VIRUPAKSHAPPA GOUDA AND ANOTHERversusTHE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER

                         [2017] 4 S.C.R. 373


          VIRUPAKSHAPPA GOUDA AND ANOTHER                                A
                                 v.
         THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 60 I of 2017)
                         MARCH 28, 2017                                  B
       [DIPAK MISRA AND A. M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.]
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.439 - Criminal
proceedings against appellants for offence punishable u/ss.143,
147, 323, 302, 504, 114 r/w s.149 !PC - Bail application rejected        C
by trial court -Aggrieved, appellant filed petition before High Court
which was also rejected - Thereafter second bail application flied
before trial court was also rejected - Plea of accused that he was
entitled to bail as in the meantime the investigation was completed
and charge sheet was also filed and, therefore, there was change of
circumstance - Plea rejected - Petition before High Court rejected       D
- Special leave petition thereagainst also rejected - Third
application for bail, however, allowed by trial court - Father of the
victim-deceased moved High Court for cancellation of bail - Bail
cancelled - On appeal, held: Trial court was swayed by the fact
that when a charge sheet is filed it amounts to change of                E
circumstance - Filing of the charge-sheet does not in any manner
lessen the allegations made by the prosecution - Jn the instant case,
trial judge did not keep himself alive to the fact that twice the bail
applications were rejected and the mailer had travelled to the
Supreme Court - Once Supreme Court declined to enlarge the
appellants on bail, endevours to project same factual score should       F
not have been allowed - The gravity of the crime should have been
taken note of by the trial court - Prosecution case was that the
victim-deceased had married daughter of accused-appellant No, I
belonging to different community and was living peacefully away
from the resentful community, but due to some kind of "misconceived      G
class honour", accused put an end to the life of the young man -
 Jn such a situation, the accused persons should not have been
 granted liberty - There was no error in the order of the High Court
 - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.143, 147, 323, 302, 504, 114 rlw s.149 -
 Honour killing.
                                                                         H
                                 373
374            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [20 J 7] 4 S.C.R.


A            Precedent: Binding effect of judgments/orders granting!
      rejecting bail - Held: A bail application is not to be entertained 011
      the basis of certain observations made in a judgment in a different
      context - It depends upon the nature of the crime and the manner in
      which it is committed - There has to be application of mind and
B     appreciation of the factual score and understanding of the
      pronouncements in the field.
            Dismissing the appeal, the Court
           HELD: 1. A bail application cannot be allowed solely or
      exclusively on the ground that the fundamental principle of
c     criminal jurisprudence is that the accused is presumed to be
      innocent till he is found guilty by the competent court. [Para
      14]1380-A-B)
            Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation
            (2012) 1 SCC 40 : [2011) 13 SCR 309; Siddharam
D           Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and others
            (2011) 1 sec 694 : [2010] 15 SeR 201- distinguished.
            2. A bail application is not to be entertained on the basis of
      certain observations made in a judgment in a different context.
      It depends upon the nature of the crime and the manner in which
 E    it is committed. The requisite factors are: (i) the nature of
      accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction
      and the nature of supporting evidence; (ii) reasonable
      apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of
      threat to the complainant; and (iii) prima facie satisfaction of the
      court in support of the charge. [Paras 15, 16)[381-B, e-D]
 F
            Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. and another (2004) 7 sec
            525 : [2004) 3 Suppl. SeR 584; Prasanta Kumar
            Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee and another (2010) 14 SCC
            496 : [2010) 12 SCR 1165; Central Bureau of
            Investigation v. V. Vl}ay Sai Reddy (2013) 7 SCC 452 -
 G          relied on.
            3. An order of bail cannot be granted in an arbitrary or
      fanciful manner. In the instant case, the trial Judge was not guided
      by the established parameters for grant of bail. He did not keep
      himself alive to the fact that twice the bail applications were
 H
VlRUPAKSHAPPA GOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                         375
           KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER

rejected and the matter had travelled to the Supreme Court. Once        A
Supreme Court declined to enlarge the appellants on '>ail,
endevours to project same factual score should not have been
allowed. It is absolute impropriety and that impropriety cat: for
axing of the order. The gravity of the crime should have been
taken note of by the trial Judge. The deceased and his wife (the
                                                                        8
daughter of the accused-appellant No.l) were staying in peace,
away from the acrimonious community, but due to some kind of
"misc?nceived class honour", the vengeance reigned and awe
for law went on a holiday. They thought that their perception
mattered and as alleged, they put an end to the life spark of the
young man. The choice of the daughter was allowed no space.             C
Her identity was crushed and her thinking was crucified by
parental dominance which has roots in an unfathomable sense of
community honour. In such a situation, the accused persons
should not have been granted liberty. The perversity of approach
by the Additional Sessions Judge, who has enlarged the appellants
                                                                        0
on bail, is totally unacceptable. In such a situation, the High Court
has performed its legal duty by lancinating the order passed by
the trial Judge. [Paras 18; 20 and 21][382-E; 383-E-H; 384-A-D]
      Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another
      (2014) 16 SCC 508 : [2014) 12 SCR 453; Dinesh .MN.
      (S.P) v. State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 66 : [2008] 6              E
      SCR 1134 - relied on.
                       Case Law Reference
      [2011) 13 SCR309                 distinguished Para 7
      [2010] 15 SCR 201                distinguished Para 7             F
      [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 584          relied on       Para 16
      [2010] 12 SCR 1165               relied on       Para 16
      (2013) 7 sec 452                 relied on       Para 17
      [2014] 12 SCR 453                relied on       Para 18          G

      [2008] 6 SCR 1134                relied on       Para 19
      CRIMIN AL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
601 of 2017.
                                                                        H
376           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A          From the Judgment and Order dated 16.09.2016 of the High Court
      ofKarnataka at Kalaburgi in Criminal Petition No. 200768of2016.
           Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Sr. Adv., Anirudh Sanganeria, Chinmay
      Deshpande, Amj id Maqbool, Advs. for the Appellants.
            V. N. Raghupathy, Adv. for the Respondents.
B
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            DIPAK MISRA, J. I. Leave granted.
          2. The appellants, who have been arraigned as accused in sessions
   case being S.C. No.90 of 20 I5 arising out of Crime No.118 of 20 I5,
 C registered at Raichur Rural Police Station for the offences punishable
   under Sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 302, 504, 114 read with Section 149 of
   the Indian Penal Code (IPC) after being taken into custody, in the course
   of investigation being aspirant for obtaining liberty, preferred an
   application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
 D (Cr.P.C.), that is, Criminal Misc. No. 457 of2015 in the court of Principal
   Sessions Judge at Raichur, which stood dismissed.
          3. Being grieved by the aforesaid order of rejection for grant of
   bail, the accused-appellants moved the High Court of Karnataka at
   Kalaburagi Bench in Criminal Petition No. 200629 of20 l 5. The High
 E Court adverted to the deadly weapons that were carried by the accused
   persons, the nature of injuries sustained on the vital parts by the deceased
   and the allegation of specific overt acts, and rejected the application.
           4. Thereafter, a second application for grant of bail was moved
   by the appellants before the Principal Sessions Judge at Raichur, that is,
   Criminal Misc. No. 791 of 20 I 5. It was contended before the learned
 F
   trial Judge that as, in the meantime, the investigation had been completed
   and the charge-sheet had. been filed, there had been a change of
   circumstance and hence, they were entitled to be admitted to bail. That
   apart, certain grounds pertaining to ai.Jment of some of the accused
   persons were highlighted. The learned trial Judge, as is evident, referred
 G to the allegations made in the F.1.R., the materials that had rome on
   record during the investigation and the postmortem report and considering
   all other relevant aspects, declined to enlarge the appellants on bail. It is
   worthy to note here that though a ground of parity was urged on the
   base that the accused Nos. 4 to 7 had been released on anticipatory
 H
VIRUPAKSHAPPA GOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                             377
     KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, J.)

bail, the same did not impress the court and accordingly the inevitable     A
result, the dismissal, followed.
       5. The aforesaid order of dismissal constrained the appellarts to
move the High Court in Criminal Petition No. 200944 of'.20 l 5. The High
Court vide its order dated 23'rl September, 2015, after referring to the
nature of alleged assault by the accused persons, the type of injury        B
sustained by the deceased and considering the pertinent facts did not
accede to the prayer for grant of bail.
      6. Being grieved by the aforesaid order, the appellants preferred
Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9858 of20 I 5, which was dismissed
vide order dated 27m November, 20 I 5.                                      C
       7. The aforesaid narration of facts would give one the impression
that the attempt of the appellants to be enlarged on bail was over unless
some extraordinary circumstance could usher in which could be
considered as change of circumstance, but as the chronology of events
would show the indefatigable spirit of the appellants forced them to remain D
embedded in their stance for putting any stand as a change of
circumstance for the purpose of grant of bail. We do not intend to mean
even for a moment that the accused cannot move successive application
for grant of bail. That is his right in law. Our emphasis is on the
delineation by the Court. The said right invigorated with adroit efforts,
resulted in filing of an application in S.C. No. 90of2015. As is ev:dent E
from the record, the earlier bail applications were rejected by the Principal
Sessions Judge, Raichur, but the third application was taken up by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Raichur. As the order would reveal,
the learned trial Judge has thought it apposite to deal with the application
as ifhe was dealing with the first application and copiously referred to F
the materials brought on record, referred to pronouncements in Sanjay
Cltandra t•s. Central Bureau of /Jivestigation 1 and Siddlzoram
Satlingappa Mltetre vs. State of Maflaraslttra a11d other,5 2 and
commented on the delay in trial and, eventually, released the appel!ants
on bail on certain conditions.
                                                                              G
        8. The enlargement of bail to the accused persons, as it seems,
 did not affect the prosecution. The State ofKarnataka chose to maintain
 silence and did not think it appropriate to assail the order.
1
     (2012) 1   sec 40
 2
     (ZO 11l 1 sec 694
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378            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A        9. The informant, who has crossed six scores and five, lost his
  son in an unfortunate and brutal circumstance, moved the High Court in
  Criminal Petition No. 200768 of 2016 under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C.
  seeking cancellation of bail. The High Court while dealing with the
  application, adverted to the allegations in the F.I.R. The n'lture of
  allegations, being significant, deserves to be adverted by us. It is alleged
B
  in the F.l.R. that the accused-appellant No. I, had a daughter named
  Basavarajeshwari who fell in love with the deceased Anand Sagar, the
  son of the informant, who belongs to "U ppar" community and the accused
  belongs to "Lingayat" community. The deceased, Anand Sagar, had
  eloped with the daughter of the accused No. I in the year 2014 and at
c that juncture, an F.l.R. was registered filed by the accused to that effect.
  As the narration would further unroll, the couple leftthe village, entered
  into wedlock and thereafter started residing at Bengaluru and later on at
  Bellary. On 17th May, 2015, the deceased, Anand Sagar, had come to
  his native place Yeramarus and had gone to Raichur on the motorbike of
D his father. When he returned to Yeramarus at 9.30 p.m. and reached
  near the bus stop, the accused persons assaulted him with weapons and
  he breathed his last on the spot. After noting the facts and the injuries
  sustained by the deceased, the High Court also adverted to the attempts
  made by the accused persons to obtain liberty despite the same having
  been declined by this Court. It also came to hold that the spark of life of
E the deceased had been extinguished because he had dared to fall in love
  and get married to the daughter of the accused No. I, and ultimately
  opined that delineation by the learned trial Judge with regard to grant of
  order of bail, was absolutely perverse and, founded on irrelevant aspects.
  In view of the aforesaid premises, it allowed the application for
  cancellation of bail and set aside the order passed by the learned Additional
F
  Sessions Judge, admitting the appellants to bail.
             10. We have heard Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior
   counsel along with Mr. Anirudh Sanganeria, learned counsel for the
   appellants and Mr. V.N. Raghupathy, learned counsel forthe respondent-
   State. Despite service of notice, no one has entered appearance on behalf
 G of the informant.
             11. It is submitted by Mr. Patil, learned senior counsel for the
      appellants that the High Court has erred in cancelling the order of bail as
      the appellants, after being enlarged on bail, had neither abused the freedom
      nor have they violated the terms and conditions of the bai I order. It is
 H
VIRUPAKSHAPPA GOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                            379
     KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

urged by him that there is no allegation of tampering with the evidence A
or influencing any witnesses and therefore, there was no justification for
cancellation of the order of granting bail. Learned senior counsel would
further contend that the analysis made by the learned trial Judge for the
purpose of grant of bail cannot be regarded as perverse and he has
correctly relied upon the pronouncements as is noticeable from his order. B
It is put forth by Mr. Patil that at such distance of time not to admit the
appellants on bail and give the stamp ofapproval to the order cancelling
the bail by the High Court, would not sub-serve the cause of justice.
        12. Mr. Raghupathy, learned counsel appearing for the Statt, per
contra, would submit that the learned trial Judge should not have
entertained the prayer for bail after this Court has special leave petition C
for the same relief. It is his submission that the High Court has correctly
opined that there is perversity in the approach by the learned trial Judge
while dealing with the application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. and hence,
it deserved to be set aside.
       13. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Judge, D
we find that he has been swayed by the factum that when a charge-
sheet is filed it amounts to change of circumstance. Needless to say,
filing of the charge-sheet does not in any manner lessen the allegat.ions
made by the prosecution. On the contrary, filing of the charge-sheet
establishes that after due investigation the investigating agency, hc.ving E
found materials, has placed the charge-sheet for trial of the accused
persons. As is further demonstrable, the learned trial Judge has remained
absolutely oblivious of the fact that the appellants had moved the special
leave petition before this Court for grant of bail and the same was not
entertained. Be it noted, the second bail application was filed before the
Principal Sessions Judge after filing of the charge-sheet which was F
challenged in the High Court and that had travelled to this Court. These
facts, unfortunately, have not been taken note of by the learned trial
Judge. He has been swayed by the observations made in Sidd/u,ram
Satlingappa Mhetre (.supra), especially in paragraph 86, the relevant
part of which reads thus:-                                                    G
       "The courts considering the bail application should try to mai:ltain
        fine balance between the societal interest vis-a-vis personal liberty
        while adhering to the fundamental principle of crin.inal
       jurisprudence that the accused is presumed to be innocent till he
        is found guilty by the competent court."                              H
380           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A        14. The proposition expounded above, has to be accepted, but
  that has to be applied appositely to the facts of each case. A bail
  application cannot be allowed solely or exclusively on the ground that
  the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused is
  presumed to be innocent till he is found guilty by the competent court.
B The learned trial Judge has also referred to the decision in Sanjay
  Chandra (supra), wherein a two-Judge Bench while dealing v1ith bail
  applications, observed thus:-
          "21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the
          earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of
          the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The
c         object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative . Deprirntion of
          liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required
          to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called
          upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle
          that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is
D         deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.
           22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in
           custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great
           hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un-
           convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure
 E         their attendance at the trial but in such cases, 'necessity' is the
           operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the
           concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any
           person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which,
           he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should
           be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper
 F         with the witnesses ifleft at liberty, save in the most extraordinary
           circumstances.
           23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of a
           refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any
           imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content
 G         and it would be improper for any Court to refose bail as a mark of
           disapproval of former conduct whether the accused h.as been
           convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person
           for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson."

 H
VIRUPAKSHAPPA GOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                              38 l
     KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

       15. Be it noted, though the aforesaid passages have their relevance A
but the same cannot be made applicable in each and every case for
grant of bail. In the said case, the accused-appellant was facing trial for
the offences under Sections 420-B, 468, 471 and I09 of the IPC and
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1 )(d) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988. Thus, the factual matrix was quite different. That apart, it
                                                                            8
depends upon the nature of the crime and the manner in which it is
committed. A bail application is not to be entertained on the basis of
certain observations made in a different context. There has to be
application of mind and appreciation of the factual score and understanding
of the pronouncements in the field.
       16. The court has to keep in mind what has been stated in Clumum C
Lal vs. State of U.P. a11d a11ot/1er. The requisite factors are: (i) the
nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction
and the nature of supporting evidence; (ii) reasonable apprehension of
tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant;
and (iii) prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. D
In Prasa11ta Kumar Sarkar vs. Asliis Chatterjee and a11other, it has
been opined that while exercising the power for grant of bail, the court
has to keep in mind certain circumstances and factors. We may usefully
reproduce the said passage:-
      "9 .... among other circumstances, the factors which are to be borne   E
      in mind while considering an application for bail are:
      (i) whether there is any primafacie or reasonable ground to be
          believed that the accused had committed the offence.
      (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
      (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;           F
      (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if releasi;;d on
          bail;
      (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the
         accused;
                                                                             G
      (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
      (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced;
          and
' (2004 J 7 sec 525
'c20101 14 sec 496
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382            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            (20 I 7) 4 S.C.R.


A           (viii) danger, ofcourse, ofjustice being thwarted by grant of bail.''
            I7. In Central Bureau ofInveMigation 1•s. V. Vijay Sui Reddy 5,
      the Court had reiterated the principle by observing thus:-
            "While granting bail, the com1 has to keep in mind the rature of
            accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity
B           of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of
            the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused,
            reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at
            the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered
            with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar
 c          considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose
            of granting bail, the legislature has used the words reasonable
            grounds for believing instead of the evidence which means the
            court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to
            whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the
             prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support
 D           of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence
             e.stablishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."
          18. From the aforesaid principles, it is quite clear that an order of
   bail cannot be granted in an arbitra1y or fanciful manner. In this context,
   we may, with profit, reproduce a passage from Neeru Yadav vs. State
 E of Uttar Pradeslt and anotller6, wherein the Court setting aside an
   order granting bail observed:-
            "The issue that is presented before us is whether this Com1 can
            annul the order passed by the High Court and curtail the hberty of
            the 2nd respondent. We are not oblivious of the fact that the liberty
 F          is a priceless treasure for a human being. It is founded on the bed
            rock of constitutional right and accentuated fm1her on human rights
            principle. It is basically a natural right. In fact, some regard it as
            the grammar of life. No one would like to lose his liberty or barter
            it for all the wealth of the world. People from centuries have
 G
            fought for liberty, for absence oflibcrty causes sense of emptiness.
            The sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilized society. It is
            a cardinal value on which the civilisation rests. It cannot be allowed
             to be paralysed and immobilized. Deprivation ofliberty of a person

       '(2013) 1 sec 452
 H     • (2014) 16 sec sos
VIRUPAKSHAPPA GOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                                 383
    KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

        has enormous impact on his mind as well as body. A demOL'.ratic         A
        body polity which is wedded to rule of law, anxiously guards Iiberty.
        But, a pregnant and significant one, the liberty of an individual is
        not absolute. The society by its collective wisdom through process
        of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an
        individual when an individual becomes a danger to the collective        B
        and to the societal order. Accent on individual liberty cannot be
        pyramided to that extent which would bring chaos and anarchy to
        a society. A society expects responsibility and accountability from
        the member, and it desires that the citizens should obey the, law,
        respecting it as a cherished social norm. No individual can make
        an attempt to create a concavity in the stem of social stream. It is    C
        impermissible. Therefore, when an individual behaves in a
        disharmonious manner ushering in disorderly things which the
        society disapproves, the legal consequences are bound to follow.
        At that stage, the Court has a duty. It cannot abandon its sacrosanct
        obligation and pass an order at its own whim or caprice. It has to      D
        be guided by the established parameters of law."
        19. In this context what has been stated by a three-Judge bench
in Dines/1 M.N. (S.P.) v. State of Gujaraf is quite instructive. In the
said case, the Court has held that where the Court admits the accused
to bail by taking into consideration irrelevant materials and keeping out
of consideration the relevant materials the order becomes vulnerable            E
and such vulnerability warrants annulment of the order.
      20. In the instant case, as is demonstrable, the learned trial Judge
has not been guided by the established parameters for grant of bail. He
has not kept himself alive to the fact that twice the bail applications had
been rejected and the matter had travelled to this Court. Once this             F
Court has declined to enlarge the appellants on bail, endevours to pr'Jject
same factual score should not have been allowed. It is absolute
impropriety and that impropriety call for axing of the order.
      21. That apart, as we find from the narration of allegations from
the order of the High Court, it is not a case where the trial court could       G
have entertained a bail application by elaborate dissection of facts and
appreciation of statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The
gravity of the crime should have been taken note of by the learned trial
Judge. The deceased and his wife (the daughter oft he accused-appellant
1
    (2008) s sec 66                                                             H
384             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [20 l 7] 4 S.C.R.


A No. I) were staying in peace away from the acrimonious community, but
  due to some kind of"misconceived class honour"', the vengeance reigned
  and awe for law went on a holiday. They thought that their perception
  mattered and as alleged, they put an end to the life spark of the young
  man .. The choice of the daughter was allowed no space. Her identity
  was crushed and her thinking was crucified by parental dominance which
B
  has roots in an unfathomable sense of community honour. Thcugh the
  lovers became fugitive, the anger founded on anachronistic values
  prompted the accused persons to annihilate the life of a young man. In
  such a situation, the factors that have been highlighted by this Court
  from time to time were required to be adverted to and the accused
c persons should not have been granted liberty on the grounds that have
  been thought appropriate by the learned trial Judge. The perversity of
  approach by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who has enlarged
  the appellants on bail, is totally unacceptable. It is reflective of sanctuary
  of errors. In such a situation, we are obligated to say that the High
D Court has performed its legal duty by lancinating the order passed by the
  learned trial Judge.
          22. Consequently, the appeal, being sans merit, stands dismissed.
   As we have dismissed the appeal, the appellants shall surrender to custody
   forthwith and it will be the duty of the trial Judge to see that they are
   taken into custody. Needless to say, whatever we have stated in the
 E present judgment, is only confined to the defensibility of the order passed
   by the High Court cancelling the bail granted by the learned Additional
   Sessions Judge and shall not weigh in the mind of the learned trial Judge
   for the purpose of the trial as that shall depend upon evidence to be
   adduced during the trial.
 F
      Devika Gujral                                              Appeal dismissed.