VIJETA GAJRAversusSTATE OF NCT OF DELHI

                       [2010) 7 S.C.R. 1150


A                         VIJETA GAJRA
                                  v.
                    STATE OF NCT OF DELHI
              (Criminal Appeal Nos.1182-84 of 2010)
                           JULY 08, 2010
B
         [V.S. SIRPURKAR AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.]

        Penal Code, 1860:

C       ss.498A, 406 - FIR lodged against appellant under
  s.498A and s.406 - Quashing of FIR sought on the ground
  that appellant was not related to the family of complainant or
  her husband - Held: Appellant should not be tried for offence
  under s.498A - Reference to the word 'relative' in s.498A is
  limited only to the blood relations or the relations by marriage
0 - However, FIR in respect of s.406 is not quashed in view of
  the allegations made - Protection given to the appellant that
  no coercive steps be taken against her - Crime against
  Women.

E       The complainant filed an FIR against the appellant
    under Sections 498A and 406 IPC alleging demand of
    dowry and criminal breach of trust. The FIR also stated
    about the illicit relations between the appellant and the
    husband of complainant.
F
        Appellant filed petition under Article 226 of the
    Constitution read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing
    the FIR, which was dismissed.
       In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that she
G did not belong to the family of the complainant or her
  husband or any of their relatives and that all the
  allegations against her were palpably wrong.

        Disposing of the appeals, the Court
H                           1150
    VIJETA GAJRA v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                   1151

                     .                   '   -   ' .   ·_   ''·.,I'.·_-.:
    HELD: 1. Reference to the word 'relative' in Section · A
498A, IPC would be limited only to the blood relations or
the relations by marriage. There is no question of
prosecution of appellant under Section 498A, IPC.
Therefore, the FIR insofar as it concerned Section 498A,
IPC, would be of no consequence and the appellant B
should not be tried for the offence under Section 498A,
IPC. [Paras 7, 8] [1156-A-C; G-H]

     2. There can be no doubt that the allegations made
against the appellant were extremely wild and disgusting.
However, how far those allegations could be used to C
meet the requirements for the offence under. S~c;:tion 406,
IPC is a moot question. Whatever the form :lri.wllich the
allegations under Section 406, IPC were made; the fact
of the matter is that ther.e is ari FIR and the Court
concerned had taken cognizance thereof. Under these D
circumstances, the interest of the appellant has to be
protected by directing that she should not be required to
attend the proceedings unless specifically directed by
the Court to do so and that too in the case of extreme
necessity. Similarly, no coercive step shall be taken E
against her. She should be granted bail by the Court
trying the case if it decides to try the offence by framing
the charge. The Court should be careful while
considering the framing of charge. Thus, the ~ppellant
should not be tried for offence under Section 49~A, IPC; F
However, the FIR is not quashed altogether in vievv ofthe
allegations made under Section 406, IPC with the
protection that has been granted fo the appellant. [Paras
10,11] [1157-D-G]

    U. Suvetha v. State By Inspector of Police & Anr. (2009)                G
6 sec 757; T. Ashok Pai v. CIT (2007) 7 sec 162;
Shivcharan Lal Verma & Anr. v. State of M.P. (2007) 15 SCC
369, relied on.

                                                                            H
    1152    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2010] 7 S.C.R


A       R. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advance Law Lexicon, Volume 4,
    3rd Edition, referred to.

                         Case Law Reference:
        (2009) 6 sec 757            relied on           Para 7
B
        (2001) 1 sec 162            relied on           Para 7

        (2001) 15 sec 369           relied on           Para 7

      CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
C No. 1182-84 of 2010.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 8.5.2009 of the High
    Court of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (Crl.) No. 1416 of 2008
    and Crl. M.A. Nos. 13113 of 2008 and 2665 of 2009.

D       U.U. Lalit, K.V. Viswananthan, Sanjeev Kumar, Vishal
    Gupta Kumar Mihir, Khaitan & Co., for the Appellant.

      Soli J. Sorabjee, J.S. Attri, Vikram Choudhary, Anand
  Mishra, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Sandhu, Anil Katiyar for the
E Respondent.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. Leave granted.

       2. The appellant herein challenges the order passed by the
F High Court whereby the petition filed by her was dismissed. The
  said petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
  India read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code
  for quashing the FIR No. 138/08 dated 07.08.2008 for offences
  under Section 498A and 406, Indian Penal Code in the
G Chitranjan Park Police Station.

        3. This FIR was lodged by one Gunjan Sujanani, wife of
    one Rohit Sujanani. It is a long document wherein the
    complainant Gunjan Sujanani stated about her marriage with
H
   VIJETA GAJRA v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI             1153
             [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

Rohit on 08.07.2003 and he being a resident of Nigeria. It was A
claimed that before the marriage, Rohit had introduced Gunjan
to one Mr. Sham and Mrs. Lavina Daswani as his foster
parents ~nd also said that he had two foster sisters, namely,
Vijeta Daswani (Vijeta Gajra-the appellant herein) who is a
resident of Indore, Madhya Pradesh and the other being one B
Ms. Ritika Daswani, who resided with her mother in London.
There are allegations made about the demand of dowry
against !the husband as also Mrs. Lavina Daswani. The
demand included diamond neckless for Vijeta Daswani/Gajra.
There was reference to subsequent behaviour of troubling the c •
complainant on account of the dowry demands. The First
Information Report also made some allegations regarding the
relations of her husband Rohit Sujanani with Mrs. Lavina
Daswani and Vijeta Daswani/Gajra, the present appellant. It
was then contended that in December, 2003, when the D
complainant had gone to Sierra Leone, Vijeta Dasawani/Gajra
took away her diamond encrusted heavy gold pendant and
chain and earring set on the pretext that she wanted to wear
them once and she would keep them at a safe place in her
father's house. The complainant also stated that she did not E
return these ornaments. further, it was stated that in May,
2004, Mr. Rohit Sujanani and Mrs. Lavina Daswani insisted
that the complainant should keep her jewellery in London and
claimed that she was slapped by her husband on her refusal.
It was further claimed that in November, 2004, the present
appellant, Vijeta Gajra got married during which the F
complainant had to beg for her ornaments for attending the
marriage. There was a reference in the FIR to the misbehaviour
on the part of Mrs. Lavina Daswani towards her and again the
name of the present appellant figured therein. At this time, the
complainant claimed that she was pregnant for the first time G
and yet she was given physical and mental ill treatment
because of which she had a mis-carriage. There is a reference
to the sexual behaviour of her husband with reference to a
pornographic website. It was claimed that the complainant
delivered a baby on 08.03.2007. Then there is reference to the H
    1154     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010) 7 S.C.R.


A   appellant visiting and staying with the complainant's parents for
    three days and the allegation that her husband was having
    sexual relations with Vijeta Gajra, the appellant herein· and
    Mrs.Lavina Daswani. There was a reference that during her stay
    the appellant was wearing the diamond encrusted pendant and
B   gold chain and earring set which she had taken (practically
    stolen) in Sierra Leone.

         4. In the last part of this lengthy FIR, there was a reference
    to the demand of two crores of rupees having been made by
    Vijeta and her mother over the phone to the complainant as a
C   cost of peace and marital happiness. There was a reference
    to a telephonic conversation with Mrs. Lavina Daswani in this
    regard. There was a further reference to an ugly scene on
    account of arguments. However, there was also a reference to
    the presence of the brother of the complainant on account of
D   which further ugly scenes were avoided. It was complained that,
    thereafter, the complainant and her parents tried to contact
    Rohit Sujanani and the Daswanis who were avoiding them and
    not returning jewellery which was with Vijeta Gajra, Lavina
    Daswani and Rohit Sujanani.
E
         5. This complaint dated 15.04.2008 seems to have been
   registered as an FIR. It seems that on the basis of this FIR, the
 • appellant was sent a summons under Section 160, Cr. P.C. and
   she moved the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi
F under Section 438 Cr.P.C. for grant of anticipatory bail. In that
   application, she had made a reference to the summons asking
   her to appear on 05.06.2008. It was claimed in the application
   that the complainant's husband Rohit Sujanani was an
   employee of appellant's father who has business in Sierra
   Leone and that he was employed on contract basis for the
G period of three years in 1994. It was claimed in that application
   that the appellant had met the complainant last in 2007. It was
   also stated that the allegations made in the FIR were
   concocted, false and baseless and she had no connection
   whatsoever with the family of the complainant or her parents.
H
     VIJETA GAJRA v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                  1155
               [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

She complained that her own marriage was being tried to be           A
destroyed by wild allegations. There was a reference made in
this application by the appellant for quashing the summons
arising out of the complaint dated 15.04.2008 and also to a
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 2153 of 2008. The High
Court had passed the order disposing it of since the State's         B
Counsel had agreed to provide copy of the complaint and had
further stated that in the event the FIR was registered, the
applicant would be informed of this fact and no coercive action
would be taken against her till then. In her application there was
a statement that she did not even belong to the family of the        c
complainant, her husband or any of their relatives and that all
the allegations were palpably false. It was then stated that the
writ petition was filed which came to be disposed of by the High
Court. It seems that the complainant sought the direction to
implead herself in the writ petition-cum-Section 482 Cr.P .C         D
application filed by the appellant.

     6. Following are the prayers in the said writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482,
Cr.P.C.:
                                                                     E
     "(a) Quash the FIR NO. 138/2008 dated 07.08.2008 under
     Sections 498A/406, IPC at Police Station Chitranjan Park
     registered against the petitioner;

     (b) Direct the police not to take any coercive action against
     the petitioner in respect of the above said complaint:          F

     (c) Pass such other and further orders which may be
     deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of
     the case."
                                                                     G
     It is on this backdrop that we have to see as to whether it
would be expedient to continue the criminal prosecution against
the appellant.

     7. Shri U.U. Lalit, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on
                                                                     H
    1156     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A   behalf of the appellant argued that in U. Suvetha v. State By
    Inspector of Police & Anr. [(2009) 6 SCC 757], it was
    specifically held that in order to be covered under Section
    498A, IPC one has to be a 'relative' of the husband by blood,
    marriage or adoption. He pointed out that the present appellant
B   was not in any manner a 'relative' as referred to in Section
    498A, IPC and, therefore, there is no question of any allegation
    against her in respect of the ill-treatment of the complainant.
    The Court in this case examined the ingredients of Section
    498A, IPC and noting the specific language of the Section and
C   the Explanation thereof came to the conclusion that the word
    'relative' would not include a paramour or concubine or so.
    Relying on the dictionary meaning of the word 'relative' and
    further relying on R. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advance Law Lexicon,
    Volume 4, 3rd Edition, the Court went on to hold that Section
    498A, IPC being a penal provision would deserve strict
D   construction and unless a contextual meaning is required to be
    given to the statute, the said statute has to be construed strictly.
    On that behalf the Court relied on the judgment in T. Ashok Pai
    v. CIT ((2007) 7 SCC 162]. A reference was made to the
    decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma & Anr. v. State of M.P.
E   [(2007) 15 SCC 369]. After quoting from various decisions of
    this Court, it was held that reference to the word 'relative' in
    Section 498A, IPC would be limited only to the blood relations
    or the relations by marriage.

F        8. Relying heavily on this, Shri Lalit contended that there
    is no question of any trial of the appellant for the offence under
    Section 498A, IPC. The argument is undoubtedly correct,
    though opposed by the Learned Counsel appearing for the
    State. We are of the opinion that there will be no question of
G   her prosecution under Section 498A, IPC. Learned Senior
    Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant, Shri Soli J.
    Sorabjee, also did not seriously dispute this proposition.
    Therefore, we hold that the FIR insofar as it concerned Section
    498A, IPC, would be of no consequence and the appellant shall
H   not be tried for the offence under Section 498A, IPC.
       VIJETA GAJRA v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                 1157
                 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

      9. That l~aves us with the allegation under Section 406,        A
IPC for the offen_ce-.of criminal breach of trust as there are
allegations jrHespect of the jewellery. We desist from saying
anything -al this juncture. We also desist from going into the
correctness or otherwise of these allegations as they will have
to be proved by evidence. Shri Lalit pointed out that on the face     B
of it the allegations are wild and baseless as the appellant
herself comes from a wealthy background and is a married lady
having settled down in Indore and is also.mother of a child. He
pointed that the FIR is.calculated to destroy her marital life with
the wildest possible allegations and, therefore, we should quash      c
the entire FIR as not being,bona fide and actuated by malice.
     10. There c;m be no doubt that the allegations made are
extremely wild and disgusting. However, how far those
allegations can be used to meet the requirements for the
offence under Section 406, IPC is a moot question. For obvious        D
reasons, we will not go into that exercise. Whatever the form
in which the allegations under Section 406, IPC are made, the
fact of the matter is that there i~an FIR and the Court concerned
has taken cognizance thereof. Under these circumstances, we
would only protect the interest of the appellant by directing that    E
she would not be required to· attend the proceedings unless
specifically directed by the Court to do so and that too in the
case of extreme necessity. Similarly, no coercive step shall be
taken against her. She shall be granted bail by the Court trying
the case if it decides to try the offence by framing the charge.      F
We expect the Court to be careful while considering the framing
of charge.
     11. We, therefore, hold that the appellant shall not be tried
for offence under Section 498A, IPC. However, we desist from          G
quashing the FIR altogether in view of the allegations made
under Section 406, IPC with the protection that we have
granted to the appellant. With these observations, the appeals
are disposed of.
D.G.                                       Appeals disposed of.       H·