ANKIT KUMARversusSTATE OF U.P. AND 5 OTHERS

   HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

          CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 210 of 2025

Ankit Kumar
                                                  .....Revisionist(s)
                             Versus
State Of U.P. And 5 Others
                                                      .....Opposite
                                                            Party(s)

Counsel for Revisionist(s)    : Raghuvansh Chandra, Ram
                                Jee Saxena
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Atul Kumar Shahi, G.A.

Court No. - 45

          HON'BLE LAKSHMI KANT SHUKLA, J.


1. Heard Mr. Raghuvansh Chandra, learned counsel for the
revisionist, learned A.G.A. for the State and Mr. Atul Kumar
Shahi, learned counsel for opposite party nos.2,3,4,5 and 6 and
perused the record.

2. The present criminal revision has been preferred before this
Court assailing the impugned order dated 10.10.2024 passed by
the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No. 6,
Meerut (hereinafter referred to as "the Trial Court") in Sessions
Trial No.995 of 2014, State v. Anuj, whereby the application filed
by the revisionist under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has been rejected.

3. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the revisionist has
preferred the present criminal revision, inter alia, on the grounds
that the impugned order has been passed in a routine and
mechanical manner without proper application of judicial mind. It
is further submitted that the impugned order is arbitrary, illegal,
and contrary to the settled principles of law. The order is also
stated to be in derogation of the law laid down by the Apex Court
in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92.

4. Elaborating his submissions, learned counsel for the revisionist
contended that at the time of the incident, the proposed accused
nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 were also present in the house where the
deceased died under suspicious circumstances. Therefore, in view
                                                           CRLR No. 210 of 2025
                             2

of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden lies upon
opposite party nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 to explain the circumstances in
which the deceased died. It has further been submitted that the
proposed accused persons were specifically named in the FIR
with allegations that they used to misbehave with the deceased,
which fact had been disclosed by the deceased herself to PW-1.
Learned counsel submits that the said aspect ought to have been
considered seriously by the Trial Court.

5. PW-1, Ankit Kumar has categorically supported the
prosecution case in his testimony before the Court. It has also
been argued that the cause of death of the deceased has been
opined to be poisoning and, in the postmortem report, a contusion
near the left clavicle bone on the chest of the deceased was found,
which prima facie indicates that prior to administration of poison,
the deceased had been subjected to physical harassment.
However, the Trial Court failed to consider the aforesaid material
facts and circumstances while rejecting the application under
Section 319 Cr.P.C.

6. To buttress his submissions, learned counsel for the revisionist
drew the attention of the Court towards paragraph 9 of the
judgment of Apex Court in Mohammad Kaleem v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh and others, 2026 INSC 251. It has been held in
Paragraph 9 of Mohammad Kaleem (supra):

     "9. At the same time, the Court has highlighted certain limits
     to the Trial Court's discretion at Section 319 Cr.P.C. stage.
     Hardeep Singh (supra) clarified that the Court need not
     establish guilt or conduct a detailed credibility assessment at
     this stage, while Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of
     U.P. and others, 2026 AIR SC 41 held that pre-trial scrutiny
     should not resemble a mini trial. The Trial Court, in this
     regard appears to have misdirected itself. In evaluating minor
     contradictions between witnesses statements and plausibility
     issues such a s whether the complainant could have avoided
     injury, effectively applied a stricter standard than necessary."

7. The Trial Court in this regard appears to have mis-directed
itself in evaluating minor contradictions in the statements of
witnesses and by examining issues of plausibility such as whether
the complainant could have avoided the injury, thereby applying
a stricter standard than what is warranted at the present stage. It
                                                      CRLR No. 210 of 2025
                           3

has thus been contended that the impugned order is liable to be
set aside by this Court invoking its revisional jurisdiction.

8. Per contra, learned AGA as well as learned counsel appearing
for opposite party nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 submitted that the legal
position is well settled that, at the stage of framing of charge, the
Court may proceed merely on the basis of suspicion; however,
while exercising powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for
summoning a proposed accused, the Court is required to record a
higher degree of satisfaction than that required at the stage of
framing of charge. It has been contended that, at this stage, there
must be some cogent and credible evidence of such quality that, if
the same remains unrebutted, it may lead to the possibility of
conviction of the proposed accused persons. It has further been
submitted that, according to the statement of the informant (PW-
1), the deceased had been married about ten years prior to the
incident and two children were born out of the wedlock.
Therefore, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian
Evidence Act is not attracted against the accused persons and, as
such, all the family members and relatives of the husband cannot
be implicated merely by invoking the said presumption. Learned
A.G.A. further submitted that although the deceased admittedly
died in her matrimonial home and allegations regarding demand
of dowry have been levelled in the statement of PW-1, the said
allegations are conspicuously absent in the FIR. Rather,
according to the FIR, the reason for assault (Marpeet) allegedly
committed upon the deceased by her matrimonial relatives was
entirely different. It has further been submitted that, as per the
allegations made in the FIR, the matrimonial family members of
the deceased used to taunt her by saying that, ever since she came
into their house, she had ruined the family. According to the
learned counsel, the said allegation is entirely different from an
allegation relating to demand of dowry.

9. It has also been argued that, as per the FIR, on the date of the
incident, the deceased had made a phone call to the informant
stating that her matrimonial family members were assaulting her.
The said phone call was allegedly made at about 3:30 p.m.
However, the informant along with other persons reached the
place of occurrence at about 10:00 p.m., i.e., after a delay of
approximately six and a half hours, whereas according to the
statement of PW-1, the distance between the two places was only
                                                     CRLR No. 210 of 2025
                          4

about 37–38 kilometers. It has further been submitted that the
presence of a solitary contusion on the body of the deceased
indicates that she was not subjected to physical assault by several
persons and, at the most, the said injury appears to have been
caused by a single individual, for which the husband of the
deceased is already facing trial. Learned counsel further argued
that, according to the statement of PW-1, he was not a direct
witness to the alleged phone conversation, inasmuch as the call
was allegedly received by his mother and whatever grievance, if
any, was expressed by the deceased was communicated to her
mother. Thus, the statement regarding the alleged assault is based
upon hearsay evidence and the same also lacks corroboration
from the medical evidence available on record. It has been
submitted that, in such circumstances, there is nothing on record
to prima facie establish the involvement of opposite party nos. 2,
3, 4, 5 and 6 in the commission of the alleged offence.

10. It has also been contended that, according to PW-1, his sister
had informed over the phone that she was being assaulted by her
in-laws and that they were threatening to kill her. However,
despite receiving such grave information, the informant took
nearly six and a half hours to reach the residence of the deceased,
although, as per his own statement, the distance was only about
37–38 kilometers. It is further submitted that PW-1 himself
admitted that the FIR was lodged on the basis of information
provided by co-villagers and police personnel, which materially
weakens the credibility of his testimony.

11. In view of the aforesaid major contradictions and
discrepancies in the statement of PW-1, the involvement of
opposite party nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 cannot be believed. In the
aforesaid conspectus, it has been argued that the Trial Court has
rightly rejected the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and the
impugned order suffers from no illegality or infirmity warranting
interference by this Court. Therefore, the present criminal
revision, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed.

12. When confronted with the aforesaid submissions, learned
counsel for the revisionist could not satisfactorily overcome the
same.

13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal
of the record, this Court is of the considered view that the Trial
                                                                                             CRLR No. 210 of 2025
                                                                   5

                                        Court rightly rejected the revisionist's application under Section
                                        319 Cr.P.C. There is no sufficient material available on record to
                                        summon opposite party nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 under Section 319
                                        Cr.P.C. to face trial along with the accused already facing trial.

                                        14. The present criminal revision, being devoid of merit, is liable
                                        to be dismissed.

                                        15. It is, accordingly, dismissed.

                                        May 7, 2026
                                        Brijesh Maurya
                                                                              (Lakshmi Kant Shukla,J.)




Digitally signed by :-
BRIJESH KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad