TUKARAM DNYANESHWAR PATILversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

                         [2015] 3 S.C.R. 526


A               TUKARAM DNYANESHWAR PATIL

                                  v.
                STATE OF MAHARASHTRA& ORS.
B                (Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 2015)

                          MARCH 13, 2015

          [V. GOPALA GOWDA AND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.]
c       . ·. Pena/code, 1860: s.302 rlws.34; s.304 Part II rlws.34
    - OiS"fJute between victim-deceased and accused persons
    over the boundary of the field - On the fateful day, A-1
    assaulted the deceased with sickle on his left ear and A-2
o   and A-3 assaulted him by means of sticks on his head and
    mouth - When PW-1, brother of the deceased intervened,
    A-1 to A-3 assaulted him with sticks on his ann and head -
    Later the deceased succumbed to injuries - Trial court
    convicted the accused u/s. 302 rlw s. 34- High Court modified
E   conviction to s.304 Part II rlw s.34 and directed the accused
    to pay Rs.105000 to PW1 and family members of the
    dece;J€;~d
           :·.,;t.
                   - Held: In view of the evidence on record, there
    was h"iJ'.error in impugned order convicting the accused ul
    s.304 Part {I - However, the sentence awarded was
F   inappropriate - Respondents 2 to 4 had undergone only
    eleven months imprisonment- High Court while altering the
    conviction to s.304 Part-II, altered the sentence to·
    imprisonment for period already undergone and directed to
G   pay a sum of Rs.350001- each to the complainant- The facts
    and circumstances of the case proved by the prosecution in
    bringing home the guilt of the acc1t16ed uls. 304 Part-II
    undoubtedly show a despicable· aggravated offence
    warranting punishment proportionate to the crime - The
H   sentence of eleven months was too meagre -                  The
                                526
    TUKARAM DNYANESHWAR PATIL v. STATE OF                 527
               MAHARASHTRA

imposition of five years rigorous imprisonf]1ent on each of A
the accused would meet the ends of justice - Sentence/
Sentencing.

      Disposing of the appeals, the Court
                                                           B
      HELD: 1. After analyzing the evidence, the High
Court held that there was quarrel which led to the
occurrence and the accused had also injuries and they
cannot be held guilty of the offence of murder and since
they had knowledge that their act is likely to cause death c ·
they are liable to be convicted for the offence under · ·
Section 304 Part-II IPC. There was no error in the said
conclusion of the High Court. [Para 9] [532-C-D]

        2. Respondents 2 to 4/accused nos.1 to 3 were D
arrested on 29.10.1997 and they were ordered to ·.t;>e • .
released on bail on 28.9.1998 and they have undergone
only eleven months imprisonment The High Court while
altering the conviction to Section 304 Part-11 IPC, altered
the sentence to imprisonment for period already E
undergone and directed to pay a sum of Rs.35000/- each
to the complainant Both the State and complainant have
challenged this alteration of sentence. Sentencing is an
important task in the matters of crime. One of the prime
objectives of the criminal law is imposition of appropriate, F
adequate, just and proportionate sentence
commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and
the manner in which the crime is done. [Paras 10, 11]
[532-E-H; 533-A]
                                                             G
  StateofU.P. v. Shri Kishan(2005) 10 SCC 420: (2004)
  6 Suppl. SCR 530 - relied on.

3. The facts and circumstances of the case which have
                                                            H
528         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015) 3 S.C.R.


A been proved by the prosecution in bringing home the
  guilt of the accused under Section 304 Part-II IPC
  undoubtedly show a despicable aggravated offence
  warranting punishment proportionate to the crime. The
  sentence of eleven months awarded by the High Court
B to the respondents for the said conviction is too meagre
  and not adequate and it would be travesty of justice. It
  is true that each of the appellant was directed to pay
  compensation of Rs.35000/- but no amount of
C compensation could relieve the family of victim from the
  constant agony. The imposition of five years rigorous
  imprisonment on each of the respondent nos.2 to 4 for
  the conviction under Section 304 Part-11 IPC would meet
  the ends of justice. [Para 12] [534-B-E]
D
                        Case Law Reference

      (2004) 6 Suppl. SCR 530      relied on        Para 11

  CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
E 442 of2015

      From the Judgment and Order dated 14.07.2011 of the High
      Court of Bombay at Nagpur Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 284
      of1998
F
                                WITH
      Crl.A. Nos. 443/2015@SLP (Crl.) No. 1505/2012
  Shankar Chillarge, A.G.A., SatyajitA. Desai, Ms. Anagha S.
G Desai, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Kishor Lambat, Rabin Majumder
  fortheAppearing Parties.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

H C. NAGAPPAN, J. 1. Leave granted in both the appeals.
    TUKARAM DNYANESHWAR PATIL v. STATE OF                        529
        MAHARASHTRA [C. NAGAPPAN, J.]

      2. Both the appeals are preferred against the judgment      A
dated 14.7.2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay, Nagpur Bench at Nagpur in Criminal Appeal No.284
of 1998, whereby the High Court partly allowed the said
Criminal Appeal filed by respondents 2 to 4 herein/accused 1
to 3 and thereby set aside their conviction and sentence under    B
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and instead convicted
them for offence under Section 304 Part-II read with Section
34 IPC and sentenced them to imprisonment for period already
undergone and directed them to pay jointly and severally a        C
sum of Rs.1,05,000/- to PW1 Narayan Patil and family
members of the deceased as compensation in default to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and the High
Court maintained the conviction of the accused persons under
Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC but reduced the              o
sentence to the period already undergone. Aggrieved by the
same the State has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 443 of2015
 (@ SLP(Crl.) No.1505 of 2012. The complainant Tukaram
 Dnyaneshwar Patil also preferred appeal in Criminal Appeal
 No. 442 of 2015 (@SLP(Crl.) No.1506 of 2012. Since both          E
the appeals have been preferred against the same judgment,
they are heard together and a common judgment is rendered.

     3. Briefly the facts are stated as follows : The accused
and the deceased belonged to village Tuljapur Tah. Wardha. F
PW1 Narayan Patil is the brother of deceased Dnyaneshwar
Patil and he was also residing in the same village. Tukaram is
the son of the deceased. There was a dispute between the
deceased Dnyaneshwar Patil and accused A1-Dipak, A2-
Prashant and A3-Pawan over the boundary of the field and on G
22.10.1997 accused no.1 assaulted Dnyaneshwar Patil by
means of sickle on the left ear and A2 and A3 assaulted him
by means of sticks on his head and mouth. When PW1
Narayan Patil intervened, accused nos.1to3 assaulted him H
530           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 3 S.C.R.
                  /



A     with sticks on his arni and head. PWs 2 to 4, PW8 and PW9
      witnessed the occurrence. The injured were taken to
      Sewagram Hospital.

         4. PW6 Dr. Rajeshkumarexamined and found the following
B     injuries o~ the person of Dnyaneshwar Patil :

      (i)     Bleeding from nose and left ear.

      (ii)    Lacerated wound on left mastoid, 5 cm x 2 cm.

c     (iii)   Lacerated wound on medial aspect of pinna.

      (iv)    Fracture of mandible.

              Exh.64 injury report was issued by him.
D
            PW6 Dr. Rajeshkumar found the following injuries on
    the person of PW1 Narayan Patil :

      (i)     Lacerated would on left side of the back 5 cm x 3 cm.

E     (ii)    Abrasion on left upper arm 7 cm x 5 cm.

    (iii)     Abrasion on right upper arm 7 cm x 4 cm.

    (iv)      Abrasion on right side of back 10 cm x 4 cm.

F   He opined that all the above injuries were simple in nature and
    caused by blunt object.

        5. The head constable of medical booth Sewagram
  Hospital recorded the complaint given by PW1 Narayan Patil
G and sent the same to Sindi Police Station, on which a case in
  Crime no.122 of 97 came to be registered under Section 326
  read with Section 34 IPC and PW14 P.S.I. of Sindi Police
  Station took up the case for investigation. In the meantime,
  both injured were shifted to Nagpur Medical College Hospital.
H
      TUKARAM DNYANESHWAR PATIL v. STATE OF                        531
          MAHARASHTRA [C. NAGAPPAN, J.]

  Dnyaneshwar Patil died on 25.10.1997 in the hospital and on A
  receiving the intimation the case was altered to one under
  Section 302 IPC. Inquest was conducted and witnesses were
  examined.

        6. PW12 Dr. Pradip Jadhao and Dr. V.R. Agrawal              B
  conducted post mortem on the body of Dnyaneshwar Patil in
  the Nagpur Hospital on 26.10.1997 and they found fracture
  base of skull and haematoma under the scalp over left temporo
  parieto occipital region. The opinion was given that death was
  caused due to injuries no.3 and 4 mentioned in the post mortem    C
  report. After the investigation charge sheet came to be filed
  and the case was committed to the court of Sessions. Charges
  under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 324 read
  with Section 34 were framed against the accused and they          D
  were convicted and sentenced as stated supra. Challenging
  the same accused nos.1 to 3 preferred appeal and the High
  Court altered the conviction and sentence as mentioned above.
  Aggrieved by the same, the State as well as the complainant,
  have preferred the present appeals.                               E

         7. We heard learned counsel for the appellant in both the
  appeals and the learned counsel for the respondents. The
  ocular witnesses PWs1 to 4, PW8 and PW9 have testified
  about the attack made by respondents 2 to 4/accused nos.1 F
  to 3 on Dnyaneshwar Patil at the time of occurrence. Relying
  on their testimonies the courts below have rightly concluded
' that the occurrence stands proved.

         8. After the occurrence Dnyaneshwar Patil was taken to G
  Sewagram Hospital and PW6 Dr. Rajeshkumar examined him
  and found lacerated wounds on left mastoid, medial aspect of
  pinna and noticed fracture of mandible. He was shifted to
  Nagpur Medical College Hospital where he succumbed to
  injuries. PW12 Dr. Pradip Jadhao along with another surgeon H
532         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 3 S.C.R.


A conducted autopsy on his body and they found fracture of skull
  with haematoma present under the scalp over left temporo
  parieto occipital region. They have expressed opinion that
  the death has occurred due to the injuries found on left mastoid
  region and over left pinna. PW12 Dr. Pradip Jadhao has also
B stated in the chief-examination that the said injuries are
  sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
  Accepting the medical evidence it is clear that Dnyaneshwar
  Patil died of homicidal violence.

C           9. After analyzing the evidence the High Court held that
      there was quarrel which led to the occurrence and the accused
      had also injuries and they cannot be held guilty of the offence
      of murder and since they had knowledge that their act is likely
      to cause death they are liable to be convicted for the offence
0
      under Section 304 Part-11 IPC. We do not fi!1d any error in the
      said conclusion ofthe High Court.

        10. The disturbing feature is the sentence awarded by
  the High Court to the respondents 2 to 4 for the conviction
E under Section 304 Part-11 IPC. As mentioned in the impugned
  judgment the respondents 2 to 4/accused nos.1 'to 3 were
  arrested on 29.10.1997 and they were ordered to be released
  on bail on 28.9.1998 and they have undergone only eleven
F months imprisonment. The High Court while altering the
  conviction to Section 304 Part-11 IPC, altered the sentence to
  imprisonment for period already undergone and directed to
  pay a sum of Rs.35000/- each to the complainant. Both the
  State and complainant have challenged this alteration of
G sentence.

       11. Sentencing is an important task in the matters of
  crime. One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is
  imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate
H sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime
    TUKARAM DNYANESHWAR PATIL v. STATE OF                        533
        MAHARASHTRA [C. NAGAPPAN, J.]

and the manner in which the crime is done. With reference to A
sentencing by courts, this Court in the decision in State of           •
U.P. vs. Shri Kishan (2005) 10 SCC 420 made these weighty
observations :

  "5. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence                B
  would do more harm to the justice system to undermine
  the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society
  could not long endure under such serious threats. It is,
  therefore, the duty of every court to award proper
  sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and         c
  the manner in which it was executed or committed,
  etc.............

  7. The object should be to protect the society and to deter
  the criminal in achieving the avowed object of law by           D
  imposing appropriate sentence. It is expected that the
  courts would operate the sentencing system so as to
  impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of
  the society and the sentencing pro~ss has to be stern
  where it should be.                                             E

  8. ................. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre
  sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on
  account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will
  be resultwise counterproductive in the long run and             F
  against societal interest which needs to be cared for
  and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the
  sentencing system.

  9. The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate        G
  punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been
  committed not only against the individual victim but also
  against the society to which the criminal and victim
  belong. The punishmentto be awarded for a crime must
                                                                  H
534          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 3 S.C.R.


A        not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be
         consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the
         crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime
         warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to
         the society's cry for justice against the criminal".
B
           12. The facts and circumstances of the case which have
  been proved by the prosecution in bringing home the guilt of
  the accused under Section 304 Part-11 IPC undoubtedly show
  a despicable aggravated offence warranting punishment
C proportionate to the crime. The sentence of eleven months
  awarded by the High Court to the respondents for the said
  conviction is too meagre and not adequate and in our view it
  would be travesty of justice. It is true that each of the appellant
  was directed to pay compensation of Rs.35000/- but no amount
0
  of compensation could relieve the family of victim from the
  constant agony. We are of the considered view that imposition
  of five years rigorous imprisonment on each of the respondent
  nos.2 to 4 for the conviction under Section 304 Part-11 IPC would
E meet the ends of justi~. We sustain the other conviction and
  sentence imposed on the said respondents.

          13. In the result both the criminal appeals are partly
  allowed and the sentence of imprisonment for period already
F undergone for the conviction under Section 304 Part-11 IPC is
  set aside and instead the respondents 2 to 4/accused nos.1
  to 3 are sentenced to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment
  each. All other conviction and sentence imposed on them by
  the High Court are maintained. They are directed to surrender
G before the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Wardha to serve
  out the remaining sentence, failing which the learned 2nd
  Additional Sessions Judge is requested to take them into
  custody and send them to jail to serve their left over sentence.

H     Devika Gujral                                Appeals disposed of.
                    [2015] 3 S.C.R. 535


             SUJITENDRANATH S!NGH ROY                           A
                              v.
            STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

              Civil Appeal No. 7535 OF 2011                     B

                     MARCH 13, 2015

   [VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.]

        West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act,
                                                                c
1997,· s.15- Writ application against an orderof W.B. Land
Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal refusing to initiate contempt
proceedings against an authority - High Court held the writ
petition to be not maintainable - Propriety of - Held: The o
power ofjudicial review of the High Court u!Articles 2261227
of the Constitution cannot be taken away by a law or even by
a constitutional amendment - Hence, it will be a rare case
where High Court can hold a writ petition against any order of
inferior court or tribunal to be not maintainable - However, it E
is always open for the High Court, in appropriate cases, to
hold that a writ petition is not entertainable on account of
propriety, constitutional scheme, some settled rules of self-
restraint or its peculiar facts - Matter remitted back to High
Court for considering the writ petition afresh on its own merits F
and as per law- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - s.19 -
Constitution of India, 1950 -Articles 226, 227.

       Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                G
       HELD: 1. Under Section 15 of the West Bengal
Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997, the
Tribunal has been vested with such power to punish for
its contempt as is vested in the High Court under the
                                                                H
                            535
536      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 3 S.C.R.

A provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Under
  Section 19 of the Act of 1971, an appeal lies before the
  Supreme Court only against such order of the High Court
  which imposes punishment for contempt and no appeal
  will lie against an interlocutory order or an order dropping
B or refusing to initiate contempt proceedings. [Paras 4
  and 5) [538-F-G; 539-DJ

         2. It is incorrect to say that writ petition under
  Article 2261227 of the Constitution is not maintainable
C when the Tribunal refuses to initiate a contempt
  proceeding. The submission that because of similar
  powers of contempt vested in the Tribunal under Section
  15 of the Act of 1997, the Tribunal ceases to be inferior to
  the High Court for exercise of writ jurisdiction is devoid
0
  of any substance because it ignores that High Courts
  have constitutional status and are vested with
  extraordinary writ jurisdiction whereas the Tribunal is
  only a creature of statute. The power of judicial review
E of the High Court under Article 2261227 of the
  Constitution cannot be taken away by a law or even by
  a constitutional amendment The matter is remitted back
  to the High Court for considering the writ petition of the
  appellant afresh on ils own merils and as per law. [Paras
F 8 to 10) [540-E-F; 541-A-B, D and F-G]

      Manju Banetjee v. Debabrata Pal2006 (1) WBLR (Cal)
      147 -disapproved.

      L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC
G
      261:1997 (2) SCR 1186- relied on.

      State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy (1996) 4
      SCC 411: 1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 166; Midnapore
      Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chuni/al Nanda (2006) 5
H
 SUJITENDRA NATH SINGH ROY v. STATE OF WEST                    537
               BENGAL & ORS.

  SCC 399: 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 986 - referred to.               A

                  Case Law Reference

2006 (1) WBLR (Cal) 147         disapproved. Para 1

1997 (2) SCR 1186               relied on.      Para3           B

1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 166         referred to.    Para 5

2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 986         referred to.    Para 5

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. C
7535of2011.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 20.03.2009 of the
Calcutta High Court in W.P.L.R.T. No. 54 of 2009.
                                                                D
       Bhaskar Gupta, R. K. Gupta, S. K. Gupta, M. K. Singh,
B. P. Gupta, Shekhar KumarfortheAppellant.

      Anip Sachthey, Saakaar Sardana for the Respondents.
                                                                E
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for
both the parties. This appeal has been preferred to assail an
order dated 20th March 2009 by the High Court at Calcutta in F
W.P.L.R.T. No.54 of 2009. The High Court placed reliance
upon a Division Bench judgment of that very Court in the case
of Manju Banerjee v. Debabrata Pal reported in (2006) 1
WBLR (Cal) 147 and held the writ petition preferred by the
appellant to be not maintainable.                             G

        . 2. The issue raised in this appeal is whether a writ
application is maintainable against an order of West Berigal
Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal ('the Tribunal'), refusing
to initiate contempt proceedings against an authority arrayed H
538         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2015] 3 S.C.R.



A     as respondent no.5 before the Tribunal. Such pristine question
      of law does not require any reference to the facts which led the
      appellant to file O.A.No.2744 of 2007 corresponding to
      M.A.No.24 of 2008 before the Tribunal with a prayer to initiate
      proceeding under the Contempt of Court$ Act, 1971.
B
         3. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed before
  us the Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court in the
  case of Manji.J Banerjee (supra) and has submitted that the
  view taken therein that there is no right of appeal against
C dismissal of contempt proceeding, is correct and requires no
  discussion but the further view that even in gross cases of
  palpable contempt the concerned informant aggrieved by
  refusal to initiate contempt proceeding can move only the
  Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India,
0
  has been assailed on the ground that such observation in the
  judgment is on account of non-appreciation of relevant facts in
  the judgment of the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in
  the case· of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India ( 1997) 3
E sec 261.

          4. On behalf of appellant, it was further submitted that
  judgment in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) was
  rendered on 18th March 1997. The relevantAct, i.e., The West
F Bengal Land Reforms & Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (for brevity
  referred to as the 'Act of 1997') was enacted subsequently in
  terms of the enabling provisions under Article 323B of the
  Constitution of India. Under Section 15 of the Act of 1997 the
  Tribunal has been vested with such power to punish for its
G contempt as is vested in the High Court under the provisions
  of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. For convenience, Section
  15 is set out hereinbelow :

        "15. Power to punish for contempt of Tribunal.-The
H       Tribunal shall have, and shall exercise, the same
 SUJITENDRA NATH SINGH ROY v. STATE OF WEST                   539
      BENGAL& ORS. [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.]

  jurisdiction, power and authority in respect of contempt      A
  of the Tribunal as a High Court has and may exercise,
  and, for this purpose, the provisions of the Contempt of
  Courts Act, 1971, shall have effect, subject to the
  modifications that-
                                                                B
  (a) the reference therein to a High Court shall be
      construed as a reference t9 the Tribunal, and

  (b) the reference therein to the Advocate-General in
      Section 15 of the said Act shall be construed as a        c
      reference to the Advocate-General of the State."

        5. There is no caveat to the proposition of law that under
Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 an appeal
lies before the Supreme Court only against such order of the ·  o
High Court which imposes punishment for contempt and no
appeal will lie against an interlocutory order or an order
dropping or refusing to initiate contempt proceedings. This
was clearly laid down in the case of State of Maharashtra v.
Mahboob S. Allibhoy (1996) 4 SCC 411. This view was· E
also followed in several cases induding in the case of
Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chuni/al Nanda
(2006) 5 sec 399.

       6. In the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) a F
Constitution Bench of this Court declared certain clauses in
Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution of India to be
unconstitutional to the extent they excluded the jurisdiction of
the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/
227and 32 of the Constitution. This was on the premise that G
power of judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the
Constitution and, therefore, could not be taken away even by
constitutional amendment. Paragraphs 91, 92 and 93 of this
judgment were highlighted by learned counsel for the appellant . H
540         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015) 3 S.C.R.


A     in support of his submission that all decisions of tribunals
      created pursuant to Article 323A or Article 323B of the
      Constitution have been held to be subject to the High Courts'
      writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.

B        7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
  respondents relied upon paragraph 4 in the case of Mahboob
  S. Allibhoy (supra) wherein it was clarified that no appeal is
  maintainable against an order dropping proceeding for
  contempt or refusing to initiate a proceeding for contempt in
C terms of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It
  was also submitted that since under Section 15 of the Act of
  1997 the Tribunal enjoys same jurisdiction, power and authority
  as a High Court in respect of contempt under the provisions of
  the Contempt of Courts Act, therefore, High Court cannot
0
  exercise power of judicial review when the Tribunal exercises
  same powers as that of the High Court to reject or drop a
  contempt petition.

          8. On a careful consideration of judgment of the Division
E Bench in the case of Manju Banerjee (supra) which has been
  followed in the impugned order, we are unable to agree with
  the view that writ petition under Article 226/227 of the
  Constitution is not maintainable when the Tribunal refuses to
F initiate a contempt proceeding. Such inference has been
  drawn by the Division Bench on the basis of some judgments
  of this Court such as in the case of D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal
  (1988) 3 SCC 26. In those cases the order refusing to initiate
  proceeding had been passed by the High Court and not by a
G tribunal and, therefore, this Court observed that in a fit and
  proper case the aggrieved person who informed the court of
  the alleged act of contempt can approach the Supreme Court
  under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Obviously in those
  cases there could be no occasion to observe that the aggrieved
H
  SUJITENDRA NATH SINGH ROY v. STATE OF WEST                      541
       BENGAL& ORS. [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.]

person can also approach the High Court under Article 226/ A
227. The submission that because of similar powers of
contempt vested in the Tribunal under Section 15 of theAct of
1997, the Tribunal ceases to be inferior to the High Court for
exercise of writ jurisdiction is devoid of any substance because
it ignores that High Courts have constitutional status and are B
vested with extraordinary writ jurisdiction whereas the Tribunal
is only a creature of statute. Hence, in our considered view, in
the case of Manju Banjerjee (supra) the Division Bench of
the Calcutta High Court does not lay down the law correctly C
that when the tribunal refuses to initiate contempt proceeding,
the aggrieved person has remedy only under Article 136 and
not under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.

        9. As held by the Constitution Bench in the case of L.
Chandra Kumar (supra) the power of judicial review of the D
High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution cannot
be taken away by a law or even by a constitutional amendment.
Hence, it will be indeed a rare case where the High Court can
hold that a writ petition against any order of inferior court or E
tribunal is not maintainable. However, we hasten to add that it
is always open for the High Court, in appropriate cases, to
hold that a writ petition is not entertainable on account of
propriety, constitutional scheme, some settled rules of self- ·
restraint or its peculiar facts.                                 F

        10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned
order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the High
Court for considering the writ petition of the appellant afresh
on its own merits and as per law. We make it clear that we G
have not applied ourselves to the merits of the matter. The
appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs.

Devika Gujral                                   Appeal allowed.
                                                                   H