Holding

The Supreme Court held that disciplinary authorities are the exclusive fact‑finders and courts may not re‑appreciate evidence or substitute punishment unless the penalty is patently perverse or shockingly disproportionate.

Summary

Constable Subrata Nath of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) was on duty when a truck carrying 800 kg of copper wires was stolen from a scrap yard. He was charged with gross negligence and dereliction of duty, and after a departmental inquiry where eight prosecution witnesses testified, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed him, a decision affirmed by the Appellate and Revisional Authorities. The High Court, however, set aside the dismissal, converting it to compulsory retirement on the ground that a key record (the Beat Book) was missing, and later ordered his reinstatement with back wages while directing a fresh, lesser punishment. The Supreme Court held that disciplinary authorities are the sole fact‑finders and that courts may interfere only when findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or the punishment is shockingly disproportionate. It found the High Court had impermissibly re‑appreciated the evidence and restored the original dismissal as a proportionate penalty. Consequently, the appeals by the Union of India were allowed and the respondent's special leave petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

The scope of judicial review over disciplinary proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.
Whether the High Court could set aside a dismissal order and substitute compulsory retirement without finding a violation of natural justice or procedural irregularity.
Whether the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the misconduct and thus liable to be altered by the court.

Legislation cited

Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001s. Rule 32, s. Rule 32(1), s. Schedule I

Subjects

disciplinary proceedingsCISFdismissal from servicejudicial reviewnatural justiceproportionality of punishmentArticle 226departmental inquirygross negligencedereliction of duty

Judgment

[2022] 18 S.C.R. 605 605

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS A
v.
SUBRATA NATH
(Civil Appeal Nos.7939-7940 of 2022)
NOVEMBER 23, 2022 B
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, CJI AND
HIMA KOHLI J.]
Service Law: Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001 :
r.32 – Disciplinary Authorities – Local police intercepted a truck
C
loaded with copper wires outside the port premises and informed
CISF that the copper wires had been removed from the scrap Port,
in the duration when the respondent-constable was on duty –
Respondent placed under suspension and charge sheeted for the
act of negligence and various delinquencies – Disciplinary Authority
imposed a penalty of dismissal from service, which was confirmed D
by appellate and revisional authority – High Court converted the
punishment of dismissal to compulsory retirement – Division Bench
directed reinstatement of the respondent with full back wages and
further directed the disciplinary authority to issue a fresh order of
punishment in respect of the respondent in commensurate to his
E
negligence and dereliction of duty – On appeal, held: Being fact
finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the
Appellate Authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine
the evidence forming part of the inquiry report – On finding the
evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental
inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to impose F
appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind
the gravity of the misconduct – In exercise of powers of judicial
review, the High Court/tribunal cannot ordinarily re-appreciate the
evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty
imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so
G
disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience
– Both the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, erred by
setting aside the order of dismissal from service imposed on the
respondent, thus, the judgment passed by the High Court is set aside,
while that of the Disciplinary Authority as upheld by the Appellate
Authority and the Revisional Authority is restored. H
605
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 18 S.C.R.

A Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 It is well settled that courts ought to refrain
from interfering with findings of facts recorded in a departmental
inquiry except in circumstances where such findings are patently
perverse or grossly incompatible with the evidence on record,
B based on no evidence. However, if principles of natural justice
have been violated or the statutory regulations have not been
adhered to or there are malafides attributable to the Disciplinary
Authority, then the courts can certainly interfere. [Para 15][615-
E]
C 1.2 Being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary
Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the
exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the
inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable
during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has
the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the
D delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the
misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review,
the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily
reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in
respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment
E imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock
the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed
for other reasons. [Para 22][621-B-D]
1.3 The approach of the Single Judge and the Division Bench
cannot be accepted. There was no good reason for the High Court
F to have entered the domain of the factual aspects relating to the
evidence recorded before the Inquiry Officer. This was clearly
an attempt to reappreciate the evidence which is impermissible
in exercise of powers of judicial review vested in the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Both, the Single
Judge as well as the Division Bench, fell into an error by setting
G aside the order of dismissal from service imposed on the
respondent by the Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the
Appellate Authority. [Para 28][623-G-H; 624-A]
1.4 The findings returned by and conclusion arrived at by
the Disciplinary Authority, duly confirmed by the Appellate
H
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. SUBRATA NATH 607

Authority and upheld by the Revisional Authority in respect of A
both the Articles of Charge levelled against the respondent and
the punishment imposed on him is accepted. The respondent
being a member of the disciplined force, was expected to have
discharged his duty diligently. His gross negligence and
dereliction of duty has resulted in theft of 800 kgs. copper wires
B
from the spot where he was performing his duty. Further, the
records reveal that the respondent did not mend his ways during
thirteen years of service rendered by him and was awarded eight
punishments for various delinquencies out of which, three
punishments included stoppage of increment on two occasions
for one year without cumulative effect twice and stoppage of C
increment for two years without cumulative effect on one occasion.
In such circumstances, the desirability of continuing the
respondent in the Armed Forces is certainly questionable and
the Disciplinary Authority could not be expected to wear blinkers
in respect of his past conduct while imposing the penalty of
D
dismissal from service on him. [Para 29][624-B-D]
1.5 It is deemed appropriate to quash and set aside the
impugned judgment while restoring the findings and the
conclusion arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority upheld by the
Appellate Authority and endorsed by the Revisional Authority.
The penalty of dismissal from service imposed on the respondent E
is commensurate with the gross negligence and dereliction of
duty on his part. [Para 30][624-E-G]
B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union Of India and Others (1995) 6
SCC 749 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644; State Of Orissa
And Others v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra AIR 1963 SC F
779 : [1963] 1 Suppl. SCR 648; Central Industrial
Security Force And Others v. Abrar Ali (2017) 4 SCC
507; State Bank Of Bikaner And Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 : [2011] 3 SCR 589;
Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. And Others v. G
Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu (2008) 5 SCC
569 : [2008] 3 SCR 1184; Union Of India and Others
V. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610 : [2014] 13
SCR 1312; Union Of India And Others v. Ex. Constable

H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 18 S.C.R.

A Ram Karan (2022) 1 SCC 373; Union Of India v. Sardar
Bahadur (1972) 4 SCC 618 : [1972] 2 SCR 218 –
referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644 referred to Para 11
B
[1963] 1 Suppl. SCR 648 referred to Para 12
[2011] 3 SCR 589 referred to Para 17
[2008] 3 SCR 1184 referred to Para 18
[2014] 13 SCR 1312 referred to Para 19
C
[1972] 2 SCR 218 referred to Para 21
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7939-
7940 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2021 of the High Court
D of Calcutta in FMA No. 679 of 2019 with FMA No. 680 of 2019.
With
Civil Appeal No.7941-7942 Of 2022
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms. Aakanksha Kaul, Rajan Kumar
E Chourasia, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Raghav Sharma, Arvind Kumar Sharma,
Ranjan Mukherjee Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HIMA KOHLI, J.
F 1-2 By this order, we propose to decide two appeals preferred by
the Union of India and the connected appeals preferred by the private
respondent against the common judgment and order dated 9th September,
2021 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in
FMA No.679 of 2019 and FMA No. 680 of 2019.
G 3. For the sake of convenience, the facts stated in the Civil Appeals
shall be referred to. The respondent joined the Central Industrial Security
Force1 as a Constable on 26th February, 1994. On 7th November, 2007,
the respondent was detailed for ‘C’ shift duty from 21:00 hours on
7th November, 2007 to 05:00 hours on 8th November, 2007 at Alif Nagar
1
H For short ‘CISF’
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. SUBRATA NATH 609
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

Scrap yard situated in the Garden Reach area of the Kolkata Port. On A
the next day, i.e., on 8th November, 2007, the local police intercepted a
Tata-407 truck loaded with approximately 800 kg. (approx.) of copper
wires outside the port premises and informed the CISF about the said
incident on learning that the copper wires had been removed from the
Kolkata Port Trust area. It transpired that the said copper wires had
B
been removed from the scrap yard of Alif Nagar Kolkata Port in the
duration when the respondent was on duty. The respondent was placed
under suspension and charge sheeted, vide Memorandum dated 7th
December, 2007. Following are the two articles of charge framed against
the respondent:
“STATEMENT OF ARTICLE OF CHARGE FRAMED AGAINST C
NO. 941400817 CONSTABLE SUBRATA NATH OF CISF UNIT
KoPT KOLKATA.
Article of Charge- I
That the said No.941400817 Constable Subrata Nath of D
CISF Unit KoPT Kolkata (“C” Coy) while perforating “C” Shift
duty from 2100 hrs on 07.11.2007 to 0500 hrs on 08.11.2007 at
Alif Nagar Scrap Yard with Arms and Ammunition has failed to
prevent theft of copper wire weighing about 800 Kgs which were
laying with other bundles of copper wire at Alif Nagar Scrap Yard
of KoPT under the security coverage of the said No. 941400817 E
Constable Subrata Nath.
The above act on the part of No. 941400817 Constable
Subrata Nath amounts to gross negligence and dereliction of duty
being member of a disciplined Force.
F
Article of Charge-II
That the said No. 941400817 Constable Subrata Nath of
CISF Unit KoPT Kolkata during the period of his 13 years sendee
in CISF has been involved himself in various delinquencies and
thereby awarded 08 (Eight) punishments. Even then he did not
G
mend himself and has developed an incorrigible character.”
4. An Inquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the inquiry in
respect of the above charges. During the inquiry, eight prosecution
witnesses were examined. However, the respondent did not produce
any witness in his defence. After examining the evidence and the defence
H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 18 S.C.R.

A of the respondent, the Inquiry Officer held that both the charges framed
against the respondent were duly proved. The Disciplinary Authority
issued a Notice to Show Cause to the respondent in relation to the inquiry
report, in response whereto, he submitted a representation. Vide order
dated 27th November, 2008, the Disciplinary Authority, namely, the
Commandant rejected the representation of the respondent. It was
B
observed that the statements of the prosecution witnesses corroborated
with the scene of the crime and established that theft of copper wires
from the Alif Nagar Scrap Yard had taken place when the respondent
was on duty at the duty post. Further, the prosecution witnesses had
proved that the respondent was found to be alert at the duty post by nine
C different checking officers, who had checked him in the intervening night
on 7th/8th November, 2007, despite which, he did not report the criminal
activities in his duty area.
5. Rejecting the plea taken by the respondent that the FIR had
recorded the occurrence of the offence at 1530 hours on 8th November,
D 2007 which indicated that the theft had not taken place during his duty
hours, the Disciplinary Authority held thus:
“12. After taking into account all the above aspect, I am of the
opinion that prosecution witnesses by virtue of corroborative
statements supported by documentary and circumstantial evidences
E has established, the Articles of charge-I proved against the charged
official. On the other hand, the charged official could not come up
with any convincing materials in his representation to disprove
the Article of charge-I. Even he could not produce any defence
witness. The defence documents produced by him during enquiry
could not prove anything in his favour. The FIR copy produced by
F him (Defence Exhibit-6) showing occurrence of offence at about
1530 hours on 08.11.2007 by which he wanted to refute all claims
of theft happening during his duty hours was examined in depth
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx
G
The above complain shows that the recovery of the copper wire
was made by the complainant at 1515 hours on 08.11.2007 whereas
the FIR shows the occurrence of offence at 1530 hours on
08.11.2007 and the offence described as theft of a vehicle TATA-
407 loaded with some coils of copper wire and recovery vehicle
H
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. SUBRATA NATH 611
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

was laid at Alif Nagar KMC Sweeper Quarters. Thus, it means A
that the recovery of copper wire was made before the theft
occurred, which is improbable and absurd indeed. It was further
observed that FIR shows time of information received at 2200
hours on 08.11.2007, occurrence of theft at 1530 hours while
complaint shows recovery was made at 1515 hours on same day.
B
All these reveal that the recovery was made well before receiving
information by the concerned police official of West Port Police
station and even before occurrence of theft……..….. Taking all
these facts together it is clear that the FIR corroborates the fact
of recovery of copper wire loaded in TATA- 407 vehicle and the
statement of PW1, PW2 & PW8 corroborates the fact that the C
seized vehicle was held in police custody in the morning of
08.11.2007. In totality of all the above it is established that the
theft of copper wire from Alif Nagar scrap yard has occurred in
the night of 07/08.11.2007 during the duty period of the charged
official and the said copper wire was later recovered by West
D
Port police and kept at their custody loaded in TATA-407 vehicle
well before the visit of PW1, PW2 and PW8 at the west port
police station in the morning of 08.11.2007……….…As regards
Article of Charge-II, I find that statement of PW4 and documentary
evidences held on record clearly establish that the charged official
has developed into incorrigible character who even after awarding E
08 punishments for various delinquencies in his 13 years of service
in CISF has not reformed himself. From the fact and factual
position as assessed, discussed and evaluated above over the
prosecution version and defence version, I find that the findings
drawn by the enquiry officer are fair, reasoned and judicially
F
justified in all respect. I, therefore, fully agree with the findings of
the enquiry officer and hold the charged official guilty of the Article
of Charge-I and Article of Charge-II.”
6. In view of the above findings and in exercise of the powers
conferred under Rule 32 read with Schedule-I and Rule 32 (1) of the
Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 20012, the Disciplinary Authority G
imposed a penalty of dismissal from service on the respondent. Aggrieved
by the order dated 27th November, 2008 passed by the Disciplinary
Authority, the respondent preferred an appeal, which was dismissed on
3rd February, 2009 with the following observations :
2
For short ‘CISF Rules, 2001’ H
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 18 S.C.R.

A “5. I have carefully considered the appeal preferred by the
appellant, the departmental proceeding files, findings of the enquiry
officer and other related documents held on record and I have
applied my mind to the case. I find that the Articles of charge
leveled against the appellant were held proved on the basis of
overwhelming evidence held on record. The enquiry officer had
B
conducted the enquiry in a fair and judicious manner and afforded
him all reasonable opportunities to rebut the adverse evidence
and to submit sufficient material in support of his defence. He,
however, failed to do so. There is also no material irregularity or
miscarriage of justice in this case. The Disciplinary Authority has
C passed the final order after considering all aspects of the case
held on records and awarded the penalty of “Dismissal from
service” to the appellant vide Final Order No. V-15014/Maj-04/
KoPT/Disc/SN/08/8271 dated 27.11.08 for his failure to prevent
theft of copper wire weighing about 800 kgs which were laying
with other bundles of copper wire at Alif Nagar scrap yard of
D
KoPT under the security coverage of the appellant while he was
performing ‘C’ shift duty from 2100 hrs on 7.11.2007 to 0500 hrs
on 08.11.2007 at Alif Nagar Scrap yard duty post and non-improving
his conduct as expected from a member of disciplined force, in
spite of having been penalized/punished earlier on 08 (Eight)
E occasions for his incorrigible habits during his short span of 13
years’ service is commensurate to the gravity of offence. The
appellant has not come up with any cogent and logical reason that
warrants consideration. Many other pleas put forth by the appellant
in his appeal do not have any merit.
F 6. As such, I do not find any mitigating circumstances to interfere
with the order of penalty dated 27.11.2008 passed by the
Disciplinary Authority, i.e., Commandant CISF Unit KoPT Kolkata.
Hence, the appeal dated 05.12.2008 preferred by the appellant is
rejected being devoid of merit.”
G 7. This was followed by a Revision Petition submitted by the
respondent in the Office of the Inspector General, CISF/NES, which
was dismissed vide order dated 19th May, 2009, holding inter alia that
the charges levelled against him had been proved beyond doubt; that he
had been afforded all the reasonable opportunities to defend himself;
that there were no procedural irregularities in conducting the disciplinary
H
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. SUBRATA NATH 613
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

inquiry by the Inquiry Officer or on the part of Disciplinary Authority in A
dealing with the case of the respondent and that principles of natural
justice had been complied with.
8. Dissatisfied by the order passed by the Revisional Authority
upholding the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority, the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court of Calcutta, B
registered as WP No.14102 (W) of 2009. The said petition was disposed
of by the learned Single Judge, vide order dated 25th June, 2018 and the
punishment of dismissal imposed on the respondent was converted to
that of compulsory retirement primarily on the ground that the authorities
had failed to preserve the relevant records pertaining to the case and
one of the vital documents of the inquiry, namely, the Beat Book, which C
recorded the time when the respondent had taken charge from his reliever
and the items available on the spot and the time when he handed over
charge to his successor, required examination. Observing that the
authorities ought to have maintained the relevant records of inquiry in
view of pendency of the writ petition, the learned Single Judge set aside D
the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the respondent
and compulsorily retired him from service w.e.f. 27th November, 2008
alongwith all consequential benefits.
9. The aforesaid order was challenged by the appellants – Union
of India in two sets of appeals (FMA No.679 of 2019 and FMA 680 of E
2019), that were disposed of by the Division Bench, vide the impugned
judgment dated 9th September, 2021 whereby, the decision of the learned
Single Judge of substituting the punishment of dismissal imposed on the
respondent with one of compulsory retirement, was quashed and set
aside. Instead, it was directed that the respondent would be entitled to
be reinstated in service along with full back wages from the date of his F
dismissal. The Disciplinary Authority was further directed to issue a
fresh order of punishment in respect of the respondent that should
commensurate to his negligence and dereliction of duty, other than a
punishment of dismissal, removal from service or compulsory retirement.
10. Questioning the aforesaid judgment, the present appeals have G
been filed by the appellants – Union of India. The respondent has also
preferred Petitions for Special Leave to appeal being aggrieved by the
directions issued by the High Court calling upon the Disciplinary Authority
to issue a fresh order of punishment qua him upon reinstatement on a
plea that there was no occasion for the Division Bench to have interfered H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 18 S.C.R.

A with the order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the punishment
of removal from service had been set aside and the respondent was
directed to be compulsorily retired from service.
11. Appearing for the appellants – Union of India, Ms. Aakanksha
Kaul, learned counsel has argued that the impugned judgment is
B unsustainable for the reason that the High Court has acted as an Appellate
Authority by directing reinstatement of the respondent, which runs
contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi
v. Union of India and Others3; that the High Court while exercising
the powers vested in it under judicial review, ought not to have stepped
into the shoes of the Appellate Authority and reappreciated the evidence
C to arrive at independent findings on the evidence adduced; that no
grievance was raised by the respondent that the rules of natural justice
had been violated or the inquiry had not been conducted in a proper
manner or that the findings arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority were
based on no evidence. Learned counsel asserted that in the instant case,
D the inquiry was conducted by a competent officer, rules of natural justice
were duly complied with and the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer
were based on sufficient evidence. Stating that having regard to the fact
that the charges against the respondent had been proved in a properly
conducted departmental inquiry after giving a reasonable opportunity to
the respondent to defend himself, there was no good reason for the
E learned Single Judge to have converted the punishment of dismissal from
service imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the Appellate
Authority, to compulsory retirement and for the Division Bench to have
further interfered by reassessing the evidence and directing reinstatement
of the respondent in service with full back wages and only thereafter,
F pass a fresh order of punishment.
12. Citing the decision in State of Orissa and Others v.
Bidyabhushan Mohapatra4, it was contended that keeping in mind the
gravity of the established misconduct, the Disciplinary Authority has the
power to impose a punishment on the delinquent officer and such a
G punishment is not open for review by the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. It was also sought to be urged on behalf of
the appellants that the past conduct of the respondent can be taken into
consideration while awarding penalty, subject to the condition that the

3
(1995) 6 SCC 749
H 4
AIR 1963 SC 779
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. SUBRATA NATH 615
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

same is made a part of a separate charge, as was done in the instant A
case. In support of the said submission, learned counsel cited Central
Industrial Security Force and Others v. Abrar Ali5.
13. The only submission made by Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, learned
counsel for the respondent is that the learned Single Judge having directed
reinstatement of the respondent with full back wages, the Division Bench B
was not justified in passing an order directing that a fresh order be passed
by the Disciplinary Authority commensurate to the negligence and
dereliction of duty on the part of the respondent. Instead, the appeals
preferred by the appellants – Union of India ought to have been dismissed
outright in which event, the punishment of compulsory retirement imposed
by the learned Single Judge would have been restored and attained finality C
thereby entitling the respondent to claim his retiral benefits.
14. The point that arises for our consideration is whether in the
given facts of the case, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
ought to have interfered with the punishment imposed on the respondent
by the Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the Appellate Authority as D
also by the Revisional Authority.
15. It is well settled that courts ought to refrain from interfering
with findings of facts recorded in a departmental inquiry except in
circumstances where such findings are patently perverse or grossly
incompatible with the evidence on record, based on no evidence. E
However, if principles of natural justice have been violated or the statutory
regulations have not been adhered to or there are malafides attributable
to the Disciplinary Authority, then the courts can certainly interfere.
16. In the above context, following are the observations made by
a three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) : F
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review
of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment
and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches
is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is G
conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/
Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held
by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are

5
(2017) 4 SCC 507 H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 18 S.C.R.

A complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on
some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold
inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some
evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof
of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary
B
proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority
is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge.
The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not
act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and
C to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence.
The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held
the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation
of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where
the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
D
authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever
reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the
conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make
it appropriate to the facts of each case.
E 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.
Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has
coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the
nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict
proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are
F not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence
cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/
Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel6 this Court held at p.
728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from
patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at
G all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx

H 6
(1964) 4 SCR 718
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. SUBRATA NATH 617
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the A
disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being
fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the
evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested
with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in
view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/
B
Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot
normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some
other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the
High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either
directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the C
penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in
exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with
cogent reasons in support thereof.”
[Emphasis laid]
17. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand D
Nalwaya7, a two Judge Bench of this Court held as below :
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the
domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another
view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry E
has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based
on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or
the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.
Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact F
recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such
findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a
tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion
or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however
interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of G
natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the
order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on
extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of

7
(2011) 4 SCC 584 H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 18 S.C.R.

A India 8, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham 9, Bank of India v.
Degala Suryanarayana 10 and High Court of Judicature at
Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil11).
[Emphasis laid]
18. In Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. and Others v.
B Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu12, a two Judge Bench of this
Court referred to several precedents on the Doctrine of Proportionality
of the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority and held
that :
“21. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have
C been complied with, the courts would not ordinarily interfere with
the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee.
The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine
of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be
within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not
D be invoked when the misconduct stands proved.”
19. Laying down the broad parameters within which the High
Court ought to exercise its powers under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India and matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, a
two Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India and Others v. P.
E Gunasekaran13 held thus :
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,
reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer.
F The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary
authority and was also endorsed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the
High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first
appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into
G
8
(1995) 6 SCC 749
9
(1997) 7 SCC 463
10
(1999) 5 SCC 762
11
(2000) 1 SCC 416
12
(2008) 5 SCC 569
13
H (2015) 2 SCC 610
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. SUBRATA NATH 619
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see A
whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed
in that behalf;
B
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a
fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case; C
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced
by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary
and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have
arrived at such conclusion; D
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit
the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
E
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High
Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
F
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the
same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings G
can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to
be;

H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 18 S.C.R.

A (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks
its conscience.”
20. In Union of India and Others v. Ex. Constable Ram
Karan14, a two Judge Bench of this Court made the following pertinent
observations :
B “23. The well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary
authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide
the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee.
Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by
such an employee, it is not open for the courts to assume and
C usurp the function of the disciplinary authority.
24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of
the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate
authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition
D of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of
punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when
the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to
the nature of misconduct that the courts would frown upon. Even
in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left
to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for
E the court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of
punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases
where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of
substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place
of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after
F assigning cogent reasons.”
21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa and
Others (supra) held that if the order of dismissal is based on findings
that establish the prima facie guilt of great delinquency of the respondent,
then the High Court cannot direct reconsideration of the punishment
G imposed. Once the gravity of the misdemeanour is established and the
inquiry conducted is found to be consistent with the prescribed rules and
reasonable opportunity contemplated under the rules, has been afforded
to the delinquent employee, then the punishment imposed is not open to
judicial review by the Court. As long as there was some evidence to
14
H (2022) 1 SCC 373
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. SUBRATA NATH 621
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

arrive at a conclusion that the Disciplinary Authority did, such an order A
becomes unassailable and the High Court ought to forebear from
interfering. The above view has been expressed in Union of India v.
Sardar Bahadur15.
22. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities,
both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested B
with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the
inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during
the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to
impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in
mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of
judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot C
ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in
respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed
is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience
of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as
enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra). If the punishment imposed on D
the delinquent employee is such that shocks the conscience of the High
Court or the Tribunal, then the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be
called upon to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional
circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court/
Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering
cogent reasons therefor. E

23. Applying the law laid down above to the instant case, we are
of the view that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the
findings of fact recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. Charge-1 levelled
against the respondent pertained to negligence and dereliction of duty
attributed to him for having failed to prevent theft of 800 kgs of copper F
wires lying at Alif Nagar scrap yard under his security cover while
performing duty in the late hours of 7th November, 2007 upto the early
hours of 8th November, 2007. Records reveal that the Disciplinary
Authority has minutely examined the entire evidence brought on record
including the deposition of eight prosecution witnesses each of whom G
have corroborated the charges levelled against the respondent, duly
supported by documentary and circumstantial evidence for arriving at
the conclusion that the Articles of Charge-I stood proved against the
respondent. Pertinently, the respondent did not produce any defence
15
(1972) 4 SCC 618 H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 18 S.C.R.

A witness and the documents produced by him did not prove anything in
his favour.
24. The contention of the respondent that the FIR registered against
him mentioned the time of the occurrence as 15:30 hours on 8th November,
2007, when he was not on duty, was also analyzed in depth by the
B Disciplinary Authority, who referred to the fact that the FIR was lodged
suo moto by the West Port Police Station on the basis of a complaint
submitted by the Office-Incharge of the Police Station who had recovered
the copper wires loaded in a commercial vehicle which was brought to
the police station and kept at the police station compound. The complaint
recorded that recovery of copper wires was made by the complainant at
C 15:15 hours on 8th November, 2007 whereas, the FIR showed the time
of the information received as 22:00 hours on 8th November, 2007, and
the time of the occurrence of the theft as 15:30 hours. Noting the
discrepancies in the FIR which were in contradiction with the depositions
of PW1, PW2 and PW8 who had stated that the information of the theft
D was received long before 22:00 hours on 8th November, 2007, the
Disciplinary Authority discarded the version of the respondent as
unacceptable and went on to hold that the evidence fairly established
that the theft of the copper wires had occurred in the intervening night
of 7th/8th November, 2007, during the duty hours of the respondent.
Accordingly, the Disciplinary Authority concluded that Charge-I was
E proved against the respondent.
25. As for Charge-II, the Disciplinary Authority noted the statement
of SI/Min. A.K. Dua (PW-4) who was working as incharge of the
Document Section of the Unit and had been summoned to prove copies
of the service documents related to the respondent and on going through
F the said documentary evidence, noted that the respondent had been
awarded eight punishments over a period of thirteen years of service for
various delinquencies but he had not reformed himself. In view of his
continuous misconduct in the past coupled with the serious offence of
theft of 800 kgs. copper wires, subject matter of Charge-I, the Disciplinary
G Authority opined that the respondent was unfit to be retained in a
disciplined force and therefore, directed his dismissal from service.
26. We have noted above that the findings of the Disciplinary
Authority had met with the approval of the Appellate Authority and the
Revisional Authority. However, the learned Single Judge overturned the
H order of dismissal from service and converted the same to compulsory
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. SUBRATA NATH 623
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

retirement on the sole ground of non-availability of the original record, A
more specifically, the Beat Book, while giving a go-by to the extract of
the Beat Book that was produced before the Inquiry Officer and the
fact that the respondent had admitted the said document. The learned
Single Judge also ignored the fact that the Beat Book was not the only
piece of document produced before the Inquiry Officer. There were
B
depositions of other witnesses produced by the department to prove the
charges levelled against the respondent and the said witnesses had
corroborated the version of the Department. At no stage, did the learned
Single Judge observe that the departmental inquiry was vitiated on account
of violation of the rules of natural justice or that the inquiry had been
conducted in gross violation of the statutory rules. C
27. The Division Bench went a step further and proceeded to
reappreciate the evidence and observed that it was not persuaded to
conclude that such a major theft of 800 kgs comprising of 42 bundles of
copper wires could have happened “in the blink of an eyelid” despite
holding that the view of the learned Single Judge regarding non-production D
of the original Beat Book was unsustainable. The Court held that the
allegation of connivance in the theft levelled against the respondent was
presumptive and there wasn’t enough evidence to conclude that theft of
such a magnitude could have happened during the duty period of the
respondent alone, yet charge-I pertaining to negligence and dereliction
of duty on the part of the respondent was sustained. At the same time, E
the order passed by the learned Single Judge directing substitution of the
punishment of dismissal with that of compulsory retirement was set aside
and the respondent was directed to be reinstated in service with full
back wages, while giving liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to issue a
fresh order of punishment commensurate to the negligence and dereliction F
of duties on his part, except for punishment of dismissal or removal from
service or compulsory retirement.
28. We are unable to commend the approach of the learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench. There was no good reason for the High
Court to have entered the domain of the factual aspects relating to the G
evidence recorded before the Inquiry Officer. This was clearly an attempt
to reappreciate the evidence which is impermissible in exercise of powers
of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. We are of the opinion that both, the learned Single
Judge as well as the Division Bench, fell into an error by setting aside
H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 18 S.C.R.

A the order of dismissal from service imposed on the respondent by the
Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the Appellate Authority.
29. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the findings
returned by and conclusion arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority, duly
confirmed by the Appellate Authority and upheld by the Revisional
B Authority in respect of both the Articles of Charge levelled against the
respondent and the punishment imposed on him. The respondent being a
member of the disciplined force, was expected to have discharged his
duty diligently. His gross negligence and dereliction of duty has resulted
in theft of 800 kgs. copper wires from the spot where he was performing
his duty. Further, the records reveal that the respondent did not mend his
C ways during thirteen years of service rendered by him and was awarded
eight punishments for various delinquencies out of which, three
punishments included stoppage of increment on two occasions for one
year without cumulative effect twice and stoppage of increment for two
years without cumulative effect on one occasion. In such circumstances,
D the desirability of continuing the respondent in the Armed Forces is
certainly questionable and the Disciplinary Authority could not be expected
to wear blinkers in respect of his past conduct while imposing the penalty
of dismissal from service on him.
30. Therefore, it is deemed appropriate to quash and set aside the
impugned judgment and order dated 9th September, 2021 passed by the
E Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in FMA No.679 of 2019
and FMA No. 680 of 2019 and the order dated 25th June, 2018 passed
by the learned Single Judge in WP No.14102 (W) of 2009, while restoring
the findings and the conclusion arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority,
as elaborated in the order dated 27th November, 2008, duly upheld by
F the Appellate Authority, vide order dated 3rd February, 2009 and endorsed
by the Revisional Authority, vide order dated 19th May, 2009. In our
view, the penalty of dismissal from service imposed on the respondent is
commensurate with the gross negligence and dereliction of duty on his
part.
31. As a result, both the appeals preferred by the Union of India
G
(arising out of Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 3524-25/
2022) are allowed and appeals @ Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal
(Civil) Nos. 11021-22/2022 filed by the private respondent are dismissed,
while leaving the parties to bear their own expenses.

H Nidhi Jain and Anurag Bhaskar Appeals disposed of.
(Assisted by : Priyanshu Agarwal, LCRA)