VIKRAM GIRIversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

              HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

                 APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 11512 of 2026

Vikram Giri
                                                                        .....Applicant(s)
                                         Versus
State of U.P. and Another
                                                                  .....Opposite Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)             :   Ashok Kumar Yadav
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)        :   Aniket Yadav, G.A., Ramesh Chandra Yadav

Court No. - 74
                         HON'BLE DEEPAK VERMA, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Ramesh Chandra Yadav, learned
counsel for opposite party No.2 and learned A.G.A. for the State.

2. The present 528 BNSS application has been filed to quash the order dated
18.6.2025 passed by Special Judicial Magistrate-II, Banda and order dated 10.2.2026
passed by Additional Session Judge/Special Judge(SC/ST Act), Banda in Criminal
Revision No. 101 of 2025(Vikram Giri vs. State of U.P. and another) as well as entire
proceeding of Complaint Case No. 328 of 2025(Dinesh Kumar Upadhyay vs. Vikram
Giri) under Section 138 N.I. Act, Police Station Girwan, District Banda.

3.It is alleged in the complaint that the applicant on account of purchase of 'Pashu
Aahar", paid Rs.5,00,000/- through cheque No. 728388 of Canara Bank on
20.1.2025. The cheque was submitted in the bank on 10.2.2025 which was
dishonoured on account of insufficient amount. Thereafter statutory notice was sent to
the applicant. The applicant replied upon the notice but did not refund the money.
Hence the present complaint.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that allegation alleged in the complaint is
false, baseless and not supported by any evidence. The applicant has not purchased
any "Pashu Aahar" from opposite party No.2 and has not issued any cheque in favour
of opposite party No.2. The summoning is without any evidence.

5. Learned counsel appearing for opposite party No.2 vehemently opposed the
submission of learned counsel for the applicant and submitted that he has received
reply sent by the applicant and there is no concealment of fact. He next submitted that
the applicant filed discharge application and discharge application was rejected on
11.11.2025. Prima facie, offence is made out against the applicant. He further
submitted that as per provision of Section 139 of N.I. Act, presumption is against the
applicant and summoning by the learned Magistrate is just and proper.

6. Considered the arguments of learned counsel appearing for both the sides, it is
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apparent that the applicant issued cheque in favour of opposite party No.2 on account
of purchase of "Pashu Aahar" and when cheque was submitted, it was dishonoured.
 Thereafter notice was issued and the applicant relied upon the notice. It is also found
that the applicant had filed Criminal Revision No. 101 of 2025 against the summoning
order dated 18.6.2025 and the said revision was rejected vide order dated
10.2.2026. Prima facie, offence is made out against the applicant. The summoning
order passed by learned Magistrate is just and proper. No interference is required by
this Court.

7. The Hon. Apex Court in Sri Om Sales Vs. Abhay Kumar @ Abhay Patel and
Another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2897 has considered following
judgments:

      "14. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Narender and others, this Court held that
      a presumption must be drawn that the holder of the cheque received the
      cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138, for the discharge of any
      debt or other liability unless the contrary is proved and, therefore, the
      High Court was not justified in entertaining and accepting the plea of the
      accused at the initial stage of the proceedings and quash the complaint.

      15. Likewise, in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, it was held that the
      presumption mandated by Section 139 of the N.I. Act includes the
      existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. It was observed that
      such a presumption is rebuttable, and the accused must raise its defense in
      the trial.

      16. In Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, it was held that
      the High Court should not quash the criminal complaint under Section
      138 of N.I. Act by going into disputed questions of fact regarding the
      cheque in question being issued for the discharge of debt or liability.
      Moreso, when Section 139 of the N.I. Act raises a statutory presumption
      as regards the cheque being issued for discharge of debt or liability.

      17. In Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court
      held that when there is a legal presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act,
      it would not be judicious to carry out a detailed enquiry on a disputed
      question of fact at a pre-trial stage to quash the complaint. The relevant
      observations in the judgment are extracted below:

      "17. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly clear
      that the court should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at
      a pre-trial stage, when the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility
      particularly because of the legal presumption, as in this matter. What is
      also of note is that the factual defense without having to adduce any
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                                3

evidence need to be of an unimpeachable quality, so as to altogether
disprove the allegations made in the complaint.

18. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pretrial stage
can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages
will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to
adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e.,
the trial court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is
allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the
criminal process. Also, because of the legal presumption, when the
cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of
convenience at this stage is in favor of the complainant / prosecution, as
the accused will have the opportunity to adduce defense evidence during
the trial, to rebut the presumption.

19. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the
summoning order, when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed
and considered by the trial court will not in our opinion be judicious.
Based upon a prima facie impression, an element of criminality cannot
entirely be ruled out here subject to the determination by the trial court.
Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, scuttling of the
criminal process is not merited."

7. The Hon. Apex Court while deciding aforementioned case, in
paragraphs 13 and 18 has observed that:


"13. However, the High Court, in its jurisdiction under Section 482,
proceeded to test whether the cheque was issued for the discharge, in
whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. In our view, such an
exercise was unwarranted because, under Section 139 of the N.I. Act,
there is a presumption that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of
the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part,
of any debt or other liability. This presumption can be rebutted by
evidence led in trial. A fortiori, the said issue can appropriately be
decided either at the trial, or later, upon conclusion of trial, by the
appellate/ revisional court."

"18. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions of this Court as also the
provisions of Section 139 of the N.I. Act, we are of the considered view
that the High Court committed an error by conducting a roving enquiry, at
the pre-trial stage, as regards the cheque being issued for the discharge of
debt or liability. Such an exercise, in our view, was not merited in
exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code more so when the
complaint allegations disclosed that the cheque was issued for discharge
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                                           of liability. As fulfillment of the necessary ingredients of Section 138 N.I.
                                           Act are prima facie made out from the complaint allegations, in our view,
                                           neither the summoning order nor the complaint could have been quashed
                                           by the High Court at the pre-trial stage."

                                    8. In view of the Apex Court's Judgment, no interference is warranted by this Court.
                                    The present application is, accordingly, dismissed.

                                                                                                         (Deepak Verma,J.)
                                    April 20, 2026

                                    P.P.




Digitally signed by :-
POONAM PATEL
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad