Holding

An appeal under Section 72 is not maintainable where the Sub‑Registrar has refused registration on the ground of denial of execution, and the Registrar cannot adjudicate on fraud or undue influence, which are matters for a civil court.

Summary

The appellant, Veena Singh, alleged that she was forced to sign a sale deed for land and that the deed was fraudulent, undervalued and included her residential house. The Sub‑Registrar refused registration under Section 35(3)(a) of the Registration Act because the appellant denied execution of the deed, although she admitted her signature and fingerprints. The second respondent appealed to the District Registrar under Section 72, which was not the correct remedy, but the Registrar treated it as an application under Section 73 and conducted an enquiry under Section 74, ultimately ordering registration. The Supreme Court held that an appeal under Section 72 is not maintainable when execution is denied and that the Registrar exceeded his jurisdiction by deciding issues of fraud and undue influence, which are matters for a civil court. Consequently, the Court set aside both the High Court’s judgment and the Registrar’s order, allowing the appeal. The decision does not affect any pending civil or criminal proceedings related to the transaction.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 72 of the Registration Act when the Sub‑Registrar has refused registration on the ground of denial of execution.
Whether the District Registrar can entertain an appeal filed under Section 72 as an application under Section 73 and conduct an enquiry under Section 74.
The proper legal meaning of "execution" of a document under the Registration Act.
Whether the Registrar may decide on allegations of fraud and undue influence in the registration process.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 68
Registration Act, 1908s. 35, s. 58, s. 68, s. 69, s. 71, s. 72, s. 73, s. 74, s. 75, s. 76, s. 77

Subjects

registrationexecution of documentdenial of executionSection 35Section 72Section 73Section 74fraudundue influencecivil suitwrit petitionappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

736 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 3 S.C.R. 736 [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LR
v.
THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR (F/R)
AND ANOTHER
B (Civil Appeal No. 2929 of 2022)
MAY 10, 2022
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, A. S. BOPANNA
AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]
Registration Act, 1908:
C
ss. 35, 72, 73, 74 – Execution and registration of sale deed –
Agreement to sell certain land between the appellant and the second
respondent – Execution of sale deed by the appellant in favour of
second respondent, however, during registration of said sale deed,
the appellant denied its execution – However, no denial on the part
D
of the appellant in signing the sale deed and having placed her
thumb impressions/fingerprints on the documents – Appellant also
asserted commission of fraud and undue influence by the second
respondent – Refusal of registration of the sale deed by the Sb-
registrar in terms of s. 35(3)(a) – However, in appeal u/s. 72, the
E District Registrar ordered registration of the sale deed – Said order
upheld by the High Court – On appeal, held: Sub-Registrar having
specifically denied registration in terms of s. 35(3)(a), the order
was not amenable to an appeal u/s. 72, however, the Registrar, in
the course of entertaining the appeal, instead took recourse to the
powers entrusted u/s. 73 – Mis-labelling of an application u/s. 73
F
as an appeal u/s. 72 would by itself not vitiate the proceedings
before the Registrar – Execution happens when a person’s signature
on the document is accompanied by their full consent to the contents
of the document, which they have understood before signing it –
“Execution” of a document does not stand admitted merely because
G a person admits to having signed the document – Thus, admission
of one’s signature on a document is not equivalent to admission of
its execution – High Court conflated the mere signing of the sale
deed with its execution – Such an approach is completely erroneous
and cannot be upheld – Thus, the order of the Single Judge of the
High Court and that of the District Registrar set aside.
H
736
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 737
COLLECTOR (F/R)

ss. 35, 72-77 – Power of the Sub-Registrar/Registrar and their A
procedures under – Explained.
Words and phrases: Expression ‘execution’ – Meaning of, in
context of the Registration Act, 1908.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
B
HELD: 1.1 From the objections filed before the Sub-
Registrar by the appellant, it is clear that she did not deny having
signed the sale deed. The essence of her grievance was that her
signatures were taken forcibly; the sale deed did not reflect the
intent of the parties in terms of the area which was intended to
be sold; the sale consideration was undervalued; the consequence C
of the sale deed was that even the residential house of the
appellant would be sold, contrary to her understanding; and the
sale deed had been procured by fraud. The order of the Sub-
Registrar makes it abundantly clear that the appellant was not
ready to register the sale deed, which was claimed to have been D
executed in a fraudulent manner and whose execution was thus
being denied. Registration was, therefore, refused by the Sub-
Registrar in terms of Section 35(3)(a) of the Registration Act.
[Para 32][765-A-C]
1.2 If a person by whom the document is purported to be E
executed denies its execution and registration is refused on those
grounds, an appeal against the order of the Sub-Registrar denying
execution would not be maintainable under Section 72 of the
Registration Act. Section 72 clearly stipulates that an appeal will
lie against an order of Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document
to registration “except where the refusal is made on the ground F
of denial of execution”. [Para 33][765-C-E]
1.3 In the instant case, the Sub-Registrar having specifically
denied registration in terms of Section 35(3)(a), the order was
not amenable to an appeal under Section 72. However, the
Registrar, in the course of entertaining the appeal, instead took G
recourse to the powers entrusted under Section 73. Section 73
empowers the Registrar where the Sub-Registrar has refused to
register a document on denial of its execution by a person
purporting to have executed it. Subsequently, the Registrar
H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A appears to have followed the procedure which is emphasized in
Section 74. Upon such an enquiry under Section 74, Section 75
enables the Registrar to order the document to be registered if
it is found that: (i) the document has been executed; and (ii) the
requirements of the law have been complied with. Section 75(4)
also allows the Registrar to summon and enforce the attendance
B
of witnesses to properly conduct the enquiry under Section 74.
[Para 34][765-E-H]
1.4 Undoubtedly, the power of the Registrar while dealing
with an application under Section 73 are wider than the powers
which are entrusted to the Sub-Registrar under Section 35. Under
C Section 35(1)(a), the registering officer shall register the
document if all the persons executing the document appear in
person before the officer and admit the execution of the document.
Section 35(2) empowers the registering officer to examine anyone
present in the office, for the purpose of satisfying himself that
D the persons appearing before him are the persons they represent
themselves to be. In contrast to sub-Section (1) of Section 35,
sub-Section stipulates that once execution is denied by the
person who purports to have executed the document, the
registering officer shall refuse to register it. On the other hand,
under Sections 73 and 74, the Registrar is entrusted with the
E duty to enquire whether the document has been executed and
whether all the requirements of the law for the time being have
been complied with. For the purposes of this enquiry, Section
75(4) provides the Registrar with the power to summon and
enforce the attendance of witnesses. Thus, while the Sub-
F Registrar under Section 35(3)(a) has to mandatorily refuse
registration when the execution of a document is denied by the
person purported to have executed the document, the Registrar
is entrusted with the power to conduct an enquiry on an
application under Section 73 by following the procedure under
Section 74. [Para 35][766-A-E]
G
1.5 In the instant case, the appeal before the Registrar was
not maintainable under Section 72. Indeed, the appellant, in
response to the memo of appeal filed by the second respondent,
specifically pleaded in her objections that “hearing the appeal
under Section 72 of the Registration Act or to deliver any judgment
H
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 739
COLLECTOR (F/R)

will be against law”. At the same time, however, the appellant A
also pleaded that she “had full right for argument under Section
75(4) of the Registration Act and under the CPC from the
witnesses and the appellant”. The Registrar is empowered to
summon witnesses under Section 75(4) for the purpose of an
enquiry under Sections 73 and 74. It thus, emerges that the
B
parties proceeded on the basis that the proceedings would be
decided on the basis of an enquiry under Section 73, and the
enquiry was conducted with reference to the provisions of Section
74. The appellant herself understood this to be the position in
her objections filed to the appeal filed by the second respondent,
since she invoked her rights under Section 75(4), which applies C
to enquiry proceedings under Section 74. The appeal against the
Sub-Registrar‘s order was not maintainable under Section 72.
The remedy of the second respondent, where the Sub-Registrar
refused registration on the ground that the appellant denied
execution of the document, was under Section 73. The Registrar
D
conducted an enquiry under the provisions of sections 73 and
74. Both parties participated in the enquiry. [Para 36][766-E-H;
767-A-B]
1.6 The mis-labelling of an application under Section 73 as
an appeal under Section 72 would by itself not vitiate the
proceedings before the Registrar. This becomes especially true E
when proceedings before the Registrar, in substance, were
proceedings under Section 73 itself and both the parties
acknowledged them to be so, explicitly or by their conduct. This
is clearly what has happened in the present case as well, as is
evident from the appellant‘s reference to Section 75(4) and her F
participation in the enquiry proceedings before the District
Registrar. Therefore, the second respondent’s mis-labelling of
their application as an appeal under Section 72 will not vitiate the
proceedings which led to the District Registrar‘s order. [Para
38][767-F-G; 768-A-B]
G
1.7 Section 35(1)(a) of the Registration Act uses the
expression “admit the execution of the document”, while Section
35(3)(a) uses the expression “denies its execution”. Similarly,
Section 72(1) has adopted the expression “denial of execution”,
while Section 73(1) uses the expression “denies its execution”.
H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A However, the word “execution” itself is not defined by the
Registration Act. [Para 39][768-C-D]
Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (Thomson
Reuters, 2009) pgs 649-650; Words and Phrases
(Permanent Edition) (Thomson Reuters, 2020); Justice
B K Kannan, Mulla’s The Registration Act (LexisNexis,
2012) pg 416 – referred to.
1.8 “Execution” happens when a person’s signature on the
document is accompanied by their full consent to the contents of
the document,which they have understood before signing it. This
C understanding of the phrase “execution” is also adopted by
textbooks in relation to the law of evidence. Section 68 of the
Evidence Act 1872 prescribes the requirement for proving that
a document has been executed. The proviso to s. 68 stipulates
that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness to prove
the execution of a document if it has been registered under the
D Act, provided that its execution is not specifically denied by the
person who is purported to have executed it. The “execution” of
a document does not stand admitted merely because a person
admits to having signed the document. Such an interpretation
accounts for circumstances where an individual signs a blank
E paper and it is later converted into a different document, or when
an individual is made to sign a document without fully
understanding its contents. Adopting a contrary interpretation
would unfairly put the burden upon the person denying execution
to challenge the registration before a civil court or a writ court,
since registration will have to be allowed once the signature has
F been admitted. In giving meaning to the expression “execute”
in the provisions of the Registration Act, it is necessary to adopt
a purposive construction to protect, facilitate and achieve the
object of registration. [Paras 42, 43, 57, 58][771-A-B, B-C; 772-
B; 780-C-E]
G Suraj Lamps and Industries Private Limited v. State of
Haryana & Another (2009) 7 SCC 363 : [2009] 9 SCR
1048; Bharat Indu and Ors. v. Hakim Mohammad Hamid
Ali Khan 1920 SCC OnLine PC 37 – referred to.

H
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 741
COLLECTOR (F/R)

S P Sen Gupta, Commentaries on the Registration Act, A
1908 (Kamal Law House, 2017) pgs 617-618; Sudipto
Sarkar and Dr. H R Jhingta, Sarkar: Law of Evidence–
In India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Ceylon,
Malaysia & Singapore: Volume 1 (LexisNexis, 2016);
N Vijayraghavan and Sharath Chandran, Ratanlal &
B
Dhirajlal: The Law of Evidence (LexisNexis, 2021) –
referred to.
1.9 The Registration Act exists so that information about
documents can be put into the public domain, where it can be
accessed by anyone in order to prevent forgeries and fraud, and
so that individuals can be aware of the status of properties. If the C
interpretation conflating signing with execution is adopted, it would
ensure that the Sub-Registrars/Registrars will continuously end
up registering documents whose validity will inevitably be then
disputed in a civil suit or a writ petition. While the suit or writ
proceedings continue, the document would remain on the public D
records as a registered instrument, which has the potential to
cause more disruption. Hence, such an interpretation should not
be adopted. However, while adopting the current interpretation-
that the admission of one‘s signature on a document is not
equivalent to admission of its execution- it is important to consider
the power of the Sub-Registrar/Registrar and their procedures E
under the Registration Act. [Paras 60, 61][781-E-H]
1.10 The decision of the Registrar in ordering document
to be registered, or for that matter in refusing to register a
document, is not conclusive and is amenable to judicial review.
Therefore, in a situation where an individual admits their signature F
on a document but denies its execution, the Sub-Registrar is
bound to refuse registration in accordance with Sections 35(3)(a)
of the Registration Act. Subsequently, if an application if filed
under Section 73, the Registrar is entrusted with the power of
conducting an enquiry of a quasi-judicial nature under Section G
74. If the Registrar passes an order refusing registration under
Section 76, the party presenting the document for registration
has the remedy of filing a civil suit under Section 77 of the

H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A Registration Act, where a competent civil court will be able to
adjudicate upon the question of fact conclusively. [Para 63,
64][784-G-H; 785-A-C]
1.11 In the instant case, where Sub-Registrar had in the
first instance declined to order the registration of the document
B and the order of the Sub-Registrar was questioned in an appeal
under Section 72 filed by the second respondent. The Registrar,
in the course of the appellate proceedings, purported to hold an
enquiry of the nature contemplated under Section 74 of the
Registration Act and concluded that the execution of the sale
deed had been established and it was liable to be registered. The
C Registrar was evidently seized of a case where the Sub-Registrar
had declined to order registration on the ground that the
execution of the document was denied by the appellant under
Section 35(3)(a). While exercising the jurisdiction pursuant to
the invocation of the remedy under Section 72, the Registrar
D relied on the statements of the scribe of the sale deed and the
attesting witnesses to the effect that the sale deed had been
signed by the appellant and that the appellant had also affixed
her fingerprints on it. However, as rightly pointed out by the
appellant, the signing of the sale deed by her and the affixation of
her fingerprints is not in dispute. The real issue is whether there
E was due execution of the sale deed by the appellant. The appellant
in the course of her objections specifically pleaded fraud. The
plea of the appellant, that the purported sale deed though signed
by her was procured by fraud and undue influence, was a matter
which raised a serious substantive dispute. In support of her
F contentions, the appellant has also adduced the inspection report
by the Sub-Registrar and the Naib Tahsildar. However, this court
cannot decide on the merits of the dispute at this stage, since the
Registrar clearly exceeded his jurisdiction by adjudicating on the
issue of fraud and undue influence. [Para 67][788-E-H; 789-A-B,
D-F]
G
Satya Pal Anand v. State of M.P. (2016) 10 SCC 767 :
[2016] 12 SCR 26 – distinguished.
1.12 The Registrar purported to exercise the powers
conferred under Section 74 and arrived at a finding that the sale
H deed had been duly signed by the appellant and was therefore
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 743
COLLECTOR (F/R)

liable to be registered. However, the objections of the appellant A
raised serious issues of a triable nature which could only have
been addressed before and adjudicated upon by a court of
competent civil jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, during the course
of the hearing, this Court has been apprised of the fact that in
respect of the remaining area of 1000 square meters in the front
B
portion of the land, a suit for specific performance has been
instituted by the second respondent, resulting in a decree for
specific performance. As regards the subject matter of the sale
deed, the second respondent instituted a suit for possession
before the Civil Judge, where certain proceedings are pending.
In view thereof, the Registrar acted contrary to law by directing C
the sale deed to be registered. [Para 68][789-F-H; 790-A-B]
1.13 In the impugned judgment, the Single Judge of the
High Court observed that registration does not depend upon the
consent of the executant but on the Registrar‘s finding that the
executant had actually signed the document. The High Court held D
that having found in the course of the enquiry that the sale deed
was duly prepared by a scribe, that the attesting witness had stated
that the sale deed was signed by the appellant and she also placed
her fingerprints in their presence, it was open to the Registrar to
direct registration in spite of a denial of its execution by the
appellant. In doing so, the Single Judge of the High Court has, E
with respect, conflated the mere signing of the sale deed with its
execution. Such an approach is completely erroneous and cannot
be upheld. The impugned judgment and order of the Single Judge
of the High Court as also the order passed by the District
Registrar is set aside. [Paras 69, 70][790-B-E] F
Rajendra Pratap Singh v. Rameshwar Prasad (1998) 7
SCC 602 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 444; N.M.
Ramachandraiah v. State of Karnataka 2007 SCC
OnLine Kar 192; Banasettappa Laljichikkanna v.
District Registrar 1965 SCC OnLine Kar 132; G
Sayyapparaju Surayya v. Ramchandar Prasad Singh
and Others 1949 SCC OnLine Mad 227; Jogesh
Prasad Singh & Others v. Ramchandar Prasad Singh
and Others 1950 SCC OnLine Pat 31; Ebadut Ali v.

H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A Muhammad Fareed AIR (3) 1916 Pat 206:35 Ind. Cas.
56; Mohima Chunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore Bhutta
Charji, ILR Volume VII Calcutta; Smt. Uma Devi v.
Narayan Nayak 1984 SCC OnLine Ori 94; Bhutkani
Nath v. Smt. Kamaleswari Nath, AIR 1972 Assam and
Nagaland 15; Puran Chand Nahatta v. Monmotho Nath
B
Mukherji and Others 1927 SCC OnLine PC 100;
Ghasita Ram Bajaj v. Raj Kamal Radio Electronic 1973
SCC OnLine Del 109; Kamlabai v. Shantirai 1980 SCC
OnLine Bom 152; S. Ramamurthy v. Jayalakshmi
Ammal 1990 SCC OnLine Mad 501; Union Bank of
C India v. Dhian Pati 1996 SCC OnLine HP 90; In Re
Kuttadan Velayudhan 2001 SCC OnLine Ker 14; Bank
of Baroda v. Shree Moti Industries 2008 SCC OnLine
Bom 486; Smt. Raisa Begam v. District Registrar,
Saharanpur and Anr. 2011 SCC OnLine All 2335 –
referred to.
D
Case Law Reference
[2016] 12 SCR 26 distinguished Para 11(i)
[1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 444 referred to Para 44

E AIR (3) 1916 Pat 206 referred to Para 48
AIR 1972 Assam and referred to Para 49
Nagaland 15
[2009] 9 SCR 1048 referred to Para 58
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2929
F of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.05.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ-C No. 24928 of 2012.
Pradeep Kant, Sr. Adv., Rohit Kumar Singh, Simranjeet Singh
G Rekhi, Advs. for the Appellant.
V. K. Shukla, Sr. Adv., P. H. Vashishtha, Divyansh Tiwari,
Ms. Parul Shukla, Pradeep Kumar Yadav, Vishal Thakre, Aryan P. Nanda,
Sanjeev Malhotra, Advs. for the Respondents.

H
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 745
COLLECTOR (F/R)

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
This judgment has been divided into sections to facilitate analysis.
They are:
A Introduction ...................................................................... 3* B
B Submissions of Counsel ................................................. 13*
C Analysis .......................................................................... 18*
C.1 Statutory Framework of the Registration Act .......... 18*
C.2 Validity of the recourse by the Second Respondent..27* C
C.3 Meaning of “execution” .......................................... 33*
D Conclusion ...................................................................... 61*
A Introduction
1. This appeal has arisen from a judgment dated 31 May 2018 of D
a Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. By the
impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed a petition under Article
226 filed by the appellant, seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari for
quashing an order dated 31 March 2012 of the District Registrar/
Additional Collector (Finance and Revenue), Bareilly1, who is the first E
respondent in the present appeal. During the pendency of this appeal,
the appellant has passed away and has been substituted by her legal
heir, by an order of this Court dated 9 December 2021.
2. At the heart of this dispute is a certain piece of land admeasuring
3,793 square yards, situated at 110-B, Civil Lines, Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, F
which was owned by one C P Singh. During his life time, he had alienated
approximately 415 square yards of the land to four distinct persons.
After his death, the appellant, who is his spouse, together with her two
daughters, namely Nita Singh and Neelam Singh, and son, Pradeep Singh,
became joint owners of the property. A power of attorney was executed
on 17 April 2010 in favour of the appellant by her daughters and son, G
which is stated to have been cancelled on 27 September 2011.
3. The appellant is alleged to have entered into two agreements
with a developer – Gujral Associates, who is the second respondent in
1
“District Registrar”
*Ed. Note: The pagination is as per the original judgment. H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A the present appeal: (i) the first was allegedly a development agreement
in respect of an area admeasuring 1000 square meters in the front portion
of the land. It is important to note that the nature of this agreement is
disputed by the second respondent (who alleges that it was instead an
agreement to sell), but that dispute is not before this Court in the present
appeal; and (ii) the second was an agreement to sell for an area
B
admeasuring 839.4 square meters in the rear portion of the land for a
sale consideration of Rs 1.6 crores, which was executed on 22 October
2010. On the other hand, the second respondent contends that this
agreement to sell was for an area admeasuring 1839.4 square meters. It
is also important to note that the stamp duty in the amount of Rs 39,61,000
C (according to counsel for the second respondent) was paid on the
agreement on the basis of the circle rate of the land, i.e., Rs 6,11,53,000.
4. Between October 2010 and 3 January 2011, the second
respondent allegedly paid the appellant a sum of Rs 93 lakhs in twelve
instalments. A cheque for the remaining sum of Rs 67 lakhs was handed
D over to the appellant by the second respondent on 20 June 2011. The
appellant has stated that she did not encash this cheque upon realising
that a fraud had been committed upon her. On the same date, a sale
deed was purported to have been executed by the appellant in favour of
the second respondent based upon the agreement to sell and upon the
payment of the remaining sale consideration. The execution and
E registration of this sale deed forms the bedrock of the dispute in the
present appeal.
5. On 5 December 2011, the second respondent filed an application
seeking permission to execute the sale deed. Thereafter, on 15 December
2011, they presented the sale deed for registration before the Sub-
F Registrar-I, Bareilly. In response to a notice from the Sub-Registrar, the
appellant appeared before the Sub-Registrar on 17 February 2012 and
submitted an objection in writing, with a request not to execute the
incomplete and forged sale deed in favour of the second respondent.
The appellant stated that she was 78 years of age, “a chronic patient of
G depression, heart ailment and hypertension” under medical treatment
and that her son was an alcoholic who was incapable of taking any
decision on his own. The appellant stated that the second respondent
had been harassing her into forcibly signing the sale deed in respect of
her property. The appellant further stated that the second respondent
furnished her with misleading and false information in order to ger her to
H
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 747
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

sign the papers, all the while even forcing her to hide the transaction A
from the members of her own family. Specifically in relation to the two
transactions in regards the front and rear portion of the land, the appellant
alleged as follows:
“(A) Details of 100 sq. meter agreement with m/S Gujral
Associates having a market value of not less than Rs.5 Crore B
showing a meagre sale consideration of Rs.1,30,00,000/- on
22.10.2010 forming part of 110-B Civil Lines, Bareilly, stipulating
to have paid a sum of Rs.18,00,000/- to me including a sum of
Rs.90,00,000/- in cash and a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- through cheque
No.111681 dated 03.06.2009 Bank of Baroda, which in fact was
never paid to me and the cheque referred to above stands credited C
in someone else account and not in my account. According to me
and the Law the agreement becomes NULL and VOID as the
intention of the party is to do a fraud by illegal measures.
(B) Details of 1839.48 Sq. meter agreement with M/s Gujral
Associates having a market value of not less than Rs.7 Crore D
showing a meagre sale consideration of Rs.1,60,00,000/- on
22.10.2010 forming part of 11-B Civil Lines, Bareilly, stipulating
to have paid a sum of Rs.83,00,000/- including a sum of
Rs.8,00,000/- shown to have been paid in cash, which in fact has
never been paid to me (Mrs. Veena Singh). According to me and E
the Law the agreement becomes NULL and VOID as the intention
of the party is to do a fraud by illegal measures.”
The appellant further stated:
“That the time within which sale deed was allegedly agreed to be
executed was period of eight months which too has expired on F
22.06.2011 and to avoid legal consequences they obtained
signature on INCOMPLETE SALE DEED dt. 20.06.2011 from
me under misleading and false information when they were
pressurizing me to quickly sign the papers before the registry office
closes and didn’t give a chance to read the papers before signing, G
my granddaughter entered the room and enquired about the doing.
She asked if the papers had been read by one to which I replied
NO. So she asked a photo copy of the documents so that our
Lawyer could go through them. It was at that moment that this
fact came to light that whatever was undergoing was wrong and
H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A misleading, M/ s Gujral Associates people and his lawyer Mr. Anil
Ku. Agarwal was shocked when my granddaughter asked for a
photo copy as she was scared to see me surrounded by 5 people
in my Room and then when we realized that they manipulated the
land area and they were taking my manipulated the land area and
they were taking my HOUSE also illegally, so I am against this
B
SALE deed as they have done a fraud.”
The appellant further claimed that:
(i) The boundaries which were set out in the deed for 1839.48
square meters were erroneous and did not clearly reflect
C what was to be sold. Further, the second respondent had
manipulated the actual land area by also including within it
the appellant’s house, where she was residing for over five
decades, though it was not her intention to alienate it;
(ii) The sale deed itself was incomplete, but the second
D respondent forcibly made her sign it on the pretext of a rush
to file the sale deed within time for registration; and
(iii) The second respondent himself was aware that there was
no partition between the co-sharers of the land, yet went
ahead with the sale deed.
E Hence, based on her above contentions, the appellant requested
the Sub-Registrar to take action for the forgery which had been committed
by the second respondent and prevent the second respondent from getting
the incomplete sale deed registered for an area admeasuring 1839.48
square meters.
F 6. By an order dated 17 February 2012, the Sub-Registrar declined
to register the sale deed after recording the following statement of the
appellant:
“I was alone, my signature was forcibly taken on this sale deed, I
do not remain well, and I take Alprex also, I am diabetic also, I
G r4emain under Hypertension also. Many persons who were 4-5
in number by reaching there, got my signature forcibly. Other
paper was read to me, and signature was taken on other paper. I
live alone. They trouble me from day to today. The land not so in
quantity which they have written. As per them, they try to occupy
that house also which is mine. I do not want to execute this sale
H deed. I be let live comfortably.”
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 749
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Relying upon her statement, the Sub-Registrar held as follows: A
“On the basis of the aforesaid statement as Smt. Beena is not
ready to register the aforesaid sale deed which she tells to be
executed fraudulently and cheatingly. Therefore, the registration
of the sale deed is denied under Section 35(3)A of the Indian
Registration Act and under Rule 249 of the Registration Manual, B
Part -2.”
7. The Sub-Registrar having refused to order the registration of
the sale deed, the second respondent instituted an appeal2 under Section
72 of the Registration Act 19083 on 2 March 2012. The appellant objected
to the maintainability of the appeal under Section 72, besides supporting C
the order of the Sub-Registrar on the ground that the sale deed in dispute
had not been executed by her.
8. By an order dated 31 March 2012, the District Registrar, while
entertaining the appeal, proceeded to follow the procedure prescribed
by Section 74 of the Registration Act to determine whether the sale D
deed had been executed by the appellant. The District Registrar
subsequently held that the appellant had admitted her signature on the
document and that the second respondent was entitled to get the sale
deed registered. In arriving at the conclusion, the District Registrar relied
on the statements made on solemn affirmation by the scribe of the sale
deed and by the witnesses to the sale deed, to the effect that the document E
had been executed by the appellant in their presence without any pressure.
The District Registrar also noted that prior to the sale deed, an agreement
to sell had been registered on 22 October 2010 in terms of which the
appellant received an amount of Rs 93 lakhs by cash and cheque, as
token money towards the sale consideration of Rs 1.6 crores. The receipt F
of the consideration by cheque in pursuance of the agreement to sell
was stated to not be in dispute. Further, the District Registrar noted that
during the period of about one year and two months, between the
registration of the agreement to sell and the presentation of the sale
deed on 15 December 2011, the appellant had not lodged any complaint
alleging fraud. The District Registrar also observed that the signatures G
and thumb impressions/fingerprints of the appellant on the agreement to
sell and sale deed had been examined by a handwriting expert, and were
found to be identical. Based on these findings, the District Registrar set
2
Appeal No 01 of 2012
3
“Registration Act” H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A aside the Sub-Registrar’s decision and ordered the registration of the
sale deed presented on 15 December 2011. Consequently, the sale deed
was registered on 16 April 2012.
9. Crucially, the appellant has adverted to certain developments
which took place after the order of the District Registrar. According to
B the appellant, the Assistant Inspector General, Registration, Bareilly
ordered a spot inspection by the Sub-Registrar of the land covered by
the sale deed. In his report dated 30 April 2012, the Sub-Registrar
concluded that the actual area covered by the deed was 1341.73 square
meters, out of which 740.73 square meters was the area of the appellant’s
house. Further, the Sub-Registrar noted that while the northern and
C western boundaries were present as according to the sale deed, the
southern and eastern boundaries at the spot did not match with the
boundaries mentioned in the sale deed. Later, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Sub-Registrar, a further spot verification was
also carried out by the Naib Tahsildar. In a report dated 26 May 2012,
D the Naib Tahsildar stated that the boundaries mentioned in the sale deed
were completely incorrect. Further, it was stated that the actual area on
the spot was 849.12 square meters, as opposed to the area of 1839.48
square meters shown in the sale deed. The report noted that if the area
of 1839.48 square meters was taken as the area of the sale deed, it
would partly cover the residential house of the appellant, garden area
E situated in front of the house and three properties which had been
previously sold by the deceased husband of the appellant. Therefore,
the Naib Tahsildar concluded that the registered sale deed was completely
incorrect.
10. At this stage, it would also be material to note that a first
F information report4 was filed by the appellant on 4 May 2012 at PS
Kotwali, Sub-District Sadar, Bareilly against the proprietors of the second
respondent for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471
and 506 of the Indian Penal Code 1860. Subsequently, a final report was
filed in the FIR by the Investigating Officer. A protest petition filed by
G the appellant against the final report has since been dismissed by the
Magistrate by an order dated 20 September 20135, against which the
appellant’s revision remains pending.

4
FIR No 192 of 2012; Case Crime No 1118 of 2012
5
H Misc Case No 225 of 2013
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 751
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

11. Along with these developments, the appellant challenged the A
order dated 31 March 2012 of the District Registrar before the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In adjudicating the appellant’s writ petition by the impugned
judgment dated 31 May 2018, a Single Judge of the High Court framed
the following questions for consideration:
B
“38. The question to be considered by this Court in facts and
circumstances of this case and in the light of arguments made by
the counsel for the parties can be summarized thus: Whether the
Writ Petition was maintainable in the form and manner it had
been filed? What is the scope of power exercised by the Deputy
Registrar under section 35(3)(a) of the Act? Whether the denial C
of execution of Sale Deed by the petitioner was correctly
interpreted by the Deputy Registrar to exercise power under
Section 35(3)(a) and refuse registration? Whether the District
Registrar could have considered, the appeal filed by Respondent
No. 2 as a representation and exercise power as an original D
Authority and not as an Appellate Authority? Whether Sale Deed
which was Registered on 16.04.2012 before this Court passed its
interim order can be set aside by this Court by holding that it was
wrongly registered?”
The Single Judge then observed: E
(i) In terms of this Court’s judgment in Satya Pal Anand v.
State of M.P.6, the Sub-Registrar under Sections 34 and
35 of the Registration Act has no quasi-judicial power to
conduct an enquiry regarding the validity of the title or
legality of the transaction in a sale deed, but only has to F
ascertain whether the provisions of the Registration Act
have been complied with. Questions regarding the validity
of the title or legality of the transaction can only be decided
by a competent civil court; and
(ii) The Sub-Registrar, in the present case, had denied the G
registration of the sale deed under Section 35(3)(a) of the
Registration Act since the appellant had, while admitting
that she had placed her thumb impressions/fingerprints and
signatures on the sale deed, objected to the registration on
6
(2016) 10 SCC 767 (“Satya Pal Anand”) H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A the ground that her signatures had been taken in a fraudulent
manner by representing to her that she was selling only 839
square meters of land whereas the area shown in the sale
deed was 1839 square meters. However, it was held that
the Sub-Registrar under Section 35 did not have the power
to conduct an inquiry regarding the execution of the sale
B
deed, and could have only recorded the denial of execution
by the appellant. On the other hand, it was noted that a
wider power is entrusted to the Registrar under Section
74(a) of the Registration Act to determine whether the
document has been executed. On these premises, the Single
C Judge held:
“55…The registration does not depend upon the consent
of the executant, but on the Registrar finding that the
executant had actually signed the document concerned,
but now was requesting that it may not be registered for
D reasons other than its execution. The registrar is required
under Section 74 to conduct an inquiry. If the Registrar
finds that the document was duly prepared by the Scribe/
Deed Writer and the attesting witnesses to such
document also deposed that the document was signed
and the thumb and finger print impressions were made
E thereon by the vendor in their presence, and on inquiry
from the vendor it comes out that indeed such facts were
correct, the Registrar can direct registration of a
document in spite of denial of execution before him by
the person aggrieved if such registration of such a
F document is compulsory under the Act.”
12. The Single Judge also observed that the writ petition had been
instituted after the registration of the FIR by the appellant, prior to which
the order of the District Registrar dated 31 March 2012 had already
been complied with by the registration of the sale deed on 16 April 2012.
G The Single Judge noted that initially, the appellant had pleaded before
the High Court that her signatures and thumb impressions/fingerprints
had not been placed on the sale deed, but had been forged by the second
respondent. However, the Single Judge noted that this was an
improvement from the appellant’s story as detailed in the FIR dated 4
May 2012, where it was stated that the appellant willingly put her
H
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 753
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

signatures and thumb impressions/fingerprints on the sale deed and only A
later did her granddaughter realise the incorrect figure of the area in the
sale deed. In any case, the High Court observed that whether the
signatures and thumb impressions/fingerprints of the appellant had been
forged by the second respondent raised a disputed question of fact which
could only be resolved on the basis of evidence before a competent civil
B
court. Holding that the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction
could not render a finding either way, the writ petition was dismissed by
the Single Judge while leaving it open to the appellant to move the civil
court for a declaration that the sale deed had been obtained by fraud and
was a nullity.
B Submissions of Counsel C

13. We have heard Mr Pradeep Kant, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr V K Shukla, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent.
14. Mr Pradeep Kant, learned Senior Counsel submitted that: D
(i) An appeal under Section 72 of the Registration Act lies to the
Registrar against an order of the Sub-Registrar refusing to
admit a document to registration except where the refusal is
made on the ground of denial of execution. In the present
case, the execution of the sale deed had been denied by the E
appellant and the Sub-Registrar refused registration on that
ground under Section 35(3)(a). Hence, no appeal would be
maintainable under Section 72;
(ii) In any event, in an appeal under Section 72, it is not open to
the Registrar to pursue an enquiry under Section 74. The F
procedure under Section 74 has to be followed only when an
application is filed under Section 73. Under Section 74, a person
who had applied under Section 73 challenging the non-
registration of a document, of which execution is denied by
any person by whom it purports to have been executed, may
apply to the Registrar to establish his right to have the G
document registered. In the present case, the second
respondent having filed an appeal under Section 72, the
provisions of Sections 73 and 74 could not have been attracted;
(iii) The appellant does not deny having signed the sale deed and
having placed her thumb impressions/fingerprints on the H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A documents. However, the execution of a document cannot
be conflated with its mere signing. The appellant admitted
her signatures but objected to registration on the ground of
fraud and undue influence. Hence, the question of proving
her signature on the sale deed was never an issue. Pertinently,
neither the Registrar nor the High Court has recorded a finding
B
that the appellant understood the contents of the sale deed or
she was made to understand the obligations which were being
assumed by her with respect to the subject matter of the sale,
including the boundaries and area of the land, at the time when
she placed her signatures and thumb impressions/fingerprints
C on the documents. Therefore, the mere fact that the witnesses
proved the signatures of the appellant on the sale deed cannot
lead to the conclusion that the appellant had duly ‘executed’
the sale deed or that there could not have been any denial of
execution;
D (iv) The specific objection of the appellant is that the sale deed is
fraudulent and contrary to the agreed terms since:
(a) The area reflected in the sale deed is almost double the area
agreed upon between the parties; and
(b) The area reflected in the sale deed includes a public way on
E the northern side as well as a part of the appellant’s residential
house; and
(v) In sum and substance, the submission for the appellant is that:
(a) The appeal itself was not maintainable before the Registrar
F under Section 72 of the Registration Act;
(b) The appellant does not deny her signatures or thumb
impressions/fingerprints on the sale deed. Hence, the
Registrar’s reliance on the statements of the two witnesses
and handwriting experts to prove the appellant’s signature on
the sale deed, while concluding that it was thus duly ‘executed’
G
by appellant, is misplaced;
(c) There has been no finding in regards to the due execution of
the sale deed by the appellant, which is the matter in dispute;
and
H
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 755
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(d) There could have been no ‘execution’ by the appellant when A
there is a serious dispute between the parties over the area
reflected in the sale deed and what had been agreed earlier.
15. On the other hand, Mr V K Shukla, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the second respondent submitted that:
(i) The appellant has admitted to the execution of the sale deed B
both in her objections before the Sub-Registrar and in the
FIR which was lodged on 4 May 2012, where the appellant
admits that the sale deed was signed by her. If an instrument
is signed by both the parties, it is presumptive of the fact
that both of them have executed it, though the presumption C
is rebuttable. In the present case, the sale deed having been
signed by the parties and attested by the two witnesses, it
has to be regarded as having been validly ‘executed’;
(ii) Under the Registration Act, the Registrar is vested with a
duality of powers: D
(a) An appellate power under Section 72; and
(b) A power under Section 73 read with Section 74 to
determine upon enquiry whether a document has been
executed and can be registered;
E
Since the Registrar has an independent power under Section
73 and Section 74, the mere mentioning of a wrong provision
(Section 72) by the second respondent and the Registrar
will not invalidate the proceedings;
(iii) A document, once it is registered, can be cancelled or set
F
aside only by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. Upon
the registration of the sale deed on 16 April 2012, the
registration authorities are rendered infructuous and would
have no power to cancel registration even on the ground of
fraud or other irregularities;
(iv) The following conduct of the appellant has disentitled her to G
relief:
(a) The appellant placed her signature and thumb impressions/
fingerprints on each page of the sale deed as well as the
photocopies totaling over 340 pages;
H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A (b) The appellant received all the payments towards the sale
consideration of Rs 1.6 crores, except the last cheque of Rs
67 lakhs which she has deliberately not encashed in order
to resist registration;
(c) The appellant has instituted a civil suit7 claiming to be an
B owner of the entire 3,172 square meters of land, despite her
husband having sold portions nearing 300 square meters to
third parties during his lifetime;
(d) The appellant has executed gift deeds dated 4 October 2011
and 22 October 2011 in favour of her granddaughter, in
C respect of land which has been registered in the name of
the second respondent under the sale deed; and
(e) The sale deed was preceded by an agreement to sell, which
is also a registered document executed by the appellant.
The registered agreement to sell dated 22 October 2010
D was also used by the handwriting/fingerprint expert for the
purpose of comparing the appellant’s signatures on the sale
deed, which was found to be identical.
16. The rival submissions would now fall for analysis.
C Analysis
E
l7. There are two broad issues which arise in the present civil
appeal:
(i) Whether the recourse by the second respondent to Section
72 of the Registration Act, against the order of the Sub-
Registrar refusing registration on the basis of the appellant’s
F
denial of execution, would deprive them of any remedy
whatsoever; and
(ii) Whether the appellant’s admission of her signatures and
thumb impressions/fingerprints on the sale deed also
amounts to an admission of its “execution”.
G
However, before proceeding with a discussion of these issues, it
is important to understand the statutory framework of the Registration
Act.

7
H Suit No 727 of 2012
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 757
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

C.1 Statutory Framework of the Registration Act A
18. Section 17 of the Registration Act stipulates which documents
are compulsorily registrable. Among them, in clause (b), are non-
testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare,
assign, limit or extinguish a right, title or interest to or in immoveable
property of a value higher than Rs 100. Section 23, which deals with the B
time for presenting documents, stipulates that subject to Sections 24, 25
and 26, no documents other than a will shall be accepted for registration
unless presented to the proper officer within four months from the date
of its execution.
19. Section 32 then entails that every document, to be registered, C
shall be presented at the registration office by: (a) person executing or
claiming under the document; or (b) a representative or assign of such a
person; or (c) the agent of such a person, or their representative or
assign, duly authorized by a power of attorney executed and authenticated
in the manner provided.
D
20. Section 348 stipulates that, subject to the provisions referred to
in it, no document shall be registered unless the person executing such a

8
“34. Enquiry before registration by registering officer.—(1) Subject to the
provisions contained in this Part and in Sections 41, 43, 45, 69, 75, 77, 88 and 89, no
document shall be registered under this Act, unless the persons executing such document, E
or their representatives, assigns or agents authorized as aforesaid, appear before the
registering officer within the time allowed for presentation under Sections 23, 24, 25
and 26:
Provided that, if owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident all such persons do
not so appear, the Registrar, in cases where the delay in appearing does not exceed four
months, may direct that on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the
proper registration fee, in addition to the fine, if any, payable under Section 25, the F
document may be registered.
(2) Appearances under sub-section (1) may be simultaneous or at different times.
(3) The registering officer shall thereupon—
(a) enquire whether or not such document was executed by the persons by whom it
purports to have been executed;
(b) satisfy himself as to the identity of the persons appearing before him and alleging
that they have executed the document; and
G
(c) in the case of any person appearing as a representative, assign or agent, satisfy
himself of the right of such person so to appear.
(4) Any application for a direction under the proviso to sub-section (1) may be lodged
with a Sub-Registrar, who shall forthwith forward it to the Registrar to whom he is
subordinate.
(5) Nothing in this section applies to copies of decrees or orders.” H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A document or their representative, assign or agent authorized, appear before
the registering officer within the time allowed for presentation. The
provision also outlines the duties of enquiry placed upon the registering
officer once a document is presented before them within the time limit
prescribed.
B 21. Section 35 entails that the registering officer shall register the
document if:
(i) All the persons executing the document appearing personally,
are personally known to the registering officer, or if the
registering officer is otherwise satisfied that they are the
C person they represent themselves to be and all of them admit
the execution of the document;
(ii) A person appearing by a representative, assign or agent
admits the execution to the registering officer; and
(iii) Where the person executing the document is dead, their
D representative or assign appears before the registering
officer and admits its execution.
On the other hand, sub-Section (3)(a) of Section 35 stipulates,
inter alia, that if a person by whom the document purports to be executed
denies its execution, the registering officer will refuse to register the
E document. Section 35 is extracted below:
“35. Procedure on admission and denial of execution
respectively.—(1) (a) If all the persons executing the document
appear personally before the registering officer and are personally
known to him, or if he be otherwise satisfied that they are the
F persons they represent themselves to be, and if they all admit the
execution of the document, or
(b) if in the case of any person appearing by a representative,
assign or agent, such representative, assign or agent admits the
execution, or
G (c) if the person executing the document is dead, and his
representative or assign appears before the registering officer
and admits the execution,
the registering officer shall register the document as directed in
Sections 58 to 61, inclusive.
H
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 759
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(2) The registering officer may, in order to satisfy himself that the A
persons appearing before him are the persons they represent
themselves to be, or for any other purpose contemplated by this
Act, examine any one present in his office.
(3)(a) If any person by whom the document purports to be executed
denies its execution, or B

(b) if any such person appears to the registering officer to be a
minor, an idiot or a lunatic, or
(c) if any person by whom the document purports to be executed
is dead, and his representative or assign denies its execution, C
the registering officer shall refuse to register the document as to
the person so denying, appearing or dead:
Provided that, where such officer is a Registrar, he shall follow
the procedure prescribed in Part XII: D
Provided further that the State Government may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, declare that any Sub-Registrar named in
the notification shall, in respect of documents the execution of
which is denied, be deemed to be a Registrar for the purposes of
this sub-section and of Part XII.” E
22. The above provisions indicate that the registration of a document
by the Sub-Registrar must be preceded by:
(i) Presentation of the document by a proper person within the
time allowed for presentation; and F
(ii) Admission of the execution of the document.
23. Section 58 provides for the particulars to be endorsed on the
documents admitted to registration. Section 58(2) provides that “[i]f any
person admitting the execution of a document refuses to endorse the
same, the registering officer shall nevertheless register it, but shall at the G
same time endorse a note of such refusal”. Section 59 stipulates that the
endorsements are to be dated and signed by the registering officer.
Section 60 provides that once the requirements of Sections 34, 35, 58
and 59 have been complied with, the registering officer shall endorse the
document with a certificate of registration. H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A 24. Section 719 requires the Sub-Registrar who refuses to register
a document, except on the ground that the property to which it relates is
not situated within his sub-district, to make an order of refusal and record
his reasons, and endorse the refusal of registration on the document.
Further, the Sub-Registrar is required to furnish a copy of the reasons
recorded, to any person executing or claiming under the document.
B
25. Section 72 provides for an appeal to the Registrar from an
order of the Sub-Registrar refusing registration on a ground other than
the denial of execution. Section 72 is in the following terms:
“72. Appeal to Registrar from orders of Sub-Registrar
C refusing registration on ground other than denial of
execution.—(1) Except where the refusal is made on the ground
of denial of execution, an appeal shall lie against and order of a
Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document to registration (whether
the registration of such document is compulsory or optional) to
the Registrar to whom such Sub-Registrar is subordinate, if
D presented to such Registrar within thirty days from the date of
the order; and the Registrar may reverse or alter such order.
(2) If the order of the Registrar directs the document to be
registered and the document is duly presented for registration
within thirty days after the making of such order, the Sub-Registrar
E shall obey the same, and thereupon shall, so far as may be
practicable, follow the procedure prescribed in Sections 58, 59
and 60; and such registration shall take effect as if the document
had been registered when it was first duly presented for
registration.”
F In terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 72, an appeal lies to the
Registrar against an order of the Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a

9
“71. Reasons for refusal to register to be recorded.—(1) Every Sub-Registrar
refusing to register a document except on the ground that the property to which it
relates is not situate within his sub-district, shall make an order of refusal and record his
G reasons for such order in his Book No. 2, and endorse the words “registration refused”
on the document; and, on application made by any person executing or claiming under
the document, shall, without payment and unnecessary delay, give him a copy of the
reasons so recorded.
(2) No registering officer shall accept for registration a document so endorsed unless
and until, under the provisions hereinafter contained, the document is directed to be
H registered.”
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 761
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

document to registration, except where the refusal is made on the ground A
of a denial of execution.
26. Section 73 provides for an application to the Registrar where
the Sub-Registrar has refused to register a document on the ground of a
denial of execution. Section 73 provides thus:
“73. Application to Registrar where Sub-Registrar refuses B
to register on ground of denial of execution.—(1) When a
Sub-Registrar has refused to register a document on the ground
that any person by whom it purports to be executed, or his
representative or assign, denies its execution, any person claiming
under such document, or his representative, assign or agent C
authorized as aforesaid, may, within thirty days after the making
of the order of refusal, apply to the Registrar to whom such Sub-
Registrar is subordinate in order to establish his right to have the
document registered.
(2) Such application shall be in writing and shall be accompanied D
by a copy of the reasons recorded under Section 71, and the
statements in the application shall be verified by the applicant in
manner required by law for the verification of plaints.”
In terms of Section 73, where a Sub-Registrar refuses registration
on the ground that the person by whom it purports to be executed (or E
their representative or assign) denies execution, any person who claims
under the document (or a representative assign or authorized agent)
may apply to the Registrar within thirty days “in order to establish [their]
rights to have the document registered”. Such an application has to be in
writing, accompanied by the reasons recorded under Section 71. The
statements in the application have to be verified in the manner required F
by law for the verification of plaints.
27. On such an application being preferred, the Registrar has to
follow the procedure which is spelt out in Section 74. Section 74 stipulates
as follows:
G
“74. Procedure of Registrar on such application.—In such
case, and also where such denial as aforesaid is made before a
Registrar in respect of a document presented for registration to
him, the Registrar shall, as soon as conveniently may be, enquire—
(a) whether the document has been executed;
H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A (b) whether the requirements of the law for the time being in
force have been complied with on the part of the applicant or
person presenting the document for registration, as the case may
be, so as to entitle the document to registration.’’
In terms of the above provision, the Registrar in such a case, and
B also where a denial of execution is made before the Registrar, has to
enquire:
(i) Whether the document has been executed; and
(ii) Whether the requirements of law for the time being in force
C have been complied with on the part of the applicant or person presenting
the document for registration.
28. Section 7510 provides that if the Registrar finds that the
document has been executed and the requirements under the law have
been complied with, the Registrar shall order the document be registered.
D Thereafter, if the document is duly presented for registration within thirty
days of the order of the Registrar, the registering officer has to obey the
order and, as far as may be practicable, must follow the procedure in
Sections 58, 59 and 60. The registration then takes effect as if the
document has been registered when it was first presented for registration.
Pertinently, under sub-Section (4) of Section 75, the Registrar may, for
E
the purpose of an enquiry under Section 74, summon and enforce the
attendance of witnesses, and compel them to give evidence, as if the
Registrar were a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure 190811.

10
“75. Order by Registrar to register and procedure thereon.—(1) If the Registrar
F finds that the document has been executed and that the said requirements have been
complied with, he shall order the document to be registered.
(2) If the document is duly presented for registration within thirty days after the
making of such order, the registering officer shall obey the same and thereupon shall, so
far as may be practicable, follow the procedure prescribed in Sections 58, 59 and 60.
(3) Such registration shall take effect as if the document had been registered when it was
G first duly presented for registration.
(4) The Registrar may, for the purpose of any enquiry under Section 74, summon and
enforce the attendance of witnesses, and compel them to give evidence, as if he were a
Civil Court, and he may also direct by whom the whole or any part of the costs of any
such enquiry shall be paid, and such costs shall be recoverable as if they had been
awarded in a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).”
H 11
“CPC”
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 763
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

29. Section 7612 provides for that the order of refusal by the A
Registrar under Sections 72 or 75 has to be reasoned, and the Registrar
is required to furnish a copy of the reasons recorded to any person
executing or claiming under the document. It further provides that no
appeal shall lie against such an order of refusal.
30. In the event of a refusal by the Registrar, a suit can be filed by B
a party in terms of the provisions of Section 7713 before a civil court,
praying for a decree directing the document to be registered. On the
other hand, an order of the Registrar directing the registration of a
document is amenable to a challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution.
While seeking a writ of certiorari, the person moving the petition before
the High Court would be entitled to establish whether the registration C
has been ordered in breach of the statutory provisions and is contrary to
law. The mere existence of the remedy available before a civil court,
under Section 9 of the CPC to avoid the document or to seek a declaration
in regard to its invalidity, will not divest a person, who complains that the
order passed by Registrar for the registration of the document was D
contrary to statutory provisions, of the remedy which is available in the
exercise of a court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Undoubtedly, whether a writ should be entertained lies at the discretion
of the court and in a given case, the High Court may decline to do so on
12
“76. Order of refusal by Registrar.—(1) Every Registrar refusing— E
(a) to register a document except on the ground that the property to which it relates is
not situate within his district or that the document ought to be registered in the office
of a Sub-Registrar, or
(b) to direct the registration of a document under Section 72 or Section 75, shall make
an order of refusal and record the reasons for such order in his Book No. 2, and, on
application made by any person executing or claiming under the document, shall, without
unnecessary delay, give him a copy of the reasons so recorded. F
(2) No appeal lies from any order by a Registrar under this Section or Section 72.”
13
“77. Suit in case of order of refusal by Registrar.—(1) Where the Registrar
refuses to order the document to be registered, under Section 72 or Section 76, any
person claiming under such document, or his representative, assign or agent, may,
within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal, institute in the Civil Court,
within the local limits of whose original jurisdiction is situate the office in which the
document is sought to be registered, a suit for a decree directing the document to be
G
registered in such office if it be duly presented for registration within thirty days after
the passing of such decree.
(2) The provisions contained in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 75 shall, mutatis
mutandis, apply to all documents presented for registration in accordance with any
such decree, and, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the document shall be
receivable in evidence in such suit.” H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A the ground that disputed questions of fact arise. However, it needs to be
emphasized that in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction, it would be open
to the High Court to determine as to whether the statutory provisions
which guide the power of the Sub-Registrar or, as the case may be, the
Registrar to order the registration of the document have been duly fulfilled.
Even where a decree is passed by the civil court for the cancellation of
B
any instrument, sub-Section (2) of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act
1963 provides that:
“31. When cancellation may be ordered.— [...]
(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian
C Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a
copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument
has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of
the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.’’
C.2 Validity of the recourse by the Second Respondent
D 31. The Sub-Registrar before whom the sale deed was submitted
for registration declined to order the registration of the sale deed by an
order dated 17 February 2012. The order of the Sub-Registrar was
prefaced by the statement of the appellant, which stated that her signatures
on the sale deed had been taken forcibly. Before the Sub-Registrar, the
E appellant had filed an objection when the sale deed was presented for
registration. The appellant, in the course of her objections before the
Sub-Registrar specifically adverted to following grievances, namely that:
(i) the second respondent had furnished false and misleading information
to her; (ii) the market value of the land admeasuring 1839.48 square
metres was not less than Rs 7 crores and the sale consideration of Rs
F 1.6 crore was meagre; (iii) the time stipulated in the sale deed had
expired; (iv) the signatures of the appellant had been obtained on an
incomplete sale deed; (v) the signatures of the appellant were taken
without furnishing to her a chance to read or peruse the papers, and
when she was surrounded by five persons; (vi) the land area having
G been manipulated under the sale deed, her residential house would also
been taken away by fraud; (vii) the boundaries mentioned in the sale
deed were incorrect and did not clearly reflect the land which was agreed
to be sold; (viii) the sale deed was incomplete and all the co-sharers had
never entered into any partition; (ix) the sale deed would attract a capital
gains tax which would be in excess of the sale consideration; and (x) an
H active forgery had been committed by the second respondent.
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 765
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

32. As is evident from the objections filed before the Sub-Registrar A
by the appellant, it is clear that she did not deny having signed the sale
deed. The essence of her grievance was that her signatures were taken
forcibly; the sale deed did not reflect the intent of the parties in terms of
the area which was intended to be sold; the sale consideration was
undervalued; the consequence of the sale deed was that even the
B
residential house of the appellant would be sold, contrary to her
understanding; and the sale deed had been procured by fraud. The order
of the Sub-Registrar makes it abundantly clear that the appellant was
not ready to register the sale deed, which was claimed to have been
executed in a fraudulent manner and whose execution was thus being
denied. Registration was, therefore, refused by the Sub-Registrar in terms C
of Section 35(3)(a) of the Registration Act.
33. If a person by whom the document is purported to be executed
denies its execution and registration is refused on those grounds, an
appeal against the order of the Sub-Registrar denying execution would
not be maintainable under Section 72 of the Registration Act. Section 72 D
clearly stipulates that an appeal will lie against an order of Sub-Registrar
refusing to admit a document to registration “except where the refusal is
made on the ground of denial of execution”.
34. In the present case, the Sub-Registrar having specifically denied
registration in terms of Section 35(3)(a), the order was not amenable to E
an appeal under Section 72. However, the Registrar, in the course of
entertaining the appeal, instead took recourse to the powers entrusted
under Section 73. As noted earlier in this judgment, Section 73 empowers
the Registrar where the Sub-Registrar has refused to register a document
on denial of its execution by a person purporting to have executed it.
Subsequently, the Registrar appears to have followed the procedure which F
is emphasized in Section 74. Section 74 provides for a procedure where
the Registrar has a two-fold function of determining: firstly, whether the
document has been executed; and secondly, whether the requirements
of the law for the time being in force have been complied with by the
applicant or the person presenting document for registration, so as to G
entitle them to have the document registered. Upon such an enquiry
under Section 74, Section 75 enables the Registrar to order the document
to be registered if it is found that: (i) the document has been executed;
and (ii) the requirements of the law have been complied with. Section
75(4) also allows the Registrar to summon and enforce the attendance
of witnesses to properly conduct the enquiry under Section 74. H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A 35. Undoubtedly, the power of the Registrar while dealing with an
application under Section 73 are wider that the powers which are
entrusted to the Sub-Registrar under Section 35. Under Section 35(1)(a),
the registering officer shall register the document if all the persons
executing the document appear in person before the officer and admit
the execution of the document. Section 35(2) empowers the registering
B
officer to examine anyone present in the office, for the purpose of
satisfying himself that the persons appearing before him are the persons
they represent themselves to be. In contrast to sub-Section (1) of Section
35, sub-Section (3) stipulates that once execution is denied by the person
who purports to have executed the document, the registering officer
C shall refuse to register it. On the other hand, under Sections 73 and 74,
the Registrar is entrusted with the duty to enquire whether the document
has been executed and whether all the requirements of the law for the
time being have been complied with. For the purposes of this enquiry,
Section 75(4) provides the Registrar with the power to summon and
enforce the attendance of witnesses. Thus, while the Sub-Registrar under
D
Section 35(3)(a) has to mandatorily refuse registration when the execution
of a document is denied by the person purported to have executed the
document, the Registrar is entrusted with the power to conduct an enquiry
on an application under Section 73 by following the procedure under
Section 74.
E 36. In the present case, the appeal before the Registrar was not
maintainable under Section 72. Indeed, the appellant, in response to the
memo of appeal filed by the second respondent, specifically pleaded in
her objections that “hearing the appeal under Section 72 of the Indian
Registration Act or to deliver any judgement will be against law”. At the
F same time, however, the appellant also pleaded that she “had full right
for argument under Section 75(4) of the Indian Registration Act and
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 from the witnesses and the
appellant”. The Registrar is empowered to summon witnesses under
Section 75(4) for the purpose of an enquiry under Sections 73 and 74. It
thus emerges that the parties proceeded on the basis that the proceedings
G would be decided on the basis of an enquiry under Section 73, and the
enquiry was conducted with reference to the provisions of Section 74.
The appellant herself understood this to be the position in her objections
filed to the appeal filed by the second respondent, since she invoked her
rights under Section 75(4), which applies to enquiry proceedings under
H Section 74. The appeal against the Sub-Registrar’s order was not
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 767
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

maintainable under Section 72. The remedy of the second respondent, A
where the Sub-Registrar refused registration on the ground that the
appellant denied execution of the document, was under Section 73. The
Registrar conducted an enquiry under the provisions of sections 73 and
74. Both parties participated in the enquiry.
37. Mulla’s commentary on The Registration Act analyses a B
situation where an application under Section 73 is wrongly labelled as an
appeal under Section 72, in the following extract14:
“If a refusal is made on the ground of denial of execution, appeal
would not lie under s 72 of the Act. When the refusal is denied on
the execution, remedy is to file an application under s 73 of the C
Act. The mere fact that an application is wrongly headed as an
appeal and an erroneous section of the statute is mentioned therein
is immaterial, if in fact and in law it is an application under s 73 of
the Registration Act.”
Similarly, in S P Sen Gupta’s commentary on the Registration D
Act, it is stated15:
“4. Proceeding erroneously described as “appeal” or vice versa.-
A proceeding under sec. 72 is an appeal whereas a proceeding
under sec. 73 is not an appeal; it is merely an application before
the Registrar in order to establish the applicants right to have the E
document registered. It is not always easy for the aggrieved party
or even by the Registrar to decide which of the two sections –
sec. 72 or sec. 73, would apply on a given facts circumstances.
Law is meant for doing justice. As such the substance of the
proceeding, and not its form, before the Registrar should be taken
into account. As such it would not be fatal if an appeal under sec. F
72 is filed as an application under sec. 73 and vice versa.”
38. Thus, it is clear that the mis-labelling of an application under
Section 73 as an appeal under Section 72 would by itself not vitiate the
proceedings before the Registrar. This becomes especially true when
proceedings before the Registrar, in substance, were proceedings under G
Section 73 itself and both the parties acknowledged them to be so,
14
Justice K Kannan, Mulla’s The Registration Act (LexisNexis, 2012) pg 416 (“Mulla’s
The Registration Act”)
15
S P Sen Gupta, Commentaries on the Registration Act, 1908 (Kamal Law House,
2017) pgs 617-618 (“S P Sen Gupta Commentary”) H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A explicitly or by their conduct. This is clearly what has happened in the
present case as well, as is evident from the appellant’s reference to
Section 75(4) and her participation in the enquiry proceedings before the
District Registrar. Therefore, we hold that the second respondent’s mis-
labelling of their application as an appeal under Section 72 will not vitiate
the proceedings which led to the District Registrar’s order dated 31
B
March 2012. Hence, for the purpose of these proceedings, we will now
proceed to analyse as to whether the District Registrar validly passed
the order directing the registration of the sale deed.
C.3 Meaning of “execution”
C 39. Section 35(1)(a) of the Registration Act uses the expression
“admit the execution of the document”, while Section 35(3)(a) uses the
expression “denies its execution”. Similarly, Section 72(1) has adopted
the expression “denial of execution”, while Section 73(1) uses the
expression “denies its execution”. However, the word “execution” itself
is not defined by the Registration Act. Before us, two possible
D interpretations have been urged by the parties:
(i) First, that “execution” is tantamount to “signing” a document.
Hence, once a person admits to their signature on a document,
they admit to having executed it; and

E (ii) Second, that “execution” cannot be equated with merely
signing a document. Hence, even if a person’s signature on
the document admitted, they can still deny its execution if
they did not agree to or understand the contents of the
document while signing it.

F We must now decide which of these two interpretations should
be adopted by this Court.
40. The first interpretation of “execution” is supported by the
definition provided in the Stamp Act 189916. Section 2(12) defines
“executed” and “execution” in the following terms:
G “(12) Executed and execution.—”Executed” and “execution”,
used with reference to instruments, mean “signed” and “signature”
and includes attribution of electronic record within the meaning of
Section 11 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);”

16
“Stamp Act”
H
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 769
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

However, since the Registration Act has been enacted for a A
purpose different from the Stamp Act, the definition under Stamp Act is
not conclusive.
41. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the expression “execute”
and “executed” thus17:
“execute, vb. (14c) 1. To perform or complete (a contract or B
duty) <once the contract was fully executed, the parties owed no
further contractual duties to each other>…3. To make (a legal
document) valid by signing; to bring (a legal document) into its
final, legally enforceable form <each party executed the contract
without a signature witness>… C
executed, adj. (16c) 1. (Of a document) that has been signed
<an executed will>…
“[T]he term ‘executed’ is a slippery word. Its use is to be avoided
except when accompanied by explanation...A contract is frequently
said to be executed when the document has been signed, or has D
been signed, sealed, and delivered. Further, by executed contract
is frequently meant one that has been fully performed by both
parties.” William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract
26 n.* (Arthur l. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919).”
The expression “execute” has been further defined in Words and E
Phrases in the following terms18:
“To complete as a legal instrument; to perform what is required to
give validity to.”
The definitions in both these dictionaries seem to once again suggest
F
that the signing of a document can be equivalent to its execution. However,
these definitions are by no means definitive and cannot be taken out of
context, since they also do seem to suggest that executing an agreement
is making it fully valid and legally enforceable.
42. Mulla’s The Registration Act (supra) notes the following
in relation to the meaning of “execution”19: G

“Admission of Execution

17
Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (Thomson Reuters, 2009) pgs 649-650
18
Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) (Thomson Reuters, 2020)
19
Supra at note 15, pgs 254-256 H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A …It is submitted that the mere proof or admission that a
person’s signature appears on a document cannot by itself
amount to execution of the document...Where a person had
signed a document after being aware of the nature of the document,
he has executed the document, and, it is submitted, the Registrar
cannot go into the question whether the document has been
B
obtained by coercion; but when a signature has been obtained
by false representations and the ostensible executant did
not sign with the intention of being bound by the terms of
the document, such a person cannot be said to have
executed the document.”
C (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, S P Sen Gupta Commentary (supra) sets out the
following position20:
“A document is liable to be set aside or declared inoperative by a
D civil court when it was not voluntarily executed. But that is an
altogether different consideration nor coming within the jurisdiction
of Registering Officer. The correct legal position seems to
be that though the Registering Officer cannot take any
decision as to the legality and validity of an instrument which
has been presented for registration, there cannot be any
E admission of execution when the plea taken by the
executant before the Registering Officer, if found true,
would invalidate the deed. An execution does not mean
merely signing but signing by way of assent to the terms
embodied in the document. When the executant admits his
F signature on the document but takes a further plea that his
signature was taken by force after detaining him in a room
or fraud was practised upon him in obtaining his signatures
on the deed or he was duped to sign on blank papers etc,
and there is no material before the Registering Officer to
rebut the plea of the executant, then there cannot be any
G “admission” within the meaning of sec. 35(1)(a) of the Act
because the mind of the signer did not accompany the
signature…”
(emphasis supplied)
20
H Supra at note 16, pgs 389-390, 390, 617-618
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 771
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

While the above extract deals with the power of the registering A
officer under Section 35(1)(a), it does suggest that “execution” happens
when a person’s signature on the document is accompanied by their full
consent to the contents of the document, which they have understood
before signing it.
43. This understanding of the phrase “execution” is also adopted B
by textbooks in relation to the law of evidence. Section 6821 of the Indian
Evidence Act 187222 prescribes the requirement for proving that a
document has been executed. The proviso to Section 68 stipulates that it
shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness to prove the execution
of a document if it has been registered under the Registration Act,
provided that its execution is not specifically denied by the person who is C
purported to have executed it. In relation to this provision, Sarkar’s
Law of Evidence notes23:
“The term “execution” is not defined in any statute. It means
completion, i.e., the last act or acts which complete a document
and in English law this is known as “signing, sealing and delivering.” D
The ordinary meaning of executing a document is signing it as a
consenting party thereto.
[...]
[s 67.4] Meaning and Proof of “Execution” E
[...]
Execution consists in signing a document written out and read
over and understood and does not consist of merely signing a
name upon a blank sheet of paper...”
F
21
“68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested.—If a
document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one
attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if
there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable
of giving evidence:
Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the
G
execution of any document, not being a will, which has been registered in accordance
with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its
execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically
denied.”
22
“Evidence Act”
23
Sudipto Sarkar and Dr. H R Jhingta, Sarkar: Law of Evidence–In India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Burma, Ceylon, Malaysia & Singapore: Volume 1 (LexisNexis, 2016) H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A Similarly, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s treatise on the law of evidence
states as follows24:
“[s 67.3] Execution of Document — Meaning
[...]
B Execution of a document is something different from mere signing
of the document. The term execution is not defined...The ordinary
meaning of executing a document is signing it as a consenting
party thereto...Execution of the document means that the
executant must have signed or put his thumb mark/impression,
only after the contents of the document have been fully stated
C and read by the executant before he put his signature thereon.
Mere admission of the initial by the executant would not be
tantamount to an admission of execution of the document.”
44. If we are to now look at the relevant precedent on the subject,
in Rajendra Pratap Singh v. Rameshwar Prasad25, the validity of a
D decree of the eviction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)
Control Act 1982 was in question before a two-judge Bench of this
Court. This Court, while considering the provisions of the third paragraph
to Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, noted that it required
that a registered instrument for the lease of an immovable property had
E to be executed both by the lessor and lessee. While elaborating on the
meaning of “executing”, this Court held:
“11…An instrument is usually executed through multifarious steps
of different sequences. At the first instance, the parties might
deliberate upon the terms and reach an agreement. Next, the terms
F so agreed upon would be reduced to writing. Sometimes one party
alone would affix the signature on it and deliver it to the other
party. Sometimes both parties would affix their signature on the
instrument. If the document is required by law to be registered,
both parties can be involved in the process without perhaps
obtaining the signatures of one of them. In all such instances, the
G instrument can be said to have been executed by both parties
thereto. If the instrument is signed by both parties, it is
presumptive of the fact that both of them have executed it,
24
N Vijayraghavan and Sharath Chandran, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: The Law of Evidence
(LexisNexis, 2021)
25
H (1998) 7 SCC 602
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 773
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

of course it is only rebuttable presumption. Similarly, if an A
instrument is signed by only one party, it does not mean that both
parties have not executed it together. Whether both parties have
executed the instrument will be a question of fact to be determined
on evidence if such a determination is warranted from the pleadings
of the particular suit. Merely because the document shows only
B
the signature of one of the parties, it is not enough to conclude
that the non-signing party has not joined in the execution of the
instrument.’’
(emphasis supplied)
In view of the above enunciation, the Court held when the C
defendant in that case had not disputed in his written statement that the
lease had been validly made, it was not be open to him to raise a contention
subsequently that the instrument was void since it had not been executed
both by the lessor and the lessee. The decree for eviction was thus
upheld. However, as a general principle, the above extract from the
decision of this Court, though in a different statutory context, emphasises D
that while the signing of an instrument by both the parties is presumptive
of the fact that both of them have executed it, yet this is rebuttable
presumption.
45. In N.M. Ramachandraiah v. State of Karnataka26, a Single
Judge of the Karnataka High Court, while construing power of the E
Registrar under Section 74 of the Registration Act, observed:
“8. The answer to these questions revolve round the scope of
enquiry as contemplated u/s. 74 of the Act. In an enquiry u/s.
74 of the Act, the Registrar should enquire whether the
document had been executed, and whether the F
requirements of the law has been complied with, so as to
entitle the document to registration. The Registrar should
not only be satisfied that the party in question has signed
the document, but he should also come to the conclusion
that the signature has been affixed by the party after G
understanding the contents and the terms of the document.
The Registrar should summon witnesses required by the
petitioner to prove execution. The enquiry under the

26
2007 SCC OnLine Kar 192 (“N.M. Ramachandraiah”) H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A section should be made by the Registrar himself and once
after such enquiry, he is satisfied that the document not
only bears the signatures of the executant, but it is also
duly executed by the executant, after understanding the
contents and terms of the document, he may order the
document to be registered. In the said enquiry he has no power
B
to enter into probabilities and surrounding circumstances. He is
merely to find out whether the document tendered actually is in
the state in which it was executed by the parties to it. The scope
of enquiry contemplated under Section 74 have been explained in
various judgments, in particular, the meaning of the word
C “executed”.”

(emphasis supplied)

In adopting this view, the Single Judge adverted to various
judgments of the Karnataka High Court, as well as other High Courts,
D which we shall now note.

46. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Banasettappa
Laljichikkanna v. District Registrar27 held:

“5…Section 74 enjoins upon the District Registrar to hold an
E enquiry and come to the conclusion as to ‘whether a document
has been executed.’ In the present case all that the District
Registrar has stated is that he was satisfied that the petitioner had
signed the sale deed. He should have come to the conclusion
that the signature had been affixed by the petitioner after
F understanding the contents and the tenor of the document.
Execution does not mean merely signing, but signing by
way of assent to the terms of the contract of alienation
embodied in the document.”

(emphasis supplied)
G
47. In Sayyapparaju Surayya v. Ramchandar Prasad Singh
and others28, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, while

27
1965 SCC OnLine Kar 132
28
H 1949 SCC OnLine Mad 227
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 775
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

construing the provisions of Section 35(1)(a) and (b) of the Registration A
Act, observed:
“The admission required therefore is admission of the execution
of the document…It is not enough for the person, who is the
ostensible executant, to admit his signature on a paper on which,
it may be, the document is ultimately engrossed. The identity of B
the papers on which the signature occurs is not sufficient. If a
man says that he signed a blank paper on the representation that
it was required for presenting a petition, as in the present case or
if a man signs a completed document on the representation that
his signature or thumb impression is required as an attesting witness,
C
that admission of the signature or thumb impression in those
circumstances cannot be construed to be an admission of the
execution of the document. Far from its being an admission, it is a
clear and unambiguous denial of the execution of the document.
He must admit, in order to attract the provisions of S. 35(1) that
he signed the document…The admission of execution therefore D
must amount to an admission that the person admitting entered
into an obligation under the instrument; in other words, that he
had executed the document, signed it as a sale deed, mortgage
deed, or a lease deed, as the case may be.”
48. In Jogesh Prasad Singh & others v. Ramchandar Prasad E
Singh and others29, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court noted
that the meaning of the phrase “execution” of a document had been well
settled by another Division Bench of the High Court in Ebadut Ali v.
Muhammad Fareed30. The decision of the Division Bench in Ebadut
Ali (supra), which was cited with approval in Jogesh Prasad Singh
F
(supra), held:
“In our view, execution consists in signing a document written out
and read over and understood, and does not consist of merely
signing a name upon a blank sheet of paper. To be executed a
document must be in existence; where there is no document in
G
existence, there cannot be execution…Where an executant clearly
says that he signed on blank paper and that the document which
he had authorised is not the document which he contemplated,
the statement is a denial not an admission, of execution.”
29
1950 SCC OnLine Pat 31 (“Jogesh Prasad Singh”)
30
AIR (3) 1916 Pat 206 : 35 Ind. Cas. 56 (“Ebadut Ali”) H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A 49. Adverting to the above decisions and to the views of the
Calcutta31, Orissa32 and Assam High Court33, the Single Judge of the
Karnataka High Court in N.M. Ramachandraiah (supra) emphasized
that the execution of the document does not mean merely signing it, but
signing it after having understood its contents in their entirety:
B “15. Therefore, the law is well settled. Execution of a document
does not mean merely signing, but signing by way of assent
to the terms of the contract embodied in the document.
Execution consists in signing a document written out and
read over and understood, and does not consist of merely
signing a name upon a blank sheet of paper. It is a solemn
C act of the executant who must own up the recitals in the
instrument and there must be clear evidence that he put
the signature after knowing the contents of document fully.
To be executed, a document must be in existence; where there is
no document in existence there cannot be execution. Mere proof
D or admission that a person’s signature appears on a document
cannot by itself amount to execution of a document. Registration
does not dispense with the necessity of proof of execution when
the same is denied. Thus, execution of document is not mere signing
of it.”
E (emphasis supplied)
50. The understanding of the Karnataka High Court in N.M.
Ramachandraiah (supra) is consistent with precedents emanating from
the Privy Council and various High Courts in India. In Privy Council’s
decision in Puran Chand Nahatta v. Monmotho Nath Mukherji and
F Others34, Viscount Sumner, while construing the provisions of Section
35 of the Registration Act, observed:
“By section 35 of the Registration Act registration is directed when
certain persons have appeared, have been duly identified, and
have admitted the execution of the document propounded, and
G the necessary persons are “the persons executing the document”.
The appellant contends that in these words executing
means and means only “actually signing”. Their Lordships
31
Mohima Chunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore Bhutta Charji, ILR Volume VII Calcutta
32
Smt. Uma Devi v. Narayan Nayak, 1984 SCC OnLine Ori 94
33
Bhutkani Nath v. Smt. Kamaleswari Nath, AIR 1972 Assam and Nagaland 15
34
H 1927 SCC OnLine PC 100
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 777
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

cannot accept this. A document is executed, when those who A
take benefits and obligations under it have put or have caused to
be put their names to it. Personal signature is not required, and
another person, duly authorized, may, by writing the name of the
party executing, bring about his valid execution, and put him under
the obligations involved. Hence ‘the words person executing” in
B
the Act cannot be read merely as “person signing”. They mean
something more, namely, the person, who by a valid execution
enters into obligation under the instrument. When the appearance
referred to is for the purpose of admitting the execution already
accomplished, there is nothing to prevent the executing person
appearing either in person or by any authorized and competent C
attorney in order to make a valid admission. Their Lordships have
failed to find in the scheme of the Act anything repugnant to this
construction. Any other would involve risk of confusion and might
even defeat the statutory procedure by multiplying the persons,
who have to be traced and induced to attend, either by themselves
D
or by some representative.”
(emphasis supplied)
51. In Ghasita Ram Bajaj v. Raj Kamal Radio Electronic35, a
Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, while differentiating between
signatures on ordinary documents and documents stamped in accordance E
with the law relating to negotiation of instruments, observed that in the
case of ordinary documents:
“8…The meaning of execution of a document ordinarily implies
that a person making his signature by way of execution knew or
should have known the nature of the document which he was F
signing…”
52. In Kamlabai v. Shantirai36, a Division Bench of the Bombay
High Court, in the context of Section 68 of the Evidence Act, held:
“30…In Sarkar’s Evidence Act, page 639, the meaning and the
proof of the word “execution” has been set out. It says G
“Executed” means completed. ‘Execution’ is the last act
or series of acts which completes it. Execution consists in
signing a document written out and read over and
35
1973 SCC OnLine Del 109
36
1980 SCC OnLine Bom 152 H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A understood and does not consist of merely signing a name
upon a blank sheet of paper. To be executed, a document
must be in existence; where there is no document in
existence, there can be no execution”.
31. It seems to us plain that a person cannot be said to execute a
B document where he does not do so with the intention of making it.
This may appear to be simple, but it is clearly, in our opinion, full
of meaning and import. The word “execution” in a sense
means the making of a document, and a person can be said
to have made or authorised a document where with the
intention and knowledge of bringing into existence a
C particular kind of document he prepares or gets prepared,
such a document and signs it in token of his having accepted
that document, with a desire to bring it into existence. Mere
signing of a document without the intention of bringing that
document into existence, meaning thereby giving effect to
D it would not properly speaking attract the expression
“execution”…”
(emphasis supplied)
53. In S. Ramamurthy v. Jayalakshmi Ammal37, a Single Judge
of the Madras High Court, while interpreting Section 35 of the Registration
E Act, observed:
“11. Let us first examine the meaning of “admission of the
execution of a document for the purpose of section 35 of the
Registration Act,” The execution of a document is not mere signing
of it. It is a solemn act of the executant who must own up the
F recitals in the instrument and there must be clear evidence that he
put his signature in a document after knowing fully its contents.
The executant of a document must, after fully understanding the
contents and the tenor of the document, put his signature or affix
his thumb-impression. In other words, the execution of a document
G does not mean merely signing but signing by way of assent to the
terms of the contract of alienation embodied in the document.”
54. In Union Bank of India v. Dhian Pati38, a Single Judge of
the Himachal Pradesh High Court had to determine whether a deed of
37
1990 SCC OnLine Mad 501
38
H 1996 SCC OnLine HP 90
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 779
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

mortgage had been validly executed. Since the Indian Contract Act 1872 A
and the Registration Act did not define “execution”, the Single Judge
deduced the meaning of the phrase in dictionaries, legal lexicons and
precedent. Thereafter, the Single Judge concluded:
“21. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid meaning of the words
“execution of document” it only signifies that the person executing B
such a document should sign such a document with free consent.
The execution of a document would be complete in case the
executant had signed the document voluntarily, without any duress,
knowing the contents of the document.”
55. While interpreting the provisions of the Evidence Act, In Re C
Kuttadan Velayudhan39, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court
determined whether the admission of signature on a document was
tantamount to admission of its execution. After perusing the decisions of
the Kerala High Court and other High Court across India, the Division
Bench held:
D
“9. To sign means to affix the signature. But when it comes to
the signing of a written instrument, it implies more than
the act of affixing a signature. It implies more than the clerical
act of writing the name. The intention of the person signing
is important. The person should have affixed the signature
to the instrument in token of an intention to be bound by E
its conditions. It has been said that for a signing consists of both
the act of writing a person’s name and the intention in doing this
to execute, authenticate or to sign as a witness. The execution of
a deed or other instrument includes the performance of all acts
which may be necessary to render it complete as a deed or an F
instrument importing the intended obligation of every act required
to give the instrument validity, or to carry it into effect or to give it
the forms required to render it valid. Thus, the signature is an
acknowledgment that the person signing has agreed to the
terms of the document. This can be achieved only if a person
signs after the documents is prepared and the terms are G
known to the person signing. In that view of the matter,
mere putting of signature cannot be said to be execution of
the document.”
(emphasis supplied)
39
2001 SCC OnLine Ker 14 H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A 56. In Bank of Baroda v. Shree Moti Industries40, a Single
Judge of the Bombay High Court, in the context of proving a document
under the Evidence Act, noted:
“21…The term “execution” is not defined in any statute. It means
completion, i.e. the last act or acts which complete a document
B and in English Law this is known as “signing, sealing and
delivering”. The ordinary meaning of executing a document is
signing it as a consenting party thereto.”
57. The “execution” of a document does not stand admitted merely
because a person admits to having signed the document. Such an
C interpretation accounts for circumstances where an individual signs a
blank paper and it is later converted into a different document, or when
an individual is made to sign a document without fully understanding its
contents. Adopting a contrary interpretation would unfairly put the burden
upon the person denying execution to challenge the registration before a
civil court or a writ court, since registration will have to be allowed once
D the signature has been admitted.
58. In giving meaning to the expression “execute” in the provisions
of the Registration Act, it is necessary to adopt a purposive construction
to protect, facilitate and achieve the object of registration. In Suraj
Lamps and Industries Private Limited v. State of Haryana &
E Another41, Justice R V Raveendran, speaking for a two-judge Bench
of this Court, highlighted the purpose of registration:
“18. Registration provides safety and security to transactions
relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or
destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents
F thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions
and execution of documents. Registration provides information to
people who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extent
of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In
other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular
G property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to
any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person(s)
presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives
solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal

40
2008 SCC OnLine Bom 486
41
H (2009) 7 SCC 363
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 781
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

importance or relevance by recording them, where people may A
see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are
and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard
to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable
property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained
in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and
B
complete account of all transactions by which the title to the
property may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly
certified.”
59. In Bharat Indu and ors v. Hakim Mohammad Hamid Ali
Khan42, Lord Philimore, speaking for the Privy Council, emphasized the
purpose of the provisions of the Registration Act in the following terms: C

“The provisions of the Registration Act are very carefully designed
to prevent forgeries and the procurement of conveyances or
mortgages by fraud or undue influence, and though it may seem
somewhat technical to insist upon exact compliance with the
provisions of the Act, it is necessary so to do. Their Lordships D
have already given their sanction to the necessity of strict
compliance with these forms in the case which was referred to at
the Bar, Jambu Parshad v. Muhammad Aftab Ali Khan [L.R. 42
I.A. 22 : s.c. I.L.R. 37 All. 49; 19 C.W.N. 282 (1914).].”
60. The Registration Act exists so that information about documents E
can be put into the public domain, where it can be accessed by anyone in
order to prevent forgeries and fraud, and so that individuals can be aware
of the status of properties. If the interpretation conflating signing with
execution is adopted, it would ensure that the Sub-Registrars/Registrars
will continuously end up registering documents whose validity will F
inevitably be then disputed in a civil suit or a writ petition. While the suit
or writ proceedings continue, the document would remain on the public
records as a registered instrument, which has the potential to cause
more disruption. Hence, such an interpretation should not be adopted by
this Court.
G
61. However, while adopting the current interpretation – that the
admission of one’s signature on a document is not equivalent to admission
of its execution – it is important to consider the power of the Sub-
Registrar/Registrar and their procedures under the Registration Act.
42
1920 SCC OnLine PC 37 H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A 62. In Smt. Raisa Begam v. District Registrar, Saharanpur
and Anr.43, a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court observed:
“33. Section 35 requires for satisfaction of the Registrar about
execution of the document. If a document is properly presented
and its execution is admitted by the competent person, as
B prescribed in statute, the Registrar has no option but to register
the document. The purpose of Registration Act was to mitigate
litigation in regard to property which in the absence of any
documentary evidence was creating lot of administrative and
otherwise problem to the then Government. It neither confers
title upon the concerned person nor validates it but only recognizes
C execution of document relating to a transaction pertaining to
property of the person concerned and acts like evidence to prove
such transaction in the manner it is written in the document and
registered with the Registrar.”
The Single Judge then adverted to the UP Registration Manual,
D more particularly paragraphs 285, 304, 305, 306 and 307. Paragraphs
285 and 304, which are extracted in the judgment of the Single Judge,
are reproduced below:
“285. When a document is presented for registration the points
requiring the attention of the registering officer may be summarized
E as follows:
(1) Whether he has jurisdiction to register the document?
(2) Whether the document is time-barred?
(3) Whether the document is free from the objections in sections
F 19, 20 and 21?
(4) Whether the document is properly stamped?
(5) Whether the document is presented by a proper person?
(6) Whether the document was executed by the persons by whom
G it purports to have been executed?’’
[...]
304. When a document is accepted for registration the prescribed
fees should be levied and the necessary entries made in the fees
43
H 2011 SCC OnLine All 2335
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 783
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

book. The counterfoil receipt should then be prepared and the A
receipts for the document and the fees delivered to the presenter.
The registering officers should then, with as little delay as possible,
enquire whether the document was executed by the alleged
executant, and satisfy himself as to the identity of the person
appearing before him to admit execution. He should also satisfy
B
himself that the person admitting execution has read and
understood the contents of the document and should if the person
is illiterate or cannot read and understand the document will explain
the nature and contents to him. If the presenter be the executant,
or his representative, assign or agent, and if such executant,
representative, assign or agent be present, the registering officer C
shall make the necessary enquiry at once. When the registering
officer is not personally acquainted with executants, he shall require
them to produce persons to testify to their identity. Such persons
shall, if possible, be persons known to the registering officer
personally, or failing these, persons of apparent respectability.
D
Witnesses who are unknown to the registering officer shall have
their thumb impressions recorded as in the case of executants
(vide Rule 308, so far as it is applicable). Any distinctive physical
peculiarity or marked deformity in a party or witness should be
noted in the endorsement. But a descriptive roll need not be
recorded except in suspicious cases. This procedure must be in E
addition to, and not take the place of, the procedure required by
section 34, that the registering officer shall satisfy himself of their
identity. Such descriptive rolls afford in themselves no proof
identity.”
The Single Judge held that where a serious question of fraud and F
manipulation was raised in a summary proceeding, such as the proceeding
before the District Registrar, it would not have been a substitute to decide
a serious civil dispute which has the effect of transferring an immoveable
property from its owners to others. Hence, when the document was not
presented by the proper person before the Sub-Registrar and the
executant denied its execution, it was held that the remedy lay in filing a G
civil suit for declaration and specific performance, and not in the summary
proceedings under Sections 72 and 73 of the Registration Act.
63. Section 73 of the Registration Act envisages that an application
may be submitted to the Registrar by a person in order to establish their
H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A rights to have a document registered, in a situation where the Sub-
Registrar has refused to register the document on the ground that the
person by whom it purports to have been executed has denied its
execution. Section 74 then lays down the procedure which is to be
followed by the Registrar, which contemplates an enquiry by the Registrar
into whether the document has been executed and whether requirements
B
of law for the time being in force have been complied with on the part of
the applicant or the person presenting the document for registration.
When the twin requirements of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 74 are
found by the Registrar to have been fulfilled, sub-Section (1) of Section
75 provides that the Registrar shall order the document be registered.
C Sub-Section (4) of Section 75 stipulates that for the purpose of the enquiry
under Section 74, the Registrar may summon and enforce the attendance
of witnesses and compel them to give evidence as if he is a civil court.
The Registrar is also empowered to impose the obligation of paying the
costs of the enquiry on a party, and such costs are to be recovered as if
they have been charged in a suit under the CPC. Thus, sub-Section (4)
D
of Section 75 incorporates a deeming fiction from two perspectives –
first, in empowering the Registrar to summon and enforce the attendance
of witnesses and for compelling them to give evidence “as if he were a
civil court”; and second, in awarding costs which become recoverable
“as if they have been awarded in a suit” under the CPC. The process
E which is conducted by the Registrar for the purpose of an enquiry under
Section 74 cannot be equated to the powers of the civil court, though
certain powers which are entrusted to a civil court are vested with the
Registrar by the provisions of Section 75(4). A quasi-judicial function is
entrusted to the Registrar for the purpose of conducting an enquiry under
Section 74. Where the Registrar refuses to register a document under
F
Sections 72 or 76, no appeal lies against such an order. Section 77, however,
provides that when the Registrar refuses to order the document to be
registered, any person claiming under such document or its representative,
assign or agents may institute a suit before the civil court within the
stipulated time for a decree directing that the document shall be registered.
G It is thus clear that the Registrar, when he conducts an enquiry under
Section 74, does not stand constituted as a civil court. The enquiry before
the Registrar is summary in nature. The decision of the Registrar in
ordering document to be registered, or for that matter in refusing to
register a document, is not conclusive and is amenable to judicial review.
H
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 785
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

64. Therefore, in a situation where an individual admits their A
signature on a document but denies its execution, the Sub-Registrar is
bound to refuse registration in accordance with Sections 35(3)(a) of the
Registration Act. Subsequently, if an application if filed under Section
73, the Registrar is entrusted with the power of conducting an enquiry of
a quasi-judicial nature under Section 74. If the Registrar passes an order
B
refusing registration under Section 76, the party presenting the document
for registration has the remedy of filing a civil suit under Section 77 of
the Registration Act, where a competent civil court will be able to
adjudicate upon the question of fact conclusively.
65. Finally, our attention has been drawn to Section 58(2) of the
Registration Act, which stipulates as follows: C

“58. Particulars to be endorsed on documents admitted to
registration.— […]
(2) If any person admitting the execution of a document refuses
to endorse the same, the registering officer shall nevertheless D
register if, but shall at the same time endorse a note of such
refusal.”
It is submitted on behalf of the second respondent that above
provision must be read along with paragraph 241 of the UP Registration
Manual, which provides: E
“241. Registering officers not concerned with validity of
documents. Registering officers should bear in mind that they
are in no way concerned with the validity of documents brought
to them for registration, and that it would be wrong for them to
refuse to register on any such grounds as the following: (1) that F
the executants was dealing with property not belonging to him;
(2) that the instrument infringed the rights of third persons not
parties to the transaction; (3) that the transaction was fraudulent
or opposed to public policy; (4) that the executants had not agreed
to certain conditions of the document; (5) that the executants was
not acquainted with the conditions of the document; (6) that the G
executants declared that he had been deceived into executing;
(7) that the executants is blind and cannot count. These and such
like are matters for decision, if necessary, by competent courts of
law, and registering officers, as such, have nothing to do with
them. If the document be presented in a proper manner, by a
H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A competent person, at the proper office, within the time allowed by
law, and if the registering officer be satisfied that the alleged
executants is the person the represents himself to be, and if such
person admits execution, the registering officer is bound to register
the document without regard to its possible effects. But the
registering officer shall make a note of such objections of the
B
kinds mentioned in grounds (1) to (7) above, as may by brought to
his notice in the endorsement required by Section 58.”
Reliance has been placed on the above provisions of the UP
Registration Manual to highlight that an individual’s refusal predicated
upon any of the above-mentioned seven grounds shall not impact its
C “execution” but shall only require an endorsement under Section 58(2).
We are inclined to disagree with this submission. For the reasons already
mentioned in the judgment, we are inclined to accept the interpretation
of the term “execution” to mean that a person has signed a document
after having fully understood it and consented to its terms. Hence, since
D paragraph 241 and Section 58(2) only come into the picture when
execution is admitted, they are not relevant at the present stage.
66. At this stage, it would be material to refer to a judgment of this
Court in Satya Pal Anand (supra), where the three-judge Bench was
constituted following a difference of opinion between two Judges. In
E that case, the mother of the appellant had been allotted a plot of land by
a registered deed by a cooperative society. After her death, the
cooperative society executed a deed of extinguishment unilaterally
cancelling the allotment of the plot and executed a registered deed in
favour of the fifth respondent. The appellant objected to the transaction,
following which a tripartite deed of compromise was reached with the
F society and the fifth respondent. Notwithstanding this, the appellant moved
the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies. During the pendency of
the dispute, the society permitted the transfer of the plot to the sixth and
seventh respondents. The appellant then moved an application before
the Sub-Registrar for cancelling the registration of the deed of
G extinguishment and the two subsequent deeds, but this application was
rejected by the Sub-Registrar, inter alia, on the ground that he had no
jurisdiction to cancel the registration of a registered document. The
appellant then moved the Inspector General of Registration under Section
69 of the Registration Act, who rejected the application. The writ petition
filed by the appellant before the High Court under Article 226, seeking a
H
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 787
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

declaration of the nullity of the deed of extinguishment and the two A
subsequent deeds, was also dismissed by the High Court. In this backdrop,
Justice A M Khanwilkar, speaking for the three-judge Bench, observed
that the appellant had entered into a deed of compromise and accepted
valuable consideration, in spite of which he had instituted a dispute under
the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act 1960. Further, pending
B
the dispute, an application was filed by the appellant before the Sub-
Registrar seeking the same relief of cancellation of the registration of
the deed of extinguishment and the subsequent deeds in favour of the
third party. In view of these circumstances, this Court held that the High
Court was justified in declining to entertain a writ petition at the instance
of the appellant: C
“25. It is a well-established position that the remedy of writ under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary and
discretionary. In exercise of writ jurisdiction, the High Court cannot
be oblivious to the conduct of the party invoking that remedy. The
fact that the party may have several remedies for the same cause D
of action, he must elect his remedy and cannot be permitted to
indulge in multiplicity of actions. The exercise of discretion to
issue a writ is a matter of granting equitable relief. It is a remedy
in equity. In the present case, the High Court declined to interfere
at the instance of the appellant having noticed the above clinching
facts. No fault can be found with the approach of the High Court E
in refusing to exercise its writ jurisdiction because of the conduct
of the appellant in pursuing multiple proceedings for the same
relief and also because the appellant had an alternative and
efficacious statutory remedy to which he has already resorted
to…” F
Having held that the writ petition before the High Court was not
maintainable for the above reasons, this Court also observed that the
role of the Sub-Registrar stood discharged once the document had been
registered, since there is no express provision in the Registration Act
which empowers him to recall the registration. This Court held: G
“34. The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged,
once the document is registered (see Raja Mohammad Amir
Ahmad Khan [State of U.P. v. Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad
Khan, AIR 1961 SC 787] )…There is no express provision in the
1908 Act which empowers the Registrar to recall such registration. H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A The fact whether the document was properly presented for
registration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its
registration. The power to cancel the registration is a substantive
matter. In absence of any express provision in that behalf, it is not
open to assume that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) would be
competent to cancel the registration of the documents in question.
B
Similarly, the power of the Inspector General is limited to do
superintendence of Registration Offices and make rules in that
behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel the
registration of any document which has already been registered.”
This Court observed that Section 35 of the Registration Act does
C not confer a quasi-judicial power on the registering officer, who is not
expected to evaluate title or irregularity in the document. As such, the
validity of the registered deed of extinguishment could be placed in issue
only before a court of competent jurisdiction. On the above facts, this
Court upheld the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, with an
D opportunity being granted to the appellant to pursue a remedy in
accordance with law. Therefore, the decision in Satya Pal Anand (supra)
has held that once a deed of extinguishment had been registered by the
registering officer, the registering officer had no power to recall it nor
was it amenable to the supervisory control of the Inspector General of
Registration under Section 69 of the Registration Act.
E
67. The aforesaid decision does not deal with a situation such as
the present case, where Sub-Registrar had in the first instance declined
to order the registration of the document and the order of the Sub-
Registrar was questioned in an appeal under Section 72 filed by the
second respondent. The Registrar, in the course of the appellate
F proceedings, purported to hold an enquiry of the nature contemplated
under Section 74 of the Registration Act and concluded that the execution
of the sale deed had been established and it was liable to be registered.
The Registrar was evidently seized of a case where the Sub-Registrar
had declined to order registration on the ground that the execution of the
G document was denied by the appellant under Section 35(3)(a). While
exercising the jurisdiction pursuant to the invocation of the remedy under
Section 72, the Registrar relied on the statements of the scribe of the
sale deed and the attesting witnesses to the effect that the sale deed had
been signed by the appellant and that the appellant had also affixed her
fingerprints on it. However, as rightly pointed out by the appellant, the
H
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL. 789
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

signing of the sale deed by her and the affixation of her fingerprints is A
not in dispute. The real issue is whether there was due execution of the
sale deed by the appellant. The appellant in the course of her objections
specifically pleaded fraud, submitting that:
(i) The area which was reflected in the sale deed which was
presented for registration was at variance that what had B
actually been agreed between the parties;
(ii) The boundaries as reflected in the sale deed did not
correspond with the land agreed to be sold;
(iii) The sale consideration was seriously undervalued;
C
(iv) The purported sale deed was resulting not only in the transfer
of excessive land but also the residential house which was
in occupation of the appellant after the death of her husband;
and
(v) The full consideration payable under the terms of the D
transaction had not been received by the appellant.
The plea of the appellant, that the purported sale deed though
signed by her was procured by fraud and undue influence, was a matter
which raised a serious substantive dispute. In support of her contentions,
the appellant has also adduced before us the inspection report by the
E
Sub-Registrar and the Naib Tahsildar. However, we are inclined to hold
that we cannot decide on the merits of the dispute at this stage, since the
Registrar clearly exceeded his jurisdiction by adjudicating on the issue
of fraud and undue influence.
68. The Registrar purported to exercise the powers conferred
F
under Section 74 and arrived at a finding that the sale deed had been
duly signed by the appellant and was therefore liable to be registered.
However, the objections of the appellant raised serious issues of a triable
nature which could only have been addressed before and adjudicated
upon by a court of competent civil jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, during
the course of the hearing, this Court has been apprised of the fact that in G
respect of the remaining area of 1000 square meters in the front portion
of the land, a suit for specific performance44 has been instituted by the
second respondent, resulting in a decree for specific performance dated
16 November 2018. As regards the subject matter of the sale deed, the
44
Original Suit No 568 of 2014 H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A second respondent has instituted a suit for possession before the Civil
Judge, Senior Division Fast Track Court45, where certain proceedings
are pending. In this view of the matter, we are clearly of the opinion that
the Registrar in the present case acted contrary to law by directing the
sale deed to be registered.
B 69. In the impugned judgment, the Single Judge of the Allahabad
High Court has observed that registration does not depend upon the
consent of the executant but on the Registrar’s finding that the executant
had actually signed the document. The High Court held that having found
in the course of the enquiry that the sale deed was duly prepared by a
scribe, that the attesting witness had stated that the sale deed was signed
C by the appellant and she also placed her fingerprints in their presence, it
was open to the Registrar to direct registration in spite of a denial of its
execution by the appellant. In doing so, the Single Judge of the High
Court has, with respect, conflated the mere signing of the sale deed with
its execution. For the reasons mentioned earlier in this judgment, such
D an approach is completely erroneous and cannot be upheld.
D Conclusion
70. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the
impugned judgment and order of the Single Judge of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad dated 31 May 2018 in the appellant’s writ petition.
E The order passed by the District Registrar on 31 March 2012 shall, in
the circumstances, stand set aside. However, it is clarified that the present
judgment shall not affect any of the civil/criminal proceedings that are
pending in respect of the subject matter of the transaction. In the
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
F 71. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

G

45
H Suit No 264 of 2016