UNION OF INDIAversusALAPAN BANDYOPADHYAY

                        [2022] 16 S.C.R. 259                            259


                        UNION OF INDIA                                  A
                                 v.
                 ALAPAN BANDYOPADHYAY
                   (Civil Appeal No. 197 of 2022)
                        JANUARY 06, 2022                                B
    [A. M. KHANWILKAR AND C. T RAVIKUMAR, JJ.]
       Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985: ss.19, 25 – Power of
chairman to transfer cases from one bench to another – High Court
setting aside the order of transfer passed by the tribunal falling
                                                                        C
within the jurisdiction of another High Court - Maintainability/
sustainability of the order – Power of judicial review over order of
transfer under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution – Respondent then
Chief Secretary of the State of West Bengal, filed application u/s.
19 before the tribunal, Kolkata Bench challenging the disciplinary
proceedings initiated against him alleging failure to attend review     D
meeting – Pending consideration, the appellant-UOI filed petition
u/s 25 seeking transfer of case from Kolkata to Delhi before the
Principal Bench, Delhi – Transfer petition allowed – Challenge to,
by the respondent before the High Court of Calcutta – High Court
set aside the order passed by Principal Bench, Delhi while passing
                                                                        E
adverse remarks against the Chairman of the tribunal – On appeal,
held: Power of judicial review of an order transferring an original
application pending before a Bench of the Tribunal to another Bench
u/s. 25 can be judicially reviewed only by a Division Bench of the
High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Bench passing
the same, falls – Division Bench of the High Court does not have        F
jurisdiction to set aside order passed by the Tribunal falling within
the jurisdiction of another High Court – Any decision of a tribunal
(including u/s 25 of the Act) can only be scrutinized by a High
Court having territorial jurisdiction over the tribunal –
Furthermore, no exceptional ground(s) exists to make scathing and
                                                                        G
disparaging remarks and observations against the Principal Bench
of the Tribunal, thus, liable to be expunged – Impugned judgment
and final order passed by the High Court at Calcutta is to be held
as one passed without jurisdiction and is ab initio void, and is set
aside – Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 -
rr. 6 , r. 4(5)(a) & (b) – Constitution of India, Arts. 226 & 227.      H
                                  259
260            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A           Allowing the appeal, the Court

            HELD: 1.1. Once the High Court found the order impugned
      as one passed by the Principal Bench, the High Court should
      have confined its consideration firstly, to decide its own territorial
      jurisdiction for exercising the power of judicial review over the
B     order or transfer in the correct perspective, without reference
      to the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action for
      application before the Tribunal, Kolkata Bench founded on the
      cause of action referred to in Rule 6(2) of the Procedure Rules
      that decides the place of filing of an O.A. [Para 15][274-A-C]
C
            1.2 The cause of action for filing an Original Application
      under section 19 of the Act to redress any grievance and the
      cause of action for challenging an order of transfer of such an
      application from the Bench where it was filed and pending, to
      another Bench are different and distinct. [Para 6][265-F-G]
D
             1.3 Dictum laid down in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India
      ‘s case clarified to mean that all decisions of tribunals would be
      subject to the scrutiny before a division bench of the High Court
      within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular tribunal falls.
      No further interpretation on the said issue is permissible. The
E
      law declared by constitution bench cannot be revisited by bench
      of lesser quorum or by High courts. [Para 16][276-B-F]

            1.4 The power of judicial review of an order transferring an
      original application pending before a Bench of the Tribunal to
F     another Bench under Section 25 of the Act can be judicially
      reviewed only by a Division Bench of the High Court within whose
      territorial jurisdiction the Bench passing the same, falls. [Para
      17][277-B-C]

            1.5 No exceptional ground(s) exists in the case to make
G     scathing and disparaging remarks and observations against the
      Principal Bench of the Tribunal. [Para 8][269-F-G]




H
        UNION OF INDIA v. ALAPAN BANDYOPADHYAY                         261


      1.6 Accordingly, impugned judgment and final order passed        A
by the High Court at Calcutta is to be held as one passed without
jurisdiction and hence, it is ab initio void. Impugned Judgement
set aside. [Para 18][277-F-G]
        L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC
        261 : [1997] 2 SCR 1186 – followed.                            B
        Bhavesh Motiani v. Union of India 2019 SCC OnLine
        Del 11541 – approved.
        Kusum Ingots and Alloys Limited v. Union of India &
        Anr. (2004) 6 SCC 254 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 841;
        Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India & Ors. (2014)           C
        9 SCC 329 : [2014] 7 SCR 1027; Navinchandra N.
        Majithia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC
        640 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 82 – held inapplicable.
        Union of India v. A Shainamol (2021) SCC OnLine SC
        962; J.K Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2007) 13           D
        SCC 673 : [2007] 12 SCR 136 – referred to.
        Braj Kishore Thakur v. Union of India (1997) 4 SCC
        65 : [1997] 2 SCR 420– relied on.
                       Case Law Reference
                                                                       E
[2007] 12 SCR 136               referred to            Para 7
[1997] 2 SCR 420                relied on              Para 8
[2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 841         held inapplicable      Para 10
[2014] 7 SCR 1027               held inapplicable      Para 11         F
[2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 82          held inapplicable      Para 11
[1997] 2 SCR 1186               followed               Para 16
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 197 of
2022.
                                                                       G
      From the Judgment and Order dated 29.10.2021 of the High Court
of Calcutta in W.P.C.T. No. 78 of 2021.
     Tushar Mehta, SG, Vikramjit Banrejee, ASG, K. M. Nataraj, Ms.
Kanu Agrawal, Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Ms. Shruti Agarwal, Arvind
Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.                                 H
262             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A          Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Shyam Divan, Abhratosh Majumdar,
      Abhay Behera, Sr. Advs., Debanjan Mandal, Kunal Vajani, Soumya
      Majumdar, Sandip Dasgupta, Subhankar Nag, Victor Chatterjee, Amit
      Bhandari, Ms. Sanam Tripathi, Saaqub Siddiqui, Kartikey Bhatt,
      Ms. Mahima Cholera, Gokula Krishnan, Kunal Mimani, Advs. for the
      Respondent.
B
             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
             C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
             1. Leave granted.

C             2. A legal conundrum calls for resolution in this case. The seminal
      question that created it is: ‘whether the bundle of facts that constitute
      the cause of action for filing an Original Application under Section 19 of
      the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short ‘the Act’) and
      determinative of the place of its filing would remain as the decisive factor
      in case such an application is subsequently transferred from the Bench
D     where it was filed to another Bench of the Tribunal falling under the
      territorial jurisdiction of another High Court, to ascertain the jurisdictional
      High Court to exercise the power of judicial review qua the order of
      transfer passed by the Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal
      at New Delhi in exercise of power under Section 25 of the Act’.
E            3. The Appellant assails the final judgment and order dated
      29.10.2021 passed by the High Court at Calcutta in WPCT No.78/2021
      whereby the High Court set aside the order dated 22.10.2021 passed by
      the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench (New Delhi) in
      P.T.No.215/2021 transferring O.A.No.1619/2021, filed by the respondent
F     herein, from Kolkata Bench to its files at the Principal Bench (New
      Delhi). In fact, order in P.T.No.215/2021 was passed by the Chairman
      of the Tribunal in exercise of the power under Section 25 of the Act.
      The respondent herein, who was the then Chief Secretary of the State
      of West Bengal (since superannuated as an IAS officer), filed
      O.A.No.1619/2021 before the Kolkata Bench of the Central
G     Administrative Tribunal challenging the disciplinary proceedings initiated
      against him vide charge memo dated 16.06.2021 alleging failure to attend
      a review meeting chaired by the Hon’ble the Prime Minister of India on
      28.05.2021 for assessing the loss of life, damage to property and
      infrastructure caused by the cyclonic storm ‘YAAS’. He was charged
      thereunder for failure to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty
H
       UNION OF INDIA v. ALAPAN BANDYOPADHYAY                                   263
                  [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

and for exhibiting conduct unbecoming of a public servant. Pending              A
consideration of the stated O.A. the Appellant herein moved a Transfer
Petition being P.T.No.215/2021 under Section 25 of the Act, before the
Principal Bench of the Tribunal at New Delhi seeking its transfer from
the Kolkata Bench to the Principal Bench. That petition was allowed by
the Chairman of the Tribunal, sitting at the Principal Bench and the
                                                                                B
challenge of which ultimately led to the passing of the impugned final
judgment and order dated 29.10.2021 by the High Court. Since we are
confining the consideration only on the question as to which is the
jurisdictional High Court having the power for judicial review as relates
the order of transfer passed in P.T.No.215/2021 it is un-essential to refer
to, in detail, the various contentions raised in the stated O.A. to challenge   C
the disciplinary proceedings as also the contentions raised before the
High Court in WPCT No.78/2021 to challenge the correctness of the
stated order of transfer. In troth, consideration of correctness or otherwise
of the decision of the High Court on merits would become inept if the
High Court at Calcutta is found lacking jurisdiction to entertain the
                                                                                D
challenge against the order in P.T.No.215/2021 passed under Section 25
of the Act.
        4. To properly consider this appeal, it is only appropriate to refer
to Section 25 of the Act and Rule 6 of the Central Administrative Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1987 (for brevity, the ‘Procedure Rules’). They read
thus: -                                                                         E

      “Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 :
      25. Power of Chairman to transfer cases from one Bench to
      another.- On the application of any of the parties and after notice
      to the parties, and after hearing such of them as he may desire to        F
      be heard, or on his own motion without such notice, the chairman
      may transfer any case pending before one Bench, for disposal, to
      any other Bench.”
      “Rule 6 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules,
      1987 :                                                                    G
      6. Place of filing applications.- (1) An application shall ordinarily
      be filed by an applicant with the Registrar of the Bench within
      whose jurisdiction –
      (i) the applicant is posted for the time being, or
                                                                                H
264            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A           (ii) the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen;
            Provided that with the leave of the Chairman the application may
            be filed with the Registrar of the Principal Bench and subject to
            the orders under section 25, such application shall be heard and
            disposed of by the Bench which has jurisdiction over the matter.
B           (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) persons
            who has ceased to be in service by reason of retirement, dismissal
            or termination of service may be at his option file an application
            with the Registrar of the Bench within whose jurisdiction such
            person is ordinarily residing at the time of filing of the application.”
C              5. There is no dispute regarding the power of the Chairman to
      transfer an Original Application pending before one Bench of the Tribunal
      to another bench, under Section 25 of the Act. A perusal of the said
      provision would reveal that a party to any Application before any Bench
      of the Central Administrative Tribunal is statutorily entitled to make a
D     separate application before the Chairman of the Central Administrative
      Tribunal for such a transfer. Upon transfer of an Original Application
      pending before a particular Bench of the Tribunal, lying within the
      territorial jurisdiction and power of judicial superintendence of any
      particular High Court other than High Court of Delhi at Delhi, to the
      Principal Bench at New Delhi lying within the territorial jurisdiction of
E     High Court of Delhi, the question of maintainability may arise in case of
      a challenge against the order of transfer. Yet another High Court may
      emerge in the picture if the Chairman, sitting at the Principal Bench
      transferred the O.A. not to the file of the Principal Bench, but to another
      Bench lying within the territorial jurisdiction of yet another High Court.
F     It is to be noted that the Chairman of the Tribunal can also pass an order
      of transfer of an Original Application while sitting at any other Bench
      than the Principal Bench. This possibility cannot be ruled out in view of
      the provisions under Section 5(4)(a) of the Act, which reads thus:-
            “S.5. Composition of Tribunals and Benches thereof.- (1)…
G           (2)…
            (3)…
            (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Section (1), the
            Chairman –
H
       UNION OF INDIA v. ALAPAN BANDYOPADHYAY                                  265
                  [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

          (a) may, in addition to discharging the functions of the Judicial    A
          Member or the Administrative Member of the Bench to which
          he is appointed, discharge the functions of the Judicial Member
          or, as the case may be the Administrative Member, of any
          other Bench;”
       6. The question of jurisdictional issue may get complicated further     B
in case some of the applicants who joined together to file a single Original
Application under Section 19 of the Act before a particular Bench of the
Tribunal have chosen to challenge the order of its transfer, if passed
under section 25 of the Act, before different High Courts, based on their
places of residence. Occurrence of such a situation is possible and cannot
be ruled out going by the provisions under Rule 4(5)(a) and (b) of the         C
Procedure Rules, which read thus:
      “Rule 4. Procedure for filing applications. -
      4(5) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rules (1) to
      (3) the Tribunal may permit more than one person to join together        D
      and file a single application if it is satisfied, having regard to the
      cause and the nature of relief prayed for that they have a common
      interest in the matter.
      4(5) (b) Such permission may also be granted to an Association
      representing the persons desirous of joining in a single application     E
      provided, however, that the application shall disclose the class/
      grade/categories or persons on whose behalf it has been filed
      [provided that at least one affected person joins such an
      application].”
        All the above aspects have to be borne in mind while considering       F
the question that calls for resolution in this appeal. Yet another important
aspect may also has to be borne in mind, idest that the cause of action
for filing an Original Application under section 19 of the Act to redress
any grievance and the cause of action for challenging an order of transfer
of such an application from the Bench where it was filed and pending, to
another Bench are different and distinct. The place for filing an Original     G
Application against any order under section 19 would depend upon the
bundle of facts constituting the cause of action which ultimately culminated
in the said order sought to be impugned. Explanation to section 19(1)
defines the meaning of the word ‘order’ for the purposes of the said
section. On the other hand, the cause of action for challenging the order
                                                                               H
266             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A     of transfer/order declining the prayer for transfer is nothing but an order
      passed in the independent application for transfer of pending Original
      Application from the files of that particular Bench of the Tribunal where
      it was filed to another Bench in the invocation of or disinclination to
      invoke, the power under Section 25 of the Act.
B            7. We have heard Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General,
      for the appellant and learned Senior Advocate Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi
      appearing for the respondent. Both sides relied on various authorities to
      drive home their respective stand as relates the impugned judgment.
      The learned Solicitor General contended that a challenge against the
      order passed in P.T.No.215/2021 by the Central Administrative Tribunal,
C     Principal Bench at New Delhi, was maintainable only before the High
      Court of Delhi as the Principal Bench of the Tribunal lies within its
      territorial jurisdiction. To buttress the said contention the judgment of a
      Constitutional Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of
      India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 is relied on. It was held therein that
D     the power vested in the High Court to exercise judicial superintendence
      over the decisions of all courts and Tribunals within the respective
      jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the constitution.
      Furthermore, it was held that the decisions of Tribunals would be subject
      to the High Court’s Writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the
      Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose
E     territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls. The learned Solicitor
      General also referred to Section 5(7) of the Act which provides that
      subject to the other provisions of the Act, Benches of the Central
      Administrative Tribunal shall ordinarily sit at New Delhi (which shall be
      known as the Principal Bench), Allahabad, Kolkata, Madras, New
F     Bombay and at such other places as the Central Government may, by
      notification, specify, to support the contention that High Court at Calcutta
      did not have jurisdiction to exercise judicial review of the orders in
      P.T.No.215/2021. Relying on the decision in Union of India vs. A.
      Shainamol, IAS and Anr., reported in (2021) SCC Online SC 962, it is
      contended that the mere residence of the Applicant in a certain place
G     would not amount to cause of action conferring jurisdiction upon the
      Bench of the Tribunal located at that place. Indubitably, this contention
      is relevant only for challenging the maintainability of an Original
      Application before any particular Bench of the Tribunal. The learned
      Solicitor General relied on the decision of this Court in JK Industries
H     Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2007) 13 SCC 673 to
       UNION OF INDIA v. ALAPAN BANDYOPADHYAY                                   267
                  [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

contend that Rule 6 of the Procedural Rules ought not to have been              A
interpreted by the High Court so as to take away Chairman’s jurisdiction
to transfer a case under Section 25 of the Act as the cardinal principle of
interpretation is that a rule made under a statute could not override or
supersede a provision of the parent statute itself. According to us the
said decision and the contention founded on the said decision are relevant
                                                                                B
only for the purpose of deciding the correctness of the order of transfer
passed by the Principal Bench of the Tribunal in exercise of the power
under Section 25 of the Act and not for deciding the jurisdictional High
Court qua the order in P.T.No.215/2021.
        8. The Appellant also got a grievance that the High Court made
some harsh or disparaging remarks in the impugned judgment against              C
the Chairman of the Tribunal. The learned Solicitor General submitted
that they were unsolicited and relied on various decisions to stress upon
the requirement of their expunction. Nevertheless, we think it unnecessary
to delve into all such contentions based on such decisions as Dr. Abhishek
Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent,              D
fairly submitted that he would not contest on that issue and left it to us to
decide. Obviously, the High Court found undue haste in the matter of
disposal of P.T.No.215/2021 and that also persuaded the High Court to
make such scathing observations and remarks in fact, against the Principal
Bench of the Tribunal. But then, a perusal of the materials on record
would reveal that WPCT No.78/2021 filed before the High Court that              E
culminated in the impugned judgment was also passed with almost equal
speed. That apart, both the order in P.T.No.215/2021 and the final
judgment and order in WPCT No.78/2021 were passed, respectively, by
the Tribunal and the High Court, after hearing both parties. The fact that
the impugned judgment contain observations and remarks amounting to             F
disparagement and as such, scathing in effect is not in dispute. We do
not think it necessary to reproduce them in this judgment in the stated
circumstances. However, contextually it will be apposite to refer to
paragraphs 11 to 13 of the decision of this Court in Braj Kishore Thakur
v. Union of India (AIR 1997 SC 1157). It was held therein thus:
                                                                                G
      “11. No greater damage can be caused to the administration of
      justice and to the confidence of people in judicial institutions when
      Judges of higher Courts publicly express lack of faith in the
      subordinate Judges. It has been said, time and again, that respect
      for judiciary is not in hands by using intemperate language and by
                                                                                H
268      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A     casting aspersions against lower judiciary. It is well to remember
      that a Judicial Officer against whom aspersions are made in the
      judgment could not appear before the higher Court to defend his
      order. Judges of higher Courts must, therefore, exercise greater
      judicial restraint and adopt greater care when they are tempted to
      employ strong terms against lower judiciary.
B
      12. A quarter of a century ago Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then
      was) speaking for a Bench of three Judges of this Court, in the
      context of dealing with the strictures passed by High Court against
      one of its Subordinate Judicial Officers (Suggesting that his
      decision was based on extraneous considerations) stressed the
C     need to adopt utmost judicial restraint against using strong language
      and imputation of corrupt motives against lower judiciary more so
      “because the Judge against whom the imputations are made has
      no remedy in law to vindicate his position” [Ishwari Prasad Mishra
      v. Mohammad Isa, (1963) 3 SCR 722: (AIR 1963 SC 1728)].
D     This Court had to repeat such words on subsequent occasions
      also. In K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P., AIR 1994 SC 1031, this
      Court came across certain observations of a learned Judge of the
      High Court casting strictures against a Judge of the subordinate
      judiciary and the Court used the opportunity to remind all concerned
      that using intemperate language and castigating strictures at the
E     lower levels would only cause public respect in judiciary to dwindle.
      The following observations of this Court need repetition in this
      context:
      “The higher Courts every day come across orders of the lower
      Courts which are not justified either in law or in fact and modify
F     them or set them aside. That is one of the functions of the superior
      Courts. Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the Judges
      and hence provides for appeals and revisions. A Judge tries to
      discharge his duties to the best of his capacity. While doing so,
      sometimes, he is likely to err………………………………………
G     it has also to be remembered that the lower judicial officers mostly
      work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under a
      psychological pressure with all the contestants and their lawyers
      almost breathing down their necks more correctly up to their
      nostrils. They do not have the benefit of a detached atmosphere
      of the higher Courts to think coolly and decide patiently. Every
H
       UNION OF INDIA v. ALAPAN BANDYOPADHYAY                                   269
                  [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

      error, however, gross it may look, should not, therefore, be attributed   A
      to improper motive.”
      13. Recently, we had to say the same thing though in different
      words in Kashi Nath Roy v. State of Bihar (1996) 4 JT (SC) 605:
      (1996 AIR SCW 2098) in a similar situation. We then said thus
      (Para 7 of AIR):                                                          B
      “It cannot be forgotten that in our system, like elsewhere, appellate
      and revisional Courts have been set up on the pre-supposition that
      lower Courts would in some measure of cases go wrong in
      decision-making, both on facts as also on law, and they have been
      knit-up to correct those orders. The human element, in justicing          C
      being an important element, computer-like functioning cannot be
      expected of the Courts: however, hard they may try and keep
      themselves precedent-trodden in the scope of discretions and in
      the manner of judging. Whenever any such intolerable error is
      detected by or pointed out to a superior Court, it is functionally
      required to correct that error and may, here and there, in an             D
      appropriate case, and in a manner befitting, maintaining the dignity
      of the Court and independence of judiciary, convey its message in
      its judgment to the officer concerned through a process of
      reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellow but clear,
      and result-orienting, but rarely as a rebuke. Sharp reaction of the       E
      kind exhibited in the afore-extraction is not in keeping with
      institutional functioning. The premise that a Judge committed a
      mistake or an error beyond the limits of tolerance, is no ground to
      inflict condemnation on the Judge-Subordinate, unless there existed
      something else and for exceptional grounds.”
                                                                                F
       On our careful scanning of the circumstances and situations
obtained in this case we are persuaded to think that no exceptional
ground(s) exists in the case on hand to make scathing and disparaging
remarks and observations against the Principal Bench of the Tribunal.
At the same time, it is to be noted that the said order was, in fact, passed
by the Chairman of the Tribunal on a formal application moved by the            G
appellants herein and after hearing both parties. As a matter of law the
Chairman could pass an order of transfer under Section 25 of the Act
suo motu. Hence, the said observations and remarks, in troth, ought not
to have been made against the Chairman of the Tribunal. To observe
sobriety, we say that the remarks made by the High Court were                   H
270             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A     unwarranted, uncalled for and avoidable being sharp reaction on
      unfounded assumptions. Ergo, we have no hesitation to hold that they
      were wholly unnecessary for the purpose of deciding the correctness or
      otherwise of the order of transfer. Hence, they are liable to be expunged.
      We do so.
B            9. Now, we will advert to the contentions advanced by Dr.
      Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent to
      support and sustain the impugned judgment and final order in WPCT
      No.78/2021 whereby the order in P.T.No.215/2021 was set aside. It is
      submitted that the High Court is justified in entertaining WPCT No.78/
      2021 as the order of transfer passed in P.T.No.215/2021 fell within its
C     power of judicial superintendence. The further contention is that it could
      not be said that the power under Section 25 of the Act was taken away
      solely because Rule 6 of the Procedure Rules was relied on to upturn
      the order in P.T.No.215/2021. The learned counsel, after drawing our
      attention to the factual background of the case, contended that the High
D     Court had rightly exercised the power of judicial review and looked into
      the correctness of the order of transfer passed by the Chairman of the
      Tribunal (the Principal Bench of the Tribunal) in the invocation of the
      power under Section 25 of the Act. The said contention is primarily
      founded on Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India that confers powers
      on High Court in relation to territories within which the case of action,
E     wholly or in part arises and also on the position settled by this Court in
      the decisions in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Limited vs. Union of India &
      Anr. (2004) 6 SCC 254, in Nawal Kishore Sharma vs. Union of India &
      Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 329 and in Navinchandra N. Majithia vs. State of
      Maharashtra & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 647. Compendium of judgments/
F     orders under Section 25 of the Act has also been produced along with
      the written submissions on behalf of the respondent to support the
      contentions that the transfer order was illegal, arbitrary, passed in violation
      of the principals of natural justice and on irrelevant considerations. We
      may hasten to note that all those judgments/orders, except one, viz., the
      decision reported in 2019 SCC Online Del 11541 (Bhavesh Motiani vs.
G     Union of India), were passed by the Principal Bench of the Tribunal
      rejecting applications for transfer of pending Original Applications in the
      exercise of power under Section 25 of the Act. Hence, they are not
      significant in deciding the stated moot question. We will refer to in
      Bhavesh Motiani’s case a little later.
H
       UNION OF INDIA v. ALAPAN BANDYOPADHYAY                                      271
                  [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

       10. We have carefully considered the contentions raised on behalf           A
of the respondent by placing reliance on the aforesaid decisions of this
Court. In Kusum Ingots’ case (supra), the question involved was “whether
the seat of Parliament would be a relevant factor for determining the
territorial jurisdiction of a High Court to entertain a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India when the constitutionality of a
                                                                                   B
Parliamentary Act is under challenge”. After referring to the expression
“cause of action” for territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, in
terms of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, this Court held thus:
       “18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on
       the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which
       have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to           C
       give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on
       the Court.
       19. Passing of a legislation by itself in our opinion does not confer
       any such right to file a writ petition unless a cause of action arises
       therefor.                                                                   D

       20. A distinction between a legislation and executive action should
       be borne in mind while determining the said question.
       21. A parliamentary legislation when it receives the assent of the
       President of India and is published in the Official Gazette, unless         E
       specifically excluded, will apply to the entire territory of India. If
       passing of a legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition
       questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High
       Court of the country. It is not so done because a cause of action
       will arise only when the provisions of the Act or some of them
       which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences        F
       to the petitioner. A writ court, it is well settled, would not determine
       a constitutional question in a vacuum.”
        11. In Nawal Kishore’s case, the issue concerned was with respect
to the jurisdiction of a particular High Court against an authority/person
residing outside its territorial jurisdiction. That question was considered        G
with reference to Article 226(2) of the Constitution. It was held that writ
could be issued if cause of action wholly or partially had arisen within
the territorial jurisdiction of High Court concerned even if the person or
authority against whom writ is sought for is located outside its territorial
jurisdiction. However, it was held that in order to maintain such a writ
                                                                                   H
272             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A     petition, the petitioner had to establish that such respondents infringed
      his legal rights within the limits of the High Court’s jurisdiction. In Navin
      Chandra N. Majithia’s case, again the jurisdictional issue was considered
      with reference to Article 226(2) of the Constitution and held that the
      High Court concerned would have jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition
      if any part of the cause of action arose within its territorial limits even
B
      though the seat of government or authority or residence of persons against
      whom direction, order or writ is sought to be issued is not within its
      territory.
             12. On a careful scanning of the aforesaid decisions relied on by
      the respondent and consideration of the nature of the question that calls
C     for decision in the case on hand and also what we have observed earlier,
      we find that the above decisions have no applicability for deciding the
      stated moot question. We will further elaborate the non-applicability of
      those decisions in the course of further consideration of the matter. We
      are not dealing with the cause of action for filing O.A.No.1619/2021
D     before the Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal in this Judgement. Even if the
      bundle of facts constituting cause of action for filing the said O.A. confers
      on the Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal the jurisdiction to entertain the
      same, the question here is whether its transfer from the said Bench to
      the Principal Bench vide order dated 20.10.2021 in P.T.No.215/2021 by
      the Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal (the Principal Bench)
E     in invocation of powers under Section 25 of the Act falls within the
      territorial jurisdiction and power of superintendence of the High Court at
      Calcutta and the fate of the challenge against the order in WPCT No.78/
      2021 dated 29.10.2021 would depend upon its answer. We may hasten
      to state that if the challenge in the writ petition was against an order
F     passed by the Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal in O.A.No.1619/2021 there
      can be no doubt with respect to the jurisdiction of the High Court at
      Calcutta.
             13. Going by Section 25 of the Act, extracted hereinbefore, an
      independent application for transfer of an Original Application filed and
G     pending before any bench of the Tribunal could be filed and the power to
      transfer lies with the Chairman. The Section mandates that if such an
      application is made, notice of it has to be given to the opposite party. At
      the same time, the Section also provides that on his motion and without
      any such notice the Chairman could transfer any case pending before
      one Bench, for disposal, to any other Bench of the Tribunal. Evidently,
H
       UNION OF INDIA v. ALAPAN BANDYOPADHYAY                                     273
                  [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

the said Section recognizes, the fundamental principles of justice and            A
fair play namely that ‘Justice must not only be done but it must be seen
to have been done’. It would enable the Chairman to avert a ‘reasonable
suspicion’ of or ‘real likelihood’ of bias. It could also be exercised on
establishing any other sufficient and sustainable grounds. This power is
to be used with great circumspection and sparingly. We do not think it
                                                                                  B
necessary to elaborate on this issue as we have already stated that we
are confining our consideration only to the specific question whether
High Court at Calcutta was having jurisdiction to entertain the challenge
against the order in P.T.No.215/2021.
       14. Before delving into the moot question any further we deem it
appropriate to refer to the impugned judgment to know in what manner              C
the order of transfer passed in P.T.No.215/2021 was understood by the
High Court. In other words, whether the High Court while passing the
impugned judgment treated the order impugned before it as an order
passed in the O.A.No.1619/2021 pending before the Kolkata Bench of
the Tribunal that lies within its territorial jurisdiction by that Bench of the   D
Tribunal or as an order passed at the Principal Bench of the Tribunal
lying outside its jurisdiction transferring that very Original Application to
another Bench of the Tribunal. A scanning of the impugned order itself
would reveal that the High Court perfectly understood and treated the
order impugned before it in WPCT No.78/2021, being the order in
P.T.No.215/2021, as an order passed by the Principal Bench of the                 E
Tribunal at New Delhi, transferring O.A.No.1619/2021. This, in our
opinion, is the correct understanding of the said order, as it was passed
in P.T.No.215/2021, filed by the Appellant herein who was also a party
to O.A.No.1619/2021, calling for an order in exercise of the power under
Section 25 of the Act, before the Principal Bench. This aspect is very            F
clear from paragraphs 22, 23, 24, and 25 of the impugned judgement of
the High Court. They read thus:
       “22. The questions which acquire relevance to decide the present
       writ petition are as follows:
       23. Is the present writ petition maintainable before this court, in        G
       view of the impugned order being passed by the Principal Bench
       situated at New Delhi?
       24. Did the Principal Bench act beyond its jurisdiction in passing
       the impugned order?
                                                                                  H
274            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A           25. Was the Principal Bench, CAT justified in law in passing the
            impugned order on merits?”
             15. When once the High Court found the order impugned as one
      passed by the Principal Bench we have no hesitation to hold that the
      High Court should have confined its consideration firstly, to decide its
B     own territorial jurisdiction for exercising the power of judicial review
      over the order dated 22.10.2021 passed by the Principal Bench in
      P.T.No.215/2021 in the correct perspective, without reference to the
      bundle of facts constituting the cause of action for filing O.A.No.1619/
      2021 before the Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal founded on the cause of
      action referred to in Rule 6(2) of the Procedure Rules that decides the
C     place of filing of an O.A.. To wit, those bundle of facts which would be
      necessary for the applicant to prove, if traversed, in order to support the
      right to a judgment from that Bench of the Tribunal. In such
      circumstances, the question of infringement or otherwise of the right of
      the respondent herein to litigate before the Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal
D     could not have been gone into, on merits, without deciding the seminal
      question whether the High Court of Calcutta itself had jurisdiction to
      undertake judicial review of the order passed by the Chairman in exercise
      of power under Section 25 at the Principal seat of the Tribunal at New
      Delhi we do not have any hesitation in holding that the High Court at
      Calcutta could not have entertained the Writ Petition.
E
             16. As noted earlier the order of transfer of O.A.No.1619/2021
      passed in P.T.No.215/2021 was understood and dealt with by the High
      Court as an order passed by the Principal Bench of the Tribunal. Section
      5(7) of the Act makes it clear that the Bench of the Central Administrative
      Tribunal at New Delhi is known as the Principal Bench. It is in this
F     context and the relevant factors as also the situations likely to cause
      conflicting decisions by different High Courts referred to hereinbefore
      in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment that the decision of this
      Court in L. Chandra Kumar’s case assumes relevance. Earlier, we made
      a brief reference about the law laid down in the said decision. One of
G     the broad issues that was considered by the Constitution Bench was as
      follows:
            “Whether the power conferred upon Parliament or the State
            Legislatures, as the case may be, by sub-clause(d) of clause(2)
            of Article 323 A or sub- clause(d)of clause(3) of Article 323 B of
H           the Constitution, to totally exclude the jurisdiction of ‘all courts’,
      UNION OF INDIA v. ALAPAN BANDYOPADHYAY                                  275
                 [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

      except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, in respect of       A
      disputes and complaints referred to in clause(1) of Article 323A
      or with regard to all or any of the matters specified in clause (2)
      of Article 323B, runs counter to the power of judicial review
      conferred on the High Courts under Article 226/227 and on the
      Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution? During such
                                                                              B
      consideration the constitutional validity of Section 28 of the Act,
      the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clause was also considered by this
      court. It reads thus:-
      S.28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme Court
      under article 136 of the Constitution.- On and from the date from
      which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable        C
      under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters
      concerning recruitment to any Service or post or service matters
      concerning members of any Service or persons appointed to any
      Service or post, [no court except –
          (a) the Supreme Court; or                                           D

          (b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority
          constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947)
          or any other corresponding law for the time being in force,
      shall have], or be entitled or exercise any jurisdiction, powers or     E
      authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning
      such recruitment or such service matters.
       In view of the reasoning adopted the constitution Bench held
Section 28 of the Act and the “exclusion jurisdiction” clauses in all other
legislations enacted under the aegis of Article 323A and 323B, to the         F
extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles
226/227 and the Supreme Court under Article 32, of the constitution,
was held unconstitutional besides holding clause 2(d) of Article 323A
and clause 3(d) of Article 323B, to the same extent, as unconstitutional.
Further, it was held thus:-
                                                                              G
      “The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles
      226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the
      Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of our
      Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts
      and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the
      powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution.        H
276             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A            The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the
             Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the
             constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions
             of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a
             Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the
             concerned Tribunal falls.”
B
                                                             (Emphasis supplied).
              When once a Constitution Bench of this court declared the law
      that “all decisions of Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article
      323B of the Constitution will be subject to the scrutiny before a Division
C     Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal
      falls”, it is impermissible to make any further construction on the said
      issue. The expression “all decisions of these Tribunals” used by the
      Constitution Bench will cover and take within its sweep orders passed
      on applications or otherwise in the matter of transfer of Original
      Applications from one Bench of the Tribunal to another Bench of the
D     Tribunal in exercise of the power under Section 25 of the Act. In other
      words, any decision of such a Tribunal, including the one passed under
      Section 25 of the Act could be subjected to scrutiny only before a Division
      Bench of a High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned
      falls. This unambiguous exposition of law has to be followed scrupulously
E     while deciding the jurisdictional High Court for the purpose of bringing in
      challenge against an order of transfer of an Original Application from
      one bench of Tribunal to another bench in the invocation of Section 25 of
      the Act. The law thus declared by the Constitution Bench cannot be
      revisited by a Bench of lesser quorum or for that matter by the High
      Courts by looking into the bundle of facts to ascertain whether they
F     would confer territorial jurisdiction to the High Court within the ambit of
      Article 226(2) of the Constitution. We are of the considered view that
      taking another view would undoubtedly result in indefiniteness and
      multiplicity in the matter of jurisdiction in situations when a decision passed
      under Section 25 of the Act is to be called in question especially in cases
G     involving multiple parties residing within the jurisdiction of different High
      Courts albeit aggrieved by one common order passed by the Chairman
      at the Principal Bench at New Delhi.
             17. The undisputed and indisputable position in this case is that
      the WPCT No.78/2021 was filed to challenge the order dated 22.10.2021
H     in P.T.No.215/2021 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench
       UNION OF INDIA v. ALAPAN BANDYOPADHYAY                                       277
                  [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

at New Delhi, (by the Chairman of the Tribunal in exercise of the power             A
under Section 25 of the Act sitting at the Principal Bench) transferring
O.A.No.1619/2021 to its files. On applying the said factual position to
the legal exposition in L. Chandra Kumar’s case (supra) it is crystal
clear that the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal at
New Delhi, which passed the order transferring O.A.No.1619/2021 vide
                                                                                    B
order in P.T.No.215/2021 falls within the territorial jurisdiction of High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi. Needless to say that the power of judicial
review of an order transferring an Original Application pending before a
Bench of the Tribunal to another Bench under Section 25 of the Act can
be judicially reviewed only by a Division Bench of the High Court within
whose territorial jurisdiction the Bench passing the same, falls. In fact,          C
the decision in Bhavesh Motiani’s case (supra), relied on by the respondent
is also in line with the said position as in that case also, as against the
order of transfer passed under Section 25 of the Act by the Principal
Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal at New Delhi Writ Petition
was filed by the aggrieved party only before the High Court of Delhi.
                                                                                    D
This is evident from the very opening sentence of the said judgment,
which reads thus:
       “The present petition has been filed being aggrieved by order dated
       30.11.2018 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal,
       Principal Bench, New Delhi (the ‘Tribunal’), by the O.A.No.421/
       2018 pending before the Ahmedabad Bench has been transferred                 E
       to the Principal Bench of the Tribunal.”
       In the instant case, the High Court at Calcutta has usurped
jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition, viz., WPCT No.78/2021,
challenging the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, New
Delhi, in P.T.No.215/2021, even after taking note of the fact that the              F
Principal Bench of the Tribunal does not lie within its territorial jurisdiction.
        18. In the circumstances, based on our conclusion the impugned
judgment and final order in WPCT No.78/2021 passed by the High Court
at Calcutta is to be held as one passed without jurisdiction and hence, it
is ab initio void. Accordingly, it is set aside. The writ petition being WPCT       G
No.78/2021 filed before the High Court at Calcutta is accordingly
dismissed, however, with liberty to the petitioner therein/the respondent
herein to assail the same before the jurisdictional High Court, if so advised.
In that regard, we clarify the position that we have not made any finding
or observation regarding the correctness or otherwise of the order dated            H
278              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A     22.10.2021 passed by the Principal Bench of the Tribunal (in fact, by the
      Chairman of the Tribunal) in P.T.No.215/2021. Needless to say that in
      the event of filing of such a Writ Petition, it shall be considered on its
      own merits, in accordance with law.
              19. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. Pending applications,
B     if any, stand disposed of.

      Nidhi Jain and Amarendra Kumar                               Appeal allowed.
      (Assisted by : Pragya Samal, LCRA)


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