UNION OF INDIA & ORS.versusDALBIR SINGH

800                      [2021]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    7 S.C.R. 800              [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A                         UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
                                       v.
                               DALBIR SINGH
                         (Civil Appeal No.5848 of 2021)
B                           SEPTEMBER 21, 2021
        [HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
             Service Law – Dismissal from service – The writ petitioner
      was a General Duty Constable in the Central Reserve Police Force
      (CRPF) – A FIR was lodged against the writ petitioner u/ss. 302,
C
      307 of IPC and s.27 of the Arms Act – He was accused of firing
      from his service revolver on Head Constable and Deputy
      Commandant, resulting in death of the Head Constable and injuring
      Deputy Commandant – Trial Court convicted the writ petitioner –
      However, the High Court acquitted him – Criminal Appeal filed by
D     the State against the acquittal of the High Court was dismissed by
      the Supreme Court – The writ petitioner was dismissed from service
      on account of conviction by the trial Court – However, as he was
      acquitted by the High Court, the writ petitioner was reinstated –
      Another charge-sheet was issued on 25.02.2013 – The Commandant,
      the punishing authority returned the finding that writ petitioner had
E
      misused his service weapon and was not entitled to be retained in
      the disciplinary force – The order was affirmed by the appellate
      authority and the revisional authority – In the writ petition filed,
      the High Court exercised power of judicial review set aside the
      order of dismissal of the Competent Authority – On appeal, held:
F     The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while exercising the
      power of judicial review over the orders passed in the disciplinary
      proceedings which were conducted while adhering to the principles
      of natural justice – The burden of proof in the departmental
      proceedings is not of beyond reasonable doubt as is the principle
      in the criminal trial but probabilities of the misconduct – The
G
      allegations in the chargesheet dated 25.2.2013 that the writ
      petitioner has fired from the official weapon is a reliable finding
      returned by the Departmental Authorities on the basis of evidence
      placed before them – It is not a case of no evidence, which alone
      would warrant interference by the High Court in exercise of power
H
                                      800
          UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. DALBIR SINGH                             801


of judicial review – It is not the case of the writ petitioner that there   A
was any infraction of any rule or regulations or the violation of the
principles of natural justice – The best available evidence was
produced by the appellants in the course of enquiry – The order
passed by the High Court is not sustainable – Hence, the same is
set aside and the order of punishment of dismissal passed as affirmed
                                                                            B
in appeal and revision stands restored.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1. This court observed that the High Court has
exceeded its jurisdiction while exercising the power of judicial
review over the orders passed in the disciplinary proceedings               C
which were conducted while adhering to the principles of natural
justice. [Para 17][808-G]
       2. In the present case this court observed that the writ
petitioner completed his fatigue duty at 10 am and then reported
for duty at the Headquarters. In the later Charge Sheet dated               D
25.2.2013, the departmental witnesses have uniformly deposed
that the noise of firing of 15-20 gun shots was heard around 11
am on 11.4.1993. In fact, PW-6 Constable is the one who
immobilized the writ petitioner when he was in the process of
loading another magazine in the self-loading rifle. Still further,
PW-5 has deposed that 3-4 soldiers had taken the self-loaded                E
rifle of the writ petitioner. Such self-loaded rifle is the one which
was issued to the writ petitioner. The statement of some of the
departmental witnesses was that they heard that the writ
petitioner used his personal weapon but such part of the
statements is hearsay evidence. It was open to the writ petitioner          F
to lead evidence that he was not using the official weapon but a
personal weapon to rebut the stand of the Department. [Paras 19
and 20][809-A-D]
       3. The burden of proof in the departmental proceedings is
not of beyond reasonable doubt as is the principle in the criminal          G
trial but probabilities of the misconduct. The delinquent such as
the writ petitioner could examine himself to rebut the allegations
of misconduct including use of personal weapon. In fact, the
reliance of the writ petitioner is upon a communication dated
1.5.2014 made to the Commandant through the inquiry officer.
                                                                            H
802            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A     He has stated that he has not fired on higher officers and that he
      was out of camp at the alleged time of incident. Therefore, a false
      case has been made against him. His further stand is that it was a
      terrorist attack and terrorists have fired on the Camp. None of
      the departmental witnesses have been even suggested about any
      terrorist attack or that the writ petitioner was out of camp.
B
      Constable PW-6 had immobilized the writ petitioner whereas all
      other witnesses have seen the writ petitioner being immobilized
      and being removed to quarter guard. PW-5 deposed that 3-4
      soldiers had taken the Self-Loading Rifle (S.L.R.) of the writ
      petitioner in their possession. Therefore, the allegations in the
C     chargesheet dated 25.2.2013 that the writ petitioner has fired
      from the official weapon is a reliable finding returned by the
      Departmental Authorities on the basis of evidence placed before
      them. It is not a case of no evidence, which alone would warrant
      interference by the High Court in exercise of power of judicial
      review. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that there was any
D
      infraction of any rule or regulations or the violation of the
      principles of natural justice. The best available evidence had been
      produced by the appellants in the course of enquiry conducted
      after long lapse of time. [Para 29][817-E-H; 818-A-B]
            4. This court in conclusion in the present case found that
E     the order passed by the High Court is not sustainable. Hence,
      the same is set aside and the order of punishment of dismissal
      passed on 21.12.1996 as affirmed in appeal and revision stands
      restored. [Para 30][818-C]
            State of Haryana & Anr. v. Rattan Singh (1977) 2 SCC
F           491 : [1977] AIR 1512; Union of India & Ors. v. P.
            Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610 : [2014] 13 SCR 1312;
            B.C Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC
            749 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644; Management of Tamil
            Nadu State Transport Corporation (Coimbatore) Limited
G           v. M. Chandrasekaran (2016) 16 SCC 16 : [2016] 4
            SCR 266; Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ),
            Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors. (2005) 7 SCC
            764 : [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 314; Noida Entrepreneurs
            Association v. NOIDA & Ors. (2007) 10 SCC 385 :
            [2007] 1 SCR 892; Depot Manager, A.P. State Road
H
               UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. DALBIR SINGH                            803


          Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya & Ors.                     A
          (1997) 2 SCC 699 : [1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 941 – relied
          on.
                                Case Law Reference
[2014] 13 SCR 1312                                relied on     Para 22
                                                                                B
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644                           relied on    Para 23
[2016] 4 SCR 266                                  relied on     Para 24
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 314                           relied on    Para 25
[2007] 1 SCR 892                                  relied on     Para 26
                                                                                C
[1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 941                           relied on    Para 27
          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.5848 of
2021.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 11.04.2019 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (civil) No.5844 of 2015.                          D

      Ms. Madhvi Divan, ASG, R. Balasubramaniam, Sr. Adv.,
Ms. Rekha Pandey, S. S. Ray, B. V. Balaram Das, Advs. for the
Appellants.
     Kaushal Yadav, E. V. Venugopal, Dr. Ajay Kumar, Nandlal Kumar              E
Mishra, Ms. Yashoda Katiyar, Shafik Ahmed, Advs. for the Respondent.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          HEMANT GUPTA, J.
          1. Leave granted.
                                                                                F
       2. The order dated 11.4.2019 passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi is the subject matter of challenge in
the present appeal whereby the order of dismissal passed by the
Competent Authority on 24.5.2014, appellate order dated 9.10.2014, and
revisional order dated 13.2.2015 were set aside. The respondent 1 was
hence directed to be reinstated and also was found entitled to arrears of       G
pay from the date of dismissal of service till the date he actually joins the
duty.


1
    Hereinafter referred to as the ‘writ petitioner’                            H
804                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A            3. The writ petitioner was a General Duty Constable in the Central
      Reserve Police Force (CRPF). An FIR No. 16/1993 was lodged against
      the writ petitioner for an offence under Section 302, 307 of the Indian
      Penal Code, 18602 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 when the writ
      petitioner was accused to have fired from his service revolver on Head
      Constable Shri Harish Chander and Deputy Commandant Shri Hari Singh
B
      resulting in the death of Shri Harish Chander and injuries to Shri Hari
      Singh. The writ petitioner was convicted by the learned trial court on
      11.3.1996 and sentenced to life imprisonment. However, in appeal, the
      High Court of Punjab and Haryana acquitted him of the charges framed
      against him by giving benefit of doubt for the reason that 20 cartridges
C     were fired but only 7 empties were recovered whereas none of the
      bullets have been recovered. In view of the said finding, the High Court
      doubted the prosecution version as the Investigating Agency had failed
      to collect the evidence. Criminal Appeal No. 117 of 2006 filed by the
      State was dismissed by this Court relying upon the aforesaid finding of
      the High Court.
D
            4. The writ petitioner was initially served with a chargesheet on
      27.6.1993. Article-I from the Statement of Article of charges reads
      thus:
                “
E                                     ARTICLE-I
                That the said No.880957136 Ct. Dalbir Singh of D/36 BN CRPF
                while functioning as CT(GD) at BN HQ Fatehbad on 11.04.1993
                has committed an act of misconduct in his capacity as member of
                the force U/s 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 in that he has committed
F               misconduct and disobedience of lawful orders and refused to
                perform fatigue duty between 0900 hrs. to 1000 hrs.”
             5. In the statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour
      in support of the above said Article of charge, it was stated that the writ
      petitioner returned to the Unit Headquarter after 60 days of earned leave
G     on 10.4.1993 and was detailed for fatigue duty. Instead of performing
      such fatigue duty, the writ petitioner sat at the tailor shop. BHM Harish
      Chandra asked for non-compliance of the orders, the writ petitioner
      however arrogantly misbehaved with the officers. It is admitted that the
      proceedings of the chargesheet were not concluded.
H     2
          For short, the ‘IPC’
          UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. DALBIR SINGH                              805
                   [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

       6. The writ petitioner was dismissed from service on 21.12.1996       A
on account of his conviction in the criminal trial in pursuance of the FIR
lodged. However, since he was granted benefit of doubt in appeal by the
High Court and was subsequently acquitted, the writ petitioner was
reinstated vide order dated 20.7.2012 by the Deputy Inspector General
of Police, CRPF, Patna. The following were the directions issued in the
                                                                             B
order of reinstatement:
      “(i) The punishment of dismissal from service awarded to No.
      880957136 CT/GD Dalbir Singh of 36BN, CRPF by disciplinary
      authority i.e. Commandant 36 BN vide order No. I-X-2/93-EC-II
      dated 21.12.1996 is hereby set aside.
                                                                             C
      (ii) The appellant No. 880957136 CT/GD Dalbir Singh of 36BN,
      CRPF is reinstated into service immediate effect (i.e. from the
      date of reporting in 36BN).
      (iii) Since the appellant i.e. Ex. CT/GD Dalbir Singh has been
      acquitted by criminal court, he shall not be punished departmentally   D
      on the same charge or similar charge upon the evidence cited in
      the criminal case Rule 27 (ccc) of CRPF Rules, 1955. If some
      other misconduct on other ground is made out then it is upto
      disciplinary authority to decide whether any Departmental Enquiry
      is called for or not under Rule GOI decisions No. 5 below Rule 19
      of CCS (CCA) 1965.”                                                    E

       7. The writ petitioner was served with another chargesheet on
27.8.2012. The said chargesheet was withdrawn when the writ petition
filed by the writ petitioner was pending before the High Court of Delhi.
Consequently, the Writ Petition (C) No. 6354 of 2012 was disposed of
on 21.11.2012, giving liberty to the appellant to charge sheet the writ      F
petitioner. The relevant extract from the order reads as thus:
      “15. However, learned counsel for the respondents submits that
      the issue pertaining to the departmental instructions with reference
      to safe custody of arms and ammunition issued to force personnel
      while on duty, which was not the subject matter of a criminal trial    G
      can always be gone into at a departmental inquiry. Learned Counsel
      submits that an official arm and ammunitions issued to a force
      personnel if found to be used in an incident resulting in the death
      of force personnel would certainly require an accountability to be
      given by the officer concerned who was issued the arm and
                                                                             H
      ammunitions.
806             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A           16. The offending chargesheet which has been challenged in the
            writ petition has been withdrawn by the respondents and therefore
            the writ petition is disposed of as infructuous observing that it
            would be permissible for the respondents to issue a chargesheet
            but not in relation to the death of Battalion Havaldar Major Harish
            Chander and the injuries caused to Dy. Comdt. Hari Singh. The
B
            respondents would be entitled to hold an inquiry with respect to
            the arm and ammunitions issued to the writ petitioner on day of
            incident and seek petitioner’s accountability in relation thereto.”
            8. It is thereafter that another chargesheet was issued on
      25.2.2013. Article I of the said chargesheet reads thus:
C
            “
                                    ARTICLE 1
            That during his posting at Amritsar Punjab No. 880957136 CT/
            GD Dalbir Singh of 36, BN, CRPF, on 11.04.1993 without having
D           the order from Competent Officer fired from his service rifle (SLR
            Butt No. 417 Body No. 150410-59), issued for his Govt. duties
            and hence misused the Government weapon and ammunition and
            committed remissness of duties. The abovesaid misconduct is a
            serious offence U/s 11(1) of CRPF Act read with Rule 27 of
E           CRPF Rules. Therefore, the constable while being the member
            of the force has misused his service rifle and ammunition without
            having the order of competent officer which is a serious offence
            and misconduct and the same is also against the discipline and
            management of the force and is also a punishable offence.”

F            9. In the enquiry proceedings, the appellants had examined six
      witnesses. The first departmental witness was Havaldar Dayamai
      Banerjee (PW-1). He had deposed that on 11.4.1993 around 11 o’ clock,
      when he was doing camp maintenance work, he heard the sound of
      firing coming from the Head Office. He reached the place of firing
      which was 150 meters away from his place of work and found some
G     persons were holding the writ petitioner. There is nothing substantial in
      the cross-examination conducted. He had reached the place of firing
      after the incident but had deposed about the time of incident of firing.
             10. PW-2 Havaldar Bal Singh deposed that he heard the noise of
      about 15-20 fire shots at around 11 o’ clock on 11.4.1993. He reached
H     the place of occurrence and found Constable Dilip Mishra holding the
          UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. DALBIR SINGH                                807
                   [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

writ petitioner as the latter was trying to free himself. He further deposed   A
that people around the writ petitioner were saying that the writ petitioner
fired inside the camp by his personal weapon. Nothing material has
come out in the cross-examination. He also however reached the place
of firing after the incident but both the above witnesses have deposed
regarding of timing of firing i.e., around 11 o’ clock.
                                                                               B
       11. PW-3 Havaldar Hetlal Deepankar was deployed for quarter
guard duty from 10-12 o’ clock on 11.4.1993. Around 11 o’ clock, he
heard the sound of gunfire. The firing stopped after 15-20 minutes. The
writ petitioner was immobilized and was brought to the quarter guard.
In the cross-examination, he stated that the firing took place at about
11:45 and that the distance between the quarter guard and the Head             C
Office was about 70-80 yards.
      12. PW-4 Havaldar J.N. Tripathi was working in the mess of the
Headquarters, which was about 50 meters away from the place of firing.
He also saw some persons immobilizing the writ petitioner. In the cross-
examination, he stated that the firing was done by the writ petitioner         D
near the Head Office. The location of firing may be 10 meters away
from the Head Office.
       13. PW-5 Brij Kishore Singh deposed that at about 11:00 am, after
he handed over his charge to the writ petitioner, who was the runner of
Deputy Commandant Shri Hari Singh as he wanted to have his food.               E
He heard the sound of firing of about 15-20 bullets continuously while he
was eating his food. After the firing went off, he ran towards the control
room and saw 4-5 people were holding the writ petitioner and Constable
Dilip Mishra was also one of them. 3-4 soldiers had taken the Self-
Loading Rifle (S.L.R.) of the writ petitioner in their possession. He also     F
stated that people were saying that the writ petitioner had fired from his
personal weapon. He further deposed that the writ petitioner fired with
his weapon without any meaningful purpose inside the camp.
      14. The most important witness is PW-6 Constable D.K. Mishra.
He was performing the duty of runner on 11.4.1993. He heard firing             G
when he had gone to get the documents signed by the officer in the
Head Office. He saw from lope hole that the writ petitioner was in a
kneeling position and was firing. He caught hold of the writ petitioner
from behind when he was changing the magazine. He was then handed
over to guard commander and three sentries of quarter guard. In the
cross-examination, he deposed that he caught the writ petitioner alone         H
808            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A     and later the guard commander and three sepoys from quarter guard
      came for help.
             15. The Commandant, punishing authority, returned a finding
      considering the evidence led by the Department that the writ petitioner
      has misused his service weapon and is thus not entitled to be retained in
B     the disciplinary force. Such order was affirmed by the appellate and the
      revisional authority.
            16. The High Court in the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner
      examined the question as to whether service rifle was issued on 11.4.1993.
      The High Court found that on 27.6.1993, when the first chargesheet
C     was issued, the writ petitioner was not on duty as he was to perform
      fatigue duty but he sat in a tailor shop instead. The Court found that this
      contradicts with the charges mentioned in the chargesheet dated 25.2.2013
      that while on duty, he misused the ‘government weapon’. The High
      Court returned the following finding:

D           “14. While it is possible that notwithstanding the pendency of a
            criminal case there could be disciplinary proceedings on the same
            issue, in the present case it is seen that Respondents are confused
            on facts. On the one hand, they charge-sheeted the Petitioner on
            27th June 1993 for not performing his fatigue duty but instead
            sitting at a tailor’s shop, while nearly two decades later on 25th
E           February 2013 they have charged him with misusing the service
            weapon issued to him. This contradiction in the stand of the
            Respondents is fatal to the disciplinary proceedings. The charge
            that he misused the weapon issued to him falls flat if he was in
            fact not even present at the place of duty. This was a case based
F           on no evidence. The Respondents had to prove that the weapon
            which was issued to the Petitioner was misused by him. This it
            has failed to do by credible evidence.”
             17. We find that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while
      exercising the power of judicial review over the orders passed in the
G     disciplinary proceedings which were conducted while adhering to the
      principles of natural justice.
             18. The High Court failed to notice the fact that in the charge
      sheet issued on 27.6.1993, the allegation was that the writ petitioner
      failed to perform his fatigue duty from 9 to 10 am and was disobedient to
      the lawful orders issued to him. There was no allegation of use of a fire
H
             UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. DALBIR SINGH                             809
                      [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

arm leading to death of Shri Harish Chander and injuries to Shri Hari          A
Singh.
       19. The writ petitioner completed his fatigue duty at 10 am and
then reported for duty at the Headquarters. In the later Charge Sheet
dated 25.2.2013, the departmental witnesses have uniformly deposed
that the noise of firing of 15-20 gun shots was heard around 11 am on          B
11.4.1993. In fact, PW-6 Constable D.K. Mishra is the one who
immobilized the writ petitioner when he was in the process of loading
another magazine in the self-loading rifle. Still further, PW-5 Brij Kishore
Singh has deposed that 3-4 soldiers had taken the self-loaded rifle of the
writ petitioner. Such self-loaded rifle is the one which was issued to the
writ petitioner.                                                               C

       20. The statement of some of the departmental witnesses was
that they heard that the writ petitioner used his personal weapon but
such part of the statements is hearsay evidence. It was open to the writ
petitioner to lead evidence that he was not using the official weapon but
a personal weapon to rebut the stand of the Department.                        D

       21. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Haryana &
Anr. v. Rattan Singh3 was dealing with the issue of non-examination of
passengers when the allegation against the conductor was non-issuance
of the tickets. This Court held that in a domestic enquiry, strict and
sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not          E
apply and that all materials which are logically probative for a prudent
mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it
has reasonable nexus and credibility.This Court heldas under:
         “4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and
         sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act         F
         may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a
         prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay
         evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is
         true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals
         must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly     G
         swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian
         Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite
         decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through
         case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The
3
    (1977) 2 SCC 491                                                           H
810                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A              essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous
               materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural
               justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or
               arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate
               the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic
               tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below
B
               misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who
               had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before
               the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residuum’
               rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon
               certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to
C              that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such
               rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence
               or was there no evidence — not in the sense of the technical
               rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair
               commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom
               will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof
D
               of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence
               of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for
               the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent
               on the record. ………..”
             22. This Court in Union of India & Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran4
E     had laid down the broad parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction of
      judicial review. The Court held as under:
               “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to
               note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the
               disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before
F              the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
               disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central
               Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court
               is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High
               Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the
G              Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the
               evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
               (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;


      4
H         (2015) 2 SCC 610
             UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. DALBIR SINGH                                   811
                      [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

         (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in            A
         that behalf;
         (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting
         the proceedings;
         (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
         conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence                B
         and merits of the case;
         (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by
         irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
         (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and      C
         capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at
         such conclusion;
         (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the
         admissible and material evidence;
         (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible        D
         evidence which influenced the finding;
         (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
         13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High
         Court shall not:
                                                                                     E
         (i) reappreciate the evidence;
         (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same
         has been conducted in accordance with law;
         (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
                                                                                     F
         (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
         (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings
         can be based.
         (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
         (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its        G
         conscience.”
      23. In another Judgment reported as B.C Chaturvedi v. Union
of India & Ors.5, it was held that the power of judicial review is meant
5
    (1995) 6 SCC 749                                                                 H
812            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A     to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure
      that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in
      the eye of the court. The Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
      but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. The Court is
      to examine as to whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or
      whether rules of natural justice are complied with. This Court held as
B
      under:-
            “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review
            of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
            review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment
            and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches
C           is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is
            conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/
            Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held
            by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are
            complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on
D           some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold
            inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
            fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some
            evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof
            of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary
            proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and
E           conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority
            is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge.
            The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as
            appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at
            its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal
F           may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against
            the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
            natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode
            of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the
            disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
            finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached,
G           the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding,
            and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of
            each case.
            13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where
            appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power
H
             UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. DALBIR SINGH                               813
                      [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

         to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a          A
         disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings
         on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or
         reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before
         the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR
         718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p.
                                                                                 B
         728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
         reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from
         patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at
         all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”
       24. This Court in Management of Tamil Nadu State Transport
Corporation (Coimbatore) Limited v. M. Chandrasekaran6 held that                 C
in exercise of power of judicial review,the Labour Commissioner
exceeded his jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence adduced before
the enquiry officer and in substituting his own judgment to that of the
disciplinary authority. It was not a case of no legal evidence. The question
as to decision of the disciplinary authority of dismissing the respondent is     D
just and proper could be assailed by the respondent in appropriate
proceedings. Considering the fact that there was adequate material
produced in the departmental enquiry evidencing that fatal accident was
caused by the respondent while driving the vehicle on duty, the burden to
prove that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own
negligence was on the respondent. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur              E
squarely applies to the fact situation. The Court held as under:
         “11. The respondent on the other hand contends that the
         Commissioner has applied the well-settled legal position that there
         can be no presumption of misconduct by the employees. That,
         charge must be proved by the Department during the inquiry. Non-        F
         examination of the material witnesses such as eyewitnesses
         present on the spot, conductor and passengers, travelling on the
         same bus was fatal. For, it entails in not substantiating the charges
         against the respondent and failure to discharge the initial onus
         resting on the Department to prove the charge as framed.                G
         According to the respondent, no fault can be found with the tangible
         reasons recorded by the Commissioner as noticed by the Single
         Judge (reproduced above); and resultantly, the conclusion of the
         Commissioner of not according approval to the order of dismissal
6
    (2016) 16 SCC 16                                                             H
814                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A              is just and proper. It is submitted that the Single Judge was justified
               in allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent and issuing
               direction to the appellant to reinstate him with back wages and
               continuity of service and all attendant benefits accrued to him.”
             25. This Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ),
B     Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors.7 held that the degree of proof
      which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of
      proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. In criminal
      law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is
      able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he
      cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the
C     other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding
      recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”.It was held as
      under:
               “11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is
               concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the
D              Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In
               our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal
               court would not debar an employer from exercising power in
               accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two
               proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They
E              operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas
               the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on
               the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with
               the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance
               with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement
               made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain
F              officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of
               evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental
               proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order
               a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary
               to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to
G              appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not
               similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution
               and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the
               accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted
               by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other
      7
H         (2005) 7 SCC 764
             UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. DALBIR SINGH                               815
                      [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

         hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a             A
         finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of
         probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate,
         therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under
         the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore,
         unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was
                                                                                 B
         acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him
         from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.”
         (Emphasis Supplied)
       26. This Court in Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA
& Ors.8 held that the criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for        C
violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of
which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the
public, whereas, the departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the
service and efficiency of public service. It was held as under:
         “11. A bare perusal of the order which has been quoted in its           D
         totality goes to show that the same is not based on any rational
         foundation. The conceptual difference between a departmental
         inquiry and criminal proceedings has not been kept in view. Even
         orders passed by the executive have to be tested on the touchstone
         of reasonableness. [See Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6
         SCC 651] and Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh [(2004)      E
         2 SCC 130] .] The conceptual difference between departmental
         proceedings and criminal proceedings have been highlighted by
         this Court in several cases. Reference may be made to Kendriya
         Vidyalaya Sangathan v. T. Srinivas [(2004) 7 SCC 442 : 2004
         SCC (L&S) 1011] , Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sarvesh            F
         Berry [(2005) 10 SCC 471 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1605] and Uttaranchal
         RTC v. Mansaram Nainwal [(2006) 6 SCC 366 : 2006 SCC (L&S)
         1341] .
             “8. … The purpose of departmental inquiry and of prosecution
             are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution    G
             is launched for an offense for violation of a duty, the offender
             owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided
             that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime
             is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of
8
    (2007) 10 SCC 385                                                            H
816                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A                  public duty. The departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline
                   in the service and efficiency of public service. It would,
                   therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are
                   conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is
                   not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible
                   rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not
B
                   be stayed pending trial in the criminal cases against the
                   delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the
                   backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be
                   no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental inquiry
                   and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal
C                  trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact
                   and law. Offense generally implies infringement of public duty,
                   as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under
                   criminal law. When the trial for a criminal offense is conducted
                   it should be in accordance with proof of the offense as per the
                   evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence
D
                   Act, 1872 [in short ‘the Evidence Act’]. The converse is the
                   case of departmental inquiry. The inquiry in a departmental
                   proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the
                   delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined
                   under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard
E                  of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is
                   a settled legal position. … Under these circumstances, what is
                   required to be seen is whether the departmental inquiry would
                   seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defense at the trial in a
                   criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered
                   in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances.”
F
             27. This Court in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport
      Corporationv. Mohd. Yousuf Miya & Ors.9 held that in the disciplinary
      proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such
      conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment.
      It was held as under:
G
               “7. …There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective
               in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is
               altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings,
               the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct
      9
H         (1997) 2 SCC 699
          UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. DALBIR SINGH                               817
                   [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

      as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment,         A
      as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the
      question is whether the offences registered against him under the
      Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Penal Code, 1860, if any)
      are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed
      upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the
                                                                              B
      rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely
      distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending
      criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course
      but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision
      may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly
      delayed.” (Emphasis Supplied)                                           C
       28. Mr. Yadav, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted
that during the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court, the
appellants were given opportunity to produce the registers of the
entrustment of S.L.R. to the writ petitioner. But it was stated that record
was not available being an old record as the incident was of 1993. The        D
enquiry was initiated in 2013 after the acquittal of the writ petitioner
from the criminal trial. Therefore, in the absence of the best evidence
of registers, the oral evidence of use of official weapon stands proven
on the basis of oral testimony of the departmental witnesses.
       29. The burden of proof in the departmental proceedings is not of      E
beyond reasonable doubt as is the principle in the criminal trial but
probabilities of the misconduct. The delinquent such as the writ petitioner
could examine himself to rebut the allegations of misconduct including
use of personal weapon. In fact, the reliance of the writ petitioner is
upon a communication dated 1.5.2014 made to the Commandant through
the inquiry officer. He has stated that he has not fired on higher officers   F
and that he was out of camp at the alleged time of incident. Therefore,
a false case has been made against him. His further stand is that it was
a terrorist attack and terrorists have fired on the Camp. None of the
departmental witnesses have been even suggested about any terrorist
attack or that the writ petitioner was out of camp. Constable D.K. Mishra     G
had immobilized the writ petitioner whereas all other witnesses have
seen the writ petitioner being immobilized and being removed to quarter
guard. PW-5 Brij Kishore Singh deposed that 3-4 soldiers had taken the
Self-Loading Rifle (S.L.R.) of the writ petitioner in their possession.
Therefore, the allegations in the chargesheet dated 25.2.2013 that the
                                                                              H
818                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A     writ petitioner has fired from the official weapon is a reliable finding
      returned by the Departmental Authorities on the basis of evidence placed
      before them. It is not a case of no evidence, which alone would warrant
      interference by the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review. It
      is not the case of the writ petitioner that there was any infraction of any
      rule or regulations or the violation of the principles of natural justice. The
B
      best available evidence had been produced by the appellants in the course
      of enquiry conducted after long lapse of time.
             30. Consequently, we find that the order passed by the High Court
      is not sustainable. Hence, the same is set aside and the order of
      punishment of dismissal passed on 21.12.1996 as affirmed in appeal and
C     revision stands restored. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.


      Ankit Gyan                                                     Appeal allowed.


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