Supreme Court of India
VED MITIER GILLversusUNION TERRITORY ADMINISTRATION, CHANDIGARH AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 264
- Decided
- 26 March 2015
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S KHEHAR
Holding
All three conditions for the valid application of clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) were met, rendering the dismissal of Ved Mitter Gill and the other jail officials constitutionally valid.
Summary
The case concerned the dismissal of Deputy Superintendent Ved Mitter Gill and four other jail officials after four under‑trial terrorists escaped from Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh through a 94‑foot tunnel. The authorities invoked clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution to dispense with a departmental inquiry and dismiss the employees. The Supreme Court examined whether the three statutory ingredients – (i) the misconduct justified dismissal, (ii) it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, and (iii) the reasons were recorded in writing – were satisfied. It held that Gill’s duties under the Punjab Jail Manual made him responsible for the safe custody of prisoners, that his and the petitioners’ delinquency directly led to the escape, and that fear of intimidation and the terrorist links made an inquiry impracticable. Consequently, the Court affirmed the dismissal as lawful and dismissed the appeal and the transferred cases.
Issues considered
- The validity of invoking clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) to dismiss civil servants without a departmental inquiry.
- Whether the conduct of the appellant and petitioners justified the penalty of dismissal.
- Whether it was reasonably practicable to hold a departmental inquiry in the circumstances of the jail‑break.
- Whether the competent authority recorded sufficient reasons in writing as required by law.
- Whether the dismissal of the jail staff is arbitrary, mala fide or violative of natural justice.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Article 311disciplinary dismissaljail breakdepartmental inquiryreasonable practicabilityPunjab Jail Manualterrorismcivil service lawconstitutional law
Judgment
[2015) 5 S.C.R. 73 73
VED MITIER GILL A
v.
UNION TERRITORY ADMINISTRATION, CHANDIGARH
AND OTHERS
B
(Civil Appeal No. 3194 of 2015 etc.)
MARCH 26, 2015.
[JAG DISH SINGH KHEHAR AND S.A. BOBDE, JJ.] C
Constitution of India, 1950:
Art. 311(2) second proviso, clause (b}- Compliance
of- Jail .break incident - Four under trials, three facing trial
0
for assassination of former Punjab Chief Minister, and one
tried for charge of murder - Escape from jail by digging 94
feet long underground tunnel - Dismissal of appellant and
petitioners-four jail staff, two of them discharging duties in
the capacity of Deputy Superintendent of Jail, and other two E
as Head Warder and Warder respectively, on account of
lapses committed by them - Said order passed by Advisor
to the Administrator; Union Territory exercising powers u/Art.
311(2) clause (b) to the second proviso, on holding that it
was not practicable to hold an inquiry- Said order upheld by F
Administrator, Union Territory and thereafter, by the tribunal
as also High Court - On appeal, held: All the parameters
laid down for a valid/legal application of clause (b) to the
second proviso u/Art. 311 (2), duly complied with -Punishment
of dismissal from service was fully justified, as evaluation of G
the duties and responsibilities of the jail staff showed that
their delinquency resulted in the escape of four dreaded
prisoners- Competent authority was satisfied that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold a departmental proceeding H
73
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A against the jail staff and the competent authority had recorded
reasons for its satisfaction.
Art. 311 (2) second proviso, clause (b) - Invocation of
- Requirement of satisfaction of three ingredients -
B Explained.
Punjab Jail Manual - Post of Deputy Superintendent
Jail, Assistant Superintendent Jail, Head Warder and Warder
- Duties and responsibilities - Nature of - Held:
c Responsibility of jail inmates exclusively rests on the
shoulders of the jail staff- Within the jail premises, only the
jail staff can be permitted to function and in case of lapses
within the jail premises, it is the jail staff alone which is
responsible.
D
• Dismissing the appeal and the transferred cases,
the Court •
HELD: 1.1 For invoking clause (b) of the second
E proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, three
ingredients should be satisfied. The first ingredient,
which is a prerequisite to the sustainable application of
the clause (b) to the second proviso under Article 311(2)
is, that the delinquency alleged should be such as would
F justify, any one of the three punishments, namely,
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. The perusal of
the order whereby, the appellant-VMG was dismissed
from service, with immediate effect reveals, that the
punishment was based on reasons recorded in the
G impugned order. One of the component of the impugned
order was with regard to the material taken into
consideration to evaluate the lapses committed by the
appellant/petitioners, as would reveal their involvement
H with reference to the alleged delinquency, justifying the
punishment of dismissal from service. [Para 20) [115-G-
VED MITIER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 75
CHANDIGARH
H; 116-A-B, D-F] A
1.2 The responsibility of all the jail inmates (safe
custody of all prisoners) rested on the shoulders of VMG
and the petitioners who assisted him in the same. The
petitioners were associated with the appellant and B
assisted him in discharging his said duties. Had the
appellant-VMG, and the petitioners, performed their
duties diligently, there could not have been any
possibility, of the escape under reference. Separate
reasons were expressed, by the competent authority in C
arriving at its conclusion. The impugned order fully
establishes the inferences recorded. The determination
by the competent authority, when viewed
dispassionately with reference to the duties assigned
0
to VMG, leaves no room for any doubt, that the
competent authority was justified in concluding, that the
four prisoners could never have escaped, if the
appellant-VMG, and the petitioners, had diligently
discharged the duties assigned to them. Having so E
concluded, about the responsibility and
blameworthiness of the appellant/petitioners, there can
be no doubt that the punishment of dismissal from
service, was fully justified, as their delinquency had
resulted in the escape of four dreaded prisoners. [Para F
21) [116-G; 117-G-H]
1.3 The second ingredient is the satisfaction of the
competent authority, that it was not reasonably
practicable, to hold a regular departmental enquiry, G
against the employees concerned. Amongst the reasons
indicated depicting the involvement of the appellant/
petitioners, it has been recorded, that VMG being a
senior, permanent and non-transferable officer of the Jail,
his junior jail officers, who alone would have been H
76 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A witnesses in such departmental proceedings, were not
likely to come forward to depose against him, for fear of
earning his wrath in future. The escaped under-trial
prisoners had links with the dreaded terrorist
organization. It would be proper to take judicial notice
B of the fact that a large number of terrorists came to be
acquitted during the period in question, on account of
the fact, that witnesses did not appear to depose against
them on account of fear, or alternatively, the witnesses
C who appeared before the concerned courts, for
recording their deposition, turned hostile, for the same
reason. The situation presented in the factual narration
noticed in the impugned order, clearly achieves the
benchmark, for the satisfaction at the hands of the
o competent authority, that it would not have been
reasonably practicable, to hold a departmental
proceeding against the appellant/petitioners, in terms of
the mandate contained under Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India. [Para 22] (118-B-H; 119-A]
E
1.4 The third essential ingredient is that, the
competent authority must record, the reasons of the
satisfaction in writing. In the instant case, the reasons
for the satisfaction have been recorded by the competent
F authority in the impugned order itself. [Para 23] (119-B]
1.5 All the parameters laid down by this Court, for
a valid/legal application of clause (b) to the second
proviso under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India,
G were duly complied with. [Para 24] [119-C-D]
1.6 The appellant and the petitioners cannot be
placed on the same pedestal as the DSR, the then
Superintendent of the Jail. The reason was that VMG was
H holding the senior-most, permanent and non-
VED MITTER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 77
CHANDIGARH
transferable position, at the Jail, whereas DSR was only A
a deputationist at the said jail. Accordingly, the parallel
sought to be drawn between the controversy in the
instant case, and the departmental proceedings initiated
against the DSR is fallacious. [Para 26] [120-D-G]
B
1.7 The submission that if witnesses can appear
in open court proceedings before the trial court, with
reference to the same set of allegations, they could
surely have appeared, in a departmental proceeding as
well. The analogy invoked by the counsel representing C
the appellant/petitioners, is wholly misconceived. The
reasons for dispensing with the departmental enquiry,
cannot be dependent upon the holding or not holding
of criminal proceedings, against the appellant/
0
petitioners. Once the parameters stipulated in clause (b)
of the second proviso to Article 311(2) are satisfied, the
submissions by the counsel for the appellant/petitioners,
would not arise. [Para 27] [121-A-E]
Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 581;
E
State of Punjab v. Harbhajan Singh (2007) 15 SCC 217;
Southern Railway Officers Association v. Union of India
2009 (12) SCR 429: (2009) 9 SCC 24; Union of India
v. Tulsiram Patel 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 131: (1985) 3 F
SCC 398; Satyavir Singh v. Union of India 1985 (2)
Suppl. SCR 791 : (1985) 4 sec 252; Ku/dip Singh v.
State of Punjab 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 339: (1996) 10
SCC 659; Union of India v. R. Reddappa 1993 (1)
Suppl. SeR 503: (1993) 4 sec 269; Indian Railway G
Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar 2003 (2) SCR
387: (2003) 4 sec 579; Ku/dip Singh v. State of Punjab
1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 339: (1996) 10 sec 659 -
referred to.
H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A Case Law Reference
(2006) 13 sec 581 Referred to. Para 13
(200·1) 15 sec 211 Referred to. Para 13
B 2009 (12) SCR 429 Referred to. Para 14
1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 131 Referred to. Para 14
1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 791 Referred to. Para 14
c 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 339 Referred to. Para 14
1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 503 Referred to. Para 14
2003 (2) SCR 387 Referred to. Para 14
D
1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 339 Referred to. Para 19
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
3194of2015
E From the Judgment and Order dated 01.05.2006 of the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ
Petition No. 5682 of 2006
WITH
F
T. C. (C) Nos. 41, 42, 43 &44 of2010
M. C. Dhingra, Piyush Kant Roy, Amit Chaudhary,
Ashwin Kr. Gupta, Tushar Bakshi, Naresh Bakshi, M. S.
G Doabia, Sudarshan Singh Rawat, Kamini Jaiswal for the
appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. Through this
H
VED MITIER GILL v. UNIONTERRITORYADMN., 79
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
common order we propose to dispose of the Special Leave A
Petition (C) No. 20379 of 2006 as well as the Transferred Case
(C) Nos. 41-44 of 2010. The aforesaid transferred cases were
pending before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as 'the High Court'). Whilst
the Special Leave Petition (C) No. 20379 of 2006 came to be 8
filed before this Court assailing the order dated 1.5.2006
passed by the High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 5682 of
2006. The prayer for transfer was premised on the fact that
the transferred cases were couched in the same factual C
foundation and raised similar legal issues, as were being
canvassed through Special Leave Petition (C) No. 20379 of
2006. In the above view of the matter, while disposing of the
special leave petition, as well as, the transferred cases, we
shall refer to the facts in Ved Mitter Gill's case, i.e., the matter o
pending in this Court as against the order passed by the High
Court on 1.5.2006 dismissing Civil Writ Petition No.5682 of
2006.
2. Leave granted. E
3. In January 2004, appellant-Ved Mitter Gill was holding
charge of the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Model
Jail, Burail, Chandigarh. At the same juncture, Dalbir Singh
Sandhu (petitioner in Transferred Case (C) No. 42 of 2010) F
was also holding the post of Deputy Superintendent of Jail,
whilst Parariljit Singh Rana (petitioner in Transferred Case (C)
No. 41 of 2010) was posted as Assistant Superintendent of
Jail, Nishan Singh (petitioner in Transferred Case (C) No. 44
of 2010) and lnder Singh (petitioner in Transferred Case (C) G
No. 43 of 2010) were working as Head Warder and Warder
respectively.
4. Whilst the appellant/petitioners were discharging
their duties in the capacity indicated hereinabove, four under H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A trials namely Jagtar Singh Hawara, Paramjit Singh and Jagtar
Singh Tara (who were facing trial for the assassination of a
former Chief Minister of Punjab Shri Beant Singh) and Jagdev
Singh, who was being tried for the charge of murder, escaped
from the Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh, by digging an
B underground tunnel. The approximate length of the tunnel is
stated to be 94 feet. The description of the above tunnel has
been expressed in a report dated 15.4.2004 submitted by an
Enquiry Committee constituted to go into the lapses committed
C by the jail authorities in the above episode of escape, as also
to determine, the remedial measures for prevention of such a
jail-break in future. The description of the tunnel in the report,
is reproduced below:
"2.4 An inspection of barrack No.7 of Burail Jail from
D
where four undertrial escaped made a number of
revelations. The 94 feet long and about 21" x 21" broad
tunnel was a very professionally done job. The tunnel
had three sections, two vertical and one horizontal as
E under:
a) Vertical straight Section below the barrack 14'
b) Horizontal portion with almost perfect
precision and direction 72'
F
c) Vertical portion outside the main perimeter
wall used for exit. It was slightly inclined for
easy footage for escape" 08'
G The aforesaid under-trials had escaped during the night
intervening January 21-22, 2004. Resultantly, a first information
report bearing no. 17 was registered at Police Station Sector
34, Chandigarh. The appellant, as well as, the petitioners came
to be detained after the registration of the first information
H
VED MITIER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 81
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
re~~ A
5. By an order dated 1.3.2004, the Advisor to the
Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh having invoked
clause (b) to the second proviso under Article 311 (2) of the
Constitution of India, dismissed the appellant from service with B
immediate effect. Similar orders were passed against the
petitioners.
6. Dissatisfied with the order dated 1.3.2004, the
appellant as well as the petitioners, assailed the respective c
orders of their dismissal from service, by preferring appeals
to the Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh. General
(Retd.) S.F. Rodrigues, the then Administrator of the Union
Territory, Chandigarh, adjudicated upon their appeals both on
merits, as well as, on their maintainability. Insofar as the merits D
are concerned, he arrived at the conclusion, that the competent
authority had rightly invoked clause (b) of the second proviso
under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Insofar as the
issue of maintainability is concerned, the Administrator of the
Union Territory of Chandigarh recorded, that the appeals were E
not maintainable, as the order passed by the Advisor to the
Administrator, Union Territory of Chandigarh, constitut£d an
order passed by the Government, from which there was no
remedy of appeal. F
7. The order of dismissal from service dated 1.3.2004,
passed by the Advisor to the Administrator of the Union Territory
of Chandigarh, as well as the order dated 11.2.2005 passed
by the Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh were assailed G
by the appellant, as well as by the petitioners, before the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench (hereinafter
referred to as, the Administrative Tribunal). Ved Mitter Gill, the
appellant herein, preferred Original Application No. 149/PB
of 2005, Dalbir Singh Sandhu filed Original Application No. H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 5 S.C.R.
A 97/PB of 2005, Paramjit Singh Rana had raised his challenge
by filing Original Application No. 188/PB of 2005, whereas,
Nishan Singh and lnder Singh filed Original Application Nos.
39/PB and 40/ PB of 2005 respectively.
B 8. All the above applications were dismissed by the
Administrative Tribunal through a common order dated
30.1.2006. Ved Mitter Gill assailed the order dated 30.1.2006
passed by the Administrative Tribunal before the High Court,
by preferring Civil Writ Petition No. 5682 of 2006. The same
C was dismissed by an order dated 1.5.2006. The order passed
by the High Court on 1.5.2006 came to be challenged before
this Court through Special Leave Petition (C) No. 20379 of
2006. The same has given rise to the present appeal. The
D writ petitions filed by the others, namely, Dalbir Singh Sandhu,
Paramjit Singh Rana, Nishan Singh and lnder Singh were
pending before the High Court. Separate writ petitions were
preferred on their behalf, wherein they had assailed the
common order passed by the Administrative Tribunal dated
E 30.1.2006. The above writ petitions were transferred to this
Court, to be heard along with the Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 20379 of 2006. This is how the present appeal and
petitions have jointly come up for hearing before us.
F 9. It is imperative in the facts and circumstances of this
case, to extract herein, the order dated 1.3.2004, passed by
the Advisor to the Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh
against Ved Mitter Gill. The same is accordingly being
reproduced hereunder:
G "CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION
HOME DEPARTMENT
ORDER
Shri V.M. Gill, Deputy Superintendent Model Jail,
H
VED MITTER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 83
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
Chandigarh (under suspension) was appointed as Clerk A
on 1.1.1988 and thereafter promoted as Assistant
Superintendent Jail on 28.3.1990 and was promoted as
Deputy Superintendent Jail, Model Jail, Chandigarh vide
order dated 25.5.2001. He was thus required to be fully
aware of his duties as prescribed in the Punjab Jail Manual B
as adopted for the Union Territory Chandigarh and the duty
orders passed by the Superintendent, Model Jail,
Chandigarh dated 29.5.2001, read along with paras 92 to
132 of the Punjab Jail Manual, forthe enforcement of laws, C
rules, regulations, directions and orders concerning the
management of the jail and the prisoners confined therein.
The said Shri V.M. Gill by virtue of his duties as such was
required to do all acts and things necessary or expedient
for ensuring the safe custody of all the prisoners at any time D
receive into or confined in the jail as well as for enforcing
and maintaining discipline and order amongst such
prisoners and all subordinate officers of the jail. The said
Shri Gill was fully aware that he was required to see for
himself every prisoner once in every 24 hours and to visit E
every barrack, ward, cell, compartment and every other part
of the jail and premises thereof every 24 hours. It was
thereof his duty to be present every evening when the
prisoners were locked up for the night and every morning
when the prisoners were taken out of the sleeping wards, F
cells or other compartments, satisfy himself both by night
and morning that all the prisoners were present and in safe
custody and to forthwith report every unusual occurrence of
a serious nature to the Superintendent of the Model Jail. G
The said Shri Gill was fully aware of his duties that he was
required at uncertain times, atleast once a week to cause
each prisoner and all clothing and bedding and all wards,
cells and other compartments, workshops, latrines and other
places frequented by the prisoners, to be thoroughly H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A searched for prohibited articles; to regulate all interviews
and communications between the prisoners and persons
who were not prisoners and to prevent all persons who were
not duly authorized by the competent authority from entering
the jail premises or having any access of any kind to, or
B communication with any prisoner, and to arrange that the
proper officer of the jail was present during all the interviews
held;
And whereas on the night intervening January 21/22, 2004,
c four under trial prisoners namely Jagtar Singh Hawara, s/o
Sher Singh, Paramjit Singh, s/o Jagjit Singh, Jagtar Singh
Tara, s/o Sadhu Singh and Dev Singh, s/o Madan Singh
lodged in the Model Jail, Burail escaped through a tunnel
dug from their barrack. The first three under-trials namely
D
Jagtar Singh Hawara, s/o Sher Singh, Paramjit Singh, s/o
Jagjit Singh and Jagtar Singh Tara, s/o Sadhu Singh were
being tried to their involvement in the assassination of S.
Beant Singh, then Chief Minister, Punjab and had links with
E Babbar Khalsa International a terrorist organization, while
Dev Singh was being tried for murder. The said Shri V.M.
Gill was fully aware that Jagtar Singh Hawara S/o Sher
Singh, Paramjit Singh, s/o. Jagjit Singh, Jagtar Singh Tara,
s/o Sadhu Singh were dreaded terrorists and high security
F prisoners;
And whereas a case F.l.R. No.17, dated 22.1.2004 under
Sections223,224,452,457, 120-B, 121, 121-A, 123,217,
221 IPC, P.S. 34, Chandigarh was registered with respect
G to the escape of the above mentioned under trials, and from
the evidence obtained during the course of the investigation
of the case, it is apparent that the said Shri V.M. Gill, was
involved in the conspiracy to facilitate the escape of the under
trials by willfully neglecting his duties and by providing them
H
VED MITTER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 85
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
support in different forms. This is evident from some of the A
following instances:-
(1) Curtains were allowed to be hung on doors and windows
from inside the barrack occupied by the said under trials,
resulting in absence of visibility from outside and facilitating B
the prisoners to carry out their plans unobserved in violation
of paras 324, 327 and 328 of the Punjab Jail Manual, 1996
as adopted for the Union Territory, Chandigarh. The said
Shri Gill, willfully ignored the suspicious activities of the under
trials and did not conduct special search of their barrack in C
violation of paras 97, 98, 100(a), (b) & (f) of the said Manual.
(2) No action was taken by the said Shri V.M. Gill despite
reports of lights of the barrack housing the said under trials
being switched off during the night hours, playing of television D
or radio at high volume and continuous flowing of water,
facilitating activities of the said under trials in digging of the
escape tunnel and disposing the excavated soil, in violation
of paras 325 and 329 of the said Manual.
E
(3) No thorough checking of the barrack housing the under
trials was carried out by the said Shri Gill in violation of
provisions of the said Manual, including para 97.
(4) A tunnel was reportedly discovered in the barrack then F
housing the three under trials of the Beant Singh case during
June, 2002. The said Shri V.M. Gill in complicity with the
under trials and other jail officials suppresses these facts.
In November, 2002 a large number of prohibited articles
were recovered from the above mentioned under trials, G
which had been earlier allowed to be delivered to them in
complicity with the under trials as well as their co-
conspirators. After recovery of the prohibited articles, strict
action as warranted under Punjab Jail Manual was not taken H
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A against the under trials or any other delinquent jail official.
The investigation have revealed that a large number of
prohibited articles have again been recovered from the cell
of the escaped under trials, clearly indicating the complicity
of the said Shri V.M. Gill, who willfully contravened the
B provisions of the said Manual including paras 105 and 110.
It was also found that a number of articles such as cell phone
(not recovered), weight lifting iron rod, rope, emergency light,
radio, portable fan, electric wires etc., directly assisted the
said under trials to escape from the Jail.
c
(5) Meeting of the under trials with the other suspected
prisoners within the jail as well as conspirators outside the
jail were neither supervised nor checked in violation of para
106 of the said Manual.
D
(6) The said Sh. Gill, was arrested on Jan. 27, 2004 and on
his disclosure statement a book titled 'True Stories of great
escapes' was recovered from his official residence in the
jail. A rough site plan prepared by the police revealed that
E the tunnel through which the under trials escaped had
similarities with the tunnel mentioned in the said book.
And whereas the above conduct of the said Shri Gill
establishes that he was directly involved in the conspiracy
F to help the above-mentioned under trials to escape from
the Model Jail, Chandigarh. It has also come to light during
investigation that three of the escaped under trials had
linkage with the Babbar Khalsa International, a known and
a dreaded terrorist organization, which is involve in anti-
G
national and anti-State activities. The said Shri V.M. Gill is
a senior, permanent and non-transferable official of the
Model Jail, Chandigarh and junior jail officials, who are
witnesses in the above case are not likely to come forward
H to depose against him if disciplinary proceedings are
VED MITIER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 87
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.J
initiated so long as he remains in service, for fear of earning A
h:s wrath in future. Further, due to the involvement of the
escaped under trials, with the Babbar K~alsa International,
a known and dreaded terrorist organiz~tion, no witness is
likely to come forward to depose against him in the
disciplinary proceedings, if initiated, due to fear of life. B
Independence assessment also is that three of the escaped
under trials are likely, inter alia, to pose a danger to the
lives of the people. In these circumstances I am satisfied
that the holding of an inquiry as contemplated by Article 311 C
(2) (b) of the Constitution of India and the Punjab Civil
Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970 as made
applicable to the employees of Union Territory, Chandigarh,
is not reasonably practicable;
D
And whereas I am of the view that in the face of such grave
culpable acts of omission and commission there is no
justification for the continuation in service of Shri Gill as he
has betrayed all responsibility placed upon him by law and
rules. From the facts that have transpired, I conclude that E
there has been misconduct of such magnitude by Shri V.M.
Gill that the severest penalty permissible by law is called
for.
Now, therefore, I being the competent authority exercising F
the powers conferred by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution
of India, having come to the conclusion that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, hereby dismiss
the said Shri V.M. Gill, from service with immediate effect.
Sd/- G
Advisor to the Administrator,
U.T., Chandigarh
Dated 1.3.2004"
Orders passed against the other petitioners were premised H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A on the same foundation, and were to the same effect.
10. During the course of hearing learned counsel for
the appellant/petitioners pleaded, non-application of mind,
arbitrariness, discrimination, and malice in fact as well as in
B law. Insofar as the issue of non- application of mind is
concerned, it was the vehement contention of the learned
counsel, that they were not assigned duties as would render
them blameworthy for the abovementioned jail-break. Besides
various contentions advanced on the instant aspect of the
C matter, the primary submission of the learned counsel was,
that personnel from the police department were in overall
supervisory control, and that, they regulated not only the ingress
and egress of jail mates and other visitors, but also materials
D and articles which were permitted to enter the jail premises.
In the above background, it was the vehement contention of
the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioners, that they have
been made scapegoats for something that others were truly
responsible for.
E 11. To adjudicate upon the above contention advanced
at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioners,
it is necessary to understand the duties and responsibilities
assigned to appellant-Ved Mitter Gill, whose case has been
F taken as the lead case. The duty chart depicting tne
responsibilities assigned to the officers of Model Jail, Burail,
Chandigarh, is available on the record of the case. A relevant
extract thereof is being reproduced hereunder:
"1. Sh. V.M. Gill. Dy. Supdt. Jail
G
He shall perform his duties under the immediate
directions and orders of the Supdt. Jail. The duties of
the Dy. Supdt. Jail are contained in para 91 to 132 of the
Punjab Jail Manual. In addition to his normal duty he will
H
VED MITTER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 89
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
hold the charge of matters relating to:- A
i) Establishment
ii) Accounts
iii) Court cases (pending in various courts)
B
iv) Diet purchase and all miscellaneous matters."
xxx )()()( )()()(
IMPORTANT NOTE c
1. Besides above duties Executive Officers will perform
all other duties assigned to them from time to time in
accordance with the provision of Punjab Jail Manual.
2. All Executive Officer will be present inside Jail in their D
respective executive charge daily at the time of lock-up
and lock-outs.
3. All will make night rounds to see the security
arrangements and satisfy themselves that inmates are E
in safe custody.
4. All will accompany the Superintendent Jail on his
weekly parade (on every Monday) inspection of prisoners
as per provision of para 75 of the Punjab Jail Manual.
F
Sci/-
Superintendent,
Model Jail, Chandigarh"
(emphasis is ours)
G
A perusal of the duty chart relating to Ved Mitter Gill reveals,
that he was responsible for duties expressed in paragraphs
92 to 132 of the Punjab Jail Manual. Extracts of the Punjab
Jail Manual are also available on record of the case, only a
few relevant paragraphs, which highlight the duties and H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A responsibilities vested on the shoulders of Ved Mitter Gill as
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Jail, are being extracted
hereunder:
"97. Duties of Deputy Superintendent as to safety of
B prisoners. discipline. visits and attendance. - (1) The
Deputy Superintendent shall do an acts and things which
may be necessary or expedient for ensuring the safe
custody of all prisoners at any time received into or
confined in the jail, as well as for enforcing and
c maintaining discipline and order amongst such prisoners
and all subordinate officers of the jail at any time serving
under his orders or control.
(2) The Deputy Superintendent shall. atleast once in everv
D twenty-four hours,- ·
(a) himself see everv prisoner for the time being
confined in the jail;
E (b) visit everv barrack. ward. cell. compartment. and
every other part of the jail and the premises thereof.
including the hospital; and shall. save as provided in
the rules, regulations. directions and orders for the time
being in force in that behalf, always remain present
F within the jail or the premises thereof.
Note- The Deputy Superintendent is permitted to be
absent for meals at such times and for such periods as
the Superintendent may specify, or when required to
G appear in a Court of Justice, or when leave of absence
is granted by the Superintendent.
xxx xxx xxx
100. Duties as to lock-up, counting. labour. food and
H
VED MITTER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 91
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
reporting unusual occurrences.- (1) It shall be the duty of A
the Deputy Superintendent to-
(a) be present every evening when the prisoners are
locked up for the night and every morning when the
prisoners are taken out of the sleeping wards. cells or B
other compartments;
(b) satisfy himself. both night and morning. that all the
prisoners are present and in safe custody;
(c) allot to each prisoner sentenced to undergo
c
rigorous imprisonment a proper task and satisfy
himself that every such prisoner, who is fit for labour,
is daily put to proper labour and performs his allotted
task and, for this purpose, to check the tasks allotted D
and visit the workshops frequently while the prisoners
are engaged at work;
(d) be present at and superintend the daily weighing
and serving out of rations and satisfy himself that the E
food-stuffs are properly cleaned and cooked;
(e) supervise the distribution of food and satisfy himself
that each prisoner receives his proper quantities at
the prescribed times, and to F
(f) forthwith report every unusual occurrence of a
serious nature, to the Superintendent.
(2) The Superintendent may by a written order take over
such of the duties of the Deputy Superintendent as he G
may deem necessary for the efficient running of the jail.
(3) Every action taken under sub-rule (2) shall forthwith
be reported by the Superintendent to the Inspector-
H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A General giving full justification therefor and the Inspector-
General may confirm, modify or cancel such order.
101. Duty of Deputy Superintendent on admission of
prisoner. - Upon the admission of every prisoner the
B Deputy Superintendent shall-
(a) examine or cause to the examined the warrant or
order under which such prisoner is committed to the
Jail and satisfy himself that it is in all respects
c complete, in order and valid;
(b) remove. or cause to be removed, from such
prisoner all money or other articles found on him,
including (if such prisoner is not. by law. entitled to
D retain it) his wearing apparel and (in such case) shall
provide him with a complete Jail out-fit;
(c) take measures to preserve and protect all property
taken from, or belonging to, the prisoner which may
E come into his hands; and
(d) shall satisfy himself that the provisions of Chapter
IV of the Act, and these rules, as to the admission of
prisoners, are duly complied with.
F )()()( )()()( )()()(
105. Deputy Superintendent to search weekly for
prohibited articles.-
G The Deputy Superintendent shall. at uncertain times. at
least once a week. cause each prisoner. and all clothing
and bedding. and all wards, cells and other
compartments. workshops. latrines and other places
frequented by prisoners. to be thoroughly searched for
H prohibited articles.
VED MITIER GILL v. UNION TERRITORYADMN., 93
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
106. Deputy Superintendent to regulate interviews and A
communications.-
It shall be the duty of the Deputy Superintendent to
regulate all interviews and communications between
prisoners and persons who are not prisoners and to B
prevent all persons who are not duly authorised in that
behalf by competent authority from entering the jail
premises or having any access of any kind to. or
communication with. any prisoner. and to arrange that
the proper officer of the Jail is present during all interviews C
held.
xxx xxx xxx
110. Deputy Superintendent to hold parade every D
Sunday.-
The Deputy Superintendent shall hold a parade of all the
prisoners for the time being confined in the jail on every
Sunday Evening and shall, E
(a) carefully inspect every prisoner;
(b) examine the clothing, bedding and utensils etc., of
every prisoner;
F
(c) check the muster roll and satisfy himself that every
prisoner is present or accounted for;
and satisfy himself generally that evervthing is in proper
order. He shall enter a report of his inspection in his G
. journal. noting therein the state of the clothing. cleanliness.
numerical strength and other matters of importance
relating to the prisoners.
xxx xxx xxx H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A 117. The Deputy Superintendent shall enter daily in his
iournal:-
(a) the time the wards were opened;
(b) the members of the staff (if any) who were absent;
B
(c) the time prisoners began work;
(d) the time work was stopped in the forenoon and
when it was recommenced;
c
(e) the time work was stopped for the day; and
(f) the time the lock-up was completed;
(g) that the gratings and locks of the jail were got tested
D and found intact.
xxx xxx xxx
120. Deputy Superintendent responsible for the efficiency
E of the guard.-
(1) The Deputy Superintendent shall satisfy himself that
a sufficient strength of the guard to meet all
emergencies is at all times present at the jail and
F ready to be armed. and that the warders sleep in the
quarters allotted to them and do not leave the jail
premises without permission.
(2) The Deputy and the Assistant Superintendent shall
G at least once a week in addition to their routine night
round search the relieved and relieving night guards
between the gates (after 10 P.M. and before 4.00
AM.)."
H (emphasis is ours)
VED MITTER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 95
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
It is not necessary for us to further delve into the nature of duties A
assigned to appellant-Ved Mitter Gill in his capacity as Deputy
Superintendent Jail, because we have highlighted the relevant
paragraphs of Punjab Jail Manual, which meticulously highlight
the nature of his duties and responsibilities. Having examined
the same, we are satisfied, that the responsibility of jail inmates B
exclusively rests on the shoulders of the jail staff. On the
evaluation of the duties and responsibilities of posts of
Assistant Superintendent Jail, Head Warder and Warder, there
remains no room for any doubt, about the other petitioners C
also, that they too were similarly responsible for securing the
detention of all jail inmates. We, therefore find no merit in the
contention advanced on behalf of the appellant/petitioners, that
it was not them, but police personnel from the Chandigarh
Police Department, who were responsible for the supervisory o
control over jail inmates, at the Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh.
12. Another contention advanced at the hands of the
learned counsel for the appellant/petitioners was, that the entire
action initiated at the hands of the respondents was vitiated, E
on account of malice in fact as also malice in law. Insofar as
the instant aspect of matter is concerned, our attention has
been invited to the factual position pleaded in Civil
Miscellaneous Nos. 8930-31 of 2010 in Civil Writ Petition
No.5147-CAT of 2007. It would be pertinent to mention, that F
the aforesaid civil miscellaneous application was filed by Dalbir
Singh Sandhu, Deputy Superintendent of Police. Our pointed
attention was invited to the following factual position expressed
in the aforesaid civil miscellaneous application:
G
".... Interestingly a perusal of the record filed before the
Criminal Court by the Chandigarh Police of the Special
Mulakat Register shows that in those copies the
signatures of the supervisory staff i.e. the Chandigarh
H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A Police is missing. Apparently these documents have
been also considered by the competent authority to pass
the impugned order against the petitioner. Photocopies
of some of the pages of the Special Mulakat Register
have been annexed earlier. The typed copies of the same
B for the corresponding days as submitted by the
prosecution before the Criminal Court and apparently
which were considered by the competent authority to
terminate the services of the petitioner are annexed
herewith asAnnexuresA/1 andA/2 respectively."
c
Having given our thoughtful consideration to the pleadings
extracted hereinabove, and having perused the annexuresA/
1 and A/2 referred to in the above pleadings, we are satisfied
that the contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel
0
for the appellant/petitioners is wholly misconceived. The
presence of police personnel to extend external support to a
jail facility is understandable. There is nothing wrong about
the same. Police personnel may be posted outside the jail
E premises, for obvious reasons. Such police personnel would
be oblivious of the activities within the four walls of the jail itself.
The presence of police personnel within the administrative
framework of a jail, is out of the question. The appellant/
petitioners have not placed any material on the record of the
F case to demonstrate, that police personnel from the police
department were assigned duties within the barracks of Model
Jail, Burail, Chandigarh. In our considered view, within the jail
premises, only the jail staff can be permitted to function. And
in case of lapses within the jail premises, it is the jail staff alone
G which is responsible. Based on the factual position brought to
our notice from the pleadings and annexures referred to above,
it is not possible for us to accept the submission advanced at
the hands of the learnedcounsel for the appellant/petitioners,
H that the action initiated against the appellant/petitioners can
VED MITIER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 97
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
be vitiated for the reasons of malice in fact or malice in law. A
13. Out of the submission advanced by the learned
counsel for the appellant/petitioners, the contention which could
have been of some significance was, that the reasons
mentioned in the impugned order of dismissal from service, B
were a mechanical repetition of grounds routinely and casually
expressed without application of mind, in such like orders. And
in that view of the matter, the contention, that the satisfaction
recorded by the disciplinary authority does not constitute a valid
satisfaction in the eyes of law. It was in the instant context, that C
the learned counsel invited our attention to some judgments
rendered by this Court. First of all, reliance was placed on
Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 581. Our
pointed attention was invited to the following observations D
recorded therein:
"10. It is now a well-settled principle of law that a
constitutional right conferred upon a delinquent cannot
be dispensed with lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior
motive or merely in order to avoid the holding of an E
enquirv. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant has taken us through certain documents for the
purpose of showing that ultimately the police on
investigation did not find any case against the appellant F
in respect of the purported FIR lodged against him under
Section 377 IPC. However, it may not be necessary for
us to go into the said question.
11. We have noticed herein before that the formal enquiry
G
was dispensed with only on the ground that the appellant
could win over aggrieved people as well as witnesses
from giving evidence by threatening and other means.
No material has been placed or disclosed either in the
said order or before us to show that subjective satisfaction H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A arrived at by the statutory authority was based upon
9bjective criteria. The purported reason for dispensing
~ith the departmental proceedings is not supported by
any document. It is further evident that the said order of
dismissal was passed, inter alia. on the ground that there
B ~as no need for a regular departmental enquiry relying
on or on the basis of a preliminary enquiry. However. if a
preliminary enquiry could be conducted, we fail to see
gny reason as to why a formal departmental enquiry could
not have been initiated against the appellant. Reliance
c placed upon such a preliminary enquiry without complying
with the minimal requirements of the principle of natural
justice is against all canons of fair play and justice. The
appellate authority. as notice hereinbefore, in its order
D dated 24-6-1998 jumped to the conclusion that he was
guilty of grave acts of misconduct proving complete
unfitness for police service and the punishment awarded
to him is commensurate with the misconduct although
no material therefor was available on record. It is further
E evident that the appellate authority also misdirected
himself in passing the said order insofar as he failed to
take into consideration the relevant facts and based his
decision on irrelevant factors.
F 12. Even the Inspector General of Police in passing his
order dated 26-11-1999, despite having been
I
asked by the High Court to pass a speaking order. did
not assign sufficient or cogent reason. He. like the
appellate authority, also proceeded on the basis that the
G appellant was guilty of commission of offences which are
grave and heinous in nature and bring a bad name to the
police force of the State on the whole. None of the
authorities mentioned hereinbefore proceeded on the
relevant material for the purpose of arriving at the
H
VED MITIER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 99
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the case A
sufficient cause existed for dispensing with the formal
enquiry. This aspect of the matter has been considered
by this Court in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991)
1 sec 362, wherein relying upon the judgment of the
Constitution Bench of this Court, inter alia, in Union of B
India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, it was held:
(Jaswant Singh case (supra), SCC p. 368, para 4)
"Although Clause (3) of that article makes the decision
of the disciplinary authority in this behalf final such c
finality can certainly be tested in a court of law and
interfered with ifthe action is found to be arbitrary or
mala fide or motivated by extraneous considerations
or merely a ruse to dispense with the inquiry."
D
13. In that case also like the present one, the attention of
the Court was not drawn to any material existing on the
date of passing of the impugned order in support of the
allegations contained in the order dispensing with the
departmental enquiry." E
(emphasis is ours)
Learned counsel thereupon placed reliance on State of Punjab
v. Harbhajan Singh, (2007) 15 SCC 217. They invited our F
attention to the following observation recorded therein:
"3. Learned counsel then contended that no departmental
enquiry could be held against the respondent in view of
his involvement with terrorists. In the suit. the State did G
not place any material to establish that any case was
made out for dispensation of a regular departmental
enquiry as required under clause (2) to Article 311 of the
Constitution of India. The question is now covered by a
H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A recent decision of this Court in Tarsem Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2006) 13 sec 581 wherein this Court has
I
QP.ined that if no material is brought to the notice of the
Court on the date of passing of the impugned order in
support of the allegations contained therein as to why it
B was impractical to hold a regular disciplinarv proceeding,
the order of termination would not be sustainable."
(emphasis is ours)
c 14. In order to fully clarify the legal position on the issue
in hand, learned counsel for the Chandigarh Administration,
invited our attention to the decision rendered in Southern
Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, (2009) 9 SCC
24. In the above cited judgment, this Court having placed
D reliance on Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC
398, Satyavir Singh v. Union of India, (1985) 4 SCC 252, Kuldip
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996) 1OSCC659, Union of India v.
R. Reddappa, (1993) 4 SCC 269 and Indian Railway
E Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579,
recorded its conclusions as under:
"26. Jhe law laid down by this Court being clear and
explicit. the question which would arise for our
consideration is whether in then prevailing situation. what
F a reasonable man taking a reasonable view would have
done.
27. The High Court in its judgment opined:
G (i) That the statement of the disciplinary authority that "I
am convinced that it is not reasonably practicable to hold
an inquiry" is against the dicta laid down by this Court
in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398.
H (ii) In the absence of any reason. much less recorded. as
VED MITIER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 101
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
has been mandated under the Rule, to show that it was A
not reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary inquiry,
we are of the opinion that the discretionary power was
exercised for extraneous purpose to dismiss the
delinquents and that the same is arbitrary and perverse
since no reasonable person could form such an opinion B
on the given material and thus the impugned orders of
dismissal are hit by malice also. The alleged incident
and the impugned orders of dismissal were all dated 31-
1-2004 which shows the haste in which the disciplinary
authority has acted.
c
(iii) While invoking the stringent extraordinary provisions
like Rule 14(ii}, principles of natural justice require every
care to be taken by the authorities concerned. Any haste
D
in invoking such stringent provisions, without even
complying with the mandatory requirements of the
provision, would make such decision of the disciplinary
authority illegal, being an abuse of power conferred upon
~ E
(iv) It can very well be held that the impugned orders of
dismissal suffer from want of materials and in the absence
of any material to substantiate the mere oral stand of the
Department that holding an inquiry was not reasonably F
practicable, without offering any reasons, much less in
writing, as mandated by law, the impugned orders of
di~missal are liable to be quashed.
(v) In the case in hand, since the authorities have invoked
G
the extraordinarv power under Rule 14(ii) dispensing with
the inquirv, and further since the alleged incident was held
to be not proved by the criminal court, after thorough trial,
the appellate and revisional authorities ought to have
considered the said aspect of acquittal while imposing H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A the punishment. Therefore. we are of the view that the
fact of acquittal is a circumstance to be considered while
awarding punishment in this case.
We with respect are unable to agree therewith.
B
28. The disciplinary authority in its order dated 31-1-
2004 categorically stated:
(i) That the delinquent employees attempted to cause
bodily harm to Shri S.M. Krishnan; created an ugly scene
c which brought a bad name to the Railways; officers who
tried to protect Shri S.M. Krishnan were badly abused;
Shri S.M. Krishnan and his family were threatened to be
killed if he goes to Chennai; it was a pre-planned attempt
o as a handwritten poster was displayed in the workshop
as well as at the railway station wherein it was stated
that Shri S.M. Krishnan will die on 31-1-2004 and his
cremation will be done at 1430 hours when Train No.
6128 leaves the railway station.
E
{ii) That all of them have conspired and assaulted Shri
S.M. Krishnan as a result whereof he could not undertake
the journey and had to go by road with escort.
(iii) The formality of holding a disciplinary proceeding was
F
dispensed with stating:
"You along with other associates threatened. intimidated
and terrorized all the officers. The atmosphere of
violence. general indiscipline and insubordination is
G
prevailing. In view of this situation I am convinced that it
is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry."
29. It was concluded:
H
VED MITTER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 103
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
"I, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred upon A
me under Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline
&Appeal) Rules, 1968, hereby dismiss you from railway
service with effect from 31-1-2004 (A/N). You are
required to hand over the railway property in your custody.
You are also required to vacate the railway quarters, if in B
occupation, within one month from the date on which a
copy of this notice is delivered. You are hereby advised
that under Rules 18 and 19 of the Railway Servants
(Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968, you may prefer an
appeal against these orders to CWM/GOC provided that:
c
(i) The appeal is preferred within a period of 45 days
from the date on which a copy of this notice is delivered.
(ii) The appeal is to be preferred in your own name and D
presented to the authority to whom the appeal lies and
does not contain any disrespectful and improper
language."
a
30. An order of a disciplinarv authority in case of this E
nature, as laid down by this Court in Tulsiram's
case (supra). must be judged by a court exercising power
of judicial review by placing himself in his armchair. The
disciplinarv authority was a man at the spot. He acted on
the basis of a report made to him. He also knew about F
the written poster having been displayed. The atmosphere
which was prevailing in the workshop must be known to
him Not only the disciplinarv authority but also the
appellate authoritv. having regard to the materials brought
G
on record, arrived at the said finding.
xxx xxx xxx
· 33. While thus considering as to whether there had been
H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A enough material before the disciplinary authority for the
R,_urpose of arriving at its satisfaction that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold departmental
ruoceedings, the appellate authority, in our opinion. was
entitled to consider the situation prevailing from the
B confidential reports submitted by other employees. They
were not relied upon for the purpose of proving
misconduct but for the purpose that in the situation which
was prevailing. whether it was reasonably practicable to
hold an enquiry. There is no dispute that the protection
c accorded to an employee by reason of the constitutional
QIOVision of mandate of recording of reasons is of great
significance. Such reasons. in our opinion, in the instant
case. have been recorded.
D
xxx xxx xxx
35. So far as the finding of the High Court thatthe orders
of dismissal suffer from want of material is concerned,
the orders of the disciplinary authority themselves
E disclose existence of sufficient materials. Before the
statutory authorities, the incident was not denied. Lodging
of the first report was also not denied. The fact that one
of the delinquent officials was arrested on the same day
F was not denied. Arrest of others after a period of two
weeks also stood admitted. Display of handwritten poster
both at the workshop and at the railway station had also
not been denied.
36. We do not find that before the High Court the
G
delinquent employees brought on record any material that
the grounds stated in the orders of dismissal were wholly
non-existent. No mala fides on the part of the disciplinary
authority was attributed. It is not the case of the delinquent
H employees that the disciplinary authority in passing the
VED MITTER GILL v. UNIONTERRITORYADMN., 105
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
said order took into consideration any irrelevant fact not A
germane therefor or failed to take into consideration any
relevant fact."
(emphasis is ours)
B
15. Before delving into the pointed issues canvassed
at the hands of the learned counsel representing appellant/
petitioners, it is necessary for us to notice the parameters laid
down by this Court for invoking clause (b) of the second proviso
to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. Insofar as the c
instant aspect of the matter is concerned, the norms stipulated
by this Court for the above purpose, require the satisfaction of
three ingredients. Firstly, that the conduct of the delinquent
employee should be such as would justify one of the three
punishments, namely, dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. D
Secondly, the satisfaction of the competent authority, that it is
not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, as contemplated
under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. And thirdly,
the competent authority must record the reasons of the above
satisfaction in writing. E
16. On the issue whether it is reasonably practicable to
hold an inquiry as contemplated under Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India is concerned, this Court elaborately
expressed the required norms, in Union of India v. Tulsiram F
Patel (supra), as under:
"130. The condition precedent for the application of
clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority
that "it is not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry G
contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is
pertinent to note is that the words used are "not
reasonably practicable" and not 'impracticable'.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary 'practicable'
H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A means "Capable of being put into practice, carried out
in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible".
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the
word 'practicable' inter alia as meaning "possible to
practice or perform: capable of being put into practice,
B dor:ie or accomplished: feasible". Further, the words used
are not "not practicable" but "not reasonably practicable".
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the
word 'reasonably' as "in a reasonable manner: to a fairly
sufficient extent". Thus, whether it was practicable to hold
c the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether
it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or
absolute impracticability which is required by clause {b).
What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not
D practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a
reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not
possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be
reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some
instances by way of illustration may, however, be given.!!
E would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry
where the government servant. particularly through or
together with his associates. so terrorizes. threatens or
intimidate witnesses who are going to give evidence
against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from
F doing so or where the government servant by himself or
together with or through other threatens, intimidates and
terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinarv authority or
members of his family so that he is afraid to hold the
inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not be
G
reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an
atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and
insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the
concerned government servant is or is not a party to
H bringing about such an atmosphere. In this connection,
VED MITTER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 107
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
we must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify A
while an individual may not. The reasonable practicability
of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be
made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is
generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is
because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of B
this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of
the disciplinary authority on this question final. A
disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a
disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior
c
motives or merely in order to avoid the hoiding of an
inquiry or because the Department's case against the
government servant is weak and must fail. The finality
given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by
Article 311 (3) is not binding upon the court so far as its D
power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case
the court will strike down the order dispensing with the
inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. The case of
Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 578, is
an instance in point. In that case, the appellant was E
working as a senior clerk in the office of the Chief
Commercial Superintendent, Northern Railway, Varanasi.
The Senior Commercial Officer wrote a letter to the
appellant calling upon him to submit his explanation with
regard to twelve charges of gross indiscipline mostly F
relating to the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent.
The appellant submitted his explanation and on the very
next day the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent
served a second notice on the appellant saying that his
G
explanation was not convincing and that another chance
was being given to him to offer his explanation with
respect to those charges. The appellant submitted his
further explanation but on the very next day the Deputy
Chief Commercial Superintendent passed an order H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to be
retained in service. This Court struck down the order
holding that seven out of twelve charges related to the
conduct of the appellant with the Deputy Chief
Commercial Superintendent who was the disciplinary
B authority and that if an inquiry were to be held, the principal
witness for the Department would have been the Deputy
Chief Commercial Superintendent himself, resulting in
the same person being the main accusor, the chief
witness and also the judge of the matter.
c
131. It was submitted that where a delinquent government
.§ervant so terrorizes the disciplinarv authoritv that neither
that officer nor any other officer stationed at that place is
willing to hold the inquiry, some senior officer can be sent
D
from outside to hold the inquiry. This submission itself
shows that in such a case the holding of an inquiry is not
reasonably practicable. It would be illogical to hold that
the administrative work carried out by senior officers
E should be paralysed because a delinquent government
servant either by himself or along with or through others
makes the holding of an inquiry not reasonably
12racticable.
F 132. It is not necessary that a situation which makes the
holding of an inquiry not reasonably practicable should
exist before the disciplinary inquiry is initiated against a
government servant. Such a situation can also come into
existence subsequently during the course of an inquiry,
G for instance, after the service of a charge-sheet upon the
government servant or after he has filed his written
statement thereto or even after evidence has been led in
part. In such a case also the disciplinary authority would
be entitled to apply clause (b) of the second proviso
H
VED MITTER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 109
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
because the word 'inquiry' in that clause includes part of A
an inquiry. It would also not be reasonably practicable to
afford to the government servant an opportunity of hearing
or further hearing, as the case may be, when at the
commencement of the inquiry or pending it the
government servant absconds and cannot be served or B
will not participate in the inquiry. In such cases, the matter
must proceed ex parte and on the materials before the
disciplinary authority. Therefore, even where a part of an
inquiry has been held and the rest is dispensed with
under clause (b) or a provision in the service rules
c
analogous thereto. the exclusionary words of the second
proviso operate in their full vigour and the government
servant cannot complain that he has been dismissed,
removed or reduced in rank in violation of the safeguards D
provided by Article 311 (2)."
(emphasis is ours)
17. Insofar as the requirement of reasons reflecting the
reasonable practicability, of holding an inquiry in writing is E
concerned, this Court in the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram
Patel (supra) held as under:
"133. The second condition necessary for the valid
application of clause (b) of the second proviso is thatthe F
disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason
for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable
to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311 (2). This
is a constitutional obligation and if such reason is not
G
recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry
and the order of penalty following thereupon would both
be void and unconstitutional.
134. It is obvious thatthe recording in writing of the reason
H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order
imposing the penaltv. The reason for dispensing with the
inquiry need not, therefore, find a place in the final order.
It would be usual to record the reason separately and
then consider the question of the penalty to be imposed
B and pass the order imposing the penalty. It would,
however, be better to record the reason in the final order
in order to avoid the allegation that the reason was not
recorded in writing before passing the final order but was
subsequently fabricated. The reason for dispensing with
c the inquiry need not contain detailed particulars, but the
reason must not be vague or just a repetition of the
language of clause (b} of the second proviso. For
instance, it would be no compliance with the requirement
D of clause (b) for the disciplinary authority simply to state
that he was satisfied that it was not reasonably
practicable to hold any inquiry. Sometimes a situation
may be such that it is not reasonably practicable to give
detailed reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. This
E would not, however, per se invalidate the order. Each case
must be judged on its own merits and in the light of its
own facts and circumstances.
135. It was vehemently contended that if reasons are
F not recorded in the final order, they must be
communicated to the concerned government servant to
enable him to challenge the validity of the reasons in a
departmental appeal or before a court of law and that
failure to communicate the reasons would invalidate the
G order. This contention too cannot be accepted. The
constitutional requirement in clause (b) is that the reason
for dispensing with the inquiry should be recorded in
writing. There is no obligation to communicate the reason
to the government servant. As clause (3) of
H
VED MITTER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 111
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary A
authority on this point final, the question cannot be
agitated in a departmental appeal, revision or review.
The obligation to recordthe reason in writing is provided
in clause (b) so that the superiors of the disciplinary
authority may be able to judge whether such authority B
had exercised its power under clause (b) properly or not
with a view to judge the performance and capacity of
that officer for the purposes of promotion etc. It would,
however, be better for the disciplinary authority to
communicate to the government servant its reason for
c
dispensing with the inquiry because such communication
would eliminate the possibility of an allegation being
made that the reasons have been subsequently
fabricated. It would also enable the government servant D
to approach the High Court under Article 226 or, in a fit
case, this Court under Article 32. If the reasons are not
communicated to the government servant and the matter
comes to the court, the court can direct the reasons to
be produced, and furnished to the government servant E
and if still not produced, a presumption should be drawn
that the reasons were not recorded in writing and the
impugned order would then stand invalidated. Such
presurpption can, however, be rebutted by a satisfactory
explanation for the non-production of the written reasons." F
(emphasis is ours)
18. Whilst examining the requirements, pertaining to
the applicability of clause (b) to the second proviso under Article G
311(2) of the Constitution of India is concerned, it would also
be proper to notice the observations of this Court in Union of
India v. Tulsiram Patel (supra), wherein it was held as under:
"138. Where a government servant is dismissed, H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A removed or reduced in rank by applying clause (b) or an
analogous provision of the service rules and he
approaches either the High Court under Article 226 or
this Court under Article 32, the court will interfere on
grounds well established in law for the exercise of power
B of judicial review in matters where administrative
discretion is exercised. It will consider whether clause
(b) or an analogous provision in the service rules was
properly applied or not. The finality given by clause (3) of
Article 311 to the disciplinary authority's decision that it
c was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry is not
binding upon the court. The court will also examine the
charge of mala fides. if any. made in the writ petition. In
examining the relevancy of the reasons. the court will
D consider the situation which according to the disciplinary
authority made it come to the conclusion that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. If the court finds
that the reasons are irrelevant then the recording of its
~atisfaction by the disciplinary authority would be an
E 13buse of power conferred upon it by clause (b) and would
take the case out of the purview of that clause and the
impugned order of penalty would stand invalidated. In
considering the relevancy of the reasons given by the
disciplinary authority the court will not, however, sit in
F judgment over them like a court of first appeal. In order to
decide whether the reasons are germane to clause (b),
the court must put itself in the place of the disciplinary
authoritv and consider what in the then prevailing situation
a reasonable man acting in a reasonable way would have
G
done. The matter will have to be judged in the light of the
then prevailing situation and not as if the disciplinary
authority was deciding the question whether the inquiry
should be dispensed with or not in the cool and detached
H atmosphere of a court- room, removed in time from the
VED MITTER GILL v. UNIONTERRITORYADMN., 113
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
situation in question. Where two views are possible, the A
court will decline to interfere."
(emphasis is ours)
19. Reference may also be made to the decision in
8
Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996) 10 SCC 659, wherein
this Court recorded the following observations:
"3. On appeal. the appellate authority found that the
appellant did have links with the terrorists and was mixed
up with them and he was supplying secret information of
c
the police department to terrorists which was creating
hindrance in the smooth functioning of the police
department. The appellate authority also found that it was
impossible to conduct an enguirv against the appellant D
because nobody would come forward to depose against
such "militant police official". The appellate authority also
referred to the fact that the appellant was interrogated in
a case. FIR No. 219of1990, and that during interrogation
he admitted that he was having links with Major Singh E
Shahid and Sital Singh Jakhar and was working for them.
It further stated in its order that the appellant was
preparing to murder some senior police officers whiie
taking advantage of his position.
F
xxx xxx xxx
8. Proviso (b) to Article 311(2) says that the enquiry
contemplated by clause (2) need not be held
G
"where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is
not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry".
H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A Clause (3) of Article 311 expressly provides that
"If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, the
question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to
hold such enquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the
B decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss
or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be
final".
These provisions have been the subject-matter of
c consideration by a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398. It
would be appropriate to notice a few relevant holdings in
the said judgment: (SCR pp. 205-74: SCC pp. 454-507,
paras 62-138)
D
"... before denying a government servant his constitutional
right to an inquiry, the first consideration would be whether
the conduct of the government servant concerned is such
as justifies the penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction
E in rank. Once that conclusion is reached and the condition
specified in the relevant clause of the second proviso is
satisfied, that proviso becomes applicable and the
government servant is not entitled to an enquiry.
F * * *
It would also not be reasonably practicable to hold the
inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general
indiscipline and insubordination prevails, and it is
G immaterial whether the government servant concerned
is or is not a party to bringing about such an atmosphere .
. . . The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is
a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary
authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and
H
VED MITTER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 115
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary A
authority is the best judge of this that clause (3) of
Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary
authority on this question final. ... The finality given to the
decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311 (3) is
not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial B
review is concerned ....
* * *
Where a government servant is dismissed, removed or c
reduced in rank by applying clause (b) or an analogous
provision of the service rules and he approaches either
the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under
Article 32, the court will interfere on grounds well
established in law for the exercise of power of judicial D
review in matters where administrative discretion is
exercised. It will consider whether clause (b) or an
analogous provision in the service rules was properly
applied or not. ... In examining the relevancy of the
reasons, the court will consider the situation which E
according to the disciplinary authority made it come to
the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to
hold the inquiry.... In considering the relevancy of the
reasons given by the disciplinary authority the court will
F
not, however. sit in judgment over them like a court of
first appeal."
(emphasis is ours)
20. We shall now advert to the impugned order to G
determine, whether the three parameters laid down for the valid
invocation of clause {b) to the second proviso under Article
311(2) of the Constitution of India, were made out. The first
ingredient, which is a prerequisite to the sustainable H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A application of the above clause (b) is, that the delinquency
alleged should be such as would justify, any one of the three
punishments, namely, dismissal, removal or reduction in rank.
We have already extracted hereinabove the order dated
1.3.2004, whereby, the appellant-Ved Mitter Gill was dismissed
B from service, with immediate effect. Its perusal reveals, that
the punishment was based on reasons (recorded in the
impugned order) divided into different compartments. The first
is contained in the first paragraph, which deals with the duties
C and responsibilities vested with Ved Mitter Gill, as Deputy
Superintendent, Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh. The second
component deals with the escape of four under-trials from
Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh. Three of the under-trials, who
had escaped, were involved in the assassination of Shri Beant
o Singh, a former Chief Minister of State of Punjab. The instant
paragraph also records, the factum that the said three under-
trials were having links with Babbar Khalsa International, a
terrorist organization. The fourth under-trial was being tried
separately, for the offence of murder. The third component of
E the impugned order, relates to the material taken into
consideration to evaluate the lapses committed by the
appellanUpetitioners, as would reveal their involvement with
reference to the alleged delinquency, justifying the punishment
of dismissal from service.
F
21. We shall now advert to the factual position emerging
from the above. A reference was first of all made to the duties
and responsibilities assigned to the appellant - Ved Mitter
Gill. Having detailed the express duties assigned to him in
G paragraph 11 above, we have concluded therefrom, that the
responsibility of all the jail inmates {safe custody of all
prisoners) rested on his shoulders, and the petitioners herein,
who assisted him in the same. The appellant-Ved Mitter Gill
H . was required to satisfy himself once in every twenty-four hours,
VED MITIER GILL v. UNION TERRITORY ADMN., 117
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
about the safe custody of the prisoners. He was also duty- A
bound to visit every barrack, ward, cell and compartment every
twenty-four hours. He was to be present every morning and
evening, when the prisioners were taken out of the sleeping
wards or cells or other compartments, and then, restored to
the same. He was to make a daily report by day-break and by B
night, that all the prisoners were present, and in·safe custody.
He was also required to report forthwith, any unusual
occurrence. He was required at least once a week to inspect
clothing, beddings, as well as, other articles, by thoroughly C
checking all places frequented by prisoners. And to make a
report, if he discovered any prohibited article, during the
checking. The petitioners were associated with the appellant
and assisted him in discharging his aforementioned duties.
Had the appellant - Ved Mitter Gill, and the petitioners, D
performed their duties diligently, there could not have been
any possibility, of the escape under reference. It cannot be
overlooked, that the escape was made good, by digging the
escape tunnel, which measured ninety-four feet in length (with
diagonal dimensions of 21" x 21 "). Six separate reasons have E
been expressed, by the competent authority in arriving at its
conclusion. We have extracted the impugned order dated
1.3.2004, in its entirety, hereinabove. It fully establishes the
inferences recorded by us. The determination by the
competent authority, when viewed dispassionately with F
reference to the duties assigned to Ved Mitter Gill, leaves no
room for any doubt, that the competent authority was justified
in concluding, that the four prisoners referred to above could
never have escaped, if the appellant- Ved Mitter Gill, and the G
petitioners, had diligently discharged the duties assigned to
them. Having so concluded, about the responsibility and
blameworthiness of the appellant/petitioners, there can be no
doubt that the punishment of dismissal from service, was fully
justified, as their delinquency had resulted in the escape of H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A four dreaded prisoners.
22. The second ingredient which needs to be met, for
a valid exercise of clause (b) to the second proviso under
Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, is the satisfaction of
B the competent authority, that it was not reasonably practicable,
to hold a regular departmental enquiry, against the employees
concerned. On the question whether it was reasonably
practicable to hold an inquiry, the competent authority has
recorded its conclusion in the paragraphs, preceding the one
C depicting the involvement of the appellanVpetitioners. Amongst
the reasons indicated, it has been recorded, that Ved Mitter
Gill being a senior, permanent and non-transferable officer of
Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh, his junior jail officers, who alone
would have been witnesses in such departmental proceedings,
0
were not likely to come forward to depose against him, for
fear of earning his wrath in future. The links of the escaped
under-trial prisoners, with the Babbar Khalsa International, a
known and dreaded terrorist organization were also clearly
E expressed in the impugned order, as one of the reasons, for it
being impracticable, to hold an inquiry against the appellanU
petitioners. It is a matter of common knowledge, and it would
be proper to take judicial notice of the fact, that a large number
of terrorists came to be acquitted during the period in question,
F on account of the fact, that witnesses did not appear to depose
against them on account of fear, or alternatively, the witnesses
who appeared before the concerned courts, for recording their
deposition, turned hostile, for the same reason. The situation
presented in the factual narration noticed in the impugned
G order, clearly achieves the benchmark, for the satisfaction at
the hands of the competent authority, that it would not have
been reasonably practicable, to hold a departmental
proceeding against the appellanUpetitioners, in terms of the
H mandate contained under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of
VED MITIER GILL v. UNIONTERRITORYADMN., 119
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
India. A
23. The third essential ingredient, for a valid application
of clause (b) to the second proviso under Article 311 (2) of the
Constitution of India, is that, the competent authority must
record, the reasons of the above satisfaction in writing. In the B
present case, there is no serious dispute on this issue, because
the reasons for the satisfaction have been recorded by the
competent authority in the impugned order (dated 1.3.2004)
itself.
c
24. For the reasons recorded above, we are satisfied,
that all the parameters laid down by this Court, for a valid/legal
application of clause (b) to the second proviso under Article
311(2) of the Constitution of India, were duly complied with.
D
25. Learned counsel for the appellanVpetitioners, lastly
placed reliance on two sets of facts. Firstly, it was contended,
that with reference to the same jail-break incident, a
departmental proceeding was also initiated against D.S.
Rana, the then Superintendent, Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh. E
It was pointed out, that the aforesaid D.S. Rana, was holding
the post of Superintendent, Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh, as
a deputationist from the State of Punjab. It was submitted,
that the State of Punjab had not invoked clause (b) to the
second proviso under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, F
against the aforesaid D.S. Rana. It was pointed out, that the
abovementioned D.S. Rana, has been issued a chargesheet,
for the same charges on which the appellanVpetitioners have
been dismissed from service. It was submitted, that a regular G
departmental enquiry was being conducted against the
aforesaid D.S. Rana. The pointed contention of learned
counsel was, that if a regular departmental enquiry can be
conducted against the aforesaid D.S. Rana, then it can also
be conducted against the appellanUpetitioners. Secondly, it H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A was the contention of the learned counsel, that a regular trial
was ongoing, against the appellant, and the petitioners herein,
as also, against the aforesaid D.S. Rana, in furtherance of
first information report bearing no. 17 registered at Police
Station Sector 34, Chandigarh. Yet again, it was the contention
B of the learned counsel, that if witnesses can appear in open
court proceedings before the trial court, with reference to the
same set of allegations, they could surely have appeared, in a
departmental proceeding as well.
C 26. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
above noted contention advanced at the hands of the learned
counsel for the appellant/petitioner. It is not possible for us to
place the appellant and the petitioners before this Court, on
the same pedestal as the aforesaid D.S. Rana, the then
D Superintendent, Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh (referred to by
in the submission noticed above). The reason for this is, that
Ved Mitter Gill was holding the senior-most, permanent and
non-transferable position, at Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh,
E whereas D.S. Rana, referred to in the submission advanced,
was only a deputationist at the said jail. Accordingly, whilst
Ved Mitter Gill would always remain superior to the jail staff
who would be summoned as witnesses, in the departmental
proceedings, the aforesaid D.S. Rana would not fall within the
F same parameter. D.S. Rana belonged to a different cadre.
After his repatriation to his parent cadre, he could not exercise
any supervisory or administrative control over the staff of the
Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh. Accordingly, the parallel sought
to be drawn between the controversy in the present case, and
G the departmental proceedings initiated against the
abovementioned D.S. Rana, erstwhile Superintendent, Jail,
is fallacious.
27. Insofar as the holding of a trial, and the appearance
H
VED MITIER GILL v. UNION TERRITORYADMN., 121
CHANDIGARH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
of witnesses therein is concerned, yet again, the analogy A
invoked by the learned counsel representing the appellanU
petitioners, is wholly misconceived. Whilst in a criminal
prosecution proof is strict, and must be based on cogent and
acceptable evidence. In a criminal case, there is no alternative
but to establish guilt of an accused, based on acceptable B
evidence. The evidence is to be produced before the Court,
trying the criminal case. There is no way the same can be
exempted, as in the case of a departmental proceeding.
Insofar as the present controversy is concerned, there is a C
constitutional provision creating an exception. Clause (b) of
the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India,
is the exception in question, which authorizes the course
adopted by the respondents. The reasons for dispensing with
the departmental enquiry, cannot be dependent upon the o
holding or not holding of criminal proceedings, against the
appellanUpetitioners. Once the parameters stipulated in clause
(b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution
of India are satisfied, the submissions advanced at the hands
of the learned counsel for the appellanUpetitioners, would not E
arise.
28. No other submission was advanced at the hands
of the learned counsel for appellanUpetitioners. For the
reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in the present F
appeal, and the connected transferred cases. The same are
accordingly dismissed.
NidhiJain Appeals & Transferred Cases dismissed.
G
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