Patna High Court

Kushmi Devi,versusThe State of Bihar

Decided: 16 February 2026
Disposal: DISPOSED
Bench: PURNENDU SINGH

Holding

The Court held that the petitioners are entitled to the compensation due under the 2013 Act and Article 300A and ordered the authorities to pay the amount within three weeks, thereby disposing the writ petition.

Summary

The petitioners, a group of landowners, claimed that they had not received the compensation due for their land (Plot No.2907) acquired under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 for an extradosed cable bridge project. The State argued that the petitioners were responsible for the delay and that the writ petition was not maintainable because an alternative statutory remedy existed. The Court examined the principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 may still be invoked when fundamental rights are infringed, natural‑justice requirements are breached, or the administrative authority acts without reason. Relying on precedents such as *Kranti Associates v. Masood Ahmed Khan* and *Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. v. State of Bihar*, the Court held that the petitioners’ right to compensation under Article 300A and the 2013 Act could not be ignored. It directed the District Land Acquisition Officer to procure the necessary records, process the compensation, and make payment within three weeks, holding the District Magistrate‑cum‑Collector accountable for compliance. The writ petition was consequently disposed.

Issues considered

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable when an alternative statutory remedy for compensation exists.
Whether the failure to pay compensation under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 violates the petitioners’ constitutional right to property under Article 300A.
Whether the quasi‑judicial authorities’ delay and lack of reasoned decisions breach principles of natural justice.

Legislation cited

Constitution of India — s. Article 226, Article 300A
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013

Subjects

land acquisition
compensation
writ petition
Article 226
Article 300A
Right to Fair Compensation Act
natural justice
quasi‑judicial authority
delay in administration

Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.17470 of 2021
======================================================
1. Kushmi Devi, Widow of Late Gagar Singh, resident of Village-Matura
Sultanpur Pachkathiya, P.S.-Bidupur, District-Vaishali.
2. Bharat Singh, Son of Late Gagar Singh, resident of Village-Matura
Sultanpur Pachkathiya, P.S.-Bidupur, District-Vaishali.
3. Munakiya Devi, Wife of Deo Nandan Singh, resident of Village-Matura
Sultanpur Pachkathiya, P.S.-Bidupur, District-Vaishali.
4. Mithilesh Singh, son of Late Jai Kisun Singh, resident of Village-Matura
Sultanpur Pachkathiya, P.S.-Bidupur, District-Vaishali.
5. Rampreet Singh, son of Late Jai Kisun Singh, resident of Village-Matura
Sultanpur Pachkathiya, P.S.-Bidupur, District-Vaishali.
6. Rajeshwar Singh, son of Late Jai Kisun Singh, resident of Village-Matura
Sultanpur Pachkathiya, P.S.-Bidupur, District-Vaishali.
7. Suresh Singh, son of Late Jai Kisun Singh, resident of Village-Matura
Sultanpur Pachkathiya, P.S.-Bidupur, District-Vaishali.

... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar
2. The District Magistrate Vaishali at Hajipur.
3. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Vaishali at Hajipur.
4. The Bihar State Road Construction Development Corporation thorugh its
Managing Director, Patna.
5. The Managing Director, Bihar State Road Construction Development
Corporation, Patna.

... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Abhinay Raj, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr.Md. Khurshid Alam ( Aag12 )
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
ORAL ORDER

6 16-02-2026 Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioners and learned counsel for the State.

2. Petitioners have inter alia prayed for following

reliefs in the paragraphs No.1 of the writ petition:-

“That the present writ application is being filed
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to command the respondents for adequate payment of
amount of compensation with respect to their land bearing
plot No.2907 under Khata No.645 revenue Thana No.423,
area 38.25 decimals, situated at Mathura Sultanpur
Pachkathiya, Circle Bidupur, P.S. Bidupur, District Vaishali,
which had been acquired under Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred as 2013 Act)
which came in effect from 01.01.2014.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioners submitted that petitioners have been deprived from

their rightful claim of due compensation for the land, which has

been acquired for the purpose of for construction of a project,

namely, Extradosed Cable Bridge Over River Ganga from

Sabalpur NH 30 and Bidupur NH 103 and approach road. The

petitioners are concerned for due payment of compensation in

respect of his land appertaining to Plot No.2907, Khata No.645.

4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the State submitted that the petitioners himself are responsible

for not receiving due compensation. Petitioners have not denied

the fact that other persons in the vicinity have not been paid the

due compensation. Petitioners have themselves delayed and

have directly approached this Hon'ble Court. Accordingly, the

writ petition is not maintainable.

5. Heard the parties.

6. It is commonly seen that the officers having quasi

judicial power on their administrative side often delay in
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considering the representation filed by the aggrieved person or

they deliberately delay to even adjudicate those cases where

they exercise their adjudicatory power, while, it is well settled

principle of law that High Courts should not exercise its writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an

effective and efficacious remedy is available. Taking into the

circumstances of the present case where

fundamental/constitutional right of a citizen is infringed, this

Court must not fail to exercise its power under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India.

7. It is also well settled principle of law that every

administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has

been held by the Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates

(P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.

The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:

“47. Summarising the above discussion,

this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has
always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must
record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons
is meant to serve the wider principle of
justice that justice must not only be done it
must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also
operates as a valid restraint on any possible
arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-
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judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion
has been exercised by the decision-maker on
relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision-
making process as observing principles of
natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) Reasons facilitate the process of
judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all
countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts.
This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial
decision-making justifying the principle that
reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial
opinions these days can be as different as the
judges and authorities who deliver them. All
these decisions serve one common purpose
which is to demonstrate by reason that the
relevant factors have been objectively
considered. This is important for sustaining
the litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery
system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a
requirement for both judicial accountability
and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial
authority is not candid enough about his/her
decision-making process then it is impossible
to know whether the person deciding is
faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to
principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions
must be cogent, clear and succinct. A
pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp
reasons” is not to be equated with a valid
decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that
transparency is the sine qua non of restraint
on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in
decision-making not only makes the judges
and decision-makers less prone to errors but
also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor32).
(n) Since the requirement to record
reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of
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fairness in decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of
human rights and was considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija
vs. Spain33 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya
v. University of Oxford34, wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons must be
given for judicial decisions.”
(o) In all common law jurisdictions
judgments play a vital role in setting up
precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving
reasons for the decision is of the essence and
is virtually a part of “due process”.

8. The law in this regard has been laid down by the

Apex Court in the Case of M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd.

Versus The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in LL 2021 SC 495,

paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard,

which is as under:-

“ 19. While a High Court would normally not
exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy
is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not
by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction
in certain contingencies. This principle has been
crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai19 and Harbanslal Sahni
v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd20. Recently, in Radha
Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors21 a
two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part
of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the
principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the
High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. This
Court has observed:
“28. The principles of law which emerge are
that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii)
The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ
petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the
High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is
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available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the
rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition
has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right
protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been
a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order
or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the
vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy
by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case
though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained
when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right
or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory
remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of
statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed
questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline
jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is
objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy
requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view
would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied)

9. The principle of alternative remedies and its

exceptions was also reiterated in Assistant Commissioner of

State Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No.

5121 of 2021). In State of HP v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd

& Anr., reported in (2005) SCC 6 499 this Court has held that a

writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if the taxing

authorities have acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction.

This Court observed:

“23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of
infringement of fundamental rights or when on the
undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have
assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the
grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But
normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions
unless it is shown that there is something more in a case,
something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer,
something which would show that it would be a case of
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palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to
adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by
this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2 SCC 355:
AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court had entertained a
petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard
the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for
the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-
exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court
finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be
desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.”

10. It is also to be taken note of the Article 300A

of the Constitution of India, which tends to safeguard the

invaluable right to property.

“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property
save by authority of law
No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.”

11. As per the constitutional mandate also, the State

cannot disposes a citizen of his property except in accordance

with law and procedure prescribed. The obligation to pay

compensation is not expressively included in Article 300-A of

the Constitution of India can be inferred in that Article. The law

in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court in case of Vidaya

Devi Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in

2020(2) SCC 569, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and

12.2 of the said judgment, which are inter alia reproduced

hereinafter;

“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
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property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to
private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose,
(1953) 2 SCC 688 , which could not be deprived without
due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right
[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 in a
welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article
300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of
his property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State
of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1”

12. The above proposition of law has again been

reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dharnidhar Mishra

(D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, in Civil

Appeal No. 6351 of 2024, reported in (2024) 10 Supreme

Court Cases 605, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as

under:–

“ 16. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human
right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under
Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1.”

13. In such circumstances, when the question of right
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to property as per the provision of Article 300 A of the

Constitution of India comes to the knowledge of this Court, this

Court has no alternative than to direct the concerned authority to

forthwith take action and see that the grievance of the

petitioners is redressed well within a period of one week in

accordance with law from the date of communication of this

order.

14. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Patna, is

directed to call for the revenue records, in respect of the lands

acquired, from the office of the Circle Officer concerned

15. The Circle Officer is directed to forthwith appear

before the District Land Acquisition Officer along with all the

revenue records relating to the land, which has been acquired

for the project.

16. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Vaishali at

Hajipur is directed to make the required forms available to the

petitioners and see that all the formalities in applying for the

compensation is fulfilled and if any assistance is required to the

petitioners, he must provide all the assistance to the petitioners

in that regard.

17. The District Land Acquisition Officer, after

making payment of required compensation amount forthwith to
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the petitioners as per the present value in the area on the basis of

MVR determined in that regard, give information to the District

Magistrate-cum-Collector, Vaishali at Hajipur well within a

period of three weeks from the date of communication of this

order that he has made payment of entire required amount of

compensation to the petitioners in accordance with law so that

the petitioners may not be harassed.

18. The District Magistrate-cum-Collector must

ensure that Land Acquisition Officer make payment of the

compensation to the petitioner well within a period of three

weeks from the date of communication of this order, or the

District Magistrate-cum-Collector will be held solely

responsible for not complying with the order of this Court.

19. With aforesaid observations and directions, the

present writ petition stands disposed of.

(Purnendu Singh, J)
Sanjay/-

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