Holding

The acquisition notifications are invalid due to procedural defects and failure to pay compensation within the statutory period, and the High Court’s quashing of the acquisition stands.

Summary

The Urban Improvement Trust (the appellant) sought to acquire land in Nangli Kota and Moongaska villages under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. The respondents challenged the acquisition, alleging procedural defects: failure to serve individual notices under s.52(2), premature possession before compensation was paid, and non‑payment of compensation within the six‑month period prescribed by s.60A(4). The High Court quashed the acquisition proceedings, and the Trust appealed. The Supreme Court examined whether the 21‑year delay in filing the writ petitions could be condoned, whether the statutory notice requirements were mandatory, and whether compensation was lawfully determined and paid. It held that the procedural irregularities, especially the improper service of notice and the failure to deposit compensation within the statutory timeline, rendered the acquisition notifications invalid, and that the delay was condonable given the patent illegality of the acquisition. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court’s order and dismissed the appeals.

Issues considered

Whether the 21‑year delay in filing the writ petitions by the respondents should be condoned.
Whether non‑compliance with the mandatory notice requirements of s.52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 invalidates the acquisition notification under s.52(1).
Whether the compensation of Rs 90,000 for the Nangli Kota lands was lawfully determined and paid.
Whether the time‑limits for passing an award under s.60A(3) of the Act apply to acquisitions pending on 1 August 1987.
Whether the requirement to deposit compensation within six months of 1 August 1987 under s.60A(4) is mandatory for vesting of the land.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 300A
Evidence Act, 1872s. 114(e)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959s. 52(2), s. 52(7), s. 60A
Rajasthan Urban Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1987s. 60A

Headnote

Issue for Consideration The present appeals arise from a common judgment passed by the High Court dated 29.10.2009, whereby the High Court allowed the writ appeals and thereby quashed the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the appellant Trust. Headnotes† Rajasthan Urban Improvement s.60A – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Condonation of delay in filing writ petition – The appellant challenges the inordinate delay of 21 years in filing writ petition by the respondent, whether the same needs to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the case: Held: The

Subjects

Inordinate delay in filing writ petitionsFundamental RightsDelayLachesRight to propertyProtection of propertyCompensationDeposit of compensationAcquisition proceedingsLegality of acquisition proceedingsCondonation of delayNotification of acquisitionCompulsory acquisition of landNoticeService of noticePublication of noticeImplied noticeSection 60A(4) of Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959Section 52 of Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959

Judgment

[2024] 12 S.C.R. 993 : 2024 INSC 980

Urban Improvement Trust
v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 14473 of 2024)
13 December 2024
[J.B. Pardiwala* and Manoj Misra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The present appeals arise from a common judgment passed by the
High Court dated 29.10.2009, whereby the High Court allowed the
writ appeals and thereby quashed the land acquisition proceedings
initiated by the appellant Trust.

Headnotes†
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 – s.52(2), s.52(7),
s.60A – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Condonation of delay in
filing writ petition – The appellant challenges the inordinate
delay of 21 years in filing writ petition by the respondent,
whether the same needs to be considered in the facts and
circumstances of the case:
Held: The courts have consistently held that undue delay in
approaching the court can be a ground for refusing relief, the
courts have also recognized that in exceptional cases, where the
impugned action is patently illegal or affects fundamental rights, the
delay must be condoned – The right of an individual to vindicate
and protect private property cannot be brushed away merely on
the grounds of delay and laches – In the instant case, there are
three instances of procedural irregularity that may prejudice the
rights of the respondents herein: (1) the notice under Section 52(2)
of the RUI Act was not served individually to the landowners and
the same was not pasted at a conspicuous area of the locality
where the property was situated; (2) the possession was allegedly
taken by the State Government and handed over to the appellant
Trust prior to the deposit of compensation in contravention to
Section 52(7) of the RUI Act; and (3) the compensation in respect
of the Nangli Kota lands was not paid in terms of the timelines

* Author
994 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

stipulated in sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 60A of the RUI
Act – These procedural anomalies are glaring and necessitate
discussion regarding the propriety of the acquisition proceedings
so as to ensure that the landowners are not dispossessed of
their property without following due procedure – Therefore, the
writ petition filed before the High Court, despite the significant
delay, raised substantial questions regarding the legality of the
land acquisition proceedings – The alleged patent illegality in
the acquisition process justify the condonation of delay in this
exceptional case. [Paras 46, 51, 52, 53, 54]

Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 – s.52(1) – Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 – Notification for acquisition u/s.52(1)
of RUI Act – Publication of Notice:
Held: The provisions of the Section 52(2) are akin to Section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – To initiate the acquisition
proceedings, the State must publish a notice under Section 52(2)
of the RUI Act for the owners or any other interested parties to
show cause as to why their land should not be acquired – The
object of issuing a notice under Section 52(2) prior to a notification
under Section 52(1) is to allow the owners and interested
parties to put forth their case as to why a land proposed to be
acquired should not be acquired or to make representations
regarding the amount of compensation – A reading of Section
52(2) shows that the conditions of publication of notice in the
official gazette and pasting the same at a conspicuous area
of the locality are together considered to be sufficient notice.
[Paras 56, 57(b), 57(d)]

Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 – s.52(1) – Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 – The validity of the notification u/s.52(1)
for the acquisition of the Nangli Kota lands:
Held: It is an admitted fact by both the parties that there were
no individual notices served upon the owners as required
u/s.52(2) nor was the notice of the proposed acquisition pasted
on some conspicuous space in the locality where the property
was situated – The State Government had only published the
notice u/s.52(2) in the official gazette – A reading of s.52(2) shows
that the conditions of publication of notice in the official gazette
and pasting the same at a conspicuous area of the locality are
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 995

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

together considered to be sufficient notice and fulfilment of just
one requirement out of the two risked causing prejudice to the
respondents herein – What remains to be seen is whether the
improper service of notice did in fact deprive the respondents
from making their representations and objections to the acquisition
proceedings – The documents placed on record show that the
seven sons of late ‘RN’ participated in the proceedings before the
OSD and were aware that the Nangli Kota lands were proposed
to be acquired – Therefore, the participation in the proceedings
by the landowners themselves is sufficient evidence that the
object of the publication of the notice u/s.52(2) was met – The
acquiring authority that is, the State was not required to prove
actual notice of the proposal to acquire in this case and the
knowledge of the appellants about the acquisition proceedings
is equivalent to implied notice to the appellants – Therefore,
the non-service of individual notices upon the owners u/s.52(2)
cannot be a ground to invalidate the acquisition proceedings.
[Paras 57(a), 57(d), 57(e), 57(f), 57(g)]

Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 – s.52(1) – Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 – The validity of the notification u/s.52(1)
for the acquisition of the Moongaska lands:
Held: The State did not serve individual notices upon the owners –
The notice u/s.52(2) was also not pasted at a conspicuous
area of the locality in which the property is situated – The State
Government only published the notice in the official gazette – From
the documents placed on record, it is found that the representations
were made by the legal heirs of two of the original landowners
that is the RN and Y – There is no evidence of the participation
by the other two original landowners that is, RS and ML or their
legal heirs – The appellant Trust or the State Government has
also not adduced any evidence whether written or oral that these
two landowners and their legal heirs actively participated in the
acquisition proceedings and made their objections heard – From
the records, it is clear that improper service of notice u/s.52(2)
did in fact prejudice the rights of the two original landowners and
their legal heirs and they were not provided with an opportunity
to be heard – Such factum is sufficient to declare the notification
u/s.52(1) for the Moongaska land, invalid. [Paras 58(a), 58(c),
58(e)]
996 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 – Rajasthan
Urban Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1987 – s.60A – Land
Acquisition Act, 1894:
Held: After the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was extended to the
State of Rajasthan on 24.09.1984, an amendment in the RUI
Act was introduced vide the Amending Act, 1987 which provided
for the transitory measures for facilitating the application of the
Land Acquisition Act to the State of Rajasthan – The legislature
enacted Section 60A with a view to address the pending acquisition
proceedings which were initiated under the RUI Act – While sub-
section (4) puts an embargo on the challenge to an acquisition on
the ground of non-payment of compensation, it is accompanied with
a proviso that the compensation must be paid within six months
from 01.08.1987. [Paras 67, 68]

Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 – Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 – Whether the compensation was determined and
paid lawfully to the respondents:
Held: Since the improper service of notice u/s.52(2) invalidates
the notification issued u/s.52(1) of the RUI Act for the Moongaksa
land, so the discussion hereby is restricted to the acquisition
proceedings for the Nangli Kota lands – The OSD passed an
order u/s.53(3) of the RUI Act for settlement of compensation at
Rs. 90,000/- in lieu of the acquisition of the Nangli Kota lands –
However, the payment of compensation was delayed – There
are atleast two inconsistencies in the payment of compensation
to the respondents and the procedure of acquisition of the Nangli
Kota lands: (i) As per Section 52(7), the possession of the land
being acquired cannot be handed over to the appellant Trust till it
deposits the compensation amount determined u/s.53 of the RUI
Act – However, in the present case, the possession of the Nangli
Kota lands was handed over to the appellant Trust long before
it deposited the compensation amount with the reference court;
(ii) Even though the parallel litigation on the questions of nature
and ownership of the land bearing Survey no. 229 was concluded
in 1985, the compensation amount was deposited by the appellant
Trust in the reference court only on 31.12.1997 that is after 12
years – The present case is squarely covered by Section 60A(4)
as the Nangli Kota lands were already deemed to be vested in the
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 997

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

State after the notification under Section 52(1) was published –
While sub-section (4) puts an embargo on the challenge to an
acquisition on the ground of non-payment of compensation, it
is accompanied with a proviso that the compensation must be
paid within six months from 01.08.1987 – It is worth noting that
neither the State Government nor the appellant Trust deposited
the amount towards compensation to be paid to the respondents
within a period of 6 months – In fact, there was an inordinate
delay of almost 10 years in depositing the compensation amount
in the reference court – Further, no reason worth the name has
been provided by the State Government and the appellant Trust
for such delay – Therefore, in considered view of this Court, the
notification under Section 52(1) is liable to be declared invalid on
the ground that the compensation was not deposited and paid to
the respondents within the timeline specified in Section 60A(4)
as well as on the ground that the acquisition process was not
fair and in accordance with law – The improper procedure being
adopted by the State Government and the appellant Trust when
it took possession of the Nangli Kota lands before depositing
compensation for the same was in contravention of the mandate
of Section 52(7) of the RUI Act. [Paras 60, 63, 66, 71]

Case Law Cited
Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2020] 1 SCR 749 :
(2020) 2 SCC 569; Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh
[2022] 2 SCR 1041 : (2022) 7 SCC 508; Maharashtra State
Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service
[1969] 1 SCR 808; D.B. Basnett (D) through LRs v. Collector,
East District, Gangtok, Sikkim and Another [2020] 4 SCR 513 :
(2020) 4 SCC 572; Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram [2024]
9 SCR 443 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2598; N. Padmamma v.
S. Ramakrishna Reddy [2008] 9 SCR 535 : (2008) 15 SCC
517 – relied on.
Pratap v. State of Rajasthan [1996] 2 SCR 1088 : (1996) 3
SCC 1; Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition CMDA v. J.
Sivaprakasam and Ors. [2010] 15 SCR 491 : (2011) 1 SCC 330;
Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [2022] 19 SCR
757 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1408; Kolkata Municipal Corporation
& Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors. [2024] 5 SCR 831 : 2024
998 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

SCC OnLine SC 968; Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State
of Maharashtra [1974] 2 SCR 216 : (1974) 1 SCC 317; Ahuja
Industries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Others [2003] 3 SCR 351 :
(2003) 57 SCC 365; Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner v. Gordhan
Dass (D.) through LRs. & Others [2023] 14 SCR 520 : (2024) 3
SCC 250 – referred to.

List of Acts
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959; Rajasthan Urban
Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1987; Evidence Act, 1872; Land
Acquisition Act, 1894; Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955; Constitution
of India.

List of Keywords
Inordinate delay in filing writ petitions; Fundamental Rights; Delay;
Laches; Right to property; Protection of property; Compensation;
Deposit of compensation; Acquisition proceedings; Legality of
acquisition proceedings; Condonation of delay; Notification of
acquisition; Compulsory acquisition of land; Notice; Service of
notice; Publication of notice; Implied notice; Section 60A(4) of
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959; Section 52 of Rajasthan
Urban Improvement Act, 1959.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14473 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 29-10-2009 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in DBSAW No. 669 of 1999
and SBCWP No. 2171 of 1998

Appearances for Parties
Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Sr. Adv., R. Gopalakrishnan, Raghav
Sharma, Vaibhav Dwivedi, Ms. Ankita Chaudhary, Parmod Kumar
Vishnoi, Advs. for the Appellant.
Shiv Mangal Sharma, A.A.G., S. K. Verma, Milind Kumar, Swadeep
Singh Hora, Manish Kumar Choudhary, Ashutosh Kumar, Ms.
Namita Choudhary, Ms. Srishti Choudhary, Ms. Shefali Choudhary,
Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 999

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts: -
INDEX*

A. FACTUAL MATRIX ………………………………………........ 2
B. WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT ……...… 14
C. WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENTS ….... 28
D. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION ……………………….......... 34
E. ANALYSIS ………………………………………………......… 35
(i) On the question of delay in filing the writ petitions before 35
the High Court ………………………………………...........
(ii) On the validity of the notification for acquisition under 40
Section 52(1) ……………………...…………………….....
(iii) On the question of whether the compensation was 48
determined and paid lawfully to the respondents ……....
F. CONCLUSION ………………………..………………………... 57

1. Leave granted.
2. Since the question of law involved in all the captioned appeals is the
same, they were taken up for hearing analogously and are being
disposed of by this common judgment and order.
3. The present appeals arise from a common judgment passed by the
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur dated 29.10.2009
in D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 669/1999 in Civil Writ Petition No.
2171/1998 and D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 673/1999 in S.B.
Civil Writ Petition No, 2204/1998 respectively whereby the High Court
allowed the writ appeals and thereby quashed the land acquisition
proceedings initiated by the appellant Trust.

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
1000 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

A. FACTUAL MATRIX
4. The Urban Development Department, Government of Rajasthan,
Jaipur, issued a notice under Section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban
Improvement Act, 1959 (the “RUI Act”), published in the official gazette
on 01.07.1976, to one Ram Narain, proposing to acquire land bearing
Survey no.229 measuring 2 bighas & 2 biswas and Survey no.229/
287 measuring 2 bighas & 18 biswas situated in Village Nangli Kota,
Tehsil & District Alwar (the “Nangli Kota lands”). These parcels
of land were owned and possessed by Yogesh Chandra Goyal,
Radheyshyam Goyal, Manohar Lal, Krishan Murari, Omprakash
Goyal, Suresh Chandra Goyal and Ashok Kumar Goyal, the sons
of Ram Narain as well as Kamla and Kesar Bai, the daughters of
Ram Narain.
5. The appellant and the State Government also sought to acquire the
land bearing Survey no. 141 measuring 3 bighas and 9 biswas situated
in Village Moongaska, Tehsil and District Alwar (the “Moongaska
land”), owned and possessed by Ram Narain, Radheyshyam,
Manohar Lal and Yogesh Chandra Goyal.
6. Ram Narain was the khatedar of the Nangli Kota and Moongaskar
parcels of land. He passed away in 1973. The Nangli Kota land
was inherited by his seven sons and two daughters. As regards
the Moongaska land, the same was purchased on 25.07.1966 by
four individuals jointly by way of different sale deeds. Ram Narain’s
portion of the Moongaska land was inherited by his seven sons and
two daughters after his demise. However, the names of the two
daughters were not included in the list of legal heirs submitted by
the seven sons of late Ram Narain and did not become a part of
the mutation records until much later on 22.03.1985.

Acquisition proceedings for the Nangli Kota lands
7. The acquisition proceedings for the Nangli Kota lands came to be
initiated on 01.07.1976 when the Urban Development & Housing
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur issued a notification
under Section 52(2) of the RUI Act. Accordingly, Ram Narain was
informed about the intention to acquire the Nangli Kota lands.
8. In response to the said notice, the legal heirs of late Ram Narain
that is, his seven sons, appeared before the Officer on Special Duty,
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1001

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

Urban Improvement Trust (the “OSD”) from time to time and sought
time to submit proof regarding their ownership of the said land.
9. On 28.04.1977, the OSD sent a letter to the State Government
under Section 52(3) of the RUI Act recommending for issuance of
notification under Section 52(1) of the RUI Act.
10. Thereafter, the State Government issued a notification under Section
52(1) of the RUI Act on 16.06.1977 and the same was published in
the official gazette on 23.06.1977 showing the names of all seven
sons of late Ram Narain. In such circumstances, as per the sub-
sections (1) and (4) of Section 52, the said lands vested completely,
free from all encumbrances, in the State Government.
11. On 06.06.1980, the respondents submitted a statement of admission
agreeing to receive compensation amount of Rs. 90,000/- for the
acquisition of the Nangli Kota lands. The OSD issued an order
dated 01.07.1980 under Section 53(3) of the RUI Act for settlement
of compensation amount at Rs. 90,000/- in respect of the Nangli
Kota lands.
12. In the meantime, the Registrar, Board of Revenue, Ajmer sent a letter
dated 22.03.1980 to the appellant Trust apprising them of the ongoing
litigation before the Revenue Appellate Authority with respect to the
land bearing Survey no. 229 and instructed the appellant Trust not to
deposit the compensation amount till the final decision of the appeal.
13. According to the appellant Trust, the memo of handing over of the
possession of the Nangli Kota lands under Section 52(5) of the RUI
Act was signed by all seven sons of late Ram Narain on 23.10.1980
and the subject land was handed over to the State Government by
way of voluntary surrender. However, the respondents maintain that
possession was not handed over to the State Government either
voluntarily or forcibly. No record of possession of the subject land
being taken by the OSD has been maintained in the note sheet of
the OSD.
14. On 15.01.1981, the possession of the Nangli Kota lands was
handed over to the appellant Trust under Section 52(7) of the RUI
Act by the State Government. Thereafter, the said lands came to
be mutated in the revenue records in favour of the appellant Trust
on 15.06.1981.
1002 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

15. The appellant Trust, on 31.12.1997,made a reference before the
court of the Senior Civil Judge, Alwar in which an amount of Rs.
2,72,714/- was deposited i.e., Rs. 90,000/- along with 12% interest
p.a. from 15.01.1981 to 15.12.1997.
16. A notice was issued by the reference court to the respondents to
collect the amount towards compensation. After receiving the said
notice, the respondents challenged the acquisition proceedings
before the High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition no. 2171/1998 on
the ground that since no award was passed within a period of two
years, the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed.
17. A single judge of the High Court vide order dated 13.04.1999 rejected
the writ petition holding that in view of Section 60A(4) introduced by
the Amending Act, 1987, any land having stoodvested in the State
government prior to the 01.08.1987, the acquisition of the same cannot
be challenged on the ground that no amount of compensation was
deposited and paid to the landowners in accordance with Section
3A and Section 17A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
18. After the above referred order, the Nangli Kota lands came to be
mutated in the name of the appellant Trust.

Proceedings before the Revenue Authorities regarding ownership
of the land bearing Survey no. 229
19. The Tehsildar, Alwar presented an application before the Court of
Sub-divisional Officer, Alwar (the “SDO”) on 30.11.1968 for correction
of entries under Section 88 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 in
respect of the land bearing Survey no. 229 (one of the parcels of land
constituting the Nangli Kota lands). It was contended by the State
Government that since the area under the said land was “Banjar
Kadim” that is, it was never under cultivation, therefore, it was wrongly
entered into the name of the predecessors of the respondents.
20. After a period of four years, the SDO rejected the application of the
Tehsildar, Alwar on 28.03.1972 and held that the land bearing Survey
no. 229 was “Abadi” land that is, the land was supposed to be used
for residential purposes and was outside the purview of agricultural
or commercial land.
21. Aggrieved by the order of the SDO, the Tehsildar, Alwar filed an
appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Alwar, which was
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1003

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

allowed on 06.07.1977, and the land was declared to be “siwaichak”
land or government land available for allotment for agricultural
purpose.
22. The appellant Trust addressed two letters dated 02.12.1980 and
05.01.1981 respectively to the Tehsildar, Alwar stating that the
land bearing Survey no. 229 already stood vested with the State
Government after the issuance of the notification under Section
52(1). It was further informed to the Tehsildar that asper Jamabandi
Khatuni no. 37/ 20 the said land was shown running under the name
of Ram Narain and only the compensation amount remained to be
paid by the appellant Trust. Further, the appellant Trust requested the
office of the Tehsildar to ascertain whether the nature of the subject
land was determined to be ‘siwaichak’ (government land) or was in
the name of Yogesh Chandra Goyal. However, the documents put
on the record before us show no communication from the Tehsildar,
Alwar or any official of the State Government to the appellant Trust
informing about the status of the proceedings.
23. The respondents filed a revision application before the Board of
Revenue, Ajmer against the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority.
The Board of Revenue vide its order dated 30.12.1983 set aside the
order of the Revenue Appellate Authority and allowed the revision
application of the respondents.
24. Pursuant to the order of the Board of Revenue, the land bearing
Survey no. 229 was mutated in the name of the respondents that
is, the seven sons of late Ram Narain. The two daughters of Ram
Narain also got their names substituted in the mutation records in
respect of the said land.
25. Thereafter, the appellant Trust filed a writ petition bearing number
S.B. C.W.P. No. 1223/1985 before the High Court praying for setting
aside of the order of the Board of Revenue on the ground that the
appellant Trust was not impleaded in the proceeding therein despite
the transfer of possession of the land bearing Survey no. 229 to it
in pursuance of the acquisition proceedings initiated on 01.07.1976.
The single judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the
grounds that: (1) the appellant Trust should have sought a further relief
of decree of possession of the land in addition to a declaratory relief,
which was not done in the instant case; and (2) it was incumbent
1004 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

upon the State Government to have informed the Board of Revenue
that the possession of the subject land was handed over to the
appellant Trust, by giving an application under Order 22 Rule 10A
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as this was a fact that was
within the special knowledge of the State Government. It could not
come to the knowledge of the respondents that the land had been
transferred by the State to the appellant Trust and therefore, the
respondents could not be held liable for not impleading the appellant
in the proceedings before the Board of Revenue.
26. The appellant Trust, aggrieved by the judgment delivered by the
single judge, filed an appeal in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 20/2012.
The division bench of the High Court in its order dated 01.12.2014
observed that the appellant Trust had only reiterated the submissions
made before the single judge. The said submissions were considered
at length by the single judge and therefore, did not warrant any
interference from the division bench. Consequently, the appeal was
held to be devoid of merits and was accordingly dismissed.
27. The appellant Trust filed a Special Leave Petition bearing SLP
Civil Diary No. 29045/2018 before this Court, which is still pending
adjudication.
28. In the meantime, the State Government issued a notification dated
07.01.1990 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in
respect of the land bearing Survey no. 229, which was published in
the official gazette on 03.09.1990. The purpose of the acquisition
under the said notification was same as the purposes set out in the
notification dated 16.06.1977 under Section 52(1) of the RUI Act.
However, the notification under Section 4 was not followed by a
notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Acquisition proceedings for the Moongaska land
29. The acquisition proceedings for the Moongaska land were initiated
on 01.07.1976 when the Urban Development & Housing Department,
Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur issued a notification under Section
52(2) of the RUI Act.Late Ram Narain was informed of the same
by way of a notice. The subject land was individually purchased by
Ram Narain, Radhey Shyam Goyal, Yogesh Chandra Goyal and
Manohar Lal, however, the notice did not clearly specify as to from
whose portion of land, the acquisition was sought to be done.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1005

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

30. In response to the said notice, the legal heirs of late Ram Narain
that is, his seven sons appeared before the Officer on Special
Duty, Urban Improvement Trust (the “OSD”) from time to time
and sought time to submit proof regarding their ownership of the
said land.
31. On 28.04.1977, the OSD sent a letter to the State Government under
Section 52(3) of the RUI Act for issuing notification under Section
52(1) of the RUI Act.
32. Thereafter, the State Government issued a notification under Section
52(1) of the RUI Act on 16.06.1977 and the same was published in
the official gazette on 23.06.1977 showing the names of late Ram
Narain, Radhey Shyam, Yogesh Chandra Goyal and Manohar Lal,
being the landowners. In such circumstances, as per sub-sections
(1) and (4) of Section 52, the said lands vested completely, free from
all encumbrances, in the State Government.
33. The order of the OSD dated 25.09.1978 passed under Section 52(3)
of the RUI Act recorded that the amount of compensation could not
be determined by way of a mutual agreement, therefore, a reference
under Section 53(4) of the RUI Act was made to the Collector, Alwar
on 26.08.1982.
34. The OSD wrote a letter dated 29.05.1982 asking the respondents
to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the Moongaska
land under Section 52(5) of the RUI Act within 30 days failing which,
the possession would be taken over by force under Section 52(6)
of the RUI Act. On 16.07.1982, the possession of the said land
was taken over by the State Government under Section 52(6) of
the RUI Act. However, the respondents maintain that no actual or
physical possession of the subject land was ever taken by the State
Government. Further, the payment of compensation by the appellant
Trust was condition precedent for transferring possession of the
subject land to it, yet the same was not done in contravention of the
provisions of the RUI Act.
35. On 22.07.1982, the possession was handed over to the appellant
Trust by the State Government under Section 52(7) of the RUI Act.
36. By order dated 17.01.1988 passed by the City Magistrate, Alwar in
compliance of Section 60A of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement
(Amendment) Act, 1987 (the “Amending Act, 1987”), the total amount
1006 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

towards compensation was fixed at Rs. 27,600/-. The appellant
Trust was liable to pay compensation to the extent of 80% of the
total compensation decided, which was to be distributed amongst
Radhey Shyam, Yogesh Chandra Goyal and Manohar Lal. A notice
was issued to the respondents by the City Magistrate, Alwar on
27.01.1988, to collect the 80% compensation amount by 30.01.1988.
A messenger from the appellant Trust also went to the residence
of the respondents on 28.01.1988 to hand over the compensation
amount but the respondents declined to receive the same on the
grounds that compensation for the Moongaska land was supposed
to be computed in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
which was not done in the instant case and that no separate
apportionment of the amount towards compensation was done for
different owners.
37. The respondents challenged the legality and validity of the
acquisition proceedings before the High Court in S.B. Civil Writ
Petition no. 2204/1998 on the ground that since no compensation
had been paid to the respondents, the acquisition proceedings
stood lapsed. A single judge of the High Court vide order dated
13.04.1990 rejected the writ petition holding that no fault could
be found with the final notification which was published in 1977
and having regard to the provisions of Section 60A(4) introduced
by the Amending Act, 1987, the proceedings cannot be interfered
with merely on the ground that compensation was not paid to
the respondents. However, liberty was reserved in favour of the
respondents to collect the amount towards compensation if they
had not been paid yet.
38. The Land Acquisition Officer, Urban Improvement Trust, Alwar wrote a
letter dated 11.08.1999 to Vinod Kumar Goyal and other respondents
to collect the compensation amount otherwise, the same would be
deposited in court through reference. After the order passed by the
single judge, the Moongaska land was mutated in favour of the
appellant Trust.

Impugned judgment of the High Court
39. A division bench of the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the
respondents herein on three grounds. First,there was no substantial
delay in filing of the writ petitions by the landowners.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1007

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

40. Secondly, it was held that Section 52(2) mandatorily required that
individual notices be served on the landowners so that each owner
would be in a position to lodge objections against the intended
acquisition. It was also held that issue of individual notices under
Section 52(2) is condition precedent to the issuance of notification
under Section 52(1). As the notices under Section 52(2) were not
served properly in accordance with the provisions of the said section
in connection with both the Nangli Kota lands and Moongaska land,
the notification under Section 52(1) was liable to be quashed.
41. Thirdly, the appellant herein and the State Government had failed
to determine the amount towards compensation in respect of the
Moongaska land in accordance with Section 60A of RUI Act as
introduced by the Amending Act, 1987.

B. WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT
42. As regards the Nangli Kota lands, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, the
learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted as follows:
a) Ms. Dave addressed herself mainly on two issues: (1) Whether
the appellant fully complied with the mandatory requirements as
laid in Section 52 of the RUI Act for the purpose of acquisition of
the Nangli Kota lands and whether the acquisition proceedings
initiated vide the notification dated 16.06.1977 could have been
declared void?; and (2) Whether the appellant was required to
pay Rs. 90,000/- towards compensation for the acquisition of
the Nangli Kota lands?
b) As regards the first issue, the learned senior counsel submitted
that the appellant issued a notification dated 01.07.1976
under Section 52(2) of the RUI Act to Ram Narain proposing
to acquire the Nangli Kota lands. The said notice was also
published in the official gazette. The learned senior counsel
fairly conceded that on 01.07.1976, Ram Narain was dead
and gone.
c) In response to the said notice, the legal heirs of Ram Narain
that is, his seven sons appeared before the Officer on Special
Duty (OSD) and sought time to place on record the proof of
their ownership of the Nangli Kota lands. The respondents
submitted various representations in respect of the proposed
1008 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

acquisition proceedings vide letters dated 30.10.1976,
01.11.1976, 30.12.1976, 17.01.1977, 07.02.1977, 24.02.1977
and 10.03.1977. However, the respondents never apprised the
OSD that there was a litigation pending between them and the
state government regarding the nature and ownership of one
parcel of the Nangli Kota lands bearing Survey no. 229. This,
according to Ms. Dave, was a willful concealment of facts on
part of the respondents.
d) On 28.04.1977, the OSD sent a letter to the State Government
recommending for the issuance of a notification under Section
52(1) of the RUI Act for acquisition of the Nangli Kota lands.
e) The State Government, on 16.06.1977 issued a notification
under Section 52(1) which was published in the official gazette
on 23.06.1977. The learned counsel has submitted that since
the said notice showed the names of all the seven sons of late
Ram Narain, the notification under Section 52(1) was valid as
per the provisions of the RUI Act.
f) The learned counsel relied on this Court’s judgment in Pratap
v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 1 to submit
that after the issuance of the notification under Section 52(1),
the land vested completely in the State Government free from
all encumbrances, as per sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 52.
g) Further, the respondents were aware of the proposed acquisition
proceedings and appeared before the OSD who heard them
at every stage of the proceedings. This is substantiated by the
fact that the respondents sought time on multiple occasions to
produce proof of their ownership of the Nangli Kota lands. The
respondents also had the benefit of legal expertise and guidance
all throughout the acquisition proceedings which is evident
from the power of attorney or vakalatnama placed on record
on behalf of the respondents. Therefore, it could not be said
that the respondents being laymen had no proper knowledge
of the legal implications involved in the acquisition process.
h) The learned counsel relied on this Court’s judgment in Special
Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition CMDA v. J. Sivaprakasam
and Ors., reported in (2011) 1 SCC 330 to submit that there
was no requirement on the part of the acquiring authority to
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1009

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

prove actual service of notice of proposal to acquire land, on
the person whose land is sought to be acquired. The purpose
of notice is to make the owner(s) or interested parties aware
about the proposed acquisition and therefore, such knowledge
can also be inferred by way of implied or constructive notice.
i) The notification issued under Section 52(1) of the RUI Act
contained names of all the seven sons of late Ram Narain
and the same was issued after the respondents had appeared
before the OSD. Therefore, the purpose of issuing the notice
under Section 52(2) notice was achieved when all the interested
parties appeared before the OSD and no individual service of
notice or pasting of the notice at a conspicuous place of the
locality was required. The learned senior counsel submitted that
the High Court erred in holding the notice to be invalid taking
a hyper technical view.
j) There is a presumption as per illustration (e) of Section 114
of the Evidence Act, 1872 that the notification under Section
52(1) was in conformity with the provisions of the RUI Act. Such
presumption has not been dislodged by the respondents as no
specific plea has been taken by them in respect of: (a) lack of
power/authority of the person issuing the notification; and (b) that
the procedure prescribed has not been followed in entirety,
that is, no notice at all was issued to and served on any of the
owners. Moreover, once the respondents participated regularly
in the acquisition proceedings before the OSD and also handed
over the possession of the lands proposed to be acquired on
23.10.1980, no question of argument of non-compliance of the
provisions of the RUI Act could have been accepted.
k) Further, the respondents filed a writ petition before the High
Court in the year 1998. There was an inordinate delay of 21
years in challenging the acquisition proceedings which were
initiated in the year 1976. The High Court erred in holding
that the delay in approaching the court could be at best 5 to 6
years on the reasoning that the State Government issued and
published the notification in the gazette to acquire the Nangli
Kota lands on 03.09.1992. The appellant clarified that although
the respondents were seeking to challenge the notification
dated 16.06.1997 yet, the acquisition proceedings had begun
1010 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

in the year 1976. The subject land was handed over to the
appellant on 15.01.1981. Therefore, taking the year 1976 to be
the point of cause of action, the appellant submitted that the
respondents approached the High Court 21 years after vesting
of the said lands in the State Government. The learned senior
counsel made an additional submission that once the land
stood vested in the State and the possession was handed over
to the appellant, the appellant could be said to have acquired
ownership of the land.
l) The Nangli Kota lands were acquired in the year 1977 for the
purpose of a residential scheme. The general public would have
been the beneficiary. However, the protracted litigation and
inordinate delay frustrated the very purpose for which the land
was even though the subject land has been in the possession
of the appellant and lying vacant for almost 50 years.
m) As regards the issue of quantum of compensation raised by
the appellant, the learned counsel submitted that sub-section
(3) of Section 53 provided for methods of determination
of compensation. One of the methods provided therein
was that compensation can be determined by way of an
agreement between the State Government and the person to
be compensated. Section 53(4) provided that where no such
agreement could be reached, the State Government shall have
to refer the case to the Collector for determination of the amount
of compensation to be paid.
n) In the case of Nangli Kota lands, the amount towards
compensation to be paid to the respondents was decided as
per the statement of acceptance dated 06.06.1980 and a draft
agreement under Section 53(3) duly signed and submitted on
a stamp paper, by the seven sons of late Ram Narain. The
said agreement stipulated that the respondents shall accept
an amount of Rs. 90,000/- in lieu of the 5 bighas of the land.
The respondents also agreed to hand over vacant and peaceful
possession of the subject lands to the State Government
or any other person specified in their behalf. The appellant
submitted that the State Government agreed to the amount of
compensation as proposed in the draft agreement and eventually
paid the said amount in the court and therefore, whether the
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1011

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

draft agreement was signed or not by the State Government
was of no significance.
o) The appellant submitted that the Registrar, Board of Revenue,
Ajmer vide its letter dated 22.03.1980 addressed to the appellant
Trust had instructed that in view of the pending litigation with
respect to the ownership of the Nangli Kota land before the
revenue authorities, the amount towards compensation need
not be deposited in court. Therefore, the payment towards
compensation got delayed till the year 1997. The appellant
thereafter, had addressed a letter dated 02.12.1980 to the
Tehsildar, Alwar informing that the Nangli Kota land had already
been vested with the State Government with the issuance of the
notification under Section 52(1) of the RUI Act and asked the
Tehsildar, Alwar vide letter dated 05.01.1981 that the issue as
regards the ownership of the said land, once decided, should
be informed to the appellant immediately.
p) The State Government had moved an application before the
court of sub-divisional officer, Alwar seeking correction of entries
with respect to one of the parcels of the Nangli Kota lands
and had asked for a declaration of the same as “sivaichak
land” (barren land) to be recorded in the name of the State
Government. The court of sub-divisional officer rejected the said
application and declared the concerned land to be an “abadi”
land whose ownership was to remain with the respondents.
Thereafter, on appeal, the Revenue Appellate Authority heard
the matter ex parte and declared the said land to be “sivaichak”
land,to be recorded in the name of the State Government. In
pursuance of this order, the mutation of the lands was done
in the name of the State Government. The State Government
mutated the Nangli Kota lands in favour of the appellant Trust
on 15.06.1981. The respondents filed a second appeal before
the Board of Revenue, Ajmer against the aforesaid order
but did not make the appellant a party to the litigation. The
Board of Revenue allowed the second appeal on 30.12.1983
and ordered for the transfer of the land in the name of the
respondents. On 20.03.1985, the relevant entries were mutated
in the revenue records which transferred the Nangli Kota land
from the Department Urban Improvement Trust, Alwar to the
seven sons and two daughters of late Ram Narain.
1012 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

q) On 31.12.1985, the appellant filed a writ petition before the
High Court against the order of the Board of Revenue, Ajmer
dated 30.12.1983 on the ground that the said order affected the
rights of the appellant, without being joined as a party before the
Board of Revenue. A single judge of the High Court dismissed
the writ petition on 30.08.2011 which was upheld by a division
bench on 01.12.2014. The appellant has had filed a SLP before
this Court, which is pending adjudication.
r) The appellant clarified the revenue entries and status of
possession of both the parcels of lands forming part of the
Nangli Kota lands as under:
• The lands bearing Khasra no. 229 as well as Khasra no.
229/287 situated in Village Nangli Kota, were mutated in
favour of the appellant Trust on 15.06.1981.
• The order of Board of Revenue dated 30.12.1983 led
to the mutation of only Khasra no. 229 in favour of the
seven sons and two daughters of late Ram Narain. The
appellant asserted that the names of the two daughters
never figured in any ownership documents of the said
land before and was also never mentioned by the seven
sons of late Ram Narain, who regularly appeared before
the OSD in the acquisition proceedings.
• The land bearing Khasra no. 229 was again mutated
in favour of the appellant Trust and till date continues
to remain recorded in favour of and possession of the
appellant Trust.
s) It was submitted that in the case of compulsory acquisition,
there is no provision in the RUI Act which provides that the
landowners may decline to hand over the possession of the
land being acquired if the compensation amount had not been
paid to them and in any circumstances, the landowners cannot
refuse to hand over the possession of the land being acquired.
t) As regards the delay in payment of compensation, it was
submitted that the same was caused due to the parallel
proceedings pending before the Revenue Authorities which were
deliberately suppressed by the respondents. The appellant had
issued a notice dated 06.11.1997 asking the respondents to
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1013

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

collect the compensation amount but the respondents for the
reasons best known to them did not collect it.
u) In such circumstances, the appellant had to make a reference
before the District Judge, Alwar to disburse the compensation
amount to the respondents. Accordingly,an amount of Rs.
2,72,212.32/- that is, compensation amount of Rs. 90,000/-
along with 12% interest from 15.01.1981 to 15.12.1997 was
deposited with the court.
v) A notice was sent to the respondents to appear before the
Land Acquisition officer, Urban Improvement Trust, Alwar in
order to receive compensation. The cheque deposited in the
court of the District Judge, Alwar has not been collected by
the respondents till date, which shows the malafide of the
respondents to back out from a concluded acquisition and/or
to receive more compensation than was initially agreed upon.
w) Upon receipt of notice from the reference court, the respondents
challenged the acquisition proceedings before the High Court
on the ground that since no award was passed within a period
of two years, the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed. A single
judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the
ground that the addition of Section 60A(4) specifically barred
the respondents from challenging the validity of the acquisition
proceedings on the ground that no amount of compensation
was tendered and paid in accordance with Section 17(3A) of
the Land Acquisition Act.
x) The respondents filed an appeal before the division bench of
the High Court and the same was allowed vide the impugned
judgment dated 29.10.2009. The acquisition proceedings and
the notification dated 16.06.1997 issued under Section 52(1)
of the RUI Act came to be quashed.
43. As regards the Moongaska land, Ms. Dave submitted as follows:
a) The Urban Development Department, Jaipur had issued a
notice dated 01.07.1976 under Section 52(2) of the RUI Act
duly published in the gazette for the purpose of acquiring
the Moongaska land and in response to the said notice, the
respondents had appeared before the OSD and had prayed for
time to place on record the proof of their ownership and also
1014 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the representations in respect of the acquisition proceedings.
Thereafter, the OSD sent a letter to the State Government for
issuance of notification under Section 52(1) of the RUI Act for
acquisition of the Moongaska land. The State Government
issued a notification under Section 52(1) on 16.06.1977 which
was published in the official gazette on 23.06.1977 and showed
names of all the owners of the Moongaska land as per the
provisions of the RUI Act.
b) In terms of sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 52 of the RUI
Act, the land vested absolutely in the State Government free
from all encumbrances. The appellant relied on this Court’s
judgment in Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1 to
substantiate this assertion.
c) Further, the respondents used to regularly appear before the
OSD in the acquisition proceedings and were adequately
heard. The appellant submitted that it gave the respondents
adequate opportunity of hearing which is evident from the various
representations submitted by the respondents to the OSD.
d) The learned senior counsel relied on this Court’s judgment
in Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition CMDA
(supra) to submit that it was not necessary for the acquiring
authority to prove actual service of notice of the proposed
acquisition on the owners of the land or persons interested
therein. The objective of giving notice is to make the owners
or interested persons aware about the proposed acquisition
and the awareness or knowledge can be inferred by way of
implied or constructive notice. Therefore, the purpose of issuing
notice under Section 52(2) notice was achieved when all the
interested parties appeared before the OSD. The appellant
submitted that the reasoning assigned by the High Court that
the notice under Section 52(2) of the RUI Act was not properly
issued as the respondents were not served individually and
no notice was affixed at a conspicuous place in the locality
where the property was situated, could be said to be hyper
technical and based on an incorrect interpretation of the scope
and object of the RUI Act.
e) Further, the respondents at no point of time had raised a plea
that no notice at all was issued to and served on any of the
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1015

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

persons recorded as owners in the revenue records. Once the
respondents participated regularly in the acquisition proceedings
before the OSD, there can be no question of non-compliance
of the provisions of the RUI Act.
f) It was also submitted that the respondents should not have
been allowed to challenge the acquisition proceedings after an
inordinate delay of 21 years. Such belated challenge before the
High Court by way of a writ petition was improper and unjustified.
g) As the parties were unable to arrive at a consensus as regards
the compensation amount, the case was referred to the
Additional Collector, Alwar under Section 53(4) on 26.08.1982.
The Additional Collector vide order dated 17.01.1988 decided
the compensation amount for the Moongaska land to be Rs.
27,600/- and directed the appellant to pay the compensation
to the extent of 80% of the said amount as per the provisions
of Section 60A(4) of the RUI Act as amended in 1987.
h) The Additional Collector had also issued notice to the respondents
dated 27.01.1988 to collect the compensation amount from the
office of the Collector. It was sought to be explained that there
was a delay in determination of compensation due to a pending
litigation before the revenue authorities regarding the ownership
of the lands being acquired.
i) On 28.01.1988, a messenger from the appellant Trust also
visited the residence of the respondents to hand over the
compensation amount, however, the respondents refused to
accept the same. A notice to this effect was pasted outside the
respondents’ residence in the presence of a witness.
j) The Land Acquisition Officer, Urban improvement Trust once
again wrote a letter to the respondents dated 11.08.1999 asking
them to collect the compensation amount for the Moongaska
land otherwise the same would be deposited in the court
through reference.
k) In 1999, the Moongaska land was mutated in favour of the
appellant Trust. At the same time, a division bench of the High
Court passed an order for the maintenance of status quo in
respect of the Moongaska land.
1016 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

l) On 29.10.2009, a division bench of the High Court by way of
the impugned order, allowed the appeal of the respondents
and quashed the notification dated 16.06.1977 issued under
Section 52(1) of the RUI Act in respect of the Moongaska land.

C. WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
44. Ms. Namita Choudhary, the learned counsel for the respondents
made the following common submissions:
a) The learned counsel addressed herself on the following broad
questions:
• Whether the requirement to tender and pay the amount
of compensation within a period of six months from the
date of commencement of the Amending Act, 1987 (i.e.
01.08.1987) in terms of the provisions of sub-section
(4) of Section 60A of the RUI Act, as amended in 1990,
is mandatory to ensure absolute vesting of the land in
question?
• Whether the requirement to pass the award within
the stipulated time frame of one year or as the case
maybe, two years from the date of commencement (i.e.
01.08.1987) of the Amending Act, 1987 as contemplated
by sub-section (3) of Section 60A of the RUI Act, as
amended in 1990, is applicable to the compulsory
acquisition made under Section 52(1) and (2) of RUI
Act, after the extension of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to
the State of Rajasthan and the subsequent existing and
repeal of RUI Actand provisions of Section 11A of the
Central Act coming into play?
• Whether the issuance of notification under Section 52(1)
of the RUI Act is illegal and has been rightly quashed in
the absence of non-compliance of mandatory requirements
of Section 52(2) of the said Act?
b) As regards the Nangli Kota lands, the learned counsel submitted
that:
• The compensation was supposed to be paid in terms of
Section 60A(3) of the RUI Act, as amended. The State
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1017

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

Government and the appellant neither determined the
amount of compensation in terms of Section 52(7) of the
RUI Act nor did they pass an award in terms of Section
60A(3). Further, the deposit of 80% of the estimated
amount of compensation was supposed to be within a
period of six months as per Section 60A(4) but deposition
of compensation in the reference court was done only in
1997.
• The appellant relied on an undated and unsigned draft
agreement which, even though was offered by the
respondents themselves for fixing compensation at Rs.
90,000/- for all of the Nangli Kota lands under acquisition,
was never acted upon by the appellant. Therefore, the same
cannot be taken advantage of for fixing compensation in
the year 1997.
• Further, the State Government and the appellant Trust
had no intention to pay compensation for the parcels of
the Nangli Kota lands, the nature and ownership of which
was under challenge before the revenue authorities. It
was contended that the draft agreement was not accepted
by the Government because of the parallel proceedings
initiated by it before the revenue authorities claiming it to
be Government land. This led to lapsing of the time-period
provided in the new law for the payment of compensation.
• Therefore, a fresh notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in 1990 and published
in the official gazette in 1992, however, no notification
under Section 6 thereof was ever made. The respondents
submitted that the counsels for the appellant Trust stated
that acquisition proceedings begun in 1977 for the
Nangli Kota land had lapsed as it was superseded by
the notification issued later in 1990 which also ultimately
lapsed as it was not taken to its logical conclusion. This
position has been recorded by the division bench of the
High Court in the impugned order.
c) As regards the Moongaska land, the learned counsel submitted
that:
1018 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

• The compensation was supposed to be paid in terms of
Section 60A(3) of the RUI Act, as amended. The State
Government and the appellant neither determined the
amount of compensation in terms of Section 52(7) of the
RUI Act nor did they pass an award in terms of Section
60A(3). Further, the deposit of 80% of the estimated
amount of compensation was supposed to be within a
period of six months as per Section 60A(4), however,
deposition of compensation in the reference court was
done on 05.11.2009 after the acquisition notification stood
quashed by the impugned order.
• Further, the Additional District Collector vide order dated
03.12.1985 held that the respondents were not competent
to receive compensation as the transfer of land in their
favour was void ab initio. Even after the setting aside of
the Additional Collector’s order, no steps were taken by
the Government to decide the compensation until after the
acquisition proceedings itself were quashed by the High
Court vide the impugned order.
• The respondents submitted that the Government’s letter
dated 17.01.1988 to the appellant Trust highlighted that
the provisions of Section 60A(4) mandatorily required the
payment of 80% amount latest by 31.01.1988 that is, within
6 months from 01.08.1987 (the commencement date of
the Amending Act, 1987). The letter further mentioned
that in the event the appellant Trust did not submit the
compensation amount by way of a cheque to the District
Magistrate’s office latest by 21.01.1988, the same would
be construed to be that the appellant Trust was no
longer interested in the acquisition of the said land. This
was never complied by the appellant as is evident from
the belated deposit of the compensation amount in the
reference court after the impugned order was passed by
the High Court.
d) Since the respondents did not hear anything about the status
of the acquisition proceedings for almost 17 years, they were of
the view that the Government was not pursuing the acquisition
proceedings. However, in 1997, the respondents were suddenly
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1019

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

put to notice regarding the deposit of compensation in the
reference court. Thereafter, the respondents filed writ petitions
before the High Court for Nangli Kota and Moongaska lands.
e) In response to the appellant’s contention that Section 60A(4)
barred the respondents from challenging the acquisition
proceedings on the ground of non-payment of compensation,
the learned counsel for the respondents referred to this Court’s
decision in Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P.
reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1408 wherein it was held
that “…even if possession is taken, such possession cannot
be considered as legal so as to vest the land absolutely if
the prerequisite condition for payment of 80% before taking
possession is not complied. In such circumstance, by legal
fiction it looses its character as an acquisition under Section
17 and since the absolute vesting does not take place, it will
lapse if the further process is not complied and the award is
not passed within two years from the date of declaration…”
Therefore, even though Section 11A is applicable to the cases of
acquisition initiated under Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, the consequence of it will not affect the case where
the land has absolutely vested on compliance of subsection
(3A) to Section 17 of the Act, 1894 and 80% of estimated
compensation is tendered and paid.
f) As regards the averment of the appellant that the filing of the
writ petition was delayed, the respondents submitted that the
High Court in the impugned order factually recorded that there
was no delay of 17 years and that the delay was at most of 5
to 6 years.
g) The learned counsel relied on this Court’s decision in Kolkata
Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 968 and submitted that
compulsory acquisition would also be considered unconstitutional
if proper procedure was not followed by the Government.

D. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
45. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the following questions
fall for our consideration:
1020 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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(i) Whether the High Court committed any error in taking the view
that the respondents herein should be non-suited on the ground
of delay and laches?
(ii) Whether the High Court committed any error in holding that
non-compliance of the mandatory requirements of Section 52 of
the RUI Act had rendered the notification issued under Section
52(1) dated 16.06.1977 invalid?
(iii) Whether the amount towards compensation of Rs 90,000/- in
respect of the Nangli Kota lands was lawfully determined?
(iv) Whether the requirement to pass the award within the stipulated
time frame of one year or as the case maybe, two years from
the date of commencement (i.e. 01.08.1987) of the Amending
Act, 1987 as contemplated by sub-section (3) of Section 60A
of the RUI Act is applicable to the compulsory acquisition made
under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 52 of the RUI Act,
after the extension of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the State
of Rajasthan?
(v) Whether the requirement to tender and pay the amount of
compensation within a period of six months from the date of
commencement of the Amending Act, 1987 (i.e. 01.08.1987) in
terms of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 60A of the
RUI Act, as amended in 1990, is mandatory to ensure absolute
vesting of the land in question?

E. ANALYSIS

(i) On the question of delay in filing the writ petitions before
the High Court
46. As regards the appellant’s challenge to the inordinate delay of 21
years in filing of the writ petitions by the respondents, we are of
the view that the same needs to be considered in the facts and
circumstances of the case. While it is true that the courts have
consistently held that undue delay in approaching the court can be
a ground for refusing relief, the courts have also recognized that in
exceptional cases, where the impugned action is patently illegal or
affects fundamental rights, the delay must be condoned.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1021

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

47. It is pertinent for us to consider the judgment of this Court in Vidya
Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569,
wherein it was held, inter alia, as follows:
“12.12. The contention advanced by the state of delay and
laches of the appellant in moving the court is also liable to
be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case
of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances
shock the judicial conscience of the court. Condonation
of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must
be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts
and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the
breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed,
and when and how the delay arose. There is no period
of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their
constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat
it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC
152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]”
[Emphasis supplied]
48. The aforesaid view has also been reiterated by this Court in Sukh
Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2022) 7 SCC
508 wherein the court opined that there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to
doing justice. The relevant observations are reproduced below:
“16. Given the important protection extended to an
individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied earlier
in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article
300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet while
acquiring land, the question remains – can the State,
merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade
its legal responsibility towards those from whom
private property has been expropriated? In these
facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to
be unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the
grounds of equity and fairness.”
[Emphasis supplied]
1022 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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49. Similarly, this Court in its decision in Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service reported
in 1969 (1) SCR 808 held that:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the
party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where
by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation
in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But
in every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must
be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two
circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during
the interval, which might affect either party and cause a
balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or
the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
[Emphasis supplied]

50. This Court in its decision in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State
of Maharashtra, reported in (1974) 1 SCC 317 held that:
“10. …There was a delay of more than ten or twelve
years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause
of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents,
was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in
a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not
think this contention should prevail with us. In the first
place, it must be remembered that the rule which
says that the Court may not inquire into belated and
stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice
based on sound and proper exercise of discretion,
and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1023

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain
the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts.
The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in
Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110,
116 : (1969) 2 SCR 824] “is one of discretion for this
Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower
limit and there is no upper limit .... It will all depend
on what the breach of the fundamental right and the
remedy claimed are and how the delay arose”. …[
SCC para 11] …”
(Emphasis supplied)

51. The decisions of this Court have consistently held that the right to
property is enshrined in the Constitution and requires that procedural
safeguards be followed to ensure fairness and non-arbitrariness
in decision-making especially in cases of acquisition by the State.
Therefore, the delay in approaching the court, while a significant
factor, cannot override the necessity to address illegalities and
protect right to property enshrined in Article 300A. The court must
balance the need for finality in legal proceedings with the need to
rectify injustice. The right of an individual to vindicate and protect
private property cannot be brushed away merely on the grounds of
delay and laches.
52. In the present case, we find that there are three instances
of procedural irregularity that may prejudice the rights of the
respondents herein: (1) the notice under Section 52(2) was not
served individually to the landowners and the same was not
pasted at a conspicuous area of the locality where the property
was situated; (2) the possession was allegedly taken by the State
Government and handed over to the appellant Trust prior to the
deposit of compensation in contravention to Section 52(7) of the RUI
Act; and (3) the compensation in respect of the Nangli Kota lands
was not paid in terms of the timelines stipulated in sub-sections
(3) and (4) of Section 60A.
53. These procedural anomalies are glaring and necessitate discussion
regarding the propriety of the acquisition proceedings so as to ensure
that the landowners are not dispossessed of their property without
following due procedure.
1024 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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54. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the writ petition filed
before the High Court, despite the significant delay, raised substantial
questions regarding the legality of the land acquisition proceedings.
The alleged patent illegality in the acquisition process justify the
condonation of delay in this exceptional case.

(ii) On the validity of the notification for acquisition under
Section 52(1)
55. It is the case of the respondents that the appellant and the State
Government failed to meet the mandatory requirements of notice
laid down in Section 52(2) of the RUI Act. Section 52 of the RUI Act
is reproduced below:
“52. Compulsory acquisition of land- (1) Where on
a representation from the Trust it appears to the State
Government that any land is required for the purpose of
improvement or for any other purpose under this Act, the
State Government may acquire such land by publishing
in the official Gazette a notice specifying the particular
purpose for which such land is required and stating that
the State Government has decided to acquire the land in
pursuance of this section.
(2) Before publishing a notice under sub-section (1),
the State Government shall by another notice call
upon the owner of the land and any other person
who in the opinion of the State Government may be
interested therein to show cause, within such time as
may be specified in the notice, why the land should
not be acquired.
[Such notice shall be individually served upon the
owner of the land and any other person who in the
opinion of the State Government may be interested
therein. It shall also be published in the Official Gazette
at least 30 days in advance and shall be pasted on some
conspicuous place in the locality, where the land to be
acquired is situate. Such publication and pasting of
notice shall be deemed as sufficient and proper service
of notice upon the owner of the land and upon all other
persons who may be interested therein,]
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1025

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner
of the land and by any other person interested therein
and after giving such owner and person an opportunity
of being heard, the State Government may pass such
orders as it deems fit.
(4) When a notice under sub-section (1) is published
in the official Gazette, the land shall, on and from the
date of such publication, vest absolutely in the State
Government free from all encumbrances.
(5) Where any land is vested in the State Government
under sub-section (4), the State Government may, by notice
in writing, order any person who may be in possession of
the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the
State Government or any person duly authorized by it in
this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.
(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order
made under sub-section (5), the State Government may
take possession of the land and may for that purpose use
such force as may be necessary.
(7) Where the land has been acquired for the Trust, the
State Government shall, after it has taken possession of
the land and on payment by the Trust of the amount of
compensation determined under Section 53, on the amount
of interest thereon, and of the other charges incurred by
the State Government in connection with the acquisition,
transfer the land to the Trust for the purpose for which the
land has been acquired.”
[Emphasis supplied]

56. The provisions of the Section 52(2) are akin to Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. To initiate the acquisition proceedings,
the State must publish a notice under Section 52(2) of the RUI Act
for the owners or any other interested parties to show cause as to
why their land should not be acquired.
57. As regards the validity of the notification under Section 52(1) for
the acquisition of the Nangli Kota lands and procedural deviation as
alleged by the respondents, we observe the following:
1026 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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a) It is an admitted fact by both the parties that there were no
individual notices served upon the owners as required under
Section 52(2) nor was the notice of the proposed acquisition
pasted on some conspicuous space in the locality where the
property was situated. The State Government had only published
the notice under Section 52(2) in the official gazette.
b) The object of issuing a notice under Section 52(2) prior to a
notification under Section 52(1) is to allow the owners and
interested parties to put forth their case as to why a land
proposed to be acquired should not be acquired or to make
representations regarding the amount of compensation. A
deviation from the process prescribed runs the risk of prejudicing
the rights of the landowners and should be discouraged.
c) A plain reading of Section 52(2) shows that the legislature
considered publication of notice in the official gazette and
pasting of the same in conspicuous areas of the locality is
considered to be sufficient notice. These requirements are akin
to the ones under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The
requirement of individual notices to be served upon the owners
is an additional measure taken by the legislature to safeguard
the rights of the landowners. While the State Government
ought to have complied with this measure, we cannot say
that non-compliance therewith can make the whole acquisition
proceedings infructuous.
d) However, a reading of Section 52(2) shows that the conditions of
publication of notice in the official gazette and pasting the same
at a conspicuous area of the locality are together considered
to be sufficient notice and fulfilment of just one requirement out
of the two risked causing prejudice to the respondents herein.
e) What remains to be seen is whether the improper service of
notice did in fact deprive the respondents from making their
representations and objections to the acquisition proceedings.
The documents placed on record show that the seven sons
of late Ram Narain participated in the proceedings before the
OSD and were aware that the Nangli Kota lands were proposed
to be acquired.
f) This Court has held in the case of Special Deputy Collector,
Land Acquisition CMDA (supra) that:
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1027

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

“The acquiring authority need not prove actual notice of
the proposal to acquire under section 4(1)of the Act to
the person challenging the acquisition. As the purpose of
publication of public notice provided in section 4(10) of
the Act is to give notice of the proposal of acquisition to
the persons concerned, such notice can also be by way
of implied notice or constructive notice. For this purpose,
we may refer to the difference between actual, implied
and constructive notice:
1. When notice is directly served upon a party in a
formal manner or when it is received personally by
him, there is actual notice.
2. If from the facts it can be inferred that a party
knew about the subject matter of the notice,
knowledge is to be imputed by implied notice.
For example, if the purpose of the notice is to
require a party to appear before an authority on a
particular date, even though such a notice is not
personally served on him, if the person appears
before the authority on that date or participates
in the subsequent proceedings, then the person
can be said to have implied notice.
3. Notice arising by presumption of law from the
existence of certain specified facts and circumstances
is constructive or deemed notice, for example, any
person purchasing or obtaining a transfer of an
immovable property is deemed to have notice of all
transactions relating to such property affected by
registered instruments till the date of his acquisition.
Or where the statute provides for publication of the
notification relating to a proposed acquisition of
lands in the gazette and newspapers and by causing
public notice of the substance of the notification at
convenient places in the locality, but does not provide
for actual direct notice, then such provision provides
for constructive notice and on fulfillment of those
requirements, all persons interested in the lands
1028 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

proposed for acquisition are deemed to have notice
of the proposal regarding acquisition.”
[Emphasis supplied]

Therefore, the participation in the proceedings by the
landowners themselves is sufficient evidence that the object
of the publication of the notice under Section 52(2) was met
and we are of the view that the acquiring authority that is, the
State was not required to prove actual notice of the proposal
to acquire in this case and the knowledge of the appellants
about the acquisition proceedings is equivalent to implied
notice to the appellants.
g) Therefore, the non-service of individual notices upon the
owners under Section 52(2) cannot be a ground to invalidate
the acquisition proceedings. We find that the reasoning of the
High Court to this extent is liable to be set aside.
58. As regards the validity of the notification under Section 52(1) for
the acquisition of the Moongaska lands and procedural deviation as
alleged by the respondents, we observe the following:
a) In case of this parcel of land as well, the State did not serve
individual notices upon the owners. The notice under Section
52(2) was also not pasted at a conspicuous area of the locality
in which the property is situated. The State Government only
published the notice in the official gazette.
b) This Court in the case of Kolkata Municipal Corporation
(supra)has held that the “right to be heard” forms an integral
part of the seven sub-rights that have been synchronously
incorporated in laws concerning compulsory acquisition.
Improper service of notice under Section 52(2) runs the risk
of contravening the “right to be heard”. Whether the objective
of making the respondents aware was achieved or not has to
be tested on the basis of concrete evidence placed on record
by the parties.
c) For the reasons stated hereinabove, we move directly to
ascertain whether the improper service of notice prejudiced
the rights of the landowners. From the documents placed on
record before us, we find that the representations made by
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1029

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

the landowners dated 30.10.1976, 01.11.1976, 30.12.1976,
17.01.1977, 07.02.1977, 24.02.1977 and 10.03.1977 were only
from legal heirs of two of the original landowners, that is the
late Mr. Ram Narain and Mr. Yogesh Chand Goyal. We find that
there is no evidence of the participation by the other two original
landowners that is, Mr. Radhey Shyam and Mr. Manohar Lal or
their legal heirs. The appellant Trust or the State Government
has also not adduced any evidence whether written or oral that
these two landowners and their legal heirs actively participated
in the acquisition proceedings and made their objections heard.
d) The appellant’s contention that there is a presumption as per
illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 that
the notification under Section 52(1) was in conformity with the
provisions of the RUI Act unless dislodged by the respondents,
is of no avail to them. Such presumption is available to the
State in cases where the owner or interested party had not
gotten their names recorded in the revenue records thereby
disabling the State from identifying who the interested parties
are. This has been the position adopted by this Court in Ahuja
Industries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Others reported in
(2003) 5 SCC 365 and the split verdict by Manoj Misra J. in
the case of Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner v. Gordhan
Dass (D.) through LRs. & others reported in (2024) 3 SCC
250 wherein it was held that “mere non-service of notice, under
Section 52(2) of the 1959 Act, upon non-recorded owner,
such as the plaintiff, would not render the acquisition notification
under Section 52(1) void…”
However, in the present case, there was no question of the
landowners’ names not being present in the revenue records,
therefore, the presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence
Act, 1872 is of no help to the appellant’s case.
e) We find from the records placed before us that improper service
of notice under Section 52(2) did in fact prejudice the rights of
the two original landowners and their legal heirs and they were
not provided with an opportunity to be heard. Such factum is
sufficient to declare the notification under Section 52(1) for the
Moongaska land, invalid. Thus, we uphold the findings of the
High Court to this extent.
1030 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

59. This Court in the case of D.B. Basnett (D) through LRs v. Collector,
East District, Gangtok, Sikkim and another, reported in (2020) 4
SCC 572 has held that:
“14. …even though rights in land are no more a
fundamental right, still it remains a constitutional right
under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, and the
provisions of any Act seeking to divest any person
from the rights in property have to be strictly followed.
15. It is also settled law that following the procedure of
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 18942 (akin to
Section 5(1) of the said Act) is mandatory, and unless that
notice is given in accordance with the provisions contained
therein, the entire acquisition proceeding would be vitiated.
An entry into the premises based on such non-compliance
would result in the entry being unlawful3 . The law being
ex-propriatory in character, the same is required to be
strictly followed. The purpose of the notice is to intimate
the interested persons about the intent to acquire the land.
These provisions, as they read, of the said Act, thus, are
also required to be so followed.”
[Emphasis supplied]

Therefore, we are of the view that in cases of compulsory acquisition
by the State, it is all the more important that proper service of notice
be made to the owners.

(iii) On the question of whether the compensation was
determined and paid lawfully to the respondents
60. Since we are of the view that the improper service of notice under
Section 52(2) invalidates the notification issued under Section 52(1)
of the RUI Act for the Moongaksa land, we restrict the discussion
regarding compensation to the acquisition proceedings for the Nangli
Kota lands.
61. According to the respondent, the Nangli Kota lands came to be vested
absolutely and free from all encumbrances on 16.06.1977 that is,
when the notification under Section 52(1) was issued and published
in the official gazette. Even though the acquisition proceedings for the
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1031

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

Nangli Kota lands were initiated in 1976, the acquisition proceedings
remained pending till 1997 when the appellant Trust finally deposited
the compensation amount in the reference court.
62. It is clear from the facts that the possession of the Nangli Kota lands
was taken by the State Government on 23.10.1980. Thereafter, the
Government handed over the possession of the said lands to the
appellant Trust on 15.01.1981 under Section 52(7). The lands were
also mutated in the name of the appellant Trust on 15.06.1981.
63. It is the case of the appellant Trust and the State Government that
the respondents had sent on stamp paper a duly signed statement
of admission that they agreed to receive Rs. 90,000/- in lieu of the
Nangli Kota lands and that the said amount was acceptable to the
State Government. The OSD passed an order under Section 53(3)
of the RUI Act for settlement of compensation at Rs. 90,000/- in lieu
of the acquisition of the Nangli Kota lands. However, the payment
of compensation was delayed as the Registrar, Board of Revenue
informed the appellant Trust of the ongoing litigation in respect of
the nature and ownership of the Survey no. 229 which formed part
of the Nangli Kota lands.
64. The respondents on the other hand, averred that the agreement to
receive Rs. 90,000/- in lieu of the Nangli Kota lands was not signed
by the designated official of the Government and therefore, does not
constitute a binding agreement for the determination of compensation.
However, from the records placed forth by the parties, we are inclined
to reject this contention as the order of the OSD settling compensation
amount at Rs. 90,000/- was sufficient acceptance of the agreement
sent by the respondents, in our view.
65. As regards the delay in payment of compensation, it is apposite to
state that the parallel litigation regarding the nature and ownership
of land bearing Survey no. 229 concluded after the said land was
mutated in the name of the respondents on 20.03.1985 after the
Board of Revenue, Ajmer held on 30.12.1983 that the said land
was ‘abadi land’ and belonged to the respondents and not the State
Government. The appellant Trust has filed a writ petition against the
mutation of the lands in the name of the respondents as the land
was already previously mutated in its name in 1981. However, it is
pertinent to mention that the appellant Trust did not challenge the
Board of Revenue’s decision on the nature of the land.
1032 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

66. We find at least two inconsistencies in the payment of compensation
to the respondents and the procedure of acquisition of the Nangli
Kota lands:
• As per Section 52(7), the possession of the land being acquired
cannot be handed over to the appellant Trust till it deposits the
compensation amount determined under Section 53 of the RUI
Act. However, in the present case, the possession of the Nangli
Kota lands was handed over to the appellant Trust long before
it deposited the compensation amount with the reference court.
• Even though the parallel litigation on the questions of nature and
ownership of the land bearing Survey no. 229 was concluded
in 1985, the compensation amount was deposited by the
appellant Trust in the reference court only on 31.12.1997 that
is after 12 years.
67. After the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was extended to the State of
Rajasthan on 24.09.1984, an amendment in the RUI Act was introduced
vide the Amending Act, 1987 which provided for the transitory
measures for facilitating the application of the Land Acquisition Act
to the State of Rajasthan. The legislature enacted Section 60A with
a view to address the pending acquisition proceedings which were
initiated under the RUI Act. The transitory provision of Rajasthan
Urban Improvement Act, 1959 is reproduced hereunder:
“60A. Transitory provisions for pending matters relating
to acquisition of land.
(1) Notwithstanding anything otherwise contained in sub-
section (1) of section 52, where, in any matter relating
to the acquisition of land pending between 24th day of
September, 1984 and 31st July, 1987, an action, thing
or order has been taken, done or made under and in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, as it stood
before the 1st day of August, 1987, such action, thing or
order shall not be re-opened or reviewed or be liable to be
challenged on the ground that such action, thing or order
was at variance with that provided in the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1984) (hereinafter in this
section referred to as the Land Acquisition Act) subject,
however, that any further proceeding, action or order in
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1033

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

such matter conducted, taken or made on or after the 1st
day of August, 1987 shall, subject to the other provisions
of this section, be made under and in accordance with
the Land Acquisition Act.
(2) The amount of compensation or interest or that
payable for any other reason shall, in a matter pending
on the 1st day of August , 1987, be payable under and
in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act and the money paid prior to the 1st day of August,
1987 shall be deducted from or adjusted against the
said amount.
(3) Where in a matter pending on the 1st day of August,
1987, a notice under sub-section (2) of section 52 or a
notice under subsection (1) thereof has been served or, as
the case may be, published, such notice shall be deemed
to be the notification or declaration published or made
under sub-section (1) of section 4 or, as the case may be,
under sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act and the declaration or award in such a matter shall
be made within a period of one year or, as the case may
be, two years from the 1st day of August, 1987.
(4) Where any land has, prior to the 1st day of
August, 1987, vested in the State Government or its
possession has been taken in accordance with the
provisions of this Act as it stood before the 1st day
of August, 1987, such vesting or possession of land
shall not be liable to be challenged on the ground that
no amount of compensation was tendered and paid
in accordance with sub-section (3-A) of section 17 of
the Land Acquisition Act, subject, however, that such
amount shall be tendered and paid within a period of
six months from the 1st day of August, 1987.
(5) In determining the amount of compensation to be
awarded in a matter pending on the 1st day of August,
1987, the market value of the land at the date on which
the notice was published in the Official Gazette under sub-
section (2) of section 52, as it stood before the 1st day of
August, 1987, shall be taken into consideration.
1034 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(6) Every transfer of land under this section shall be either
on free hold basis or on lease hold basis.
(7)Any land sold, allotted, regularized or otherwise
transferred on lease hold basis may be converted in
free hold basis subject to such terms and conditions,
and on payment of such conversion charges, as may be
prescribed.
Explanation. - For the purposes of tins section, “free hold”
means tenure in perpetuity with right of inheritance and
alienation.
Validation. - Notwithstanding anything contained in any
judgment, decree or order or finding of any court, tribunal
or Authority to the contrary, any action, thing or order
taken, done or made under and in accordance with the
provisions relating to acquisition of land contained in the
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, shall be deemed
to be valid and effective as if such action, thing or order
has been made, taken or done under the said Act as
amended by this Act.”
[Emphasis supplied]

68. The present case is squarely covered by Section 60A(4) as the Nangli
Kota lands were already deemed to be vested in the State after the
notification under Section 52(1) was published. While sub-section (4)
puts an embargo on the challenge to an acquisition on the ground of
non-payment of compensation, it is accompanied with a proviso that
the compensation must be paid within six months from 01.08.1987. It
is worth noting that neither the State Government nor the appellant
Trust deposited the amount towards compensation to be paid to
the respondents within a period of 6 months. In fact, there was an
inordinate delay of almost 10 years in depositing the compensation
amount in the reference court. Further, no reason worth the name
has been provided by the State Government and the appellant
Trust for such delay. We are of the view that the contention of the
appellant Trust regarding the delay in the payment of compensation
due to parallel proceedings before the revenue authorities, cannot
be accepted.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1035

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

69. This Court in the case of Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram,
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2598 has held that the right to
property is to be considered not only a constitutional or statutory
right but also a human right and therefore, time is of the essence in
determination and payment of compensation by the State, otherwise
there would be a breach of Article 300A of the Constitution. The
relevant para of the judgment is reproduced below:
“46. This Court has held in Dharnidhar Mishra (D) and
Another v. State of Bihar and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 932 and State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011)
10 SCC 404 that the right to property is now considered
to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but
also a human right. This Court held in Tukaram Kana
Joshi and Ors. thr. Power of Attorney Holder v. M.I.D.C.
and Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 353 that in a welfare State, the
statutory authorities are legally bound to pay adequate
compensation and rehabilitate the persons whose lands
are being acquired. The non-fulfilment of such obligations
under the garb of industrial development, is not permissible
for any welfare State as that would tantamount to uprooting
a person and depriving them of their constitutional/human
right.
47. That time is of the essence in determination and
payment of compensation is also evident from this
Court’s judgment in Kukreja Construction Company
& Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 2547 wherein it has been held that once the
compensation has been determined, the same is payable
immediately without any requirement of a representation or
request by the landowners and a duty is cast on the State
to pay such compensation to the land losers, otherwise
there would be a breach of Article 300-A of the Constitution.
48. In the present case, the Government of Himachal
Pradesh as a welfare State ought to have proactively
intervened in the matter with a view to ensure that the
requisite amount towards compensation is paid at the
earliest. The State cannot abdicate its constitutional and
statutory responsibility of payment of compensation by
1036 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

arguing that its role was limited to initiating acquisition
proceedings under the MOU signed between the Appellant,
JAL and itself. We find that the delay in the payment
of compensation to the landowners after taking
away ownership of the subject land from them is in
contravention to the spirit of the constitutional scheme
of Article 300A and the idea of a welfare State.
49. Acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken
under the power of eminent domain of the government
much against the wishes of the owners of the land
which gets acquired. When such a power is exercised,
it is coupled with a bounden duty and obligation on the
part of the government body to ensure that the owners
whose lands get acquired are paid compensation/
awarded amount as declared by the statutory award
at the earliest.”
[Emphasis supplied]

70. This Court has also held in the case of N. Padmamma v.
S. Ramakrishna Reddy, reported in (2008) 15 SCC 517 that:
“21. If a right of property is a human right as also a
constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except
in accordance with law. Article 300 A of the Constitution
protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking
to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions
of Article 300 A of the Constitution of India, must be
strictly construed. (See - Hindustan Petroleum Corpn.
Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, [(2005) 7 SCC 627]”
[Emphasis supplied]

71. Therefore, in our considered view, the notification under Section 52(1)
is liable to be declared invalid on the ground that the compensation
was not deposited and paid to the respondents within the timeline
specified in Section 60A(4) as well as on the ground that the
acquisition process was not fair and in accordance with law. The
improper procedure being adopted by the State Government and
the appellant Trust when it took possession of the Nangli Kota lands
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1037

Urban Improvement Trust v.
Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors.

before depositing compensation for the same was in contravention
of the mandate of Section 52(7) of the RUI Act.

F. CONCLUSION
72. For all the foregoing reasons, we have reached the conclusion that
no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been
committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order.
73. As a result, the appeals stand dismissed. Parties shall bear their own
cost. Pending applications, if any shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan