RAJNISH SHUKLAversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

                 CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 11267 of 2024

Rajnish Shukla
                                                              .....Appellant(s)
                                      Versus
State of U.P. and Another
                                                            .....Respondent(s)

Counsel for Appellant(s)          :    Shivam Shukla, Sushil Kumar Shukla
Counsel for Respondent(s)         :    G.A., Rajendra Kumar Sonker

Court No. - 53
                     HON'BLE ABDUL SHAHID, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel appearing for
opposite party no. 2 and the learned A.G.A. for the State. Perused the record.

2. The instant criminal appeal has been preferred against the entire
proceedings, including the cognizance order dated 26.09.2023 as well as the
charge sheet, passed by the learned court of the Special Judge, SC/ST Act,
Kanpur Nagar, in Sessions Case No. 1386 of 2023, State vs. Rajnish Shukla
and others, arising out of Case Crime No. 123 of 2023, under Sections 452,
504, 323 read with Section 34 I.P.C., and Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989;
Section 354 read with Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Section 354-B read
with Section 3(2)(va) Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Section 376 read with Section 3(2)(v)
of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989; Section 506 read with Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; and Sections
3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), and 3(1)(w)(i) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Police Station Hanumant Vihar,
South Commissionerate, District Kanpur Nagar, by which the learned trial
court summoned the appellant to face trial and fixed the next date as
18.10.2023.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there is a
considerable delay in the registration of the FIR. The alleged incident took
place on 27.04.2023, whereas the FIR was lodged on 03.05.2023. It is
submitted that the FIR appears to have been lodged after due deliberation
and thought. The FIR has been lodged by Pankaj Kumar against Golu
Mishra, Sandeep Shukla, Rajnish Shukla (revisionist), and Sonu Pandit.

4. As per the allegations made in the FIR, the complainant belongs to the
Scheduled Caste and is working as a driver in the Transport Department. On
27.04.2023, at about 9:40 PM, after having dinner, the complainant was
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sitting outside his house. At that time, the accused persons, namely Golu
Mishra, Sandeep Shukla, Rajneesh Shukla/revisionist, and Sonu Pandit, were
passing through the road and allegedly started abusing the complainant with
filthy abuses relating to his mother and sister and also used caste-indicative
insulting words, asking him to remain inside the house. When the
complainant protested, the accused persons allegedly rushed towards him to
assault him. The complainant then ran inside his house, and the accused
persons entered the house and started beating him.

5. It is further alleged that when the complainant's wife, Archana, and his
sister-in-law, Radha, intervened to save him, the accused persons caught
Radha by her hair and threw her on the ground. It is also alleged that
Sandeep beaten her hand and Rajneesh tore her blouse and committed
obscene acts. The complainant is said to have sustained injuries on his
hands, while Radha sustained injuries on her left hand. The accused persons
also allegedly threatened the complainant and his family with dire
consequences, using caste-related abuses and asking them to leave the house
if they did not stay within their limits. According to the complainant, the acts
of the accused persons created terror in the neighbourhood, and people were
not willing to come forward to support him. The complainant and his family
members were allegedly threatened with death.

6. It is also stated that the complainant dialed number 112, upon which the
police arrived at the spot, and the accused persons fled to their houses. After
the police left, the accused persons allegedly called 10–12 persons by phone
and again threatened the complainant and his family members. The
complainant claims that he apprehends danger to his life. The complainant
further states that he got medical treatment for himself and Radha at Arjun
Kashiram Hospital. According to him, although the police had visited the
area, the report was not registered at that time, and the accused persons
continued to pressurize the complainant and his family members to
compromise, failing which they allegedly extended threats to kill them.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the alleged incident did
not occur in a public place and, therefore, the provisions of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 are not
attracted. It is contended that the incident took place inside the house and not
at a public place. It has further been submitted that enmity between the
parties is admitted. Learned counsel has also pointed out serious
contradictions in the statements recorded under Sections 161 Cr.P.C. and
164 Cr.P.C., and submitted that the charge-sheet has been filed without any
substantive evidence. He has placed reliance on the judgment of Hitesh
Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand and Another, passed by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 707 of 2020, and has specifically
referred to paragraph 14, which reads as follows:

Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any
place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view"
had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as
Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors. The Court
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had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any
place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside
the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by
someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn
would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the
remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there
(not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is
not in the public view. The Court held as under:

     "28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first
     informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a
     "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the
     gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place
     within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place
     within public view. It could have been a different matter had the
     alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was
     not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed
     outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn
     can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the
     boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the
     public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building,
     but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or
     friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public
     view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place
     within public view" with the expression "public place". A place
     can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other
     hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is
     owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other
     local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and
     not by private persons or private bodies."

8. It has also been argued that the injuries sustained by the injured persons
are simple in nature. Archana is reported to have suffered only two abrasions
on the left wrist joint and on the lower part of the body, while Radha has
been found to have only pain in the abdomen. The complainant, Pankaj
Kumar, is reported to have sustained two contusions on the left side of the
neck and on the wrist joint.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that the complainant
never alleged in the FIR that rape was committed upon his bhabhi, who is
the alleged victim. Similarly, Archana, wife of the complainant, has also not
alleged that the appellant committed rape upon her jethani. Even the victim,
in her statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., did not initially support
any allegation of rape against the appellant.

10. It is submitted that the victim, aged about 25 years and a married
woman, for the first time stated in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
that the appellant had inserted his finger into her private part. When she was
specifically asked as to why she had not disclosed this fact earlier to the
police, she stated that it was her mistake. She further stated that at the time
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of the incident her devar and devarani were present at the spot. Her devar is
the complainant and her devarani is Archana, both of whom had sustained
injuries and were present there. When she was asked why the complainant
had not mentioned this fact in the FIR, she replied that he might not have
known about it, as he was lying beside her after sustaining injuries.

11. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there has
been a significant improvement in the version of the victim. Neither the
complainant nor any of the injured persons mentioned the allegation of rape
in their statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It is further submitted
that the FIR was lodged with a delay of about seven days and the allegation
of rape was introduced subsequently.

12. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for opposite party no. 2 has
opposed the present criminal appeal and submitted that the learned trial court
has passed the impugned order after due consideration of the material
available on record, and the same does not suffer from any illegality,
infirmity, or perversity. It has further been submitted that the cognizance
order and the consequential proceedings have rightly been initiated by the
trial court. Therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court in the
present appeal. He further submitted that there are two FIRs against the
appellant vide Case Crime No. 443 of 2022, under Sections 323, 354, 504,
294 IPC and Case Crime No. 811 of 2017, under Sections 354, 323, 504,
506 IPC and Section 7/8 of POCSO Act. It is clarified that each criminal
case has to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.

13. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material available on record. It is admitted that there exists
enmity between the parties. There is also an allegation of rape under Section
376 IPC, which is a serious and heinous offence, and Section 3(2)(v) of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989 has also been invoked.

14. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sujoy Ghosh vs. State of
Jharkhand and Another, reported in 2026 INSC 267, in paragraphs 13
and 14 as follows:

     "13. The principles governing the summoning of an accused in a
     criminal case, as well as the parameters for quashing criminal
     proceedings, are well settled. Summoning of an accused in a
     criminal case is a serious matter, and criminal law cannot be set
     into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant
     has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the
     complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of
     the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect application of
     mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The
     Magistrate must carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on
     record and determine whether any offence is prima facie made
     out. The Magistrate may even himself put questions to the
     complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the
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                                5

     truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise, and then examine if
     any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.
     (See: Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate &
     Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749; Vikas Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh
     & Another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1534.)

     14. When an accused seeks quashing of either the FIR or criminal
     proceedings on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly
     frivolous, vexatious, or malicious, the Court is duty-bound to
     examine the matter with greater care. It will not be just enough
     for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/
     complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
     necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are
     disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court
     owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances
     emerging from the record of the case, over and above the
     averments, and, if need be, with due care and circumspection,
     and try to read between the lines. The Court while exercising its
     jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
     or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, need not restrict itself
     only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account
     the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/ registration of
     the case as well as the materials collected in the the course of
     investigation. (See: Mohd. Wajid & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh
     & Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 219)."

15. In the present case, the genesis of the occurrence is that the complainant
was sitting outside his house after having dinner when the accused persons
passed through the road and allegedly abused him. Upon protest, the accused
persons allegedly attempted to assault him, whereupon the complainant ran
inside his house and the accused persons followed him inside and started
beating him. Thus, the alleged incident of assault and the subsequent events
took place within the premises of the house.

16. In view of the aforesaid facts, prima facie, the ingredients of Section 376
IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 do not appear to be made out against the
appellant. Furthermore, there appear to be serious contradictions in the
contents of the FIR and in the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
of the complainant, the victim, and the injured persons. The victim appears
to have made substantial improvements in her version under Section 164
Cr.P.C., which are in contradiction to her earlier statement, the contents of
the FIR lodged by the complainant, and the statements of the injured
persons. Moreover, the FIR has been lodged with a delay of about seven
days.

17. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is
of the view that no offence under Section 376 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989 is made out against the appellant.
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                                    18. Accordingly, the summoning of the appellant under Section 376 IPC and
                                    Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
                                    (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is hereby set aside. The criminal appeal
                                    is partly allowed.

                                    19. However, it shall be open to the learned trial court to proceed against the
                                    appellant with respect to the remaining offences, in accordance with law.
                                    March 23, 2026
                                    M. Tarik
                                                                                               (Abdul Shahid,J.)




Digitally signed by :-
MOHD TARIK
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad