SHRI. BHALCHANDRA CHINTAMAN DEO AND ORSversusTHE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER NO. 24, PUNE AND ORS

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         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                WRIT PETITION NO. 6353 OF 2012

Bhalchandra Chintaman Deo & ors.                 …         Petitioners
            vs.
The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Pune & ors. …        Respondents

Mr. Anil V. Anturkar, Senior Advocate, a/w. Mr. Ranjit D. Shinde and
Mr. Kashish Chelani for petitioners.
Dr. Milind Sathe, Advocate General, a/w. Smt. S. D. Vyas, Addl. GP and
Mr.Rajan S. Pawar, AGP for respondent No.1-SLAO.
Mr. Kedar B. Dighe for respondent No.2A-PCMC.
Mr. Milind M. Mahajan for respondent No.2B-PMRDA.
Mr. Nitesh Bhutekar a/w. Mr. Aaditya M. for respondent No.4.
Mr. Abhaykumar Apte for respondent No.7(a).

                          CORAM               : MANISH PITALE &
                                                MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, JJ
                          RESERVED ON         : 23rd DECEMBER, 2025
                          PRONOUNCED ON: 09th MARCH, 2026


JUDGEMENT (Per Justice Manish Pitale):


.     By this writ petition, the petitioners initially raised their claim
for release of 25.39 acres of land belonging to them and acquired by
the State, located in Survey No.210 in Village Wakad, Taluka Mulshi,
District Pune, on the ground that while it was acquired for public
purpose, it was subsequently being given to private parties. The
petitioners also sought quashing of an advertisement notice issued in
a newspaper by the original respondent No.2-Pimpri Chinchwad New
Township Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as
PCNTDA), whereby parts of the said land were put up for sale for
residential, commercial and/or industrial purpose by granting leases
of 99 years. The thrust of the contentions raised on behalf of the

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petitioners was that giving away land to private parties, after
acquiring the same ostensibly for public purpose, was in the teeth of
law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Royal Orchid
Hotels Limited and another vs. G. Jayarama Reddy and others (2011)
10 SCC 608.


2.    After the respondents filed their reply affidavits, the petitioners
applied for amending the writ petition and by an order dated
18.12.2023, this Court allowed the amendment, making it clear that
this Court had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the issues
added by way of amendment and that those would be decided when
the writ petition was to be taken up for final hearing.


3.    By the said amendment, the petitioners added certain
paragraphs in the writ petition, to justify addition of respondent
No.2A-Pimpri    Chinchwad      Municipal    Corporation     (hereinafter
referred to as PCMC) and respondent No.2B-Pune Metropolitan
Region Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as PMRDA).
The petitioners also added instances of specific plots from the said
land being given on lease of 99 years to specific third parties. The
petitioners also gave details of the manner in which parts of the said
land were transferred to respondent Nos.2A-PCMC and 2B-PMRDA.
They also added reference to certain Government Resolutions
(hereinafter referred to as GRs), concerning the policy of the
respondent-State to allot 12.5% of the acquired land in the form of
developed plots to owners, whose land has been acquired. Prayer
clause (aa) was also added, claiming that the aforesaid entire land of
25.39 acres ought to be returned by respondent Nos.2A and 2B to
the petitioners or they be directed to pay compensation along with
interest, after calculating the same in accordance with the provisions


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of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act of 2013). Prayer clause (aaa) was also added,
seeking a direction to the respondents to grant benefit of the said
GRs to the petitioners, which pertain to providing developed plots to
land owners.


4.      Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would be
appropriate to refer to the chronology of events leading upto the
present writ petition, so that the submissions can be appreciated in
the proper perspective.


5.      On 09.03.1970, a notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the LA Act) was
issued and it was published in official gazette on 12.03.1970, for
acquisition of land admeasuring 39 hectares 26 ares (97.01 acres)
from Survey No.210 and land admeasuring 1 hectare and 23 ares
(3.03 acres) from Survey No.211, both situated at Village Wakad,
Taluka Mulshi, District Pune. This petition is concerned with 10.27
hectares (25.39 acres) of land from Survey No.210. The purpose of
acquisition was for establishment of new town in Pimpri Chinchwad
area.


6.      On 16.03.1972, the State issued a notification under Section
113 of The Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966
(hereinafter referred to as MRTP Act), designating original
respondent No.2-PCNTDA as new town planning development
authority. On 09.11.1972, a declaration was issued under Section 6
of the LA Act in respect of the subject land, published in the official
gazette on 23.11.1972. The notification pertaining to the said


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declaration recorded the public purpose as ‘for the planned
development and utilization of the said lands in the Pimpri
Chinchwad New Township area and for industrial, commercial and
residential area’.


7.    On 23.09.1986, respondent No.1-SLAO passed an award in
respect of the area of 59 hectares and 24 ares of land, which
included the portion belonging to the petitioners and the total
compensation was determined at ₹ 6,01,943. Notices were issued to
the petitioners, under Section 12(2) of the LA Act, for receiving
compensation. But, since the petitioners refused to accept the same,
the amount of compensation was deposited in the Personal Ledger
Account (hereinafter referred to as the PLA), which is a designated
account in the Treasury.


8.    Some of the petitioners filed Writ Petition No.3719 of 1987,
challenging the acquisition of land. On 18.07.1989, this Court
dismissed the writ petition. On 04.08.1989, the petitioners submitted
an application under Section 48 of the LA Act for deletion of the said
land from acquisition. In the meanwhile, the petitioners also filed
review application in respect of dismissal of their Writ Petition
No.3719 of 1987. On 08.09.1989, this Court dismissed the review
application of the petitioners. Thereupon, the petitioners filed special
leave petition, challenging the said orders passed by this Court,
dismissing the writ petition as well as review application. It is an
admitted position that the said SLP was withdrawn in the year 1989,
with liberty for the petitioners to pursue their application submitted
under Section 48 of the LA Act.




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9.    On 19.09.1989, the petitioners and other land owners
submitted another application under Section 48 of the LA Act for
deletion of their lands from acquisition. As the applications remained
pending, the petitioners filed Writ Petition No.36 of 1990 in this
Court, seeking a direction to the respondent-State to consider the
said applications dated 04.08.1981 and 19.09.1989 submitted under
Section 48 of the LA Act. On 12.01.1990, this Court disposed of the
said writ Petition, granting liberty to the petitioners to submit an
application complete in all respects, under Section 48 of the LA Act
and a direction was issued to the Revenue Minister to pass an
appropriate order on the said application. On 03.07.1992, the
Revenue Minister granted hearing to the petitioners. On 07.07.1992,
the Secretary of the respondent-State of Maharashtra passed an
order releasing 76.17 acres of land from acquisition and under the
said order, the petitioners were to handover the aforesaid area of
25.39 acres to the said respondent. The said order stipulated that no
damages would be payable to the petitioners in respect of the said
25.39 acres of land. Thus, 76.17 acres of land was released from
acquisition.


10.   On 10.08.1992, the respondent-State stayed the effect of the
aforesaid order dated 07.07.1992, whereby 76.17 acres of land was
released from acquisition. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners
filed Writ Petition No.1116 of 1993 for quashing and setting aside of
the stay order dated 10.08.1992. It is crucial to note that in the said
writ petition, the petitioners specifically stated that it was agreed
between the petitioners and respondents that for the purpose of
acquiring 25.39 acres of the said land, the petitioners would not be
entitled to any compensation. In the instant writ petition, although a
reference is made to filing of Writ Petition No.1116 of 1993, neither


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a copy of the same was annexed, nor was it brought to the notice of
this Court that such a statement about agreement between the
petitioners and respondents, had been made in the said writ petition.


11.   On 23.03.1993, this Court passed an order in Writ Petition
No.1116 of 1993 setting aside the said stay order dated 10.08.1992
and effectively restoring the order dated 07.07.1992, whereby 76.17
acres of land was released from acquisition and 25.39 acres of land
was retained. It is an admitted position that on 26.11.1993, the
Supreme Court dismissed Special Leave Petition No.10056 of 1993,
challenging the said order dated 23.03.1993, passed in Writ Petition
No.1116 of 1993, resulting in confirmation of the said order. In the
meanwhile, on 25.10.1993, some of the land owners also belonging
to the ‘Deo family’, like the petitioners herein, transferred part of the
acquired   land    to   Vishnudev     Co-operative    Housing    Society
(hereinafter referred to the said society). On 20.08.1994, the
Divisional Commissioner of Pune passed a specific order deleting the
said area of about 76.17 acres of land from acquisition and retained
10 hectares and 33 ares of land, including the aforesaid area of 25.39
acres of the petitioners with the respondent-State for the aforesaid
public purpose, to be executed by the original respondent No.2-
PCNTDA.


12.   The said society, claiming to be the owners of the land
admeasuring 10 hectares and 55 ares of land purchased from some
members of the ‘Deo family’, filed Writ Petition No.3200 of 1994,
seeking deletion of the said piece of land also from acquisition. This
Court dismissed the said writ petition and on 10.02.1995, the
Supreme Court dismissed Special Leave Petition (C) No.22907 of
1994, thereby confirming the said order dated 07.09.1994,
dismissing the writ petition of the said society.

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13.   On 30.05.2000, the SLAO took possession of the land
admeasuring 10 hectares and 33 ares from Survey No.210, including
25.39 acres of land belonging to the petitioners and a panchanama
was executed. The possession was taken in presence of two of the
petitioners herein i.e. petitioner No.1-Bhalchandra Chintaman Deo
and petitioner No.10-Chandrakant Gajanan Deo. In this backdrop, on
20.01.2004, the said society filed an application for release of 10
hectares and 55 ares of land, claiming to be owners thereof, under
Section 48 of the LA Act. It is claimed that the Revenue Minister
passed an order dated 10.06.2004, releasing the aforesaid land from
acquisition, although the said order was not issued or communicated.
In this backdrop, in the year 2006, the said society filed Writ Petition
No.5783 of 2006, seeking enforcement of the aforesaid ‘order’ of the
Revenue Minister. Before this writ petition was filed by the said
society, the respondent No.1-SLAO, on 08.11.2005, handed over
possession of the retained land to PCNTDA, admeasuring 10 hectares
and 33 ares, including 25.39 ares of land of the petitioners. During
the pendency of the said Writ Petition No.5783 of 2006 filed by the
said society, the original respondent No.2-PCNTDA executed lease
deeds in favour of various entities in the year 2011, in terms of the
scheme for new town development, which was the public purpose for
which the land was acquired. On 24.05.2012, PCNTDA published the
aforesaid advertisement in a newspaper for granting the land on
lease for planned development of the new township, as per the
public purpose.


14.   It is in this backdrop that on 04.07.2012, the petitioners filed
the present writ petition, originally for the relief, as noted
hereinabove, for release of 25.39 acres of land from acquisition, on


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the ground that it was not being utilized for the ostensible public
purpose, but it was being given away to private parties. The original
respondent No.2-PCNTDA filed its reply affidavit to which the
petitioners field their rejoinder affidavit and thereupon, the said
respondent filed its sur-rejoinder affidavit. At this stage, the Act of
2013 came into force with effect from 01.01.2014.


15.   On 28.02.2017, this Court allowed the aforesaid Writ Petition
No.5783 of 2006 filed by the said society and directed the State to
comply with the ‘order’ of the Revenue Minister passed on
10.06.2004 and consequently, to issue notification for release of
another 10 hectares and 55 ares of land from acquisition.


16.   Aggrieved by the said judgment and order of this Court, the
original respondent No.2-PCNTDA filed Special Leave Petition (C)
No.20188 of 2017. The Supreme Court granted leave in the said
leave petition. As a consequence, it was converted in Civil Appeal
No.764 of 2018. By judgment and order dated 03.08.2018, the
Supreme Court allowed the appeal of PCNTDA and set aside the
order of this Court dated 28.02.2017 passed in Writ Petition No.5783
of 2006. The said judgment and order of the Supreme Court is
reported in (2018) 8 SCC 215 (Pimpri Chinchwad New Township
Development Authority vs. Vishnudev Co-operative Housing Society
and others). Certain observations made in the said judgment are
heavily relied upon by the respondents to resist the present writ
petition.


17.   On 06.03.2020, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
passed judgment and order in the case of Indore Development
Authority vs. Manoharlal and others (2020) 8 SCC 129. Since the


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rival parties have referred to and relied upon various portions of the
said judgment, the same is also relevant for the present case.


18.      On 07.06.2021, the respondent-State issued a notification,
dissolving the original respondent No.2-PCNTDA and the lands were
consequently transferred to respondent Nos.2A-PCMC and 2B-
PMRDA. On 18.12.2023, this Court allowed the aforementioned
amendment application moved by the petitioners, thereby adding
PCMC and PMRDA as respondent Nos.2A and 2B respectively, with
paragraph Nos.16A to 16D being added in writ petition along with
prayer clauses (aa) and (aaa).


19.      On 13.12.2024, the respondent No.1-SLAO filed affidavit-in-
reply,    stating   that   the   petitioners   had   refused   to   accept
compensation, after notices were issued under Section 12(2) of the
LA Act, as a consequence of which the amount of compensation had
to be deposited in the PLA. On 15.01.2025, respondent No.2A filed
its reply affidavit. It is in this backdrop that the writ petition was
taken up for hearing.


20.      Mr. Anil Anturkar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioners submitted that the aforesaid land admeasuring 25.39
acres land retained by the respondents, has not been utilized for
public purpose and that it has been diverted towards catering to the
interests of private parties. On this basis, it was submitted that in
terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Royal
Orchid Hotels Limited and another vs. G. Jayarama Reddy and others
(supra), the acts undertaken by the respondents amount to a fraud
on statute and therefore, the said piece of land ought to be returned
to the petitioners. In this context, reference was made to the lease


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deeds of 99 years, executed by the original respondent No.2-PCNTDA
in favour of various private parties. It was asserted that the public
purpose of ‘District Commercial Centre’ was completely ignored,
while plots demarcated from the said piece of land were made over
to private parties. On this basis, it was submitted that the petition
deserves to be allowed and the land ought to be returned to the
petitioners. It was sought to be indicated that in pursuance of such
lease deeds, since the third parties were already in possession, the
petitioners can enter into the shoes of the lessor and the unutilized
land can be made over to the petitioners.


21.   It was submitted that the petitioners also deserve the benefit of
policy of the respondent-State under GRs dated 03.03.1990 and
15.09.1993 for allotment of 12.5% of said land admeasuring 25.39
acres in the form of developed plots. This would ensure that justice is
done to the petitioners, who have been illegally deprived of their
land, without payment of any compensation.


22.   It was further submitted that in the present case, the admitted
position on record is that the petitioners have not been paid
compensation at all for acquisition of 25.39 acres of land and that
releasing 76.17 acres of land from acquisition, cannot amount to
compensating the petitioners for deprivation of 25.39 acres of land.
It was submitted that if the stand taken by the respondents is
accepted,   it   would   lead   to   drastic   consequences,      thereby
demonstrating that the constitutional right of the petitioners under
Section 300A of the Constitution of India, stands violated.


23.   It was further submitted that the petitioners are clearly entitled
to benefit of proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. It stipulates


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that when an award has been made under the LA Act, but
compensation has not been deposited in the account of the
beneficiaries like the petitioners, who are owners of the majority of
the land holdings (in terms of area), all the beneficiaries specified in
the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the LA Act, are
entitled for compensation in terms of the provisions of Act of 2013.
In this context, reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development
Authority vs. Manoharlal and others (supra). The learned counsel for
the petitioners submitted that the Supreme Court had accepted
deposit of compensation in PLA or in the Treasury as compliance
with law, only in the context of States where such Rules had been
framed by the concerned legislature under the LA Act. It was
submitted that in the State of Maharashtra, no such Rules have been
framed and therefore, the amount of compensation was required to
be deposited in the ‘Court’, which admittedly was not done in the
present case.


24.   In support of the said contention that the law laid down in this
context in the said Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Indore
Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and others (supra), does not
apply to the State of Maharashtra, reliance was placed on the
judgments of this Court in the case of Hemantkumar Krushnaji
Charegaonkar vs. State of Maharashtra and others (judgment and
order dated 02.03.2022 passed in Writ Petition No.10390 of 2018),
Shital Anna Walawade and others vs. State of Maharashtra and
others (2023 SCC OnLine Bom 128) and Geeta Vijay Deshpande and
others vs. State of Maharashtra and others (judgment and order
dated 10.01.2025 passed in Writ Petition No.3214 of 2019). It was
submitted that therefore, the proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of


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2013, clearly applies to the the facts and circumstances of the
present case.


25.   Much emphasis was placed on the stand taken by the
respondent No.1-SLAO about the compensation amount being
deposited in PLA. It was submitted that in these circumstances, the
respondents could not be allowed to take the stand that releasing
76.17 acres of land from acquisition, on an agreement with the
petitioners that they would not be entitled to compensation for the
retained land to the extent of 25.39 acres, ought not to be accepted.
It was submitted that the petitioners cannot be said to have waived
their constitutional right and that there was no substance in the
argument of the respondents that since the aforesaid prayer for
granting compensation, as per the provisions of the Act of 2013, was
added by way of amendment only in the year 2023, it was hit by
delay and laches. Reliance was placed on judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh and others (2022) 7 SCC 508, to contend that the
State cannot evade its responsibility to pay compensation for
acquiring private property, on the ground of delay or laches, as
valuable right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, is
involved. It was further submitted that there were sufficient
pleadings in the writ petition for the petitioners to invoke proviso to
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. It was emphatically stated in the
original unamended writ petition itself that the petitioners had not
received even a paisa for acquisition of 25.39 acres of their land.


26.   In the context of failure on the part of the petitioners in
placing on record the memo of Writ Petition No.1116 of 1993 and
allegation of suppression against the petitioners, as sought to be


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highlighted by the respondents, it was submitted that the same
cannot inure to the benefit of the respondents, for the simple reason
that in the reply affidavits, the respondents did not advert to the
same. It was emphasized that the petitioners had specifically referred
to the said writ petition and the order passed therein by this Court
and even a copy of the order was annexed. Even if it is to be stated
that for completeness, the memo of the said writ petition should
have been placed on record, that in itself cannot be a ground to hold
against the petitioners. It is submitted that even if the statement
made in paragraph No.6 of the said writ petition is taken into
account, it would not result in waiver of the constitutional right of
the petitioners, under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.


27.   It was submitted that the emphasis placed on behalf of
respondents on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Pimpri Chinchwad New Township Development Authority vs.
Vishnudev Co-operative Housing Society and others (supra), was
misplaced as the said judgment was delivered in the context of the
plea of the said society for release of further land from acquisition. It
is in the context of the controversy arising in the said matter that the
Supreme Court had used the word ‘bargain’ about the petitioners
enjoying release of 76.17 acres of land, while consenting to
acquisition of 25.39 acres of land. The bargain was in the context of
release of land, but the same did not mean that the petitioners had
given up their right to payment of compensation for 25.39 acres of
land actually retained and acquired by the respondents.


28.   As regards the allegation that the petitioners had sold their
land to the said society, it was submitted that the petitioners did not
sell their land at all. It was some other members of the said ‘Deo


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family’, who had sold the land. In this regard, it was submitted that
the petitioners are ready to place an affidavit on record and hence,
the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents in that context,
are wholly unsustainable.


29.   On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, it was vehemently
contended that the petition deserves to be allowed, so that the
petitioners are appropriately compensated for acquisition of their
land admeasuring 25.39 acres and that the objections raised on
behalf of the respondents, deserve to be rejected.


30.   On the other hand, Dr. Milind Sathe, learned Advocate General
appearing for respondent No.1 - State and respondent No.2B -
PMRDA submitted that the instant petition, in its original form,
sought relief only on the basis of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and another Vs. G.
Jayarama Reddy (supra). The whole emphasis in the writ petition, as
it was originally filed by the petitioners, was on the claim that, while
the aforesaid land admeasuring 25.39 acres was retained for
acquisition by the respondents for the public purpose of ‘District
Commercial Centre’, it was actually given into private hands, thereby
committing a fraud on the Statute. The learned Advocate General
submitted that the said stand is wholly misplaced, for the reason that
the acquisition was initiated for the entire larger piece of land in the
year 1970 for the stated public purpose of ‘planned development and
utilization of lands for Pimpri-Chinchwad New Township Area and
for Industrial, Commercial and Residential Areas’. The utilization of
the said 25.39 acres of land has been strictly in consonance with the
said public purpose and that, misleading statements were made in
the petition to claim the benefit of the law laid down by the Supreme


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Court in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and another Vs. G.
Jayarama Reddy (supra). It was submitted that the lease deeds of 99
years were executed in favour of various parties by the respondent
No.2 - PCNTDA and now the respondent No.2B - PMRDA.


31.   It was submitted that even if the said piece of land was to be
utilized for a different public purpose, it would still be in accordance
with law as per the position of law clarified by the Supreme Court in
various judgements, including Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay Vs. Industrial Development & Investment Company Private
Limited and others, (1996) 11 SCC 501. It was further submitted
that as per the settled law recognized by the Supreme Court, even if
some portion of such land remained unutilized for the public
purpose, the expropriated owner cannot insist on restoration of land.
The said position of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases
of Gulam Mustafa and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others,
(1976) 1 SCC 800, State of Kerala and others Vs. M. Bhaskaran Pillai,
(1997) 5 SCC 432 and Tulsi Cooperative Housing Society, Hyderabad
and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 2000 (1) SCC
533, has been followed by this Court in a number of judgments,
including in the case of Raghunath Abajirao Shinde (Lt. Co.) and
others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2003) SCC OnLine Bom
53. It is specifically laid down in the said judgments that in such
situations, the State must sell the land through public auction and
not restore it to the expropriated owner. On this basis, it was
submitted that the main thrust of the petition, as it was originally
filed, claimed relief in the teeth of the said position of law and
hence, it cannot be granted.




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32.     It was further submitted that by amending the petition in
terms of order dated 18.12.2023, for the first time, the petitioners
introduced prayer clause (aa). The first part of the said prayer clause
pertained to the claim that since the said land admeasuring 25.39
acres was not utilized for the stated public purpose, it ought to be
returned to the petitioners. But, the second part, for the first time,
introduced the relief of payment of monetary compensation along
with interest under the provisions of the Act of 2013 for the said land
of 25.39 acres. It was submitted that although the aforesaid prayer
clause (aa) was introduced by way of amendment, not a word was
added in the substantive part of the petition for introducing any
factual basis or pleadings to claim such monetary compensation. It
was asserted that the introduction of the said claim in prayer clause
(aa) on 18.12.2023 was 37 years after acquisition of the land and 31
years after the order dated 07.07.1992 was passed under Section 48
of the LA Act. On this basis, it was submitted that the petitioners
cannot be granted relief of monetary compensation for 25.39 acres of
land.


33.     Apart from this, it was submitted that the petitioners have
played hide and seek with this Court and they have indulged in
suppression. While the instant petition did refer to Writ Petition
No.1116 of 1993 filed by them and the order dated 23.03.1993
disposing of the same, deliberately, memo of the said writ petition
was not placed on record. Hence, it was produced during the course
of arguments and the contents of the said writ petition were not
denied by the petitioners. In paragraph 6 of the said Writ Petition
No.1116 of 1993, these very petitioners had clearly stated that it was
agreed between them and the respondent authorities that for the
purpose of acquiring 25.39 acres, the petitioners would not be


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entitled to any compensation. Having suppressed this crucial aspect
of the matter, the petitioners having come with unclean hands before
the writ court, the instant petition deserves to be dismissed on this
ground alone.


34.   The learned Advocate General further placed reliance on the
aforesaid judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Pimpri
Chinchwad New Township Development Authority Vs. Vishnudev
Cooperative Housing Society and others (supra). He submitted that,
in all fairness, the petitioners ought to have brought the said
judgment to the notice of this Court as certain observations made
therein do have a bearing on the issues arising in this petition. By
referring to the said judgment, it was emphasized that possession of
25.39 acres of land was taken on 30.05.2000 in the presence of
petitioner Nos.1 and 10 in this petition. This being established, there
was no question of lapsing of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the
Act of 2013 as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the
case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and others
(supra). On this basis, it was submitted that the contentions raised
on behalf of the petitioners about absence of rules being framed
under the LA Act in Maharashtra and to that extent, the aforesaid
Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Indore Development
Authority Vs. Manoharlal and others (supra) not being applicable,
are not required to be considered at all. It was submitted that even if
some other members of the ‘Deo family’ had sold part of the land to
the said society, the petitioners could not feign ignorance about the
litigation initiated by the said society, which culminated in the said
judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Pimpri Chinchwad
New Township Development Authority Vs. Vishnudev Cooperative
Housing Society and others (supra). Hence, this is also another


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instance of suppression of relevant facts by the petitioners from this
Court.


35.   It was further submitted that in the present case, since the land
acquisition award was admittedly passed on 23.09.1986, this case is
covered under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 and further
proceedings, if any, are required to be continued as if the LA Act has
not been repealed. In such a situation, there was no question of
applicability of Section 24(2) of the Act 2013 and hence, the
submissions made on the basis of proviso to Section 24(2) thereof do
not deserve any consideration. In any case, it was submitted that
there is no factual basis in the writ petition or any material placed on
record by the petitioners to claim that compensation was not
deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, who were majority
landholders, concerning the said piece of land. On this basis, it was
submitted that the petition does not deserve any consideration.


36.   A further submission was made by referring to one of the
findings rendered in the said judgment of Pimpri Chinchwad New
Township    Development     Authority   Vs.   Vishnudev    Cooperative
Housing Society and others (supra) by the Supreme Court, recording
that the landowners had entered into a ‘bargain’ and they had agreed
not to claim compensation for the said 25.39 acres of land. It was
submitted that 76.17 acres of land was released and this was after
the acquisition award for the entire land had been made. It is also an
admitted position that the possession of the land was taken in the
presence of some of the petitioners herein on 30.05.2000. Thereafter,
the land has been utilized for the stated public purpose of developing
new township at Pimpri-Chinchwad and therefore, it cannot lie in the
mouth of the petitioners that they are entitled to turn around and


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claim monetary compensation for 25.39 acres of land. On this basis,
it was submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed.


37.   Mr. Kedar Dighe, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent No.2A - PCMC, supported the contentions raised by the
learned Advocate General and specifically emphasized upon the fact
that the petitioners had suppressed vital facts from this Court and
misleading statements were made. It was submitted that on this
ground alone, the petition deserves to be dismissed. The claim of the
petitioners that certain portion of 25.39 acres of land is still vacant
and unutilized was stoutly denied on behalf of respondent No.2A -
PCMC. It was further submitted that the petitioners, having refused
to respond to the notices sent under Section 12(2) of the LA Act, due
to which the amounts had to be deposited in PLA, cannot turn
around and put the blame on the respondent - authorities for the
alleged non-payment of compensation.


38.   It was submitted that the said 25.39 acres of land has been
utilized for the stated public purpose and as on today, there are
various   third   parties   in   possession   thereof   with   industrial,
commercial and residential layouts and structures constructed on
plots. These developments cannot be ignored while considering the
present writ petition. In this regard, reliance was placed on judgment
of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Housing and
Infrastructure Development Board and another Vs. Vijay Bodana and
others (judgement and order dated 04.03.2020 passed in Civil
Appeal No.1998 of 2020). It was submitted that the petitioners, who
have suppressed vital facts from this Court and have chosen to raise
claims for return of land for the first time in the year 2012 and much
later by amendment in the year 2023, the claim for monetary


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compensation has been raised, ought not to be permitted to undo
what has been done for the stated public purpose of establishing new
township at Pimpri-Chinchwad with industrial, commercial and
residential layouts. On this basis, it was submitted that the petition
deserves to be dismissed.


39.   As noted at the outset, the petitioners originally came before
this Court in the present writ petition with a specific relief for return
of 25.39 acres of land on the ground that it was not utilized for the
stated public purpose and that it had been given into private hands.
Thereupon, the petition was amended to add further claim of
monetary compensation for the aforesaid piece of land, on the
ground that it stood acquired without any compensation being paid
to the petitioners. These two aspects will have to be dealt with
separately.


40.   The first aspect pertains to the allegation that while the said
25.39 acres of land was acquired for the purpose of ‘District
Commercial Centre’, eventually, it was given away to private hands in
the form of leases being executed in favour of private parties.


41.   This Court has perused the documents and material brought
on record on behalf of the parties. It is an undisputed position that
the public purpose for which the acquisition was initiated in the year
1970 and which culminated in the land acquisition award dated
23.09.1986 shows that the stated public purpose was ‘for the
planned development and utilization of the said land in the Pimpri-
Chinchwad New Township Area and for Industrial, Commercial and
Residential Area’.




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42.     Thus, the stated public purpose was establishment of new
township in Pimpri-Chinchwad Area consisting of industrial,
commercial and residential areas. The petitioners have claimed in the
petition that execution of lease agreements by the respondent No.2 -
PCNTDA in favour of private parties, including respondent Nos.3 and
4, for periods of 99 years, was against the stated public purpose. The
said contention of the petitioners is based on the assertion that while
the said piece of land of 25.39 acres was acquired for the ostensible
public purpose of establishing a District Commercial Centre, such
lease agreements were executed, resulting in residential user of the
land.


43.     We find that in the writ petition, the petitioners have not
specifically stated the aforementioned public purpose for which the
acquisition was initiated as far back as in the year 1970, culminating
in the award dated 23.09.1986. On a proper reading of the stated
public purpose, we do not find anything amiss in the respondent
No.2 - PCNTDA and subsequently its successors respondent No.2A -
PCMC and respondent No.2B - PMRDA, utilizing the said land for
various layouts including layouts for residential purposes as this was
in furtherance of establishment of new township area in Pimpri-
Chinchwad. This is not a case where the land was acquired at the
behest of private parties and upon acquisition, such private parties
have unlawfully gained at the expense of the original landowners. In
the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and another Vs. G. Jayarama
Reddy (supra), the Supreme Court found, as a matter of fact, that
while the acquisition was ostensibly for public purpose, private
interests were catered to and that the whole exercise was undertaken
by the State authorities to further the interest of such private parties.
In such a factual background, it was found that the acquisition was a


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fraud on the Statute and hence, it was quashed. The facts in the
present case are clearly distinguishable and the respondents - State
as well as other authorities have been able to demonstrate that the
public purpose was ‘establishment of new township area in Pimpri-
Chinchwad’ and that the said land of 25.39 acres has been utilized
for the said purpose. While establishing the new township, the
respondent No.2 - PCNTDA and respondent No.2A - PCMC as also
respondent No.2B - PMRDA were well within their rights to execute
necessary documents for establishing various parts of such a new
township which, as per the stated public purpose, included
industrial, commercial and residential areas.


44.   Hence, we find that the main ground and the thrust in the writ
petition seeking return of 25.39 acres of land to the petitioners, is
based on a misunderstanding of the stated public purpose and it is
also based on misapplication of the judgment of the Supreme Court
in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and another Vs. G.
Jayarama Reddy (supra). The original ground on which the writ
petition was filed in the year 2012 is, therefore, found to be without
any substance and the same is rejected.


45.   The record shows that the petitioners amended the writ
petition from time to time. As per order dated 19.08.2022, the
petitioners added respondent Nos.2A and 2B i.e. PCMC and PMRDA
respectively as party respondents in the light of subsequent
developments, as some portions of the property were taken over by
the PCMC and some others by PMRDA from respondent No.2 -
PCNTDA. By an order dated 18.12.2023, the petitioners were
permitted to amend the writ petition, whereby they added paragraph
Nos.16A to 16D, as also prayer clause (aa) in the writ petition. It is


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crucial to note that in the aforesaid order dated 18.12.2023, whereby
this Court allowed the petitioners to carry out the said amendments,
it was specifically made clear that this Court had not opined on the
merits of the matter and that the said aspects would be decided
when the writ petition is heard. A perusal of paragraphs 16A to 16D,
added by way of the aforesaid amendment, shows that reference was
made to the respondent No.2 - PCNTDA being dissolved from the
date of publication of Notification dated 07.06.2021. Reference was
also made to the respondent No.2 having leased out certain portion
of the aforesaid land for the period of 99 years for beautification and
it was also stated that the assets of respondent No.2 - PCNTDA had
been transferred to respondent No.2A - PCMC and respondent No.2B
- PMRDA. It was further alleged that when the petitioners had
approached the said respondents, they were throwing the burden on
each other.


46.    It is necessary to peruse prayer clause (aa), added by way of
amendment, permitted as per order dated 18.12.2023. The said
prayer clause reads as follows:-
      “(aa) That this Honourable Court be pleased to issue the
           necessary writ or direction in the nature of
           Mandamus under the provision of Article 226 of the
           Constitution of India directing, the respondent
           No.2A and / or the Respondent No.2B either to
           return the entire area of 25.39 acres from the suit
           property viz. Survey No.210 and 211 Wakad, Tal –
           Mulshi, Dist:- Pune to the petitioners herein and /
           or such area from the area of 25.39 acres which is
           not even today also utilized by the Respondent
           Municipal Corporation for the public purposes
           which are mentioned in the order dated 7 th July
           1992 by the State Government at Exhibit C page 53
           that area should be returned back to the petitioner
           by the respondent No.2A and / or respondent No.2B
           and the Respondent No.2A and / or the Respondent
           No.2B may be directed to pay the monetary

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           compensation in respect of the area, of 25.39 acres
           to the petitioner herein with such interest thereupon
           as the Honourable Court may deem fit after
           calculating the said amount in accordance with the
           provision of the Right to Fair Compensation and
           Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
           and Resettlement Act, 2013.”


47.     The first part of the above-quoted prayer clause (aa) reiterated
the claim of the petitioners that the said area of 25.39 acres had not
been utilized for the stated public purpose, inter alia, mentioned in
the order dated 07.07.1992 passed by the respondent - State under
Section 48 of the LA Act. The second part of the above-quoted prayer
clause (aa), for the first time, alternatively claimed monetary
compensation in respect of the entire 25.39 acres of land by
calculating the same in accordance with the provisions of the Act of
2013.


48.     We have perused the writ petition along with amendments, but
we find that there are no pleadings or statements in the writ petition
to form the basis for claiming relief in terms of the second part of the
above-quoted prayer clause (aa). It was only in paragraph 7 of the
writ petition, as it was originally filed, that a passing reference was
made to the allegation that the petitioners had not been paid
compensation for acquisition of 25.39 acres of land. Being a writ
petition before this Court, there cannot be an insistence on detailed
pleadings as would be required in a civil suit. But, we find substance
in the contention raised by the learned Advocate General that the
second part of prayer clause (aa), for the first time, seeking monetary
compensation by amendment in the year 2023, has no factual or
legal basis pleaded in the writ petition.




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49.    Nonetheless, we have considered the elaborate submissions
orally made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioners in support of the reliefs claimed in this petition, including
relief for monetary compensation as per the provisions of the Act of
2013. We have already noted hereinabove that the petitioners were
throughout aware of the acquisition proceedings. In fact, they filed
Writ Petition No.3719 of 1987 challenging the acquisition. The award
was already rendered on 23.09.1986 and it cannot be disputed that
the petitioners refused to respond to the notices issued under Section
12(2) of the LA Act and they did not collect the compensation
determined for acquisition of the land belonging to them, totally
admeasuring 97.01 acres from Survey No.210. The writ petition was
dismissed on 18.07.1989 and the review application filed by the
petitioners was also dismissed on 08.09.1989. The special leave
petition filed by the petitioners was withdrawn with liberty to the
petitioners to pursue their application under Section 48 of the LA
Act.



50.    The petitioners then filed Writ Petition No.36 of 1990, seeking
a direction to the Competent Authority to decide their applications
under Section 48 of the LA Act for deletion of their lands from
acquisition. The said writ petition was disposed of by granting liberty
to the petitioners to submit a comprehensive application under
Section 48 of the LA Act and a direction was issued to the concerned
Minister to hear and dispose of the said application. Consequently,
hearing was granted on 03.07.1992 and on 07.07.1992, the
respondent-State passed the order releasing 76.17 acres of land from
acquisition, requiring the petitioners to handover 25.39 acres of land.
It was recorded in the said order dated 07.07.1992 that the
petitioners would not be entitled to any amount towards damages for

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the period of acquisition. We do find substance in the contention
raised on behalf of the petitioners that the said condition recorded in
the order dated 07.07.1992, pertained to compensation under
Section 48(2) of the LA Act towards damages suffered by the
landowner in consequence of the acquisition proceedings together
with costs incurred by the landowner in prosecution of proceedings
under the LA Act relating to the subject land.


51.   But, it is to be noted that the petitioners resisted acquisition of
their land from the very beginning and in that context, pursued the
writ petition and review application before this Court and the special
leave petition before the Supreme Court. It is in this backdrop, that
the order dated 07.07.1992 was passed by the respondent-State,
releasing major portion of the acquired land admeasuring 76.17
acres from acquisition and retaining only 25.39 acres for the
aforesaid stated public purpose.


52.   As a matter of fact, the said order dated 07.07.1992 was
stayed by the State Government itself by a subsequent order dated
10.08.1992. The petitioners filed Writ Petition No.1116 of 1993 in
the High Court to challenge the said order of stay and insisted upon
the order dated 07.07.1992 being implemented.


53.   While the petitioner referred to filing of Writ Petition No.1116
of 1993 in this Court and they also placed on record copy of the
order dated 23.03.1993, whereby the stay order dated 10.08.1992
was set aside, paving the way for implementation of order dated
07.07.1992, they did not place on record copy of the memo of Writ
Petition No.1116 of 1993. The same was produced before this Court
on behalf of the respondents by the learned Advocate General,


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stating that the petitioners deliberately indulged in suppression of
material facts from this Court.


54.   The contents of the memo of Writ Petition No.1116 of 1993,
when produced before this Court, were not denied on behalf of the
petitioners. In paragraph 6 of Writ Petition No.1116 of 1993, these
very petitioners categorically stated as follows:-
       “6. The petitioners state that thus, the Respondent No.2
       had passed an order directing that after acquiring the land
       required for acquisition viz. 15 acres for the purpose of
       Bus Depot, Hospital and other public amenities plus 10
       Acres for other similar public purposes and thus, the total
       area of 25-39 Acres may be acquired for the new township
       development Authority and the remaining areas of 76.17
       acres which is in the residential zone may be dropped
       from acquisition and the same may be given for the
       development of 4 proposed cooperative housing societies,
       similarly it was further agreed that for the purpose of
       acquiring 25.39 acres the petitioners would not be
       entitled to any compensation. The petitioners state that
       thus, this order was passed pursuant to specific directions
       given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Writ Petition
       No.36/1990.”


55.   Thus, according to the petitioners themselves, it was an
agreement between them and the respondent authorities that 25.39
acres of their land would be acquired without any entitlement
towards compensation, while 76.17 acres would stand released.
Therefore, according to the petitioners, this was an agreement, which
was in the backdrop of their insistence on implementation of the said
order dated 07.07.1992 under Section 48 of the LA Act. This was
suppressed by the petitioners in the present writ petition and instead
the following statement was made in paragraph 7 of the present writ
petition:-
       “7. … At this juncture, it is further pointed out that till
       this date, the Petitioners have not been paid any single

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      ‘rupee’ towards their compensation against the
      acquisition of the said area of 25.39 Acres under the Land
      Acquisition Act, 1984.”


56.   The above-quoted sentence in the present writ petition is
diametrically opposite to the stand taken by the petitioners in the
above-quoted paragraph 6 of Writ Petition No.1116 of 1993 filed on
their behalf. All through the period of pendency of the present writ
petition, from the year 2012 till the final hearing, the petitioners did
not reveal the aforesaid stand taken by them in the previous Writ
Petition No.1116 of 1993. The respondents have brought the
aforesaid suppression of the petitioners to the notice of this Court. It
is in this backdrop that we have to appreciate the observation made
by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgement in the case
of Pimpri Chinchwad New Township Development Authority Vs.
Vishnudev Co-operative Housing Society and others (supra).
Although the petitioners were not parties to the said proceedings, it
is undisputed that some other members of the 'Deo family', to which
the petitioners themselves belong, had sold part of the property that
was the subject matter of acquisition to the said society and yet, no
reference was made at any point in time about the said proceeding.
Be that as it may, in the said judgement, the Supreme Court found
that 76.17 acres of land was released in favour of the landowners
(petitioners herein) and 25.39 acres was retained. This was recorded
as a 'bargain' by the Supreme Court in paragraph 42 of the said
judgement, which reads as follows:-
      “42. Indeed, the release of part of the land in
      landowners’ favour and retention of the remaining land
      for accomplishing the project vide Notification dated 20-
      8-1994 was in the nature of a bargain. It disentitled the
      landowners to seek further release of the remaining land.
      This is apart from the fact that consequent upon
      obtaining the possession of the land by the State, the
      release of the remaining land under Section 48 of the Act

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      was otherwise not legally possible.”


57.   The petitioners emphasized that the said reference to 'bargain'
was only in the context of landowners being disentitled to seek
further release of the remaining lands. But we are of the opinion that
the resistance to acquisition on the part of the petitioners, challenge
thereto by filing writ petition and review application before this
Court as also special leave petition before the Supreme Court,
culminating in release of 76.17 acres of the lands of the petitioners
with only 25.39 acres being retained, was clearly a bargain struck by
the petitioners and as per their own statement contained in the
above-quoted paragraph 6 of Writ Petition No.1116 of 1993, they
agreed that they would not be entitled to claim compensation for
acquisition of 25.39 acres of land.


58.   We find that when the petitioners were confronted, during
final hearing, with the memo of Writ Petition No.1116 of 1993,
particularly contents of paragraph 6 thereof, they took a stand that
even if 'ideally' they should have placed the said fact before this
Court, their claim for compensation as an assertion of their right
under Article 300-A of the Constitution could not be ignored. It was
asserted that the respondents cannot resist the claim of the
petitioners on the ground of delay and laches and that the law laid
down by the Supreme Court in that context inures to the benefit of
the petitioners.


59.   But, before considering the aspect of delay and laches, it would
be appropriate to first consider as to in what manner this Court
exercising writ jurisdiction should deal with the suppression of vital
facts by the petitioners, while pursuing the present writ petition.
Although, it was claimed on behalf of the petitioners that the failure

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to place the memo of Writ Petition No. 1116 of 1993 on record and
not referring to the specific assertion therein about agreement
between the petitioners and the respondents-State that they would
not claim compensation for acquisition of 25.39 acres of land, would
not amount to ‘material suppression’, we find that the said
suppression of fact was certainly an act of material suppression, for
the reason that in this writ petition, the petitioners are pursuing a
diametrically opposite line of arguments. The aforesaid Writ Petition
No. 1116 of 1993 was filed and pursued by the petitioners, insisting
upon release of 73.17 acres of land and in lieu thereof, the State
retaining 25.39 acres and in that backdrop, they specifically stated in
the said writ petition before this Court that they had agreed not to
claim compensation for 25.39 acres of land and yet, this most vital
fact was suppressed in the present writ petition. A completely
opposite stand was taken and as recently as in the year 2023, 11
years after filing of the present writ petition, the petitioners for the
first time amended the prayers to add prayer clause (aa) to claim
monetary compensation for the said piece of land. We find this to be
an act of brazen and deliberate suppression of material facts on the
part of the petitioners, while invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court.


60.   In this context, the position of law laid down by the Supreme
Court needs to be taken into account.


61.   In the case of Hari Narain vs. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558, the
Supreme Court found that substantially inaccurate and untrue
statements were made in the Special Leave Petition, due to which
leave was granted by the Supreme Court. Upon being apprised of the
correct facts, the Supreme Court revoked the leave granted to the
appellant and held that it would be unfair to betray the confidence of
the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading.

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62.   In the case of Abhyudya Sanstha vs. Union of India & Ors.
(2011) 6 SCC 145, the Supreme Court observed that the minimum
that is expected from litigants approaching the Court is that they do
so with clean hands and if they do not do so, they pollute the stream
of justice by making false statements. In the said judgment, the
Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment in the case of Dalip
Singh vs. State of U. P. (2010) 2 SCC 114 and quoted the relevant
paragraphs from the said judgment in the following manner :
      21. In Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. [(2010) 2 SCC 114]
      this Court noticed the progressive decline in the values of
      life and observed:
             “1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two
      basic values of life i.e. ‘satya’ (truth) and ‘ahimsa’ (non-
      violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma
      Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their
      daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-
      delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-
      independence era and the people used to feel proud to
      tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences.
      However, post-independence period has seen drastic
      changes in our value system. The materialism has
      overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal
      gain has become so intense that those involved in
      litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood,
      misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court
      proceedings.
             2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has
      cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have
      any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to
      falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals.
      In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of
      litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new
      rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who
      attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches
      the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not
      entitled to any relief, interim or final.”


63.   In the case of Kishore Samrite vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
(2013) 2 SCC 398, the Supreme Court referred to earlier precedents

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to cull out principles for dealing with litigants who mislead Courts.
The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows :
      “31. Now, we shall deal with the question whether both
      or any of the petitioners in Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 111 of
      2011 and 125 of 2011 are guilty of suppression of
      material facts, not approaching the court with clean
      hands, and thereby abusing the process of court. Before
      we dwell upon the facts and circumstances of the case in
      hand, let us refer to some case law which would help us
      in dealing with the present situation with greater
      precision.
      32. The cases of abuse of process of court and such
      allied matters have been arising before the courts
      consistently. This Court has had many occasions where it
      dealt with the cases of this kind and it has clearly stated
      the principles that would govern the obligations of a
      litigant while approaching the court for redressal of any
      grievance and the consequences of abuse of process of
      court. We may recapitulate and state some of the
      principles. It is difficult to state such principles
      exhaustively and with such accuracy that would
      uniformly apply to a variety of cases. These are:
      32.1. Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon
      litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the
      courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure of
      facts and came to the courts with “unclean hands”. Courts
      have held that such litigants are neither entitled to be
      heard on the merits of the case nor are entitled to any
      relief.
      32.2. The people, who approach the court for relief on an
      ex parte statement, are under a contract with the court
      that they would state the whole case fully and fairly to
      the court and where the litigant has broken such faith,
      the discretion of the court cannot be exercised in favour
      of such a litigant.
      32.3. The obligation to approach the court with clean
      hands is an absolute obligation and has repeatedly been
      reiterated by this Court.
      32.4. Quests for personal gains have become so intense
      that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take
      shelter of falsehood and misrepresent and suppress facts
      in the court proceedings. Materialism, opportunism and

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         malicious intent have overshadowed the old ethos of
         litigative values for small gains.
         32.5. A litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of
         justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with
         tainted hands is not entitled to any relief, interim or
         final.”


64.   Thus, the approach of the Supreme Court and consequently
the Constitutional Courts in such situations is that when it is found
that the petitioners have approached the Court and indulged in
suppression of material facts, in order to mislead the Court, such
petitioners are not entitled to any relief either interim or final. The
approach of the petitioners in casually dealing with their obvious act
of suppression of facts by stating that ‘ideally’ they should have
disclosed their stand in the earlier Writ Petition No. 1116 of 1993, is
found to be reprehensible. Such litigants cannot be allowed to go
scot-free and to turnaround and claim that their valuable
Constitutional right has been violated and therefore, this Court
exercising writ jurisdiction ought to hold in their favour. We find that
the conduct of the petitioners in the present case amounts to
approaching the writ Court with unclean hands and they have
polluted the stream of justice, deserving no indulgence from this
Court.


65.   In this context, much emphasis was placed on behalf of the
petitioners on the line of judgments of the Supreme Court dealing
with the question of delay and laches, when the right to property as a
constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India
has been considered. Reliance has been placed on judgments of the
Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal
Pradesh & Ors. (2020) 2 SCC 569 and Sukh Dutt Ratra and another
vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others (supra). We find that the

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said line of judgments, including the aforesaid two precedents, are
distinguishable from the facts of the present case.


66.   In the case of Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
(supra), the Supreme Court found that the appellant was an 80 year
old woman whose land was taken over by the State as far back as in
the year 1967-1968 for construction of a district road, which was
completed in the year 1975. The appellant was an illiterate widow
coming from a rural background, totally unaware of her rights and
entitlement in law and hence, she could not file any proceedings for
compensation for her land compulsorily taken over by the State. In
the year 2004, similarly situated persons, whose land had been taken
over by the State for the same public purpose, had approached the
High Court by filing a writ petition claiming compensation, and
certain orders were passed in their favour. Thereafter, the appellant
therein, becoming aware of the proceedings in the year 2010,
approached the High Court along with her daughter, seeking
compensation for the compulsory taking over of her land, way back
in the year 1967-68.


67.   It is in the backdrop of such facts that the Supreme Court held
that the writ Court can certainly consider the plight of such a
petitioner, who was deprived of her right under Article 300A of the
Constitution of India and thereupon, issued necessary directions for
compensation in accordance with law. The factual backdrop is crucial
to understand why the Supreme Court held that in such cases the
State cannot rely upon delay and laches as a ground to deny relief to
the petitioner.


68.   In the case of Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh and others (supra), the Supreme Court found that

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the appellants before the Court had stated that their lands were
utilized for construction of a road in the year 1972-73, while no land
acquisition proceedings at all were initiated and no compensation
was paid to them. The appellants therein approached the High Court
in writ jurisdiction in the year 2011. The appellants therein
contended that the State had simply taken over their land without
following due process of law and that they had been deprived of
their land without any compensation. The Supreme Court found that
although it was strenuously argued that the appellants therein had
approached the writ Court after a huge delay, the right of the
appellants therein under Section 300A of the Constitution of India,
which stipulates that no person shall be deprived of property save by
authority of law, had been violated. It was held that the State cannot
take the shelter of delay and laches as a ground to resist the claim for
compensation by a person, whose property has been expropriated
and that just and fair compensation must be paid. Reference was also
made to the said judgment in the case of Vidya Devi vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh & Ors. (supra).


69.   We find that the facts in the present case are clearly
distinguishable. The petitioners herein are not illiterate individuals.
As a matter of fact, they are very much aware about their rights. It is
a matter of record that they resisted acquisition of their land from
the very beginning. The petitioners filed aforesaid Writ Petition No.
3719 of 1987 to challenge the acquisition process, which had
culminated in award dated 23.09.1986. Upon their writ petition
being dismissed, they filed a review application before this Court,
which was also dismissed. Thereupon, they filed Special Leave
Petition before the Supreme Court, which was withdrawn in order
that the petitioners pursue their application for deletion of their land


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from acquisition. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners stridently
pursued the matter by filing further Writ Petition No. 36 of 1990, for
a direction to the Competent Authority to consider release of their
land from acquisition. When the order dated 07.07.1992, releasing
major portion of 76.17 acres of from acquisition, was stayed by a
subsequent order dated 10.08.1992, the petitioners filed the
aforesaid Writ Petition No. 1116 of 1993 for setting aside of the stay
order and insisting upon implementation of the order dated
07.07.1992.


70.   It is in the said Writ Petition No. 1116 of 1993 that the
petitioners specifically and categorically stated in the above quoted
paragraph 6 of the writ petition that there was an agreement
between them and the State that they will not claim compensation
for 25.39 acres of land. This was clearly in the backdrop of release of
76.17 acres from acquisition. This crucial fact was suppressed by the
petitioners in the present writ petition, even upto the time of its final
hearing, till they were confronted with the memo of Writ Petition No.
1116 of 1993, as a copy of the same was produced by the learned
Advocate General for the perusal of this Court.


71.   We are of the opinion that the facts in the present case clearly
show that the petitioners do not deserve any indulgence and they
cannot portray their case to be akin to cases in which the Supreme
Court and this Court has held that delay and laches would not be
relevant factor in the context of violation of right of the petitioners
under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.


72.   In the present case, the land acquisition award was passed as
far back as on 23.09.1986. Notices were issued to the petitioners
under Section 12(2) of the LA Act for receiving compensation, to

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which they refused to respond, as a consequence of which, the State-
Authorities deposited the compensation amount in PLA. The
possession of the land was handed over to the Authorities on
30.05.2000. It is specifically recorded in the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Pimpri Chinchwad New Township
Development Authority vs. Vishnudev Co-operative Housing Society
and others (supra) that possession was handed over without any
resistance after it was agreed between the land owners i.e. the
petitioners and the State that 76.17 acres of land was released from
acquisition. It is recorded in the said reported judgment that
petitioner No.1-Bhalchandra Chintaman Deo and petitioner No.10-
Chandrakant Gajanan Deo were personally present at the time of
taking over possession by the respondent No.1-SLAO.


73.   The present writ petition was filed in the year 2012 and in its
original form, the only thrust of the petitioners was that since the
said land of 25.39 acres was not utilized for the stated public
purpose and it was allegedly handed over to private parties, the land
must be returned to the petitioners in terms of law laid down by the
Supreme Court in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and
another vs. G. Jayarama Reddy and others (supra). There was no
prayer for granting monetary compensation or invoking of right to
property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Eleven
years after filing of the writ petition, in December 2023, the
petitioners amended the writ petition, for the first time, to add
prayer clause (aa), wherein it was claimed that monetary
compensation ought to be given as per the provisions of the Act of
2013. Thus, 37 years after the land acquisition award was passed
and 23 years after possession was willfully handed over to the
respondent    No.1-SLAO,    the    petitioners   claimed    monetary


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compensation and for that purpose, in the body of the writ petition
no factual or legal basis was incorporated.


74.   In this factual backdrop, we find that the petitioners cannot
rely upon the line of judgments, pertaining to Article 300A of the
Constitution of India in the context of the question of delay and
laches. The said position of law cannot inure to the benefit of the
petitioners, particularly when they have indulged in suppression of
material facts and misled this Court in the present writ petition. On
this ground alone, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.


75.   The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners relied
upon the judgement of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
in the case of Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and
others (supra). It was contended that the petitioners were not even
claiming lapsing of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the Act of
2013, but reliance was being placed on proviso to Section 24(2) of
the Act of 2013. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General
submitted that this was a case covered under Section 24(1)(b) of the
Act of 2013 as the award had been passed way back on 23.09.1986.


76.   We find that there can be no denial about the fact that the
award was passed on 23.09.1986. The petitioners refused to accept
the notices issued under Section 12(2) of the LA Act and they refused
to accept the compensation. As a consequence, the amount was
deposited in PLA. Much emphasis has been placed on behalf of the
petitioners on this aspect of the matter, to claim that the amount
should have been deposited in the Court and the amount being
deposited in PLA, was of no consequence. In this regard, reference
was made to Section 31 of the LA Act. It was submitted that the
moment it was conceded that the amount was deposited in PLA, the

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petitioners can certainly claim relief under proviso to Section 24(2)
of the Act of 2013.


77.   It was emphasized that the compensation amount should have
been deposited in the accounts of the beneficiaries in respect of
majority of land holding and since this had not been done, the
petitioners are now entitled for compensation in accordance with
provisions of the Act of 2013.


78.   In the first place, in the light of the observations made
hereinabove, we find that the petitioners are dis-entitled from
claiming compensation. In any case, the petitioners are not entitled
to invoke proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, by claiming
that since the respondent No.1-SLAO failed to deposit the
compensation amount in the account of the beneficiaries in the year
1986, they should be paid compensation today, as per the provisions
of the Act of 2013. It is an admitted position on record that the
petitioners never made any claim for compensation. In fact, they
refused to accept the compensation for the entire land acquired from
survey No.210. Even when 25.39 acres of land was taken over and
76.17 acres of land was released in favour of the petitioners, there
was no whisper on the part of the petitioners towards their claim for
compensation. The petitioners willfully handed over possession to
the respondent No.1-SLAO on 30.05.2000. They did not raise their
claim for compensation till the petition was amended in December
2023. Even while permitting the amendment, this Court had made it
explicitly clear that the merits of the claim were being kept open to
be decided at the stage of hearing of the writ petition.


79.   We find that the petitioners are now seeking to turnaround
and claim benefit of the provisions of the Act 2013, by claiming that

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failure on the part of the State in depositing compensation amount in
their accounts must penalize the State-exchequer and to pay
compensation    under    the   Act   of   2013,   notwithstanding    the
aforementioned conduct of the petitioners. We are unable to
appreciate the said stand taken by the petitioners.


80.   In this context, we find that the learned Advocate General is
justified in referring to relevant portions of the Constitution Bench of
the Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority vs.
Manoharlal and others (supra), wherein it is observed that Section
24(2) of the Act of 2013 is not a tool to revive old acquisition
proceedings and to question the validity of acquisitions or to claim
compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013, where the
land owners have no good reason to have refused to accept
compensation. The Supreme Court held that land owners cannot be
permitted to wake-up from deep slumber and raise such questions
after long periods of time and if they are permitted to do so, it would
result in financial strain on the treasury. The Supreme Court held
that the mode of deposit of compensation by the State-Authorities
cannot become the basis for claimants to seek relief after decades,
under the provisions of the Act of 2013.


81.   We are of the opinion that the said observations of the
Supreme Court in the Constitution Bench judgment have to be
applied to the present case, particularly keeping in mind the stated
case of the petitioners themselves in their Writ Petition No. 1116 of
1993, that there was an agreement between them and the State that
they would not claim compensation for 25.39 acres of land. The land
admeasuring 76.17 acres was released from acquisition and this
factor, as an agreement or ‘bargain’ was noted by the Supreme Court
itself in the aforesaid judgment in the case of Pimpri Chinchwad New

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Township    Development      Authority   vs.   Vishnudev    Co-operative
Housing Society and others (supra). It is not even the case of the
petitioners that they were coerced into the agreement. They
voluntarily gave possession of 25.39 acres of land in the year 2000
and did not raise a whisper about compensation till December, 2023.


82.   Considering the peculiar facts of this case, we find that the
petitioners are certainly not entitled to raise a contention that if their
petition is dismissed, it would lead to a situation where the State
could notify a larger chunk of land for acquisition and then restrict
the acquisition to a smaller piece, while refusing to pay
compensation for such smaller piece of land being acquired. Each
case has to be considered on its own facts and merits. In the present
case, we do not find the petitioners to be victims of any such ‘design’
of the State. As noted hereinabove, the notification under Section 4
of the LA Act was issued as far back as on 09.03.1970 and the
declaration under Section 6 thereof was issued on 09.11.1972 for the
stated public purpose of the planned development and utilization of
lands for establishing new township area in Pimpri Chinchwad and
for industrial, commercial and residential areas. The acquisition
process culminated in the award dated 23.09.1986 and possession of
only 25.39 acres of land could be taken after about 14 years i.e. on
30.05.2000. In the interregnum, the petitioners were continuously
litigating and eventually, as per their own specific stand, it was
agreed that the petitioners would not be paid for compensation for
25.39 acres and 76.17 acres were released from acquisition.
Therefore, the general apprehension expressed on behalf of the
petitioners does not apply to the facts of their case and by rejecting
the claim of the petitioners, this Court would not be granting
imprimatur to any such approach of the State of notifying a larger


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piece of land and eventually, acquiring a smaller piece without
paying compensation. Each case has to be dealt with on its own facts
and if such malicious conduct of the State is evident from the facts of
an individual case, the Court would certainly take remedial action.


83.   In this context, we do not find it necessary to deal with the
judgments of this Court relied upon by the petitioners in the cases of
Hemantkumar Krushnaji Charegaonkar vs. State of Maharashtra and
others (supra), Shital Anna Walawade and others vs. State of
Maharashtra and others (supra) and Geeta Vijay Deshpande and
others vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra). There can be no
quarrel with the position of law laid down in the said judgments of
this Court, to the effect that in the State of Maharashtra Rules were
not framed under the LA Act, specifying the mode of deposit of
compensation amount. But, the said judgments and the position of
law laid down therein cannot inure to the benefit of the petitioners,
in the light of the conclusions reached hereinabove.


84.   We find substance in the contention raised on behalf of the
respondent No.2A-PCMC by placing reliance on the judgments of the
Supreme Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Housing and
Infrastructure Development Board and another Vs. Vijay Bodana and
others (supra).


85.   In the said judgment, the Supreme Court found that due
credence has to be given to the aspect of delay and change in
position in creation of third party rights when the acquired land is
already utilized. It was held that innocent plot owners in the
acquired land would face the brunt, if the claims of the original
owners were considered and allowed and it would be a situation of
adversely affecting third party rights, despite considerable delay and

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                          laches on the part of the original land owners. It was found that the
                          Municipal Corporation therein had proceeded to develop the
                          acquired land creating third party rights.


                          86.   In the present case also, the new township of Pimpri-
                          Chinchwad has developed and industrial, commercial and residential
                          areas have been developed, wherein third party rights have been
                          created after possession of land was handed over by the petitioners
                          way back on 30.05.2000. Therefore, there is no question of
                          entertaining the prayer of the petitioners for return of their land and
                          in the light of the findings rendered hereinabove, we find that the
                          relief of monetary compensation sought by way of amendment, as
                          per subsequently added prayer clause (aa) can also not be granted.


                          87.   In the light of the findings rendered hereinabove, there is no
                          occasion to consider the additional prayer of relief in terms of
                          Government     Resolutions,   formulating    a   scheme   of     granting
                          developed plots by way of compensation. Hence, the writ petition is
                          devoid of merits.


                          88.   Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.


                          89.   Pending applications also stand disposed of.




                          (MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J.)                          (MANISH PITALE, J.)



      Minal/Bipin/Priya




         Digitally
         signed by
PRIYA  PRIYA KAMBLI
       Date:
KAMBLI 2026.03.09
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         17:44:27
         +0530