GAURAV GOYALversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND 3 OTHERS

            HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
             CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5110 of 2026

Gaurav Goyal
                                                              .....Petitioner(s)
                                   Versus

State Of Uttar Pradesh And 3 Others
                                                            .....Respondent(s)

Counsel for Petitioner(s)       : Eishan Mehta, Prateek Rai, Sunil
                                  Kumar Upadhyay, Vipin Kumar
Counsel for Respondent(s)       : G.A.

Court No. - 47
                 HON'BLE RAJEEV MISRA, J.
                 HON'BLE LAKSHMI KANT SHUKLA, J.

1. Heard Mr. Prateek Rai, the learned counsel for petitioner, the learned
AGA representing State-respondents 1, 2 and 3 and Mr. Yogesh Kumar
Singh, the learned counsel representing first informant/respondent 4 Harsh
Garg who has put in appearance by filing a short counter affidavit along with
his vakalatnama in Court today, which is taken on record.

2. Perused the record.

3. Petitioner Gaurav Goyal has approached this Court by means of present
Criminal Misc. Writ Petition challenging the FIR dated 31.01.2026 lodged
by first informant/respondent 4 Harsh Garg and registered as Case Crime
No. 73 of 2026, under sections 352 and 109(1) of BNS, Police Station Kavi
Nagar, District Commissionerate Ghaziabad.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that after aforementioned FIR was
lodged parties amicably settled their dispute outside the court. On the basis
of settlement so arrived at between the parties a compromise was entered
into. Subsequently the terms of the settlement were reduced to writing by
way of a settlement agreement dated 19.02.2026. A copy of the said
settlement agreement has been brought on record as Annexure-2 to the writ
petition.

5. On the above premise, the learned counsel for petitioner thus submits that
dispute between the parties is a purely private dispute. Offence complained
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of is not a crime against State or society. As such there cannot be any legal
impediment in accepting the compromise entered into by the parties. It is
further submitted by the learned counsel for petitioner that the compromise
entered into by the parties has been acted upon. As such on date there is no
lis between the parties. At this juncture the learned counsel for petitioner
invited the attention of Court to paragraph 3 of the short counter affidavit
filed on behalf of first informant/respondent 4 wherein the first
informant/respondent 4 has clearly admitted the compromise entered into by
the parties. For ready reference paragraph 3 of the short counter affidavit
filed by first informant/respondent 4 is extracted herein under:-

      "3. That during the pendency of the investigation, the deponent
      (First Informant) and the injured person, Rinku, have amicably
      settled the dispute with the Petitioner, Gaurav Goyal, by
      executing a formal Settlement Deed dated 19.02.2026. This
      settlement deed is already annexed to main Criminal Misc. Writ
      Petition."

6. It is then contended by the learned counsel for petitioner that once the
parties had entered into a compromise no useful purpose shall be served in
prolonging the criminal prosecution of petitioner. In case the criminal
prosecution of petitioner is allowed to continue, the same shall result in loss
of public time and money. It is thus contended by the learned counsel for
petitioner that in view of above, the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed by
this Court.

7. Per contra the learned AGA representing State-respondents 1, 2, 3 does
not oppose the present writ petition. Learned AGA submits that since
offence complained of is private in nature and not a crime against State or
Society, therefore, he cannot have any objection in case the present writ
petition is decided by this Court in terms of the compromise entered into by
the parties.

8. Mr. Yogesh Kumar Singh, the learned counsel representing first
informant/respondent 4 on the other hand submits that he has received
instructions not to oppose the present writ petition. According to the learned
counsel representing first informant/respondent 4, it is an admitted fact that
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                                3


the parties have entered into a compromise. Moreover the said compromise
has been acted upon. It is thus contended by the learned counsel representing
first informant/respondent 4 that once the first informant/respondent 4 has
himself entered into a compromise with the accused-petitioner which fact is
clearly evident from the recital contained in paragraph 3 of the short counter
affidavit filed by first informant/respondent 4 then in that circumstance he
cannot have any grievance in case the present writ petition is decided by this
Court in terms of the compromise entered into by the parties.

9. Be that as it may, the crux of the matter is that the parties have entered
into a compromise, which has been acted upon. This Court is not unmindful
of the following judgements of Apex Court:

i. B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 SCC
675

ii. Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582

iii. Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation[2008)9 SCC
677]

iv. Manoj Sharma Vs. State and others ( 2008) 16 SCC 1

v. Shiji @ Pappu and Others VS. Radhika and Another, (2011) 10 SCC
705

vi. Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303

vii. K. Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226

viii. Dimpey Gujral and others Vs. Union Territory through
Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2013) 11 SCC 497

ix. Narindra Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab ( 2014) 6 SCC 466

x. Yogendra Yadav and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand and another (2014)
9 SCC 653

xi. Shlok Bhardwaj Vs. Runika Bhardwaj, (2015) 2 SCC 721

xii. C.B.I. Vs. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389
                                                     CRLP No. 5110 of 2026
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xiii. C.B.I. Vs. Sadhu Ram Singla and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 350

xiv. Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others
Vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641

xv. Anita Maria Dias and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others,
(2018) 3 SCC 290

xvi. Social Action Forum For Manav Adhikar and Another Vs. Union of
India and others, (2018) 10 SCC, 443 (Constitution Bench)

xvii. State of M.P. VS. Dhruv Gurjar and Another, (2019) 5 SCC 570

xviii. State of M.P. V/s Laxmi Narayan & Ors., (2019) 5 SCC 688

xix. Rampal Vs. State of Haryana, AIR online 2019 SC 1716

xx. Arun Singh and Others VS. State of U.P. and Another (2020) 3 SCC
736

xxi. (Ramgopal and Another Vs. The State of M.P.), 2021 SCC OnLine
SC 834

xxii. Daxaben Vs. State of Gujarat, 2022 SCC Online 936.

xxiii. State of Kerala VS. Hafsal Rahman N.R., Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) Diary Nos. 24362 of 2021.

xiv. Shatrughna Atmaram Patil and Another Vs. Vinod Dodhu
Chaudhary and Another, (2024) 4 SCC 458.

xv. Suraj Singh Gujar and Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and
Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2414.

xvi. K. Bharti Devi and Another Vs. State of Telangana and Another,
(2024) 10 SCC 384.

xvii. Ramji Lal Bairwa and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3193.

xviii. H.N. Pandakumar Vs. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
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38.

wherein the Apex Court has categorically held that compromise can be made
between the parties even in respect of certain cognizable and non
compoundable offences. However, Apex Court in State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi
Narayan (Supra) held that no compromise can be made in respect of
offences against society as they are not private in nature. Similarly in Ram
Pal Vs. State of Haryana (Supra) it has been held that no compromise can
be made in cases relating to rape and sexual assault. Recently, the Apex
Court in Daxaben (supra) has held that no compromise can be made in
matter under Section 306 IPC. In state of Kerala Vs. Hafsal Rahman
(Supra), Court has held that no compromise can be entertained in matters
under the POCSO Acts. Reference may also be made to the decision given
by this Court in Shaifullah and others Vs. State of U.P. And another
[2013 (83) ACC 278] in which the law expounded by the Apex court in
some of the aforesaid cases has been explained in detail.

Recently Apex court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur (Supra) has laid down the following guidelines with regard to
quashing of criminal proceedings as well compromise in criminal
proceedings in paragraphs 16 to 16.10 of the report, which read as under:

      "16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on
      the subject, may be summarized in the following propositions
      16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
      Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
      secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
      powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere
      in the High Court;
      16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
      quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on
      the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the
      offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
      jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While
      compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by
      the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
      Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is
      attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
      16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
      complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
      under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the
      ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
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     16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
     ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends
     of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
     16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First
     Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the
     offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately
     on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive
     elaboration of principles can be formulated;
     16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
     dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High
     Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
     offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental
     depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
     appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the
     victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly
     speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon
     society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is
     founded on the overriding element of public interest in
     punishing persons for serious offences;
     16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
     criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
     element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so
     far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
     16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
     commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
     transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
     situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the
     dispute;
     16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
     proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants,
     the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of
     a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice;
     and
     16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
     propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving
     the financial and economic well-being of the state have
     implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
     between private disputants. The High Court would be justified
     in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an
     activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour.
     The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial
     or economic system will weigh in the balance."

Recently in Ramgopal and another (supra), Court has again reiterated the
guidelines regarding quashing of criminal proceedings in view of
compromise. Following has been observed in paragraph 18-19:-

     "18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that plenary jurisdiction
     of this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142
     cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory
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                                   7

     provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an
     express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers
     on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal
     proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of
     the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to
     quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete
     justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the
     overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice
     system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of
     maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of
     placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.
     19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320
     Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise
     between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable'
     within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power
     enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or
     vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can
     be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C.
     Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude
     ought to be exercise carefully in the context of quashing
     criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of
     the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of
     the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between
     accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons,
     prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence
     and/or other relevant considerations."

10. Having heard the learned counsel for petitioners, the learned A.G.A. for
State-respondents 1 and 2 and 3, the learned counsel representing first
informant-respondent-4, upon perusal of record and in view of the facts and
circumstances of the case as noted herein above and also the observations
made by the Apex Court as mentioned above, this Court finds that there does
not exists any legal impediment in accepting the compromise entered into by
the parties inasmuch as, the dispute between the parties is private in nature
and not a crime against state or society. In view of the compromise entered
into by the parties, the chances of conviction of accused-petitioners is not
only remote but also bleak. As such, continuation of proceedings would
itself cause injustice to the parties. The trial would only entail loss of judicial
time in a futile pursuit particularly when torrents of litigation drown the
Courts with an unimaginable flood of dockets.

11. In view of the discussion made above, the present writ petition succeeds
and is liable to be allowed.

12. It is, accordingly, allowed.
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                                    13. The FIR dated 31.01.2026 lodged by first informant/respondent 4 Harsh
                                    Garg and registered as Case Crime No. 73 of 2026, under sections 352 and
                                    109(1) of BNS, Police Station Kavi Nagar, District Commissionerate
                                    Ghaziabad (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) is quashed.

                                    14. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own
                                    costs.



                                                                 (Lakshmi Kant Shukla,J.) (Rajeev Misra,J.)
                                    March 18, 2026
                                    Arti




Digitally signed by :-
ARTI SHARMA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad