Patna High Court

KAMDEO PRASAD VERMA @ KAMDEO VERMA and ANRversusSTATE OF BIHAR

Decided: 9 July 2026
Disposal: ALLOWED
Bench: PURNENDU SINGH

Holding

The conviction under Sections 304B and 201 IPC is set aside because the prosecution failed to prove the requisite elements of a dowry death, and the benefit of doubt must be extended to the appellants.

Summary

The High Court examined an appeal against the conviction of Kamdeo Verma and Suresh Mahto for offences under Sections 304B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, stemming from the alleged dowry‑related death of Sushila Devi. The prosecution’s case relied chiefly on the testimony of the deceased’s brother (an informant) and a self‑declared eyewitness, while other witnesses were hostile or irrelevant and no post‑mortem or medical evidence was produced. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients of Section 304B – namely cruelty or harassment linked to a dowry demand occurring “soon before” the death – and therefore the statutory presumption under Section 113B could not be invoked. It also noted that the non‑examination of the investigating officer, though not fatal per se, contributed to the evidential weakness. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, the appellants were acquitted, and the appeal was allowed. The judgment underscores the need for a proximate link between dowry demand, cruelty, and death before invoking the presumption of dowry death.

Issues considered

The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the essential ingredients of Section 304B IPC, especially cruelty or harassment in connection with a dowry demand occurring soon before the death.
Whether the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act can be invoked in the absence of a proximate link between dowry demand, cruelty, and death.
Whether the non‑examination of the investigating officer vitiates the prosecution case.
Whether the testimonies of the informant (PW‑3) and the sole eyewitness (PW‑4) are sufficient to sustain conviction under Sections 304B and 201.

Legislation cited

Subjects

dowry death
Section 304B IPC
Section 201 IPC
statutory presumption
benefit of doubt
evidence law
investigating officer
criminal appeal
acquittal

Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

CRIMINAL APPEAL (SJ) No.821 of 2010

======================================================
1. KAMDEO PRASAD VERMA @ KAMDEO VERMA, Son of late
Lalmani Prasad Verma @ Lalmani Mahton
2. Suresh Mahto, son of late Lalmani Prasad Verma @ Lalmani Mahton
All are residents of village Gadi Silfari, Police Station, Chandramandi,
District, Munger at present Jamui

... ... Appellant/s

Versus
The State of Bihar

... ... Respondent/s

======================================================
Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr.Nagendra Dubey, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr.S.N.Pd., App
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH

CAV JUDGMENT
Date : 09-07-2026
Heard Mr. Nagendra Dubey, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. S .N. Prasad,

learned APP for the State.

2. The present appeal is directed against the

judgment of conviction dated 01.07.2010 and order of sentence

dated 07.07.2010 passed by the learned Additional District and

Sessions Judge, F.T.C. V, Jamui in Sessions Trial No. 534 of

1996/ Tr No.92/2009 arising out of Chandramandih P.S. Case

No. 21/89, whereby the appellants have been convicted for the
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offences under Section 304 - B and 201 of the Indian Penal

Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten

years under Sections 304B of the Indian Penal Code and

rigorous imprisonment for three years under Section 201 of the

Indian Penal Code with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, each and in default

of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment

for three months. Both the sentences were directed to run

concurrently.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the

marriage of deceased Sushila Devi was solemnized with

accused Kamdeo Pd. Verma (appellant no.1) about six to seven

years prior to the occurrence. After her marriage, she started

residing at her matrimonial home situated at village Gadi -

Silfari under Chandramandih Police Station. It is alleged that

whenever she visited her parental home, she complained to her

brother, the informant Sudhir Kumar Verma, and other family

members that her husband Kamdeo Pd. Verma, her devar Suresh

Mahton, her father-in-law Lalmani Mahton and her mother-in-

law Pagli Devi were persistently demanding Rs.10,000/- in cash

along with utensils, an umbrella and a pair of shoes as dowry. It

is further alleged that on account of non-fulfilment of the said
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demand, she was subjected to physical assault, cruelty and

harassment by the aforesaid accused persons.

4. According to the prosecution, on 17.04.1989, the

informant visited the matrimonial home of his sister and

requested the accused persons not to subject her to further

torture. He also assured them that their demands would be

fulfilled as early as possible and thereafter returned to his

village. However, on 21.04.1989 at about 5:00 P.M., the

informant received information from his brother-in-law (Sala),

Shail Kumar Verma, that his sister had been brutally assaulted

by her husband, devar, in-laws and one Kailash Mahton, and

had succumbed to the injuries sustained in the assault. On

receiving the said information, the informant, accompanied by

several villagers, immediately proceeded to the matrimonial

village of the deceased and reached there during the night. It is

alleged that despite repeated requests, the accused persons did

not open the door of their house. Thereafter, the informant met

Laljit Mahton, a resident of the same village, who informed him

that the accused persons, with the assistance of certain villagers,

had hurriedly cremated the dead body of Sushila Devi on the

bank of the Dharhwa River with the intention of causing

disappearance of evidence and screening themselves from legal
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punishment.

5. On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant

recorded on 22.04.1989 at about 5:30 A.M., Chandramandih

P.S. Case No. 21 of 1989 was instituted initially under Sections

302, 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4

of the Dowry Prohibition Act against Kamdeo Pd. Verma

(appellant no.1), Pagli Devi, Lalmani Mahton, Suresh Mahton

(appellant no.2), Rameshwar Mahton, Bahadur Mahton, Horil

@ Maru Mahton, Numani Mahton, Budhdeo Mahton, Shankar

Mahton and Kailash @ Kaleshwar Mahton. During the course

of investigation, the Investigating Officer visited the place of

occurrence, as well as, the alleged cremation site, recovered

ashes, burnt remains and broken bangles, prepared the seizure

list, recorded the statements of witnesses and, finding the

allegations to be true, submitted charge-sheet against the

accused persons under Sections 304B and 201 of the Indian

Penal Code, leading to the conviction of the appellants upon

conclusion of trial.

ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE

APPELLANTS

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellants submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction
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and order of sentence are contrary to the evidence available on

record and the settled principles of criminal law. It was

contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the

foundational ingredients of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal

Code beyond reasonable doubt. The entire prosecution case

substantially rests upon the testimony of P.W.3 Sudhir Kumar

Verma (informant), who admittedly is not an eyewitness and

whose evidence regarding the alleged occurrence is hearsay,

being based upon the information allegedly received from Shail

Kumar Verma, a material witness who was not examined during

trial. Though P.W.4 Laljit Mahton claimed to be an eyewitness,

his testimony is not corroborated by any independent witness. It

was further submitted that P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.6 did not

support the prosecution case and were declared hostile, while

P.W.5 merely proved formal facts regarding the marriage and

death of the deceased. Thus, the conviction is based only upon

the interested testimonies of P.W.3 and P.W.4, which do not

inspire confidence and are insufficient to sustain the conviction.

7. Learned counsel further submitted that the

Investigating Officer was not examined, thereby depriving the

defence of the opportunity to confront him with the

contradictions and omissions in the prosecution evidence and to
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challenge the alleged investigation. Moreover, no postmortem

examination was conducted, nor was any doctor or medical

witness examined to establish that the deceased died otherwise

than under normal circumstances. It was argued that the

prosecution has also failed to prove that the deceased was

subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any

demand for dowry soon before her death, which is an essential

ingredient for attracting Section 304-B IPC. Consequently, the

statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian

Evidence Act could not have been invoked by the learned Trial

Court. It was, therefore, contended that the prosecution having

failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction

of the appellants under Sections 304-B and 201 of the Indian

Penal Code is unsustainable in law and deserves to be set aside

by extending the benefit of doubt to the appellants.

ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
8. Per Contra, learned APP appearing for the State

while opposing the appeal submitted that the learned District

court, after considering all the evidences on record and exhibits

submitted on behalf of the parties during the course of trial has

erred no mistake in convicting the appellants for the offences

under Sections 304B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code.
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ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
9. Heard the parties.

10. I have perused the lower court records and

proceedings and also taken note of the arguments canvassed by

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

11. The learned trial court, on the basis of materials

as collected during the course of investigation, passed the

judgment of conviction dated 01.07.2010 and order of sentence

dated 07.07.2010 for the offence punishable under Sections 304

B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code.

12. During the trial, the prosecution has examined

altogether six witnesses, namely:

1) P.W.1 – Sitaram Mahton

2) P.W.2 – Sumitra @ Sumiya Devi

3) P.W.3 – Sudhir Kumar Verma (informant)

4) P.W.4 – Laljit Mahton

5) P.W.5 – Rajkumar Mahton

6) P.W.6 – Barhamdeo Pd. Verma

13. The prosecution has also relied upon following

documents exhibited during the course of trial:

Ext. 1 – Signature of P.W.1 Sitaram Mahton on the
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seizure list.

Ext. 2 – Signature of Bedi Prakash Sinha on the

fardbeyan dated 22.04.1989.

Ext. 2/1 – Signature of Manohar Pd. Verma on the

fardbeyan.

Ext. 2/2 – Signature of Kushal Chand Mahton on the

fardbeyan.

Ext. 2/3 – Signature of Shail Kumar Verma on the

fardbeyan.

Ext. 2/4 – Signature of informant Sudhir Kumar

Verma on the fardbeyan dated 22.04.1989.

14. Upon a meticulous examination of the record,

the evidence of the prosecution witnesses (PWs) can be

summarised as follows:

P.W.1 – Sitaram Mahton P.W.1 was a resident of

village Gadi-Silfari. He did not support the prosecution case

during trial and was declared hostile. Even after his attention

was drawn to his previous police statement, he denied having

made such statement.

P.W.2 – Sumitra @ Sumiya Devi P.W.2 also

belonged to village Gadi-Silfari. She failed to support the
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prosecution case and was declared hostile. She denied her

previous statement recorded during investigation.

P.W.3 – Sudhir Kumar Verma (Informant and

brother of the deceased) P.W.3 deposed that his sister Sushila

Devi had been married to accused Kamdeo Pd. Verma about six

years prior to the occurrence. According to him, after marriage

his sister repeatedly informed him that her husband, devar

Suresh Mahton, father-in-law Lalmani Mahton and mother-in-

law Pagli Devi were demanding ₹10,000/- in cash along with

utensils, umbrella and shoes as dowry and were assaulting and

torturing her for non-fulfilment of the demand.

He further stated that on 17.04.1989 he visited her

matrimonial home and requested the accused persons not to

torture his sister and assured them that their demands would be

fulfilled. On 21.04.1989, Shail Kumar Verma informed him that

Kamdeo Mahton, Suresh Mahton, Lalmani Mahton, Pagli Devi

and Kailash Mahton had brutally assaulted Sushila Devi

resulting in her death. He thereafter reached the matrimonial

village where P.W.4 Laljit Mahton informed him that the

accused persons had already cremated the dead body to destroy

evidence.

He proved his signature on the fardbeyan and also
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identified the signatures of the attesting witnesses thereon.

During cross-examination he denied the defence suggestion that

Sushila Devi had died due to snake bite or that the accused

persons had been falsely implicated owing to previous enmity.

P.W.4 – Laljit Mahton P.W.4 was a resident of

village Gadi-Silfari and father of Shail Kumar Verma. He

claimed to be an eyewitness to the occurrence. He deposed that

on hearing hulla he reached the house of Sushila Devi and found

accused Pagli Devi, Lalmani Mahton, Kamdeo Mahton, Suresh

Mahton and Kailash Mahton assaulting Sushila Devi for

bringing insufficient dowry. According to him, Sushila Devi

succumbed to the injuries at about 4:00 P.M.

He further stated that his son Shail Kumar Verma

had gone to inform the informant regarding the occurrence. In

cross-examination, he admitted that the informant was his son-

in-law but denied the suggestion that he had falsely implicated

the accused due to any land dispute or that Sushila Devi had

died due to snake bite. Nothing substantial could be elicited to

discredit his testimony regarding the assault.

P.W.5 – Rajkumar Mahton- P.W.5 was a co-

villager of the accused. He admitted that Sushila Devi had been

married to Kamdeo Mahton and that she died at her matrimonial
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home. He did not depose regarding the alleged assault or

demand of dowry.

P.W.6 – Barhamdeo Pd. Verma- P.W.6 was a

resident of village Gadi-Silfari and brother-in-law (Sala) of the

informant. He admitted the marriage of Sushila Devi with

Kamdeo Mahton and also admitted that she died in her

matrimonial home. However, he did not support the prosecution

case on material particulars and was declared hostile.

15. On the basis of materials surfaced during the

trial, the appellants/accused was examined under Section 313 of

the Cr.PC by putting incriminating circumstances/evidences

surfaced against him, which he denied and shows his complete

innocence.

LAW GOVERNING DOWRY DEATH

16. It would be appropriate to reproduce the

provisions of Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code

for the sake of convenience and better understanding:

“Sections 304B- Where the death of a woman is caused
by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than
under normal circumstances within seven years of her
marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with,
any demand for dowry, such death shall be called
“dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be
deemed to have caused her death.Explanation.— For the
purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same
meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
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1961 (28 of 1961).”

498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the
husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to
fine.Explanation.— For the purpose of this section,
“cruelty” means—
(a)any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b)harassment of the woman where such harassment
is with a view to coercing her or any person related
to her to meet any unlawful demand for any
property or valuable security or is on account of
failure by her or any person related to her to meet
such demand.

17. The essential ingredients for attracting the

offence under Section 304-B IPC, as consistently laid down by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court, require the following conditions to

be cumulatively satisfied:

(i) that the death of a woman has been caused by

burns or bodily injury or has occurred otherwise than under

normal circumstances;

(ii) that such death has occurred within a period of

seven years of her marriage;

(iii) that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or

harassment by her husband or his relatives soon before her

death; and
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(iv) that such cruelty or harassment was in

connection with, or in furtherance of, a demand for dowry and it

is only upon the strict establishment of all the aforesaid

ingredients that the offence under Section 304-B IPC can be

said to be made out and the presumption under Section 113-B of

the Evidence Act can be invoked.

18. Law in this regard is well settled by the Apex

Court in case of Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6

SCC 477 reported in para nos. has held inter alia as under:

8. A perusal of Section 2 shows that this
definition can be broken into six distinct parts:
(1) Dowry must first consist of any
property or valuable security— the word “any” is a
word of width and would, therefore, include within it
property and valuable security of any kind
whatsoever.
(2) Such property or security can be
given or even agreed to be given. The actual giving
of such property or security is, therefore, not
necessary.
(3) Such property or security can be
given or agreed to be given either directly or
indirectly.
(4) Such giving or agreeing to give can
again be not only by one party to a marriage to the
other but also by the parents of either party or by
any other person to either party to the marriage or
to any other person. It will be noticed that this
clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as
those guilty of committing the offence of giving or
receiving dowry is concerned.
(5) Such giving or agreeing to give can
be at any time. It can be at, before, or at any time
after the marriage. Thus, it can be many years after
a marriage is solemnised.
(6) Such giving or receiving must be in
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connection with the marriage of the parties.
Obviously, the expression “in connection with”
would in the context of the social evil sought to be
tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean “in
relation with” or “relating to”.
9. The ingredients of the offence under
Section 304-B IPC have been stated and restated in
many judgments. There are four such ingredients
and they are said to be:
(a) death of a woman must have been
caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death
must have occurred otherwise than under normal
circumstances;
(b) such death must have occurred
within seven years of her marriage;
(c) soon before her death, she must have
been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband; and
(d) such cruelty or harassment must be
in connection with the demand for dowry.
21. Coming now to the other important
ingredient of Section 304-B—what exactly is meant
by “soon before her death”?
22. This Court in Surinder Singh v. State
of Haryana [(2014) 4 SCC 129 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri)
769] had this to say : (SCC pp. 137-39, paras 17-
18)22. This Court in Surinder Singh v. State of
Haryana [(2014) 4 SCC 129 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri)
769] had this to say : (SCC pp. 137-39, paras 17-
18)
17. “Thus, the words ‘soon before’
appear in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872
and also in Section 304-B IPC. For the
presumptions contemplated under these sections to
spring into action, it is necessary to show that the
cruelty or harassment was caused soon before the
death. The interpretation of the words ‘soon before’
is, therefore, important. The question is how ‘soon
before’? This would obviously depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. The cruelty or
harassment differs from case to case. It relates to
the mindset of people which varies from person to
person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical.
Mental cruelty is also of different shades. It can be
verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or
humiliating a woman. It can be giving threats of
injury to her or her near and dear ones. It can be
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depriving her of economic resources or essential
amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on her
movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the
outside world. The list is illustrative and not
exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be actual beating
or causing pain and harm to the person of a woman.
Every such instance of cruelty and related
harassment has a different impact on the mind of a
woman. Some instances may be so grave as to have
a lasting impact on a woman. Some instances which
degrade her dignity may remain etched in her
memory for a long time. Therefore, ‘soon before’ is
a relative term. In matters of emotions we cannot
have fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from
case to case. This must be kept in mind while
examining each case of dowry death.
18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment
of this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000)
5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935] where this Court
considered the term ‘soon before’. The relevant
observations are as under : (SCC pp. 222-23, para
15)
‘15. … “Soon before” is a relative term which is
required to be considered under specific
circumstances of each case and no straitjacket
formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit.
This expression is pregnant with the idea of
proximity test. The term “soon before” is not
synonymous with the term “immediately before”
and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as
used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a)
of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that
the interval should not be too long between the time
of making the statement and the death. It
contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier
noticed, has to be understood and determined under
the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation
to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the
existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased
are not restricted to a particular instance but
normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct
may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty
or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to
have persisted, it shall be deemed to be “soon
before death” if any other intervening circumstance
showing the non-existence of such treatment is not
brought on record, before such alleged treatment
and the date of death. It does not, however, mean
that such time can be stretched to any period.
Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty
based on dowry demand and the consequential
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death is required to be proved by the prosecution.
The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based
upon such demand and the date of death should not
be too remote in time which, under the
circumstances, be treated as having become stale
enough.’
Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of
dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such
demand and the date of death. The test of proximity
will have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case
and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach of
the court within the confines of law.”
17. “Thus, the words ‘soon before’ appear in
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in
Section 304-B IPC. For the presumptions
contemplated under these sections to spring into
action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or
harassment was caused soon before the death. The
interpretation of the words ‘soon before’ is,
therefore, important. The question is how ‘soon
before’? This would obviously depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. The cruelty or
harassment differs from case to case. It relates to
the mindset of people which varies from person to
person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical.
Mental cruelty is also of different shades. It can be
verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or
humiliating a woman. It can be giving threats of
injury to her or her near and dear ones. It can be
depriving her of economic resources or essential
amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on her
movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the
outside world. The list is illustrative and not
exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be actual beating
or causing pain and harm to the person of a woman.
Every such instance of cruelty and related
harassment has a different impact on the mind of a
woman. Some instances may be so grave as to have
a lasting impact on a woman. Some instances which
degrade her dignity may remain etched in her
memory for a long time. Therefore, ‘soon before’ is
a relative term. In matters of emotions we cannot
have fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from
case to case. This must be kept in mind while
examining each case of dowry death.
18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment
of this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000)
5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935] where this Court
considered the term ‘soon before’. The relevant
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observations are as under : (SCC pp. 222-23, para
15)
‘15. … “Soon before” is a relative term which is
required to be considered under specific
circumstances of each case and no straitjacket
formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit.
This expression is pregnant with the idea of
proximity test. The term “soon before” is not
synonymous with the term “immediately before”
and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as
used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a)
of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that
the interval should not be too long between the time
of making the statement and the death. It
contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier
noticed, has to be understood and determined under
the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation
to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the
existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased
are not restricted to a particular instance but
normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct
may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty
or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to
have persisted, it shall be deemed to be “soon
before death” if any other intervening circumstance
showing the non-existence of such treatment is not
brought on record, before such alleged treatment
and the date of death. It does not, however, mean
that such time can be stretched to any period.
Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty
based on dowry demand and the consequential
death is required to be proved by the prosecution.
The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based
upon such demand and the date of death should not
be too remote in time which, under the
circumstances, be treated as having become stale
enough.’
Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of
dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such
demand and the date of death. The test of proximity
will have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case
and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach of
the court within the confines of law.”
19. Similar view was taken by the Apex Court in case

of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Jogendra and Anr. reported in

(2022) 5 SCC 401.
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20. The record reveals that P.W.1 Sitaram Mahton and

P.W.2 Sumitra @ Sumiya Devi did not support the prosecution

case during trial and were declared hostile by the prosecution.

Likewise, P.W.6 Barhamdeo Pd. Verma also did not support the

prosecution version on material particulars and was declared

hostile. P.W.5 Rajkumar Mahton merely deposed regarding the

marriage of the deceased with accused Kamdeo Pd. Verma and

the fact that she died at her matrimonial home, but he did not

state anything with respect to the alleged demand of dowry,

cruelty, harassment or assault. Nothing substantive emerged

from the testimonies of these witnesses which could corroborate

or lend assurance to the prosecution version regarding the

alleged demand of dowry, cruelty or the circumstances leading

to the death of Sushila Devi. None of these witnesses supported

the prosecution case on any material aspect. Consequently, their

evidence does not advance the prosecution case in any manner

and is of no assistance in establishing the guilt of the appellants.

Therefore, the testimonies of P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.5 and P.W.6 are

of no material relevance in proving the charges under Sections

304-B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellants.

21. The conviction of the appellants has been founded

upon the testimonies of P.W.3 Sudhir Kumar Verma, the
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.821 of 2010 dt.09-07-2026
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informant and brother of the deceased, and P.W.4 Laljit Mahton,

who claimed to be an eyewitness to the occurrence. These

witnesses have deposed that after the marriage of the deceased

Sushila Devi with appellant Kamdeo Pd. Verma, she was

subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband, devar and

in-laws on account of persistent demands of Rs.10,000/- in cash

along with utensils, an umbrella and shoes as dowry. According

to P.W.3, despite his intervention on 17.04.1989 and assurance

to fulfil the demand, the deceased continued to be subjected to

cruelty and, on 21.04.1989, he received information from Shail

Kumar Verma that the accused persons had assaulted the

deceased, resulting in her death. P.W.4 claimed that he had

witnessed the accused persons assaulting Sushila Devi on

account of insufficient dowry and further stated that the accused

persons hurriedly cremated the dead body to screen themselves

from legal punishment. Thus, the testimonies of P.W.3 and

P.W.4 constitute the principal basis on which the learned Trial

Court sustained the conviction of the appellants under Sections

304-B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. However, it is

noteworthy that P.W.3 is not an eyewitness to the occurrence,

the material witness Shail Kumar Verma and the Investigating

Officer were not examined, and no medical or post-mortem
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.821 of 2010 dt.09-07-2026
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evidence was adduced to establish the cause of death of the

deceased.

22. In the present case, the Investigating Officer

has not been examined by the prosecution. Undoubtedly, the

Investigating Officer is a material witness, being essential to

explain the manner in which the investigation was conducted

and the steps taken during the investigation. His examination

also affords the defence an opportunity to test the fairness of the

investigation through cross-examination. However, it is well

settled that the mere non-examination of the Investigating

Officer does not ipso facto vitiate the prosecution case. The

effect of such omission has to be assessed in the facts and

circumstances of each case, particularly with regard to whether

any prejudice has been caused to the accused and where the

ocular and other substantive evidence is otherwise found to be

cogent, reliable and trustworthy, the prosecution case cannot be

rejected on that ground alone. In this regard reference can be

drawn from the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case

of Ram Gulam Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, reported in

(2001) 8 SCC 311 in para no. 18, which is reproduced

hereinafter:

“26. In the case of Ram Dev v. State of
U.P. [1995 Supp (1) SCC 547 : 1995 SCC
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.821 of 2010 dt.09-07-2026
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(Cri) 402 (2)] this Court has held that it is
always desirable for the prosecution to
examine the investigating officer. However,
non-examination of the investigating officer
does not in any way create any dent in the
prosecution case much less affect the
credibility of the otherwise trustworthy
testimony of the eyewitnesses.
27. In the case of Behari Prasad v. State of
Bihar [(1996) 2 SCC 317 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
271] this Court has held that for non-
examination of the investigating officer the
prosecution case need not fail. This Court
has held that it would not be correct to
contend that if the investigating officer is not
examined the entire case would fall to the
ground as the accused were deprived of the
opportunity to effectively cross-examine the
witnesses and bring out contradictions. It
was held that the case of prejudice likely to
be suffered must depend upon the facts of
each case and no universal straitjacket
formula should be laid down that non-
examination of investigating officer per se
vitiates the criminal trial.
28. In the case of Ambika Prasad v. State
(Delhi Admn.) [(2000) 2 SCC 646 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 522] it was held that the criminal
trial is meant for doing justice not just to the
accused but also to the victim and the society
so that law and order is maintained. It was
held that a Judge does not preside over the
criminal trial merely to see that no innocent
man is punished. It was held that a Judge
presides over criminal trial also to see that a
guilty man does not escape. It was held that
both are public duties which the Judge has to
perform. It was held that it was unfortunate
that the investigating officer had not stepped
into the witness box without any justifiable
ground. It was held that this conduct of the
investigating officer and other hostile
witnesses could not be a ground for
discarding evidence of PWs 5 and 7 whose
presence on the spot was established beyond
any reasonable doubt. It was held that non-
examination of the investigating officer
could not be a ground for disbelieving
eyewitnesses.
29. In the case of Bahadur Naik v. State of
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.821 of 2010 dt.09-07-2026
22/26

Bihar [(2000) 9 SCC 153 : 2000 SCC (Cri)
1186] it was held that non-examination of an
investigating officer was of no consequence
when it could not be shown as to what
prejudice had been caused to the appellant
by such non-examination..”
23. From the perusal of the records and facts and

circumstances of the present case and in light of consistent

observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of the

expression “dowry” under Section 304-B IPC is required to

receive a broad and purposive construction, so as, to effectuate

the legislative intent of eradicating the social evil of dowry

deaths, and any demand for money or valuable security having a

nexus with the marital relationship, even if made subsequent to

the marriage, would fall within its sweep; however, for the

presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act to arise,

the prosecution is obligated to establish, by cogent and reliable

evidence, that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or

harassment in connection with such demand “soon before her

death” and that there existed a proximate and live link between

the alleged cruelty and the death and in the absence of such

foundational facts, mere general or omnibus allegations would

not suffice to sustain a conviction under Section 304-B IPC, and

the Court must, therefore, exercise due circumspection in

evaluating the evidence so as to ensure that the statutory

presumption is not invoked in a mechanical manner but only
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.821 of 2010 dt.09-07-2026
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upon strict satisfaction of the requirements contemplated by law.

WHETHER PROSECUTION PROVED THEIR

CASE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?

24. It is observed that merely because P.W.1 Sitaram

Mahton, P.W.2 Sumitra @ Sumiya Devi and P.W.6 Barhamdeo

Pd. Verma did not support the prosecution case and were

declared hostile, the evidence of the remaining material

witnesses could not have been discarded by the learned Trial

Court on that score alone. The learned Trial Court relied mainly

upon the testimonies of P.W.3 Sudhir Kumar Verma, the

informant and brother of the deceased, and P.W.4 Laljit Mahton,

who claimed to be an eyewitness to the occurrence. These

witnesses consistently deposed regarding the demand of

₹10,000/- in cash along with utensils, an umbrella and shoes as

dowry, the continued cruelty and harassment meted out to the

deceased, and the alleged assault upon her shortly before her

death. The learned Trial Court also relied upon the circumstance

that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage and

that the accused persons had hurriedly cremated the dead body

to cause disappearance of evidence. On the cumulative effect of

the aforesaid oral evidence, the learned Trial Court held that the

deceased had died otherwise than under normal circumstances
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.821 of 2010 dt.09-07-2026
24/26

after being subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection

with dowry demands soon before her death and, consequently,

invoked the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian

Evidence Act. Holding that the defence had failed to rebut the

statutory presumption, the learned Trial Court recorded the

conviction of the appellants under Sections 304-B and 201 of

the Indian Penal Code.

25. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances,

and in the light of the settled legal principles and law laid down

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajinder Singh (supra) and

Jogendra (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that

the learned Trial Court has erred in convicting the appellants.

The prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt

that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in

connection with any demand for dowry soon before her death,

which is a sine qua non for attracting the provisions of Section

304-B of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction is primarily

founded upon the testimonies of P.W.3 and P.W.4, whereas

P.W.3 is admittedly not an eyewitness and P.W.4 is the solitary

witness claiming to have witnessed the occurrence. The material

witness, Shail Kumar Verma, who allegedly informed the

informant about the occurrence, was withheld by the
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.821 of 2010 dt.09-07-2026
25/26

prosecution. Furthermore, the Investigating Officer was not

examined, thereby, depriving the defence of an effective

opportunity to challenge the prosecution case that the deceased

died otherwise than under normal circumstances. In such

circumstances, the prosecution failed to prove the foundational

facts necessary for invoking the statutory presumption under

Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. Consequently, the

conviction of the appellants under Sections 304-B and 201 of

the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained and is liable to be set

aside by extending the benefit of doubt to the appellants.

26. Accordingly, judgment of conviction dated

01.07.2010 and order of sentence dated 07.07.2010 passed by

the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, F.T.C. V,

Jamui in Sessions Trial No. 534 of 1996/ Tr No.92/2009

arising out of Chandramandih P.S. Case No. 21/89 is hereby set

aside and quashed.

27. Since the appellants stand acquitted and all the

appellants are on bail, they are discharged from the liabilities of

their respective bail bonds. The fine amount, if already

deposited by the acquitted appellants, shall be refunded

forthwith, subject to verification by the court concerned.

28. Accordingly, the present appeal stands allowed.
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.821 of 2010 dt.09-07-2026
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29. Office is directed to send back the lower court

records along with a copy of this judgment to the learned court

below forthwith.

(Purnendu Singh, J)
Sanjay/-
AFR/NAFR
CAV DATE 30.06.2026
Uploading Date 09.07.2026
Transmission Date 09.07.2026

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