Holding

Clause 2.2 does not create a contract of guarantee and ECL cannot be treated as a guarantor for the loan facilities.

Summary

The appellant UV Asset Reconstruction Company claimed that Electrosteel Castings Ltd (ECL), as promoter of borrower Electrosteel Steels Ltd (ESL), had provided a guarantee for a Rs 500 crore loan from SREI, based on Clause 2.2 of a Deed of Undertaking which required ECL to arrange infusion of funds to help ESL meet financial covenants. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether this clause amounted to a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and whether the insolvency resolution plan extinguished any such liability. The Court examined the language of Clause 2.2 and held that it created an obligation to the borrower, not a direct promise to the creditor to discharge the debt, and therefore did not satisfy the statutory requirements of a guarantee. It also noted that the sanction letter and other documents did not contemplate any personal or corporate guarantee from ECL. Consequently, the Court affirmed the findings of the NCLT and NCLAT that ECL was not a guarantor. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Issues considered

Whether Clause 2.2 of the Deed of Undertaking constitutes a contract of guarantee within the meaning of Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
Whether the approval of the insolvency resolution plan extinguishes any liability of ECL as a guarantor for the financial facilities availed by ESL.

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue pertains to the interpretation of Clause 2.2 of Deed of Undertaking executed between SREI-original creditor, which subsequently assigned all its rights and interests in favour of the appellant; ESL-borrower; and ECL-erstwhile promoter of ESL and obligor in and whether Clause 2.2 constitutes a contract of guarantee within the meaning of s.126 of the Contract Act, 1872 thereby rendering ECL as a guarantor to SREI in respect of financial facilities availed by ESL from SREI. Headnotes† Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 –

Subjects

Indian Accounting StandardsClause 2.2 of Deed of UndertakingContract of guaranteeGuarantorFinancial facilitiesInfusion of fundsPromoterEssential ingredients of a guarantee‘See to it’ guarantee

Judgment

[2026] 1 S.C.R. 130 : 2026 INSC 14

UV Asset Reconstruction Company Limited
v.
Electrosteel Castings Limited
(Civil Appeal No. 9701 of 2024)
06 January 2026
[Sanjay Kumar and Alok Aradhe,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue pertains to the interpretation of Clause 2.2 of Deed of
Undertaking executed between SREI-original creditor, which
subsequently assigned all its rights and interests in favour of the
appellant; ESL-borrower; and ECL-erstwhile promoter of ESL
and obligor in the Deed of Undertaking; and whether Clause 2.2
constitutes a contract of guarantee within the meaning of s.126 of
the Contract Act, 1872 thereby rendering ECL as a guarantor to
SREI in respect of financial facilities availed by ESL from SREI.

Headnotes†
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Contract Act, 1872 –
Contract of Guarantee – Infusion of funds – Clause 2.2 of
Deed of Undertaking – Interpretation of – Financial facilities
availed by ESL-borrower from SREI-original creditor – ECL
being the promoter of ESL required to furnish an undertaking
to arrange for the infusion of funds – ECL, one of the
promotors of ESL, executed Deed of Undertaking, warranty,
and indemnity (undertaking) whereby it undertook a limited
obligation to arrange for infusion of funds into ESL – SREI
subsequently assigned all its rights and interests in favour of
UV Company-appellant – Clause 2.2, if constitutes a contract
of guarantee within the meaning of s.126 thereby rendering
ECL as a guarantor to SREI in respect of financial facilities
availed by ESL from SREI:
Held: Clause 2.2 of Deed of Undertaking obligates ECL to arrange
for infusion of funds into ESL, so as to enable the borrower to
comply with the stipulated Financial Covenants – For an obligation
to be construed as a guarantee u/s.126, there must be a direct and
unambiguous obligation of the surety to discharge the obligation

* Author
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 131

UV Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v.
Electrosteel Castings Limited

of the principal debtor to the creditor – Clause neither records an
undertaking to discharge the debt owed to the creditor nor does
it contemplate payment to the lender in the event of the default –
Clause contains a promise, not to the creditor to pay the debt upon
default, but to the borrower to facilitate compliance with Financial
Covenants – Undertaking to infuse funds into a borrower, so that
it may meet its obligations cannot, by itself be equated with the
promise to discharge the borrower’s liability to the creditor – Mere
Covenant to ensure financial discipline or infusion of funds does
not satisfy the statutory requirements of s.126 – Sanction letter
does not contemplate any personal or corporate guarantee – It
specifically identifies the securities for the facilities and does not
require ECL to stand as surety – Fact that no guarantee was
furnished by ECL also borne out from the documents – Thus, the
parties never intended to create contract of guarantee – Payment
of INR 38 crores by ECL to appellant not made on account of any
contractual obligation – Said payment was made in its capacity
as a promotor of ESL – Such payment by itself does not give
rise to any contract of guarantee, particularly when there is no
contractual obligation of guarantee in the Deed of Undertaking –
Pleadings must be read as a whole and cannot be read selectively
out of context or in isolation – Appellant had initiated an action to
enforce the mortgage security created by ECL in favour of SREI –
ECL in its pleadings stated that it has given a guarantee which
is limited to the mortgaged property with no personal recourse
to ECL – Concurrent findings of NCLT and NCLAT that Clause
2.2 of the Deed of Undertaking does not constitute a contract of
guarantee and that ECL cannot be treated as guarantor for the
financial facilities availed by ESL concurred with – No infirmity in
the impugned judgment warranting interference. [Paras 19-25]

Contract Act, 1872 – s.126 – ‘Contract of Guarantee’ – Essential
ingredients of a guarantee – ‘See to it’ guarantee – Explained.
[Paras 17, 18, 22]

Case Law Cited
Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Golden Chariot Airport and
Ors. [2010] 12 SCR 326 : (2010) 10 SCC 422; Nagindas Ramdas v.
Dalpatram Ichharam and Ors. [1974] 2 SCR 544 : (1974) 1 SCC
242; Kamla Devi v. Thakhratmal Land [1964] 2 SCR 152 : AIR
1964 SC 859 – referred to.
132 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Yes Bank Limited v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited and
Ors, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 11763 ; United Breweries (Holding)
Ltd. v. Karnataka State Industrial Investment and Development
Corporation Ltd. and Others, 2011 SCC OnLine Kar 4012; Aditya
Birla Finance Ltd. v. Siti Networks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1290;
Raghunandan v. Kirtyanand, AIR 1932 PC 131 – referred to.
Moschi v. Lep Air Services Ltd., 2 WLR 1175; Associated British
Courts v. Ferryways [2009] EWCA Civ. 189; Shanghai Shipyard
Co. Ltd. v. Reignwood International Investment (Group) Co. Ltd.:
[2021] EWCA Civ. 1147; Eshelby v. Federated European Bank
Ltd. (1932) 1 KB 254; Perrylease Ltd v. Imecar AG (1987) 2 All
ER 378; Conley (Re), ex p Trustee v. Barclays Bank Ltd. (1938)
2 All ER 127 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals cited
Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 49, 5th Edition – referred to.

List of Acts
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Contract Act, 1872.

List of Keywords
Indian Accounting Standards; Clause 2.2 of Deed of Undertaking;
Contract of guarantee; Guarantor; Financial facilities; Infusion of
funds; Promoter; Essential ingredients of a guarantee; ‘See to it’
guarantee.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9701
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.01.2024 of the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal at Delhi in CAAT (I) No. 975 of
2022

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Mukul Rohatgi, Dhruv Mehta, Gopal Subramanium, Sr. Advs.,
Vikas Mehta, Pulkit Deora, Hemant Kothari, Sameer Rohatgi,
Muthu Thangathurai, Kartikeya Sharma, Kartik Pandey, Ms. Nitika
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 133

UV Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v.
Electrosteel Castings Limited

Grover, Nishant Anshul, Dhruv Dhawan, Rohan Batra, Ms. Gauri
Subramanium, Raghav Kohli, Rishabh Bhargava, Ms. Sanjukta
Roy, Dhruv Sethi, Pranav Diesh.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Amit Sibal, Mukul Rohatgi, Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Advs., Dhruv Dhawan,
Rohan Batra, Rishabh Bhargava, Ms. Sanjukta Roy, Dhruv Sethi,
Vikas Mehta, Pulkit Deora, Hemant Kothari, Sameer Rohatgi,
Muthu Thangathurai, Kartikeya Sharma, Kartik Pandey, Ms. Nitika
Grover, Nishant Anshul.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Alok Aradhe, J.

INTRODUCTION
1. This appeal under Section 62 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016 (hereinafter, referred to as the ‘Code’) calls in question the
legality and correctness of the judgment dated 24.01.2024 by the
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), whereby,
the NCLAT affirmed the order dated 24.06.2022 passed by the
Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) rejecting the application filed by the
appellant under Section 7 of the Code.

(ii) ISSUE
2. The central issue arising for consideration in the present appeal
pertains to the interpretation of Clause 2.2 of Deed of Undertaking
dated 27.07.2011 executed between SREI Infrastructure Finance
Limited (SREI), the original creditor, which subsequently assigned all
its rights and interests in favour of UV Asset Reconstruction Company
Limited, the appellant; Electrosteel Steels Limited (ESL), the borrower;
and Electrosteel Castings Limited (ECL), the erstwhile promoter of
ESL and obligor in the Deed of Undertaking. The Controversy lies in
determining whether said Clause constitutes a contract of guarantee
within the meaning of Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
(Act) thereby rendering ECL as a guarantor to SREI in respect of
financial facilities availed by ESL from SREI.
134 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(iii) FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. Briefly stated, the facts leading to filing of present appeal, are as
follows. ESL availed financial assistance of INR 500 crores from SREI
pursuant to sanction letter dated 26.07.2011. Under the sanction letter,
the only security for the facility comprised a demand promissory note
and post-dated cheques. The sanction letter did not stipulate any
requirement for a personal or corporate guarantee from the ECL.
However, ECL being the promoter of ESL was required to furnish
an undertaking to arrange for the infusion of funds.
4. On the same day, SREI issued an addendum to the sanction letter,
providing for an additional security for the facility in the form of
subservient charge over movable and project assets of ESL. On
26.07.2011 itself, SREI and ESL executed a Rupee Loan Agreement.
Clause (d)(3) of schedule 4 to the loan agreement, required the ECL
to furnish an undertaking to arrange for infusion of funds to enable
ESL, to comply with financial covenants.
5. In pursuance thereof, ECL, one of the promotors of ESL, executed
a Deed of Undertaking, warranty, and indemnity dated 27.07.2011
(undertaking) whereby it undertook a limited obligation to arrange
for infusion of funds into ESL. Clause 2.2 of the aforesaid guarantee
provides that ECL shall arrange for infusion of such amount of funds
into the ESL, as may be necessary to enable ESL to comply with
stipulated financial covenants.
6. Subsequently on 21.11.2011, ESL, ECL and SREI entered into a
supplementary agreement amending inter alia the facility agreement
and the security package for the facility.

(iv) CORPORATE INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS OF
ESL
7. On 27.06.2017, State Bank of India, one of the lenders of ESL, filed
an application on 27.06.2017 under Section 7 of the Code, before
NCLT Kolkata, which was admitted on 20.07.2017. Thereafter, by
an order dated 17.04.2018, passed under Section 31 (1) of the
Code, the NCLT Kolkata, approved the resolution plan submitted
by Vedanta for acquisition of ESL. Under the approved resolution
plan, ESL was acquired for a total consideration of INR 12,719.14
crores, comprising upfront cash payment of INR 5,320.00 crores
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 135

UV Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v.
Electrosteel Castings Limited

and conversion of balance amount into equity shares. The resolution
plan duly was implemented.
8. Upon implementation of the resolution plan, SREI issued an
unconditional ‘no due certificate’ to ESL certifying that dues owned
by ESL to SREI stood fully discharged. However, SREI subsequently
claimed that it has been allotted reduced amount of shares upon
conversion of balance debt. On 30.06.2018, SREI executed a Deed of
Assignment (Assignment Deed) in favour of the appellant, purporting
to assign the alleged residual debt.

(v) PROCEEDING BEFORE NCLT
9. The appellant thereafter filed an application under Section 7 of
the Code before the NCLT, Cuttack, asserting that; (i) a residual
financial debt, remained payable by ESL despite implementation of
the resolution plan, and (ii) ECL has furnished a corporate guarantee
for the debt of ESL.
10. The NCLT, by order dated 24.06.2022, dismissed the petition filed by
the appellant under Section 7 of the Code on two principal grounds;
(i) ECL was not a guarantor in respect of financial facilities availed by
ESL and, therefore no financial debt was owed by ECL, and (ii) the
conversion of ESL’s debt into equity under resolution plan resulted
in extinguishment of any liability of ECL.

(vi) PROCEEDING BEFORE NCLAT
11. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred an appeal before the
NCLAT. The NCLAT in its judgment dated 24.01.2024 framed two
specific issues for adjudication namely, (i) whether ECL was a
guarantor to SREI for the financial facilities availed by ESL and
(ii) whether approval of the resolution plan of ESL resulted in
extinguishment, of entire debt, so as to bar any claim against the
ECL as a guarantor or third party surety.
12. The NCLAT answered the first issue in the negative, holding that
ECL cannot be construed as a guarantor under Clause 2.2 of Deed
of Undertaking in respect of the financial facility extended by SREI
to ESL. While answering the second issue, it held that approval
of resolution plan extinguished the debt, qua ESL i.e., corporate
debtor alone. It was further held that such extinguishment did not by
136 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

itself, extend to third parties unless expressly provided in the plan.
Nonetheless, the appeal was dismissed on the primary finding that
ECL was not a guarantor. Hence, the present appeal.

(vii) RIVAL SUBMISSIONS
13. Learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that Clause 2.2
of the Deed of Undertaking, satisfies the requirements of a contract of
guarantee as defined under Section 126 of the Act. It is submitted that
Clause 2.2 envisages the ECL to discharge the obligation to infuse
funds upon default of ESL in compliance of financial covenants. It
is argued that Clause 2.2 involves two step process of discharging
liability as a guarantor namely, (i) the first step is to fund ESL for
such amounts, and (ii) second step is to eliminate the breach of
default on the part of the borrower. It is submitted that the guarantee
in question is “See to it” type guarantee. In support of aforesaid
submission, reliance has been placed on the decisions of House of
Lords1 and Court of Appeal2.
14. It is argued that ECL had admitted its status as a guarantor in the
pleadings before the Madras High Court3 and this Court4 and is
therefore, estopped5 from taking a contrary stand. Our attention has
also been invited to the letters dated 30.06.2017 and 20.07.2017
sent by ESL to SREI, evidencing payment of INR 38 Crores by ECL
to SREI which according to the appellant, reinforces the existence
of guarantee obligation. It is urged that NCLAT erred in relying upon
the sanction letter dated 26.07.2011 and information memorandum
dated 27.10.2017 to negate the existence of the guarantee and the
impugned order warrants interference in this appeal.
15. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondent
submitted that Clause 2.2 of the Deed of Undertaking, imposed only
an obligation to arrange for infusion of funds and did not amount
to a guarantee under Section 126 of the Act. In support of the

1 Moschi vs. Lep Air Services Ltd.: 2 WLR 1175 (per Lord Diplock).
2 Associated British Courts vs. Ferryways [2009] EWCA Civ. 189 and Shanghai Shipyard Co. Ltd. vs.
Reignwood International Investment (Group) Co. Ltd.: [2021] EWCA Civ. 1147 .
3 CSD No. 18692 of 2019 and Order dated 05.11.2019 passed by Division Bench of Madras High Court.
4 Judgment dated 26.11.2021 in Civil Appeal No. 6669 of 2021.
5 Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. vs. Golden Chariot Airport and Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 422 (Para
43-50) and Nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatram Ichharam and Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 242 (para 27).
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 137

UV Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v.
Electrosteel Castings Limited

aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the decisions
of Bombay, Karnataka and Delhi High Courts6. It is pointed out that
even the appellant in its pleading before NCLAT has admitted that
undertaking is not a contract of guarantee. It is also pointed out that
the sanction letter by SREI does not envisage facility being secured
by any personal or corporate guarantee. It is contended that ‘see
to it’ guarantee is not the type of guarantee contemplated under
Section 126 of the Act and has not been adopted in Indian Common
Law. It is submitted that ECL made a payment of INR 38 crores to
SREI on 20.07.2017 on its own volition, in its capacity as promotor
of ESL. It is further submitted that aforesaid payment was not made
on account of any contractual obligation.
16. It is also urged that, it is well settled, that pleadings must be read
as a whole and cannot be read selectively, out of context or in
isolation. It is pointed out that the pleading was filed by the ECL
in the proceeding initiated by the appellant to enforce mortgage
security created by ECL in favour of SREI. In the said pleading, it
was stated that ECL has given a guarantee which is limited only
to the mortgage property and the same is not personal. It is urged
that reliance on the decisions in Nagindas Ramdas and Mumbai
International Airport Pvt. Ltd. is misplaced. It is finally urged that
detailed and reasoned orders passed by the NCLT and NCLAT do
not call for any interference in this appeal.

(viii) ANALYSIS
17. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions
and have carefully perused the records. Section 126 of the Act
defines a ‘Contract of Guarantee’, as a contract to perform promise,
or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default. The
essential ingredients of a guarantee, therefore, are (a) existence of
principal debt, (b) default by the principal debtor and (c) a promise by
the surety to discharge the liability of the principal debtor upon such
default. Thus, a guarantee is a promise to answer for the payment
of some debt, or the performance of some duty, in case of failure of

6 Yes Bank Limited v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited and Ors, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 11763
(Paras 50,53,59,62,67), United Breweries (Holding) Ltd. v. Karnataka State Industrial Investment and
Development Corporation Ltd. and Others, 2011 SCC OnLine Kar 4012 (para 6,9) and Aditya Birla
Finance Ltd. vs. Siti Networks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1290 (Para 26,237,238).
138 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

another party, who is in the first instance, liable to such payment or
performance7. A guarantee is a security in the form of right of action
against a third party. In order to constitute a guarantee, there has to
be a specific undertaking or unambiguous affirmation to discharge
the liability of a third person in case of their default.
18. A guarantee is governed by principles of construction generally
governing other documents8. A guarantee being a mercantile contract,
the Court does not apply to it merely technical rules but construes it
so as to reflect what may fairly be inferred to have been the parties’
real intention and understanding as expressed by them in writing
and to give effect to it rather than not9.
19. Now, we advert to Clause 2.2 of Deed of Undertaking dated
27.07.2011, which reads as under: -
“2.2. Financial Covenants
In the event the Borrower is not in a position to
comply with the Financial Covenants in the Financing
Documents, or has breached such Financial
Covenants, the Obligors will arrange for the
infusion of such amount of fund into the Borrower
such that the Borrower is in a position to comply with
the abovementioned Financial Covenants.”
Thus, the aforesaid Clause obligates ECL to arrange for infusion
of funds into ESL, so as to enable the borrower to comply with the
stipulated Financial Covenants.
20. For an obligation to be construed as a guarantee under Section 126
of the Act, there must be a direct and unambiguous obligation of
the surety to discharge the obligation of the principal debtor to the
creditor. The clause neither records an undertaking to discharge the
debt owed to the creditor nor does it contemplate payment to the
lender in the event of the default. The clause contains a promise,
not to the creditor to pay the debt upon default, but to the borrower
to facilitate compliance with Financial Covenants. An undertaking to

7 Conley (Re), ex p Trustee v Barclays Bank Ltd. (1938) 2 All ER 127, at 130-131 (CA)
8 Raghunandan v. Kirtyanand, AIR 1932 PC 131, Eshelby v Federated European Bank Ltd. (1932) 1 KB
254 and Kamla Devi v. Thakhratmal Land, AIR 1964 SC 859
9 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 49, 5th Edition and Perrylease Ltd v Imecar AG, (1987) 2 All ER 378
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 139

UV Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v.
Electrosteel Castings Limited

infuse funds into a borrower, so that it may meet its obligations cannot,
by itself be equated with the promise to discharge the borrower’s
liability to the creditor. A mere Covenant to ensure financial discipline
or infusion of funds does not satisfy the statutory requirements of
Section 126 of the Act.
21. The sanction letter dated 26.07.2011 does not contemplate any
personal or corporate guarantee. On the contrary, it specifically
identifies the securities for the facilities and does not require ECL
to stand as surety. The fact that no guarantee was furnished by
ECL is also borne out from the following documents: (i) information
memorandum in the CIRP of ESL does not reflect any guarantee
from the Respondent in connection with SREI’s Facility under the
category of Guarantee or Security Interest; (ii) In Schedule 1 to the
Assignment Agreement, against the column titled “details of the
guarantor/co-borrower”, the parties to Assignment Agreement stated
‘Nil’ and (iii) Audited Financial Statement of ESL does not reflect
any guarantee obligation towards SREI. Thus, contemporaneous
documents reinforce the conclusion that parties never intended to
create a contract of guarantee.
22. Section 126 of the Act mandates a guarantor to ‘perform a promise’
or ‘discharge the liability’ of a third person which necessarily implies
a direct performance or discharge. A ‘See to it’ guarantee in English
Common Law refers to an obligation upon the guarantor to ensure that
principal debtor itself, performs its own obligation and the guarantor,
therefore, is in breach as soon as principal debtor fails to perform.
However, a ‘See to it’ guarantee does not include an obligation to
enable the principal debtor to perform its own obligation. Such an
arrangement would not be a guarantee under Section 126 of the Act.
23. It is pertinent to note that payment of an amount of INR 38 crores
by ECL to the appellant was not made on account of any contractual
obligation. The said payment was made on 20.07.2017 in its capacity
as a promotor of ESL. Such payment by itself does not give rise to
any contract of guarantee, particularly when there is no contractual
obligation of guarantee in the Deed of Undertaking.
24. It is well settled in law, that, pleadings must be read as a whole
and cannot be read selectively out of context or in isolation. The
appellant had initiated an action to enforce the mortgage security
created by ECL in favour of SREI. In the aforesaid proceeding, ECL
140 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

in its pleadings stated that it has given a guarantee which is limited
to the mortgaged property with no personal recourse to ECL. The
reliance of the appellant on the decisions of Nagindas Ramdas
and Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd., is misconceived, as
the aforesaid decisions are an authority for the proposition that
if admissions are true and clear, they are the best proof of facts,
admitted in the context of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872. Therefore, the aforesaid decisions have no application to the
fact situation of the case.

(ix) CONCLUSION
25. For the aforementioned reasons, we concur with the concurrent
findings of NCLT and NCLAT that Clause 2.2 of the Deed of
Undertaking does not constitute a contract of guarantee and that
ECL cannot be treated as guarantor for the financial facilities availed
by ESL. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the impugned
judgment warranting interference in this appeal.
26. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as
to costs.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain