VANEETA PATNAIKversusNIRMAL KANTI CHAKRABARTI & ORS.

                [2025] 10 S.C.R. 253 : 2025 INSC 1106

                           Vaneeta Patnaik
                                  v.
                    Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti & Ors.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 11786 of 2025)
                             12 September 2025
           [Pankaj Mithal* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose whether the Division Bench of the High Court is justified
       in non-suiting the appellant on the ground that her complaint was
       barred by limitation; and whether the subsequent event of removal
       of the appellant from the post of the Director, CFRGS or initiation
       of inquiry by the Executive Council are in any way linked to sexual
       harassment or amounts to sexual harassment as described u/s.3(2)
       of the POSH Act.

                                   Headnotes†
       Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
       Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – ss.2(n), 3, 9 – Sexual
       Harassment – Appellant-faculty member of the University
       lodged a formal complaint on 26.12.2023 with the Local
       Complaint Committee alleging sexual harassment on part
       of respondent no.1-Vice Chancellor of the University – LCC
       rejected the complaint as barred by time as the last alleged
       incident of sexual harassment occurred in April 2023; whereas
       the complaint was filed beyond the prescribed period of
       limitation of three months as also the extendable period of
       limitation of six months – Writ petition, thereagainst – Single
       Judge of the High Court quashed the order of the LCC hold
       that the appellant was subjected to threat of detrimental
       treatment in her employment even after April 2023 and as
       the Vice-Chancellor created an intimidating, offensive and
       hostile work environment for her, as such the complaint was
       within time, taking the subsequent event as the last incident
       of sexual harassment – However, the Division Bench set aside
       the order passed by the Single Judge – Correctness:
       Held: Last incident of actual sexual harassment took place in
       April 2023 – Subsequent incident of August 2023, whereunder the

* Author
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       appellant was removed as Director of CFRGS, with no financial
       implications arose out of a complaint received from the Central
       Government undertaking wherein appellant was specifically
       named – It was a collective decision taken up by the Executive
       Council and not a unilateral action of the Vice-Chancellor – Actions
       taken against the appellant in August 2023, are administrative in
       nature and does not create a gender based hostile environment,
       and thus, fall short of being actions amounting to acts of sexual
       harassment – No direct link between the last incident of sexual
       harassment which happened in April 2023, and those referred to
       subsequently in August 2023 or December 2023 – Alleged act of
       harassment of April 2023, was a complete act in itself and had
       not continued thereafter – Subsequent events have no connection
       to the earlier act of sexual misconduct and as such, fall clearly
       out of the preview of acts or behaviours amounting to sexual
       harassment – Thus, the incident of April 2023, remains the last
       event related to sexual harassment – Furthermore, the appellant
       was conscious of the fact that her complaint was delayed proves
       that she herself treated the act of April 2023, to be the last incident
       of sexual harassment and as such, tried to explain the delay in filing
       the complaint – Division Bench of the High Court committed no
       error of law in restoring the decision of the LCC – Wrong which has
       been committed against the appellant may not be investigated on
       technical grounds, but it must not be forgotten – It is directed that
       the incidents of alleged sexual harassment on part of respondent
       no.1 may be forgiven but allowed to haunt the wrongdoer forever –
       Thus, this judgment to be made part of the resume of respondent
       no.1. [Paras 21-27, 29-34]

                                 Case Law Cited
       Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [2008] 12 SCR 104 : (2008) 8
       SCC 648 – referred to.

                                   List of Acts
       Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition
       and Redressal) Act, 2013; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

                                List of Keywords
       Barred by limitation; Subsequent event; Removal; Post of the
       Director, CFRGS; Initiation of inquiry; Executive Council; Sexual
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                            255

           Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti & Ors.


     harassment; Faculty member of the West Bengal National University
     of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata; Local Complaint Committee; Vice
     Chancellor of the University; Last incident of sexual harassment;
     Period of limitation of three months; Extendable period of limitation
     of six months; Writ petition; Threat of detrimental treatment;
     Vice-Chancellor; Intimidating, offensive; Hostile work environment;
     Director of CFRGS; Financial implications; Collective decision;
     Unilateral action of the Vice-Chancellor; Administrative in nature;
     Gender based hostile environment; Expressions ‘in relation to” or
     “connected with”; Direct link; Sexual misconduct; Condonation of
     delay; “Mitigating circumstances”.

                            Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11786 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.2024 of the High Court
     at Calcutta in FMA No. 873 of 2024

                         Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Rohit Das, Rishad Ahmed
     Chowdhury, Ms. Padma Priya, Apoorv Agarwal, Ms. Kishwar
     Rahman, Ms. Manvi Jain, Ms. Astha Singh, Ms. Sohini Sanyal,
     Shantanu Mitra.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Ms. Madhavi Divan, Sr. Adv., Satya Ranjan Swain, Vishnu Kant,
     Ankush Kapoor, Kautilya Birat, Ms. Aandrita Deb, Ms. Rajnandini,
     Vishwadeep Chandrakar, Aayush Gupta, Kunal Chatterji,
     Ms. Maitrayee Banerjee, Varij Nayan Mishra, C. K. Rai.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                    Order

     Pankaj Mithal, J.

1.   Leave granted
2.   Heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, senior counsel and Ms. Madhavi Divan,
     senior counsel, appearing for the appellant and the respondent no.1
     respectively.
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3.     The appellant-Ms. Vaneeta Patnaik is a faculty member of the
       West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences1, Kolkata. Dr.
       Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, respondent no.1 was appointed as a Vice
       Chancellor of NUJS on 03.07.2019
4.     The appellant lodged a formal complaint on 26.12.2023 with the
       Local Complaint Committee2 alleging sexual harassment on part of
       respondent no.1. The LCC rejected the complaint as barred by time
       inasmuch as the last alleged incident of sexual harassment occurred
       in April 2023; whereas the complaint was filed on 26.12.2023 which
       was not only beyond the prescribed period of limitation of three months
       but also beyond the extendable period of limitation of six months.
5.     The appellant, aggrieved by the rejection of her complaint, preferred
       a writ petition before the High Court. The single Judge of the High
       Court vide judgment and order dated 22.05.2024 quashed the order
       of the LCC and directed for rehearing of the complaint on its merit.
       The single Judge held that the appellant was subjected to threat of
       detrimental treatment in her employment even after April 2023 and
       as the Vice-Chancellor created an intimidating, offensive and hostile
       work environment for her, as such the complaint was within time,
       taking the subsequent event as the last incident of sexual harassment.
6.     The aforesaid judgment and order of the single Judge of the High
       Court was taken up by the Division Bench in a writ appeal, FMA No.
       873 of 2024 (M.A.T. No. 1295 of 2024) and the same was allowed
       by the impugned judgment and order dated 23.12.2024.
7.     The Division Bench held that administrative actions taken against the
       appellant after April 2023 were collective decisions of the Executive
       Council, consisting of eminent academicians, jurists and even
       Supreme Court Judges and were not just personal actions of the
       Vice-Chancellor. It was improbable for the Vice-Chancellor to have
       prevailed over the decision of the Executive Council, exerting his
       pressure. He was not in a position to manipulate the decision of the
       Executive Council. The alleged incidents of harassment, if any, after
       April 2023, did not constitute sexual harassment and that even the
       appellant in all her communications to the Chancellor and Executive



1    Hereinafter referred to as “NUJS” or “University”
2    Hereinafter referred to as “LCC”
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                           257

              Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti & Ors.


      Council prior to December 2023, had not made any allegation of
      such sexual harassment against the Vice-Chancellor. Therefore,
      the complaint filed on 26.12.2023, after the last incident of sexual
      harassment that took place in April 2023, is beyond the normal
      period of limitation and even the extended period. It was, therefore,
      rightly rejected by the LCC as barred by time and the Single Judge
      of the High Court was not justified in overturning the said decision.
8.    The neat question which falls for consideration of this Court is: whether
      the Division Bench of the High Court is justified in non-suiting the
      appellant on the ground that her complaint was barred by limitation.
9.    To decide the above issue in the facts of the present case, it would be
      beneficial to first consider not only the definition of ‘sexual harassment’
      but also what other circumstances, acts or behaviours would constitute
      as sexual harassment, vis-a-vis the period of limitation provided for
      making complaint in that regard.
10. ‘Sexual harassment’ is defined in Section 2(n) of the Sexual
    Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
    Redressal) Act, 20133 to include any one or more of the unwelcome
    act or behaviour (whether directly or by implication) such as physical
    contact and advances; or a demand or request for sexual favours;
    or making sexually coloured remarks; or showing pornography; or
    any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of
    sexual nature.
11. Section 3 of the POSH Act, while providing that no woman shall be
    subjected to sexual harassment at any workplace, describes certain
    circumstances that would amount as an act or behaviour of sexual
    harassment, i.e., implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in
    her employment; or implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment
    in her employment; or implied or explicit threat about her present or
    future employment status; or interference with her work or creating
    an intimidating or offensive or hostile work environment for her; or
    humiliating treatment likely to affect her health or safety.
12. On a combined reading of both the above provisions, it is manifest
    that not only the unwelcome act or behaviour in the form of physical
    contact or advances, a demand or request for sexual favours, making


3    Hereinafter referred as the “POSH Act”
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       sexually coloured remarks, showing pornography or any unwelcome
       physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature but also any
       other circumstances connected with the act or behaviour of sexual
       harassment, like implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment
       in employment, threat about the present and future employment
       status, interference with work or creating an intimidating, offensive
       or hostile work environment or subjecting to humiliating treatment
       which may likely affect her health or safety, would also amount to
       acts or behaviour of sexual harassment.
13. Section 9 of the Act postulates that any aggrieved woman may make
    a complaint, in writing, of sexual harassment at the work place to
    the Local Committee within a period of three months from the date
    of incident, and in the case of series of incidents, within a period of
    three months from the date of the last incident. The second proviso
    to Section 9 provides that the LCC may for reasons to be recorded in
    writing, extend the time of making the complaint not exceeding three
    months, if it is satisfied that the circumstances prevailing prevented
    the woman from filing of the complaint within the period prescribed.
14. In other words, a complaint of sexual harassment is mandatorily
    required to be filed within a period of three months from the date
    of the last incident of such harassment or within a further extended
    period of three months, i.e., within a maximum period of six months
    from the date of the last incident of sexual harassment.
15. No doubt, the issue of limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of
    fact and law and it may not be possible to throw out a complaint
    at the threshold without collecting material on the factual aspects
    relating to the limitation. Nonetheless, where a complaint on the
    simple reading of the averments made therein appears to be patently
    barred by limitation, it can be rejected at the very first instance on
    the analogy of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, without even calling the other
    side to participate in the proceedings.
16. In view of the above, it would be prudent to consider the averments
    made in the complaint which admittedly was filed by the appellant
    on 26.12.2023. The said complaint, apart from other things, inter
    alia, alleges that respondent no. 1 joined the University as the
    Vice-Chancellor in July 2019. He called her (the appellant herein) in
    his office in September 2019, and insisted that she should accompany
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                    259

             Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti & Ors.


     him for dinner, which would greatly benefit her personally. He even
     touched her hand in a manner that made her extremely uncomfortable,
     whereupon, she left his office quietly.
17. The Vice-Chancellor again called her in his office in October 2019.
    He asked her whether she (the appellant) has thought over his
    proposal for going out for a dinner. The appellant told him that she
    is not comfortable and wants to keep the relationship professional
    only. He, thereafter, demanded sexual favour from her and threatened
    her if the offers are declined.
18. In October 2019, her promotion was put on hold by the Executive
    Council. Finally, the Executive Council in its meeting held on
    02.04.2022 accepted the recommendations of the Selection
    Committee and cleared her for promotion.
19. The appellant was called upon by the Vice-Chancellor in his office
    again in April 2023, where he asked the appellant to accompany him
    on a trip to a resort which the appellant flatly refused. Thereupon,
    he threatened the appellant that her career would suffer badly. On
    29.08.2023, the appellant received a letter from the Vice-Chancellor
    removing her as Director, Centre of Financial, Regulatory and
    Governance Studies4.
20. In the meantime, some complaints by the faculty members were made
    against her, whereupon the Executive Council resolved to appoint the
    Principal Secretary, Law, Government of West Bengal as a ‘one-man
    enquiry commission’ for conducting preliminary enquiry into the issue
    of misutilisation of the grant received from UGC and with regard to
    the issue of National Foundation of Corporate Governance5. The
    Executive Council resolved that a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- be refunded
    immediately by the NUJS. Thereafter, the appellant allegedly made
    complaints of harassment and victimisation to the members of the
    Executive Council through e-mails and even to the Chancellor.
21. A plain reading of the entire complaint would reveal that the sexual
    harassment, if any, of the appellant at the hands of respondent no.1
    commenced sometime in September 2019, and the last incident in
    that connection took place in April 2023. Thereafter, no incident of


4   Hereinafter referred to as “CFRGS”
5   Hereinafter referred to as “NFCG”
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       sexual harassment is alleged to have taken place except for the
       fact that on 29.08.2023, the appellant was removed from the post of
       Director, CFRGS or that a preliminary inquiry was instituted against
       her by the Executive Council.
22. The complaint of the appellant from the last incident of sexual
    harassment of April 2023, is certainly beyond time. However, the
    issue is whether the subsequent event of removal of the appellant
    from the post of the Director, CFRGS or initiation of inquiry by the
    Executive Council are in any way linked to sexual harassment or
    amounts to sexual harassment as described under Section 3(2) of
    the POSH Act.
23. The last incident of actual sexual harassment took place in April 2023.
    The subsequent incident of August 2023, whereunder the appellant
    was removed as Director of CFRGS, with no financial implications
    arose out of a complaint received from the Central Government
    undertaking i.e. NFCG wherein appellant was specifically named.
    The said action was taken completely independently on the basis
    of the complaint of NFCG alleging that the project report was not
    submitted within time and that the amount sanctioned for the project
    be refunded. It may be pertinent to note that the MoU was signed
    by the appellant with the NFCG and the bank account was also
    under her control.
24. In view of the above, the incident of removal of appellant as
    the Director of CFRGS cannot be attributed as an act of sexual
    harassment in connection with the previous incidents. It was based
    upon the report of NFCG, an independent body.
25. The inquiry into the project funds was taken up by the Executive
    Council and it was a collective decision and not a unilateral action
    of the Vice-Chancellor. Thus, the said act would also not amount
    to an act of sexual harassment in conjunction with the previous
    reported acts.
26. The actions taken against the appellant in August 2023, are
    administrative in nature and does not create a gender based hostile
    environment, and hence, fall short of being actions amounting to
    acts of sexual harassment.
27. It would be important to refer to the expressions “in relation to” or
    “connected with” used in Section 3(2) of the Act. The use of the
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                      261

            Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti & Ors.


     above expression clearly demonstrates that there has to be a direct
     link between the action complained of and an overt act of sexual
     harassment. In view of what has been said above, we find no such
     direct link between the last incident of sexual harassment which
     happened in April 2023, and those referred to subsequently in August
     2023 or December 2023.
28. A distinction has to be made between a “continuing wrong” and a
    “recurring wrong”. The difference between the two has been clarified
    in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh6 where it has been held that
    a “continuing wrong” is when the injury itself persists, whereas a
    “recurring wrong” is when a fresh cause of action arises each time.
29. The alleged act of harassment of April 2023, was a complete act in
    itself and had not continued thereafter. The administrative measures
    of August 2023, were independent and were collective decisions
    of the NFCG and the Executive Council which cannot be solely
    attributed to the Vice-Chancellor. The said decision may have caused
    inconvenience to the appellant or may have given an impression that
    they are in line with previous acts of harassment, but they were not
    part of the continued sexual harassment. The subsequent events
    have no connection to the earlier act of sexual misconduct and as
    such, fall clearly out of the preview of acts or behaviours amounting
    to sexual harassment. In this way, the incident of April 2023, remains
    the last event related to sexual harassment.
30. The appellant, in addressing her grievances to the Chancellor, had
    not made any mention whatsoever of the sexual harassment which
    may have taken place in August, 2023 onwards. The appellant
    initiated the complaint on 26.12.2023, immediately after the Executive
    Council meeting on 21.12.2023, which had resolved to inquire into
    diverse acts of misconduct on part of the appellant, that could give
    an impression that the complaint was filed in retaliation.
31. The appellant, in filing the complaint, also moved an application for
    condonation of delay stating that there were “mitigating circumstances”
    which she had attempted to resolve within the institution and when she
    failed, she then filed the complaint. The very fact that the appellant
    was conscious of the fact that her complaint was delayed, proves


6   (2008) 8 SCC 648
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       that she herself treated the act of April 2023, to be the last incident
       of sexual harassment and as such, tried to explain the delay in filing
       the complaint.
32. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as the
    discussion, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High
    Court committed no error of law in restoring the decision of the LCC
    that the complaint of the appellant is time barred and is liable to be
    dismissed.
33. It is advisable to forgive the wrongdoer, but not to forget the
    wrongdoing. The wrong which has been committed against the
    appellant may not be investigated on technical grounds, but it must
    not be forgotten.
34. In this view of the matter, we direct that the incidents of alleged sexual
    harassment on part of respondent no.1 may be forgiven but allowed
    to haunt the wrongdoer forever. Thus, it is directed that this judgment
    shall be made part of the resume of respondent no.1, compliance
    of which shall be strictly ensured by him personally.
35. The appeal is dismissed with the observations made above.
36. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain