NAVGHAN JASHABHAI BALASARAversusSTATE OF GUJARAT
- Disposal
- 38-RULE ABSOLUTE/ALLOWED @ FH
Holding
The detention order is invalid and is quashed because the material on record does not establish that the detainee’s activities affect or are likely to affect public order.
Summary
Navghan Jashabhai Balasara was preventively detained under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985 as a “dangerous person” pursuant to a district magistrate’s order dated 04‑12‑2025. He challenged the order, arguing that no material showed any disturbance to public order and that the detention was mechanical. The State contended that Balasara was a habitual offender whose activities threatened public order. The Court examined the detention order, the definition of “dangerous person” under Section 2(c) of the Act, and the limited evidence of two criminal cases for which bail had been granted. Relying on Supreme Court precedents that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly, the Court held that the material was insufficient to satisfy the required subjective satisfaction. Consequently, the detention order was quashed and the petitioner was ordered to be released.
Issues considered
- Whether the detention order issued under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985 is valid in the absence of material showing a threat to public order.
- Whether preventive detention is permissible when the detainee has been granted bail in the underlying criminal proceedings.
Legislation cited
- Arms Act, 1959
- Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985s. 2(c)
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 114, s. 303(1), s. 316(3), s. 316(4), s. 317(1), s. 317(2), s. 317(4), s. 318(3), s. 407, s. 54, s. 61(2)(a)
Subjects
Judgment
R/SCR.A/136/2026 ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 136 of 2026
==================================================
NAVGHAN JASHABHAI BALASARA
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==================================================
Appearance:
MR. HARISINGH SODHA(17638) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR. ROHAN RAVAL, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 22/01/2026
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI)
[1] The detenue herein, namely Navghan Jashabhai Balasara,
came to be preventively detained vide detention order dated
04.12.2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Morbi, as a
“dangerous person” as de=ned under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat
Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (herein after
referred as ‘the Act of 1985).
[2] By way of this petition, the detenue has challenged the
legality and validity of the aforesaid order.
[3] This Court has heard learned advocate for the petitioner
and learned APP for the respondent-State Authorities.
Page 1 of 6
R/SCR.A/136/2026 ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026
[4] Learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently argued
that there was no material available with the detention authority
to indicate as to how public health, public order or public
tranquility was disturbed in any manner. Thus, in the absence
of any such material on record, the order of detention ought not
have been passed. It is further submitted by learned advocate
for the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed
without application of mind and prima facie, the order appears
to have been passed mechanically.
[4.1] Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that
the impugned order was executed upon the petitioner and
presently he is detained in the Ahmedabad Central Jail.
[5] On the other hand, learned APP, opposing the present
petition contended that the detenue is habitual oFender and his
activities have aFected society at large. Hence, the Detaining
Authority, considering the antecedents and past activities of the
detenue, has passed the impugned order with a view to
preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order in the area of Morbi and lastly
prayed to dismiss the present petition.
[6] Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties, the core issue that arises is whether the order of
detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of its
Page 2 of 6
R/SCR.A/136/2026 ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026
powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable in
law or not?
[7] We have carefully gone through the order passed by the
concerned authority. It appears that the impugned order was
executed upon the detenue and presently he is detained in
Ahmedabad Central Jail. In the grounds of detention, reference
of two criminal cases for the oFences punishable under Sections
303(1), 316(3), 316(4), 317(1), 317(2), 317(4), 318(3), 61(2)(a)
and 54 of the BNS and Sections 407 and 114 of the IPC
registered with Morbi Taluka police stations against the
detenue from 17.02.2024 to 21.01.2025 is made out.
[7.1] In the impugned order, it is alleged that the activities of
the detenue, as a “dangerous person”, aFect adversely or are
likely to aFect adversely the maintenance of public order as
explained under the provisions of the the Act of 1985.
Undisputedly, in the aforesaid alleged oFences, the detenue was
granted bail by the concerned court.
[8] Considering the impugned order, it appears that the
provisions of Section 2(c) of the Act of 1985 is referred by the
concerned authorities. Hence, the same is required to be
reproduced. The same reads as under:-
“(c) "dangerous person" means a person, who either by himself
or as a member or leader of a gang, during a period of three
successive years, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or
Page 3 of 6
R/SCR.A/136/2026 ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026
abets the commission of any of the o"ences punishable under
Chapter XVI or Chapter VIII or Chapter XVI (except section
354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 376, 376A, 376B, 3376C, 376D,
or 377) or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal
Code or any of the o"ences punishable under chapter V of the
Arms Act, 1959;”
[9] After consideration of the available material, we are of the
considered view that on the basis of two cases, the authority has
wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the activities
of the detenue could be termed as acting in a manner
‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’. In our
considered opinion, the said oFences do not have any bearing
on the maintenance of public order. In this regard, we would
like to refer the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dhaya
M. v. State of Kerala and others reported in AIR 2025 Sc
2868. In para-9 and para-21 of the said decision, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“9. It is well settled that the provision for preventive detention
is an extraordinary power in the hands of the State that must
be used sparingly. It curtails the liberty of an individual in
anticipation of the commission of further o"ence(s), and
therefore, must not be used in the ordinary course of nature.
The power of preventive detention 5nds recognition in the
Constitution itself, under Article 22(3)(b). However, this Court
has emphasized in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu3 that the
power of preventive detention is an exception to Article 21 and,
therefore, must be applied as such, as an exception to the main
rule and only in rare cases.”
…..
“21. This Court in SK. Nazneen (supra), had observed that the
State should move for cancellation of bail of the detenu, instead
of placing him under the law of preventive detention, which is
not the appropriate remedy. Similarly, in Ameena Begum v.
State of Telengana9 , this Court observed :
Page 4 of 6
R/SCR.A/136/2026 ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026
“59. … It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal
proceedings where the detenu had been released on bail, no
applications for cancellation of bail had been moved by the
State. In the light of the same, the provisions of the Act, which
is an extraordinary statute, should not have been resorted to
when ordinary criminal law provided su"icient means to
address the apprehensions leading to the impugned detention
order. There may have existed su"icient grounds to appeal
against the bail orders, but the circumstances did not warrant
the circumvention of ordinary criminal procedure to resort to
an extraordinary measure of the law of preventive detention.”
60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain Singh
v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] ,
Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was)
observed : (SCC pp. 35-36, para 32)
32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a
hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care
should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised
unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the
relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be
used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a
criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of
keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal
law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail,
unless the material available is such as would satisfy the
requirements of the legal provisions authorising such
detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent
criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising
the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based
on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal
court.” (Emphasis supplied)”
[10] For the reasons recorded above, we are of the considered
opinion that, the material on record is not suFicient to hold that
the alleged activities of the detenue have either aFected
adversely or are likely to aFect adversely the maintenance of
public order, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived
at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid
and in accordance with law.
Page 5 of 6
R/SCR.A/136/2026 ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026
[11] Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The impugned
order dated 04.12.2025 passed by the respondent authority is
hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set at liberty
forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Rule is made
absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.
(ILESH J. VORA, J.)
(R. T. VACHHANI, J.)
DHARMENDRA KUMAR
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: KUMAR DHARMENDRA(HC01071), GOV, at High Court of Gujarat on 22/01/2026 14:34:05
Page 6 of 6
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.