2014.
      Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Krishnanand Pandey, Advs. for the
Appellants.
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412             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 14 S.C.R.


A           Pradeep Kant, Sr. Adv., Mareesh Pravir Sahay, Simaranjeet Singh
      Rekhi, Shubham Kumar, Ms. Awantika, Sachin Kharb, Advs. for the
      Respondent.
            The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
                                    JUDGMENT
B
            1. Delay condoned.
            2. Leave granted.
             3. The State of Uttar Pradesh and its authorities in the Education
      Department are aggrieved by the judgment dated 24.01.2017 passed by
C     a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow
      Bench whereby the respondent was declared to have continued in service,
      thus, entitling her to all consequential benefits including salary. The State
      of Uttar Pradesh has been permitted to hold an enquiry to find out the
      officers in the Basic Education Department responsible for the situation
D     which led to order of reinstatement with all consequential benefits, and
      to effect recovery of the entire amount from the officers found
      responsible.
            4. The facts may be briefly recounted.
             5. The respondent was appointed as an untrained Assistant
E     Teacher on 28.01.1971 in Kanya Karmottar Junior High School, Gaura,
      Rai-Bareli. She was relieved from the aforesaid post on 04.08.1973 to
      undergo the Basic Training Course (for short ‘BTC’). Completion of
      this course was a necessity as per Department Instructions, in order to
      continue on the post on which the respondent was appointed on tenure
      basis. The respondent did not furnish a BTC Training Certificate but
F
      appears to have produced a B.Ed Certificate instead, on the basis of
      which she was not permitted to resume her duties in the year 1974. No
      formal order terminating the services of respondent was passed but
      considering the fact that she was an untrained teacher and was admittedly
      relieved from her duties, her contractual employment came to an end.
G            6. The respondent appears to have made representations, which
      were seemingly ignored by the authorities. For the next several decades,
      respondent continued to make her representations, but did not approach
      a judicial/quasi-judicial forum for relief. She eventually filed a complaint
      before the State Information Commission, Uttar Pradesh, after the
H     enactment of the Right to Information Act, 2005, somewhere in the
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJMATI SINGH                            413


year 2009, and based on her complaint, the Commission passed an               A
order dated 05.03.2009 directing the District Basic Education Officer,
Rai-Bareily to communicate the decision to the respondent on her
representations.
      7. The aforesaid order of the State Information Commission
compelled the District Basic Education Officer to issue a communication       B
dated 04.06.2009 (P-2) which contains a brief history as to how the
respondent failed to produce the required BTC Certificate and was not
permitted to resume her duties. This order, in no way, amounts to fresh
consideration of the representations made by the respondent or rejection
thereof on merits. It simply communicated the history regarding the events
of 1973-1974 when the respondent had worked for a short duration.             C

       8. Claiming that the communication dated 04.06.2009 amounted
to denial of reinstatement to her, the respondent approached the State
Public Services Tribunal (in short, ‘the Tribunal’) on 03.06.2010 but her
Claim Petition was dismissed on 11.06.2010 as being barred by limitation.
The respondent filed a Review Petition but it was dismissed on                D
13.08.2010. Thereafter, the respondent approached the High Court which
vide order dated 02.07.2012 directed the Tribunal to consider the matter
afresh on merits. The Tribunal then passed an order dated 13.12.2013
directing the appellant-authorities to consider and dispose of the
representations filed by the respondent. In compliance with these             E
directions, the District Basic Education Officer considered and rejected
the representation(s) moved by the respondent, on 05.04.2014. In
substance, this was actually the first communication sent to the respondent
which explicitly rejected her claim for reinstatement/rejoining, as the
prior communication had not provided any determination on merits.
                                                                              F
       9. The respondent again approached the High Court challenging
the communication dated 05.04.2014 as well as the order of the Tribunal
dated 13.12.2013. The High Court vide the impugned judgment, as stated
earlier, has modified the Tribunal’s order dated 13.12.2013 and declared
the respondent to have continued in service with all consequential benefits
including the salary.                                                         G
       10. The question that falls for our consideration is whether the
claim of the respondent was inordinately delayed, obsolete, stale, and
barred by the principle of delay and laches and as a civil claim, whether
it was barred by law of limitation?
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414             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 14 S.C.R.


A            11. To trace out the answer to the question formulated above,
      some facts need to be repeated. The respondent was apparently relieved
      on 04-08-1973 to undergo the required BTC courses. She was allegedly
      not permitted to resume duties in the year 1974 after she had completed
      B.Ed. degree. She made several representations, one after the other,
      but did not deem it appropriate to approach any judicial or quasi-judicial
B
      forum. It was only after the enactment of Right to Information Act,
      2005, whereunder the State Information Commission came to be
      constituted, that the respondent moved before the said Commission to
      issue a directive to discover the fate of her representations. The
      Commission passed an Order on 05.03.2009 asking the appellant -
C     authorities to communicate the decision on the representations of the
      respondent and it was in this backdrop that the communication dated
      04.06.2009 was issued by the District Basic Education Officer, which
      according to the respondent revived her pending claim.
             12. In our considered view, the respondent like any vigilant citizen,
D     especially given that she does not belong to economically or socially
      backward segments of the society, was expected to assert her rights
      before an appropriate forum within a reasonable time. Repeated
      representations neither give rise nor revive the cause of action, if it had
      already arisen in the past. Respondent’s difficulties do not end there,
      given that her services were brought to an end when she was denied to
E     resume her duties in the year 1974. She was, thus, required to seek a
      declaration of her continuity or have a writ of mandamus issued for her
      reinstatement. She did not do either. The Information Commission is not
      a forum to adjudicate service disputes. It was not a forum which either
      could declare the rights of the respondent or grant any service benefits.
F     The respondent’s move before the State Information Commission was
      thus an exercise in futility. It leaves no room for doubt that the respondent
      slept over her rights and allowed the grass to grow under her feet for a
      long duration of over 33 years.
            13. We are of the considered opinion that the respondent waived
G     her rights to raise objections in this regard and is deemed to have
      abandoned her employment.
            14. The next question which falls for consideration is whether a
      deemed order of termination of services or abandonment of employment
      could be challenged by the respondent before the Tribunal in the year
H     2010? There can be no quarrel that such a challenge was hopelessly
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJMATI SINGH                              415


time-barred under Section 5 of U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976.       A
       15. The view taken by the Tribunal on 11.06.2010 was legally
correct and tenable. The High Court nevertheless vide Order dated
02.07.2012 passed in the respondent’s Writ Petition set aside the
Tribunal’s order. A perusal of the High Court’s order reveals that neither
the principles of delay and latches nor the law of limitation were              B
considered, with reference to the facts of the case in hand. The High
Court blissfully ignored the proposition of law and proceeded on the
premise that there was no fault on the part of the respondent to file the
claim petition before the Tribunal as “the impugned order was passed on
04.06.2009 xx xx xx”. The High Court completely overlooked the fact
that it was not an order passed on the representations made by the              C
respondent but was a communication sent to her under compulsion due
to the directions issued by the State Information Commission. The said
communication in no way revived the cause of action in favour of the
respondent.
      16. In all fairness and faced with the situation, learned Senior          D
counsel appearing for the respondent relies upon a decision of this Court
in “Basic Shiksha Parishad And Another vs. Sugna Devi (Smt.) And
Others” (2004) 9 SCC 68.
       17. In Sugna Devi’s case, the only issue that arose for consideration
was whether or not she was appointed as an Assistant Teacher and if             E
so, whether her services were terminated illegally. This Court upheld
the finding of fact returned by the High Court which, upon consideration
of the record regarding the payment of salary, transfer orders, joining
reports and letter of authority asking her to present her testimonials etc.,
proceeded to hold that Sugna Devi was actually working as a Teacher.            F
It was further held that her services could not be terminated without
passing a formal order. Consequently, this Court upheld the directions
issued by the High Court to grant “compensation equivalent to the salary
for the last three preceding years before the date of her superannuation”.
       18. In “Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh” (2008) 8 SCC           G
652, this Court summarized the settled principles in the following manner:-
      “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will
      be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is
      sought is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy
      is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of
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416             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 14 S.C.R.


A            the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing
             wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing
             wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking
             remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong
             commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source
             of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance
B
             is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related
             to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the
             issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim
             will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment
             or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of
C            delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the
             claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc..,
             affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine
             of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential
             relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the
             principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a
D
             consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief
             relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the
             date of filing of the writ petition.”
              19. Close to the facts of this case, in “C. Jacob versus Director of
      Geology and Mining And Other” (2008) 10 SCC 115, this Court, having
E     found that the employee suddenly brought up a challenge to the order of
      termination of his services after 20 years and claimed all consequential
      benefits, held that the relief sought for was inadmissible. The legal position
      in this regard was laid out in the following terms:
             “10. Every representation of the Government for relief, may not
F            be applied on merits. Representations relating to matters which
             have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that
             ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard
             to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be
             only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or
G            to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with
             incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant
             particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a
             fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.
             11. When a decision is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or
H            deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed)
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJMATI SINGH                             417


      examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that           A
      failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is
      passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in
      compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order
      does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of
      “acknowledgement of a jural relationship” to give rise to a fresh
                                                                               B
      cause of action.
      12. When a government abandons service to take alternative
      employment or to attend to personal affairs, and does not bother
      to send any letter seeking leave or letter of resignation or letter of
      voluntary retirement, and the records do not show that he is treated
      as being in service, he cannot after two decades, represent that         C
      he should be taken back to duty. Nor can such employee be treated
      as having continued in service, thereby deeming the entire period
      as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. That will be a
      travesty of justice.
      13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents himself and                 D
      suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should be
      taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally
      will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at
      that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to
      produce the records of the enquiry and the order of dismissal/           E
      removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference against the
      employer for not producing records, nor direct reinstatement with
      back wages for 20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or the
      lucrative alternative employment of the employee. Misplaced
      sympathy in such matters will encourage discipline, lead to unjust
      enrichment of the employee at fault and result in drain of public        F
      exchequer. Many a time there is also no application of mind as to
      the extent of financial burden, as a result of a routine order for
      back wages.”
       20. Taking into consideration the cumulative effect of the facts in
this case, coupled with the legal principles cited above, we are satisfied     G
that the claim of the respondent is stale, highly belated, time barred, and
the same ought not to have been entertained by the Tribunal or the High
Court after a span of over three decades.
     21. We reiterate that undue sympathy and a perceived liberal
approach by a judicial forum can lead to significant adverse                   H
418             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 14 S.C.R.


A     consequences. It not only gives rise to illegitimate expectations in the
      mind of fence sitting employees, but also leads to undue burdens on
      the public exchequer. Not only this, the indulgence shown by a Court
      solely on equitable considerations, dehors the law, breeds indiscipline
      in public services and incorrigible employees start looking for a dividend
      on the period of their absence or for dereliction of duty. While there is
B
      no evidence to suggest that the respondent deliberately absented herself
      from duty, the facts speak for themselves in that she failed to take any
      recourse provided under law for more than three decades. We may
      say at the cost of repetition that the respondent had hardly served as
      an untrained teacher on temporary basis for a period of 2½ years and
C     in terms of the impugned judgment of the High Court, she has been
      held entitled to get arrears of pay of more than 40 years, besides all
      the retiral benefits. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court
      ought not to have drawn adverse inferences against the appellants or
      put the entire onus on them to prove that the respondent was
      unjustifiably denied the resumption of duties. The approach of the High
D
      Court in this regard is completely erroneous and contrary to the settled
      principles of law. The impugned Judgment thus cannot sustain and is
      liable to be set aside.
             22. Having held so, let us look into the conduct of the appellants
      as well. It is true that the State Information Commission had no authority
E     to intrude into a service dispute and pass an inappropriate order like
      dated 05.03.2009. The Tribunal, however, corrected that error and turned
      down the respondent’s claims being barred by limitation. That order was
      nullified by the High Court vide impugned Judgment dated 02.07.2012.
      The appellants sat silent and accepted that verdict without any murmur.
F     The said Judgment has, in a way, attained finality, though it is legally
      unsustainable. Having accepted that Judgment, the appellants ought to
      have been prepared to face the next consequence which fell on them
      when the Tribunal directed them to decide the respondent’s
      representations afresh. This led to the revival of a ghost claim after over
      30 years. The appellants were expected to immediately understand the
G     implications and consequences of events as they unfolded but they
      remained silent on the judgment dated 02.07.2012. Under these
      circumstances, the appellants are also partially responsible for engendering
      hope in respondent at a juncture when she was nearing the age of
      superannuation.
H
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJMATI SINGH                              419


       23. Taking into consideration the cumulative effects of all the facts    A
and circumstances, while we set aside the impugned Judgment dated
24.01.2017 of the High Court and reject the claim of the respondent for
reinstatement, retiral benefits or arrears of pay etc., we direct the
appellants to pay a lump-sum compensation of a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-
(Five Lakh) within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a
                                                                                B
copy of this Order to the respondent.
       24. The appeal stands allowed in the above terms.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                          Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Neha Sharma, LCRA)
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