VIPIN SAHNI AND ANOTHERversusCENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

                 [2024] 4 S.C.R. 308 : 2024 INSC 284

                       Vipin Sahni and Another
                                  v.
                    Central Bureau of Investigation
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 1980 of 2024)
                                 08 April 2024
             [Aniruddha Bose and Sanjay Kumar*, JJ]

                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether it is open for High Court to convert or treat a petition
       filed under section 482 Cr.P.C., as one filed under section 397
       Cr.P.C.

                                   Headnotes
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.482 and 397 –
       Special Judicial Magistrate while exercising the power given
       under section 239 Cr.P.C. discharged the appellants – CBI
       approached the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. –
       High Court set aside the discharge order and directed the
       learned Special Judicial Magistrate to proceed with the case
       – Appellants preferred appeal against the said impugned
       order – Order of the High court is set aside.
       Held: When the specific remedy of revision under section 397
       Cr.P.C. is available, it could not have been ignored – A petition
       under section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be filed as an alternative of
       revision. [Para. 25]
       Penal Code, 1860 – Criminal Conspiracy – Two or more person
       agrees to, cause to be done i) an Illegal act ii) an act which is not
       illegal by illegal means – No agreement except an agreement
       to commit an offence shall amount to Criminal conspiracy –
       Cheating – An act to cheat and thereby dishonestly induce the
       person so deceived to deliver any property and fraudulent or
       dishonest intention at the time of making the representation
       or promise.
       Held: The sine qua non to make out an offence under section
       420 IPC is an act on part act to cheat and thereby dishonestly
       induce the person so deceived to deliver any property and
       fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the
       representation or promise and such culpable intention should
* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                             309

      Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation


     be there at the time of entering into the agreement – Ingredients
     required to constitute an offence of cheating are (i) there
     should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by
     deceiving him; (ii) (a) the person so deceived should be induced
     to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any
     person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived
     should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything
     which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and
     (iii) in cases covered by (ii) (b), the act or omission should be
     one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the
     person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. [Paras
     9, 10, 19, 20 and 26]
     Inherent power of the court – Can be exercised when there
     is no remedy provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure for
     redressal of the grievance.
     Held: As per the Article 131 in the Schedule to the Limitation
     Act, 1963, the limitation period for filing a criminal revision under
     Section 397 Cr.P.C. is 90 days – However, there is no limitation
     prescribed for invocation of the inherent powers of the High Court
     under Section 482 Cr.P.C – It is well settled that the inherent
     power of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no
     express provision in the Code under which order impugned can
     be challenged – When a revision is lawfully instituted before the
     High Court but the same is thereafter found to be not maintainable
     on some other ground, it would be open to the High Court to
     treat the same as a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C in
     order to do justice in that case – However, the reverse analogy
     may not apply in all cases and it would not be open to the High
     Court to blindly convert or treat a petition filed under Section 482
     Cr.P.C as one filed under Section 397 Cr.P.C., without reference
     to other issues, including limitation. [Paras 23 and 25]

                              Case Law Cited
           Ram Jas v. State of U.P. [1971] 2 SCR 178 : (1970) 2
           SCC 740; V.P. Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Limited
           and others [2010] 11 SCR 788 : (2010) 10 SCC 361
           – Followed.
           Mohit alias Sonu and another v. State of U.P. and another
           [2013] 7 SCR 86 : (2013) 7 SCC 789 – Relied on.
310                                                        [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                        Digital Supreme Court Reports


                                 List of Acts
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; AICTE
       Approval Process 2006.

                              List of Keywords
       Inherent Power of the Court, Revision, Criminal Conspiracy,
       Cheating, Discharge.

                             Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1980
       of 2024
       From the Judgment and Order dated 20.01.2023 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No. 11426 of 2021
                          Appearances for Parties
       Mukul Rohatgi, Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Adv., Samir Rohtagi, Ajay Singh,
       Ms. Alka Sinha, Anuvrat Sharma, Advs. for the Appellants.
       Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Padmesh
       Mishra, Arkaj Kumar, Anukalp Jain, Ms. Bani Dikshit, Merusagar
       Samantaray, Advs. for the Respondent.
                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment
       Sanjay Kumar, J.
1.     Leave granted.
2.     Exercising power under Section 239 Cr.P.C, the learned Special
       Judicial Magistrate, CBI Court, Ghaziabad, discharged the appellants
       herein of a charge under Sections 420 and 120B IPC, vide order
       dated 31.08.2019 in Case No. 456 of 2012 arising out of RC-219
       2011 (E) 0016 registered on the file of Police Station CBI, EO-1, New
       Delhi. Aggrieved thereby, the Central Bureau of Investigation (for
       short, ‘CBI’) approached the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
       under Section 482 Cr.P.C, by way of Application U/S 482 No. 11426
       of 2021. By order dated 20.01.2023 passed therein, the High Court
       set aside the discharge order and directed the learned Magistrate
       to proceed with the case against the appellants. Assailing the said
       order, they are before this Court.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                           311

      Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation


3.   The appellants had established Sunshine Educational and
     Development Society, NOIDA, Uttar Pradesh, and registered it
     under the Societies Registration Act in the year 2004. The aims and
     objectives of this Society, inter alia, included propagation of technical
     education. Appellant No. 1 was the Chairman of the said Society
     while his wife, viz., appellant No. 2, was its Secretary. In September,
     2006, the Society acquired 4.90 acres of land in Greater NOIDA,
     Uttar Pradesh, on a 90-year lease from Greater Noida Industrial
     Development Authority, Gautambudh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, for
     setting up educational institutions. The Society filed application dated
     22.01.2007 seeking approval of the All India Council for Technical
     Education (AICTE) to establish ‘Business School of Delhi’, offering a
     Post-Graduate Diploma Course in Business Management (PGDM),
     in an extent of one acre out of the leased land. In the application,
     the Society disclosed that a loan of ₹5.75 Crore had been availed
     by it from Corporation Bank and that the outstanding loan stood at
     above ₹3 Crore. It also disclosed, in response to clause 6(v), that a
     loan/mortgage had been raised against the land, by ticking the ‘Yes’
     box. However, in the tabular form in the first page, against the query
     – ‘Mortgaged with Bank - Yes/No’, the answer was stated as ‘No’.
     There was, thus, an apparent contradiction in the application itself.
     In any event, approval was accorded by the AICTE on 17.08.2007
     to start the ‘Business School of Delhi’.
4.   Thereafter, the Society submitted another application to the AICTE
     on 27.10.2007 seeking to establish ‘Business School for Women’,
     offering PGDM course. A day later, on 28.10.2007, the Society filed
     yet another application seeking approval from the AICTE to start a
     third institute, named ‘International Business School of Delhi’. The
     first and third applications were moved on behalf of the Society by
     appellant No. 1, being its Chairman, while the second application was
     filed by appellant No. 2, as its Secretary. In the two later applications,
     the Society failed to mention that the leased land was mortgaged
     but it disclosed the fact that it had already been granted approval in
     the year 2007 to operate another institute from the same premises.
     By proceedings dated 29.05.2008, the AICTE granted approval for
     starting the ‘Business School for Women’ in an extent of 0.8 acres
     out of the said land. On 19.06.2008, the AICTE accorded approval
     to commence the ‘International Business School of Delhi’ in the
     leased land.
312                                                           [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


5.     While so, it appears that an anonymous complaint was made to the
       Chief Vigilance Commissioner alleging that officials of the AICTE
       had shown undue favour to the Society. On the strength thereof,
       the Chief Vigilance Commissioner referred the matter to the CBI for
       investigation. In the first instance, the Regional Officer of the CBI at
       Kanpur addressed letter dated 24.07.2011 to the Station-in-charge,
       Police Station Greater NOIDA, to register a case for investigation but
       the District Police of Gautambudh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, opined that
       the complaint did not justify registering of a FIR and/or proceeding
       with investigation as no cognizable offence was made out.
6.     However, on 30.11.2011, Case Crime No. 219 2011 (E) 0016 was
       registered on the file of PS CBI, EO-1, New Delhi, under Sections
       420 and 120B IPC along with Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)
       (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This FIR was registered
       against the appellants and unnamed officials of the AICTE, alleging
       that the appellants had obtained approval by deceitful means from
       the AICTE, in violation of Section 4.2(iii) of the AICTE Approval
       Process 2006. As per this provision, the land approved for starting an
       educational institution ought not to be encumbered. After completion
       of the investigation, Charge Sheet No. 11 of 2012 was filed by the
       CBI for offences under Sections 420 and 120B IPC, naming only
       the appellants as the accused. No official of the AICTE was charged
       with criminality in granting approval to the Society’s institutions.
7.     Aggrieved by their arraignment, the appellants approached the High
       Court at Allahabad under Section 482 Cr.P.C, vide Application U/S
       482 No. 37398 of 2012, seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings
       against them. By order dated 14.02.2013, the High Court accepted
       their plea and quashed the said proceedings. However, upon the
       CBI approaching this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 239 of 2015, by
       order dated 05.02.2018 passed therein, this Court set aside the
       order dated 14.02.2013 but made it clear that the Trial Court would
       be at liberty to go into the merits of the issue raised at the stage
       of framing of charges. Thereafter, on 02.07.2018, the Trial Court
       granted bail to the appellants.
8.     On 25.09.2018, the appellants moved an application for discharge
       before the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI Court, Ghaziabad,
       but the learned Magistrate rejected their plea by order dated
       15.02.2019 and directed the matter to be listed for framing of charges.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                         313

      Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation


     The appellants, thereupon, preferred Criminal Revision No. 101 of
     2019 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad,
     under Section 397 Cr.P.C. The revision was allowed by the learned
     Additional Sessions Judge, vide order dated 29.05.2019, whereby the
     order passed by the learned Magistrate was set aside and the matter
     was remanded for hearing afresh, in the light of the observations
     made in the revisional order. In consequence, the learned Magistrate
     reheard the case and passed order dated 31.08.2019, discharging
     the appellants from the alleged offence under Sections 420 and 120B
     IPC. Nearly one and a half years after the passing of this discharge
     order, i.e., on 21.02.2021, the CBI filed a petition under Section 482
     Cr.P.C assailing it before the High Court at Allahabad. The petition
     was taken on file as Application U/S 482 No. 11426 of 2021 and the
     High Court allowed the same by way of the impugned order, leading
     to the present appeal.
9.   Before we proceed to examine the case on merits, we may first take
     note of relevant legal provisions. Section 415 IPC defines ‘Cheating’
     and it reads thus: -
           ‘415. Cheating.-
           Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or
           dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any
           property to any person, or to consent that any person shall
           retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so
           deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not
           do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or
           omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to
           that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said
           to “cheat”.
           Explanation.- A dishonest concealment of facts is a
           deception within the meaning of this section.’
     Section 420 IPC, the provision we are concerned with presently,
     reads as under: -
           ‘420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of
           property.-
           Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the
           person deceived to deliver any property to any person,
314                                                          [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


           or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a
           valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed,
           and which is capable of being converted into a valuable
           security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
           description for a term which may extend to seven years,
           and shall also be liable to fine.’
       Sections 120A IPC and 120B IPC read thus: -
           ‘120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.-
           When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be
           done,
                 (1)   an illegal act, or
                 (2)   an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such
                       an agreement
           is designated a criminal conspiracy:
           Provided that no agreement except an agreement to
           commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy
           unless some act besides the agreement is done by one
           or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.’
           ‘120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.-
           (1)   Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit
                 an offence punishable with death, [imprisonment
                 for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two
                 years or upwards, shall, where no express provision
                 is made in this Code for the punishment of such a
                 conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if
                 he had abetted such offence.
           (2)   Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than
                 a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable
                 as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of
                 either description for a term not exceeding six months,
                 or with fine or with both.]’
10. The sine qua non to make out an offence under Section 420 IPC,
    insofar as the present case is concerned, is an act on the part of
    the appellants to ‘cheat and thereby dishonestly induce the person
    so deceived, viz., the AICTE, to deliver any property’. Therefore, the
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                         315

      Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation


     appellants, while applying for and on behalf of the Society, should
     have either suppressed material information or projected incorrect
     information so as to induce the AICTE, by such dishonest means, to
     grant approval for its educational institutions. Further, as no official
     of the AICTE has been implicated in the offence, as per the charge
     sheet, the alleged ‘criminal conspiracy’ under Section 120B IPC
     would also be attributable to the appellants only.
11. Viewed in this light, we may note that the first application dated
    22.01.2007 submitted by appellant No. 1 for starting ‘Business
    School of Delhi’ clearly mentioned the fact that a part of the leased
    land admeasuring about 5 acres was to be used for setting up this
    institution and that a term loan of ₹5.75 crore had been raised from
    the Corporation Bank. The repayable outstanding loan was also
    shown as above ₹3 crore. Clause 6 of the application dealt with
    ‘Land’ and it was stated thereunder that the government’s leased
    land of about 5 acres was intended to be used for establishing the
    college. Clause 6(v) of the application and the Society’s response
    thereto are extracted hereunder.
           '(v) Any loans/mortgage raised against the titles of the
                land

                    Yes                          No’
12. Further, as already noted, the AICTE deemed it fit to grant approval
    on 17.08.2007 to start this institution. This was despite the AICTE’s
    ‘Approval Process 2006’ providing that the land should have been
    registered in the name of the applicant’s society/trust on or before
    the date of submission of the proposal, free from any encumbrances.
    However, no official of the AICTE has been implicated in any
    wrongdoing.
13. Coming to the Society’s second application for the ‘Business School
    for Women’, the same extent of 5 acres was shown against clause 6
    but there was non-disclosure of the mortgage of the land to secure
    the outstanding bank loan. Under clause 6(v), the society failed to
    state that a loan/mortgage had been raised against the title of the
    land and tick-marked ‘No’ instead of ‘Yes’. Similarly, the application
    for starting the ‘International Business School of Delhi’ also mentioned
    the same extent of 5 acres of land but again, clause 6(v) contained
    incorrect information as against the question whether any loan/
316                                                        [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                     Digital Supreme Court Reports


       mortgage had been raised against the title of the land. The word
       ‘No’ was tick-marked instead of ‘Yes’.
14. These are the actions which formed the foundation for the CBI’s case
    against the appellants. As already stated hereinbefore, it was not the
    AICTE that claimed that it was deceived and dishonestly induced to
    grant approval owing to suppression of material information by the
    appellants acting on behalf of the Society. It was a third party who
    chose to remain anonymous that initiated the investigation. Further,
    by not implicating any official of the AICTE in the charge sheet and
    by dropping the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
    the CBI found that the AICTE’s officials were not complicit at all and
    they were given a clean chit.
15. At this stage we may note that, though the appellants were initially
    successful in getting the proceedings quashed by the High Court,
    this Court reversed the said order but left it open to the Trial Court
    to examine the issue raised, on merits, at the time of framing of
    charges. It is pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court that the
    learned Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI Court, chose to exercise
    power under Section 239 Cr.P.C and discharged the appellants. The
    validity of that exercise was called in question before the High Court,
    which ultimately held against the appellants.
16. Significantly, the High Court was not inclined to accept the preliminary
    objection raised by the appellants to the effect that the CBI ought to
    have filed a revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C against the discharge
    order and could not maintain a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
    In this regard, the High Court observed that it could always treat a
    petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C as a revision under Section
    397 Cr.P.C and, therefore, the appellants’ objection had no substance.
    On merits, the High Court opined that the appellants had deliberately
    withheld relevant information knowing fully well that if the land was
    encumbered in any manner, approval for setting up the educational
    institutions there would be declined. Holding so, the High Court set
    aside the discharge order.
17. We are, however, of the considered opinion that the finding of the High
    Court as to deliberate withholding of information by the appellants
    cannot be accepted on the given facts. It is a matter of record that
    the first application dated 22.01.2007 filed by appellant No. 1 on
    behalf of the Society disclosed that a bank loan was still outstanding
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                             317

       Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation


     and that the subject land of nearly 5 acres had been mortgaged to
     secure the loan. This was followed by scrutiny and verification by the
     officials of the AICTE, including a spot inspection, following which,
     approval for starting the ‘Business School of Delhi’ was accorded
     on 17.08.2007. No wrongdoing has been attributed to the officials
     of the AICTE in that regard. It was only the later application dated
     27.10.2007 for the ‘Business School for Women’ and the application
     dated 28.10.2007 for the ‘International Business School of Delhi’ that
     did not state correct information with regard to the outstanding bank
     loan and the mortgage of the land in connection therewith. However,
     all three applications mentioned the extent of nearly 5 acres and the
     AICTE could not be said to be in ignorance of the fact that the said
     land was under an encumbrance at the time the applications were
     made. Notably, both the later applications mentioned the fact that
     an institution was already granted approval in 2007 to operate from
     the same premises. This was obviously in reference to the ‘Business
     School of Delhi’ and the application for the same did disclose the
     subsistence of the loan and the encumbrance on the land.
18. That apart, it was not even the case of the AICTE that it was under
    any illusions, whereby it was dishonestly induced to grant approval
    for establishment of the colleges in question. The only party who
    can speak of being ‘dishonestly induced to do or not do something’
    is that party itself and when the AICTE made no such complaint,
    it was not for others to insinuate that the AICTE was dishonestly
    induced to do something.
19. In Ram Jas v. State of U.P.1, the ingredients required to constitute
    an offence of cheating were succinctly summed up thus: -
            "(i)    there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement
                    of a person by deceiving him;
            (ii)    (a) the person so deceived should be induced to
                    deliver any property to any person, or to consent that
                    any person shall retain any property; or
                    (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally
                    induced to do or omit to do anything which he would
                    not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and


1   [1971] 2 SCR 178 : (1970) 2 SCC 740
318                                                           [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                          Digital Supreme Court Reports


            (iii) in cases covered by (ii) (b), the act or omission should
                  be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or
                  harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation
                  or property.’
20. In V.P.Shrivastava vs. Indian Explosives Limited and others2, this
    Court observed that in order to constitute an offence of cheating,
    it must be shown that the accused had a fraudulent or dishonest
    intention at the time of making the representation or promise and
    such a culpable intention should be there at the time of entering into
    the agreement. On facts, it was found that the party alleged to have
    been cheated was fully conscious of the situation at the time it decided
    to enter into the contract and there was no dishonest inducement.
21. In the case on hand, there was disclosure of the fact that the subject
    land was mortgaged to secure the bank loan but despite the same,
    the AICTE granted approval for the ‘Business School of Delhi’ and it
    never complained that it was under any misinformation in that regard.
    Thus, the essential requisite to make out an offence of cheating is
    lacking. Mere carelessness on the part of the appellants in filling up
    the second and third applications and a part of the first application
    also cannot be taken to be motivated by deliberate deception, on
    the admitted factual position, so as to invite criminal charges.
22. Further, there is no evidence of the appellants consciously agreeing
    or conspiring to deliberately furnish false information to the AICTE so
    as to garner its approval for their colleges. As already noted, appellant
    No.1 filed the first application, divulging the relevant details of the bank
    loan and the mortgage over the leased land, but he failed to do so
    in the third application filed by him. Appellant No.2 filed the second
    application with the same non-disclosure but there is no evidence
    whatsoever of the appellants resorting to deception in that regard
    willfully and in connivance with each other. Therefore, the charge
    under Section 120B IPC also does not withstand judicial scrutiny.
23. As regards the objection raised by the appellants as to the maintainability
    of the CBI’s petition filed before the High Court under Section 482
    Cr.P.C., we may note that, as per Article 131 in the Schedule to the
    Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation period for filing a criminal revision



2   [2010] 11 SCR 788 : (2010) 10 SCC 361
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                             319

       Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation


     under Section 397 Cr.P.C, be it before the High Court or the Sessions
     Court, is 90 days. However, there is no limitation prescribed for
     invocation of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482
     Cr.P.C. and it can be at any time. It is a matter of record that when
     the learned Special Magistrate, CBI Court, dismissed the appellants’
     discharge petition in the first instance, they had filed a revision before
     the Sessions Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. and the matter was
     remanded for hearing afresh. However, the CBI did not choose to adopt
     this course when the appellants’ discharge petition was allowed by the
     learned Special Magistrate in the second round. Long after the expiry
     of the limitation period of 90 days, the CBI filed a petition before the
     High Court at Allahabad under Section 482 Cr.P.C. This was obviously
     to get over the hurdle of the limitation for filing of a revision under
     Section 397 Cr.P.C. In this regard, useful reference may be made to
     the decision of this Court in Mohit alias Sonu and another vs. State
     of U.P. and another3, wherein it was observed thus:
             ‘28. So far as the inherent power of the High Court as
             contained in Section 482 CrPC is concerned, the law
             in this regard is set at rest by this Court in a catena of
             decisions. However, we would like to reiterate that when
             an order, not interlocutory in nature, can be assailed in
             the High Court in revisional jurisdiction, then there should
             be a bar in invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High
             Court. In other words, inherent power of the Court can be
             exercised when there is no remedy provided in the Code of
             Criminal Procedure for redressal of the grievance. It is well
             settled that the inherent power of the Court can ordinarily
             be exercised when there is no express provision in the
             Code under which order impugned can be challenged.
             29. Courts possess inherent power in other statute also like
             the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), Section 151 whereof
             deals with such power. Section 151 CPC reads:
             “151. Saving of inherent powers of court.—Nothing in
             this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the
             inherent power of the court to make such orders as may
             be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse
             of the process of the court.”


3   [2013] 7 SCR. 86 : (2013) 7 SCC 789
320                                                          [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                     Digital Supreme Court Reports


          30. This Court in Padam Sen v. State of U.P. [AIR 1961
          SC 218 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 322] regarding inherent power
          of the Court under Section 151 CPC observed: (AIR p.
          219, para 8)
          “8. … The inherent powers of the court are in addition to
          the powers specifically conferred on the court by the Code.
          They are complementary to those powers and therefore it
          must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the
          purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the
          exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with
          what has been expressly provided in the Code or against
          the intentions of the legislature. It is also well recognised
          that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner
          which will be contrary to or different from the procedure
          expressly provided in the Code.”
          31. In a Constitution Bench decision rendered in Manohar
          Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal [AIR 1962 SC 527] , this Court
          held that: (AIR p. 537, para 43)
          “43. … The inherent jurisdiction of the court to make orders
          ex debito justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by Section 151 of
          the Code, but [inherent] jurisdiction cannot be exercised so
          as to nullify the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
          Where the Code of Civil Procedure deals expressly with a
          particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded
          as exhaustive.”
          32. The intention of the legislature enacting the Code of
          Criminal Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure vis-à-vis
          the law laid down by this Court it can safely be concluded that
          when there is a specific remedy provided by way of appeal
          or revision the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC or
          Section 151 CPC cannot and should not be resorted to.’
24. In the light of the above edict, it was not open to the CBI to blithely
    ignore the statutory remedy available to it under Section 397 Cr.P.C
    and thereafter resort to filing of an application under Section 482
    Cr.P.C.
25. We may also note that in the event a revision is lawfully instituted
    before the High Court but the same is thereafter found to be not
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                        321

      Vipin Sahni and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation


     maintainable on some other ground, it would be open to the High
     Court to treat the same as a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C
     in order to do justice in that case. However, the reverse analogy may
     not apply in all cases and it would not be open to the High Court
     to blindly convert or treat a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C
     as one filed under Section 397 Cr.P.C., without reference to other
     issues, including limitation. When the specific remedy of revision was
     available to the CBI, it could not have ignored the same and filed a
     petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We, therefore, find in favour of
     the appellants even on this count.
26. On the above analysis we are of the opinion that the learned
    Magistrate was fully justified in exercising power under Section 239
    Cr.P.C. and discharging the appellants from criminal proceedings in
    relation to Case No. 456 of 2012. The High Court adopted a rather
    technical approach and practically concluded that the appellants
    were guilty of deliberately withholding relevant information so as
    to secure the approvals by deceitful means. This finding of the
    High Court is not supported by the admitted facts, which indicate
    disclosure of the mortgage at the outset when the first application
    was made and, therefore, there is no possibility of inferring that the
    appellants conspired in terms of Section 120A IPC to commit an
    illegal act of suppression so as to secure the approvals. Further, the
    AICTE itself never claimed that it was dishonestly induced to grant
    such approvals and that essential link is altogether missing, whereby
    any such criminal charge of cheating can be sustained against the
    appellants. The impugned order dated 20.01.2023 passed by the
    Allahabad High Court in Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C No. 11426 of
    2021 is, therefore, set aside and the order of discharge passed by
    the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI Court, Ghaziabad, in
    Case No. 456 of 2012 is restored. In consequence, the appellants
    shall stand discharged of the alleged offence under Sections 420
    and 120B IPC in Case Crime No. 219 of 2011 (E) 0016.
           The criminal appeal is allowed accordingly.
           Pending applications shall stand closed.


     Headnotes prepared by:                              Result of the case:
     Himanshu Rai, Hony. Associate Editor                  Appeal allowed.
     (Verified by: Abhinav Mukerji, Sr. Adv.)