MANISH AND 2 OTHERSversusSTATE OF U.P. AND 2 OTHERS

             HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

            CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5127 of 2026

Manish And 2 Others
                                                                .....Petitioner(s)
                                   Versus
State Of U.P. And 2 Others
                                                              .....Respondent(s)

Counsel for Petitioner(s)            :   Amit Kumar, Vinod Kumar Tirpathi
Counsel for Respondent(s)            :   G.A.

Court No. - 47
                 HON'BLE RAJEEV MISRA, J.
                 HON'BLE LAKSHMI KANT SHUKLA, J.

1. Heard Mr. Amit Kumar, the learned counsel for petitioners, the learned
AG.A. representing State/respondents 1 & 2 and Mr. Nimesh Kumar Shukla,
Advocate, who has put in appearance on behalf of first
informant/respondent-4 by filing his vakalatnama in court today, which is
taken on record.

2. Perused the record.

4. Petitioners-Manish And 2 Others have approached this Court by means of
present criminal misc. writ petition challenging the FIR dated 27.01.2026
lodged by first informant-respondent-3 Nandlal, and registered as Case
Crime No. 0015 of 2025, under Sections 115 (2), 352, 351 (2), 324 (2) BNS,
Police Station-Jarcha, District-Gautam Buddha Nagar.

5. Learned counsel for petitioners in support of present writ petition submits
that after aforementioned F.I.R. was lodged, on account of intervention of
well wishers, parties amicably settled their dispute outside the Court. In
view of the settlement so arrived at between the parties, a compromise was
entered into by the parties. Subsequently, the terms of compromise so
entered into by the parties were reduced to writing by way of a compromise
affidavit dated 03.02.2026. Photocopy of the compromise affidavit has been
brought on record and is at page 26 of the paper book.

6. On the above premise, the learned counsel for petitioners submits that the
dispute between the parties is a purely private dispute. As such, offence
complained of is not a crime against State or society. In view of above,
there does not exist any legal impediment in accepting the compromise so
entered into by the parties. Moreover, since the parties have entered into
compromise, therefore, no useful purpose shall be served in prolonging the
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                                 2

criminal prosecution of petitioners. In case the criminal prosecution of
petitioners is allowed to continue, the same shall result in loss of public time
and money. Apart from above, the compromise entered into by the parties
has been acted upon. It is thus urged by the learned counsel for petitioners
that the impugned F.I.R dated 27.01.2026 is liable to be quashed by this
Court.

7. Per contra, the learned learned A.G.A. for State-respondents 1 and 2
submits that since offence complained of is private in nature and not a crime
against State or Society, therefore, he cannot have any objection in case the
present writ petition is decided by this Court in terms of the compromise so
entered into by the parties.

8. Mr. Nimesh Kumar Shukla,, the learned counsel representing first
informant/respondent-3 on the other hand submits that he has received
instructions not to oppose this writ petition. According to the learned counsel
representing first informant/respondent-3, it is an admitted fact that after
aforementioned F.I.R. was lodged, parties have amicably settled their
dispute out side the Court. Once the first informant/respondent-3 has
himself entered into a compromise with the accused petitioners and the said
compromise has been acted upon then in that eventuality he cannot have any
grievance in case present writ petition is decided by this Court in view of the
compromise entered into by the parties.

9. Be that as it may, the crux of the matter is that the parties have entered
into a compromise, which has been acted upon. This Court is not unmindful
of the following judgements of Apex Court:

i. B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 SCC
675
ii. Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582
iii. Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation[2008)9 SCC
677]
iv. Manoj Sharma Vs. State and others ( 2008) 16 SCC 1
v. Shiji @ Pappu and Others VS. Radhika and Another, (2011) 10 SCC
705
vi. Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303
vii. K. Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226
viii. Dimpey Gujral and others Vs. Union Territory through
Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2013) 11 SCC 497
ix. Narindra Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab ( 2014) 6 SCC 466
x. Yogendra Yadav and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand and another (2014)
9 SCC 653
xi. Shlok Bhardwaj Vs. Runika Bhardwaj, (2015) 2 SCC 721
xii. C.B.I. Vs. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389
xiii. C.B.I. Vs. Sadhu Ram Singla and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 350
xiv. Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others
Vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641
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xv. Anita Maria Dias and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others,
(2018) 3 SCC 290
xvi. Social Action Forum For Manav Adhikar and Another Vs. Union of
India and others, (2018) 10 SCC, 443 (Constitution Bench)
xvii. State of M.P. VS. Dhruv Gurjar and Another, (2019) 5 SCC 570
xviii. State of M.P. V/s Laxmi Narayan & Ors., (2019) 5 SCC 688
xix. Rampal Vs. State of Haryana, AIR online 2019 SC 1716
xx. Arun Singh and Others VS. State of U.P. and Another (2020) 3 SCC
736
xxi. (Ramgopal and Another Vs. The State of M.P.), 2021 SCC OnLine
SC 834
xxii. Daxaben Vs. State of Gujarat, 2022 SCC Online 936.
xxiii. State of Kerala VS. Hafsal Rahman N.R., Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) Diary Nos. 24362 of 2021.

xiv. Shatrughna Atmaram Patil and Another Vs. Vinod Dodhu
Chaudhary and Another, (2024) 4 SCC 458.

xv. Suraj Singh Gujar and Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and
Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2414.

xvi. K. Bharti Devi and Another Vs. State of Telangana and Another,
(2024) 10 SCC 384.

xvii. Ramji Lal Bairwa and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3193.

xviii. H.N. Pandakumar Vs. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
38.

wherein the Apex Court has categorically held that compromise can be made
between the parties even in respect of certain cognizable and non
compoundable offences. However, Apex Court in State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi
Narayan (Supra) held that no compromise can be made in respect of
offences against society as they are not private in nature. Similarly in Ram
Pal Vs. State of Haryana (Supra) it has been held that no compromise can
be made in cases relating to rape and sexual assault. Recently, the Apex
Court in Daxaben (supra) has held that no compromise can be made in
matter under Section 306 IPC. In state of Kerala Vs. Hafsal Rahman
(Supra), Court has held that no compromise can be entertained in matters
under the POCSO Acts. Reference may also be made to the decision given
by this Court in Shaifullah and others Vs. State of U.P. And another
[2013 (83) ACC 278] in which the law expounded by the Apex court in
some of the aforesaid cases has been explained in detail.
Recently Apex court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur (Supra) has laid down the following guidelines with regard to
quashing of criminal proceedings as well compromise in criminal
proceedings in paragraphs 16 to 16.10 of the report, which read as under:
"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the
subject, may be summarized in the following propositions
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of
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justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and
preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First
Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a
settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not
the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding
an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is
governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even
if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint
should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the
High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the
exercise of the inherent power;
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and
plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report
should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled
the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing
with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious
offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and
dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of
the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not
private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to
continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element
of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases
which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute.
They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent
power to quash is concerned;
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial,
financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an
essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing
where parties have settled the dispute;
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if
in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a
conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would
cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8
and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic
well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a
mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity
akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The
consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic
system will weigh in the balance."
Recently in Ramgopal and another (supra), Court has again reiterated the
guidelines regarding quashing of criminal proceedings in view of
compromise. Following has been observed in paragraph 18-19:-
"18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that plenary jurisdiction of this
Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be
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limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy
that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section 482
Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside
criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of the
Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to quash criminal
proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard
must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal
justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of
maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an
individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.
19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where
the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in
respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the
extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can
be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C.
Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be
exercise carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings,
bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of
the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of
compromise between accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the
accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence
and/or other relevant considerations."
10. In State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan (Supra), the Apex Court held that
mere mention of Section 307 IPC cannot be sole basis for not quashing the
proceedings. Court has to examine whether the prosecution has collected
sufficient evidence for framing of charge under Section 307 IPC. The Court
has further required to examine the weapons used and nature of injury and
whether injury has been inflicted on vital/delicate parts of the body, the
previous antecedents of accused and whether they are absconding and how
the compromise was got entered into by the parties are relevant factors,
which must be considered. The above observations can be clearly delineated
from the recital occurring in paragraphs 11 to 18 of the aforementioned
report.

11. Having heard the learned counsel for petitioners, the learned A.G.A. for
State-respondents 1, 2 and 3, the learned counsel representing first
informant-respondent-4, upon perusal of record and in view of the facts and
circumstances of the case as mentioned herein above and also the
observations made by the Apex Court as noted above, this Court finds that
there does not exists any legal impediment in accepting the compromise
entered into by the parties inasmuch as, the dispute between the parties is
private in nature and not a crime against state or society. In view of the
compromise entered into by the parties, the chances of conviction of
accused-petitioners is not only remote but also bleak. As such, continuation
of proceedings would itself cause injustice to the parties. The trial would
only entail loss of judicial time in a futile pursuit particularly when torrents
of litigation drown the Courts with an unimaginable flood of dockets.
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                                    12. In view of the discussion made above, the present writ petition succeeds
                                    and is liable to be allowed.

                                    13. It is, accordingly, allowed.

                                    14. The FIR dated 27.01.2026 lodged by first informant-respondent-3
                                    Nandlal, and registered as Case Crime No. 0015 of 2025, under Sections 115
                                    (2), 352, 351 (2), 324 (2) BNS, Police Station-Jarcha, District-Gautam
                                    Buddha Nagar (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) shall stand quashed.

                                    15. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own
                                    costs.

                                    March 18, 2026
                                    YK
                                                                 (Lakshmi Kant Shukla,J.) (Rajeev Misra,J.)




Digitally signed by :-
YASHWANT KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad