Supreme Court of India

URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANERversusGORDHAN DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS

Citation: 2023 INSC 935
Decided: 19 October 2023
Disposal: Matter referred to larger bench
Bench: HRISHIKESH ROY

Holding

The Court was divided on the validity of the acquisition notice and the civil court's jurisdiction, and consequently referred the matter to a larger bench for resolution.

Summary

The case concerns three bighas of land in Bikaner purchased by Gordhan Dass and co‑owners in 1970, which the Urban Improvement Trust later claimed to have acquired under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. The Trust issued acquisition notices to the original khatedars recorded in the revenue records but not to the subsequent purchasers, and proceeded to take possession without paying compensation. The respondents filed a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the Trust, raising questions about the validity of the acquisition notice, the civil court's jurisdiction under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, and whether a declaratory relief or the State needed to be impleaded. The Supreme Court bench was split: Justice Hrishikesh Roy upheld the High Court’s view that the acquisition was void for lack of notice and the suit was maintainable, while Justice Manoj Misra held that the notice requirement was satisfied, the civil court lacked jurisdiction, and the suit was not maintainable. Because of this disagreement, the matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for consideration by a larger bench.

Issues considered

Whether land acquisition proceedings can be declared void for failure to give notice under s.52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 to owners who purchased the land before acquisition despite the revenue records showing the original khatedar.
Whether a civil court has jurisdiction to grant an injunction in respect of agricultural land when s.207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 bars civil suits.
Whether the suit for injunction is maintainable without seeking a declaratory relief and without impleading the State as a party.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 9
Constitution of Indias. Article 300A
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 12, s. 4, s. 6, s. 9
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955s. 207, s. 256
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959s. 52, s. 53, s. 54, s. 55, s. 56, s. 57, s. 58, s. 59, s. 60

Subjects

land acquisitionnotice requirementcivil court jurisdictioninjunctionRajasthan Tenancy Actprocedural fairnesseminent domainrevenue courtnon‑impleadment of State

Judgment

[2023] 14 S.C.R. 520 : 2023 INSC 935

CASE DETAILS

URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER
v.
GORDHAN DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No.8411 of 2014)
OCTOBER 19, 2023
[HRISHIKESH ROY AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]

HEADNOTES

Issue for consideration: Whether land acquisition proceedings can be
declared null and void for failure to give notice u/s.52(2) of the Rajasthan
Urban Improvement Act, 1959 to the owners who had purchased the land
two years earlier through registered sale deeds, before the initiation of the
land acquisition proceedings, even though the name of original khatedaar
was reﬂected in the Revenue records; whether the civil court has jurisdiction
to grant injunction as s. 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 bars
jurisdiction of civil court in respect of agricultural land; and whether the suit
for injunction was maintainable without seeking declaration in a civil court.
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 – s. 52 – Rajasthan
Tenancy Act, 1955 – s. 207 – Compulsory acquisition of land –
Requirement of service of notice upon the owners prior to notiﬁcation
– Jurisdiction of civil court in respect of the said land – On facts, the
respondents purchased the land through registered sale deeds, though
in the Revenue records, the name of original khatedaar-tenure holders
was reﬂected – Two years later, initiation of the land acquisition
proceedings wherein notices duly issued to the tenure holders and were
paid compensation – Suit instituted against the appellant-Trust seeking
permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain the Trust from entering or
acquiring the land without adopting due process of law – Matter reached
the High Court wherein it was held that the acquisition notiﬁcation
was issued without notice to the land owners, thus was null and void;
and that the suit ﬁled for injunction was maintainable – Issue arising

520
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 521
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS.

as regards whether the land acquisition proceedings could be declared
null and void for failure to give notice u/s.52(2) to the landowners who
had purchased the land through registered sale deeds, two years before
the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings; whether the civil court
has jurisdiction to grant injunction; and whether the suit for injunction
was maintainable without seeking declaration in a civil court:
Held: Per Hrishikesh Roy, J: Upholding the judgment of the High
Court, it was held that the land acquisition proceedings is held to be void ab
initio for not following the procedure of serving notice; that having regard to
the limited relief that can be obtained from a revenue court under Tenancy
Act, 1955, to deny the land losers access to civil court would aggravate the
injustice, thus, civil court has jurisdiction to grant injunction; and that the
suit for injunction can be ﬁled without seeking declaration in a civil court
[Paras 10, 21, 38, 39 and 41]
Per Manoj Misra, J: Setting aside the judgment of the High Court
it was held that if the landowners did not get their names mutated in the
record of rights, how would the State come to know of their ownership, thus,
mere non-service of notice, u/s. 52(2) of the 1959 Act, upon non-recorded
owners, would not render the acquisition notiﬁcation void; that suit before
the civil court was barred by s.207 of the 1955 Act; and that the suit as
framed was not maintainable, not only for not seeking a declaratory relief
but also for not impleading the State as a party – In view of diﬀerence of
opinion, matter to be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for
referring the matter to a larger Bench – Reference to larger Bench – Land
acquisition. [Paras 51 and 64]

LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

In the judgment of Hrishikesh Roy, J.
Dhulabhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968) 3 SCR 662; Firm Seth
Radha Kishan vs. Municipal Committee (1964) 2 SCR 273 – relied on.
Bhola Shanker v. The District Land Acquisition Oﬃcer, Aligarh and
Ors. (1973) 2 SCC 59; State of Bihar v Dhirendra Kumar (1995) 4 SCC
229; Shri Saurav Jain v M/s ABP Design & Another 2021 SCC OnLine SC
552 – distinguished.
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

Vidya Devi v. State of H.P (2020) 2 SCC 569; Ahuja Industries Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka & Others (2003) 5 SCC 365: [2003] 3 SCR 351; Sukh
Dutt Ratra v. State of H.P (2022) 7 SCC 508; D.B. Basnett v Collector,
East District, Gangtok, Sikkim (2020) 4 SCC 572; Jagan Singh & Co. v
Ludhiana Improvement Trust 2022 SCC OnLine 1144; M.P. Housing Board
v Mohd. Shaf (1992)2 SCC 168; Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun
Mirza (2010) 8 SCC 726; Dewaji v. Ganpatlal, AIR 1969 SC 560; Sree
Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannath Rao Pantulu Bahadur Garu v. State of A.P.,
(1969) 3 SCC 71; Anathula Sudhakar v P. Buchi Reddy (2008) 4 SCC 594;
Laxmi Chand v Gram Panchayat Kararia (1996) 7 SCC 218; Commissioner,
Bangalore Development Authority and another v Brijesh Reddy and another
(2013) 3 SCC 66; Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v. Regency
Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited (2010) 7 SCC 417; Nagpur
Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao 6 (1973) 1 SCC 500; Urban Improvement
Trust v Shri Padmanand AIR 1980 Raj 176; Urban Improvement Trust v
Mohan Lal (2010) 1 SCC 512 – referred to.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v Mc Grath 341 US 123 (1951)
– referred to.
Namita Wahi, ‘Property’ in Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla, Pratap
Bhanu Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution
(Oxford University Press 2016); Preeti Sampat, ‘Limits to Absolute Power:
Eminent Domain and Right to Land in India’ (2013) 48 Economic and
Political Weekly 40; Usha Ramanathan, ‘A Word of Eminent Domain’ in
Lyla Mehta(ed), Displaced by Development: Confronting Marginalisation
and Gender Injustice. (SAGE 2009); Debjani Bhattacharyya, ‘History
of Eminent Domain in Colonial Thought and Legal Practice’ (2015) 50
Economic and Political Weekly 45; Law Commission, ‘Law of Acquisition
and Requisitioning of Land’ (Law Com No. 10, 1977); Sambhav Shrivastava
et al., ‘Subversion of Due Process for Seeking the Consent of Communities
in Land Acquisition and Resultant Land Conﬂicts’ (Oxfam 2020); Namita
Wahi, Ankit Bhatia et al, ‘Land Acquisition in India: A Review of Supreme
Court Cases 1950-2016’(Centre for Policy Research 2017) – referred to.
Julius L. Sackman, Russell D Van Brunt, ‘Nichols on Eminent Domain’
vol 1 (3rd edn, Mathew Bender & co, 1959). § 1.11; Tom Allen, The Right
to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (Cambridge University Press
2000) 172 – referred to.
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 523
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS.

Access to Justice Survey 2015-16’ (Daksh, May 2016) <https://
dakshindia.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/05/Daksh-access-to-justice-
survey.pdf > accessed 19 September 2023 – referred to.
In the judgment of Manoj Misra, J.
Ahuja Industries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Others (2003) 5 SCC
365: [2003] 3 SCR 351; Bhola Shanker v. The District Land Acquisition
Oﬃcer, Aligarh and Ors. (1973) 2 SCC 59; Commissioner, Bangalore
Development Authority and another v. Brijesh Reddy and another (2013)
3 SCC 66: [2013] 1 SCR 853; Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan AIR 1954
SC 340: [1955] SCR 117; Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta
(1979) 3 SCC 83; Dhulabhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968) 3 SCR
662; Firm Seth Radha Kishan vs. Municipal Committee (1964) 2 SCR 273;
Nawabkhan Abbaskhan vs. State of Gujarat (1974) 2 SCC 121: [1974] 3
SCR 427; Bharati Reddy vs. State of Karnataka (2018) 6 SCC 162: [2018]
3 SCR 137; Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (2008) 4 SCC 594: [2008]
5 SCR 331; State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar and others (1995) 4 SCC
229: [1995] 3 SCR 857; Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia (1996)
7 SCC 218: [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 774; T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satpal and
another (1977) 4 SCC 467: [1978] 1 SCR 742; Shri Saurav Jain & Another
Vs. M/s A.B.P. Design & Another 2021 SCC OnLine SC 552; Pyarelal v.
Shubhendra Pilania (2019) 3 SCC 692: [2019] 1 SCR 717; Bank of Baroda
v. Moti Bai (1985) 1 SCC 475: [1985] 2 SCR 784 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL APPEAL NO.8411
OF 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.01.2010 of the High Court of
Rajasthan at Jodhpur in SBCRSA No.114 of 2004
Appearances:
Aruneshwar Gupta, Sr. Adv., Himanshu Chaurvedi, Abhishek Sharma,
Rajeev Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
Manoj Swaroop Sr. Adv., Achal Singh Bule, Nikhil Kumar Singh,
Sudhanshu Khandelwal, Rishi Matoliya, Advs. for the Respondents.
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

JUDGMENT
HRISHIKESH ROY, J.
Factual Backdrop
1. The challenge here is to the judgment dated 12.1.2010 by the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in SB Civil Regular Second
Appeal No.114 of 2004 whereby the High Court upheld the verdict of the
ﬁrst Appellate Court and opined that the acquisition proceeding is null and
void since notice was not given to the owners who were in possession but
was given to original khatedaars whose names were existing in the revenue
record.
2. The respondent Gordhan Dass ﬁled Regular Civil Suit No. 03/04
projecting the case that the plaintiﬀ and the defendant nos.2 to 4 jointly
purchased 3 bighas of land in Bikaner town in two tranches. Under the
registered sale deed dated 2.3.1970, two and a half bigha land was ﬁrst
purchased and under the second registered sale deed dated 16.3.1970,
another half bigha land was purchased from one Lal Khan. The plaintiﬀ
and the defendant nos. 2 to 4 thereby became joint khatedars of the said
three bighas of purchased land. While the purchasers were in peaceful
possession of the land bearing Khasra no.211/81 and 239/83, the defendant
no.1 i.e. the Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner started making claim
over this land projecting that they had acquired the said land. Initially, the
suit was ﬁled seeking permanent injunction to restrain the defendant no.1
from trespassing into the land and initiating any acquisition process but
later when the defendant no.1 was trying to obtain forceful possession of
the land during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiﬀ amended the suit on
11.11.2002 to secure restoration of possession through mandatory injunction.
It was also pleaded that on the basis of a judgment dated 26.2.1998(WP
2243/95) in Bhanwarlal v State of Rajasthan, concerning some other land,
the defendant no. 1 had taken possession of the plaintiﬀ’s land and that the
plaintiﬀ was enjoying possession till 9.6.1998 during the pendency of civil
suit. In the written statement, the Urban Improvement Trust admitted that
the plaintiﬀ together with the defendant nos.2 to 4 purchased total 3 bighas
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 525
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

of land through 2 sale deeds dated 2.3.1970 and 16.3.1970, and those sale
deeds are registered in the oﬃce of Sub-Registrar, Bikaner. The defendant
no.1 also admitted that the plaintiﬀ submitted an application before District
Magistrate to convert one bigha land to non-agricultural category on which
the District Magistrate issued NOC since the said land was needed to set up
a petrol pump. Projecting their right over the concerned land, the defendant
no.1 in the written statement claimed that they had acquired 24 Bigha 12
Biswa land comprising Khasra No.294/82 and requisite compensation was
paid to the original khatedar. Therefore, no compensation is payable to either
the plaintiﬀ or the defendant nos.2 to 4 who had purchased the 3 Bigha land.
3. The Trial Court on the basis of the rival contentions framed the
following issues:
“(i) Whether properties mentioned in paras 1, 1 (a), 1 (b) of the
plaint are under the ownership of plaintiﬀ and defendant no.2 to 4?
(ii) Whether out of the above-stated lands, two bigha land has been
wrongly acquired by the defendant no.1?
(iii) Whether defendant no.1 has wrongly got possession over
suit land according to para no.9 of the plaint, plaintiﬀ is entitled
to get the same restored?
(iv) Whether compensation has already been paid to the
concerning people having acquired 24 Bigha 12 Biswa suit
land comprising Khasra No.294/83 adopting lawful process
according to para No.115 of written statement?

(v) Relief (s) ?”
4. The learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division) Bikaner partially
decreed the suit against the defendant no.1 by holding that the plaintiﬀ is
entitled to get possession of 1 Bigha land meant for petrol pump in Khasra
No.284/83. However, for the balance suit land, it was held that the defendant
no.1 had acquired the said land and accordingly the suit of the plaintiﬀ for
the 2 Bighas land, was dismissed. While granting relief for the 1 Bigha land,
the learned Trial Judge noted that possession of the same was restored to
the plaintiﬀ after due permission from the State Government and therefore
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

his ownership remained undisturbed. For the balance 2 Bighas land, relief
was refused and it was held that even though the said land was purchased in
1970 through registered sale deeds, the names of the new owners were not
mutated in the revenue records which continued to reﬂect the name of the
previous owner (seller), to whom compensation was paid. It was further held
that the onus was on the plaintiﬀ to prove ownership, claim compensation,
and get his name recorded in jamabandi.
5. The plaintiﬀ then ﬁled an appeal before the District Judge, Bikaner
and the learned Appellate Court by its judgment dated 16.4.2004 decreed
the entire suit land in favour of the plaintiﬀ and against the defendant
no.1 and the defendant was restrained from interfering with the plaintiﬀ’s
peaceful possession, use and occupation of the suit land. The Appellate
Court concluded in favour of the plaintiﬀ after noting that no opportunity
of hearing was provided to the plaintiﬀ for acquisition of the land and
furthermore, the plaintiff, Gordhan Dass was enjoying undisturbed
possession of the land until 10.6.1988. Notwithstanding the mutation
correction not being carried out in the revenue records by the purchasers,
the Appellate Court noted that the plaintiﬀ had already applied before the
District Magistrate for conversion of 1 Bigha land for establishing petrol
pump and NOC for the said purpose was issued in favour of the plaintiﬀ
with the active cooperation by the defendants and it was thus concluded that
despite knowledge of the plaintiﬀ’s ownership and possession, the defendant
no.1 did not discharge its duty to issue notice to the land owner/plaintiﬀ
and accordingly the land acquisition proceedings were held to be invalid.
Moreover, since during the pendency of the suit the plaintiﬀ was forcefully
evicted from the land on 10.6.1988 under cover of some other judgment
of the High Court, the Court opined that without proper acquisition
proceedings with notice to the owner, the possession of the plaintiﬀ (who
was enjoying uninterrupted possession till 10.6.1988), could not have been
disturbed. It was further noted that neither was any acquisition notice issued
to the plaintiﬀ nor they were paid any acquisition compensation although
they were the actual owners of the land. On the claim that the compensation
was paid, the Court opined that it was a vague contention in the written
statement and it was not categorically mentioned to whom compensation
was paid nor any evidence on such payment was produced by the defendant
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 527
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

No. 1. It was also found that the defendant no.1 had forcibly evicted the
plaintiﬀ from his property during the pendency of the suit without due legal
process i.e. without service of notice, without providing the opportunity
of hearing and without payment of compensation to the plaintiﬀ, and thus,
the proceedings of the defendant no.1 were declared to be invalid. The
decree of the Trial Court dated 23.2.2004 was thus set aside allowing the
plaintiﬀ’s appeal. The decree of permanent injunction was accordingly
granted favouring the plaintiﬀ against the defendant no.1 and it was further
ordered that defendant no.1 is to restore the suit land mentioned in para
no.1 (a) & 1 (b) of the plaint and they were restrained from interfering with
the use and occupation of the said land by the plaintiﬀ.
6. The defendant no.1 i.e. Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner
assailed the judgment and decree dated 16.4.2004 in Appeal Decree
No.30/04. The High Court in the second appeal noted that the defendant
no.1 in the written statement had admitted that the plaintiﬀ together with
the defendant nos.2 to 4 are the owners of the suit land. Therefore, it was
held that suit for injunction without seeking relief of title declaration is
maintainable as even the defendant no.1 does not claim any title over
land purchased by the plaintiﬀ and the defendant nos.2 to 4, by way of
two registered sale deeds in the year 1970. Since the plaintiﬀ together
with the defendant nos.2 to 4 had obtained valid title by purchase in the
year 1970 and were in peaceful possession, they were not required to
seek relief of declaration of title, particularly when the title has not been
disputed by the defendant no.1.
7. The High Court adverted to the provisions of The Rajasthan Urban
Improvement Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the “1959 Act”) and
observed that for compulsory acquisition of land under Section 52, the
procedure to be followed is prescribed in the sub-Sections under Section
52 such as giving notice and providing opportunity of hearing to the owner
and/or any other interested person and compensation must also be paid to
the owner under Section 53. However, since the defendant no.1 failed to
comply with the mandatory provisions under Section 52 and 53 of the 1959
Act and that acquisition process was initiated much after the purchase of the
land by the plaintiﬀ, the acquisition proceeding in the absence of notice and
compensation was declared to be void and a nullity. It was speciﬁcally noted
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

that the defendant no. 1 admitted the possession and title of the plaintiﬀ in
their written statement and thus it was opined that the plaintiﬀ is entitled
to protect their property. As the defendant no.1 had also raised an issue
questioning the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, it was held that a suit in a
civil Court will always lie to question the order of the tribunal created by a
statute even if its order is expressly or by necessary implication made ﬁnal,
if the said tribunal abuses its power or acts in violation of its provisions.
Consequently, the second appeal ﬁled by the defendant no.1 was dismissed
upholding the decree passed in favour of the plaintiﬀ by the ﬁrst Appellate
Court.
B. Submissions
8. Challenging the above judgment of the High Court, Mr.
Aruneshwar Gupta, Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant
argued that pursuant to the notiﬁcation dated 22.8.1974, public notice
and personal notices were duly issued to the original Khatedars whose
names were in the revenue records. The amount of compensation was
also duly paid. Service of notice to the original khatedars in the record
of rights was suﬃcient notice as State Government is not liable to make
a roving or ﬁshing inquiry about the ownership of land. Secondly, the
purchaser of acquired land is ‘any other person interested’ and could
have raised objections under Section 52(3) of the 1959 Act. There is no
right to challenge the acquisition of land after expiry of 23 years as the
suit for permanent injunction was ﬁled on 21.4.1997. (Ahuja Industries
Ltd. v State of Karnataka1; Bhola Shanker v The Disst. Land Acquisition
Oﬃcer2). Thirdly, it was argued that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is
a complete code in itself and thus, by necessary implication Civil Court
has no jurisdiction to pass injunction for a land which is already acquired.
Finally, it was argued that the nature of land acquired under the 1959 Act
was ‘agricultural land’ as the same was not converted for ‘non-agricultural
use’ u/s 90-A of Land Revenue Act,1956. Owing to Section 207 of the
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter “Tenancy Act,1955”)read with

1 2003 5 SCC 365
2 (1973) 2 SCC 59
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 529
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

entry 8A and entry 23C of third Schedule, matter relating to temporary
and permanent injunction in respect of agricultural land could be heard
and determined only by a revenue Court. No civil suit is maintainable for
permanent injunction w.r.t agricultural land.
9. Projecting the contrary view, Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned Senior
Counsel for the Respondents argued that revenue authorities i.e. Patwari,
Tehsildar and Collector had knowledge of the rights and interests of the
plaintiﬀs. As per the requirements under Section 52(2) of the 1959 Act,
notice should be given not only to the owner of the land but also any other
person who in the opinion of State Government would be interested therein.
The Learned Counsel has placed on record letters from Tehsildar, Bikaner
acknowledging the sale deeds, thereby indicating that they had knowledge
of plaintiﬀs being in possession of the land. Reliance was also placed on
the decision of this Court in Ahuja Industries Limited v State of Karnataka3.
On the aspect of maintainability, it was canvassed that the civil suit was not
barred in law to adjudicate on the dispute. To substantiate the same, Mr.
Swarup cites the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Dhulabai and
others v State of Madhya Pradesh4(hereinafter referred to as “Dhulabai”)
and Firm Seth Radha Kishan v The Administrator5.
C. Issues
10. Having summarised the contentions of the respective parties, the
following questions fall for our consideration:
a) Whether land acquisition proceedings can be declared null and
void for failure to give notice to the owners who had purchased
the land two years earlier through registered sale deeds, before
the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings, even though
the name of original khatedaar was reﬂected in the Revenue
records?
b) Whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant injunction as Section
207 of the Tenancy Act,1955 bars jurisdiction of Civil Court in
respect of agricultural land?

3 (2003)5 SCC 365
4 (1968) 3 SCR 3 662
5 (1964) 2 SCR 2 273
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

c) Whether plaintiﬀ’s suit for injunction is maintainable without
seeking Declaration in a Civil Court?
D. Notice requirements in land acquisition proceedings
i) Constitutional right to property and procedural justice
11. This is a case of compulsory acquisition of land where the land
owner has no choice in the matter. The respondent purchased the concerned
land for valuable consideration and was in peaceful possession of the
land. At that stage, the appellant attempted to dispossess the respondent.
Acquisition of land for public purpose is permitted by law, but the
acquiring authority is required to ensure adherence to the statutory regime
for compulsory acquisition. Only by strict adherence to the procedure, a
measure of protection is aﬀorded to the landowners and the interested
persons, and implicit therein is fairness in the procedure. After all, one is
concerned with protection of constitutional rights under Article 300A of
the Constitution.
12. In the context, the recent observations of this Court in Sukh Dutt
Ratra v. State of H.P6., would bear consideration where the Court traced the
recognition of the right to property since the 1700s and reiterated the high
threshold of legality that ought to be satisﬁed, to dispossess an individual
of their property:
“13. While the right to property is no longer a fundamental right
[“Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978”], it is pertinent
to note that at the time of dispossession of the subject land, this
right was still included in Part III of the Constitution. The right
against deprivation of property unless in accordance with procedure
established by law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article
300-A.
14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be
deprived of liberty or property without due process, or authorisation of
law. The recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the decision of
the King’s Bench in Entick v. Carrington [Entick v. Carrington, 1765

6 (2022) 7 SCC 508
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 531
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

EWHC (KB) J98 : 95 ER 807] and by this Court in Wazir Chand v.
State of H.P. [Wazir Chand v. State of H.P., (1955) 1 SCR 408 : AIR
1954 SC 415] Further, in several judgments, this Court has repeatedly
held that rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the State
often has a higher responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted
within the conﬁnes of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the basic
principle of the rule of law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this Court has
upheld the high threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess an
individual of their property, and even more so when done by the State.”
13. The Land acquisition laws in India have their origins in British
colonial law. Compulsory acquisition of land is based on the principle of
eminent domain which can be understood as the State’s power to acquire
private property without the owner’s consent for a ‘public purpose’7.
Thus, when the State acquires property while exercising its eminent
domain powers, the economic loss suﬀered by the owner is followed by a
corresponding economic gain to the State. The State deals with the property
as if it is the owner of the property8. Scholarly writings on the principle
of eminent domain have shed light on this subject 9. In an article titled,
“History of Eminent Domain in Colonial Thought and Legal Practice”
published in the Economic and Political Weekly10, the author, while
critiquing the principle of eminent domain reﬂects on the need to rethink
compulsory acquisition from the lens of ethics and justice. Referring to the
opening paragraph in the Tenth Report of the Law Commission of India:

7 Julius L. Sackman, Russell D Van Brunt, ‘Nichols on Eminent Domain’ vol 1 (3rd edn,
Mathew Bender & co, 1959). § 1.11
8 Namita Wahi, ‘Property’ in Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla, Pratap Bhanu Mehta
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press
2016)
9 Tom Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (Cambridge
University Press 2000) 172; Preeti Sampat, ‘Limits to Absolute Power: Eminent
Domain and Right to Land in India’ (2013) 48 Economic and Political Weekly 40;
Usha Ramanathan, ‘A Word of Eminent Domain’ in Lyla Mehta(ed), Displaced by
Development: Confronting Marginalisation and Gender Injustice. (SAGE 2009)
10 Debjani Bhattacharyya, ‘History of Eminent Domain in Colonial Thought and Legal
Practice’ (2015) 50 Economic and Political Weekly 45.
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

Law of Acquisition and Requisitioning of Land (1958) 11 dealing with land
acquisition as per which “critical examination of the various stages of
evolution of this(compulsory land acquisition) power and its ethical basis
will serve no useful purpose as the power has been established in all civilised
countries”, the author questions the precedence given to customary practices
over ethics. There ought to be substantive limits on the power of eminent
domain in order to avoid arbitrary action. Strict adherence to procedure
is an essential safeguard towards achieving fairness and transparency in
the land acquisition process. Such procedures provide land owners and
interested persons a fair opportunity to say why their land should not be
acquired and also whether the compensation assessed for their lands is
adequate. To deny procedural safeguards to the land loser would mean that
the doors of justice are shut for him. Such an interpretation, in my view,
should be avoided.
ii) International Legal Framework on Compulsory Land Acquisition
14. Before proceeding to deal with the issue of the legitimacy of
the land acquisition proceeding, it would be appropriate to set out the
international legal framework on compulsory land acquisition. The right
to self-determination is enshrined within the Charter of the United Nations,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), amongst other instruments which is deﬁned as the right of all
people to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources, and that no
person may be deprived of its own means of subsistence. Article 17 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that, “Everyone has
the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Self-determination also
includes obligation for states to refrain from any forcible actions that deprive
people of enjoying such rights. The concept of Free, Prior and Informed
Consent(FPIC) within international development law is most clearly stated
in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in

11 Law Commission, ‘Law of Acquisition and Requisitioning of Land’ (Law Com No. 10,
1977).
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 533
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

Articles 10, 11, 19, 28 and 29 which prescribes situations in which FPIC
must be obtained before granting compensation, taking of indigenous
property etc. Development experts have recognized that FPIC is not only
important for Indigenous people but can also be used as a positive approach
to involve local communities in decision-making about any proposed
development. Engaging them in such processes fosters a greater sense of
ownership and engagement and, moreover, helps safeguard their right to
development as a basic human rights principle12. These principles are not to
be found under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 but the concept of acquiring
land through consent and Social Impact Assessment (SIA) on whether a
project serves “public purpose” has been added in the 2013 avatar of the
Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, The Right To Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 is found to be more attuned to the notion of fairness and is progressive
to this extent.
15. While there are many instances of authorities failing to adhere to
the acquisition regime, this Court has the beneﬁt of a study conducted by
the Lands Rights Initiative of the Centre for Policy Research13. The outcome
of the extensive study of around 1269 judgments of the Supreme Court of
India between 1950 to 2016 on the legal trajectory of land acquisition cases
in India lead to the following comments:
“The process of land acquisition in India has been the source of
increasing political and legal contestation for almost two hundred
years. This stems from the inherently coercive nature of the process,
which creates a severe imbalance in power between the state and land
losers. Our review of Supreme Court litigation since the time India
became a constitutional republic in 1950 shows that while much of this
imbalance was created within the very text of the Land Acquisition

12 Sambhav Shrivastava et al., ‘Subversion of Due Process for Seeking the Consent
of Communities in Land Acquisition and Resultant Land Conﬂicts’ (Oxfam 2020)
<https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/subversion-of-due-process-for-seeking-
the-consent-of-communities-in-land-acquis-621109/> accessed 19 September 2023.
13 Namita Wahi, Ankit Bhatia et al, ‘Land Acquisition in India: A Review of Supreme
Court Cases 1950-2016’(Centre for Policy Research 2017)
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

Act, a considerable part of it could also be attributed to executive
non-compliance with the rule of law. The result was a situation of
great inequity for the land losers”

[emphasis supplied]
16. The Supreme Court in a recent judgment had the occasion to look
at the process of compulsory land acquisition where the landowners had
practically no means to oppose the proposed acquisition. A two judge bench
in Vidya Devi v. State of H.P14 speaking through Indu Malhotra J. made the
following signiﬁcant observation:
“12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by
the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it
continued to be a human right (Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corpn. [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corpn., (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC
(Civ) 491] ) in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article
300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall
be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot
dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that
Article [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation
(P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ)
414] ].
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without
following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as
also the constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution.”
17. The signiﬁcance of complying with procedural requirements
cannot, therefore, be overstated.
iii) Burden is on the Authority to fulﬁl procedural requirements under
Section 52 of the 1959 Act

14 (2020) 2 SCC 569
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 535
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

18. Returning to the facts of the present case, let us now consider the
implication of Section 52 of the 1959 Act. The provision having a bearing
in this discussion, is extracted below:
“52. Compulsory Acquisition of Land-
(1) Where on a representation from the Trust it appears to the State
Government that any land is required for the purpose of improvement
or for any other purpose under this Act, the State Government may
acquire such land by publishing in the oﬃcial Gazette a notice
specifying the particular purpose for which land is required and stating
that the State Government has decided to acquire the land in pursuance
of this Section.
(2) Before publishing a notice under sub-section (1), the State
Government shall by another notice call upon the owner of the land
and any other person who in the opinion of the State Government
may be interested therein to show cause, within such time as may be
speciﬁed in the notice, why the land should not be acquired.
(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land
and by any other person interested therein and after giving such owner
and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may
pass such orders as it deems ﬁt.
(4) When a notice under sub-section (1) is published in the oﬃcial
gazette, the land shall on and from the date of such publication, vest
absolutely in the State Government free from all encumberances.
(5) Where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section
(4), the State Government may by notice in writing order any person
who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession
thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised by it
in this behalf within thirty days of the service of notice.
**** **** **** **** ****”
19. The implication of Section 52 of the 1959 Act, is that notice is
required to be served not only to the owner but also to “any other person
interested” thereby covering everyone interested in the concerned land.
To avoid the rigour of this Section, the appellant- Trust have given their
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

version by saying that the plaintiﬀ, Gordhan Dass intentionally did not
receive compensation so as to make it a ground thereafter and that the
onus would lie on the plaintiﬀ as found by the trial Court. Gordhan Dass
was indisputably the actual owner and hence, as per the mandate of the
law, it was the responsibility of the concerned Authority 15 to adhere to
the due statutory process before depriving the landowner or interested
persons, of their property. The burden is on the defendant No. 1 i.e. the
Urban Improvement Trust to satisfy the high procedural threshold before
acquiring any private property. Moreover, the defendant no. 1 was also
unable to produce any evidence to indicate whether compensation was ever
paid to the original khatedaars as was vaguely claimed by them. This fact
was also noted by the First Appellate Court in para 20 of the decision that,
despite a vague contention, there is no proof of payment of compensation
even to the original khatedars. On the other hand, the plaintiﬀs have
produced a letter wherein the original khatedaar is seeking compensation
as on 10.1.1990. Be that as it may, neither was notice issued to the actual
owners nor any compensation was paid to them by defendant no. 1. As
already noted, Section 52 of the 1959 Act requires the Government to
issue notice to the owner of the land and to any other person, who may be
interested therein to seek protection of their land from acquisition. Only
after consideration of the response to the notice, the concerned land is to
vest on the State Government. The land owner or interested persons are
also required to be given the opportunity of being heard. In the present
case, neither any notice was issued nor any compensation was paid to
the land owner. Moreover, it has been alleged that even after initiation
of land acquisition proceedings in 1972, the plaintiﬀ continued to enjoy
possession till 10.6.1998 during the pendency of the civil suit. The plaintiﬀ
was forcefully dispossessed under the cover of a judgment concerning
some other land. The said judgment has nothing to do with the land of
respondents. This further points towards glaring procedural irregularities
in the entire land acquisition process.

15 D.B. Basnett v Collector, East District, Gangtok, Sikkim (2020) 4 SCC 572; Jagan
Singh & Co. v Ludhiana Improvement Trust 2022 SCCOnLine 1144
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 537
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

20. The observations in M.P. Housing Board v Mohd. Shaﬁ16 are
relevant in this context where the signiﬁcance of giving proper notice was
noted as under:
“8…..The object of issuing a notiﬁcation under Section 4 of the Act is
two- fold. First, it is a public announcement by the Government and
a public notice by the Collector to the eﬀect that the land, as speciﬁed
therein, is needed or is likely to be needed by the Government for
the «public purpose» mentioned therein; and secondly, it authorises
the departmental oﬃcers or oﬃcers of the local authority, as the case
may be to do all such acts as are mentioned in Section 4(2) of the Act.
The notiﬁcation has to be published in the locality and particularly
persons likely to be aﬀected by the proposal have to be put on notice
that such an activity is afoot. The notiﬁcation is, thus, required to give
with suﬃcient clarity not only the «public purpose» for which the
acquisition proceedings are being commenced but also the «locality»
where the land is situate with as full a description as possible of the
land proposed to be acquired to enable the «interested» persons to
know as to which land is being acquired and for what purpose and to
take further steps under the Act by ﬁling objections etc., since it is
open to such persons to canvass the non-suitability of the land for the
alleged "public purpose" also. If a notiﬁcation under Section 4(1) of
the Act is defective and does not comply with the requirements of the
Act, it not only vitiates the notiﬁcation, but also renders all subsequent
proceedings connected with the acquisition, bad.”

[emphasis supplied]
21. It logically follows from above that dispossession without
following prescribed statutory process such as giving proper notice, is not
only highly prejudicial but it is also a violation of constitutional rights and
would thereby vitiate the entire process of land acquisition. Law is well-
settled that strict adherence to the mandatory procedural requirements
outlined in the legislation is sine-qua-non for the compulsory acquisition of
land. Legally conducted acquisition procedures minimize the potential for
arbitrary action by the concerned Authority. The ﬁndings to this eﬀect by

16 (1992)2 SCC 168
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

the Appellate Court and the High Court would therefore merit our approval.
In other words, land acquisition proceedings for the entire 3 bighas of land
is held to be void-ab-initio.
22. As far as the judgment of this Court in Bhola Shankar v Dist.
Land Acquisition Oﬃcer17 relied upon by Mr. Aruneshwar Gupta, learned
Counsel for the Appellant is concerned, it is distinguishable from the facts
of this case. In Bhola Shankar(supra), the factual matrix was such that the
concerned plot was purchased subsequent to the publication of notiﬁcation
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894. However, in the present
case, the plaintiﬀ together with defendant no. 2 to 4 had bought the land
well before commencement of the land acquisition proceedings. Therefore
issue(i) is answered accordingly.
E. Maintainability
i) Expansive jurisdiction of Civil Courts under Section 9, Civil
Procedure Code
23. Adverting next to the appellant’s argument on maintainability of a
suit, it is no more res-integra that ouster of jurisdiction of civil Courts cannot
be a matter of course. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the
Courts to try all civil suits, unless barred. The contour of the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court has been succinctly enunciated by a ﬁve-judge Constitution
Bench in Dhulabai(supra). Chief Justice M Hidayatullah writing for the
Bench laid down the tests on the bar of jurisdiction of the civil courts. The
relevant principles are extracted below:
“(1) Where the statute gives a ﬁnality to the orders of the special
Tribunals the civil courts’ jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if
there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do
in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where
the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the
statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental
principles of judicial procedure.

17 (1973) 2 SCC 59
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 539
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court,
an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to ﬁnd the adequacy
or the suﬃciency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not
decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.
Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the
remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to ﬁnd out the intendment
becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In
the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special
right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or
liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right
and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and
whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are
prescribed by the said statute or not.
(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily
to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.”
[emphasis supplied]
24. In Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza 18, a two-Judge
Bench of this Court observed that the jurisdiction of the civil courts to try
suits of a civil nature is expansive and the onus to prove the ouster of the
jurisdiction is on the party that asserts it. The court observed that even in
cases where the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred by a statute, the test
is to determine if the authority or tribunal constituted under the statute has
the power to grant reliefs that the civil courts would normally grant in suits
ﬁled before them. The relevant observations are extracted below:
“12. The well-settled rule in this regard is that the civil courts have the
jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those entertainment
whereof is expressly or impliedly barred. The jurisdiction of the civil
courts to try suits of civil nature is very expansive. Any statute which
excludes such jurisdiction is, therefore, an exception to the general rule
that all disputes shall be triable by a civil court. Any such exception
cannot be readily inferred by the courts. The court would lean in favour
of a construction that would uphold the retention of jurisdiction of the
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

civil courts and shift the onus of proof to the party that asserts that the
civil court’s jurisdiction is ousted.”
25. In this case, applying the test laid down in Dhulabai (supra), it
has to be determined whether the Act provides an adequate ﬁnal remedy
of the kind the civil Court would normally grant in a suit, such that the
jurisdiction of the civil court must necessarily be inferred to have been
ousted. For that purpose, the statutory scheme of the Tenancy Act, 1955 is to
be carefully examined. Additionally, as per the test laid down by Dhulabai
(supra), jurisdiction of civil Court would not be ousted in cases where
the fundamental principles of judicial procedure and the provisions of the
particular Act are not complied with.
26. Proceeding with the above understanding of the law as laid down
by this Court in Dhulabai (supra), let us now examine the scheme of the
Tenancy Act, 1955 to determine whether the reliefs claimed in the suit, were
within or outside the scope of the 1955 Act. The Preamble to the Tenancy Act,
1955 provides that it’s an Act to “consolidate and amend the law relating
to tenancies of agricultural lands, and to provide for certain measures of
land reforms and matters connected therewith”. The statutory scheme of the
Act provides for tenancies of agricultural lands. Section 1 contained in Part
I of the Act deals with short title and commencement. Section 5 deals with
deﬁnitions. Importantly, Section 5(35) provides the deﬁnition of Revenue
Court “as a court or an oﬃcer having jurisdiction to entertain suits or other
proceedings relating to agricultural tenancies, proﬁts and other matters
connected with land or any other right or interest in land, wherein such
court or oﬃcer is required to act judicially.” Section 5(43) provides for the
deﬁnition of tenant. Chapter III deals with classes of tenant while Chapter
IV is about Devolution, Transfer, Exchange, and Division of Tenancies.
Chapter V is concerned with Surrender, Abandonment, and Extinction of
Tenancies. A cursory look at the other chapters would also show that they
relate to agricultural tenancies which has nothing to do with the relief of
permanent injunction claimed in the suit. The title, as noted earlier, is not
disputed. Section 207 and 208 of the Tenancy Act,1955 which is central to
the present issue, reads as under:
“207. Suits and applications cognizable by revenue court only— (1)
All suits and application of the nature speciﬁed in the Third Schedule
shall be heard and determined by a revenue court.
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 541
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

(2) No court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any
such suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause
of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means
of any such suitor application.
Explanation— If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief
might be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief
asked for from the civil court is greater than, or additional to, or is
not identical with, that which the revenue court could have granted.
208. Application of Civil Procedure Code— The provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908), except:
(a) provisions inconsistent with anything in this Act, so far as
the inconsistency extends.
(b) provisions applicable only to special suits or proceedings
outside the scope of this Act, and
(c) provisions contained in List I of the Fourth Schedule, shall
apply to all suit and proceedings under this Act, subject
to the modiﬁcations contained in List II of the Fourth
Schedule.”
27. Let us now look at the relief claimed in the suit in the context
of the overall scheme of the Tenancy Act,1955. In the suit, the plaintiﬀ,
inter alia, sought permanent injunction from disturbing the ownership and
possession w.r.t 3 bighas of land purchased through two registered sale
deeds. Such a relief could not possibly be granted by the forums empowered
under the Tenancy Act,1955 which primarily deals with tenancy rights and
their protection. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not ousted
by Section 207 or Section 208 of the Tenancy Act,1955 and the contrary
submission made by the appellant has to be rejected. Therefore, evaluation
of the scheme of the Act would lead us to the conclusion that jurisdiction
of the revenue Court would be barred under Tenancy Act,1955, in view of
the reliefs claimed by plaintiﬀ.
28. Moreover, even where a statute gives ﬁnality to the process, it does
not exclude cases where the provisions of the particular statute have not
been complied with or the Tribunal has failed to decide in conformity with
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

the fundamental principles of judicial procedure19. In the present case, in
the absence of notice to the actual owner under Section 52 of the 1959 Act,
the acquisition proceedings are legally vitiated and therefore the aﬀected
owner should be entitled to seek relief from the civil Court. As noticed,
the defendant no. 1 i.e., the Urban Improvement Trust failed to adhere to
the essential requirements under Section 52 of the 1959 Act. When the
fundamental judicial procedure is disregarded, the action rendered is legally
void and should be seen as being “outside the Act”. The observations in
Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Administrator, Municipal Committee 20 would
therefore be applicable in this context:
“7. Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the court shall
have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A statute, therefore,
expressly or by necessary implication, can bar the jurisdiction of civil
courts in respect of a particular matter. The mere conferment of special
jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of the said matter does not in itself
exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts. The statute may speciﬁcally
provide for ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts; even if there was
no such speciﬁc exclusion, if it creates a liability not existing before
and gives a special and particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the
remedy provided by it must be followed. The same principle would
apply if the statute had provided for the particular forum in which the
remedy could be had. Even in such cases, the civil court’s jurisdiction is
not completely ousted. A suit in a civil court will always lie to question
the order of a tribunal created by a statute, even if its order is, expressly
or by necessary implication, made ﬁnal, if the said tribunal abuses its
power or does not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions.”
29. Applying the principles laid down in Dhulabai (supra) and Firm
Seth Radha Krishnan(supra) to the facts of the present case, there can be no
diﬃculty in holding that a suit of this nature would be maintainable before
the civil Court particularly considering the nature of relief prayed in the suit.

19 Dewaji v. Ganpatlal, AIR 1969 SC 560; Sree Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannath Rao
Pantulu Bahadur Garu v. State of A.P., (1969) 3 SCC 71
20 (1964) 2 SCR 273
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 543
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

ii) Plaintiﬀ’s title is not under a cloud
30. The next issue is whether a civil suit for permanent injunction can
be ﬁled without declaration. On this, it is settled that where the plaintiﬀ’s
title is not in dispute or under a cloud, a suit for injunction could be decided
with reference to the ﬁnding on possession. The relevant tests were laid
down in Anathula Sudhakar v P. Buchi Reddy21:
“13.1. Where a plaintiﬀ is in lawful or peaceful possession of
a property and such possession is interfered or threatened by the
defendant, a suit for an injunction simpliciter will lie. A person has a
right to protect his possession against any person who does not prove a
better title by seeking a prohibitory injunction. But a person in wrongful
possession is not entitled to an injunction against the rightful owner.
13.2. Where the title of the plaintiﬀ is not disputed, but he is
not in possession, his remedy is to ﬁle a suit for possession and seek
in addition, if necessary, an injunction. A person out of possession,
cannot seek the relief of injunction simpliciter, without claiming the
relief of possession.
13.3. Where the plaintiﬀ is in possession, but his title to the
property is in dispute, or under a cloud, or where the defendant
asserts title thereto and there is also a threat of dispossession from
the defendant, the plaintiﬀ will have to sue for declaration of title and
the consequential relief of injunction. Where the title of the plaintiﬀ
is under a cloud or in dispute and he is not in possession or not able
to establish possession, necessarily the plaintiﬀ will have to ﬁle a suit
for declaration, possession and injunction.”
31. At the cost of repetition, it must be noted that in the written
statement in the suit, the defendant no.1 admitted that the plaintiﬀ together
with the defendant nos.2 to 4 purchased total 3 bighas of land through
two sale deeds respectively dated 2.3.1970 and 16.3.1970 and it was
also admitted that the plaintiﬀ submitted an application before District
Magistrate to convert one bigha land to non-agricultural category on
which the District Magistrate issued NOC since the said land was needed

21 (2008) 4 SCC 594
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

to set up a petrol pump. Here, the title for the plaintiﬀ is not disputed by
the defendants and the same is not under a cloud. Therefore, the question
of title is not an issue in the suit. Moreover, the mandatory requirements
under the provisions of the 1959 Act were itself not followed before issuing
notiﬁcation, without which the title cannot be said to be disputed. Such a
suit for injunction in the absence of contest to the title would therefore,
be maintainable.
32. In State of Bihar v Dhirendra Kumar22, Laxmi Chand v Gram
Panchayat Kararia23, Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority
and another v Brijesh Reddy and another24, it was held that validity of
acquisition notiﬁcation cannot be questioned in a Civil Court and it can only
be challenged in the High Court under its writ jurisdiction. Would these ratios
apply to the present case is a question that needs to be addressed. It is the
case of the Appellant i.e. the Urban Improvement Trust that the nature of land
acquired under the 1959 Act was ‘agricultural land’ which got converted for
‘non-agricultural use’ under Section 90-A of the Land Revenue Act,1956. As
per Section 207 of the Tenancy Act,1955 read with entry 8A and entry 23C
of Third Schedule, the matter relating to agricultural land could be heard
and determined only by a Revenue Court. As the scheme of the Tenancy
Act, 1955 was earlier examined, it is quite apparent that the prayers made
in the suit are beyond the scope of the 1955 Act. Moreover, the relief for
quashing the notiﬁcation was also not sought in the Suit. That apart, it is
not the case of the appellant that writ court is the legal option for relief but
they want the land owners to be relegated to the Revenue Court under the
1955 Act. It is already noticed why the Revenue Court is not the appropriate
forum for the reliefs claimed by the respondents. The facts here are clearly
distinguishable and hence, the ratio laid down in Dhirendra Kumar(supra)
can have no application here. Moreover, as per the ﬁve-judge bench judgment
in Dhulabai (supra), an exception is carved out as per which if there is a
violation of fundamental principles of judicial procedure and the provisions
of a particular Act are not followed, a Civil suit is maintainable.

22 (1995) 4 SCC 229
23 (1996) 7 SCC 218
24 (2013) 3 SCC 66
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 545
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

iii) Non-impleadment of State cannot be considered fatal for
maintainability
33. It was also pleaded by the Appellant that the suit was not
maintainable on account of considerable delay and because the State was
not impleaded as a party defendant in the suit proceeding. Such a contention
upon consideration is only to be rejected. The legal position relating to
necessary and proper parties was summarized in Mumbai International
Airport Private Limited v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private
Limited25 as under:
“15. A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as
a party and in whose absence no eﬀective decree could be passed at
all by the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself
is liable to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not
a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court
to completely, eﬀectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters
in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or
against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be
a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead
him, against the wishes of the plaintiﬀ. The fact that a person is likely
to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided
against the plaintiﬀ, will not make such person a necessary party or a
proper party to the suit for speciﬁc performance.”
34. It must be borne in mind that the Urban Improvement Trust,
Bikaner is an instrumentality of the State and was a contesting party in the
suit as it was the beneﬁciary of the acquisition process. The observation
of the seven-judge bench of this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust v.
Vithal Rao26, would be relevant in this context where, it was noted that
“the acquisition is for the trust and may be at its instance, but nevertheless
the acquisition is by the Government”. In the backdrop of diﬀerential
compensation under diﬀerent land acquisition Acts, it was held that as far as
the owner is concerned, it does not matter whether the land was acquired by
Improvement Trust, Municipal Corporation or the Government. In the facts

25 (2010) 7 SCC 417
26 (1973) 1 SCC 500
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

of the present case, non-impleadment of the State cannot be perceived as
fatal for the maintainability of the suit as the contesting defendant i.e. Urban
Improvement Trust is an instrumentality of the State and the beneﬁciary
of the acquisition process. At this point, we may also usefully refer to the
conclusion of the Rajasthan High Court in Urban Improvement Trust v Shri
Padmanand27, where after analysing the provisions of the Act 1959, it was
noted as under:
“15..............In our view, a close scrutiny of the provisions of the
1959 Act leave no doubt that the Improvement Trust, created under
the aforesaid Act, works as an agent or instrumentality of the State
Government and as such the Trust must be considered as a ‘State
Government department’, for the purposes of Section 18 of the Act
of 1953.ˮ
35. In light of the above observation, can it possibly be said that the
Urban Improvement Trust for the present purpose, is a separate entity
altogether in relation to the State of Rajasthan, without whose participation,
no authoritative pronouncement could possibly be made in the suit? The
answer for this has to be in the negative. The ratio in Shri Saurav Jain v M/s
ABP Design & Another28 would also not be applicable here. In that case,
a suit was instituted by the 1st respondent in the Court of Civil Judge who
claimed to be a “transferable owner and cultivator” of a certain piece of
land. This Court, in the said case, inter alia, arrived at a ﬁnding that invalid
transfer of land was made to the Respondent and it was null and void for
being in violation of Section 5(3) of Urban Ceiling Act,1976. Signiﬁcantly,
neither the State nor any authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act 1976 were impleaded in that suit. The Court speciﬁcally
noted that the real object of the suit was to aﬃrm plaintiﬀ’s title on the basis
of an alleged permission for sale in his favour. It was in that context that
the Court noted that the 1st respondent resorted to engineered drafting for
declaration of title. However, in the present case, the title is undisputed and
the necessary contesting party i.e. the Trust was arrayed as a party. These
are the key distinguishing features for that case to be of no relevance in the
present matter.

27 AIR 1980 Raj 176
28 2021 SCC OnLineSC 552
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 547
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

36. At this point, let us now refer to the observations of this Court
in Urban Improvement Trust v Mohan Lal29 which are closer to the facts
of the present case. This Court deprecated the tendency of State and its
instrumentalities of ﬁling appeals against all orders that came against them
on false, frivolous, vexatious and technical grounds. The facts in that case
were that the Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner without notice, acquisition
or consent, took over the allotted plot of the landowner and thereafter, when
relief was granted to landowners by the National Commission, challenged it
on technical grounds for absence of protest and Complaint, within two years
of the cause of action. Moreover, it was argued by the Counsel for the Trust
that even if it was an illegal encroachment, jurisdiction under Consumer
Protection Act,1986 could not be invoked. Rejecting the arguments of the
Counsel for the Trust, the Supreme Court made the following pertinent
observations:
“5. It is a matter of concern that such frivolous and unjust litigations
by Governments and statutory authorities are on the increase. Statutory
authorities exist to discharge statutory functions in public interest. They
should be responsible litigants. They cannot raise frivolous and unjust
objections, nor act in a callous and high-handed manner. They can not
behave like some private litigants with proﬁteering motives. Nor can
they resort to unjust enrichment. They are expected to show remorse
or regret when their oﬃcers act negligently or in an overbearing
manner. When glaring wrong acts by their oﬃcers are brought to
their notice, for which there is no explanation or excuse, the least
that is expected is restitution/restoration to the extent possible with
appropriate compensation. Their harsh attitude in regard to genuine
grievances of the public and their indulgence in unwarranted litigation
requires to be corrected.
6. This Court has repeatedly expressed the view that Governments and
statutory authorities should be model or ideal litigants and should not
put forth false, frivolous, vexatious, technical (but unjust) contentions
to obstruct the path of justice.”

29 (2010) 1 SCC 512
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

37. What we see here are few landowners whose lands were subjected
to compulsory acquisition for the beneﬁt of the Urban Improvement Trust,
Bikaner. The Trust took possession of their land without serving any notice
on the landowners. It is also not clear whether any compensation was actually
paid to the recorded khatedars. The respondents then ﬁled suit seeking to
injunct the appellant from dispossessing the landowners from their land.
This was a situation of a genuine grievance attempted to be canvassed by the
landowners before a Court of law. For a litigant who has partially succeeded
from the 1st Court and later at the appellate stage obtained full relief from
two courts be told that his suit is not maintainable? In my opinion, justice
would be better served if the respondents are not forced to commence
another round of litigation before the High Court to secure a redressal for
their grievances pertaining to being deprived of their land without getting
any notice or just compensation.
38. As can be seen, the landowners had arrayed the Urban Improvement
Trust, Bikaner as a defendant in the suit as their grievance was primarily
against the appellant who dispossessed the respondents and took over their
land. The State Authority which wronged the landowners was a defendant in
the suit and also contested the suit by ﬁling written submission and adducing
evidence. In this backdrop, to non-suit the landowners would lead to manifest
injustice. The issue no. (iii) is therefore answered against the appellant.
F. Conclusion
39. It must now be noted that the litigation in this case has been
continuing for 25 years. Empirical Data30 shows that land disputes clog
all levels of courts in India, and according to certain studies, land-related
litigations account for the largest set of cases, in terms of both absolute
numbers and judicial pendency. For those who are going to lose their land
through compulsory acquisition, a key redressal mechanism is to enable
them to access courts, at ﬁrst instance. The aggrieved land loser is often

30 ‘Access to Justice Survey 2015-16’ (Daksh, May 2016) <https://dakshindia.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Daksh-access-to-justice-survey.pdf > accessed 19 September
2023.
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 549
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

unable to access justice from the judicial system. Therefore, having regard
to the limited relief that can be obtained from a revenue court under Tenancy
Act, 1955, to deny the land losers access to civil court in my opinion, would
aggravate the injustice that would otherwise enure, in all cases of compulsory
land acquisition.
40. The upshot of the above is that the appellant here failed to establish
that they had acquired the land in accordance with the law or paid due
compensation to the aﬀected party. The appellant took forceful possession
of the respondents’ valuable land by disregarding the legal process and
thereby denied the protection of procedural fairness to the respondents. At
this moment, I am reminded of the words of former Associate Justice of the
US Supreme Court, William O. Douglas who in his concurring opinion in
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v Mc Grath31 wrote the following:
“It is procedure that spells much of the diﬀerence between rule by law
and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural
safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under
law.”
41. Noticing the departure from the due process by the authorities,
relief was granted to the land owners. No inﬁrmity is thus seen with those
verdicts which invalidated the acquisition process. The impugned judgment
of the High Court therefore merits this Court’s approval.
42. The appellant i.e., the Urban Improvement Trust however claims to
have developed the balance 2 bighas for the purpose of the Jai Naryan Vyas
Yojana and divided it into plots. Therefore, considering the public interest
and balancing the equity, it is clariﬁed that notwithstanding the ﬁndings in
this judgment, if the authorities wish to, they may even now acquire the
land by following the due process of law.
43. The appeal is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear
their own cost.

31 341 US 123 (1951)
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

MANOJ MISRA, J.
1. I had the beneﬁt of reading the scholarly judgment of my learned
Brother, Hrishikesh Roy, J., dismissing this appeal ﬁled against the judgment
and order of the High Court1 dated 12.01.2010 passed in S.B. Civil Regular
Second Appeal No. 114 of 2004. However, since I’m of the opinion that
plaintiﬀ’s suit was not maintainable in respect of the land which was acquired
by a notiﬁcation, the defendant’s appeal is entitled to be allowed. Therefore,
I’m recording my opinion separately.
Appeal
2. This is a defendant’s appeal against the order of the High Court
dismissing his second appeal preferred against the judgment and decree
of reversal passed by the ﬁrst appellate Court22 The ﬁrst appellate Court
had not only set aside the decree of the Trial Court33 to the extent it denied
complete relief as sought in the suit,4 4 but decreed the suit of the ﬁrst
respondent in its entirety.
3. To have a clear understanding of the issues that arise for consideration
in this appeal, it would be apposite to advert to the pleadings in the suit out
of which the appeal arises.
Suit
4. Gordhan Dass5 instituted the suit on 23.4.1997 against Urban
Improvement Trust, Bikaner6, Narayan Das (Respondent no.2), Kanhaiya Lal
(Respondent no.3) and Ganesh Ram (Respondent no. 4) seeking permanent
prohibitory injunction to restrain the Trust from entering or acquiring the
land in dispute7 without adopting due process of law.

1 High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur
2 District Judge, Bikaner
3 Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division/Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.1,
Bikaner
4 Original Suit No.29 of 1997
5 Predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos.1/1 to 1/3
6 The Trust (Appellant)
7 Khasra Nos. 211/81 and 239/83-New No. 294/83, measuring 3 bighas, adjoining
Bikaner Sagar Road
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 551
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

Plaint Case
5. The plaint case was that, -- (a) the land in dispute admeasuring 3
bighas was jointly purchased by the plaintiﬀ and defendant nos.2 to 4 8 vide
two separate sale-deeds dated 02.03.1970 and 16.03.1970; (b) out of the total
area of the disputed land, 1 bigha, comprising a portion of plot no.294/83,
was converted to non-agricultural use for setting up a Petrol Pump and,
for that purpose, the District Collector issued NOC9 on 23.07.1971; (c)
the Trust had not acquired the land by any lawful manner, yet, it started
showing itself as owner in possession of the disputed land, as a result,
when, on 23.4.1997, the Trust threatened to acquire the land, the suit had
to be instituted. Additionally, it was pleaded that neither the provisions of
the 1894 Act10 nor of the 1959 Act11 were followed to acquire the land as
neither opportunity of hearing nor compensation was provided to either the
plaintiﬀ or defendant nos. 2 to 4.
Appellant’s case in the Written Statement
6. The appellant12 in its written statement rebutted the plaint case
and pleaded that, -- the land pertaining to Khasra no.239/83 stood in the
name of Bhanwari Devi, which had already been acquired whereas, the
land bearing Khasra no.211/81 is out of Jainarain Vikas Colony Scheme;
the land in dispute has been duly acquired and compensation paid to the
Khatedars13; the suit of the plaintiﬀ is not maintainable; the land in dispute
being agricultural, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction; and the plaintiﬀ has
not come to the court with clean hands as the disputed land had already been
acquired and compensation paid to the recorded Khatedars.
Amended Pleadings
7. During the suit proceeding, comprehensive amendments in the
plaint were sought and allowed, resulting in ﬁling of an amended plaint
on 11.11.2002. Therein it was stated that though, pursuant to the order of

8 Respondent Nos.2 to 4
9 No Objection Certiﬁcate
10 The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
11 The Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959
12 Defendant No.1 in the suit
13 Person whose name is recorded as tenure holder in the record of rights
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

the High Court dated 26.02.1998 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2243/95
(Bhanwarlal vs. State of Rajasthan), the Trust had taken possession of the
land in dispute on 10.06.1998 but the writ court’s order related to some other
land. Therefore, relief for a mandatory injunction to restore the possession
of the plaintiﬀ was sought.
8. In the amended written statement ﬁled by the appellant, it was stated
that after plaintiﬀ had instituted the suit, report from Tehsildar was obtained.
Then it was discovered that the plaintiﬀ along with others had purchased
the land in dispute vide sale deeds dated 02.03.1970 and 16.03.1970 and
had also given an application for conversion of 1 bigha of that land for non-
agricultural use, which was allowed, and, on payment of conversion fee,
NOC was issued for setting up a Petrol Pump. It was, however, clariﬁed that
the appellant had, in all, acquired 24 bighas and 12 biswas of land comprising
Khasra No.294/83 after following due procedure and compensation thereof
was paid to the recorded owners. It was also stated that the plaintiﬀ had
never raised any objection to the acquisition. In respect of 1 bigha of that
land, for which NOC was issued to set up a petrol pump, it was stated that
the State vide order dated 7.8.2002 had taken a decision to return it to its
owner. In paragraph 18 of the amended written statement, it was speciﬁcally
stated that 2 bighas of the disputed land were acquired and its compensation
was paid to the recorded tenure-holders.
Trial Court Findings
9. The trial court found that there is no dispute between the parties
that 1 bigha, out of 3 bighas of the land in dispute, was converted to non-
agricultural land and that it was not acquired by the State. Therefore, the
plaintiﬀ is entitled to get possession of that one bigha. Regarding the
remaining 2 bighas of land, in paragraph 15 of the judgment it was held
that, though plaintiﬀ had purchased it through separate sale-deeds of the
year 1970, in the Jamabandi (i.e., record of rights), the name of the plaintiﬀ
was not entered rather it continued to reﬂect previous Khatedar’s name.
Moreover, notice under Section 52(2) of the 1959 Act was issued to the
recorded Khatedars, award was passed in the year 1985 and compensation
was also paid to them. Trial Court also observed that plaintiﬀ raised no
objection, despite knowledge, even though the Trust had commenced
development work over the land to make it habitable. A passing observation
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 553
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

was also made that plaintiﬀ’s intention appeared to be to enjoy the land and
later stake a claim over it. The trial court thus concluded that plaintiﬀ did
not approach the Court with clean hands. Consequently, the suit was decreed
only to the extent of that 1 bigha of the disputed land regarding which, the
appellant had given up its claim.
Appeal Before the First Appellate Court
10. Aggrieved by dismissal of the suit in part, the plaintiﬀ preferred
an appeal14. No appeal was preferred by the Trust. Consequently, the decree
of the trial court to the extent of 1 bigha of the disputed land became ﬁnal
as against the Trust.
11. Before the ﬁrst appellate court, on behalf of the plaintiﬀ, it was
argued that acquisition proceedings of the land had commenced in the year
1972 whereas the two sale-deeds in favour of the plaintiﬀ were registered
in the year 1970. The sale-deeds were in the knowledge of the oﬃcers of
the State as conversion of 1 bigha land to non-agricultural land was sought,
and the Collector had issued NOC in favour of the plaintiﬀ. Therefore, even
if plaintiﬀ’s name was not recorded as Khatedar, it could be presumed that
the State and its oﬃcers were aware about ownership rights of the plaintiﬀ
and other co-purchasers (i.e., defendant nos.2 to 4). Yet, no notice of the
proposed acquisition was given to the plaintiﬀ. Hence, the acquisition is
void. It was also argued that the plaintiﬀ and defendant nos.2 to 4 have
been in continuous possession, which was disturbed during pendency of
the suit on 10.06.1998.
First Appellate Court Findings
12. The ﬁrst appellate court in paragraph 14 of its judgment noted
the admitted case of the parties that the land was purchased by the plaintiﬀ
vide sale-deeds dated 02.03.1970 and 16.03.1970 whereas notiﬁcation,
commencing proceedings for acquisition, was issued on 09.06.1972. Yet,
the plaintiﬀ was not served notice of proposed acquisition. In paragraph
18 of the judgment, the ﬁrst appellate court observed that admittedly
prior to the acquisition, NOC was issued to the plaintiﬀ for conversion
of agricultural land to non-agricultural land, therefore it is to be assumed

14 Appeal Decree No.30 of 2004
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

that the State was aware of the ownership right of the plaintiﬀ. Yet, notice
of acquisition was not served on the plaintiﬀ. In these circumstances,
non-mutation of plaintiﬀ’s name in the revenue records would not defeat
plaintiﬀ’s claim that acquisition notiﬁcation was bad for non-service of
notice on him. With these observations, and ﬁnding upon that possession
of the land was taken on 10.6.1998, the ﬁrst appellate court decreed
plaintiﬀ’s suit in its entirety.
Second Appeal Before the High Court
13. Aggrieved by decision of the ﬁrst appellate court, the appellant
preferred second appeal before the High Court contending, inter alia, (a)
mere suit for injunction is not maintainable unless a relief for declaration of
title is sought; (b) the civil court has no jurisdiction to decide the suit when
the land in dispute is subject matter of acquisition and, under Section 52 of
the 1959 Act, on publication of the notiﬁcation in the gazette, the land stood
vested in the State free from all encumbrances; and (c) the plaintiﬀ had failed
to implead the State as a defendant even though it was a necessary party.
14. In rebuttal, on behalf of the plaintiﬀ, it was argued that since the
notiﬁcation for acquisition was not preceded by service of notice on the
owner of the land, as contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 52 of the
1959 Act, the acquisition was void and, therefore, the Civil Court held
jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.
High Court’s decision
15. The High Court opined that purchase of land by the plaintiﬀ in
the year 1970, prior to the acquisition was not disputed; the acquisition
notiﬁcation was issued without serving notice on the plaintiﬀ, therefore, the
acquisition was void and suit as instituted was maintainable. Moreover, the
plaintiﬀ was in possession up to the date of institution of the suit. It thus
upheld the decree of the ﬁrst appellate court and dismissed the second appeal.
16. Aggrieved by dismissal of its second appeal, the Trust is in appeal
before us.
17. We have heard Sri Aruneshwar Gupta, learned senior counsel,
assisted by Sri Rajeev Singh, Advocate-on-Record for the defendant-
appellant; and Sri Manoj Swaroop, learned senior counsel, for the
respondents.
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 555
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

Submissions on Behalf of the Appellant
18. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Chapter VII of the
1959 Act deals with acquisition and disposal of land by the Trust. Section 52
of the 1959 Act provides for compulsory acquisition of land. Sub-section (1)
of Section 52 empowers the State Government to acquire land by publishing
in the Oﬃcial Gazette a notice specifying the special purpose for which the
land is required and stating therein that the State Government has decided to
acquire the land in pursuance thereof. Sub-section (4) of section 52 provides
that when a notice under sub-section (1) is published in the oﬃcial Gazette,
the land shall, on and from the date of such publication, vest absolutely
in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Sub-section (5) of
Section 52 provides that where any land is vested in the State Government
under sub-section (4), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order
any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver
possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorized by
it in this behalf within 30 days of the service of the notice. Sub-section (7)
of Section 52 provides that where the land has been acquired for the Trust,
the State Government shall, after it has taken possession of the land and
on payment by the Trust of the amount of compensation determined under
Section 53, and of the other charges incurred by the State Government in
connection with the acquisition, transfer the land to the Trust for the purpose
for which the land has been acquired.
19. Learned counsel submitted that the mechanism for determination
of compensation, the mode of its payment, and resolution of disputes in
respect thereof are provided for by Sections 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of
the 1959 Act. Thus, the 1959 Act is a complete Code insofar as acquisition
of the land, payment of compensation for its acquisition and settlement of
disputes regarding the compensation payable therefor are concerned. As a
result, by necessary implication, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is barred from
entertaining any claim in respect of that land. Moreover, once the land vests
in the State free from all encumbrances, in absence of seeking a declaration
qua the validity of the acquisition notiﬁcation, mere suit for injunction
would not be maintainable. According to him, the trial court was justiﬁed
in dismissing the suit to the extent the land was covered by the notiﬁcation
whereas the ﬁrst appellate court and the High Court committed manifest
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

error of law in holding the suit maintainable. In addition to the above, it was
submitted that admittedly 2 bighas out of 3 bighas of the land in dispute
was agricultural land, therefore, by virtue of Section 207 of the Rajasthan
Tenancy Act, 1955 (in short, “the 1955 Act”), the suit was barred before a
Civil Court and could only be ﬁled in a Revenue Court.
20. Regarding non-service of notice upon the owners of the land prior to
the notiﬁcation under Section 52(1) of the 1959 Act, the learned counsel for
the appellant submitted that as the original Khatedars, who stood recorded
in the record of rights, were served with notice of the proposed acquisition,
there was substantial compliance of the provisions of sub-section (2) of
Section 52 of the 1959 Act. Hence, the notiﬁcation under sub-section (1)
of Section 52 cannot be treated as void.
21. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant
placed reliance on the following decisions:
(i) Ahuja Industries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Others15;
(ii) Bhola Shanker v. The District Land Acquisition Oﬃcer, Aligarh
and Ors16;
(iii) Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority and another
v. Brijesh Reddy and another17;
(iv) Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan18; and
(v) Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta19.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondents
22. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that
under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the 1959 Act, the State Government is
under an obligation to call upon the owner of the land and any other person
who, in the opinion of the State Government, may be interested therein to
show cause, within such time as may be speciﬁed in the notice, why the

15 (2003) 5 SCC 365
16 (1973) 2 SCC 59
17 (2013) 3 SCC 66
18 AIR 1954 SC 340
19 (1979) 3 SCC 83
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 557
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

land should not be acquired. The requirement of issuing such notice, before
publishing the notiﬁcation under sub-section (1) of Section 52, is mandatory.
In absence thereof, the notiﬁcation under sub-section (1) of Section 52 is
void. Hence, there could be no deemed vesting under sub-section (4) of
Section 52. Thus, the suit was maintainable, notwithstanding no relief was
sought to annul the notiﬁcation. In support of his submissions, the learned
counsel for the respondents placed reliance on a Constitution Bench decision
of this Court in Dhulabhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh20 and a three-judge
Bench decision in Firm Seth Radha Kishan vs. Municipal Committee21.
Questions that arise for Our Consideration
23. On consideration of the rival submissions, in my view, the following
questions arise for determination:
(i) Whether for failure to serve notice under sub-section (2) of
Section 52 of the 1959 Act on the plaintiﬀ, the notiﬁcation
acquiring the land under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the
1959 Act could be treated as void by the Civil Court?
(ii) Whether in respect of the land covered by the acquisition
notiﬁcation, the suit of the plaintiﬀ for injunction simpliciter,
without seeking a declaratory relief and, that too, without
impleading the State as defendant, maintainable?
(iii) Whether the civil suit of the plaintiﬀ was also barred by section
207 (2) of the 1955 Act?
Discussion and Analysis
24. Though the aforesaid issues are interrelated but, for clarity, I
propose to deal with them separately.
Issue No.(i) — Whether the notiﬁcation under Section 52(1) of the
1959 Act could have been treated as void by the Civil Court?

25. Before proceeding further on issue no.(i), it is apposite to observe
that when an act is void, it is a nullity and can be disregarded and impeached

20 (1968) 3 SCR 662
21 (1964) 2 SCR 273
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

in any proceeding before any court or tribunal whenever it is relied upon.
In other words, it is subject to a “collateral attack”. But, in Nawabkhan
Abbaskhan vs. State of Gujarat22, followed in Bharati Reddy vs. State of
Karnataka23, this Court held that if illegal acts of authorities are deﬁed on
self-determined voidness, startling consequences will follow. In the light of
settled legal position, the question which falls for consideration is, whether
for want of service of notice of proposed acquisition under sub-section (2)
of Section 52 of the 1959 Act, the acquisition notiﬁcation, under section
52 (1) of the 1959 Act, could be treated as void and, therefore, vulnerable
to a collateral attack.
26. To appropriately address the aforesaid issue, it would be useful to
ﬁrst examine the provisions of the 1959 Act which deals with compulsory
acquisition of land. Chapter VII of the 1959 Act deals with acquisition and
disposal of land. Section 52 deals with compulsory acquisition of land. For
convenience, the same is reproduced below:
“52. Compulsory acquisition of land- (1) Where on a representation
from the Trust it appears to the State Government that any land is
required for the purpose of improvement or for any other purpose under
this Act, the State Government may acquire such land by publishing
in the oﬃcial Gazette a notice specifying the particular purpose for
which such land is required and stating that the State Government has
decided to acquire the land in pursuance of this section.
(2) Before publishing a notice under sub-section (1), the State
Government shall by another notice call upon the owner of the land
and any other person who in the opinion of the State Government
may be interested therein to show cause, within such time as may be
speciﬁed in the notice, why the land should not be acquired.
(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land
and by any other person interested therein and after giving such owner
and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may
pass such orders as it deems ﬁt.

22 (1974) 2 SCC 121
23 (2018) 6 SCC 162
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 559
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

(4) When a notice under sub-section (1) is published in the oﬃcial
Gazette, the land shall, on and from the date of such publication, vest
absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances.
(5) Where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section
(4), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order any person
who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession
thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorized by it in
this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.
(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under
sub-section (5), the State Government may take possession of the land
and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.
(7) Where the land has been acquired for the Trust, the State
Government shall, after it has taken possession of the land and on
payment by the Trust of the amount of compensation determined under
Section 53, on the amount of interest thereon, and of the other charges
incurred by the State Government in connection with the acquisition,
transfer the land to the Trust for the purpose for which the land has
been acquired.”
27. Section 53 of the 1959 Act is regarding payment of compensation
for compulsory acquisition of land. Sub-section (3) of Section 53 provides
that where the amount of compensation can be determined by agreement
between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be
determined in accordance with such agreement. Sub section (4) of Section
53 provides that where no such agreement is reached, the State Government
shall refer the case to the Collector for determination of the person to whom
the amount of compensation is to be paid and the amount of compensation
to be paid for such acquisition.
28. Section 54 of the 1959 Act provides that any party aggrieved by
the decision of the Collector determining the amount of compensation may,
within sixty days from the date of such decision, appeal to the court of the
District Judge having jurisdiction.
29. Section 55 of the 1959 Act provides for reference of disputes
regarding apportionment of compensation to the Court of the District Judge.
It reads:
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

“55. Disputes as to apportionment of compensation. - If any dispute
arises as to the apportionment of compensation among persons claiming
to be entitled thereto the State Government shall refer such dispute for
the decision of the Court of the District Judge having jurisdiction.”
30. Section 56 confers on a person, aggrieved by the decision of the
District Judge under Section 55 of the Act, a right to ﬁle an appeal to the
High Court
31. Section 57 provides for the mode of payment of compensation, or
deposit of the same in Court.
32. Section 58 empowers the Court to invest the amount of
compensation deposited in court.
33. Section 59 provides that if any question or dispute arises as to
the suﬃciency of the compensation paid or proposed to be paid under any
provision of the Act, otherwise than under the foregoing provisions of
that Chapter, the matter shall be determined by the District Judge having
jurisdiction upon a reference made to him either by the Trust or by the
claimant within a speciﬁed period.
34. Section 60 provides for the disposal of the land by the Trust.
35. A conspectus of the provisions of Chapter VII of the 1959 Act
makes it clear that once the acquisition notiﬁcation is published in the
Oﬃcial Gazette under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the 1959 Act, by
virtue of sub section (4) of Section 52, the land shall, on and from the date
of such publication, vest absolutely in the State Government free from all
encumbrances and, thereafter, the owner or person interested in the land is
entitled to receive compensation. Further, as to whom the compensation is
payable and the quantum payable are all issues for which a mechanism is
in place under the provisions of the 1959 Act.
36. Now, the question that falls for consideration is whether the
notiﬁcation under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the 1959 Act could be
treated as void for non-service of notice, under sub-section (2) of Section
52, on the plaintiﬀ and other co-owners of the land who had purchased
the same from the erstwhile owners, or their predecessors, entered in the
record of rights.
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 561
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

37. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, where the
mandatory provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 52 of 1959 Act are
not followed, the notiﬁcation issued thereunder would be a nullity and,
therefore, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction to grant appropriate relief shall
not be ousted. Taking the proposition further, it was submitted that ouster
of a Civil Court’s jurisdiction cannot be a matter of course even where
ﬁnality to the orders of the Special Tribunals is provided for, particularly,
where the provisions of the concerned Act have not been complied with
or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental
principles of judicial procedure.
38. In support of the above submission, the learned counsel for the
respondent relied on the decisions of this Court in Dhulabhai (supra) and
Firm Seth Radha Kishan (supra).
39. In Dhulabhai (supra) the appellant before this Court had
instituted a suit to recover sales tax alleged to have been realized illegally
by the State of Madhya Pradesh. The State contested the suit by claiming
that it was barred by Section 17 of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act. The
court of the District Judge decreed the suit. On appeal by the State, the
High Court reversed the decision holding that the suit was barred even
though it was conceded by the Revenue that the tax could not have been
imposed in view of the bar of Article 301 of the Constitution of India. In
that context, the question that arose for this Court to decide was whether the
suit was barred expressly by Section 17 of that Act or by any implication
arising from the Act. The contention on behalf of the appellant therein
was that if it was a question of the correctness of the imposition within
the valid framework of the statute, rules or notiﬁcation, Section 17 might
have operated but not when the imposition was under a void law. After
considering several decisions, the Constitution Bench summarized the
legal position as under:
“35. … The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in
this Court may be stated as follows:
(1) Where the statute gives a ﬁnality to the orders of the special
Tribunals the civil courts’ jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if
there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally
do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied
with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the
fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an
examination of the scheme of the particular Act to ﬁnd the adequacy
or the suﬃciency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not
decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.
Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies
and the scheme of the particular Act to ﬁnd out the intendment becomes
necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case
it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability
and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further
lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be
determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies
normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the
said statute or not.
(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires
cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even
the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference
from the decision of the Tribunals.
(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the
constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open.
A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is
clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not
a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax
collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a
suit lies.
(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its
constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit
does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be ﬁnal or
there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the
scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant
enquiry.
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 563
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to
be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
40. In Firm Seth Radha Kishan (supra), the question that fell for
determination was whether a suit would lie in a civil court claiming refund
of the terminal tax collected by a municipality under the provisions of the
Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. The trial court decreed the suit on ﬁnding
that imposition/collection of tax was illegal. On appeal, the High Court of
Punjab held that even though the imposition of tax might not be authorized
but the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the Act provided
for a remedy by way of appeal against the wrong orders of the authorities
thereunder. In that context, this Court, after considering a plethora of
decisions, held:
“7. Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the court shall
have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A statute, therefore,
expressly or by necessary implication, can bar the jurisdiction of civil
courts in respect of a particular matter. The mere conferment of special
jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of the said matter does not in itself
exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts. The statute may speciﬁcally
provide for ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts; even if there was
no such speciﬁc exclusion, if it creates a liability not existing before
and gives a special and particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the
remedy provided by it must be followed. The same principle would
apply if the statute had provided for the particular forum in which the
remedy could be had. Even in such cases, the civil court’s jurisdiction is
not completely ousted. A suit in a civil court will always lie to question
the order of a tribunal created by a statute, even if its order is, expressly
or by necessary implication, made ﬁnal, if the said tribunal abuses its
power or does not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions.”
(Emphasis supplied)
41. The decisions of this Court in Dhulabhai (supra) and Firm Seth
Radha Kishan (supra) reiterate the settled legal position that if the act
impugned is not under the statute but in violation of its provisions, the
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

jurisdiction of a civil court is not completely ousted even though the statute
may have created the liability and provided for a speciﬁc remedy to the
person aggrieved.
42. In the light of aforesaid legal principle, the argument on behalf of
the plaintiﬀ-respondent is that, as notice contemplated under sub-section
(2) of Section 52 of the 1959 Act was not given to the owner of the land
prior to the acquisition notiﬁcation, the notiﬁcation would be void and,
therefore, the Civil Court would have jurisdiction to grant appropriate
relief by treating the same as void notwithstanding that there is no speciﬁc
challenge to it.
43. In my view, the aforesaid submission is not acceptable for the
following reasons:
(a) there is no challenge to the jurisdictional power of the acquiring
body to issue notiﬁcation under Section 52(1) of the 1959 Act, therefore
the notiﬁcation is under the 1959 Act and not beyond the scope of the
1959 Act;
(b) it is not the case of the plaintiﬀ that pursuant to the sale-deeds
qua the land in dispute, prior to the date of acquisition notiﬁcation,
plaintiﬀ’s name was entered in the record of rights, yet no notice under
Section 52(2) was served on him prior to the acquisition;
(c) it is also not the case of the plaintiﬀ that landowners/ Khatedars
already recorded in the record of rights qua the land in dispute, were
not served with notice as contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section
52 of the 1959 Act; and
(d) there is a presumption that oﬃcial acts have been regularly
performed (see: Section 114 Illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872), therefore, once a notiﬁcation under sub-section (1) of Section
52 was issued, by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 52, in my view,
a legal ﬁction with regard to the vesting of land in the State free from
all encumbrances from the date of publication of the notiﬁcation in the
Oﬃcial Gazette would come into play and it cannot be treated as void.
44. Elaborating upon the above reasons, it may be noted that assuming
the plaintiﬀ and defendant nos. 2 to 4 had purchased a portion of the disputed
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 565
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

land, but if they do not get their names mutated in the record of rights, how
would the State come to know of their ownership. Therefore, if the land is
acquired after serving notice on the recorded owners, as is the case of the
appellant, the State’s action in issuing notiﬁcation under Section 52 (1),
in my view, cannot be treated as void. More so, because the State had the
power to acquire the land.
45. It may also be noted that from the submissions made before us,
it appears that proceedings for acquisition were initiated under Section
52(2) of the 1959 Act in the year 1972 and, thereafter, in the year 1974,
notiﬁcation under sub-section (1) of Section 52 was published. The plaintiﬀ
and defendant nos.2 to 4 neither claim that they were recorded in the record
of rights prior to that, nor do they claim that none of the recorded owners
was served with notice. Importantly, the plaintiﬀ does not dispute publication
of notiﬁcation under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the 1959 Act. In fact,
plaintiﬀ’s claim is that he along with defendant nos. 2 to 4 were owners of
the land, pursuant to sale-deeds of the year 1970, yet they were not served
notice, under sub-section (2) of Section 52, prior to the notiﬁcation under
sub-section (1) of Section 52 and, therefore, the notiﬁcation, under sub-
section (1) of Section 52, is illegal and void.
46. In Ahuja Industries (supra), a somewhat similar claim under
another land acquisition law was rejected. In that case, the appellant who ﬁled
the appeal before this Court had purchased a piece of land on 10.02.1993.
However, the said land was not mutated in his name in the record of rights
which continued to show the name of the person who had sold the land to the
vendor of the appellant. Subsequently, the said land and surrounding lands
were acquired vide notiﬁcation dated 30.10.1997. The appellant questioned
the acquisition, by claiming, inter alia, that no notice under Section 28(2)
and 28(6) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 was
served on him and that such violation of principle of natural justice vitiated
the acquisition proceedings. It was also argued that Sections 127, 128 and
129 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 cast an obligation on the
Registering Oﬃcer to make a report to the revenue authority to enter his
name in the record of rights and its failure to do so resulting in non-service
of the notice on the appellant, depriving him of the opportunity to ﬁle his
objections, should not act to his detriment or disadvantage.
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

47. Dealing with the above submissions, in Ahuja Industries (supra),
upon ﬁnding that notices were issued to/served on the owners/occupants,
or their representatives, as shown in the record of rights, and the appellant
had not got his name mutated in the record of rights, this Court, after taking
notice of earlier decisions, held:
“12. This Court in Winky Dilawari v. Amritsar Improvement Trust
[(1996) 11 SCC 644] has taken the view that failure to serve personal
notices on the persons whose names have not been mutated in the
oﬃcial record-of-rights in pursuance of any sale in their favour does
not vitiate the proceedings for acquisition. Similar view was taken in
W.B. Housing Board v. Brijendra Prasad Gupta [(1997) 6 SCC 207]
wherein this Court observed: (SCC p. 214, para 8):
“It is no part of the duty of the Collector to make a roving inquiry into
ownership of the persons. We are of the opinion that the requirements
of the law were met when notices were served upon the recorded
owners as per the record- of-rights. Again we do not think in a case
like the present one, it is for the Collector to make enquiries from the
registration oﬃce to ﬁnd out if the land had since been sold by the
recorded owners. In Winky Dilawari v. Amritsar Improvement Trust
[(1996) 11 SCC 644], this Court observed that the public authorities
were not expected to go on making enquiries in the Sub-Registrar’s
oﬃce as to who would be the owner of the property. The Collector in
the present case was thus justiﬁed in relying on the oﬃcial record being
the record-of-rights as to who were the owners of the land sought to be
requisitioned and prudence did not require any further enquiry to be
made. We are therefore of the view that notices were properly served
under Section 3(2) of the Act on the owners of the land.”
13. It could be seen from the above order that service of notice on a
person shown as owner or occupier in the record-of-rights is suﬃcient
even though the said person had already sold the land prior to the said
notiﬁcation unless it is substantiated otherwise that the authorities
concerned had knowledge of the rights or interest of any person other
than those found recorded as owner/occupier in the revenue records.
It is further held that the Collector is not obliged to make a roving
enquiry about the ownership of the land. If the name of the purchaser
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 567
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

is not yet entered in the record-of-rights then non-service on such a
person does not vitiate the acquisition proceedings. Admittedly, the
appellant had not got his name entered in the revenue records as owner
or occupant of the said land and therefore he could not complain about
non-service of notice on him nor about the failure to grant a hearing to
him. Contention that as per provision of the Land Revenue Act there
was no obligation on his part to either inform the Revenue Authorities
about the sale in his favour or to request them to transfer the katha
in his name cannot stand as it has not been brought on record with
reference to any pleadings with supporting documents that in fact the
appellant had made payment for making the necessary entries in the
record-of-rights and the register in his name at the time of registration
of the sale deed in his favour. This apart, failure to make entries on the
part of the Revenue Authorities by itself would not cast any obligation
on the authorities under the Act to make a roving enquiry and try to
locate an owner who may have subsequently purchased the land from
the previous owner. Failure on the part of the Revenue Authority to
make entry in the register of mutation in favour of the subsequent
owner would not render the acquisition proceedings bad in law on
account of non-issuance of notice inviting objections to the acquisition
proceedings or service thereof.”
(Emphasis supplied)
48. Having noticed the decision in Ahuja Industries (supra), in my
view, the legal position that emerges is, that if the name of the owner is
not entered in the record of rights pertaining to the land proposed to be
acquired, there is no legal obligation on the state authorities to make a
roving enquiry to ﬁnd out as to who its actual owner is for eﬀecting service
of notice upon him prior to issuance of the acquisition notiﬁcation. In
such circumstances, there would be suﬃcient compliance of the statutory
obligation of serving notice on the owner if the notice is served on the
owners entered in the record of rights, unless it is speciﬁcally proved that
the real owners, other than owners entered in the record of rights, were
known to the revenue authorities.
49. In the instant case, the plaintiﬀ’s case is not that his name
was mutated in the record of rights, rather his case is that the district
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

administration was aware of his title to the land because they had issued
NOC for conversion of that agricultural land to non-agricultural land. To
test the correctness of the aforesaid claim, I have perused the amended
plaint. The relevant averments to that eﬀect are in paragraph 1 (b) of the
amended plaint. A careful reading of the same would indicate that the plea
of the plaintiﬀ was that he sought conversion of one bigha, out of three
bighas of the disputed land, for non-agricultural use and, in connection
therewith, a favorable report was given by the Patwari resulting in
issuance of an NOC by the District Magistrate for non-agricultural use
of one bigha land. However, there is no averment in the plaint that sale-
deeds of the entire disputed land were produced by the plaintiﬀ before
the oﬃcers of the State /administration at the time of seeking NOC. In
these circumstances, in my view, a constructive notice of the sale-deeds
cannot be imputed on the State. I, therefore, reject the argument that by
issuing NOC for non-agricultural use of one bigha of the disputed land,
the State acquired knowledge regarding plaintiﬀ’s title in respect of the
entire land comprising 3 bighas.
50. Even assuming that by issuing NOC the State got knowledge about
plaintiﬀ’s title, it could at best be in respect of that one bigha land which
was converted for non-agricultural use. But that would not be material for
deciding this appeal because the appellant has already given up its claim
qua that portion of land in the amended written statement. In fact, the trial
court has already passed a decree in favour of the plaintiﬀ in respect of that
portion which has attained ﬁnality. Thus, that one bigha of land is not the
subject matter of the current appeal.
51. In light of the discussion above, in my view, once there is no
dispute that a notiﬁcation regarding acquisition of the land was issued
and duly published under sub-section (1) of section 52 of the 1959 Act,
a presumption would arise under illustration (e) of Section 114 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 that the notiﬁcation was in conformity with the
provisions of the 1959 Act. This presumption, in my view, has not been
dislodged by the plaintiﬀ, as there is no speciﬁc plea in respect of: (a)
lack of power/authority of the person issuing the notiﬁcation; and (b) the
procedure prescribed being not followed in its entirety. No doubt, there is
a plea that notice as contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 569
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

the 1959 Act was not served upon the plaintiﬀ prior to the notiﬁcation but
there is no plea that no notice at all was issued to and served on any of the
persons recorded as owners in the record of rights. Therefore, once it is
established that the plaintiﬀ was not recorded as the owner in the record
of rights on the date of issuance of the notiﬁcation for acquisition of the
land, taking into account the law laid down in Ahuja Industries (supra),
I’m of the view that mere non-service of notice, under Section 52 (2) of
the 1959 Act, upon non-recorded owner, such as the plaintiﬀ, would not
render the acquisition notiﬁcation under Section 52(1) void. Thus, the Civil
Court could not have treated the notiﬁcation under Section 52 (1) of the
1959 Act as void. Issue no.(i) is decided accordingly.
Issue No.(ii) – Whether in respect of the land covered by acquisition
notiﬁcation, the suit of the plaintiﬀ for injunction simpliciter, without
seeking a declaration and, that too, without impleading the State as
defendant, maintainable?
52. As I have held that the acquisition notiﬁcation could not have been
disregarded as void, the question that would now arise for consideration is
whether the suit of the plaintiﬀ for injunction simpliciter, without seeking
a declaratory relief, would be maintainable in a Civil Court.
53. At this stage, at the cost of repetition, it may be observed
that initially the suit was instituted for injunction to restrain the Trust
(i.e., the defendant no.1- appellant) from taking possession of the land
without following due process of law. When, in the written statement,
the appellant took a speciﬁc plea that the land had already been acquired
and compensation was paid, the plaint was amended stating therein that
during pendency of the suit possession was taken and, therefore, a direction
be issued upon the Trust to restore possession. Despite knowledge of
appellant’s case that land has been acquired, no declaratory relief, either
to declare the notiﬁcation invalid or to declare plaintiﬀ as the owner, was
sought, despite the legal position that under sub-section (4) of Section 52
of the 1959 from the date of publication of notiﬁcation under sub-section
(1) of Section 52 of the 1959 Act the land would vest in the State free from
all encumbrances.
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

54. In Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy24, this Court had the
occasion to lay down general principles as to when a mere suit for permanent
injunction will lie, and when it is necessary to ﬁle a suit for declaration and/
or possession with injunction as a consequential relief. The relevant portion
of that judgment is extracted below:
“13. The general principles as to when a mere suit for permanent
injunction will lie, and when it is necessary to ﬁle a suit for declaration
and/or possession with injunction as a consequential relief, are well
settled. We may refer to them brieﬂy.
13.1. Where a plaintiﬀ is in lawful or peaceful possession of a property
and such possession is interfered or threatened by the defendant, a suit
for an injunction simpliciter will lie. A person has a right to protect
his possession against any person who does not prove a better title by
seeking a prohibitory injunction. But a person in wrongful possession
is not entitled to an injunction against the rightful owner.
13.2. Where the title of the plaintiﬀ is not disputed, but he is not in
possession, his remedy is to ﬁle a suit for possession and seek in
addition, if necessary, an injunction. A person out of possession,
cannot seek the relief of injunction simpliciter, without claiming the
relief of possession.
13.3. Where the plaintiﬀ is in possession, but his title to the property is
in dispute, or under a cloud, or where the defendant asserts title thereto
and there is also a threat of dispossession from the defendant, the
plaintiﬀ will have to sue for declaration of title and the consequential
relief of injunction. Where the title of the plaintiﬀ is under a cloud or in
dispute and he is not in possession or not able to establish possession,
necessarily the plaintiff will have to file a suit for declaration,
possession and injunction.
14. We may, however, clarify that a prayer for declaration will be
necessary only if the denial of title by the defendant or challenge to the
plaintiﬀ’s title raises a cloud on the title of the plaintiﬀ to the property.

24 (2008) 4 SCC 594
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 571
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

A cloud is said to raise over a person’s title, when some apparent defect
in his title to a property, or when some prima facie right of a third party
over it, is made out or shown. An action for declaration, is the remedy
to remove the cloud on the title to the property. On the other hand,
where the plaintiﬀ has clear title supported by documents, if a trespasser
without any claim to title or an interloper without any apparent title,
merely denies the plaintiﬀ’s title, it does not amount to raising a cloud
over the title of the plaintiﬀ and it will not be necessary for the plaintiﬀ
to sue for declaration and a suit for injunction may be suﬃcient. Where
the plaintiﬀ, believing that the defendant is only a trespasser or a
wrongful claimant without title, ﬁles a mere suit for injunction, and
in such a suit, the defendant discloses in his defence the details of the
right or title claimed by him, which raise a serious dispute or cloud
over the plaintiﬀ’s title, then there is a need for the plaintiﬀ, to amend
the plaint and convert the suit into one for declaration. Alternatively,
he may withdraw the suit for bare injunction, with permission of the
court to ﬁle a comprehensive suit for declaration and injunction. He
may ﬁle the suit for declaration with consequential relief, even after
the suit for injunction is dismissed, where the suit raised only the issue
of possession and not any issue of title.”
(Emphasis supplied)
55. In the instant case, the stand of defendant no.1 (i.e., the appellant
herein) was categorical that the land in dispute had already been acquired.
Therefore, in light of the provisions of Section 52(4) of the 1959 Act, a cloud
existed over the title of the plaintiﬀ. Further, during pendency of the suit,
plaintiﬀ admitted that possession was also taken. In these circumstances, in
the light of the law laid down by this Court in Anathula Sudhakar (supra),
without seeking a declaratory relief qua the validity of the acquisition
notiﬁcation, mere suit for injunction, in my view, was not maintainable.
56. In addition to what has been discussed above, there are multiple
decisions to the eﬀect that the validity of an acquisition notiﬁcation,
acquiring land under compulsory land acquisition laws for public purpose,
cannot ordinarily be questioned in a Civil Court, though its validity may
be questioned before a superior court by invoking its powers under the
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

Constitution of India. In State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar and others25,
a notiﬁcation under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act was published on
13.02.1957 acquiring the disputed land along with other lands for public
purpose. The declaration under Section 6 was published on 27.03.1957 and
possession of the land was taken on 22.03.1957. Several encroachments
were made on that land. When steps were taken to have the encroachers
evicted, a suit came to be instituted. In that suit, an application seeking
temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 of C.P.C. was ﬁled. The
trial court found that there existed a triable issue and thereby granted
injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiﬀ till
the disposal of the suit. Against the order of the trial court, the matter
went to the High Court. The High Court modiﬁed the temporary injunction
and directed status quo. Thereafter, the matter travelled to this Court. The
question that arose for consideration by this Court was whether a civil
suit would be maintainable and whether ad-interim injunction could be
issued where proceedings under the 1894 Act were taken pursuant to
a notice issued under Section 9 of the 1894 Act. Dealing with the said
question, it was held:
“3. … The provisions of the Act are designed to acquire the land by
the State exercising the power of eminent domain to serve the public
purpose. The state is enjoined to comply with statutory requirements
contained in s.4 and s.6 of the Act by proper publication of
notiﬁcation and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of
publication in papers and the local publications envisaged under the
Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notiﬁcations
and declaration under s.6, the public purpose gets crystalised and
becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the
Land Acquisition Oﬃcer to proceed with the acquisition of the land
and to make the award. Section 11A now prescribes limitation to
make the award within 2 years from the last of date of publication
envisaged under s.6 of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the
Govt. needs possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the
power under s.17(4) of the Act and dispense with the enquiry under

25 (1995) 4 SCC 229
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 573
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

s.5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled to issue notice to the parties under
s.9 and on expiry of 15 days, the State is entitled to take immediate
possession even before the award could be made. Otherwise, it would
take possession after the award under s.12. Thus, it could be seen
that the Act is a complete code in itself and is meant to serve public
purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised,
that by necessary implication the power of the civil court to take
cognizance of the case under s.9 of CPC stands excluded, and a
civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity
or legality of the notiﬁcation under s.4 and declaration under s.6,
except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable. When
such is the situation, the ﬁnding of the trial court that there is a prima
facie triable issue is unsustainable. Moreover, possession was already
taken and handed over to Housing Board. So, the order of injunction
was without jurisdiction.”
(Emphasis supplied)
57. In Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia26, validity of the
acquisition and of the award was challenged by instituting a civil suit for a
declaration that the land could not be acquired. In that suit, a preliminary
issue was framed regarding maintainability of the suit. The trial court held
that the suit was not maintainable. The judgment of the trial court was
aﬃrmed. The matter came before this Court. The contention raised on behalf
of the petitioner before this Court was that once the acquisition proceedings
were dropped by the Land Acquisition Oﬃcer, he had no jurisdiction or
power to reopen the same and to make the award under Section 11 of the 1894
Act. It was argued that the award is squarely illegal for want of jurisdiction.
After noticing the facts, this Court held:
“2. … It is seen that Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 gives
jurisdiction to the civil court to try all civil suits, unless barred. The
cognizance of a suit of civil nature may either expressly or impliedly
be barred. The procedure contemplated under the Act is a special

26 (1996) 7 SCC 218
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

procedure envisaged to effectuate public purpose, compulsorily
acquiring the land for use of public purpose. The notiﬁcation under
Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act are required to
be published in the manner contemplated thereunder. The inference
gives conclusiveness to the public purpose and the extent of the
land mentioned therein. The award should be made under Section
11 as envisaged thereunder. The dissatisﬁed claimant is provided
with the remedy of reference under Section 18 and a further appeal
under Section 54 of the Act. If the Government intends to withdraw
from the acquisition before taking possession of the land, procedure
contemplated under Section 48 requires to be adhered to. If possession
is taken, it stands vested under Section 16 in the State with absolute
title free from all encumbrances and the Government has no power to
withdraw from acquisition.
3. It would thus be clear that the scheme of the Act is complete in itself
and thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognizance of the
cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood barred.
The civil court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on
the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only
right an aggrieved person has is to approach the constitutional courts,
viz., the High Court and the Supreme Court under their plenary power
under Articles 226 and 136 respectively with self-imposed restrictions
on their exercise of extraordinary power. Barring thereof, there is no
power to the civil court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
58. Following the above two decisions (i.e., State of Bihar v Dhirendra
Kumar and Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat), in Commissioner, Bangalore
Development Authority and another v. Brijesh Reddy and another (supra),
it was held:
“18. It is clear that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete code in itself
and is meant to serve public purpose. By necessary implication, the
power of the civil court to take cognizance of the case under Section
9 CPC stands excluded and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into
the question of the validity or legality of the notiﬁcation under Section
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 575
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

4, declaration under Section 6 and subsequent proceedings except by
the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.
It is thus clear that the civil court is devoid of jurisdiction to give
declaration or even bare injunction being granted on the invalidity of
the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right available
for the aggrieved person is to approach the High Court under Article
226 and this Court under Article 136 with self-imposed restrictions
on their exercise of extraordinary power.”
59. Reverting to the present case, the acquisition is for a public
purpose, namely, development of land for residential colony and, by virtue
of sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the 1959 Act, the land stood vested in the
State free from all encumbrances with eﬀect from the date of publication
of the notiﬁcation. Once that is the position, in the light of discussion
above, and applying the law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v.
Dhirendra Kumar (supra); Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat (supra);
and Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority and another v.
Brijesh Reddy and another (supra), I am of the considered view that in
respect of land covered by the acquisition notiﬁcation, the suit as framed
was not maintainable.
60. Otherwise also, there was another patent defect in the plaint as the
State was not impleaded as defendant in the suit. The State was a necessary
party because all the steps taken for acquisition of land under sub-section (1)
of Section 52 of the 1959 Act were taken by it. And, by virtue of sub-section
(4) of Section 52 of the 1959 Act, the land vested in the State. Therefore,
when a collateral attack to the validity of the acquisition was launched by
the plaintiﬀ, by alleging that necessary steps for a lawful acquisition were
not taken, it was the State which could have eﬀectively disclosed whether
all the necessary steps required for a valid acquisition of the land were taken
or not. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the suit was also bad for
non-joinder of necessary party.
61. In my view, the suit in question is a classic example of clever
drafting where to avoid crucial issues, such as the bar of limitation and
response from the State, ﬁrstly, no declaration in respect of the acquisition
notiﬁcation was sought and, secondly, the State, which issued the acquisition
notiﬁcation and in whom the title of the land vested by a deeming ﬁction,
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

was not impleaded as a party. Such clever drafting to avoid critical issues
have been deprecated time and again by this Court as it amounts to an
unfair practice.
62. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satpal and another27 cautioning the
Courts to be mindful of the craft of creating an illusion of a cause of action
for instituting the suit, it was observed:
“5…………..The learned Munsif must remember that if on a
meaningful -not formal- reading of plaint it is manifestly vexatious,
and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a right to sue, he should
exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that
the ground mentioned therein is fulﬁlled. And, if clever drafting has
created an illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the ﬁrst
hearing ……….”
(Emphasis supplied)
63. The necessity to implead the State in a suit where an issue is raised
qua vesting of surplus land in the State, under the ceiling laws, for failure
to take possession before enforcement of the Repeal Act of 1999, has been
highlighted by this Court in Shri Saurav Jain & Another Vs. M/s A.B.P.
Design & Another (Civil Appeal No.4448 of 2021, arising out of SLP
(C) No.29868 of 2018, decided on 05.08.2021) 28 by observing:
“36…….The High Court held that no material was forthcoming on
whether actual and physical possession was taken by the Competent
Authority from the land owner and it held that in the absence thereof,
the ﬁrst respondent, as the purchaser from Zahid Hussain, would
continue to have a valid title. The High Court has entered these
ﬁndings despite the fact that by a process of engineered drafting, the
ﬁrst respondent sought no reliefs in regard to the proceedings under
the ULCRA (to obviate bar to the maintainability of the suit) and did
not implead either the State or the Competent authority who would
have been in a position to answer the challenge.”
(Emphasis supplied)

27 (1977) 4 SCC 467
28 LL 2021 SC 354
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 577
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

64. No doubt, in the instant case, the land was transferred by the
State to the Trust after acquisition, and the Trust was a party in the suit.
But it was the State which had acquired the land for the beneﬁt of the
Trust and by virtue of Section 52 (4) of the 1959 Act the land vested in
the State pursuant to the notiﬁcation issued by it under Section 52(1).
Therefore, in my view, when the relief of injunction was dependent on
validity of the acquisition notiﬁcation, the State was a necessary party as
it alone could have appropriately produced all the records about the steps
taken for acquisition of the land. Institution of the suit without challenging
the acquisition notiﬁcation and without impleading the State is a clever
ploy to avoid crucial questions. Such an exercise is akin to approaching
the Court with unclean hands. This alone, in my view, as also observed
by the trial court, disentitles the plaintiﬀ to obtain discretionary relief of
injunction. Thus, in my considered view, in respect of the land covered by
the acquisition notiﬁcation, the Suit as framed was not maintainable, not
only for not seeking a declaratory relief but also for not impleading the
State as a party. The issue no. (ii) is decided accordingly.
Issue no.(iii)-- Whether the civil suit of the plaintiﬀ was barred by
section 207 (2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act?
65. To appropriately address the issue as to whether the suit in the Civil
Court was barred by Section 207 (2) of the 1955 Act, it would be useful
to examine the scheme of the 1955 Act as also whether the reliefs claimed
in the suit were within the scope of the reliefs which could be sought for
under the 1955 Act.
66. The preamble of the 1955 Act provides that it is an Act to
consolidate and amend the law relating to tenancies of agricultural lands,
and to provide for certain measures of land reforms and matters connected
therewith.
67. Section 5(24) of the 1955 Act deﬁnes “land” as “land” shall
mean land which is let or held for agricultural purposes or for purposes
subservient thereto or as grove land or for pasturage including land occupied
by houses or enclosures situated on a holding, or land covered with water
which may be used for the purpose of irrigation or growing Singhara or
other similar produce but excluding abadi land; it shall include beneﬁts to
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened
to anything attached to the earth.
68. In the instant case, there exists no dispute between the parties that
for conversion of one bigha, out of 3 bighas of the land in dispute, from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, application was given, and conversion
was made after charging conversion fee, etc. This fact clearly demonstrates
that the land in dispute was agricultural land and was recorded as such in
the Jamabandi (i.e., record of rights). In so far as that one bigha of land,
which was converted to non-agricultural use, is concerned, no dispute
survives as the appellant gave up its claim to it and the trial court passed
a decree in respect thereof, which has attained ﬁnality. The dispute which
survives is conﬁned to that 2 bighas of the disputed land, which remained
agricultural land.
69. Section 207 of the 1955 Act provides:
“207. Suits and applications cognizable by revenue court only—
(1) All suits and application of the nature speciﬁed in the Third
Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court.
(2) No court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of
any such suit or application or of any suit or application based on
a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained
by means of any such suit or application.
Explanation — If the cause of action is one in respect of which
relief might be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that
the relief asked for from the civil court is greater than, or additional
to, or is not identical with, that which the revenue court could have
granted.”
70. Section 256 of the 1955 Act reads:
“S.256. Bar to jurisdiction of civil courts. – (1) Save as otherwise
provided speciﬁcally by or under this Act, no suit or proceeding
shall lie in any civil court with respect to any matter arising under
this Act or the rules made thereunder, for which a remedy by way
of suit, application, appeal or otherwise is provided therein.
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN 579
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [MANOJ MISRA, J.]

(2) Save as aforesaid no order by the State Government or by any
revenue court or oﬃcer in exercise of the powers conferred by this
Act or the rules made thereunder shall be liable to be questioned
in any civil court.”
71. In Pyarelal v. Shubhendra Pilania29 this Court, by relying on
earlier decision of this Court in Bank of Baroda v. Moti Bai30, held that
Section 207 read with Section 256 of the 1955 Act bars the jurisdiction of
the civil courts in respect of suits and applications of the nature speciﬁed
in the Third Schedule of the 1955 Act.
72. The Third Schedule of the 1955 Act, gives a list of suits, applications
and appeals which could be maintained under the Act. Entry 8A provides that
a suit for injunction could be ﬁled before the Court of Assistant Collector
within a period of three years from the date the cause of action arises. Entry
23-C provides that a suit for perpetual injunction can be ﬁled before the
Court of Assistant Collector within a period of three years from the date
the cause of action arises. Entry 5 provides that a suit for declaration of the
plaintiﬀ’s right as a tenant, or as a tenant of Khudkasht, or as a sub-tenant,
or for a share in a joint tenancy are also to be ﬁled in the Court of Assistant
Collector. Similarly, suit for declaration of tenancy rights or for recovery
of possession or for ejectment of trespassers can be ﬁled under Sections
89, 187 and 183 respectively, vide entries 6, 23 and 23-A respectively in
the Third Schedule.
73. Once it is established that two bighas out of three bighas of the
land in dispute was agricultural land and as such fell within the purview of
the 1955 Act, in my view, though the revenue court may not have had the
jurisdiction to annul the notiﬁcation acquiring the land, which, in any case,
was not sought for by the plaintiﬀ, the suit for injunction was maintainable
before the Revenue Court by virtue of Entries 8A and 23-C read with Entries
5, 6, 23 and 23A of the Third Schedule of the 1955 Act. Thus, the Suit before
the Civil Court was barred by Section 207 read with Section 256 of the 1955
Act. Issue no.(iii) is decided accordingly.

29 (2019) 3 SCC 692
30 (1985) 1 SCC 475
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

Conclusion
74. As I have found the suit not maintainable insofar as it related to the
land covered by the acquisition notiﬁcation and also barred by Section 207
read with Section 256 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, the defendant’s
appeal is entitled to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The judgment and
decree of the High Court as well as of the First Appellate Court are set aside
and the decree passed by the Trial Court is restored.

ORDER
In view of the diﬀerence of opinions and the distinguishing judgments
(Justice Hrishikesh Roy dismissing the appeal and Justice Manoj Misra
allowing the appeal), the Registry is directed to place the matter before
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for referring the matter to a larger Bench.

Headnotes prepared by: Matter to be placed before Hon’ble CJI
Nidhi Jain for referring the matter to larger Bench.

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