Holding

The Supreme Court held that the Central Complaints Committee was duly empowered to consider the second complaint, to question witnesses as part of its fact‑finding role, and that its findings were based on admissible evidence, rendering the High Court’s order setting aside the penalty erroneous.

Summary

The case concerns Dilip Paul, a former Area Organizer of the Service Selection Board, who was penalised with a 50% pension withholding after a Central Complaints Committee (CCC) found him guilty of sexual harassment based on a first complaint and a later second complaint filed by a female employee. The appellant (Union of India) challenged the High Court's order that set aside the penalty, arguing that the CCC was authorised to consider the second complaint, to question witnesses, and that its findings were supported by evidence, not conjecture. The Supreme Court held that the CCC’s jurisdiction under the 2006 Standing Order allowed it to entertain the second complaint, that asking questions of witnesses is a permissible fact‑finding function, and that the evidence on record was sufficient to support the findings. Consequently, the High Court’s decision was reversed and the disciplinary penalty was restored.

Issues considered

Whether the Central Complaints Committee could lawfully consider the second complaint filed on 18‑09‑2012.
Whether the Committee acted as a prosecutor by questioning witnesses, thereby vitiating the disciplinary inquiry.
Whether the Committee's findings were based on conjecture and amounted to a case of ‘no evidence’.
Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the penalty imposed on the respondent.

Legislation cited

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965s. Rule 14, s. Rule 15
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964s. Rule 3C
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. Section 165
Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013
Standing Order No.1 of 2006 (Grievances Redressal Mechanism: To Redress Grievances of Women/Sexual Harassment at Workplace)s. Clause 10(i), s. Clause 10(viii), s. Clause 9

Subjects

sexual harassmentdisciplinary proceedingsCentral Complaints Committeetest of prejudiceno evidence doctrineservice lawstandard of proofnatural justice2006 Standing OrderCCS Rulesevidence

Judgment

[2023] 13 S.C.R. 473 : 2023 INSC 975

CASE DETAILS

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
V.
DILIP PAUL
(Civil Appeal No. 6190 of 2023)
NOVEMBER 06, 2023
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, CJI,
J. B. PARDIWALA AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issues for consideration:
In an appeal directed against the judgment passed by the High
Court by which it allowed the writ petition ﬁled by respondent and thereby
set aside the order of penalty of withholding of 50% of his pension for all
times to come, imposed upon the respondent in connection with disciplinary
proceedings initiated against him on allegations of a lady employee of sexual
harassment at workplace, the following questions arose for consideration:-
I. Whether the Central Complaints Committee constituted by the
Competent authority to inquire into the ﬁrst complaint dated 30.08.2011
committed error in looking into the second complaint dated 18.09.2012
containing additional allegations against the respondent alongwith few other
documents including anonymous complaints made against the respondent
in October 2011;
II. Whether the Central Complaints Committee erred in assuming the
role of a prosecutor by putting questions to the witnesses in the course of
departmental enquiry and thereby vitiating the disciplinary proceedings; and
III. Whether the Central Complaints Committee could be said to have
based its ﬁndings on mere conjectures and surmises and the case on hand
was one of “No Evidence”
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Standing Order No. 1 of 2006

473
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

(Grievances Redressal Mechanism: To Redress Grievances of Women/
Sexual Harassment at Work Place) – Clauses 9 and 10(i) – Sexual
harassment at workplace – Lady employee lodged complaint against
respondent and subsequently submitted another (second) complaint
containing additional allegations against respondent alongwith few
other documents including anonymous complaints made against the
respondent – Central Complaint Committee, constituted to inquire
into the ﬁrst complaint, also looked into the second complaint – High
Court held that the Central Complaints Committee was constituted
by the competent authority to only inquire into the ﬁrst complaint –
Correctness of.
Held: Irrespective of whether a prior complaint had already been made
to any authority, a complaint regarding sexual harassment could be made
under Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order to the complaints committee
as-well – In the instant case, the second complaint had been promptly
preferred right after the Central Complaints Committee was constituted and
duly before its ﬁrst hearing – The High Court’s reasoning that as the Central
Complaints Committee was constituted on the basis of the ﬁrst complaint,
its scope of inquiry was restricted to its content, is completely erroneous
inasmuch as the Central Complaints Committee owed its existence to the
2006 Standing Order and not to the complaint – Moreover, even if it is
assumed for a moment that the complaints committee owed its existence to
the complaint, Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order envisages ﬁling of
a complaint to the complaints committee i.e., it envisages a situation where
after a complaints committee had come into existence, a complaint may be
preferred to it – In sensitive matters such as sexual harassment & misconduct,
there is an obligation to look into the entire evidence of the complainant
that inspires conﬁdence – It would be quite preposterous to hold that the
complainant was precluded from making the second complaint before the
Central Complaints Committee merely because she had already made one
complaint – In the context of the second complaint, the only relevant aspect
that required consideration was whether any serious prejudice was caused to
the respondent – On facts, no prejudice could be said to have been caused
to the respondent even if one believes that he was not asked to plead guilty
to the second complaint – High Court mechanically proceeded to set-aside
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 475

the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority on the ground
that there was nothing to indicate that the respondent was asked whether
he pleaded guilty to the charges imputed in the second complaint without
applying the principle of “test of prejudice” [Paras 49, 50, 55, 56, 65 and 66]
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Standing Order No. 1 of 2006
(Grievances Redressal Mechanism: To Redress Grievances of Women/
Sexual Harassment at Work Place) – Clause 10(viii) – Sexual harassment
at workplace – Lady employee lodged complaint – Disciplinary
proceedings conducted under Rule 14 of the 1965 CCS Rules – Central
Complaint Committee constituted by the Competent authority to make
inquiry had put questions to the witnesses in a departmental inquiry
– Whether the same vitiated the inquiry proceedings – Service Law –
Central Civil Services (Classiﬁcation, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965
– r.14 – Disciplinary proceedings – “Fact Finding” Authority.
Held: It is the Inquiry Authority and the Disciplinary Authority who are
the fact ﬁnding authorities in a disciplinary proceeding – A perusal of r.14
of the 1965 CCS Rules makes it clear that, where a ‘Presenting Oﬃcer’ has
been appointed by the Disciplinary Authority, such Oﬃcer shall present the
case in support of the articles of charge. Conversely, what logically transpires
from the aforesaid is that, where no presenting oﬃcer has been appointed,
the duty or role to present the case in support of the articles of charge falls
back on the Disciplinary Authority or the Inquiry Authority as the case may
be – The power and discretion of the complaints committee to put question
to the witnesses is further reﬂected though implicitly in Clause 10(viii) of
the 2006 Standing Order – There appears to be neither any statutory bar nor
any logic to restrict the power of the complaints committee to put questions
to the witnesses only to the context enumerated in the aforesaid provision
– One fails to understand what other purpose the complaints committee
which is deemed to be an ‘inquiry authority’ would serve, if it is held that
the complaints committee cannot put questions to the witnesses – If s.165
of the Evidence Act, 1872 permits a Judge to put questions to the parties
or to the witnesses in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant
facts and this provision being widely used by the judges throughout the
country, how the complaints committee after being equated with a judge
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

in a judicial proceeding can be denied that privilege – High Court was not
correct in taking the view that the proceedings stood vitiated because the
Central Complaints Committee put questions to the prosecution witnesses.
[Paras 69,73,75, 77 and 78]
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Whether the Central Complaints
Committee based its ﬁndings on conjectures and surmises – Whether
the instant case is one of “no evidence”.
Held: The evidence taken into consideration by the Central Complaints
Committee for arriving at the conclusion that the charges were held to be
proved would indicate that this was not a case of “no evidence” – Some
evidence has come on record to indicate or rather substantiate the allegations
of sexual harassment levelled by the complainant – The allegation related to
the respondent making unsolicited phone calls to the complainant, although
no evidence of the call recordings had been produced to substantiate the
same, was rightly accepted by the Central Complaints Committee keeping
in mind the background of the case – The ﬁndings of the Central Complaints
Committee could not be said to be based on conjectures and surmises – The
Central Complaints Committed duly noted that the non-availability of the
call records was owed to the fact that the inquiry into the complainant’s
grievances was undertaken after a lapse of signiﬁcant time – Moreover, said
ﬁnding is fortiﬁed by the oral evidence of one of the witnesses who deposed
that he was aware of the respondent making calls to the complainant. [Paras
94, 95, 96 and 97]
Service Law – Disciplinary inquiry – Standard of Proof.
Held: In a disciplinary inquiry, the standard of proof is preponderance
of probabilities – The courts must only interfere where the ﬁndings are either
perverse or based on no evidence at all. [Para 93]
Service Law – Disciplinary proceedings – Scope of judicial review.
Held: It is well settled that when it comes to disciplinary proceedings,
it is the inquiry authority and the disciplinary authority who could be said
to be the fact-ﬁnding authority and the courts in exercise of their powers of
judicial review should not sit in appeal and re-appreciate the evidence or
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 477

substitute its own ﬁndings – The scope of judicial review of the courts is
limited only to the propriety of the decision-making process and the fairness
of the inquiry procedure. [Para 42]
Doctrines / Principles – Principle of “Test of Prejudice” – In Service
Jurisprudence – Discussed. [Paras 57 and 58]
Doctrines / Principles – Principle of “No Evidence” – In Service
Jurisprudence – Discussed. [Paras 79, 80, 86 and 89]
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Historical Background –
Statutory Scheme – Discussed. [Paras 31-38]
Crime against Women – Sexual harassment – Veracity and
genuineness of complaint should be scrutinised to prevent misuse –
Duty of the courts.
Held: Sexual harassment in any form at the work place must be viewed
seriously – However, the charge of this nature is very easy to make and is very
diﬃcult to rebut – When a plea is taken of false implication for extraneous
reasons, the courts have a duty to make deeper scrutiny of the evidence and
decide the acceptability or otherwise of the accusations – The veracity and
genuineness of the complaint should be scrutinised to prevent any misuse
of such laudable laws enunciated for the upliftment of the society and for
equal rights of people without gender discrimination by anybody under the
garb of “sexual harassment”, lest justice rendering system would become
a mockery. [Para 2]

LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

State of Haryana and Another v. Rattan Singh (1977) 2 SCC 491;
Pravin Kumar v. Union of India and Others (2020) 9 SCC 471 : [2020] 7
SCR 1078; Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra (1999) 1
SCC 759 : [1999] 1 SCR 117; West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO Ltd.) v. Ram
Pravesh Singh (2008) 3 SCC 729 : [2008] 2 SCR 247; B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 749 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644; Union
of India and Others v. Mudrika Singh (2021) 14 SCALE 509 and Managing
Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others v. B. Karunakar and Others (1993)
4 SCC 727 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 576 - relied on.
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others (1997) 6 SCC 241
: [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404; Medha Kotwal Lele and Others v. Union of India
and Others (2013) 1 SCC 297 : [2012] 9 SCR 895; Aureliano Fernandes v.
State of Goa and Others 2023 SCC OnLine SC 621; State Bank of Patiala
and Others v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364 : [1996] 3 SCR 972; State of
U.P. v. Harendra Arora and Another (2001) 6 SCC 392 : [2001] 3 SCR 375;
Sakshi v. Union of India and Others (2004) 5 SCC 518 : [2004] 2 Suppl.
SCR 723; State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. S. Sree Rama Rao AIR
1963 SC 1723 : [1964] 3 SCR 25; State of Andhra Pradesh and Others
v. Chitra Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC 557 : [1976] 1 SCR 521; Union of
India v. H.C. Goel AIR 1964 SC 364 : [1964] 4 SCR 718; R. Mahalingam
v. Chairman, Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission and Another (2013)
14 SCC 379; Vijay Shankar Pandey v. Union of India (2014) 10 SCC 589
: [2014] 13 SCR 1238 - referred to.
Regina v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex parte Moore
(1965) 1 Q.B. 456; The King v. Carson Roberts 1908 (1) K.B., 407; French
Kier Developments Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment 1977 (1)
All ELR 297 and Edward (Inspector of Taxes, Bairstow) (1956) Appeal
Cases, 14 - referred to.
Bernard Schwartz’s Treatise on Administrative Law, 1976 Edition, at
page 595 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6190 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.05.2019 of the High Court of
Gauhati in WPC No.7876 of 2015.
Appearances:
K. Parmeshwar, Ms. Rekha Pandey, Ms. Vaishali Verma, Ms. Manjula
Gupta, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Avijit Roy, Adv. for the Respondent.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 479

JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

JUDGMENT
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
For the convenience of the exposition, this judgement is divided in the
following parts: -
INDEX*
A. FACTUAL MATRIX ..................................................................................4
A.1 On-Spot/Preliminary Inquiry Report.................................................6
A.2 Frontier Complaints Committee’s Inquiry Report............................9
A.3 Central Complaints Committee’s Inquiry Report...........................10
A.4 Defence of the Respondent ..............................................................23
A.5 Proceedings before the CAT ............................................................23
A.6 Proceedings before the High Court .................................................25
B. IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT .................26
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT .....................29
D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ..................32
E. ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................37
E.1 Relevant Statutory Scheme and Case Law .............................38
E.2 Whether the Central Complaints Committee could
have looked into the second complaint dated
18.09.2012?................................................................................65
i) Principle of “Test of Prejudice” in Service
Jurisprudence .............................................................................71
E.3 Whether the Central Complaints Committee could have
put questions to the witnesses in a departmental inquiry?.......81
i) “Fact Finding” Authority in Disciplinary Proceedings ........81

*Ed. Note: Pagination in the Index is as per the original judgment.
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

E.4 Whether the Central Complaints Committee based its
ﬁndings on conjectures and surmises? Whether the case
on hand is one of “no evidence”? .......................................87
i) Principle of “No Evidence” in Service Jurisprudence ....87
ii) Standard of Proof in Disciplinary Proceedings ..............95
F. CONCLUSION........................................................................104

The Registry is directed to anonymize the name of the complainant
in this Judgment, all orders that have been passed as well as in the records
which are publicly available.
1. This appeal is at the instance of the Union of India and others being
the unsuccessful respondents before the High Court and is directed against
the judgement and order dated 15.05.2019 passed by the Gauhati High Court
in Writ Petition (C) No. 7876 of 2015 by which the High Court allowed
the writ petition ﬁled by the respondent herein (original petitioner) and
thereby set aside the order of penalty of withholding of 50% pension for all
times to come, imposed upon the respondent herein in connection with the
disciplinary proceedings initiated on the allegations of sexual harassment.
2. We are dealing with a litigation relating to sexual harassment.
Sexual harassment in any form at the work place must be viewed seriously
and the harasser should not be allowed to escape from the clutches of law.
We say so because the same humiliates and frustrates a victim of sexual
harassment, more particularly when the harasser goes unpunished or is let
oﬀ with a relatively minor penalty. However, at the same time, it should be
kept in mind that the charge of this nature is very easy to make and is very
diﬃcult to rebut. When a plea is taken of false implication for extraneous
reasons, the courts have a duty to make deeper scrutiny of the evidence
and decide the acceptability or otherwise of the accusations. Every care
should be taken to separate the chaﬀ from the grain. The veracity and
genuineness of the complaint should be scrutinised to prevent any misuse
of such laudable laws enunciated for the upliftment of the society and for
equal rights of people without gender discrimination by anybody under the
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 481
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

garb of “sexual harassment”, lest justice rendering system would become
a mockery. In such circumstances, we have decided to look into this matter
closely and in details.
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The respondent herein was serving as the Area Organizer i.e., the
Local Head of Oﬃce of the Service Selection Board (for short, “the SSB”),
Rangia, State of Assam between September, 2006 to May, 2012. In the very
same oﬃce, a lady employee was serving as the Field Assistant (Lady)
(hereinafter referred to as the “complainant”). She lodged a complaint
(hereinafter referred to as the “ﬁrst complaint”) addressed to the Inspector
General (for short, “IG”), Frontier Headquarters, Guwahati with one copy
each forwarded to the DG SSB, New Delhi, Dy. IG, SSB, SHQ, Tezpur and
the Chairperson of the National Women Rights Commission, New Delhi
inter alia alleging sexual harassment at the hands of the respondent. The
ﬁrst complaint dated 30.08.2011 reads thus: -
“To,
The Inspector General,
Frontier Hqrs. SSB Guwahati
Subject: Regarding information of personal grievances thereof.
Hon’ble Sir,
With due respect and humility, I the undersigned to draw your kind
attention to the following matter.
1. I have joined the oﬃce of the A.O Rangia in March, 2009, Since
my joining I have been entrusted the task of receiving telephones
and Mobiles in the Control Room, CAP, Training, Sports. Then I
was the only female employee in the Oﬃce.
2. Having just started discharging my duties devotedly the AO Mr.
Dilip Paul started teasing me tactically. He started making phone
calls to me sometimes at night using unoﬃcial and multimeaninged
word. Even he went to the extent of visiting my residence where
I stay alone with two of my children as my husband is a state
Government employee in Manipur.
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

3. Sometimes CAP work needs close working with the oﬃcers. Taking
the advantage he used to call me in his room and started teasing
indirectly and unnecessarily makes me sit for hours. One day he
went to the extent of saying “If you want to work happily in my
oﬃce, then agree to my saying.
4. I have been tolerating his acts since the last two and half years. I
could neither inform my husband nor lodge any written complaint
against such acts as it will be diﬃcult to give evidence. Unable
to bear the situation I have verbally complaint to the then DIG
Shri S. C. Katoch over Telephone in May, 2010 about Mr. Paul
uncivilized altitude. The DIG did a favour and warned Mr. Paul
of severe consequences if he did not stopped misbehaving.
5. Since then, he stopped teasing but instead began torturing me
mentally. I have not been entrusted any work and ex-communicated
in the oﬃce. Throughout the day all I have to do is sit silently in
the oﬃce. If any of my colleagues talk with me, Mr. Paul would
immediately call him and scold him bitterly. Sir, I am now so much
depressed and mentally disturbed I have visited to the Doctors
many times for which I have taken many medical leaves. Now, I
am not in position to work even for a day under him. It also began
aﬀecting my family life.
6. In view of the above, I request your kind honour to look into the
matter sympathetically and it is also requested to take necessary
action against the Shri D. Paul, AO Rangia to get rid of this
problem as soon as possible for which I shall remain ever grateful
to you.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/- 30.8.2011
(Smt. X)
FA (Lady)
A.O. Oﬃce, SSB Rangia”
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 483
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

A.1 On-Spot/Preliminary Inquiry Report
4. The Dy. IG, SSB, SHQ, Tezpur held a common “on-the-spot”
fact ﬁnding inquiry in relation to the ﬁrst complaint dated 30.08.2011
and recorded the statements of the employees working in the oﬃce of the
respondent. The respondent was given an opportunity to ﬁle his reply to the
allegations levelled in the complaints. On 13.12.2011, the “on-the-spot” fact
ﬁnding inquiry was concluded, and two reports in that regard were submitted
to the IG, Frontier HQ, Guwahati.
a) On the ﬁrst complaint of sexual harassment, the staﬀ members
stated that they had not seen anything in the oﬃce which could be termed
as indirect teasing or harassment to the complainant. The report reads as
under: -
“To
The Inspector General,
Frontier Hqrs. SSB
Guwahati,
Sub: Inquiry on complaints lodged by Smt. X FA(Lady) against
Shri D. Paul, Area Organiser, SSB Rangia.
Sir,
With reference to Ftr. Hqrs. Ghy. letter No. FG-II/VC-
VIG/08(Part)/15293 dt. 01-09-11, I visited the Oﬃce of the Area
Organiser, SSB Rangia on 1st November, 2011 and enquired into the
matter. All the staﬀ available in the oﬃce on the date, were summoned
one after another individually, but none of them stated to have seen
or known Shri Dilip Paul, Area Organiser misbehaving with Smt. X,
FA(Lady) in the oﬃce. Further most of them stated that due to reasons
best known to Shri Paul, Area Organiser, she was not allotted with any
work for about 3 months before her release on transfer to Ftr. Hqrs.
Ghy. and hence she was often seen depress.
On the other hand, in his written statement Shri Dilip Paul, Area
Organiser pointed out that she was found even unﬁt in any kind of
assignment, and therefore, she was not assigned with any work just
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

before her transfer i.e. from 18-08-11. But it is also duty of supervisory
oﬃcer as administrator and manager to somehow motivate his sub-
ordinate staﬀ and take work from them.
In the case of Smt. X, FA(Lady), Shri Dilip Paul, Area Organiser,
is found to have failed to motivate her and get work from her.
Regarding allegation of tactical and indirect teasing and making
her to sit in the oﬃce chamber of Area Organiser, hours together, none
of the staﬀ have stated to have ever seen such situation in the oﬃce.
Hence the allegation of direct/indirect teasing and harassments to
Smt. X, FA(L) by Shri Dilip Paul could not be ascertained. However,
since Smt. X referred the case to National Women Rights Commission,
New Delhi the matter may be under investigation by them.

Yours faithfully
Deputy Inspector General
SHQ, SSB, Tezpur”
b) Similarly, as per the report on the anonymous complaints, nothing
substantive was found as regards the allegations. The said report further
noted that during the inquiry the only thing that surfaced was the occasional
rudeness and uncordial inter-personal relations of the respondent with three
of his subordinate employees. Accordingly, the respondent was advised to
improve his personnel management and administration of the oﬃce. The
said report reads as under: -
“To
The Inspector General,
Frontier Hqrs. SSB
Guwahati.
Sub: Enquiry report on Anonymous Complaint against Shri D. Paul,
Area Organiser, SSB, Rangia
Sir,
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 485
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

With reference to Ftr. Hqrs. Ghy. letter No. FG-II/VC-VIG/08(Part)/5660
dt 08-09-11, I visited Oﬃce ·Of the Area Organiser, SSB, Rangia on 1st
November, 2011 and enquired into the matter. All the staﬀ present in the
oﬃce on the date, were summoned one after another individually. I obtained
their statements individually and on the basis of the interaction with each
of them; I opine as follow:
i) From the statements of the staﬀ it is observed that Shri Dilip Paul,
Area Organiser sometimes shout to some of the staﬀ in the oﬃce, for
the purpose of oﬃcial work only. No proof has been found regarding
use of unoﬃcial language. One or two oﬃcial stated that the Area
Organiser used to be rude and shouted at them on some occasions on
matters of oﬃcial work only.
ii) Regarding passing of TA/DA, MR Bills etc. it is found that these works
are going smoothly. There has been no occasion when he took interest
of passing his own bill by neglecting that of others.
iii) Regarding granting of leave to staﬀ and passing of bills etc. it is found
that no refusal or delay occurred. However, while granting leave
sometimes staﬀ position and administrative convenience has been
taken in to account.
iv) It is observed that Area Organiser is using his own vehicle to attend
oﬃce.
v) On the basis of statement given by each staﬀ and from the para-wise
reply given by the Area Organiser, it is observed that there is no evidence
regarding use of unnecessary slang language by the Area Organiser,
to his sub-ordinate staﬀ but at times he used to be rude to get the work
done within the time limit, from some of the subordinate staﬀ.
It is further observed that there is no cordial inter personal relation
between Shri P.B. Gohain, SAO, Shri K. Siga, SAO, Shri J Singh, UDC and
Area Organiser, Shri Dilip Paul. Therefore, these oﬃcers/oﬃcials may be
shifted out in order to bring back cordial working atmosphere in the Area
Oﬃce. At the same time, Shri Dilip Paul, Area Organiser may be advised
to improve upon his man management, administration and other oﬃcial
dealings, skills and tactics with his sub-ordinate staﬀ to bring back congenial
atmosphere in the oﬃce.
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

Yours faithfully
Sd/-
Deputy Inspector General
Sector Hqrs. SSB, Tezpur”
A.2 Frontier Complaints Committee’s Inquiry Report
5. Simultaneously, a Frontier Complaints Committee comprising of
three women members was constituted by the IG, Frontier HQ, Guwahati to
inquire into the allegations of sexual harassment levelled by the complainant
in her ﬁrst complaint dated 30.08.2011. The Frontier Complaints Committee
upon completion of the inquiry, submitted its report dated 17.01.2012 to the
Frontier Headquarters SSB, New Delhi through the IG, Guwahati, stating
that the allegations levelled by the complainant could not be said to have
been fully established or proved. The Committee further observed that the
complainant had lodged her ﬁrst complaint after a delay of more than two
years and had also failed to produce any documentary evidence in support
of her allegations. The relevant observations of the Frontier Complaints
Committee’s Inquiry Report are reproduced below: -
“7) Finding of inquiring authority: - The inquiry committee assembled
at FTR HQRs Guwahati on 25.01.2012 to ascertain the fact of the
case. The committee has gone through the statements of complainant,
charged oﬃcer, and the statements of prosecution /defense witnesses
but the point raised in the complaint could not be fully established/
proved. The statement given by all the prosecution witnesses are not
enough to prove the complaint. She has lodged a complaint after a
gap of more than two years. The complainant failed to produce any
documentary evidence based on the allegations levelled against the
charged oﬃcer”
A.3 Central Complaints Committee’s Inquiry Report
6. While the Frontier Complaints Committee’s Report dated
17.01.2012 was pending for consideration, the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs /
Competent Authority, constituted another inquiry committee on 06.08.2012
being the Central Complaints Committee to conduct an appropriate inquiry
into the complainant’s allegations of sexual harassment.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 487
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

7. Prima facie, it appears from the materials on record that the Central
Complaints Committee had to be constituted, in view of Clause 9 of the
2006 Standing Order. Clause 9 of the 2006 Standing Order envisages two
levels of complaints committee; (i) a Frontier Complaints Committee for the
“combatised and in-ﬁeld oﬃcers” (ii) a Central Complaints Committee for
the “non-combatised oﬃcers”. At the time of lodging of the complaint, the
respondent was serving as a non-combatised oﬃcer i.e., Area Organizer. For
such reason, the decision to constitute the Central Complaints Committee
had to be taken.
8. On 18.09.2012, the complainant through fax submitted a second
complaint containing additional allegations against the respondent
(hereinafter referred to as the “second complaint”) along with few other
documents including the anonymous complaints made against the respondent
in October 2011.
9. Accordingly, the Central Complaints Committee undertook the
inquiry, and in the preliminary hearing held on 27.09.2012, it decided to
treat the complaint as the charge-sheet in view of the fact that no speciﬁc
charges were framed against the respondent. The respondent was provided
with all the relevant documents including the original copy of the ﬁrst
complaint dated 30.08.2011. After, conﬁrming with the respondent as regards
the receipt of all relevant documents, the Central Complaints Committee
inquired with the respondent whether he pleaded guilty to the charges or
not. The respondent pleaded not guilty and categorically denied the charges
levelled against him. The relevant portion of the Central Complaints
Committee’s Report reads as under: -
“VI. CHARGES WHICH WERE ADMITTED/ DROPPED/ NOT
PRESSED:
Shri Dilip Paul, the charged oﬃcer did not plead guilty to any of the
allegations made by Smt. X, FA (Lady) vide complaint dated 30.08.2011
framed against him.”
10. The Central Complaints Committee in the course of its inquiry
examined in all 20 witnesses produced by the complainant (incl. 5 witnesses
who were earlier examined by the Frontier Level Complaints Committee)
and 6 witnesses on behalf of the respondent (incl. 1 witness earlier examined
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

by the Frontier Level Complaints Committee). Later, the Central Complaints
Committee delineated the charges to be inquired by it into 10 distinct points.
The points of determination framed by the Committee reads thus: -
“VII. CHARGES ACTUALLY INQUIRED INTO AND POINTS
TO BE DETERMINED
The Complaints Committee is aware that aspects of this complaint are
implicated in the FIR that Shri Dilip Paul lodged on 26.08.2011 at P.S.
Rangia, on the matter of an allegedly threatening message sent to him
on his mobile phones by Smt. X’s husband. In the counter-case ﬁled
by Smt. X’s husband, similar allegations of sexual harassment have
been raised. The Committee has ascertained from the SP Kamrup that
both the cases are still pending investigation. Nevertheless, going by
what has been stated in the CCS, CCA Rules 14(3), which states that
action of prosecution in a court and departmental proceedings can
go on simultaneously. The CCS CCA Rules require the fact that the
approach and objective in the criminal and disciplinary proceedings
are altogether distinct and diﬀerent, be kept in view, as is laid down
by the various Supreme Court rulings to this eﬀect. Accordingly, the
Committee decide to proceed with enquiry and submit its ﬁndings.
Smt. X has alleged that a few months after she joined Area Oﬃce,
Rangia in April 2009, Shri Dilip Paul, then A.O. Rangia, started
making unwelcome sexual advances to her, and that upon her refusal
to submit to his advances and his sexually determined misconduct, he
withdrew all work from her. She has cited the following incidents as
the substance of her complaint.
Point 1: That Shri Dilip Paul would use the pretext of summoning
into his room with work-related ﬁles in order to make comments of
a sexually loaded and personal nature, such as remarks about her
personal appearance and her looks, about how he wanted to marry a
Manipuri girl like her. He would also boast at times about his sexual
prowess and abilities in satisfying women who were unhappy with their
husbands. He would also make comments that had a double meaning
(of a sexual nature). On such occasions, he would detain her in his
oﬃce for inordinately long periods. This charge, if substantiated, is
admissible under the Vishaka deﬁnition of sexual harassment as it
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 489
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

involves sexually coloured remarks and other unwelcome physical,
verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature. Furthermore, it may also
be shown to be discriminatory if it is substantiated that Smt. X believed
that her objection to Shri Dilip Paul’s conduct would disadvantage
her in connection with her employment and her apprehension that it
would create a hostile work environment.
Point 2: That Shri Dilip Paul would stare at her in the workplace, such
as the repeated incidents in which he would come out from his oﬃce
into the room that she was sitting, on the pretext of drinking water. This
charge, if substantiated, is admissible under the Vishaka deﬁnition of
sexual harassment as it involves sexually coloured remarks and other
unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature.
Point 3: That Shri Dilip Paul would attempt to touch her in an
unwelcome sexually determined manner in the workplace, such as an
incident when, on the pretext of teaching her to operate a laptop, he
come close to her and touched her shoulder and body. This charge,
if substantiated, is admissible under the Vishaka deﬁnition of sexual
harassment as it involves physical contact and advances and other
unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature.
Furthermore, it may also be shown to be discriminatory if it is
substantiated that Smt. X believed that her objection to Shri Dilip Paul’s
conduct would disadvantage her in connection with her employment
and her apprehension that if would create a hostile work environment.
Point 4: That Shri Dilip Paul would often make her work much beyond
oﬃce hours, often after 2000 hours. He would then oﬀer to drop here
in his vehicle to her home. In general, Shri Dilip Paul would pressure
her to drive with him in his vehicle, either when she was returning
from work or in the town.
Point 5: That Shri Dilip Paul, on the occasion that Smt. X with other
oﬃce colleagues had accompanied him to the railway station to book
train tickets for the study tour to South India in march 2010, made an
unwelcome sexual advance to her in full public view. While she was
standing in the queue at the ticket booking counter, Shri Dilip Paul
came to stand next to her and putt his arm around her shoulder and
tried to hug her close to his body. Shri Dilip Paul said to her that he
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

is sending her on the study tour to make her “mind fresh” so that she
may forget her previous life and when she returned, begin a new one
as Mrs. Paul.
Point 6: That Shri Dilip Paul subjected her to further unwelcome
sexually determined conduct by the statements that he made when he
came to the railway station to see oﬀ the group departing for the study
tour. After the luggage had been loaded onto the train, Shri Dilip Paul
came into the train compartment and said to Smt. X “tum jaa rahe ho to
mari jaan jaa rahi hai. Ham ka saath jaanaa hi acchaa hota. Koi baat
nahiin, tum study tour se waapas aa jaaoo, to tum Mrs Paul banogi.”
Point 7: That Shri Dilip Paul made unwelcome sexual advances to
her outside the workplace as well, where on several occasions, he
propositioned her, asking her to leave her husband and marry him
on the assurance that he would adopt her children as his own. Since
July 2009, Shri Dilip Paul made it a habit to visit her uninvited and
she felt unable to refuse entry to her hierarchically superior oﬃcer,
fearing future discrimination. These visits took place even late at night.
Several incidents have been cited in the complaint in this connection.
a. That Shri Dilip Paul used to make unsolicited phone calls to
her, frequently at night and insisted on speaking to her for long
durations, sometime up to half and hour. The phone calls were
usually made between 19:00 and 20:00 hours, but occasionally, she
also received calls from Shri Dilip Paul as late as 4.30 a.m. The
substance of these calls mostly consisted of unwelcome comments
of sexual nature with the objective of making her submit to his
unwelcome sexual advances.
b. On one occasion, Shri Dilip Paul came to Smt. X’s home at around
4.45 a.m. and insisted that she came out for a morning walk with
him. Fearful that if she refused, he would insist on coming into her
house at that hour, she accompanied him for a short distance.
c. That, on one uninvited visit to Smt. X’s home, Shri Dilip Paul came
with a bottle of alcohol and sought to pressure her to join him in
drinking. When she tried to get away from him by going to the
kitchen, Shri D. Paul followed her and tried to force himself upon
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 491
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

her by embracing her. She somehow managed to extricate herself
and ran out the house, and remained there until Shri D. Paul left
the house.
d. That on his uninvited visits to Smt. X’s home, Shri Dilip Paul showed
an unnatural and unhealthy interest in her daughter. He would call
the child and draw her to him, and would then attempt to hold her in
a very ‘dirty’ manner. On the occasion that this happened, he only
let go of the child when Smt. X called the child to her in Manipuri.
e. That when Shri Dilip Paul visited her house one evening in April
2010, shortly after her return from the Study Tour to South India,
he made unwelcome sexual advances to her by his statement that
they would become one in a few days time and that she should stop
resisting. He also tried to forcibly embrace her, but she extricated
herself and ran into the room that her children were sleeping in.
f. That Shri Dilip Paul, during an official trip to Nagrijuli in
connection with the Civic Action Programme, made her sit next to
him and tried to hold her hand and touch her, all of which behaviour
was sexually determined, unwelcome and insulting. Smt. X also
stated that there were no eyewitnesses to these acts, as only she
·and Shri Dilip Paul were seated in the middle seat of the car.
Point 8: That Shri Dilip Paul began victimising her for her refusal to
submit to his unwelcome sexual advances soon after he learnt that she
had made a complaint about his misconduct to Shri S.C. Katoch, who
happened to be DIG of another area. Smt. X had telephoned Shri S.C.
Katoch after the incident reported in point 10, and told him all that
had been taking place. She stated that Shri Katoch informed her in a
subsequent phone call that she made to him that he had issued a verbal
reprimand to Shri Dilip Paul. However, a few days after the incident,
Shri Dilip Paul called her into his oﬃce and asked her whether she
had made a complaint against him to Shri Katoch. Smt. X conﬁrmed
to him that she had indeed done so, and to scare him, told him that
she had made a written complaint. From that day on, Shri Dilip Paul
withdrew all the work that was assigned to her and assigned it to
another employee. Thereafter, and for the next three months, Smt. X
was made to sit idle in the oﬃce.
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

Point 9: In late August 2010, Smt. X approached IG S.K. Singhal with
a written complaint of sexual harassment in the workplace, which also
contained an application for her transfer to Ftr Hqr Guwahati. Shri
Singhal asked her to separate the two complaints of sexual harassment in
the workplace from the transfer request and issued an order transferring
her to Ftr Hqr Guwahati on 1 September 2011. However, the transfer
order did not contain directions for the payment of TA/DA and did not
provide her any joining time.
Point 10: Smt. X has also complained that the now-quashed enquiry
into her complaint of sexual harassment in November 2011 did
not provide her suﬃcient time or opportunity to submit additional
documents and produce additional witnesses relating to the past
history of the accused. She has also stated that she was not aﬀorded
the right of cross-examination of Shri Paul, or a chance to rebut his
alleged false statements. After the completion of the thereafter quashed
enquiry, she was not also provided a copy of the enquiry report. In her
deposition as well as the written submissions made to the Complaints
Committee, she also pleaded that due cognizance be taken of the fact
that, as a woman employee of the SSB, she was entirely unaware of
that a Complaints Committee mechanism for dealing with complaints
of sexual harassment was in place, and that as a complainant, she had
the right to submit a request for either her own transfer or the transfer
of the defendant. She has also queried whether the promotion of Shri
Dilip Paul on 11 September 2012 to the rank of DIG is maintainable
when a complaint of sexual harassment in the workplace against him
was pending.”
11. While the Central Complaints Committee’s Inquiry was still
pending, the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs i.e., the Competent Authority vide its
order dated 30.11.2012 annulled the Frontier Level Complaints Committee’s
Inquiry Report on the ground that, the Chairperson of the said Frontier Level
Complaints Committee was of an equivalent rank as that of the respondent
and the same was in violation of the statutory provisions, more particularly
the Standing Order No. 1 of 2006 (Grievances Redressal Mechanism: To
Redress Grievances of Women/Sexual Harassment at Work Place) (for short,
“the 2006 Standing Order”).
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 493
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

12. Clause 9(1) of the 2006 Standing Order mandates that the chairperson
of the inquiry committee must be senior in rank to the delinquent / charged
oﬃcer and reads as under: -
“9. COMPLAINT COMMITTEES
1. Chairman of committee should be senior to the oﬃcer / oﬃcial against
whom the complaint is made.
xxx xxx xxx
“TO : I) SO(ADMN), FTR HQR GUWAHATI
II) DR- K.S. DEVI, CHAIRPERSON, COMPLAINT
COMMITTEE, FTR HQR GUWAHATI
FM : AD(PERS-m), FHQ NEW DELHI
REF. FTR, HQR GUWAHATI LETTER NO.GF-II/VC-VIG/
O8(PART)/3270 DATED 17.02.2012 REG. SUBMISSION OF INQUIRY
SUBMITIED BY THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMPLAINT
COMMITIEE DR. K.S. DEVI ON 17.01.2012 ON COMPLAINT OF
SEXUAL HARASSMENT MADE BY SMT. X, FA (LADY) FTR HQR
GUWAHATI AGAINST SHRI D.PAUL, AO RANGIA NOW DIG, FTR
HQR SILIGURI (.) IT IS OBSERVED THAT AS PER SOP ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INQUIRY SHALL
BE ONE RANK ABOVE OF THE GOVT. EMPLOYEE AGAINST
WHOM HIS COMPLAINT IS MADE (.) IN THE SAID INQUIRY
THE CHAIRPERSON AND SH. D.PAUL AGAINST WHOM THE
COMPLAINT/INQUIRY WAS MADE WERE IN THE SAME STATUS
AND IN THE MEAN TIME SHRI DILIP PAUL WAS ALSO PROMOTED
TO THE RANK OF DIG (.) AS SUCH THE INQUIRY REPORT DATED
27.01.2012 OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT AGAINST SHRI D.PAUL,
THE THEN A.O. NOW DIG WHICH WAS CONDUCTED BY THE
BOARD UNDER BELOW STATUS CHAIRPERSON AS PRESCRIBED
IN THE STANDING INSTRUCTIONS IS HEREBY CANCELLED BY
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY ALONGWITH BOARD (.) FTR.
HQR GUWAHATI IS REQUESTED INFORM ALL CONCERNED
ACCORDINGLY(.)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

NO. 20/SSB. P-III/2011(4)-11606
DATED. THE 30.11.2012
SD/- 30/11/2012
ASSITANT DIRECTOR (PERS-M1)”
13. The Central Complaints Committee submitted its inquiry report
on 28.12.2012 to the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs, wherein after recording its
ﬁndings on the aforesaid 10 points, held the charges of sexual harassment
against the respondent to have been proved. The committee concluded its
report with the following recommendations being reproduced below: -
“XI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Complaints Committee finds that the charges of sexual
harassment in the workplace have been well proven. Moreover a
perusal of the charged oﬃcer’s defence statement, in which Shri
Dilip Paul attempts to slander and assassinate the complainant,
alone speaks volumes about his respect for women. In view of
its findings, the Complaints Committee makes the following
recommendations:
1. That Shri Dilip Paul be given exemplary punishment for his
sustained sexual harassment of Smt. X in the form of dismissal
from service, and he be stripped of promotion to DIG and the
Police medal awarded to him.
2. That Smt. X be reimbursed for the TA/DA that was denied to
her in her transfer to Ftr Hqrs Guwahati.
3. That Smt. X be provided a copy of the Complaints Committee
report.
4. That the SSB implement on a war-footing its standing order
1/2006 by organizing regular workshops for women employees
to sensitise them about the nature of sexual harassment and
their rights as women employees, as well as the procedures
detailed by the said order. Members of the Complaints
Committees instituted by the SSB should regularly tour the
various divisions and area oﬃces of the SSB for such meetings.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 495
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

5. Further, regular workshops must be held for senior oﬃcers of the
SSB to sensitise them with regards to their role and responsibilities
regarding the implementation of the standing order 1/2006.”
14. On 16.01.2013. the respondent was provided with the Central
Complaints Committee’s Inquiry Report and was asked by the Disciplinary
Authority to submit his reply / written representation, which was submitted by
him on 30.01.2013. The Inquiry Report along with the written representation of
the respondent was forwarded by the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs in accordance
with the relevant rules to the Union Public Service Commission for the purpose
of seeking advice on the penalty that was proposed to be imposed.
15. The order imposing penalty passed by the Disciplinary Authority
reads thus:
“GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIR
DIRECTORATE GENERAL, SSB
EAST BLOCK-V, R.K. PURAM
NEW DELHI – 110066
Date 05.01.2016
Order No. 14/SSB/PERS-I/2013(1) 69-79
WHEREAS, a complaint of sexual harassment at workplace was made
by Smt. X, FA (Lady) vide her complaint dated 30.08.2011 against Shri
Dilip Paul, Area Organiser who had superannuated from government
service on 31.03.2013 as DIG.
AND WHEREAS, Ministry of Home Aﬀairs being the disciplinary
authority in respect of Group ‘A’ Oﬃcers vide their UO No.20/SSB/Pers.
III/11 (4)/Pers.III dated 06.08.2012 had appointed Smt. B. Radhika, Joint
Director, CCTNS-II, NCRB, New Delhi as Chairman of the Complaint
Committee to enquire into the said complaint of sexual harassment
against Shri Dilip Paul.
AND WHEREAS, the Chairman of the complaint committee had
handed over the complaint of sexual harassment dated 30.08.2011
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

submitted by the Complainant to Shri Dilip Paul, DIG during the course
of 1st hearing of enquiry held on 26.09.2012 at New Delhi.
Shri Dilip Paul, DIG had denied the allegations of sexual harassment
levelled against him by the complainant.
AND WHEREAS, the complainant had levelled various allegations of
sexual harassment against the said Shri Dilip Paul, Area Organiser
(now retired DIG), which are summarised here as under –
(a) That the said Shri Dilip Paul started teasing her tactically. He
started making phone calls at night using unoﬃcial and multi-meaning
words. At times, he would visit her residence, when she was alone.
Further, he would summon her into his room in his oﬃcial capacity and
would make her sit for hours. That the said Shri Paul on one pretext
or the other used to make personal contact with her body.
(b) That repeatedly, he used to tell the complainant that if she kept
him satisﬁed by cooperating with the sexual activities, she shall be
protected from all corners.
(c) That in one of the incident, when he had visited her residence, he
had entered the kitchen and embraced her.
(d) That he repeatedly proposed marriage to her.
(e) That the said Shri Paul had many a times tried to outrage her
modesty.
(f) That she had complained against the Oﬃcer to the then DIG Shri
S.C. Katoch, who had also warned the oﬃcer to desist from doing
such activities.
(g) That during the course of the proceedings, some additional
allegations were also levelled.
On these allegations, the Complaint Committee examined all the
relevant witnesses in presence of the accused. The accused was
aﬀorded all the opportunities of defense.
AND WHEREAS, Smt. B. Radhika, Joint Director, CCTNS-II, NCRB,
New Delhi, Chairman of the complaint committee submitted the inquiry
report dated 28.12.2012 to the disciplinary authority i.e. Ministry of
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 497
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

Home Aﬀairs. The Inquiry Oﬃcer in its ﬁndings has proved all the
charges levelled against the Charged Oﬃcer.
AND WHEREAS, in terms of DoP&T OM No. 11013/2009-Estt.
(A) dated 03.08.2009, the report of Complaint Committee is to be
treated as the enquiry report under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and
the disciplinary authority is to take action on that report as per the
procedure prescribed in Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules 1965.
AND WHEREAS, a copy of enquiry report after its acceptance was
served upon the Charged Oﬃcer, Shri Dilip Paul, DIG for making his
representation vide Memo No.14/SSB/Pers-1/2013(1)/437-39 dated
16.01.2013. The Charged Oﬃcer had submitted his reply vide letter
dated 30.01.2013 denying all the charges levelled against him.
AND WHEREAS, the representation of the accused oﬃcer on the
inquiry report was examined and considered by the Disciplinary
Authority, whereafter the advice of Union Public Service Commission
regarding quantum of punishment to be imposed upon the charged
Oﬃcer vide letter No.14/SSB/Per.I/2013 (1)/Pers-III dated 26.04.2013
was sought.
AND WHEREAS, the Union Public Service Commission vide its letter
dated 22.08.2013 has advised imposition of penalty of withholding
of 50% (ﬁfty percent), of monthly pension on permanent basis. The
gratuity amount, if not otherwise, required may be released to him.
AND WHEREAS, Charged Oﬃcer Shri Dilip Paul, Ex-DIG had ﬁled an
OA No. 181/2013 before the Hon’ble CAT Bench Guwahati challenging
there under constitution of Central Complaint Committee and its report
dated 28.12.2012. Hon’ble CAT Guwahati vide its interim judgment
dated 28.06.2013 had imposed STAY on operation of enquiry report
dated 28.12.2012 of Central Complaint Committee. The said OA
was disposed by Hon’ble CAT, Guwahati vide its judgment dated
03.07.2015 directing therein to complete the disciplinary proceedings
within four months from the date of receipt of the order.
After the disposal of the case by the Hon’ble CAT and vacation of the
interim directions of the Hon’ble Court, a copy of UPSC advice dated
22.08.2013 was served upon the Charged Oﬃcer vide Memorandum
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

No.14/SSB/Pers-1/2013(1)/9923-24 dated 04.08.2015, which was duly
acknowledged by the Charged Oﬃcer. The Charged Oﬃcer vide his
letter dated 25.08.2015 had submitted representation against the UPSC
advice. All the relevant issues have been accordingly examined by the
Ministry of Home Aﬀairs being the Competent Disciplinary Authority.
The issues agitated by the Charged Oﬃcer were found devoid of merit by
the Disciplinary Authority. Accordingly, the charge of sexual harassment
of a woman at work place levelled against the Charged Oﬃcer has been
proved beyond shadow of doubt by a Committee headed by Jt. Director,
NCRB, which has been upheld by the Disciplinary Authority.
NOW, THEREFORE, after careful consideration on the ﬁndings of
inquiry report, UPSC advice, written submission of Charged Oﬃcer and
other related records of the case, the President of India has come to the
conclusion that justice would be met if the penalty of “withholding of
50% (ﬁfty percent) of monthly pension on permanent basis” is imposed
upon the Charged Oﬃcer Shri Dilip Paul, the then Area Organiser, now
Ex-DIG, SSB.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid penalty is hereby imposed upon Shri
Dilip Paul, Ex-DIG who had superannuated on 31.03.2013. The gratuity
amount, if not otherwise required may be released to him.
(By order and in the name of the President)
Sd/-
(Vandan Saxena)
Assistant Director (Pers-I)”
16. It appears that during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings,
the respondent superannuated on 31.03.2013 as Dy. IG, Frontier Headquarters,
SSB, Ranidanga, Siliguri, Darjeeling, West Bengal, and subject to the ﬁnal
outcome of the disciplinary proceedings, he was granted provisional pension
without retirement gratuity.
A.4 Defence of the Respondent
17. It is the case of the respondent that the complainant had preferred
one application in August, 2011 with a request to transfer her from the Rangia
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 499
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

Oﬃce to the Frontier Headquarter Guwahati. The request for transfer was made
on the ground that the complainant needed to look after her ailing mother-in-
law. However, her application was rejected by the IG, Frontier Headquarters
on 24.08.2011 on the ground of non-availability of corresponding vacant
post. It is the case of the respondent that on the very next day, he received a
message on his mobile phone which read as follows; “I am hubby of one of
your lady staﬀ, wait and watch the end of your career.”
18. According to the respondent the message was forwarded by the
husband of the complainant as she harboured a grudge on the misconception
that it was the respondent who was instrumental in getting her transfer
application rejected.
19. It is also the case of the respondent that he had lodged the ﬁrst
information report at the Rangia Police Station being Case No. 348 of 2011
in connection with the threats administered to him by way of a telephonic
message.
A.5 Proceedings before the CAT
20. The respondent preferred OA No. 181 of 2013 before the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati (CAT), assailing (i) the constitution of the
Central Complaints Committee vide order dated 06.08.2012 (received via fax
dated 03.09.2012), (ii) cancellation of the Frontier Complaints Committee’s
Inquiry Report vide order dated 30.11.2011 (received via Memorandum
dated 10.12.2012 of the Frontier, Headquarters, SSB, Guwahati) and the
(iii) Central Complaints Committee’s Inquiry Report dated 28.12.2012. The
reliefs which were inter-alia prayed for by the respondent in the captioned
OA are reproduced below: -
“8. Relief(s) sought for:
The Hon’ble Tribunal be pleased to. set aside and quash the impugned -
(i) FAX message dated 03.09.2012 (Anexure-11) and the constitution
of the Central Legal Complaint Committee under the Chairperson
Smt. S. Radhika, IPS there under;
(ii) Memorandum dated 10.12.2012 (Annexure-16) and cancellation
of the enquiry report of the Frontier Level Complaint Committee
there under, and
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

(iii) the Enquiry report dated 28.12.2012. (Annexure-17) of the ·
Central Complaint Committee.”
21. The CAT, Guwahati vide its final judgement & order dated
03.07.2015 dismissed the said OA No. 181 of 2013 observing that the
Frontier Complaints Committee had not been constituted as per the 2006
Standing Order, and as the disciplinary proceedings were still pending, it
refrained from expressing any opinion in regard to the Central Complaints
Committee’s Inquiry (except expressing some reservations on the issue of
penalty recommended therein) and directed that the disciplinary proceedings
be completed within 4-months. The relevant portion reads as under: -
“61. Undisputedly, the Chairperson of the Frontier Level Complaint
Committee was Junior in the rank to the applicant, inasmuch as the
applicant got promotion in the rank of Area Organizer on 22.12.2005,
whereas the Chairperson was promoted to the rank of complainant,
which is not prescribed as per Standing Operating Procedure of the
department. The fact that the Chairperson of the said committee was
junior to the applicant was not unknown to the respondents and the
respondents knowingly constituted the Frontier Level Complaints
Committee with a Chairperson junior to the applicant and therefore
there was no valid reason to annul the report of the FLCC.

62. We are unable to accept the said submission by expressing that
if there is a procedural irregularity even accrued unknowingly or
unfortunately that could not be encouraged when we go into the proper
adjudication of the matter. The Central Complaint Committee by going
to the thorough enquiry by giving opportunity to the applicant and
others with due examination as well as cross examination with the
witness culminated into the opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
64. We have given our thoughtful consideration in the matter by taking
into account the entire conspectus of the case, to the conclusion on
the point that the consideration of Central Complaints Committee as
per law laid down and in terms of the guidelines which has been duly
followed by the department by taking care of the earlier observation
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 501
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

by giving our view that the Frontier Level Standing Committee ﬁndings
was not as per SOP reason as already given. We are not ﬁnding any
inﬁrmity in the enquiry apropos sexual harassment of the women in
work place and to that context, we are not giving any ﬁndings or any
opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
66. However, respondents are directed to complete the Departmental
Proceedings within four months from the date of receipt of the order.
…”
A.6 Proceedings before the High Court
22. Aggrieved with the aforesaid, the respondent preferred writ petition
being WP (C) No. 7876 of 2015 before the Guwahati High Court challenging
the judgement and order dated 03.07.2015 passed by the CAT, Guwahati.
23. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the Ministry of
Home Aﬀairs vide its Order dated 05.01.2016 referred to above held that
the charges of sexual harassment levelled against the respondent stood duly
proved and after due consideration of the respondent’s representation and the
advice of the UPSC imposed a penalty of withholding 50% of the monthly
pension on permanent basis.
24. In such circumstances referred to above, the respondent amended
his writ petition pending before the Gauhati High Court and challenged the
ﬁnal order of penalty dated 05.01.2016 in addition to the original reliefs
prayed before the CAT, Guwahati.
B. IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT
25. The impugned judgment of the High Court is in three parts. In other
words, the High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of
penalty on three grounds: -
(i) First, the High Court took the view that the Central Complaints
Committee was constituted by the competent authority to inquire
into only the ﬁrst complaint dated 30.08.2011, however, the
Central Complaints Committee during the course of its inquiry also
looked into the allegations levelled in the second Complaint dated
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

18.09.2012 which it could not have. The relevant observations on
this issue read as under: -
“41. What is important to note is that a complaint dated
18.09.2012 along with ﬁve Annexures was submitted by Smt. X
to the Chairperson of the CCC and copy of such complaint was
also made available to the petitioner. In the inquiry report the
above fact is not mentioned. It also does not appear that the said
complaint was brought to the notice of the disciplinary authority.
The CCC was mandated by the authority to inquire into the
complaint dated 30.08.2011. However, it is manifest from the
inquiry report that the complaint submitted on 18.09.2012 was
also taken into consideration. It is noted by the CCC in the report
under the heading “VI. Charges which were admitted/dropped/
not pressed” that the petitioner did not plead guilty to any of
the allegations made by the complainant in her complaint dated
30.08.2011. Though the copy of the complaint dated 30.08.2011
was furnished, the same was not given in the form of articles of
charge. The requirement of the oﬃcer proceeded against to be
formally asked whether he pleads guilty or not would, according
to the understanding of the court, is not an opportunity to such
oﬃcer only to answer the same in a mono-syllable. To give meaning
to the word “formally”, a real and eﬀective opportunity has to be
granted to the oﬃcer concerned to make his comment in writing
in response to the complaint. Apparently, no such opportunity was
aﬀorded. There is no indication that in respect of the complaint
dated 18.09.2012, the oﬃcer was even asked as to whether he
pleads guilty to the allegations made therein or not.
xxx xxx xxx
43. Clause 10(ii) of the Complaint Mechanism provides that complaint
shall contain all the material and details concerning the alleged
sexual harassment. What were the allegations in the complaint ﬁled
on 30.08.2011 after the petitioner had ﬁled an ejahar on 26.08.2011
1 have already been taken note of. A perusal of the above ten points
would go to show that Point Nos. 1 to 6, 7 (b) to (f), 9 and 10 are no
way connected to the complaint dated 30.08.2011. Two inquiries had
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 503
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

also taken place and, after more than a year later, after lodging of the
complaint dated 30.08.2011, another complaint with many allegations
was submitted to the Chairperson of the CCC on 18.09.2012. In
our considered opinion, the CCC could not have entertained such a
complaint for the purpose of a disciplinary proceeding in absence of
entrustment in terms of Standing Order.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(ii) Secondly, the Central Complaints Committee while conducting the
inquiry, could not have assumed the role of a prosecutor by putting
questions to the witnesses. According to the High Court, the same
vitiated the inquiry proceedings. The relevant observations on this
issue are as under: -
45. Perusal of the order-sheets, more particularly, the orders dated
26.11.2012, 27.11.2012, 28.11.2012 and 10.12.2012 go to show that
the committee asked questions to the prosecution witnesses and
examination-in-chief was done by, the committee. Prosecution witness,
Mr. S. C. Katoch, who was cross-examined by the complainant, in his
statement had stated that the complainant had made only one call on
his mobile and that she had mentioned that the petitioner is harsh
in his oﬃce work and had given her duty in control room for which
she is to sit in the control room after oﬃce hours. He had, in other
words, negated the assertions made in the complaint that she had
informed about sexual harassment meted out by the petitioner. The
CCC, however, noted that it appeared that Shri Katoch had pre-judged
the complaint as untrue. When his evidence was that there was no
complaint of sexual harassment, there was no occasion for the CCC
to opine that he pre-judged the complaint. He was also put ﬁfteen
questions by the CCC, which was styled as “examination-in-chief”. …
46. It is noticed that the prosecution witnesses were also put questions
by the CCC, which is evident from the report of the CCC under the
heading “V. Examination of witnesses”, wherein the CCC itself
recorded that CCC had conducted the examination-in-chief whenever
it felt necessary. Thus, it is evident that the CCC also played the role
of prosecutor, which vitiates the proceeding.”
(Emphasis supplied)
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

(iii) Thirdly, the Central Complaints Committee could be said to have
based its ﬁndings on surmises and conjectures. The High Court
recorded that the case was one of “No Evidence”. The relevant
observations on this issue are under:
“47. With regard to Point No. 7(a), the CCC had recorded that it
had noted that no witness examined by it had speciﬁc knowledge of
the events listed in, wrongly recorded as 5(a) - (f). It should have
been events listed in 7(a) - (f). Events at 7(a) pertain to allegation
of making unsolicited phone calls at unearthly hours and, that too,
for long duration. No call records were produced. However, CCC
accepted the allegations by merely holding that the committee saw
no reason what gain the complainant would have in fabricating
the allegations and that it is understandable that no woman would
be expected to conﬁde matters of sexual nature even to her female
colleagues. The CCC is to record its ﬁnding based on evidence on
record and not on surmises and conjectures. It will be worthwhile to
recall that the prayer of the complainant for a transfer was rejected
on 24.08.2011 and based on a threatening message issued by the
husband of the complainant on 26.08.2011, the petitioner had lodged
the ejahar on 26.08.2011. These aspects were, however, not weighed
by the CCC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
26. The High Court accordingly, allowed the writ petition vide its
Impugned Judgment and Order and set-aside the penalty of permanently
withholding 50% of the pension imposed upon the respondent.
27. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before
this Court with the present appeal.
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
28. Mr. K. Parmeshwar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant
in his written submissions has stated thus: -
“I. There has been no violation of the principles of natural justice
as the Respondent was given an opportunity to defend himself at
every stage of the case.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 505
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

a. It is submitted that the Central Complaints Committee was constituted
to look into the allegations made against the Respondent as prescribed
under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classiﬁcation, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1965.
b. The said Committee conducted its ﬁrst hearing on 26.09.2012 at
10:00 am. The Respondent was served with all the relevant documents
including the complaint dated 20.08.2011. Further, the list of ‘witnesses
to be examined’ submitted by the Complainant on 18.09.2012 was also
supplied to the Respondent. The Respondent appeared and submitted
that he will provide the name of his counsel within an hour. Therefore,
on his request, the proceedings were adjourned to 2 PM. At 2 PM,
he submitted an application seeking 30 days’ time for engagement of
counsel. The Committee after taking into account his request granted
one week’s time to provide name of his counsel in order to complete the
proceedings within the stipulated time period.
c. It is important to mention that the next date of the hearing was ﬁxed
for 26.11.2012 i.e., after 2 months. When the Respondent was enquired
about the name of his counsel, he submitted before the Committee that
he will represent himself and cross-examine the witnesses and he himself
examined as many as 11 witnesses. Thus, the Respondent participated in
the enquiry proceedings and chose to defend himself despite suﬃcient
time being given.
d. The allegation made by the Respondent that the Complainant
submitted a list of witnesses later on 18.09.2012, which the Committee
could not look into is misconceived. It is submitted that the Complainant
can’t be denied to produced witnesses to provide her claim and that too,
even before the preliminary hearing was conducted by the Committee
on 26.09.2011.
e. The allegation raised by the Respondent that he was not informed
of the charges in the form of a ‘charge-sheet’ is frivolous as he was
supplied with the copies of all the complaints and all other relevant
documents. This goes to show that he was well acquainted with the nature
of allegations levelled against him and knew what he had to state in his
defence. Given the above position, non-framing of the articles of charge
cannot be said to be detrimental to the interest of the Appellants herein.
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

f. Therefore, it is submitted few inﬁrmities here and there would not
vitiate entire proceedings unless it is shown that some prejudice has
been caused to the Respondent as has been held by this Hon’ble Court
in State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 847
(Para 39). In the present case, adequate opportunity was aﬀorded to
the appellant not just by the Committee, but also by the Disciplinary
Authority and the Appellate Authority before taking any action against
him. Therefore, this was not a case of “no opportunity” or “no
hearing” but a case of “adequate opportunity” and “fair hearing”
aﬀorded to the appellant before imposing a penalty of withholding
50% pension amount.
II. No prejudice has been caused to the Respondent due to non-supply
of the Reports submitted in pursuance of an on-spot enquiry and
Frontier Level Complaint Committee.
a. It is submitted that the ﬁrst alleged inquiry dated 13.12.2011 was
pursuant to conducting of an on-spot enquiry and by the very nature
of it, is summary in nature and not an inquiry of the nature envisaged
in Vishaka & Ors. v State of Rajasthan & Ors, (1997) 6 SCC 241
line of cases and the SSB Standard Operating Procedure on sexual
harassment. Therefore, it cannot be equated with a disciplinary
enquiry.
b. It is relevant to note that before the report of on-the-spot enquiry
was submitted, Frontier Level Complaint Committee (FLCC) was
already constituted. The FLCC submitted its report on 17.01.2012.
However, the same was cancelled by Memorandum dated 10.12.2012
on the ground that the Chairperson of the FLCC was not an oﬃcer who
was senior to the petitioner against whom the complaint was made as
required under Rule 9(b)(a) of the Departmental Standard Operating
Procedure on Sexual Harassment. The said decision was conveyed to
the Respondent vide Memo dated 10.12.2012.
c. Further, it is submitted that even if in the FLCC reports no allegations
were found to be proved against the Respondent, same would not have
any material bearing on the facts as the said report were subsequently
annulled by the competent authority and a fresh committee was
constituted as per the rules.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 507
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

III. The punishment imposed is proportionate to the offence
committed by the Respondent.
a. It is submitted that this Hon’ble Court in a number of cases has
held that the High Court while exercising its powers under Article 226
would not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it shocks
the conscience of the court.
b. Further, it has been held in catena of cases that scope of judicial
review in case of misconduct and imposition of penalty under the
service jurisprudence is limited as to whether the charges have been
established on the basis of a fair enquiry. The scope is limited to the
decision-making process, not the decision per se. This Hon’ble Court
in a recent judgment Aureliano Fernandes vs State of Goa 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 621 while pondering upon the extent to which a High
Court can interfere with respect to the departmental proceedings and
ﬁndings thereof, observed the following:
“62…Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts and
once ﬁndings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are
recorded, the High Court in its writ jurisdiction should not
normally interfere with those factual ﬁndings unless it ﬁnds that
the recorded ﬁndings were based either on no evidence or that
the ﬁndings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The
Court is under a duty to satisfy itself that an inquiry into the
allegations of sexual harassment by a Committee is conducted in
terms of the service rules and that the concerned employee gets
a reasonable opportunity to vindicate his position and establish
his innocence.”
c. The Respondent herein was a member of the disciplined force and
was holding a signiﬁcant post at the time of commission of oﬀence.
He harassed the Complainant continuously for a period of more
than 2 years despite warning issued by his superior. He did not stop
despite the warning and started torturing the Complainant by not
giving her work and making her sit idle till late in the night. Having
superannuated during the pendency of the proceedings before the
disciplinary authority, the Respondent superannuated on 31.03.2013
as DIG. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the punishment
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

imposed by the disciplinary authority for withholding 50% of monthly
pension is proportionate to the oﬀence committed by the Respondent.”
D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
29. Mr. Avijit Roy, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent
in his written submissions has stated thus: -
“1. The Hon’ble High Court in para 25 of the its judgment (Page
-39 of SLP) rightly held that the scope of judicial review in case of
misconduct and imposition of penalty under the service jurisprudence
is circumscribed as the court is only required to examine as to whether
the charges have been established on the basis of a fair enquiry as
the Hon’ble High Court was also conscious of the fact that judicial
review is not against the decision but the decision making process.
2. It is relevant to mention here that Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA)
Rules, 1965, more particularly sub-rule 1 and 2 of Rule 15 imposed a
categorical restriction on holding of a 2nd and further statutory inquiry.
But in the instant case, in spite of the fact that the sole respondent was
exonerated from the alleged complaint by three successive enquiries
i.e. i) the Fact Finding enquiry, ii) ﬁrst the statutory enquiry conducted
by the duly constituted Frontier Level Committee and iii) a second
statutory enquiry (in fact it was 4th enquiry in the series which includes
inquiry on the basis of another anonymous complaint) by the Central
Complaint Committee was instituted. Subject matter of all the facts
were on the same set of allegations.”
3. That, this Hon’ble Court in Vijay Shankar Pandey-Vs-U.O.I. and
another, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 589, held as follows:-
“26. It can be seen from the above that the normal rule is that
there can be only one enquiry. This court has also recognized
the possibility of a further enquiry in certain circumstances
enumerated therein. The decision however makes it clear that
the fact that the report submitted by the enquiring authority is
not acceptable to the disciplinary authority, is not a ground
for completely setting aside the enquiry report and ordering a
second enquiry.”
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 509
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

4. Further, in K.R. Deb-Vs-The Controller, Central Excise, Shillong
reported in [1971 (2) SCC 102], this Hon’ble Court has laid down
that a 2nd enquiry is not permissible under the statutory provision
of the Rule 15(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The above decision
was reiterated by this Hon’ble Court in U.O.I –V- Shri K.D. Pandey
& Ors, reported in [2002 (10) SCC 471].
5. The above quoted decisions of the Apex Court conclusively mandate
that – (1) A second enquiry is not permissible, and (2) It is the
correctness of the conclusion recorded in the enquiry report which
determines the legality of the conclusions and not the mere technical
ﬂaws. These principles are ﬁt to be extrapolated in the instant case.
6. That, the complaint dated 30.08.2011 contained only 2 (two)
allegations, but the Central Complaint Committee extrapolated the
allegations to as many as 10 nos. incorporating therein the newly added
exaggerated versions of the complainant and delved into those, thus
travelling beyond the allegations in the complaint dated 30.08.2011
and overstepping its jurisdiction in violation of procedure laid down
in CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
7. The Hon’ble High Court in para 41 of its impugned judgment (Page
54 of the SLP) rightly observed that a complaint dated 18.09.2012
along with ﬁve Annexures was submitted by Smt. X (Complainant) to
the Chairperson of the Central Complaint Committee (CCC) and copy
of such complaint was also made available to the sole respondent.
In the inquiry report the above fact is not mentioned. It also does
not appear that the said complaint was brought to the notice of the
disciplinary authority. The Hon’ble High Court rightly held that the
Central Complaint Committee (CCC) was mandated by the authority
to inquire into the complaint dated 30.08.2011. However, it is manifest
from the inquiry report that the complaint submitted on 18.09.2012
was also taken into consideration. It was also noted by the Hon’ble
High Court that the CCC in the report under the heading “VI. Charges
which were admitted/dropped/not pressed” that the petitioner did
not plead guilty to any of the allegations made by the complainant in
her complaint dated 30.08.2011. Though the copy of the complaint
dated 30.08.2011 was furnished, the same was not given in the form
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

of articles of charge. The requirement of the oﬃcer proceeded against
to be formally asked whether he pleads guilty or not would, according
to the understanding of the court, is not an opportunity to such oﬃcer
only to answer the same in a mono-syllable. The Hon’ble High Court
held that to give meaning to the word “formally”, a real and eﬀective
opportunity has to be granted to the oﬃcer concerned to make his
comment in writing in response to the complaint. Apparently, no such
opportunity was aﬀorded. There is no indication that in respect of the
complaint dated 18.09.2012, the oﬃcer was even asked as to whether
he pleads guilty to the allegations made therein or not.
8. That, the Hon’ble High Court at para 43 of its judgment ( Page
70-71 of the SLP) rightly held that few points of allegations are no
way connected to the complaint dated 30.08.2011. The Hon’ble High
Court held that two inquiries had also taken place and, after more than
a year later, after lodging of the complaint dated 30.08.2011, another
complaint with many allegations was submitted to the Chairperson of
the CCC on 18.09.2012. Accordingly the Hon’ble High Court rightly
held that the CCC could not have entertained such a complaint for
the purpose of a disciplinary proceeding in absence of entrustment in
terms of Standing Order.
9. That, the Hon’ble High Court at para 44 & 45 of its judgment
(Page 71-74 of the SLP) rightly held that the orders dated 26.11.2012,
27.11.2012, 28.11.2012 and 10.12.2012 go to show that the committee
asked questions to the prosecution witnesses and examination-in-chief
was done by the committee. Prosecution witness, Mr. S.C. Katoch, who
was cross-examined by the complainant, in his statement had stated
that the complainant had made only one call on his mobile and that
she had mentioned that the sole respondent is harsh in his oﬃce work
and had given her duty in control room for which she is to sit in the
control room after oﬃce hours. He had, in other words, negated the
assertions made in the complaint that she had informed about sexual
harassment meted out by the sole respondent. The CCC, however,
noted that it appeared that Shri Katoch had pre-judged the complaint
as untrue. When his evidence was that there was no complaint of
sexual harassment, there was no occasion for the CCC to opine that
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 511
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

he pre-judged the complaint. He was also put ﬁfteen questions by the
CCC, which was styled as “examination-in-chief”
10. That, the Hon’ble High Court at para 46 of its judgment ( Page
74 of the SLP) rightly held that the prosecution witnesses were also
put questions by the CCC, which is evident from the report of the
CCC under the heading “V. Examination of witnesses”, wherein the
CCC itself recorded that CCC had conducted the examination-in-chief
whenever it felt necessary. Thus, it is evident that the CCC also played
the role of prosecutor, which vitiates the proceeding.
11. That the Hon’ble High Court at para 47 of its judgment (Page
75-76 of the SLP) rightly held that the CCC had recorded that it had
noted that no witness examined by it had speciﬁc knowledge of the
events listed in. The Hon’ble High Court observed that events alleged
pertain to allegation of making unsolicited phone calls at unearthly
hours and, that too, for long duration. No call records were produced.
However, CCC accepted the allegations by merely holding that the
committee saw no reason what gain the complainant would have
in fabricating the allegations and that it is understandable that no
woman would be expected to conﬁde matters of sexual nature even
to her female colleagues. In this regard, the Hon’ble High Court
correctly held that the Central Complaint Committee (CCC) ought
to have recorded its ﬁnding based on evidence on record and not on
surmises and conjectures.
12. That, it may be mentioned here that the sole respondent was most
decorated oﬃcer in his cadre in SSB. He was awarded by the President
of India for his exemplary services. He was a recipient of Indian Police
Medal, DG’s Disc with Commendation (2 times), Best Performing
Oﬃcer in SSB (Best Area) for 04 consecutive years from 2009, 2010,
2011 and 2012, recipient of various appreciations in each month from
all senior controlling oﬃcers including DG of SSB. Now after putting
in 35 glorious years of service in SSB, he has been victimized and
forced to proceed on superannuation without a single penny from the
department. Even his personal accumulation under diﬀerent heads has
also not been sanctioned to him. The sole respondent is still deprived
of his retiral beneﬁt like gratuity and others as the gratuity due to
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

him cannot be withheld as the nature of allegation is not related any
ﬁnancial issues and there was no order by any quarter about any
such withholding of his retiral beneﬁt. Moreso, the Punishment order
dated 05.01.2016 (@ page 447-453 of Vol-II of present SLP) passed
by the Authority concerned clearly directed that the gratuity amount
shall be released to the sole respondent and the said order of release
of gratuity by the respondent authority is not opposed or assailed by
the petitioner authority. However, till date no Gratuity amount was
released to the sole respondent. Due to such order, commutation value
of pension has also not been paid till date.
13. Sole respondent is the victim of circumstances as there was never
any blemish in his entire service career and he was exonerated in
all ﬁrst three inquiries on same allegation. That too with a type of
punishment which was not at all recommended by the Central Level
Complaint Committee. Surprisingly, the authority on same allegations
instituted 4th inquiry and imposed penalty just to victimize the sole
respondent for reasons best known to them. The sole respondent was the
unfortunate victim of interdepartmental rivalry and he was traumatized
due to unproved allegations and his innocence was upheld time to
time by the ﬁrst three inquiries and same was discussed in detail by
the Hon’ble High Court at para 40, 43, 46 and 47 of the impugned
judgment while rightly setting aside the impugned order of penalty.
(Page no.-54, 70-74, 75-76 of the SLP)
14. The contention of the petitioner authority that the penalty of
withholding of 50% of pension is just and suﬃcient. In this regard, the
sole respondent submits that when all three inquiry reports exonerated
him and even Hon’ble High Court acquitted him all his charges and
set aside the impugned order of penalty then the sole respondent has
proved his honesty and agitating his case for his reputation and honour
as a decorated retired oﬃcer as DIG of SSB apart from unjustiﬁed
penalty withholding 50% of pension.”
E. ANALYSIS
30. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the following four questions
fall for our consideration: -
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 513
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

I. Whether the Central Complaints Committee committed any
egregious error in looking into the second complaint dated
18.09.2012?
II. Whether the Central Complaints Committee committed any
egregious error in putting questions to the witnesses in the course
of the departmental enquiry and thereby vitiating the disciplinary
proceedings?
III. Whether the Central Complaints Committee could be said to have
based its ﬁndings on mere conjectures and surmises? Whether the
case on hand is one of “No Evidence”?
IV. Whether the High Court committed any egregious error in passing
the impugned judgment and order?
E.1 Relevant Statutory Scheme and Case Law
31. Before adverting to the rival contentions canvassed on either side,
we must look into the statutory scheme relating to the complaints of sexual
harassment.
32. Sexual harassment is a pervasive and deeply rooted issue that has
plagued the societies worldwide. In India, it has been a matter of serious
concern, and the development of laws to combat sexual harassment is a
testament to the nation’s commitment towards addressing this problem.
Sexual harassment has existed in India for centuries, but it was only in the
latter half of the 20th century that it began to gain legal recognition.
33. The turning point against the growing social menace of sexual
harassment of women at work place could be traced back to the pathbreaking
decision of this Court in Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan and
Others reported in (1997) 6 SCC 241, whereby this Court recognized sexual
harassment at the workplace as a violation of a woman’s fundamental right
to equality and dignity. The relevant observations are as under:
“1. This writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of the
fundamental rights of working women under Articles 14 19 and 21
of the Constitution of India in view of the prevailing climate in which
the violation of these rights is not uncommon. With the increasing
awareness and emphasis on gender justice, there is increase in the
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

eﬀort to guard against such violations; and the resentment towards
incidents of sexual harassment is also increasing. The present petition
has been brought as a class action by certain social activists and NGOs
with the aim of focusing attention towards this societal aberration,
and assisting in ﬁnding suitable methods for realisation of the true
concept of “gender equality”; and to prevent sexual harassment of
working women in all work places through judicial process, to ﬁll the
vacuum in existing legislation.
2. The immediate cause for the ﬁling of this writ petition is an incident
of alleged brutal gang rape of a social worker in a village of Rajasthan.
That incident is the subject-matter of a separate criminal action and
no further mention of it, by us, is necessary. The incident reveals the
hazards to which a working woman may be exposed and the depravity
to which sexual harassment can degenerate; and the urgency for
safeguards by an alternative mechanism in the absence of legislative
measures. In the absence of legislative measures, the need is to ﬁnd an
eﬀective alternative mechanism to fulﬁl this felt and urgent social need.
3. Each such incident results in violation of the fundamental rights
of “Gender Equality” and the “Right to Life and Liberty”. It is
a clear violation of the rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the
Constitution. One of the logical consequences of such an incident
is also the violation of the victim’s fundamental right under Article
19(1)(g) “to practice any profession or to carry out any occupation,
trade or business”. Such violations, therefore, attract the remedy
under Article 32 for the enforcement of these fundamental rights of
women. This class action under Article 32 of the Constitution is for this
reason. A writ of mandamus in such a situation, if it is to be eﬀective,
needs to be accompanied by directions for prevention, as the violation
of fundamental rights of this kind is a recurring phenomenon. The
fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade or profession
depends on the availability of a “safe” working environment. Right
to life means life with dignity. The primary responsibility for ensuring
such safety and dignity through suitable legislation, and the creation of
a mechanism for its enforcement, is of the legislature and the executive.
When, however, instances of sexual harassment resulting in violation
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 515
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

of fundamental rights of women workers under Articles 14, 19 and
21 are brought before us for redress under Article 32, an eﬀective
redressal requires that some guidelines should be laid down for the
protection of these rights to ﬁll the legislative vacuum.
xxx xxx xxx
7. In the absence of domestic law occupying the ﬁeld, to formulate
eﬀective measures to check the evil of sexual harassment of working
women at all workplaces, the contents of international conventions
and norms are signiﬁcant for the purpose of interpretation of the
guarantee of gender equality, right to work with human dignity in
Articles 14, 15 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and the safeguards
against sexual harassment implicit therein. Any international
convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in
harmony with its spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge
the meaning and content thereof, to promote the object of the
constitutional guarantee. This is implicit from Article 51(c) and the
enabling power of the Parliament to enact laws for implementing
the international conventions and norms by virtue of Article 253
read with Entry 14 of the Union List in Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution. Article 73 also is relevant. It provides that the executive
power of the Union shall extend to the matters with respect to which
Parliament has power to make laws. The executive power of the
Union is, therefore, available till the Parliament enacts legislation
to expressly provide measures needed to curb the evil.”
(Emphasis supplied)
34. This Court in Vishaka (supra) further embarked on an innovative
judicial process for the eﬀective enforcement of the basic human right of
gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse by
laying down the essential principles for preventing and redressing sexual
harassment, including the creation of internal complaints committee
at workplaces, awareness programs, and punitive measures against
the oﬀenders. These guidelines now popularly known as the ‘Vishaka
Guidelines’ set a foundation for the development of comprehensive
legislation on sexual harassment. The relevant observations are as under: -
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

“16. In view of the above, and the absence of enacted law to provide
for the eﬀective enforcement of the basic human right of gender
equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse, more
particularly against sexual harassment at work places, we lay down
the guidelines and norms speciﬁed hereinafter for due observance at
all work places or other institutions, until a legislation is enacted for
the purpose. This is done in exercise of the power available under
Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental
rights and it is further emphasised that this would be treated as the
law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution.
17. The GUIDELINES and NORMS pre-scribed herein are as under:
HAVING REGARD to the deﬁnition of “human rights” in Section
2(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.
TAKING NOTE of the fact that the present civil and penal laws in
India do not adequately provide for speciﬁc protection of women
from sexual harassment in work places and that enactment of
such legislation will take considerable time,
It is necessary and expedient for employers in workplaces as well as
other responsible persons or institutions to observe certain guidelines
to ensure the prevention of sexual harassment of women:
1. Duty of the Employer or other responsible persons in workplaces
and other institutions:
It shall be the duty of the employer or other responsible persons in
workplaces or other institutions to prevent or deter the commission
of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the
resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment by
taking all steps required.
2. Deﬁnition
For this purpose, sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually
determined behaviour (whether directly or by implication) as:
a) physical contact and advances;
b) a demand or request for sexual favours;
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 517
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

c) sexually coloured remarks;
d) showing pornography;
e) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct
of sexual nature.
Where any of these acts is committed in circumstances whereunder
the victim of such conduct has a reasonable apprehension that in
relation to the victim’s employment or work whether she is drawing
salary, or honorarium or voluntary, whether in Government, public or
private enterprise such conduct can be humiliating and may constitute
a health and safety problem. It is discriminatory for instance when the
woman has reasonable grounds to believe that her objection would
disadvantage her in connection with her employment or work including
recruiting or promotion or when it creates a hostile work environment.
Adverse consequences might be visited if the victim does not consent
to the conduct in question or raises any objection thereto.
3. Preventive Steps:
All employers or persons in charge of workplace whether in the
public or private sector should take appropriate steps to prevent sexual
harassment. Without prejudice to the generality of this obligation they
should take the following steps:
(a) Express prohibition of sexual harassment as deﬁned above at the
workplace should be notiﬁed, published and circulated in appropriate
ways.
(b) The rules/regulations of government and public sector bodies
relating to conduct and discipline should include rules/regulations
prohibiting sexual harassment and provide for appropriate penalties
in such rules against the oﬀender.
(c) As regards private employers steps should be taken to include the
aforesaid prohibitions in the standing orders under the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
(d) Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of work,
leisure, health and hygiene to further ensure that there is no hostile
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

environment towards women at workplaces and no woman employee
should have reasonable grounds to believe that she is disadvantaged
in connection with her employment.
4. Criminal Proceedings:
Where such conduct amounts to a speciﬁc oﬀence under the
Indian Penal Code or under any other law, the employer shall initiate
appropriate action in accordance with law by making a complaint with
the appropriate authority.
In particular, it should ensure that victims, or witnesses are not
victimized or discriminated against while dealing with complaints of
sexual harassment. The victims of sexual harassment should have the
option to seek transfer of the perpetrator or their own transfer.
5. Disciplinary Action:
Where such conduct amounts to misconduct in employment as
deﬁned by the relevant service rules, appropriate disciplinary action
should be initiated by the employer in accordance with those rules.
6. Complaint Mechanism:
Whether or not such conduct constitutes an oﬀence under law
or a breach of the service rules, an appropriate complaint mechanism
should be created in the employer’s organization for redress of the
complaint made by the victim. Such complaint mechanism should
ensure time bound-treatment of complaints.
7. Complaints Committee
The complaint mechanism, referred to in (6) above, should be
adequate to provide, where necessary, a Complaints Committee, a
special counsellor or other support service, including the maintenance
of conﬁdentiality.
The Complaints Committee should be headed by a woman and
not less than half of its member should be women. Further, to prevent
the possibility of any undue pressure or inﬂuence from senior levels,
such Complaints Committee should involve a third party, either NGO
or other body who is familiar with the issue of sexual harassment.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 519
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

The Complaints Committee must make an annual report to the
Government Department concerned of the complaints and action
taken by them.
The employers and person-in-charge will also report on the
compliance with the aforesaid guidelines including on the reports of
the Complaints Committee to the Government department.
8. Workers’ initiative
Employees should be allowed to raise issues of sexual harassment
at workers’ meeting and in other appropriate forum and it should be
aﬃrmatively discussed in employer-employee meetings.
9. Awareness:
Awareness of the rights of female employees in this regard should
be created in particular by prominently notifying the guidelines (and
appropriate legislation when enacted on the subject) in a suitable
manner.
10. Third-party Harassment:
Where sexual harassment occurs as a result of an act or omission
by any third party or outsider, the employer and person- in-charge will
take all steps necessary and reasonable to assist the aﬀected person
in terms of support and preventive action.
11. The Central/State Governments are requested to consider adopting
suitable measures including legislation to ensure that the guidelines
laid down by this order are also observed by the employers in private
sector.
12. These guidelines will not prejudice any rights available under the
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.
18. Accordingly, we direct that the above guidelines and norms
would be strictly observed in all work places for the preservation and
enforcement of the right to gender equality of the working women.
These directions would be binding and enforceable in law until suitable
legislation is enacted to occupy the ﬁeld. These writ petitions are
disposed of, accordingly.”
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

35. This was followed by another decision of this Court in Medha
Kotwal Lele and Others v. Union of India and Others reported in (2013)
1 SCC 297, decided on 19.10.2012, wherein this Court anguished by the
failure of the Union & State Governments in complying with the Vishaka
guidelines, more particularly, the constitution of the complaints committee,
issued a writ of continuing mandamus to ensure due compliance of the
guidelines. The relevant observations are reproduced below: -
“43. As the largest democracy in the world, we have to combat violence
against women. We are of the considered view that the existing laws,
if necessary, be revised and appropriate new laws be enacted by
Parliament and the State Legislatures to protect women from any
form of indecency, indignity and disrespect at all places (in their
homes as well as outside), prevent all forms of violence— domestic
violence, sexual assault, sexual harassment at the workplace, etc.—and
provide new initiatives for education and advancement of women and
girls in all spheres of life. After all they have limitless potential. Lip
service, hollow statements and inert and inadequate laws with sloppy
enforcement are not enough for true and genuine upliftment of our
half most precious population—the women.
44. In what we have discussed above, we are of the considered view
that guidelines in Vishaka (Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6
SCC 241 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 932) should not remain symbolic and the
following further directions are necessary until legislative enactment
on the subject is in place:
44.1. The States and Union Territories which have not yet carried
out adequate and appropriate amendments in their respective Civil
Services Conduct Rules (by whatever name these Rules are called)
shall do so within two months from today by providing that the report
of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be an inquiry report
in a disciplinary action under such Civil Services Conduct Rules. In
other words, the disciplinary authority shall treat the report/ﬁndings,
etc. of the Complaints Committee as the ﬁndings in a disciplinary
inquiry against the delinquent employee and shall act on such report
accordingly. The ﬁndings and the report of the Complaints Committee
shall not be treated as a mere preliminary investigation or inquiry
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 521
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

leading to a disciplinary action but shall be treated as a ﬁnding/report
in an inquiry into the misconduct of the delinquent.
44.2. The States and Union Territories which have not carried out
amendments in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules
shall now carry out amendments on the same lines, as noted above in
para 44.1 within two months.
44.3. The States and Union Territories shall form adequate number
of Complaints Committees so as to ensure that they function at
taluka level, district level and State level. Those States and/or Union
Territories which have formed only one committee for the entire State
shall now form adequate number of Complaints Committees within
two months from today. Each of such Complaints Committees shall
be headed by a woman and as far as possible in such committees an
independent member shall be associated.
44.4. The State functionaries and private and public sector
undertakings/organisations/bodies/institutions, etc. shall put in
place suﬃcient mechanism to ensure full implementation of Vishaka
(Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 : 1997 SCC (Cri)
932) guidelines and further provide that if the alleged harasser
is found guilty, the complainant victim is not forced to work with/
under such harasser and where appropriate and possible the alleged
harasser should be transferred. Further provision should be made that
harassment and intimidation of witnesses and the complainants shall
be met with severe disciplinary action.
44.5. The Bar Council of India shall ensure that all Bar Associations
in the country and persons registered with the State Bar Councils
follow Vishaka (Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 :
1997 SCC (Cri) 932) guidelines. Similarly, the Medical Council of
India, Council of Architecture, Institute of Chartered Accountants,
Institute of Company Secretaries and other statutory institutes shall
ensure that the organisations, bodies, associations, institutions and
persons registered/aﬃliated with them follow the guidelines laid down
by Vishaka (Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 : 1997
SCC (Cri) 932). To achieve this, necessary instructions/circulars
shall be issued by all the statutory bodies such as the Bar Council of
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

India, Medical Council of India, Council of Architecture, Institute of
Company Secretaries within two months from today. On receipt of any
complaint of sexual harassment at any of the places referred to above
the same shall be dealt with by the statutory bodies in accordance
with Vishaka (Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 : 1997
SCC (Cri) 932), guidelines and the guidelines in the present order.”
(Emphasis supplied)
36. The relevant statutory rules, applicable to the case on hand, are
the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (for short, “the 1964 CCS
Rules”) and the Central Civil Services (Classiﬁcation, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1965 (for short, “the 1965 CCS Rules”) enacted in exercise of the
powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 and Clause 5 of Article 148
of the Constitution of India.
37. Part VI of the 1965 CCS Rules contains the relevant provisions
relating to the disciplinary proceedings and imposition of penalties for
government servants in the central civil services and posts and Rule 14
therein stipulates the ordinary procedure and process for imposition of
major penalties.
38. Pursuant to the decisions of this Court in Vishaka (supra) and
Medha Kotwal Lele (supra) referred to above, the CCS Rules underwent
several amendments whereby new provisions speciﬁcally dealing with
sexual harassment came to be inserted, more particularly Rule 3C in the 1964
CCS Rules along with a new Proviso to Rule 14(2) of the 1965 CCS Rules.
The said provisions conjointly made sexual harassment punishable with
major penalties and speciﬁcally made the Vishaka Guidelines applicable to
the disciplinary proceedings in relation to complaints of sexual harassment.
The said provisions are enumerated below: -
“3C. Prohibition of sexual harassment of working women.
(1) No Government servant shall indulge in any act of sexual
harassment of any woman at any work place.
(2) Every Government servant who is incharge of a work place shall
take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment to any woman
at the work place.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 523
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

Explanation. - (I) For the purpose of this rule, –
(a) “sexual harassment” includes any one or more of the following
acts or behaviour (whether directly or by implication) namely –
(i) physical contact and advances; or
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii) making sexually coloured remarks; or
(iv) showing pornography; or
(v) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct
of a sexual nature.
(b) the following circumstances, among other circumstances, if
it occurs or is present in relation to or connected with any act or
behaviour of sexual harassment may amount to sexual harassment:-
(i) implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in
employment; or
(ii) implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment in
employment; or
(iii) implied or explicit threat about her present or future
employment status; or
(iv) interference with her work or creating an intimidating or
oﬀensive or hostile work environment for her; or
(v) humiliating treatment likely to aﬀect her health or safety.
(c) “workplace” includes:-
(i) any department, organisation, undertaking, establishment,
enterprise, institution, oﬃce, branch or unit which is established,
owned, controlled or wholly or substantially ﬁnanced by funds
provided directly or indirectly by the Central Government;
(ii) hospitals or nursing homes;
(iii) any sports institute, stadium, sports complex or competition
or games venue, whether residential or not used for training,
sports or other activities relating thereto;
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

(iv) any place visited by the employee arising out of or during
the course of employment including transportation provided
by the employer for undertaking such journey;
(v) a dwelling place or a house.
xxx xxx xxx
14. Procedure for imposing major penalties.-
(1) No order imposing any of the penalties speciﬁed in clauses (v)
to (ix) of Rule 11 shall be made except after an inquiry held, as far
as may be, in the manner provided in this rule and rule 15, or in the
manner provided by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37
of 1850), where such inquiry is held under that Act.
(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are
grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct
or misbehaviour against a Government servant, it may itself inquire
into, or appoint under this rule or under the provisions of the Public
Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to
inquire into the truth thereof.
Provided that where there is a complaint of sexual harassment within
the meaning of rule 3C of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,
1964, the Complaints Committee established in each Ministry or
Department or Oﬃce for inquiring into such complaints, shall be
deemed to be the inquiring authority appointed by the disciplinary
authority for the purpose of these rules and the Complaints Committee
shall hold, if separate procedure has not been prescribed for the
Complaints Committee for holding the inquiry into the complaints of
sexual harassment, the inquiry as far as practicable in accordance
with the procedure laid down in these rules.”
(Emphasis supplied)
39. In addition to the aforesaid amendments in the CCS Rules, the
Standing Order No. 1 of 2006 (Grievances Redressal Mechanism: To
Redress Grievances of Women/Sexual Harassment at Work Place) was
also issued by the Directorate General, SSB, New Delhi delineating the
entire framework and procedure of the grievances redressal mechanism
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 525
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

relating to sexual harassment at workplace. The 2006 Standing Order is
reproduced below: -
“DIRECTORATE GENERAL, SASHASTRA SEEMA BAL (SSB), R.K.
PURAM, NEW DELHI-110066
2006
STANDING ORDER 1/2006
SUB: GRIEVANCES REDRESSAL MECHANISM : TO REDRESS
GRIEVANCES OF WOMEN / SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT WORK
PLACE.
1. The Constitution of India has given to women, the Fundamental
Right to equality and the Right not to be discriminated against
on grounds of religion, caste and sex. The constitution includes
a special provision in Article 15(3), permitting the State to make
special provisions in favour of women by enacting Laws/provisions
so as to advance their social economic and political condition and
to accord them parity.
2. Sexual harassment of women at the workplace violates their sense
of dignity and right to earn a living with dignity and is against their
fundamental rights and their basic human rights. The International
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979 at Beijing also
recognized the right of women to equality at the work place and it
states that women shall not be subjected to sexual harassment at
work places; as such harassment vitiates the working environment.
3. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Vishaka and others Vs
State of Rajasthan and others (AIR 1997 SC 3011) while recognizing
the International Convention and norms has interpreted gender
of women, in relation to work and held that sexual harassment of
women at the workplace, which is against their dignity is a clear
violation of the fundamental rights of “Gender Equality” and the
“Right to Life and Liberty” enshrined in Article -14, 15 and 21
of the Constitution of India. Other logical consequences of such
an incident is also the violation of the victim’s fundamental right
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

under Article-19(1) (g) ‘to practice any profession or to carry out any
occupation, trade or business’. Gender equality includes protection
from sexual harassment and right to work with dignity.
4. In absence of enacted law to provide for the eﬀective enforcement
of the basic human right of gender equality and guarantee against
sexual harassment and abuse more particularly against harassment at
work place, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the guidelines
and norms for compliance at all workplaces and institutions. Under
Article 141 of the Constitution, these guidelines and norms of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court are required to be treated as THE LAW OF
THE LAND.
5. The National Commission for Women, a statutory and autonomous
body constituted by the Government of India is working for justice
for women, safeguarding their rights, and promoting women’s
empowerment. The NCW consequently formulated a code of conduct
for work place putting down the Supreme Court guidelines in a simple
manner which has been widely circulated.
Arrangements at various levels have been made to ensure that
the women employed in Departments work with utmost dignity and
are free from all types of sexual harassment. Accordingly, following
scheme of arrangements has been devised for SSB:
6. DEFINITION
Sexual harassment will include such unwelcome sexually determined
behaviour by any person either individually or in association with other
persons or by any person in authority whether directly or by implication
such as:-
i) Physical contact and advances.
ii) A demand or request for sexual favours.
iii) Sexually coloured remarks.
iv) Eve-teasing.
v) Unsavoury remarks.
vi) Jokes causing or likely to cause awkwardness or embarrassment.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 527
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

vii) Innuendos and taunts.
viii) Gender based insults or sexist remarks.
ix) Unwelcome sexual overtone in any manner such as over telephone
(obnoxious telephone calls) and the like.
x) Touching or brushing against any part of the body and the like.
xi) Displaying pornographic or other oﬀensive or derogatory pictures
cartoons, pamphlets or sayings.
xii) Forcible physical touch or molestation.
xiii) Physical conﬁnement against one’s will and other act likely to
violate one’s privacy.
xiv) Any other unwelcome physical verbal or non-verbal conduct of
sexual nature.
And includes any act or conduct by a person in authority and
belonging to one sex which denies or would deny equal opportunity in
pursuit of career development or otherwise making the environment at
the work place hostile or intimidating to a person belonging to the other
sex, only on the ground of sex.
For any further interpretation, elaboration or explanation in
the, matter or any of its ingredient thereto, the judgement of Hon’ble
Supreme Court or the guidelines of National Commission for Women
may be referred to which are being annexed.
7. DUTY OF THE HEAD OF THE UNIT/OTHER RESPONSIBLE
PERSONS IN WORK PLACES

1. He shall take all necessary steps at work place to prevent
or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment
or the acts outraging/insulting the modesty of a women
employee.
2. He shall ensure that women employee is not be treated as
sex object.
3. He shall provide for the proper grievance redressal &
remedial mechanism in the unit for the purpose.
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

4. He would enforce express prohibition of sexual harassment
as deﬁned above at the work place and get it notiﬁed,
published and circulated in appropriate ways.
5. He would augment appropriate work condition in respect
of work, leisure, health and hygiene to further ensure that
there is not hostile environment towards women at work
places and no women employee should have reasonable
grounds to believe that she is disadvantaged in connection
with employment.
6. He will ensure suitable arrangements for prevention of
sexual harassment as a result of an act or omission by any
third party or outsider and would provide necessary and
reasonable assistance to the aﬀected person in terms of
support and preventive actions.
8. CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Where such conduct amounts to a speciﬁc oﬀence under the
Indian Penal Code or under any other law, the head of unit/competent
authority shall initiate appropriate action in accordance with law by
making a complaint with the appropriate authority.
In particular, it should ensure that victims or witnesses are
not victimized or discriminated against while dealing with complaints
of sexual harassment. The victims of sexual harassment should have
the option to seek transfer of the perpetrator or their own transfer.
9. COMPLAINT COMMITTEES
Complaint Committees at two levels will exist in SSB i.e. Central
Complaint Committee at the Directorate and Frontier Complaint
Committee at the Frontier level.
(a) The Central Complaint Committee will consist of the following:

i) Chairperson One lady oﬃcer of the rank of
DIG/Commandant rank to be
appointed by IG (Pers).
ii) Member-I One lady Gazetted Oﬃcer to be
appointed by IG (Pers).
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 529
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

iii) Member-II Nomination from an NGO
recognized by NCW or
One Counsellor from NGO
(nomination from an NGO
recognized by NCW) to be
solicited by the Chairperson of
the Committee.
iv) Member-III AD (Legal) Force Headquarters
or the senior most Law Oﬃcer.
(b) Frontier level Complaint Committee will be constituted as follows: -
i) Chairperson One Gazetted rank lady oﬃcer
to be appointed by the Frontier
IG.
ii) Member-I One counsellor from an NGO
(Nomination from an NGO
recognized by NCW to be
solicited by the Chairperson of
the Committee)
iii) Member-II Legal Oﬃcer of Frontier (Ex-
oﬃcio member)
1. Chairman of committee should be senior to the oﬃcer /
oﬃcial against whom the complaint is made.
2. Wherever Frontier IG does not have a higher rank woman
oﬃcer to be appointed in the Frontier level committee (i.e.,
there is no SSB, oﬃcer of commensurate rank available, in
case where complaints are against senior oﬃcers) IG shall
immediately get in touch with IG (Pers) and seek placement
of an oﬃcer from any Central Govt. organization.
3. Where the required number of senior oﬃcers are not
available within the organization, member should be co-
opted from other Central Government Departments.
4. In case complaint is against the Frontier IG himself, the
matter will be viewed / looked into at the level of Central
Complaint Committee.
5. Proper safety and security of the complainant and witnesses
shall be ensured by the concerned unit / oﬃce.
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

(c) The charter of the Central Complaint Committee and the Frontier
Complaint Committee would, inter alia, include: -
CENTRAL COMPLAINT FRONTIER COMPLAINT
COMMITTEE COMMITTEE
1. Enquiry into any matter 1. Enquiry into any matter
of sexual abuse in the of sexual abuse under the
organization – Suo moto Frontier.
or on complaint with
the option to enquire at
its own level or assign
the task to Frontier
Committee.

2. Monitoring all such 2. Keeping Central Complaint
cases including reports Committee informed of
received from Frontiers. all such matters coming
to light and work in close
liaison with the Central
Complaint Committee
seeking proper guidance
as required.

3 Ensuring follow up action 3. Submitting enquiry report
to its logical end. to the Frontier IG and to
solicit further required
action.

4. Submitting annual report 4. Submission of periodical
to MHA, other bodies as reports to central
required. complaint committee as
may be prescribed by the
Central Committee from
time to time.

5. Any other duties assigned 5. Any other duties assigned
by DG. by the Frontier I’sG
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 531
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

6. Secretarial and logistical 6. The secretarial and logis-
assistance to the Central tical assistance to FTR
Complaint Committee Committees would be pro-
will be provided by Pers vided by Frontier I’sG from
Branch of Directorate its local resources. Fron-
General. Central Com- tier IG shall ensure that
plaint Committee shall all complaints are properly
route its reports through disposed of to their logical
IG (Pers) who would end. He would exercise all
keep ADG and DG, SSB powers of the head of the
apprised and ensure department in this respect
proper action. under his jurisdiction un-
less a particular matter
falls within the jurisdiction
of the Central Committee
or it would otherwise be
appropriate for the Central
Committee to take up the
matter or it requires further
action at the level of IG
(Pers/FHQ)/DG, SSB.
10. COMPLAINT MECHANISM
This procedure / mechanism has been devised in pursuance of
Hon’ble Supreme Court Judgement dated 26.04.2004 in the matter of
Medha Kotwal Lele & Ors Versus UOI & Ors. WP (Crl) No. 173-177-
1999 and Govt. of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances
& Pensions, DOP&T Notiﬁcation dated 01.07.2004 signed by Smt.
Pratibha Mohan, Director from ﬁle No.11012/5/2001/Estt.(A), para
6 (Complaint Mechanism) is as under:-
i) Any person aggrieved shall prefer a complaint before the
Complaints Committee at the earliest point of time.
ii) The Complaint shall contain all the material and details
concerning the alleged sexual harassment including the names
of the contravener and the complaint shall be addressed to the
Complaints Committee.
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

iii) If the Complainant feels that she cannot disclose her identity
for any particular reason, the complainant shall address the
complaint to the Frontier IG/IG (Pers, FHQ) and handover
the same in person or in a sealed cover. Upon receipt of such
complaint, Frontier IG/IG (Pers, FHQ) shall retain the original
complaint with himself and send to the Complaints Committee, a
gist of the complaint containing all material and relevant details
other than the name of the complainant and other details, which
might disclose the identity of the Complainant.
iv) As soon as an enquiry into any complaint of women regarding
sexual harassment is entrusted to the Complaints Committee,
the Chairperson shall open a daily order sheet to proceed with
the case as envisaged in Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 and
maintain the same during the course of entire enquiry.
v) The entries in the daily order sheet are to be signed by the
Chairperson of Complaints Committee, alleged Oﬃcer / oﬃcial
and witnesses as the case may be.
vi) In the preliminary hearing the Chairperson should serve gist of
complaint to the alleged oﬃcer/ oﬃcial (in the form of articles
of charge) and he should formally be asked whether he pleads
guilty or not based on the complaint.
vii) If the charges are denied, the complainant should be asked to
produce her witnesses if any before the Complaints Committee
for recording their statements.
viii) Cross examination of the witnesses should be allowed by the
complainant and alleged oﬃcer. However, cross examination of
complainant by the alleged oﬃcer is permissible as per Indian
Evidence Act 1872 subject to the directions as laid down by
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in AIR 2004 SC 3566-Sakshi
Vs UOI & Others i.e. to say “Questions put in cross examination
on behalf of accused (charged oﬃcer in our case), which
relate directly to incident, should be given in writing to the
Chairperson of the Complaints Committee who may put them
to victim or witnesses in a language which is clear and NOT
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 533
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

EMBARRASSING.” The questions shall thus be vetted by the
Chairperson of such Complaints Committee.
ix) The cross examination of witnesses should be with strict regard
to decency and should not be against the dignity of the women.
x) During the course of enquiry by the Complaints Committee,
the question of relevance is to be decided by the Chairperson
and aggrieved provided with opportunity of being heard.
xi) There may not be any Presenting Oﬃcer but a Defence Assistant
shall be provided during the course of enquiry and rest of the
enquiry shall be completed as per the provisions provided in
CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 or as per the provisions of any other
Rules.
xii) The statement of witnesses to be authenticated by the signature
of witnesses, the alleged oﬃcer/oﬃcial and the Complaints
Committee Chairperson.
xiii) After completion of recording statement of witnesses (say from
the prosecution side), the alleged oﬃcer/oﬃcial should be given
opportunity to produce defence, if any. It shall be ensured that
the Rule of Law & principles of natural Justice are strictly
followed.
xiv) The Committee to give the ﬁndings / opinion after recording
the defence and proceedings of cross examination of Defence
Witnesses, documents etc if any.
xv) In the order dated 26.4.2004 in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 173-
177/1999 (Medha Kotwal Lele & Others Vs Union of India
and Others) the Supreme Court has directed that “the report
of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be an inquiry
report under the CCS (CCA) Rules. Thereafter the disciplinary
authority will act on the report in accordance with the rules.”
Sub-rule (2) of rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 has
accordingly been amended to provide that the Complaints
Committee shall be deemed to be the inquiring authority
appointed by the disciplinary authority for the purpose of
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

these Rules by the Notiﬁcation No.11012/5/2001-Estt.(A) dated
01.07.2004 (GSR 225 dated 10th July, 2004) and the report
of the Complaints Committee should be treated as an enquiry
report.
xvi) On receipt of the ﬁndings from Complaints Committee, copy of
the same should be provided to the alleged oﬃcer/oﬃcial for
his reply representation by the disciplinary authority (Govt in
the case of the Group ‘A’ Oﬃcers).
xvii) On receipt of representation if any submitted by the alleged
officer/official, the case should be finally decided by the
competent authority as per procedure laid in CCS (CCA) Rules
or CRPF Act & Rules as the case may be.
11. PERIODICAL REPORT
The Frontier Complaints Committee shall prepare periodical
reports giving a full account of its activities during the period and
forward a copy thereof to the Central Complaint Committee in the
following format:-
1. Date of incident.
2. Place of incident.
3. Name of complainant with Rank/Unit/GC/Oﬃce.
4. Name against whom complaint is made with rank/unit/GC/oﬃce.
5. Allegation in brief.
6. Date of receipt of complaint.
7. Whether any FIR lodged to Police, if so, outcome of Police
investigation report.
8. Action taken on the complaint/ present status supported with
authenticated copy of relevant documents.
The Central Complaint Committee will submit annual report
to the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs and other bodies wherever required.
The Frontiers will submit report to Directorate half yearly i.e. in June
and December.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 535
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

12. ONUS OF THE SUPERVISORY/INSPECTING OFFICERS
The senior oﬃcers during their visit/ inspections of the
subordinate formations will reiterate the instruction in their
meeting and Sainik Sammelans.
They will review the complaints received by them in their
respective oﬃces.
They will ensure that proper working environment is
provided in their subordinate oﬃces for the women and they
are not discriminated on any point.
13. AWARENESS
Awareness of the right of female employees in this regard
should be created in particular by prominently notifying and
displaying the guidelines at appropriate places.
Women employees should be allowed to raise issues of sexual
harassment at work places through personal interviews,
orderly rooms, welfare meetings, Sainik Sammelans etc.
14. SAVINGS
Nothing contained in these standing orders shall prejudice any
right available to the employee or prevent any person from seeking
any legal remedy under the National Commission for Women Act 1990,
Protection of Human Rights Commission Act 1993 or under any other
law for the time being in force.
15. INTERACTION OF COMMITTEE WITH WOMEN
1. The National Commission for Women has recommended that
Proactive steps such as meeting with women oﬃcers and members
of Complaints Committee with all women in the Force in small
groups should be organized. This would help them to informally
exchanging views on handling sexual harassment related matters
and draw mutual strength. This would build conﬁdence for women
to go forward professionally.
2. Keeping in view of this aspect it has been decided that henceforth
the members of the Frontier level Complaints Committee will
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

organize the meeting with all women as well as women employees
within their operational jurisdiction of the Frontier in small groups
and exchange their views on handling sexual harassment related
matters as frequently as possible.
3. The Committee will also include a progress report about the
number of such meetings organized, number of women present
participated points if any, projected and its solution in the half
yearly report to be submitted to Central Committee Directorate
General as per para 7 of above SOP.
4. The IsG concerned will monitor such visits of the committee
members to ensure positive results.”
40. Rule 3C of the 1964 CCS Rules and the Proviso to Rule 14(2) of
the 1965 CCS Rules along with the 2006 Standing Order encompass the
entire legislative scheme for dealing with sexual harassment at workplace
in connection with the Central civil services and posts.
41. The Proviso to Rule 14(2) of the 1965 CCS Rules, provides that
in an inquiry into sexual harassment under the 2006 Standing Order, the
general procedure laid down in the 1965 CCS Rules shall also be applicable
as far as practicable. The expression “as far as practicable” was examined
by this Court in Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa and Others reported
in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 621 wherein it was held that the same is to provide
ﬂexibility for achieving a balance between sensitivity and fairness in an
inquiry into sexual harassment. It further held that while a detour may be
made from the CCS Rules however the same must not be unreasonable. The
relevant observations are given below: -
“51. As can be seen from the above, when the misconduct relates to
a complaint of sexual harassment at the work place, the Complaints
Committee constituted by the respondent no. 2-University to examine
such a complaint, dons the mantle of the inquiring authority and is
expected to conduct an inquiry in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in the rules, as far as may be practicable. The use of the
expression “as far as is practicable” indicates a play in the joints
available to the Complaints Committee to adopt a fair procedure that
is feasible and elastic for conducting an inquiry in a sensitive matter
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 537
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

like sexual harassment at the workplace, without compromising on the
principles of natural justice. Needless to state that the fact situation
in each case will vary and therefore no set standards or yardstick can
be laid down for conducting the inquiry in complaints of this nature.
However, having regard to the serious ramiﬁcations with which the
delinquent employee may be visited at the end of the inquiry, any
discordant note or unreasonable deviation from the settled procedures
required to be followed, would however strike at the core of the
principles of natural justice, notwithstanding the ﬁnal outcome.”
(Emphasis supplied)
42. It is well settled that when it comes to disciplinary proceedings,
it is the inquiry authority and the disciplinary authority who could be said
to be the fact-ﬁnding authority and the courts in exercise of their powers
of judicial review should not sit in appeal and reappreciate the evidence
or substitute its own ﬁndings. The scope of judicial review of the courts is
limited only to the propriety of the decision-making process and the fairness
of the inquiry procedure as held by this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union
of India & Ors. reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749. The relevant observations
are reproduced below:
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of
the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is
meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to
ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily
correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges
of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned
to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent oﬃcer or
whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the ﬁndings
or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted
with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority
to reach a ﬁnding of fact or conclusion. But that ﬁnding must be based
on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor
of proof of fact or evidence as deﬁned therein, apply to disciplinary
proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion
receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold
that the delinquent oﬃcer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent ﬁndings
on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority
held the proceedings against the delinquent oﬃcer in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory
rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or ﬁnding
reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or ﬁnding be such as no reasonable person would have
ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion
or the ﬁnding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the
facts of each case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
43. As regards the manner in which the court ought to exercise its
powers of judicial review in matters of disciplinary proceedings particularly
one pertaining to sexual harassment, this Court in Apparel Export Promotion
Council v. A.K. Chopra reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 observed that the
courts should not get swayed by insigniﬁcant discrepancies or hyper-
technicalities. The allegations must be appreciated in the background of the
entire case, and the courts must be very cautious before any sympathy or
leniency is shown towards the delinquent. It further held that the courts are
obliged to rely on any evidence of the complainant that inspires conﬁdence.
The relevant observations are reproduced below: -
“28. … In a case involving charge of sexual harassment or attempt
to sexually molest, the courts are required to examine the broader
probabilities of a case and not get swayed by insigniﬁcant discrepancies
or narrow technicalities or the dictionary meaning of the expression
“molestation”. They must examine the entire material to determine
the genuineness of the complaint. The statement of the victim must be
appreciated in the background of the entire case. Where the evidence
of the victim inspires conﬁdence, as is the position in the instant case,
the courts are obliged to rely on it. Such cases are required to be dealt
with great sensitivity. Sympathy in such cases in favour of the superior
oﬃcer is wholly misplaced and mercy has no relevance. The High
Court overlooked the ground realities and ignored the fact that the
conduct of the respondent against his junior female employee, Miss
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 539
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

X, was wholly against moral sanctions, decency and was oﬀensive to
her modesty. Reduction of punishment in a case like this is bound to
have demoralising eﬀect on the women employees and is a retrograde
step. There was no justiﬁcation for the High Court to interfere with
the punishment imposed by the departmental authorities. The act
of the respondent was unbecoming of good conduct and behaviour
expected from a superior oﬃcer and undoubtedly amounted to sexual
harassment of Miss X and the punishment imposed by the appellant
was thus commensurate with the gravity of his objectionable behaviour
and did not warrant any interference by the High Court in exercise of
its power of judicial review.
“29. At the conclusion of the hearing, learned counsel for the
respondent submitted that the respondent was repentant of his actions
and that he tenders an unqualiﬁed apology and that he was willing
to also go and to apologise to Miss X. We are afraid, it is too late in
the day to show any sympathy to the respondent in such a case. Any
lenient action in such a case is bound to have demoralising eﬀect on
working women. Sympathy in such cases is uncalled for and mercy
is misplaced.”
(Emphasis supplied)
44. Similarly, in Union of India and Others v. Mudrika Singh reported
in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1173, this Court speaking through one of us Dr.
D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI., cautioned the courts from invalidating inquiries
into sexual harassment on specious pleas and hyper-technical interpretations
of the service rules. The relevant observations are reproduced hereunder: -
“47. Before we conclude our analysis, we would also like to highlight
a rising trend of invalidation of proceedings inquiring into sexual
misconduct, on hyper-technical interpretations of the applicable service
rules. For instance, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act 2013 penalizes several
misconducts of a sexual nature and imposes a mandate on all public
and private organizations to create adequate mechanisms for redressal.
However, the existence of transformative legislation may not come
to the aid of persons aggrieved of sexual harassment if the appellate
mechanisms turn the process into a punishment. It is important that
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

courts uphold the spirit of the right against sexual harassment, which
is vested in all persons as a part of their right to life and right to
dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is also important to be
mindful of the power dynamics that are mired in sexual harassment
at the workplace. There are several considerations and deterrents
that a subordinate aggrieved of sexual harassment has to face when
they consider reporting sexual misconduct of their superior. In the
present case, the complainant was a constable complaining against
the respondent who was the head constable - his superior. Without
commenting on the merits of the case, it is evident that the discrepancy
regarding the date of occurrence was of a minor nature since the event
occurred soon after midnight and on the next day. Deeming such a
trivial aspect to be of monumental relevance, while invalidating the
entirety of the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent and
reinstating him to his position renders the complainant’s remedy at
nought. The history of legal proceedings such as these is a major factor
that contributes to the deterrence that civil and criminal mechanisms
pose to persons aggrieved of sexual harassment. The High Court, in
this case, was not only incorrect in its interpretation of the jurisdiction
of the Commandant and the obligation of the SSFC to furnish reasons
under the BSF Act 1968 and Rules therein, but also demonstrated
a callous attitude to the gravamen of the proceedings. We implore
courts to interpret service rules and statutory regulations governing
the prevention of sexual harassment at the workplace in a manner
that metes out procedural and substantive justice to all the parties.”
(Emphasis supplied)
E.2 Whether the Central Complaints Committee could have
looked into the second complaint dated 18.09.2012?
45. The High Court in its impugned judgment observed that the
Disciplinary Authority had constituted the Central Complaints Committee
on the basis of the complaint ﬁled by the victim. Since, at the time when
the Central Complaints Committee came to be constituted, there was only
one complaint i.e., the complainant’s ﬁrst complaint dated 30.08.2011, it
necessarily meant that the Central Complaints Committee was mandated and
empowered to inquire into only that complaint to which the committee owed
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 541
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

its existence or in other words, the complaint that was before the Disciplinary
Authority which led the authority to take the decision of constituting the
Central Complaints Committee in the ﬁrst place.
46. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the 2006 Standing
Order more particularly Clause 10(i), which prescribes the ﬁrst step for
making a complaint of sexual harassment and provides how the complaint
and redressal mechanism for sexual harassment is set-into motion. The said
provision is being reproduced below: -
“10. COMPLAINT MECHANISM
i) Any person aggrieved shall prefer a complaint before the Complaints
Committee at the earliest point of time.”
47. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision makes it abundantly
clear that the complaint mechanism begins with a complaint being made to
the “complaints committee” and as such any inquiry into the complaint of
sexual harassment under Rule 14 of the 1965 CCS Rules read with the 2006
Standing Order begins the moment any complaint is made to a complaints
committee speciﬁed in Clause 9, be it a Frontier Complaints Committee or
a Central Complaints Committee.
48. The use of the words “Any person aggrieved shall prefer a
complaint before the Complaints Committee at the earliest point of time”
connotes two pertinent aspects; (i) ﬁrst, that the word “prefer” stipulates that
the said provision is an enabling provision that permits a person from making
a complaint of sexual harassment directly to the complaints committee
which is the designated committee for looking into such complaints and
(ii) secondly, the said provision contains nothing which could be construed
to inhibit the ﬁling of a subsequent or additional complaint before the
complaints committee.
49. What emerges from the aforesaid is that irrespective of whether
a prior complaint had already been made to any authority, a complaint
regarding sexual harassment could be made under Clause 10(i) of the 2006
Standing Order to the complaints committee as-well. Whether the additional
or second complaint should be entertained by the complaints committee is
a completely diﬀerent tangent and must be ascertained on the touchstone
of whether it was ﬁled at the earliest point of time and whether the same
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

has been mischievously ﬁled at a belated stage to cause prejudice to the
person-charged. In the instant case, the Central Complaints Committee was
constituted on 06.08.2012 and its ﬁrst hearing took place on 25.09.2012
whereas the second complaint had been ﬁled by the complainant before the
Central Complaints Committee on 18.09.2012. Thus, the second complaint
had been promptly preferred right after the Central Complaints Committee
was constituted and duly before its ﬁrst hearing.
50. The High Court’s reasoning that as the Central Complaints
Committee was constituted on the basis of the ﬁrst complaint, its scope of
inquiry was restricted to its content, is completely erroneous inasmuch as
the Central Complaints Committee owed its existence to the 2006 Standing
Order and not to the complaint. Moreover, even if it is assumed for a moment
that the complaints committee owed its existence to the complaint, Clause
10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order envisages ﬁling of a complaint to the
complaints committee i.e., it envisages a situation where after a complaints
committee had come into existence, a complaint may be preferred to it.
51. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to the decision of this Court
in State of Haryana and Another v. Rattan Singh reported in (1977) 2 SCC
491, wherein the Court held that all material that are logically probative to
a prudent mind ought to be permissible in disciplinary proceedings keeping
in mind the principles of fair play. The relevant observations are reproduced
below: -
“4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and
sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may
not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent
mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided
it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental
authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating
such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking
not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not
necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken
through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The
essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous
materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice.
Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 543
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions
reached, such ﬁnding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be
held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps,
in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be
chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid ﬁnding could
be recorded. The ‘residuum’ rule to which counsel for the respondent
referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence
does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on
such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence
or was there no evidence — not in the sense of the technical rules
governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way
as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in
this way, suﬃciency of evidence in proof of the ﬁnding by a domestic
tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of
a ﬁnding is certainly available for the court to look into because it
amounts to an error of law apparent on the record.”
(Emphasis supplied)
52. In view of this unequivocal and clear proposition of law set out
in Rattan Singh (supra), it could be said that there was no legal bar on
the Central Complaints Committee to look into the allegations levelled
in the second complaint dated 18. 09.2012. Since strict and technical rule
of evidence and procedure does not apply to departmental enquiry the
connotation “evidence” cannot be understood in a narrow technical sense
as to include only that evidence adduced in a regular court of law when a
person is examined as a witness by administering oath. There should not
be any allergy to “hearsay evidence” provided it has reasonable nexus and
credibility.
53. In our judgment, the correct principle of law is found in the
following observations of Diplock, J. in Regina v. Deputy Industrial Injuries
Commissioner, Ex parte Moore reported in (1965) 1 Q.B. 456.
“These technical rules of evidence, however, form no part of the rules
of natural justice. The requirement that a person exercising quasi-
judicial functions must base his decision on evidence means no more
than it must be based upon material which tends logically to show
the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issue to be
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

determined, or to show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence
of some future event the occurrence of which would be relevant. It
means that he must not spin a coin or consult an astrologer, but that
he must take into account any material which, as a matter of reason,
has some probative value. If it is capable of having any probative
value, the weight to be attached to it is a matter for the person to whom
Parliament has entrusted the responsibility of deciding the issue. The
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court does not entitle it to usurp
this responsibility and to substitute its own view for his.”
(Emphasis supplied)
54. From the above case law, it becomes clear that it is open to the
adjudicating authority to accept, rely and evaluate any evidence having
probative value and come to its own conclusion, keeping in mind judicial
approach and objectivity, exclusion of extraneous material and observance of
the rule of natural justice and fair play. In short, the essence of the doctrine is
that fair opportunity should be aﬀorded to the delinquent at the enquiry and
he should not be hit below the belt. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the High
Court in such cases is indeed limited. The High Court should not exercise
appellate powers and substitute its ﬁndings for the ﬁndings recorded by the
disciplinary authority. It is no doubt true that if there is “no evidence” or
the decision is “so unreasonable that no reasonable man could have ever
come to it”, or the decision is “so outrageous” in its deﬁance of logic or of
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind
to the question to be decided could have arrived at it “or that it is so absurd
that one is satisﬁed that the decision-maker must have taken leave of his
senses”, it calls for interference by a competent court of law.
55. As discussed before, this Court in Apparel Export Promotion
Council (supra) had held that in sensitive matters such as sexual harassment
& misconduct, there is an obligation to look into the entire evidence of
the complainant that inspires conﬁdence. What is discernible from the
above is that in disciplinary proceedings documents and materials such as
evidence or pleadings be it statement of defence or a complaint should be
readily entertained by the courts and more so by the disciplinary & inquiry
authorities irrespective of whether they are later actually relied or not in the
ultimate decision making. Thus, it would be quite preposterous to hold that
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 545
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

the complainant was precluded from making the second complaint before
the Central Complaints Committee merely because she had already made
one complaint to the IG, Frontier Headquarters, Guwahati.
56. In the context of the second complaint, the only relevant aspect
that requires consideration is whether any serious prejudice was caused to
the respondent. It is not in dispute that the respondent was provided with the
copy of the second complaint. It is also not in dispute that the respondent
was aware of the nature of the allegations levelled in the second complaint.
It is also not in dispute that ample opportunity was given to the respondent
to meet with the allegations levelled in the second complaint. It is not as if
the respondent was taken by surprise. In such circumstances, this aspect of
the matter should have been looked into by the High Court on the anvil of
the principle of “test of prejudice”.
i) Principle of “Test of Prejudice” in Service Jurisprudence
57. The “test of prejudice” is a well settled canon of law that may be
applied where any procedural impropriety or violation of rule of audi alteram
is alleged. This Court in State Bank of Patiala and Others v. S.K. Sharma
reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 held that the test is to ascertain whether the
violation of such procedure or process resulted in a prejudice being caused
or a loss of fair hearing. The relevant observations are reproduced below: -
“11. ... Does it mean that any and every violation of the regulations
renders the enquiry and the punishment void or whether the principle
underlying Section 99 CPC and Section 465 CrPC is applicable in the
case of disciplinary proceedings as well. In our opinion, the test in
such cases should be one of prejudice, as would be later explained in
this judgment. But this statement is subject to a rider. The regulations
may contain certain substantive provisions, e.g., who is the competent
authority to impose a particular punishment on a particular employee/
oﬃcer. Such provisions must be strictly complied with. But there may be
any number of procedural provisions which stand on a diﬀerent footing.
We must hasten to add that even among procedural provisions, there
may be some provisions which are of a fundamental nature in the case
of which the theory of substantial compliance may not be applicable.
For example, take a case where a rule expressly provides that the
delinquent oﬃcer/employee shall be given an opportunity to produce
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

evidence/material in support of his case after the close of evidence of
the other side. If no such opportunity is given at all in spite of a request
therefor, it will be diﬃcult to say that the enquiry is not vitiated. But in
respect of many procedural provisions, it would be possible to apply
the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice, as the
case may be. The position can be stated in the following words: (1)
Regulations which are of a substantive nature have to be complied with
and in case of such provisions, the theory of substantial compliance
would not be available. (2) Even among procedural provisions, there
may be some provisions of a fundamental nature which have to be
complied with and in whose case, the theory of substantial compliance
may not be available. (3) In respect of procedural provisions other than
of a fundamental nature, the theory of substantial compliance would
be available. In such cases, complaint/objection on this score have
to be judged on the touchstone of prejudice, as explained later in this
judgment. In other words, the test is: all things taken together whether
the delinquent oﬃcer/employee had or did not have a fair hearing.
We may clarify that which provision falls in which of the aforesaid
categories is a matter to be decided in each case having regard to the
nature and character of the relevant provision.
xxx xxx xxx
28. … In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the
decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the
disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction ought to be made
between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram
partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In
other words, distinction is between “no notice”/“no hearing” and
“no adequate hearing” or to put it in diﬀerent words, “no opportunity”
and “no adequate opportunity”. To illustrate — take a case where
the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether
(as in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 All ER 66 : (1963) 2
WLR 935] ). It would be a case falling under the ﬁrst category and the
order of dismissal would be invalid — or void, if one chooses to use
that expression (Calvin v. Carr [1980 AC 574 : (1979) 2 All ER 440
: (1979) 2 WLR 755, PC] ). But where the person is dismissed from
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 547
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry oﬃcer’s
report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC
727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] ) or without
aﬀording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L.
Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62] ) it would be a case
falling in the latter category — violation of a facet of the said rule
of natural justice — in which case, the validity of the order has to
be tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the
person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be
correct — in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and
every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating
such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set
aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test
adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184
: (1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint
is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no
hearing) but one of not aﬀording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or
a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement
governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the
touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid.
xxx xxx xxx
33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above
discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and
are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and
orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee):
(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee
consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in
violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing
such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The
Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision
violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural
in character.
(2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as
explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance
or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case.
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position
is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for aﬀording
a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent oﬃcer/
employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest.
Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said
to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except
cases falling under — “no notice”, “no opportunity” and “no
hearing” categories, the complaint of violation of procedural
provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice,
viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent oﬃcer/
employee in defending himself properly and eﬀectively. If it is
found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have
to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting
aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is
established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference
is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there
may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental
character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court
may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in
the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision
expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/
government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to
lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry oﬃcer
does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent oﬃcer/
employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of
prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the
test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair
hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be
looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory
provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4)
hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as
is dealt with herein and not a diﬀerent or distinct principle.
(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of
a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be
examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that
as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 549
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice
to the delinquent employee.
(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is
of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the
provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded
against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then
it must be seen whether the delinquent oﬃcer has waived the
said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is
found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot
be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other
hand, it is found that the delinquent oﬃcer/employee has not
waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him,
then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions
(include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping
in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B.
Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993)
25 ATC 704] . The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of
prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called.
(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/
statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the
principles of natural justice — or, for that matter, wherever
such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and
impact of the order/action — the Court or the Tribunal should
make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice
(rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said
rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words,
a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” and
no adequate opportunity, i.e., between “no notice”/“no hearing”
and “no fair hearing”. (a) In the case of former, the order passed
would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it ‘void’ or a nullity if
one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved
for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law,
i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b)
But in the latter case, the eﬀect of violation (of a facet of the rule
of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to
see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent
oﬃcer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders
to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It
is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the
case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down
elsewhere.]
(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary
principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must
always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective
underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to
ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which
should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that
arise before them.
(7) There may be situations where the interests of State or
public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram
partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/
State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive
at an appropriate decision.”
(Emphasis supplied)
58. In the case of State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora and Another
reported in (2001) 6 SCC 392, this Court further expanded the applicability of
the “Test of Prejudice” to even procedural provisions which are fundamental
in nature with the following relevant observations being reproduced below: -
“13. The matter may be examined from another viewpoint. There may
be cases where there are infractions of statutory provisions, rules and
regulations. Can it be said that every such infraction would make
the consequent action void and/or invalid? The statute may contain
certain substantive provisions, e.g., who is the competent authority
to impose a particular punishment on a particular employee. Such
provision must be strictly complied with as in these cases the theory
of substantial compliance may not be available. For example, where
a rule speciﬁcally provides that the delinquent oﬃcer shall be given
an opportunity to produce evidence in support of his case after the
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 551
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

close of the evidence of the other side and if no such opportunity is
given, it would not be possible to say that the enquiry was not vitiated.
But in respect of many procedural provisions, it would be possible to
apply the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice, as
the case may be. Even amongst procedural provisions, there may be
some provisions of a fundamental nature which have to be complied
with and in whose case the theory of substantial compliance may
not be available, but the question of prejudice may be material. In
respect of procedural provisions other than of a fundamental nature,
the theory of substantial compliance would be available and in such
cases objections on this score have to be judged on the touchstone of
prejudice. The test would be, whether the delinquent oﬃcer had or
did not have a fair hearing. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
59. We now proceed to consider the next question whether the
respondent was asked by the Central Complaints Committee whether he
pleaded guilty to the allegations levelled in the second complaint. The
High Court after referring to the Central Complaints Committee’s report
found that, while the respondent was asked whether he pleaded guilty to the
allegations made in the ﬁrst complaint, there was nothing to indicate that
the same exercise had been undertaken in respect of the second complaint.
60. In the aforesaid context, we must look into Rule 14 sub-rule (9)
of the 1965 CCS Rules. The said provision reads as under: -
“14. Procedure for imposing major penalties.
(9) If the Government servant who has not admitted any of the articles
of charge in his written statement of defence or has not submitted any
written statement of defence, appears before the inquiring authority,
such authority shall ask him whether he is guilty or has any defence
to make and if he pleads guilty to any of the articles of charge, the
inquiring authority shall record the plea, sign the record and obtain
the signature of the Government servant thereon.”
61. The obligation on the part of the Authority to ask the delinquent
whether he pleaded guilty or had any defence to make is only in the
circumstances, if the delinquent had not admitted any of the articles of
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

charge in his written statement of defence or had not submitted any written
statement of defence. Indisputably, in the case on hand, the respondent had
ﬁled his written statement of defence dealing with all allegations on the ten
points framed for determination that were enquired into by the Committee
and also cross-examined all the witnesses on the same.
62. In our opinion, mere violation of Rule 14(9) of the 1965 CCS
Rules would not vitiate the entire inquiry. Rule 14(9) is only procedural.
63. A similar view has been recently taken in Aureliano Fernandes
(supra) wherein this Court rejected the delinquent’s contention of prejudice,
on the ground that all materials proposed to be used against him were duly
furnished and that he had submitted his reply to the same as-well. The
relevant observations are reproduced below: -
“64.… but it is not in dispute that all the complaints received from
time to time and the depositions of the complainants were disclosed
to the appellant. He was, therefore, well aware of the nature of
allegations levelled against him. Not only was the material proposed
to be used against him during the inquiry furnished to him, he was also
called upon to explain the said material by submitting his reply and
furnishing a list of witnesses, which he did. Furthermore, on perusing
the Report submitted by the Committee, it transpires that depositions
of some of the complainants were recorded audio-visually by the
Committee, wherever consent was given and the appellant was duly
aﬀorded an opportunity to cross-examine the said witnesses including
the complainants. The charges levelled by all the complainants were
of sexual harassment by the appellant with a narration of speciﬁc
instances. Therefore, in the given facts and circumstances, non-framing
of the Articles of Charge by the Committee cannot be treated as fatal.
Nor can the appellant be heard to state that he was completely in the
dark as to the nature of the allegations levelled against him and was
not in a position to respond appropriately.”
(Emphasis supplied)
64. A four-Judge bench of this Court in Managing Director, ECIL,
Hyderabad and Others v. B. Karunakar and Others reported in (1993) 4
SCC 727 held that in order to determine if prejudice had been caused by a
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 553
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

violation of a procedural rule or facet of natural justice, it must be shown
that violation had some bearing either upon the outcome or the punishment
imposed. The relevant observations are as under:
“30.[v] The next question to be answered is what is the eﬀect on
the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry oﬃcer is not
furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him
in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the
punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from
service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to
him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced
him gravely while in other cases it may have made no diﬀerence to the
ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement
of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of
justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity
and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the
rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights.
They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on
all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused
to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report,
has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no diﬀerent
consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice
to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential
beneﬁts. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus
to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits.
It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in
itself is antithetical to justice.
31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry oﬃcer’s report is not
furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings,
the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be
furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured
it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an
opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the
non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal
comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

made no diﬀerence to the ultimate ﬁndings and the punishment given,
the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment.
The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of
punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is
regrettably being done at present. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
65. Applying the aforesaid dictum as laid by this Court no prejudice
could be said to have been caused to the respondent even if we believe that
he was not asked to plead guilty to the second complaint. Had the respondent
been asked if he pleaded guilty to the allegations levelled in the second
complaint, then in such circumstances, whether the result would have been
any diﬀerent? The answer to this has to be an emphatic “No”. We say so
because the respondent had denied all the ten charges which were framed
against him. In other words, the respondent answered to all the ten points
by way of his written statement of defence and even had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses on each of the charges.
66. We are of the view that the High Court completely failed to advert
itself to the principles laid down by this Court as aforesaid, and mechanically
proceeded to set-aside the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority on the ground that there was nothing to indicate that the respondent
was asked whether he pleaded guilty to the charges imputed in the second
complaint without applying the principle of “test of prejudice”.
E.3 Whether the Central Complaints Committee could have put
questions to the witnesses in a departmental inquiry?
i) “Fact Finding” Authority in Disciplinary Proceedings
67. The High Court observed that the Central Complaints Committee
in the course of the inquiry had put questions to the prosecution witnesses,
and even the examination-in-chief was recorded by it, and as such it played
the role of a prosecutor which it could not have, thereby vitiating the inquiry
proceedings.
68. Ordinarily, in a disciplinary proceeding conducted under Rule 14
of the 1965 CCS Rules, the disciplinary authority as per Rule 14 sub-rule 2
read with sub-rule 5(c) may either conduct the inquiry itself or appoint an
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 555
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

inquiry committee to conduct the inquiry. The inquiry committee may further
appoint a presenting oﬃcer to present the case on its behalf in support of
the articles of charge. It is worthwhile to note that it is the Inquiry Authority
and the Disciplinary Authority who are the fact ﬁnding authorities in a
disciplinary proceeding. Rule 14 is reproduced below:
“14. Procedure for imposing major penalties.
(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are
grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct
or misbehaviour against a Government servant, it may itself inquire
into, or appoint under this rule or under the provisions of the Public
Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to
inquire into the truth thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
(5)(c) Where the disciplinary authority itself inquires into any article
of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for holding an inquiry
into such charge, it may, by an order, appoint a Government servant
or a legal practitioner, to be known as the “Presenting Oﬃcer” to
present on its behalf the case in support of the articles of charge.”
69. A perusal of the aforesaid makes it clear that, where a ‘Presenting
Oﬃcer’ has been appointed by the Disciplinary Authority, such Oﬃcer
shall present the case in support of the articles of charge. Conversely, what
logically transpires from the aforesaid is that, where no presenting oﬃcer
has been appointed, the duty or role to present the case in support of the
articles of charge falls back on the Disciplinary Authority or the Inquiry
Authority as the case may be.
70. This Court in Medha Kotwal Lele and Others v. Union of
India and Others reported in (2013) 1 SCC 311, held that the complaints
committee under the Vishaka Guidelines shall be deemed to be the Inquiry
Authority. The relevant portion is reproduced below: -
“Complaints Committee as envisaged by the Supreme Court in its
judgment in Vishaka case (1997) 6 SCC 241 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 932, SCC
at p. 253, will be deemed to be an inquiry authority for the purposes
of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter call
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

the CCS Rules) and the report of the Complaints Committee shall be
deemed to be an inquiry report under the CCS Rules. Thereafter the
disciplinary authority will act on the report in accordance with the
Rules.”
(Emphasis supplied)
71. This Court in Sakshi v. Union of India and Others reported
in (2004) 5 SCC 518 had observed that quite often in sensitive matters
particularly those involving crime against women the victims either due to
fear or embarrassment were not able to openly disclose the entire incident.
Often the victims during their testimony were put embarrassing questions by
accused with the sole purpose of confusing or suppressing out of shame. To
remedy this, directions were issued by this Court that for cross-examination
of victims, the question would be given to the presiding oﬃcer who in turn
would ask them in clear language which is not embarrassing. The relevant
observations are reproduced below: -
“32. The mere sight of the accused may induce an element of extreme
fear in the mind of the victim or the witnesses or can put them in a
state of shock. In such a situation he or she may not be able to give
full details of the incident which may result in miscarriage of justice.
Therefore, a screen or some such arrangement can be made where
the victim or witnesses do not have to undergo the trauma of seeing
the body or the face of the accused. Often the questions put in cross-
examination are purposely designed to embarrass or confuse the
victims of rape and child abuse. The object is that out of the feeling of
shame or embarrassment, the victim may not speak out or give details
of certain acts committed by the accused. It will, therefore, be better if
the questions to be put by the accused in cross-examination are given
in writing to the presiding oﬃcer of the court, who may put the same
to the victim or witnesses in a language which is not embarrassing.
There can hardly be any objection to the other suggestion given by the
petitioner that whenever a child or victim of rape is required to give
testimony, suﬃcient breaks should be given as and when required.
The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 327 CrPC should also
apply in inquiry or trial of oﬀences under Sections 354 and 377 IPC.
xxx xxx xxx
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 557
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

“34. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of with the following
directions:
(1) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 327 CrPC shall, in
addition to the oﬀences mentioned in the sub-section, also apply
in inquiry or trial of oﬀences under Sections 354 and 377 IPC.
(2) In holding trial of child sex abuse or rape:
(i) a screen or some such arrangements may be made where
the victim or witnesses (who may be equally vulnerable like
the victim) do not see the body or face of the accused;
(ii) the questions put in cross-examination on behalf of the
accused, insofar as they relate directly to the incident, should
be given in writing to the presiding oﬃcer of the court who
may put them to the victim or witnesses in a language which
is clear and is not embarrassing;
(iii) the victim of child abuse or rape, while giving testimony
in court, should be allowed suﬃcient breaks as and when
required.”
(Emphasis supplied)
72. The power and discretion of the complaints committee to put
question to the witnesses is further reﬂected though implicitly in Clause
10(viii) of the 2006 Standing Order which provides that, the delinquent
oﬃcer shall not cross-examine the complainant directly and instead should
hand over the questions to the chairperson of the committee who in turn
would then put them to the complainant, to ensure no fear or embarrassment
is caused to the complainant. The provision reads as under:
“10. COMPLAINT MECHANISM
viii) Cross examination of the witnesses should be allowed by the
complainant and alleged oﬃcer. However, cross examination of
complainant by the alleged officer is permissible as per Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 subject to the directions as laid down by Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in AIR 2004 SC 3566-Sakshi vs. UOI & Others,
i.e. to say “Questions put in cross-examination on behalf of accused
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

(charged oﬃcer in our case), which relate directly to incident, should
be given in writing to the Chairperson of the Complaints Committee
who may put them to victim or witnesses in a language which is clear
and NOT EMBARRASSING.” The questions shall thus be vetted by
the Chairperson of such Complaints Committee.”
73. There appears to be neither any statutory bar nor any logic to restrict
the power of the complaints committee to put questions to the witnesses
only to the context enumerated in the aforesaid provision. The complaints
committee being an inquiry authority and in some sense equivalent to a
presiding oﬃcer of the court as inferred from Sakshi (supra), must be
allowed to put questions on its own if a proper, fair and thorough inquiry
is to take place.
74. If the observations of the High Court are accepted, it would lead
to a chilling eﬀect, whereby the complaints committee which is deemed
to be an inquiry authority would be reduced to a mere recording machine.
75. We fail to understand what other purpose the complaints committee
which is deemed to be an ‘inquiry authority’ would serve, if we are to hold
that the complaints committee cannot put questions to the witnesses.
76. Even otherwise, the aforesaid issue has been answered by this
Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India and Others reported in (2020)
9 SCC 471. The very same argument was canvassed before a three-Judge
Bench that the Inquiry Oﬃcer could not have put his own questions to the
prosecution witnesses and could also have not cross-examined the witnesses.
In the said case, it was argued that the same would amount to making the
prosecutor the judge. This argument was negatived by the Court observing
in para 31 as under:
“31. Signiﬁcant emphasis has been placed by the appellant on the
fact that the enquiry oﬃcer put his own questions to the prosecution
witness and that he cross-examined the witnesses brought forth by
the defence. This, it is claimed, amounts to making the prosecutor the
Judge, in violation of the natural justice principle of “nemo judex in
sua causa”. However, such a plea is misplaced. It must be recognised
that, under Section 165, Evidence Act, Judges have the power to
ask any question to any witness or party about any fact, in order to
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 559
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts. While strict rules
of evidence are inapplicable to disciplinary proceedings, enquiry
oﬃcers often put questions to witnesses in such proceedings in order
to discover the truth. Indeed, it may be necessary to do such direct
questioning in certain circumstances. Further, the learned counsel for
the appellant, except for making a bald allegation that the enquiry
oﬃcer has questioned the witnesses, did not point to any speciﬁc
question put by the oﬃcer that would indicate that he had exceeded
his jurisdiction. No speciﬁc malice or bias has been alleged against
the enquiry oﬃcer, and even during the enquiry no request had been
made to seek a replacement, thus, evidencing how these objections
are nothing but an afterthought.”
(Emphasis supplied)
77. If Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permits a Judge to
put questions to the parties or to the witnesses in order to discover or obtain
proper proof of relevant facts and this provision being widely used by the
judges throughout the country, we fail to understand as to how the complaints
committee after being equated with a judge in a judicial proceeding be denied
that privilege. However, it would be a diﬀerent situation if a speciﬁc case of
personal bias is made out against the members of the committee. After all,
the very purpose of the disciplinary proceedings is to reach to the bottom of
the fact while aﬀording adequate opportunities to the aﬀected party.
78. Thus, the High Court was not correct in taking the view that the
proceedings stood vitiated because the Central Complaints Committee put
questions to the prosecution witnesses.
E.4 Whether the Central Complaints Committee based its ﬁndings
on conjectures and surmises? Whether the case on hand is
one of “no evidence”?
i) Principle of “No Evidence” in Service Jurisprudence
79. It is well settled that the ﬁndings of fact recorded in the course of
any domestic inquiry, unless they are collateral or jurisdictional, are exempt
from judicial review and that the court exercising writ jurisdiction should not
sit in appeal over the ultimate decision based on such ﬁndings and review it
on merits. However, there are two well-known exceptions to the said rule.
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

First, the case must not be one where there is “no evidence” to support the
ﬁndings. Secondly, the ultimate decision based on such ﬁndings must not be
perverse or unreasonable. These two concepts have aﬃnity with each other;
indeed, the “no evidence” principle clearly has something in common with
the principle that perverse or unreasonable action is unauthorised and ultra
vires. As pointed out by Lord Radcliﬀe in Edward (Inspector of Taxes,
Bairstow. (1956) Appeal Cases, 14 at page 36 “I do not think that it much
matters whether this state of aﬀairs is described as one in which there is
no evidence to support the determination or as one in which the evidence is
inconsistent with and contradictory of the determination, or as one in which
the true and only reasonable conclusion contradicts the determination.”
Rightly understood, each phrase propounds the same test, in each of these
cases, according to Lord Radcliﬀe, there would be an error in point of law
requiring the court’s intervention.
80. We must explain the true meaning of the ‘no evidence’ principle.
The rule has been adopted in India from England and we may, therefore,
ascertain, in the ﬁrst instance, how the rule over there is understood. Prof.
H.W.R. Wade in his treatise on Administrative Law, Fourth Edition, has
observed as follows:
“It is one thing to weigh conﬂicting evidence which might justify
a conclusion either way. It is another thing altogether to make
insupportable ﬁndings. This is an abuse of power and may cause grave
injustice. At this point, therefore, the court is disposed to intervene.
‘No evidence’ does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends
to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably
capable of supporting the ﬁnding; or where, in other words, no tribunal
could reasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence.
There is, indeed, the well-established rule that to ﬁnd facts on no
evidence is to err in law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
81. The learned Author has pointed out that the “no evidence” rule has
some aﬃnity with the substantial evidence rule of American law which, as
explained by Bernard Schwartz in his treatise on Administrative Law, 1976
Edition, at page 595, means “such evidence as might lead a reasonable
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 561
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

person to make ﬁnding.” In other words, according to the learned Author,
“The evidence in support of a fact-ﬁnding is substantial when from it an
inference of existence of the fact may be drawn reasonably.”
82. The earliest English decision which has touched upon the concept of
“no evidence” is that of the Court of Appeal in The King v. Carson Roberts
reported in 1908 (1) K.B., 407. The question in that case was whether the
superior court having the power to issue a writ of certiorari, if it appeared to
it that the decision of the auditor in regard to disallowances and surcharges,
under the Public Health Act, 1875, was erroneous, could review the same
only when such decision was erroneous in point of law and not when the
auditor had come to an erroneous conclusion in fact. Fletcher Moulton L.J.
observed in that case as follows:
“It is admitted by the appellant that if there was no evidence on which
any tribunal could reasonably come to the conclusion to which the
auditor has come the superior Courts have a jurisdiction to quash the
surcharge, and in my opinion this is the case here.”
83. In the Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner (supra), two
learned law Lords have made certain observations on the true content of the
“no evidence” rule by treating the said rule as a principle of natural justice.
Willmar L.J. observed as under:
“Where so much is left to the discretion of the Commissioner, the only
real limitation, as I see it, is that the procedure must be in accordance
with natural justice. This involves that any information on which the
Commissioner acts, whatever its source, must be at least of some
probative value.”
84. Diplock L.J. made the following pertinent observations reproduced
below:
“Where, as in the present case, a personal bias or mala ﬁdes on the
part of the deputy commissioner is not in question, the rules of natural
justice which he must observe can, in my view, be reduced to two. First,
he must base decision on evidence, whether a hearing is requested
or not. Secondly, if a hearing is requested, he must fairly listen to the
contentions of all persons who are entitled to be represented at the
hearing.
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

“In the context of the ﬁrst rule, “evidence” is not restricted to evidence
which would be admissible in a court of law….
“… The requirement that a person exercising quasi-judicial functions
must base his decision on evidence means no more than it must be
based upon material which tends logically to show the existence or
none-existence of facts relevant to the issue to be determined, or to
show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence of some future
event the occurrence of which would be relevant. It means that he must
not spin a coin or consult an astrologer, but he may take into account
any material which, as a matter of reason, has some probative value
in the sense mentioned above. If it is capable of having any probative
value, the weight to be attached to it is a matter for the person to whom
Parliament has entrusted the responsibility of deciding the issue. The
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court does not entitle it to usurp
this responsibility and to substitute its own view for his.””
85. In French Kier Developments Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the
Environment reported in 1977 (1) All ELR 297, the jurisdiction of the
court of Queen’s Bench Division was invoked for quashing the appellate
decision of the Secretary of State conﬁrming the refusal of permission for
development. The Secretary of State accepted the ﬁndings of fact recorded
by the Inspector at the conclusion of the public inquiry which followed
the Borough Council’s refusal of permission but not his recommendation
that the appeal should be allowed. The Secretary of State, in deciding the
appeal, took into consideration the contents of a document and accepted
them as correct, notwithstanding the fact that the Inspector had regarded
the document as of no evidential value. The argument before Willis J.
was that the Secretary of State should have ignored the document, or any
reference to its contents, as the Inspector did, since it was not produced by
any witness, its provenance was unexplained and it could not be tested by
cross-examination. The learned Judge made the following observations
while considering the submission:
“It hardly needs to be said that legal rules of evidence are not applied
at local inquiries, and both oral and documentary evidence is freely
admitted in circumstances where even the more relaxed rules of
evidence at the present time would not allow of its admission in a court
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 563
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

of law. Nonetheless some limit must surely be imposed in fairness to
an appellant on the scope of so-called evidence which by no stretch of
the imagination can be said to have the slightest evidential value. This
must, I should have thought, particularly be so when if such ‘evidence’
is considered, it is used to support a conclusion unfavourable to the
appellant. I think the Inspector was light to ignore this document and
the Secretary of State was wrong in the particular circumstances to
attach any weight to it or its contents.”
86. The aforesaid decisions would indicate that the English Courts
have not construed the words “no evidence” narrowly. The rule of “no
evidence” is there attracted not only in cases where there is complete lack
of evidence, that is to say, where there is not a shred of evidence, but also
in cases where the evidence, if any, is not capable of having any probative
value, or on the basis of which no Tribunal could reasonably and logically
come to the conclusion about the existence or non-existence of facts relevant
to the determination. According to the English decisions, although a domestic
tribunal may act on evidence not admissible according to the legal rules in
a court of law, yet unless such evidence has some probative value in the
sense mentioned above, it would be a breach of natural justice and/or an
error of law to base any adverse decision thereon.
87. In State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. S. Sree Rama Rao
reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723, it was held at page 1726 that in considering
whether a public oﬃcer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him the
rule followed in criminal trials with regard to the establishment of charge by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt was not applicable. In a proceeding under
Art. 226, the High Court, not being a court of appeal over the decision of
the domestic tribunal, was concerned to determine whether the inquiry was
held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice were not
violated. Then follow the following important observations: -
“Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with
the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent oﬃcer is guilty
of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for
a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

independent ﬁnding on the evidence… if there be some legal evidence on
which their ﬁndings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence
is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High
Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
(Emphasis supplied)
88. This decision was approvingly referred to and relied upon in State of
Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Chitra Venkata Rao reported in (1975) 2 SCC 557.
89. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel reported in AIR 1964 SC 364, the
question as to the amplitude and width of the judicial review under Art. 226, fell
for consideration in the context of the disciplinary proceedings against Government
servants. It was observed that “the High Court under Art. 226 has jurisdiction
to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned
order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all” and that there
was little doubt that a writ of Certiorari can be claimed by a public servant if he
is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government
in the said proceeding is based on no evidence. A conclusion on a question of
fact, it was held, would be assailable if it is manifest that there is no evidence to
support it even assuming bona ﬁdes of the disciplinary authority. The following
observations made at page 369 are material from the point of view of the aspect
under consideration:
“… In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High
Court cannot consider the question about the suﬃciency or adequacy of
evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is
within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but
the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all
in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the
evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow
that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach
will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and
only examine whether on that evidence illegally the impugned conclusion
follows or not. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
90. In R. Mahalingam v. Chairman, Tamil Nadu Public Service
Commission and Another reported in (2013) 14 SCC 379, this Court laid down
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 565
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

the scope of judicial review as regards the ﬁndings of the disciplinary proceedings
with the following relevant observations being reproduced below: -
“11. ... The scope of judicial review in matters involving challenge to the
disciplinary action taken by the employers is very limited. The courts are
primarily concerned with the question whether the enquiry has been held
by the competent authority in accordance with the prescribed procedure
and whether the rules of natural justice have been followed. The
court can also consider whether there was some tangible evidence for
proving the charge against the delinquent and such evidence reasonably
supports the conclusions recorded by the competent authority. If the
court comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was held in consonance
with the prescribed procedure and the rules of natural justice and
the conclusion recorded by the disciplinary authority is supported by
some tangible evidence, then there is no scope for interference with the
discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority to impose the particular
punishment except when the same is found to be wholly disproportionate
to the misconduct found proved or shocks the conscience of the court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
91. This Court in Aureliano Fernandes (supra) while discussing upon
the extent to which a court can interfere with respect to the departmental
proceedings conducted pursuant to the allegations of sexual harassment, made
the following relevant observations: -
“62. … Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts and once
ﬁndings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the
High Court in its writ jurisdiction should not normally interfere with
those factual ﬁndings unless it ﬁnds that the recorded ﬁndings were
based either on no evidence or that the ﬁndings were wholly perverse
and/or legally untenable. The Court is under a duty to satisfy itself that
an inquiry into the allegations of sexual harassment by a Committee is
conducted in terms of the service rules and that the concerned employee
gets a reasonable opportunity to vindicate his position and establish
his innocence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
ii) Standard of Proof in Disciplinary Proceedings
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

92. In another decision of this Court in West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO
Ltd.) v. Ram Pravesh Singh reported in (2008) 3 SCC 729, it was held that
in a departmental inquiry, the standard of proof is based on preponderance of
probability and not beyond reasonable doubt. The relevant observation made in
it are given below: -
“20. The Tribunal has set aside the report of the enquiry oﬃcer and the
order of dismissal passed by the punishing authority by observing that the
charges against the respondent were not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
It has repeatedly been held by this Court that the acquittal in a criminal
case would not operate as a bar for drawing up of a disciplinary proceeding
against a delinquent. It is well-settled principle of law that yardstick and
standard of proof in a criminal case is diﬀerent from the one in disciplinary
proceedings. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond
all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding
is preponderance of probabilities.”
(Emphasis supplied)
93. Similarly in Apparel Export (supra) this Court had held that inquiries in
respect of sexual harassment must be examined on broader probabilities keeping in
mind the entire background of the case. Thus, in a disciplinary inquiry, the standard
of proof is preponderance of probabilities and the courts must only interfere where
the ﬁndings are either perverse or based on no evidence at all.
94. Bearing the aforesaid principles of law in mind, we must look into some
relevant portion of the evidence taken into consideration by the Central Complaints
Committee for arriving at the conclusion that the charges are held to be proved: -
a. Shri Mast Ram Thakur, SFA(H) (PW3) stated that the respondent used
to quite often call the complainant in his chamber and made her sit for
hours without any oﬃce work. He further stated that quite often on
such occasions, the respondent would draw the curtains of his chamber.
He also stated that the complainant had once conveyed to him that the
respondent used to make proposals of marriage to her.
Nothing substantial could be elicited from the cross-examination
of Mast Ram Thakur. In fact, what has been deposed by Mast Ram
Thakur as referred above, has not even been remotely disputed in the
cross-examination by way of even a suggestion.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 567
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

b. Shri Rynjan Singh, peon (PW8) and Shri Chandan Sarkar (PW6) stated
that they had seen the complainant being made to sit in the respondent’s
chamber for hours. Shri Ashok Kumar, PA (PW17) further stated that
the complainant had once told him that after being called in his chamber
the respondent would often comment on her beauty and clothes.
c. Shri P.K. Rawat, UDC (PW5), Shri Ranjit Patoi, Assistant (PW7)
and Shri Samir Nandi, SFA(G) (PW14) have all stated that they had
seen the respondent pour himself a glass of water in his chamber and
then go to the complaint’s room 5-6 times a day, and while drinking
he would always be looking at the complainant. Shri Runjan Singh,
peon (PW8) stated that earlier the respondent used to drink water in
his own chamber, but once the complainant joined the oﬃce, he started
frequently visiting her room to drink water.
d. Shri Rabi Ram Biswas, sweeper (PW12) stated that he had seen the
respondent touching the shoulder of the complaint while teaching her
to operate a laptop. Smt Pema Narzary, AFO(WI) (PW9) stated that
the complainant had once told her how the respondent used to call her
to his chamber on the pretext of teaching her to operate the laptop. Shri
Rynjan Singh, peon (PW8) stated that on one occasion, the respondent
shut the door of his Chamber while teaching the complainant and when
all of a sudden he entered the respondent’s chamber the respondent got
startled and moved away from the complainant and instructed him to
knock before entering.
e. Shri Rabi Ram Biswas, peon (PW12) stated that whenever, the
complainant would leave the oﬃce, the respondent would also leave
soon thereafter in a hurry. The other staﬀ presumed that this hurry
was due to the respondent’s desire to drive the complainant home.
Shri Rynjan Singh, peon (PW8) stated that he had seen the respondent
oﬀering a lift to the complainant and that it was only the complainant
to whom the respondent used to oﬀer. Smt. Pema Narzary, AFO(WI)
(PW9) stated to have heard from other oﬃce staﬀ that the respondent
would oﬀer lifts to the complainant in his oﬃcial vehicle.
f. Shri B.B. Sonar, chowkidar (PW4) stated that once while the
complainant was standing in the ladies’ queue for booking tickets at
the railway station, the respondent approached her from behind and
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

placed his hand on her shoulder. This made the complainant very
uncomfortable and on shrugging oﬀ her shoulder the respondent
withdrew his hand. He further stated that he saw the complainant
looking upset and uncomfortable.
To the aforesaid allegations, the respondent offered his
explanation saying that he had done so as it was his “bounden duty to
protect the dignity of the complainant” from the “boisterous crowd”
and also to make people know standing at the railway station that the
complainant was not alone.
g. Shri Mast Ram Thakur, SFA(H) stated that he overheard the respondent
making sexually coloured remarks to the complainant at the railway
station saying; “aap to jaa rehen hain, meri jaan jaa rahi hai. Aap
chinta mat karo main tumhara dimag taza karne ke iye bhej rahaa
huu, vahaan se aane ke baad tum shrimati paul banogi”.
h. Shri B.B. Sonar, chowkidar (PW4), Shri A. Deben Singh, AFO(M)
(PW13) Shri Surjit Singh, Driver (PW2), Shri Rynjan Singh, peon
(PW8) all stated to have heard from the other oﬃce staﬀ that the
respondent would often visit the complainant’s residence uninvited
and make proposal of marriage. Other witnesses namely; Shri Shyam
Dass, Section Oﬃcer DACS (retd.) (PW19), Shri Subhash Prasad,
UDC (PW18), Shri Ashok Gahlot, PA (PW17), Shir Jinen Singh,
UDC (PW11), Shri Ranjit Patoi, Shri Samir Nandi, SFA(G) and Smt.
Pema Nazary, AFO(WI) (PW9) all supported these allegations and
said to have heard from the complainant sometime in 2009-10 that
the respondent used to visit her house at odd hours and also used
to misbehave with her by making sexual advances and asking the
complainant to leave her husband and marry him. Shri Chandan Sarkar,
SFA(M) (PW6), stated to have even heard a telephonic recording of
the respondent making sexual remarks to the complainant. Shri P.K.
Rawat, UDC (PW5) stated that on many occasions he had seen the
respondent sitting at the complainant’s house.
i. Shri S.C. Katoch, IG (PW20), stated that the complainant had once
telephoned him making a complaint against the respondent for
detaining her beyond working hours. He further stated that, he had then
telephonically reprimanded the respondent after which the respondent
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 569
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

assigned her no work. Shri Mast Ram Thakur, SFA(H) (PW3) and
Shri Ranjit Patoi, Assitant (PW7) also corroborated the aforesaid and
stated that the respondent withdrew all work from the complainant
after she made a complaint against him.
95. The aforesaid would indicate that this is not a case of “no evidence”.
Some evidence has come on record to indicate or rather substantiate the
allegations of sexual harassment levelled by the complainant. What is most
important to note at this stage is that the High Court has not gone into the
suﬃciency of evidence as it was aware that the law does not permit it to go into
the issue of suﬃciency of evidence for the purpose of holding a public servant
guilty of the alleged misconduct. It is in such circumstances that in the entire
judgment the High Court has concentrated only on technical pleas raised by
the respondent. It is only on the issue of point 7(a) that the High Court seems
to have taken the view that the ﬁndings in that regard are based on conjecture
and surmises.
96. The High Court took the view that in respect of the allegations
contained in Point 7(a) which relates to the respondent making unsolicited
phone calls to the complainant, although no evidence of the call recordings had
been produced to substantiate the same, yet the Central Complaints Committee
accepted the allegations as true, and therefore its ﬁndings could be said to be
based on conjectures and surmises.
97. The aforesaid in our opinion is not correct. The allegation in Point 7(a)
was rightly accepted by the Central Complaints Committee keeping in mind
the background of the case. The Central Complaints Committed duly noted
that the non-availability of the call records was owed to the fact that the inquiry
into the complainant’s grievances was undertaken after a lapse of signiﬁcant
time. Moreover, the said ﬁnding is fortiﬁed by the oral evidence of one of the
witnesses who deposed that he was aware of the respondent making calls to the
complainant. The relevant portion is reproduced below: -
“POINT 7
“x. … Shri Samir Nandi has also stated that he knew that Shri Dilip Paul
was calling Smt. X on her mobile.
xxx xxx xxx
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

B. The Complaints Committee made every eﬀort to substantiate the charge
that Shri Dilip Paul often telephoned Smt. X, and that too at odd hours, but
since call records for Shri Dilip Paul’s mobile phone were not available
and Smt. X had a prepaid SIM card, it has failed to do so.
xxx xxx xxx
... The Complaints Committee also notes that the unavailability of
corroboration from call records cannot be laid at Smt. X’s door because,
had the enquiry into her complaint been timely and speedy, these records
would have been available as on date.””
98. Before we close this judgement, we must deal with one submission
very vociferously canvassed on behalf of the respondent as regards the multiple
inquiries conducted by the appellant. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent
that the normal rule is that there can be only one inquiry. It was also submitted
that once the on-spot / preliminary inquiry revealed nothing incriminating against
the delinquent, no further committee could have been constituted to inquire into
the allegations once again.
99. It was further submitted that even the Frontier Complaints Committee
came to the conclusion that the charges were not held to be proved.
100. In such circumstances referred to above, according to the learned
counsel, the Central Complaints Committee could not have been constituted
to probe further into the allegations. In this regard, reliance was placed on the
decision of this Court in the case of Vijay Shankar Pandey v. Union of India
reported in (2014) 10 SCC 589.
101. In the aforesaid context, we may only say that the aforesaid point was
raised even before the High Court and the same came to be negatived holding
as under:
“22. The report dated 13.12.2011 was submitted pursuant to conducting
of an on-the-spot enquiry. On-the-spot enquiry, by the very nature of it, is
summary in nature. Such enquiry cannot be equated with a disciplinary
enquiry. It will be relevant to note that before the report of the on-the-
spot enquiry was submitted, the competent authority had constituted
FLCC, which had also commenced its proceedings. In that context, even
if in such an on-the-spot enquiry, no allegation was found to have been
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. DILIP PAUL 571
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

established, same would not have any material bearing in the facts of
the instant case. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was posted at the
frontier and, accordingly, in terms of the Standing Order No. 1/06, FLCC
was constituted to enquire into the allegation of sexual harassment. As
noticed earlier, though the FLCC had submitted report on 17.01.2012,
the same was cancelled by Memorandum dated 10.12.2012 on the ground
that the Chairperson of the FLCC was not an oﬃcer who was senior to
the petitioner against whom the complaint was made.
23. We are unable to subscribe to the submission of the learned counsel
for the petitioner that report of FLCC could not have been cancelled and
the report was required to be acted upon as the Chairperson of the FLCC
being from a diﬀerent stream, the question of comparison of seniority did
not arise. It is not the contention of the petitioner that the Chairperson
was, indeed, higher in rank than the petitioner. Therefore, the signiﬁcance
of appropriate constitution of the Complaints Committee, in terms of the
norms laid down, cannot be lost sight of. True, the authorities themselves
had constituted the Complaints Committee, but the fact by itself cannot
detract the competent authority from cancelling the proceeding or the
report of an improperly constituted committee. It was in this background the
CCC had come into the picture. Though earlier the FLCC had conducted
enquiry, we ﬁnd that the CCC can also enquire into any matter of sexual
abuse in the organization which necessarily includes the frontier also and,
therefore, it cannot be said that the CCC could not have exercised authority
in the instant case. The decision in K. D. Pandey (supra), wherein it was
held that when speciﬁc ﬁndings have been given in respect of charges by
the inquiry oﬃcer, the matter could not have been remitted to the inquiring
authority for further inquiry as it would have resulted in a second inquiry
and not a further inquiry on the same set of charges and the materials on
record, will not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.
In K. R. Deb (supra), the Supreme Court observed in the context of the
rules in question that though it may be possible in certain circumstances
for the disciplinary authority to record further evidence, because of some
serious defects that had crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses
were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some
other reason, no power is vested in the disciplinary authority to completely
set aside previous inquiry on the ground that the report does not appeal to
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.

the disciplinary authority. It was also observed that disciplinary authority
in terms of the rules had enough power to reconsider the evidence and
come to its own conclusion. In Vijay Shankar Pandey (supra), the Supreme
Court followed K.R. Deb (supra) and reiterated the principle laid down
therein. The said decisions are also not applicable to the facts of the
present case. We also ﬁnd no merit in the contention urged on behalf of
the petitioner that complaint dated 30.08.2011 having not been submitted
to the Complaints Committee, the same could not have been acted upon.
Materials on record do not indicate that at the time of submission of the
complaint dated 30.08.2011, there was any speciﬁc Complaints Committee
in place and on the contrary, it appears that only after the complaint was
received by the authority, FLCC was constituted to go into the complaint.
Even otherwise, the Standing Order No.1/2006 itself visualizes submission
of complaint directly to the Frontier IG/IF under certain circumstances.”
(Emphasis supplied)
102. We are in complete agreement with the aforesaid ﬁndings recorded
by the High Court on the issue of multiple inquiries.
F. CONCLUSION
103. For all the forgoing reasons, we have reached to the conclusion that
the appeal deserves to be allowed. The High Court committed an egregious error
in passing the impugned judgment and order.
104. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court dated 15.05.2019 is hereby set-
aside.
105. The order of penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is hereby
restored. However, we clarify that the appellant shall not eﬀect any recovery of
the amount already paid so far to the respondent.
106. Pending application(s) if any shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Appeal allowed.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose
Assisted by: Shubhanshu Das, LCRA