VIJAY KUMAR ARORAversusSTATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI

                   [2009] 8 S.C.R. 1069

                  VIJAY KUMAR ARORA                          A
                             v.
            STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
            (Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 2009)
                   JANUARY 13, 2010
                                                             B
    [HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Murder of wife - Death due
 to more than 90% burn injuries - Circumstantial evidence -
 Verbal dying declaration of deceased before five witnesses C
implicating the accused - Parents and sister of deceased
alleging physical and mental cruelty meted out to deceased
by accused - Extra marital relations of accused also proved
- Defence case that the death was either suicidal or accidental
- Conviction by courts below - Held: Conviction justified - D
The facts and circumstances of the case prove that the case
was neither suicidal nor accidental, it was homicidal -Physical
and mental cruelty against the deceased is proved - Motive
of the accused for the murder is also proved - Testimony of
the witnesses establish that the deceased made the dying E
declaration - These witnesses are truthful - Medical evidence
also proves that the case was homicidal - The circumstances
from which conclusion of guilt is to be drawn are proved
conclusively - Circumstantial evidence.

     Evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Yardsticks for     F
reliance on - Discussed.

    The appellant-accused was prosecuted for causing
death of his wife. The prosecution case was that the
injured wife who had sustained burn injuries, was            G
admitted to the hospital by (appellant-accused) at 2.30
a.m. on the fateful night. On the information of the Duty
Constable posted at the said hospital, Daily Diary entry
was made in the police station and one ASI was deputed.
                           1069                              H
   1070   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010] 1 S.C.R.


A He collected MLC of the injured, wherein it was
  mentioned that she died due to exploding of stove; that
  her clothes were smelling of kerosene. As per the MLC,
  the injured was declared unfit to make statement at about
  4.30 a.m. and 11.00 a.m. The injured ultimately succumbed
B to the burn injuries.

      Thereafter, father of the deceased gave a written
  complaint to police, mentioning that his daughter was
  burnt to death by her husband and mother-in-law and
C other family members. He stated that the victim had, at
  12.15 p.m., declared before him that the appellant-
  accused and his mother and his other .relatives had set
  her on fire. ·

       Case was registered against the appellant-accused
D and his mother u/s. 302/34 IPC. Plea of the appellant-
  accused was that the deceased died as the stove
  exploded when the deceased had gone to boil the milk
  for their infant daughter. On hearing the cry, he got up
  and tried to extinguish the fire to save the deceased. In
E the process, he also received burn injuries on his palms.

      Trial court held that the deceased had neither
  committed suicide nor received the injuries accidentally,
  but was set ablaze. The court convicted the appellant-
F accused u/s. 302 IPC. However, his mother was acquitted
  in absence of sufficient evidence against her.

      High Court dismissed the appeal against the trial
  court judgment confirming the conviction. Hence the
G present appeal.
       Dismissing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1. In dealing with circumstantial evidence,
  there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion
H lingering on mind may take place of proof. Suspicion,
 VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF1071
                   DELHI
however strong, cannot be allowed to take place of proof       A
and, therefore, the Court has to be watchful and ensure
that conjectures and suspicions do not take place of legal
proof. However, it is no derogation of evidence to say that
it is circumstantial. Human agency may be faulty in
expressing picturisation of actual incident, but the           B
circumstances can not fail. [Para 9] [1083-G-H; 1084-A],

      1.2. In cases where evidence is of a circumstantial
  nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of.
 guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully · C
 established. Each fact sought to be relied upon must be
 proved individually. However, in applying this principle,
 a distinction must be made between facts called primary
 or basic on the one hand and inference of facts to be
 drawn from them, on the other. [Para 9] [1084-A-C]
                                                                D
      1.3. With regard to proof of primary facts, the court
 has to judge the evidence and decide whether that
 evidence proves a particular fact and if that fact is proved,
 the question whether that fact leads to an inference of
 guilt of the accused person should be considered. In E
 dealing with this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of
 benefit of doubt applies. Although, there should not be
any missing links in the case, yet it is not essential that
each of the links must appear on the surface of the
evidence adduced and some of these links may have to F
be inferred from the proved facts. In drawing these
inferences, the court must have regard to the common
course of natural events and to human conduct and their
relations to the facts of the particular case. The Court
thereafter has to consider the effect of proved facts. In G
deciding the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence for
the purpose of conviction, the court has to consider the
total cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each one
of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the
combined effect of all these facts taken together is
                                                               H
    1072   SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 1 S.C.R.

A conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the
  conviction would be justified even though it may be that
  one or more of these facts by itself or themselves is, or
  are not decisive. The facts established should be
  cons.istent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
B accused and should exclude every hypothesis, except
  the one sought to be proved. [Para 9) [1084-C-G]

       1.4. But this does not mean that before the
  prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon
  circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and
C every hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever
  extravagant and fanciful it might be. There must be a
  chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
  reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with
  the innocence of the accused and must show that in all
D human probability the act must have been done by the
  accused; and where the various links in a chain are in
  themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence
  may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court.
  [Para 9) [1084-G-H; 1085-A-B]
E
      2. On overall view of the circumstances of the case,
  the Court is of the opinion that the deceased did not die
  a suicidal death. A critical analysis of the paragraphs from
  the diary relied on by the accused to suggest suicidal
F death of the deceased, does not indicate any suicidal
  tendencies on the part of the deceased. No suggestion
  was made by the defence to any of the prosecution
  witnesses that the deceased had developed suicidal
  tendencies. The paragraphs make it more than clear that
  the relations between the deceased on the one hand and
G her husband and members of his family on the other,
  were strained one. However, those paragraphs do not
  indicate that the deceased was of feeble mind and had
  developed tendency to commit suicide. It is also nobody's
  case that the deceased was not a caring mother. The
H
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1073
                  DELHI
testimony of the father of the deceased makes it more A
than clear that the behaviour of the father-in-law of the
deceased towards the newly born child was not good at
all. Under the circumstances, if the deceased had
decided to put an end to her life by committing suicide,
in normal course, she would have left her daughter to the B
care of her own parents but no attempt, at any point of
time, was made by the deceased to leave the infant child
to the care of her parents. Normally, a woman committing
suicide will leave a suicidal note. But it is nobody's case
that any suicidal note written by the deceased was found c
after she had received burn injuries. Further, if the
deceased had been fed up with her life and had decided
to commit suicide, she would not have failed to inform
the appellant that because of lack of love and affection
on his part, she had set herself ablaze. [Para 12) (1087- 0
G; 1086-G-H; 1087-A-FJ.
    3.1. The circumstances proved by the prosecution
establish beyond pale of doubt that the deceased had
died a homicidal death and not an accidental death as
suggested by the defence. [Para 13] (1091-G]             E

     3.2. The panchnama of the place of incident
establishes that the place suggested by the defence
where the deceased was found engulfed in fire is a
narrow passage where several articles were lying. The F
panchnama does not indicate that any article was burnt
except a towel which was found partially burnt Further,
the story put forth by the appellant that at midnight the
deceased had got up for boiling milk for the infant itself
does not inspire confidence of the Court. Even if it is G
assumed for the sake of argument that the deceased had
got up at 2.00 am for boiling milk for the infant, it does
not sound reasonable to believe that she would attempt
to light a kerosene stove in the dingy and cramped
passage normally used for washing clothes, utensils etc. H
   1074    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 1 S.C.R.


A and would not go in the kitchen and use gas connection
  for the purpose of heating the milk. [Para 13) [1088-A-D;
   F-H]

       3.3. As the record does not show that. other articles
  lying in the narrow passage were ·extensively burnt, it
8
  becomes highly doubtful whether the incident in question
  had at all taken place in the passage as suggested by the
  appellant. [Para 13) [1089-C-D]

       3.4. The presence of kerosene oil on the body of the
C deceased and clothes put on by hQr, rules out the theory
  of accidental fire, as suggested by the defence. The
  medical evidence on record makes it evident that soot
  particles were present in the stomach of the deceased.
  This indicates that the injuries could have been sustained
D by the deceased only in a conflagration and that too In a
  closed area. [Para 13] [1089-G-H; 1090-A]
      3.5. In this case, the record does not indicate that any
  attempt was made by the deceased to run towards any
E open space and positively establishes that she was
  found at the end of the passage which hardly
  admeasures 12? x 3? [Para 13] [1090-B-C]

      3.6. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument
  that in the instant case, the appellant had made an
F attempt to extinguish fire with his bare hands, it is
  reasonable to infer that he would have received-extensive
  burn injuries because the whole body of the deceased
  was on fire and ultimately it was found that she had
  received almost 100% burn injuries. The medical
G evidence on record indicates that the appellant had
  sustained first to second degree burns over the dorsum
  and wrist of his right hand with blisters at places, some
  of which had already burst. The case of the appellant that
  the deceased had informed him that she had sustained
H burn injuries because the kerosene oil stove had burst
  VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF1075
                    DELHI
 into a vaporized flame does not inspire the confidence        A
 at all. [Para 13) [1090-D-G]

     3.7. The established facts of the case abundantly
indicate that kerosene oil stove was planted at the site
in a fake attempt to hide the homicidal death. The
                                                               8
presence of extensive burns with more than 90% burn
injuries rules out the theory of accidental fire. [Para 13)
[1091-8-E)

    Surinder Kumar v. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1987
SC 692, relied on.                                             C

      4.1. The evidence of father of the deceased would
 indicate that the deceased was subjected to physical and
 mental cruelty for bringing insufficient dowry. The
 testimony of the father regarding physical and mental
                                                               0
 cruelty meted out to his daughter gets corroboration from
 the testimony of the mother and the sister of the
 deceased. The record further shows that 22 letters were
 recovered from the tenanted premises of the appellant.
Those letters were written by a woman. Some of the
letters show that the appellant was simultaneously             E
carrying affairs with two/three girls. The evidence relating
to cruelty meted out by the appellant to the deceased for
bringing insufficient dowry and his extra-marital relations
would show that he had a strong motive to do away with
the deceased. Thus, the second circumstance of motive          F
sought to be relied upon by the prosecution is also firmly
established. [Para 14) [1091-H; 1092-A-D-H]

     4.2. Yet another circumstance relied upon by the
 prosecution against the appellant is that the deceased        G
had made a verbal dying declaration. The evidence of six
of the witnesses would indicate that the deceased had
stated before them that she was held by her husband,
,and her mother-in-law had poured kerosene oil. over her
before she was set on fire. The. father of the deceased,       H
    1076   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010) 1 S.C.R.


A the mother of the deceased, PW 6 and PW 11 would
  indicate that each of them had entreated and implored
  different authorities to get the statement of the deceased
  recorded. The testimony of father of the deceased would
  show that he had requested Assistant Commissioner of
8 Police to record the statement of the deceased but he had
  refused to oblige saying that on her MLC, it was
  mentioned that she was unfit to make a statement. The
  witness has further stated that thereafter he had met
  Doctor who was in- charge of Burns Ward and requested
C him to record the statement of the deceased but he had
  refused to record the same saying that he had to attend
  some operation. The evidence of mother of the deceased
  shows that she had beseeched Sub-Inspector to record
  the statement of her daughter but he refused to record
  the same saying that the doctor had declared the
D deceased unfit to make the statement. The testimony of
  PW6 would indicate that he had gone to the extent of
  visiting Tees Hazari Courts in the company of one Sub-
  Inspector and had gone to the hospital with an SOM to
  record the statement of the deceased. The testimony of
E PW 11 satisfactorily establishes that when the Assistant
  Sub-Inspector sitting inside the Burns Ward had refused
  to record the statement of the deceas~d, he had
  immediately gone to the shop to bring a tape recorder and
  had returned to the hospital with tape recorder but the
F hospital staff and nurses on duty had prevented him from
  taking the tape recorder inside the burns ward and,
  therefore, he could not record the dying declaration of the
  deceased. The statements made on oath by these
  witnesses would indicate that the deceased was in a fit
G state of mind to make a statement and was talking and,
  therefore, the four witnesses had made frantic efforts and
  craved different authorities to record the statement of the
  deceased. [Para 15] (1093-A, F-H; 1094-A-H; 1095-A-C;
   1096-E-H; 1097-A]
H
 VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1077
                   DELHI

      Sunder Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1962 SC 1211,       A
 referred to.

     4.3. It is true that the police statements of PWs 6, 10
 and 11 before whom the deceased had made dying
 declarations, were recorded after one month from the
                                                               8
 date of the death of the deceased. However, neither an
 explanation was sought from any of the witnesses as to
 why their police statements were recorded after a delay
 of one month nor the Investigating Officer was
 questioned about the delay in recording statements of
 those witnesses. Unless the Investigating Officer is asked    C
 questions about delay in recording statements and
 explanation is sought from the witnesses as to why their
 statements were recorded late, the statements by
themselves did not become suspicious or concocted.
The evidence of the above-mentioned witnesses would            D
indicate that though they are neighbours of the father of.
the deceased, they were neither got up nor concocted
witnesses, No enmity is suggested to any of the
witnesses with the appellant. Under the circumstances,
their evidence could not have been rejected on the             E
ground stated by the High Court unless the same was
found suffering from inherent improbability. [Para 15)
[1095-F-H; 1096-A-C]

     4.4. It is true that on MLC of the deceased, it was       F
endorsed that she was unfit to make a statement at about
4.30 am and 11.00 am on April 6, 1983. However, keeping
in view the statements on oath made by the above-
named witnesses which are not seriously challenged in
their searching cross-examination, it would be safe to         G
infer and conclude that medical record at about 12.00
Noon or 12.30 pm did not mention at all that the deceased
was not in a fit state of mind to make a statement. [Para
15] [1097 -C-D]
    4.5. On the facts and in the circumstances of the          H
    1078   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 1 S.C.R.


A case, this Court has no hesitation in relying upon the
  truthful testimony of the relatives and neighbours of the
  deceased which unerringly establishes that the deceased
  had made dying declaration before those witnesses
  implicating the appellant. The circumstance, namely,
B deceased had made dying declaration before six
  witnesses implicating the appellant is firmly established.
  [Para 15) [1097-D-F]
       4.6. On reappraisal of the evidence adduced by the
  prosecution, the circumstances from which the
C conclusion about the guilt of the appellant is to be drawn
  are fully proved. The circumstances proved are
  conclusive in nature. All the facts so established are
  consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the
  appellant and inconsistent with his innocence. The
D circumstances proved exclude the possibility of guilt of
  any person other than the appellant. [Para 16) [1097-F-G] _
       4.7. The defence that the deceased had received burn
  injuries accidentally, is disbelieved by the trial court and
E the High Court as well as by this Court. This false plea/
  defence of the appellant is called into aid only to lend
  assurance that the circumstances taken in cumulative,
  suggest that it was the appellant who had murdered his
  wife. No error is committed either by the trial court or the
F High Court in convicting the appellant under Section 302
  IPC for committing murder of his wife. [Paras 16 and 17)
  [1097-H; 1098-A-C]
                       Case Law Reference:

G      AIR 1987 SC 692            Relied on.          Para 13
       AIR 1962 SC 1211           Referred to.        Para 15
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 125 of 2009.
H      From the Judgment & Order dated 15.5.2008 of the High
 VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1079
                   DELHI

Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 183 of               A
1992.

   Shashi Kumar Dubey, Sanjeev K. Bhardwaj, Yash Pal
Chopra Yogesh Tiwari, Sunil Roy for the Appellant.

     P.P. Malhotra, ASG, Sadhna Sandhu, Naresh Kaushik,                 B
Anil Katiyar for the Respondent.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      J.M. PANCHAL, J. 1. This appeal by special leave,                 C
questions the legality of Judgment dated May 15, 2008
rendered by Division Bench of High Court of Delhi in Criminal
Appeal No.183 of 1992 by which Judgment dated September
29, 1992 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Delhi in Sessions Case No.100 of 1989 convicting the
appellant under Section 302 lPC and sentencing him to R.I. for          D
life and fine of Rs.2000/-in default R.I. for one year, is confirmed.

    2. The facts emerging from the record of the case are as
under:
                                                                        E
     The marriage of deceased Shashi was solemnised with
the appellant on January 30, 1982. After marriage, the
deceased started living with the appellant at his place of
residence situated at Chandigarh.

     3. During the subsistence of the marriage, the deceased            F
gave birth to a girl child on January 2, 1983 at New Delhi.
Thereafter, the deceased went to Chandigarh to reside with the
appellant. On April 4, 1983, the appellant with his wife and child
came to Delhi from Chandigarh. After visiting the parents of the
appellant, they went to the house of the parents of the deceased        G
and took dinner there. After taking dinner, the appellant and the
deceased with the child returned to the house of parents of the
appellant at about 11.30 pm and retired to bed. At about 2.30
am on April 6, 1983, shrieks of the deceased were heard and
she was found engulfed in the flames. At about 2.45 am on the           H
    1080    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 1 S.C.R.


A   night intervening between April 5 and April 6, 1983, the
    deceased was admitted to Lok Nayak Jai Prakash Narain
    Hospital, New Delhi (LNJPN Hospital, for short) with burn
    injuries. The Duty Constable posted at the said hospital sent a
    telephonic message at about 3.00 am that Shashi, aged about
B 26 years, with burn injuries sustained in her house was admitted
    by her husband, i.e., the appellant. This message was recorded
    at DD No.6A. On receipt of the message, ASI Hans Raj along
    with Constable Umrao Singh went to the hospital. He collected
  · MLC of injured Shashi wherein it was mentioned that the injured
c was got admitted at 2.45 am by her husband and Dr. S.K.
    Bindal. It was also mentioned therein that the accident occurred
    due to the exploding of the stove. It was further mentioned in
    the said certificate that her clothes were smelling of kerosene
    oil and she had received extensive burns all over the body and
D face.

          4. As per the endorsement recorded on the MLC, the
    injured was declared unfit to make statement at about 4.30 am
    and 11 am on April 6, 1983. Under the circumstances, ASI
    Hans Raj recorded the statement of the appellant in the hospital
E   wherein the appellant claimed that at about 2.15 am, his wife
    Smt. Shashi had got up for boiling the milk for their three
    months' old child and he had got up from the bed on hearing
    her shouts "Raje Raje". In his statement, the appellant
    mentioned that he immediately rushed and found his wife
F   Shashi in flames in the kitchen and that her clothes had caught
    fire while Shashi was boiling the milk on the stove. It was also
    mentioned by the appellant in his statement that he had received
    burn injuries on palm when he had made attempt to extinguish
    the fire to save his wife. The record shows that said injured
G   Shashi succumbed to her burn injuries in the hospital at about
    3.15 pm on April 6, 1983. On the same day, Mr. Ram Nath
    Mehra, the father of the deceased submitted a written complaint
    before the Police mentioning that his daughter was burnt to
    death by Beena Arora who was her mother in law as well as
H   by V.K. Arora who was her husband and by other family
 VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1081
           DELHI [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

members on the night intervening between April 5 and April 6,        A
1983, It was mentioned by Mr. Mehra in his complaint that
injured Shashi had regained her senses in the hospital at about
12.15 pm on April 6, 1983 and had declared weepingly in his
presence and in the presence of his other relatives that she had
been set on fire by her mother-in-law, the appellant and his other   B
family members. On the basis of the complaint, offences
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC were
registered and investigation commenced. On completion of
investigation, the appellant and his mother Mrs. Beena Arora
were chargesheeted for commission of offence punishable              c
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. As the offence
punishable under Section 302 is exclusively triable by the Court
of Sessions, the case was committed to Sessions Court, Delhi
for trial.

      5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, to whom the          D ·
 case Was made over for trial, framed charge 'against the
 appellant and his mother under Section 302 read with Section
 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The same was read over and
 explained to them. The appellant and his mother did not plead
 guilty to the same and claimed to be tried. Therefore, the          E
prosecution examined several witnesses and produced
documents in support of its case against the appellant and his
mother. On completion of recording of evidence of prosecution
witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge explained to the
appellant and his mother the circumstances appearing against         F
them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and recorded
their further statements as required by Section 313 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973. As far as the mother of the
appellant is concerned, she claimed that she was falsely
involved ·in the case and was innocent. The appellant in his         G
further statement claimed that when he was asleep, he was
awakened by the shrieks of his wife and, therefore, had come
out in the verandah and had seen his wife in flames. According
to him, he tried to extinguish the fire with his hands and water
and in that process received burn injuries on his hands. What        H
    1082    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2010) 1. S.C.R.


A was claimed by the appellant was that he called a doctor and
  rang up his father-in-law but he was not remembering the exact
  time at which the information about the deceased having
  sustained bum injuries was conveyed to his father-in-law. It was
  stated by him that he told the family of his father-in-law to come
B to the hospital and that his injured wife herself had told him that
  she had caught fire while she was boiling milk on the stove. It
  was also mentioned by him in his further statement that he was
  informed by his wife that the stove had inflamed (bhabhak
  gaya). He claimed in his statement that he would file a written
c statement if so advised.

           6. On appreciation of evidence adduced by the
    prosecution, the learned Judge of Trial Court held that ASI Mr.
    Hans Raj to whom DD report was marked at about 3 am on
    the night intervening April 5 and April 6, 1983 conducted
D   himself in the most dishonest and partisan manner in making
    enquiry and in conducting investigation after registration of the
    first information report. The learned Judge further noticed that
    the conduct of Mr. V.P. Gupta, who was the then SHO of P.S.
    Moti Nagar and presently ACP was not above board.
E   According to the learned Judge, the then SHO Mr. V.P. Gupta
    had passed on his entire burden on the shoulders of ASI Hans
    Raj without doing absolutely anything in the name of fair
    investigation. After noticing that the deceased had sustained
    accidental burns leading to her death on the night intervening
F   April 5 and April 6, 1983 at her matrimonial home located at
    F-503, Karam Pura, Delhi, the learned Judge held that the case
    against the appellant and his mother was based on
    circumstantial evidence. The learned Judge considered the
    circumstances established by the prosecution and held that the
G   deceased had neither committed suicide nor received burn
    injuries accidentally but was set ablaze by the appellant.
    According to the learned Judge, the circumstances brought on
    record were inconsistent with the innocence of the appellant arid
    established that, in all human probability, the act of murder of
H   the deceased was committed by the appellant. The learned
  VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1083
            DELHI {J.M. PANCHAL, J.)
 Judge noticed that no satisfactory evidence could be adduced          A
 by the prosecution to establish the guilt of original accused No.2
 who was mother of the appellant. In view of the said
 conclusions, the learned Judge, by judgment dated September
 29, 1992, convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and
 sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of         B
 Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand only) in default rigorous
 imprisonment for one year and acquitted his mother.

      7. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed Criminal Appeal
 No.183 of 1992 before Delhi High Court. The Division Bench            C
 of the High Court has dismissed the appeal, giving rise to the
 instant. appeal. ·

      8. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties
 at length and in great detail. This Court has also considered
 the docu·ments forming part of the appeal.                            D
        9. It is not in dispute that the case against the appellant
  rests on circumstantial evidence. It would be advantageous to
  restate the well settled law relating to appreciation of
  circumstantial evidence. The evidence tendered in a court of         E
  law is either 'direct' or 'circumstantial'. Evidence is said to be
  'direct' if it consists of an eye-witness account of the facts in
  issue in a criminal case. On the other hand, circumstantial
  evidence is evidence of relevant facts from which, one can, by
· process of intuitive reasoning, infer about the existence of facts
  in issue or factum probandum. Es.sential ingredients to prove        F
  the guilt of an accused by circumstantial evidence are :
       The law relating to circumstantial evidence is well settled.
In dealing with circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger
that conjecture or suspicion lingering on mind may take place G
of proof. Suspicion, however, strong cannot be allowed to take
place of proof and, therefore, the Court has to be watchful and
ensure that conjectures and suspicions do not take place of
legal proof. However, it is no derogation of evidence to say that
it is circumstantial. Human agency may be faulty in expressing H
    1084    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 1 S.C.R.


A   picturisation of actual incident, but the circumstances can not
    fail. Therefore, many a times it is aptly said that "men may tell
    lies, but circumstances do not". In cases where evidence is of
    a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the
    conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance,
B   be fully established. Each fact sought to be relied upon must
    be proved individually. However, in applying this principle, a
    distinction must be made between facts called primary or basic
    on the one hand and inference of facts to be drawn from them,
    on the other. In regard to proof of primary facts, the court has
c   to judge the evidence and decide whether that evidence proves
    a particular fact and if that fact is proved, the question whether
    that fact leads to an inference of guilt of the accused person
    should be considered. In dealing with this aspect of the
    problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt applies. Although,
    there should not be any missing links in the case, yet it is not
0
    essential that each of the links must appear on the surface of
    the evidence adduced and some of these links may have to
    be inferred from the proved facts. In drawing these inferences,
    the court must have regard to the common course of natural
    events and to human conduct and their relations to the facts of
E   the particular case. The Court thereafter has to consider the
    effect of proved facts. In deciding the sufficiency of the
    circumstantial evidence for the purpose of conviction, Court has
    to consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved facts,
    each one of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the
F   combined effect of all these facts taken together is conclusive
    in establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction would be
    justified even though it may be that one or more of these facts
    by itself or themselves is, or are not decisive. The facts
    established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the
G   guilt of the accused and should exclude every hypothesis,
    except the one sought to be proved. But this does not mean
    that before the prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon
     circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and every
     hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever, extravagant
H    and fanciful it might be. There must be a chain of evidence so
 VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF1085
           DELHI [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the               A
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and
must show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused; and where the various links in a chain
are in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false
defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the         B
Court.

    10. Having noticed the principles governing the case
based on the circumstantial evidence, this Court proposes to
consider the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution.
                                                                     c
      11. The first circumstance sought to be relied upon by the
 prosecution is that the deceased died a homicidal death. A
 human death may be a natural one or homicidal one or
 accidental or suicidal one. It is not the case of anyone that the
 deceased Shashi had died a natural death. Therefore, the            D
 question which falls for determination of this Court is whether
 she died a homicidal death or a suicidal death or an accidental
 death. The medical evidence on record shows that after the
 deceased had succumbed to her burn injuries, post mortem
 examination was conducted by Dr. G.K. Sharma on April 7,            E
 1983 at 12 noon. On external examination, the doctor found that
there were superficial bums all over the body except patches
over scalp, lower front of abdomen, perineum, left buttock and
inner part of right buttock. According to the doctor, the
approximate area of burn was about 90%. When the post                F
mortem was being perfoqTied, the doctor could not smell
kerosene oil. On internal examination, it was found by the doctor
that all the organs were congested. According to the doctor,
the death of the deceased was due to shock and toxemia due
to burns by fire. What is important to notice is that the defence    G
had not cross-examined Dr. G.K. Sharma at all.

     12. Having regard to the nature of injuries noticed by Dr.
G.K. Sharma, who had performed autopsy on the dead body
of the deceased, the Court will have to examine the question
whether those injuries were received by the deceased while · H
    1086    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010) 1 S.C.R.


A committing suicide. It may be mentioned that in the further
  statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure, 1973, the case of the appellant is that the deceased
  had died accidentally while boiling milk for the infant and it was
  never claimed by him in his further statement that the deceased
B had committed suicide. However, it was argued by the learned
  counsel for the appellant that personal diary maintained by the
  deceased indicates that she was a highly sensitive woman who
  expected wholehearted love and affection from the appellant
  but having been thoroughly disappointed, out of sheer disgust,
c frustration and depression, she might have chosen to end her
  life. The relevant passage from the diary of the deceased relied
  upon by the defence has been quoted in paragraph 24 of the
  impugned judgment. A critical analysis of those paragraphs from
  the diary does not indicate any suicidal tendencies on the part
  of the deceased. No suggestion was made by the defence to
0
  any of the prosecution witnesses that the deceased had
  developed suicidal tendencies. It is well to remember that the
  deceased was well educated and a teacher by profession. She
  had a three months old child. The paragraphs from the diary
E quoted in the impugned judgment make it more than clear that
  the relations between the deceased on the one hand and her
  husband and members of his family on the other, were strained
  one. However, those paragraphs do not indicate that the
  deceased was of feeble mind and had developed !endency to
  commit suicide. It is relevant to notice that it is nobody's case
F that the deceased was not a caring mother. The lingering doubt
  about the uncertain future of the infant aged three months would
  surely deter the deceased from committing the suicide. As
  noticed earlier, the deceased in the company of the appellant
  and her child had come to the house of the parents of the
G appellant from the house of her parents after taking dinner. It
  could not even be remotely suggested on behalf of the appellant
  either to the father or to the mother or to the sister of the
  deceased that when the deceased, in the company of the
  appellant, had come for dinner, she was found to be
H disheartened or gloomy or nervous or depressed. The
 VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1087
           DELHI [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
  passages quoted in the impugned judgment from the diary A
  maintained by the deceased indicate a firm resolve on the part
  of the deceased to lead a life for herself away from her husband
  and her in-laws. The testimony of the father of the deceased
  makes it more than clear that the behaviour of the father-in-law
  of the deceased towards the newly born child was not good at B
  all. Under the circumstances, if the deceased had decided to
  put an end to her life by committing suicide, in normal course,
 she would have ieft her daughter to the care of her own parents
  but no attempt, at any point of time, was made by the deceased_
 to leave the infant child to the care of her parents. The evidence c
 of the father of the deceased on the contrary makes it very clear
 that the appellant wanted to leave the infant daughter with the
 parents of the deceased but the deceased had not agreed to
 the said suggestion. Further, what is normally found in a case
 of suicide by a recently married woman who has given birth to
                                                                    0
 a child shortly before the suicide is that she would bolt herself
 in a room or a kitchen or a bathroom to see that no one makes
 any attempt to save her and would commit suicide along with
 the child. However, the facts of the present case do not indicate
that the deceased had locked herself inside a room or kitchen
or bathroom nor the record shows that any attempt was made E
by her to commit suicide with her infant. As noticed earlier, the
deceased was highly educated lady and was blessed with
motherhood. Normally, a woman committing suicide will leave
a suicidal note. But it is nobody's case that any suicidal note
written by the deceased was found after she had received burn F
injuries. Further, if the deceased had been fed up with her life
and had decided to commit suicide, she would not have failed
to inform the appellant that because of lack of love and affection
on his part she had set herself ablaze.
                                                                   G
     On overall view of the circumstances brought on the record
of the case, this Court is of the firm opinion that the deceased
did not die a suicidal death.

    13. The next question which falls for consideration of the     H
    1088    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2010) 1 S.C.R.


A Court is whether the deceased died an accidental death. As
  observed in the earlier part of this judgment, the case of the
  appellant is that while boiling milk for the infant, the clothes of
  the deceased caught fire accidentally because of the flames
  emanating from the stove as a result of which she died. The
B panchnama of the place of incident establishes that the place
  suggested by the defence where the deceased was found
  engulfed in fire is a narrow passage where several articles were
  lying. If the deceased had died because of the flames
  emanating from the stove, the other articles lying nearby would
c have been found to be burnt. However, admittedly the
  panchnama of place of incident does not indicate that any
  article was burnt except a towel which was found partially burnt.
  Further, the story put forth by the appellant that at midnight the
  deceased had got up for boiling milk for the infant itself does
  not inspire confidence of the Court. The deceased who was a
0
  teacher by profession and well educated must be
  breastfeeding her three months old infant and it would not be
  reasonable to infer that the infant was being fed buffalo or any
  other milk. It may also be mentioned that the deceased in the
  company of the appellant had left her parental home between
E 11 pm to 11.15 pm on April 5, 1983 and must not have gone
  to sleep before 11.30 pm. From this fact, it would be reasonable
  to hold that before going to the sleep, the young infant child
  must have been fed and the child would not have required
  another feed within two hours. Thus, the story that deceased
F got up at 2.00 am in the night to boil the milk for the infant does
  not inspire confidence of the Court. The panchnama of the place
  of incident also makes it clear that there was a kitchen in which
  there was a gas cylinder. Therefore, even if it is assumed for
  the sake of argument that the deceased had got up at 2.00 am
G for boiling milk for the infant, it does not sound reasonable to
  believe that she would attempt to light a kerosene stove in the
  dingy and cramped passage normally used for washing clothes,
  utensils etc. and would not go in the kitchen and use gas
  connection for the purpose of heating "the milk. Further, as per
H the panchnama of place of the incident, the milk container
 VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1089
           DELHI [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

 without any handle was lying near the kerosene stove but no A
 pliers or tangs were found. It is difficult to comprehend or
 entertain a belief by a prudent man that an educated lady like
 the deceased would use such a milk pot without a handle for
 boiling the milk. The photograph of the place of occurrence
 brought on the record of the case makes it more than clear that B
 a small aluminium milk container was lying near the stove and
 a partially burnt towel hanging on a peg at a height of about
 5%" from the floor level of the gallery was also found. But as
 noticed earlier, no other article lying nearby was damaged due
 to the burns. As the record does not show that other articles    c
 lying in the narrow passage were extensively burnt, it becomes
 highly doubtful whether the incident in question had at all took
 place in the passage as suggested by the appellant. What is
 claimed by the appellant is that because of the bhabhak of the
 stove, the cotton garments put on by the deceased had caught 0
 fire. However, a brief burst of flames, i.e., bhabhak at the time
when the stove is ignited first time would cause at the best first
degree burns and could not have been sufficient to totally and
completely ignite the cotton garments. Normally, it is
inconceivable that the deceased would have received 90%
                                                                   E
burns in spite of the fact that she was wearing a cotton
nightgown. Further, the evidence of prosecution witnesses ·
establishes beyond pale of doubt that when the deceased was
removed to the hospital, her clothes and her body were smelling
of kerosene. It is also inconceivable that due to initial bhabhak,
the clothes and body of the deceased would be soiled with F
kerosene unless it had burst. The CFSL report on the record
shows that kerosene oil stove was found in normal working
order. Therefore, the presence of kerosene oil on the body of
the deceased and clothes put on by her, rules out the theory of
accidental fire as suggested by the defence. The medical G
evidence on record makes it evident that soot particles were
present in the stomach of the deceased. According to Dr.
Bernard Knight who has authored 'Medical Jurisprudence and
Toxicology' if soot particles are found in Larynx Trachea or into
stomach, it is commonly a case of conflagration. The presence H
    1090    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2010] 1 S.C.R.


A of soot particles in the stomach indicates that the injuries could
  have been sustained by the deceased only in a conflagration
  and that too in a closed area. The instinct of survival would have
  made the deceased to run into an open place but in this case,
  the record does not indicate that any such attempt was made
B by the deceased to run towards any open space and positively
  establishes that she was found at the end of the passage which
  hardly ad measures 12' x 3'. The case of the appellant is that
  on hearing shrieks of the deceased, he was woken up and he
  found that the deceased was engulfed in the fire. It is also his
c case that he had made an attempt to extinguish fire on her and
  had received burn injuries on the dorsum and wrist of the right
  hand. Having regard to the common course of natural events
  and human conduct in their relation, when a loving husband finds
  his wife engulfed in fire, he try his best to extinguish the fire
  either with the help of a gunny bag or blanket or sheet of cloth
0
  and would not make any attempt to extinguish the fire with bare
  hands. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that in
  the instant case, the appellant had made an attempt to·
  extinguish fire with his bare hands, it is reasonable to infer that
E he would have received extensive burn injuries because the
  whole body of the deceased was on fire and ultimately it was
  found that she had received almost 100% burn injuries. The
  medical evidence on record indicates that Dr. R.P. Saraswat
  had examined the appellant on April 8, 1983 and found that the
  appellant had sustained first to second degree burns over the
F dorsum and wrist of his right hand with blisters at places, some
  of which had already burst. The case of the appellant that the
  deceased had informed him that she had sustained burn injuries
  because the kerosene oil stove had burst into a vaporized
  flame does not inspire the confidence at all. Any one who is
G little conversant with operation of a kerosene stove would
  understand that the brief inflammation which may be caused
  during the initial ignition of the stove is because of little excess
  oil escaping through the feeder hole and not for any other
  reason. The so called bhabhak of the stove would not result
H into release of kerosene from the stove in such a large quantity
 VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1091
           DELHI [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

  so as to fully drench the whole body and the clothes of the         A
  deceased with kerosene. As observed earlier, a gas cylinder
  and a gas stove were available in the kitchen. Therefore, the
  use of kerosene stove by the deceased becomes highly
  improbable and doubtful. Mr. M.R. Kundal, PWS, has mentioned
  in his testimony that he had visited the site on April 8, 1983      B
  and found the gas cylinder and the gas stove in working order
  with no gas leakage. The established facts of the case
  abundantly indicate that kerosene oil stove was planted at the
  site in a fake attempt to hide the homicidal death. The record
  of the case, as noticed· earlier, establishes beyond pale of        c
·doubt that the deceased had suffered more than 90% burns of
  3rd to 5th degree category. If the deceased had suffered
  extensive burns because of her clothes catching fire
  accidentally, she would have run for her life either in the open
 backyard or rolled on the floor or would have wrapped a curtain
                                                                      0
  or any mattress around herself to extinguish the fire. However,
 the record does not indicate that any such attempt was made
 by the deceased. The presence of extensive burns with more
 than 90% burn injuries out the theory of accidental fire. Applying
 the principle laid down in Surinder Kumar v. State (Delhi            E
 Administration) AIR 1987 SC 692 to the facts of the present
 case, it becomes clear that if the stove had burst as suggested
 by the defence, the deceased would not have sustained burns
 on the face, neck, trunk, upper limbs etc. and her clothes would
 not have been found containing kerosene oil. Further, at no point
 of time, any complaint was made either by the appellant or his       F
 family members to the company which had manufactured the
 stove or the owner of the stove from which the store was
 purchased that the stove was defective or faulty or had burst
 causing death of the deceased. Thus, the circumstances
 proved by the prosecution establish beyond pale of doubt that        G
 the deceased had died a homicidal death and not an accidental
 death as suggested by the defence.

    14. The evidence of Ram Nath Mehra who is father of the
deceased would indicate that the deceased was subjected to            H
    1092    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 1 S.C.R.


A physical and mental cruelty for bringing insufficient dowry.
  According to the said witness, he had given dowry worth
  Rs.75,000/- to the appellant and his family members at the time
  of marriage of the deceased. On one occasion, the deceased
  was asked to bring gold set for her motherin law but the witness
B was not able to make arrangement of the funds for gold set and
  had, therefore, purchased a gold chain and given it to the
  appellant. His evidence further shows that the appellant had
  demanded scooter from the deceased and he was not able to
  meet the said demand of the appellant because of his weak
c financial conditions. The evidence pf B.L. Sharma, PW6, who
  is friend of the father of the deceased shows that in order to
  fulfil the demands made by the appellant, the father of the
  deceased had sought financial assistance from him but he
  could not render any financial help to the father of the deceased
  because of his own weak financial conditions. The testimony
0
  of the father of the deceased regarding physical and mental
  cruelty meted out to his daughter gets corroboration from the
  testimony of the mother of the deceased and the sister of the
  deceased. The record further shows that 22 letters were
  recovered from the tenanted premises of the appellant. Those
E letters were written by one Ms. Chhaya from Bangalore. A close
  analysis of those letters makes it very clear that the appellant
  was very much fond of and infatuated with Ms. Chhaya. The very
  fact that the appellant had preserved all these letters even after
  one year and two months of his marriage with the deceased
F persuades this Court to infer that he was carrying on and
  wanted to carry on a quite affair with Ms. Chhaya
  notwithstanding his marriage with the deceased. Some of the
  letters show that the appellant was simultaneously carrying
  affairs with two/three girls. The evidence relating to cruelty
G meted out by the appellant to the deceased for bringing
  insufficient dowry and his extra-marital relations with Ms.
  Chhaya would show that he had a strong motive to do away
  with the deceased. Thus, the second circumstance of motive
  sought to be relied upon by the prosecution is also firmly
H established.
 VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1093
           DELHI [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

      15. Yet another circumstance relied upon by the                A
 prosecution against the appellant is that the deceased had
 made a verbal dying declaration to (1) Ram Nath Mehra, her
 father; (2) Ravi Kanta Mehra, her mother; (3) Meena Mehra, her
 sister; (4) B.L. Sharma; (5) Kamlesh Sharma; and (6)
 Sudarshan Lal at about 12.00 Noon in Burns Ward of LNJP             B
 Hospital on April 6, 1983. It may be stated that the Trial Court
 found that deceased was conscious and had made statements.
 lhe lrial Court further held that the quality of evidence lead to
 establish the oral dying declaration was insufficient to record
 conviction but the same could be used as a corroborative piece      c
 of evidence. From the impugned judgment, it becomes evident
that the High Court considered the question whether acquittal
of mother of the appellant was proper or not in view of the
principles laid down in Sunder Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR
1962 SC 1211. After considering the evidence led by the              0
prosecution to prove oral dying declaration of the deceased,
the High Court has come to the conclusion that the oral dying
declaration is not reliable. On the facts and in the circumstances
of the case, this Court also proposes to consider the evidence
led by the prosecution witnesses for the purpose of satisfying       E
whether the deceased had made oral dying declaration before
her close relatives and others.

    The evidence of above witnesses would indicate that the
deceased had stated before them that she was held by her
husband, i.e., the appellant and her mother-in-law had poured        F
kerosene oil over her before she was set on fire.

     Witness Ravi Kanta Mehra, the mother of the deceased,
stated before the Court that she had met her daughter Shashi
at about 12.00 Noon who had told her that her husband had            F
caught hold of her while her mother-in-law had sprinkled
kerosene oil on her. Her evidence further shows that she had
beseeched Sub-Inspector Bakshi to record the statement of her
daughter but Sub-Inspector Bakshi refused to record the same
saying that the doctor had declared Shashi unfit to make the         H
    1094    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [201 O] 1 S.C.R.


A statement. Her evidence also shows that thereafter she in the
  company of her relative had searched for the doctor and some
  quarrel had ensued between them and the doctor.

        The reliable testimony of Mr. B.L. Sharma shows that he
  had enquired with injured Shashi as to what had happened
8
  whereupon Shashi had told him that she had been set on fire
  by the accused and other family members. The witness has
  asserted before the court that on seeing Shashi's condition, he
  felt that she was not likely to survive for a long and thought that
  it would be proper to call a Magistrate to record her statement.
C What is mentioned by the witness is that he, therefore, rushed
  to Moti Nagar Police Station and metthe SHO and took along
  with him one Sub-Inspector in a jeep to reach Tees Hazari
  Courts and contacted the SOM whose name perhaps was Mr.
  Mathai. The witness has further mentioned that from the court
D premises, they reached the hospital at about 3.15 pm by which
  time Shashi had expired.

       The assertion made by witness Sudarshan Lal on oath is
  that he had rushed to LNJP Hospital on learning that the
E deceased was admitted in the said hospital with burn injuries.
  According to him, he had met Shashi and Shashi told him about
  the incident implicating the appellant. What this witness has
  asserted is that thereupon he had requested one Assistant Sub-
  1nspector who was· sitting inside the ward to record the
F statement of Shashi but the said Assistant Sub-Inspector had
  refused to do so and, therefore, he immediately h~d left the
  hospital and gone to the shop where he was serving which is
  situated in Canaught Place to bring a tape recorder. The
  witness has, further stressed before the Court that he had
G reached the hospital at about 1.30 pm with tape recorder to
  record the statement of injured Shashi but the hospital staff and
  nurses had not permitted him to take a tape recorded inside
  the burns ward.

       The reliable testimony of witness Ram Nath Mehra, father
H of the deceased shows that the deceased had made a
 VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1095
           DELHI [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

statement to him in trembling voice that the appellant, his               A .
mother and other members had set her on fire. His testimony
would further show that thereafter he had requested Mr. Khan,
Assistant Commissioner of Police to record the statement of
Shashi but the Assistant Commissioner of Police had refused
to oblige saying that on her MLC, it was mentioned that she               B
was unfit to make a statement. The witness has further stated
that thereafter he had met Doctor Tiwari who was in charge of
Burns Ward and requested him to record the statement of the
deceased but he had refused to record the same saying that
he had to attend some operation.                                          c
       The High Court, while disbelieving the evidence adduced
  by the prosecution .to prove oral dying declaration of the
  deceased held that "ASI Hans Raj, it is plain to us, is both an
  untrustworthy witness and also an incompetent investigator".
  Having held so, it was noticed by the High Court that he was            D
  not suggested by the prosecution that Shashi was conscious
  at various times and periods and that she had spoken to
-several members of her family and her neighbour who had
10ntered the room where she was being treated. Therefore, the
IHigh Court held that the assumption that Shashi was conscious            E
"'.o make a statement would run foul to court's duty. The High
  :ourt further concluded that the evidence of four witnesses
  Jefore whom oral dying declaration was allegedly made did not
indicate as to who had set the deceased on fire whereas Police
 istatements of Mr. B.L. Sharma PW6, Mrs. Kamlesh Sharma                  F
  :JW10 and Sudarshan Lal PW11, were recorded after the
 -lassage of about one month from the date of the death of
   3hashi and, therefore, the evidence adduced by the
  "lrosecution to prove dying declaration was not satisfactory. On
  reappraisal of the evidence, this Court finds that it is true that      G
   ie police statements of the above-named three witnesses were
  iecorded after one month from the date of the death of the
  •eceased. However, neither an explanation was sought from
  .ny of the witnesses as to why their police statements were
                                                                  >-l"1   H
   ~corded after a delay of one month nor the Investigating Officer       H
    1096    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 1 S.C.R.


A was questioned about the delay in recording statements of
   those witnesses. The law on the point is well settled. Unless
   the Investigating Officer is asked questions about delay in
   recording statements and explanation is sought from the
   witnesses as to why their statements were recorded late, the
B statements by themselves did not become suspicious or
   concocted. The evidence of the above-mentioned witnesses
   would indicate that though they are neighbours of the father of
   the deceased, they were neither got up or concocted witnesses.
   Even remotely, it was not suggested to any of the witnesses
c  that the witness was close to the father of the deceased and,
  therefore, out of love and affection for him, he was falsely
  deposing before the Court. No enmity is suggested to any of
  the witnesses with the appellant. Under the circumstances, this
  Court is of the opinion that their evidence could not have been
  rejected on the ground stated by the High Court unless the
0
  same was found suffering from inherent improbability. The
  evidence of Ram Nath Mehra, the father of the deceased, Ravi
  Kanta Mehra, the mother of the deceased, B.L. Sharma and
  Sudershan Lal would indicate that each of them had entreated
  and implored different authorities to get the statement of the
E deceased recorded. The testimony of B.L. Sharma would
  indicate that he had gone to the extent of visiting Tees Hazari
  Courts in the company of one Sub-Inspector deputed by the
  SHO of Moti Nagar Police Station and had gone to the hospital
  with an SDM to record the statement of the deceased. The
F testimony of Sudershan Lal satisfactorily establishes that when
  the Assistant Sub-Inspector sitting inside the Burns Ward had
  refused to record the statement of the deceased, he had
  immediately gone to the shop being run in the name of Mis.
  Bright Electricals situated at Cannaught Place to bring a tape
G recorder and had returned to the hospital with tape recorder
  but the hospital staff and nurses on duty had prevented him from
  taking the tape recorder inside the burns ward and, therefore,
  he could not record the dying declaration of the deceased. The
  statements made on oath by these witnesses as well as
H Kamlesh Sharma and Meena Mehra would indicate that the
 VIJAY KUMAR ARORA \/. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF1097
           DELHI [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
deceased Shashi was in a fit state of mind to make a statement         A
and was talking and, therefore, the four witnesses had made
frantic efforts and craved different authorities to record the
statement of the deceased. There is no manner of doubt that if
the deceased was not talking and was not in a fit state of mind
to make statement, these witnesses would not have run helter           B
skelter or contacted different authorities to get the statement
of the deceased recorded. This aspect of the matter has been
totally lost sight of by the Trial Court and the High Court. It is
true that on MLC of the deceased, it was endorsed that she
was unfit to make a statement at about 4.30 am and 11.00 am            c
on April 6, 1983. However, keeping in view the statements on
oath made by the above-named witnesses which are not
seriously challenged in their searching cross-examination, it
would be safe to infer and conclude that medical record at about
12.00 Noon or 12.30 pm did not mention at all that the                 0
deceased was not in a fit state of mind to make a statement.
On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this Court
has no hesitation in relying upon the truthful testimony of the
relatives and neighbours of the deceased which unerringly
establishes that the deceased had made dying declaration
                                                                       E
before those witnesses implicating the appellant. This Court,
on reappraisal of the evidence on record, comes to the
conclusion that the circumstance, namely, deceased had made
dying declaration before six witnesses implicating the appellant
is firmly established.
                                                                       F
     16. On reappraisal of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, this Court finds that the circumstances from which
the conclusion about the guilt of the appellant is to be drawn
are fully proved. The circumstances proved are conclusive in
nature. All the facts so established are consistent only with the      G
hypothesis of guilt of the appeliant and inconsistent with his
innocence. The circumstances proved exclude the possibility
of guilt of any person other than the appellant. As noticed earlier,
the appellant had taken the defence that the deceased had
received burn injuries accidentally. The defence is disbelieved        H
    1098     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010) 1 S.C.R.


A   by the Sessions Court and the High Court as well as by this
    Court. This false plea/defence of the appellant is called into aid
    only to lend assurance to this Court that the circumstances
    taken in cumulative suggest that it was the appellant who had
    murdered his wife.
B
        17. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this
  Court is of the opinion that no error is committed either by the
  Trial Court or the High Court in convicting the appellant under
  Section 302 IPC for committing murder of his wife. Therefore,
C the appeal which lacks merit deserves dismissal.

        18. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is
    dismissed.

    K.K.T.                                       Appeal dismissed.