BHOLAversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                 APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 18335 of 2026

Bhola
                                                           .....Applicant(s)
                                    Versus

State of U.P. and Another
                                                                .....Opposite
                                                                      Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)      : Shodan Singh, Vikrant Gupta
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : G.A., Santosh Kumar Pandey, Saurabh
                                Tripathi

Court No. - 74
                      HON'BLE DEEPAK VERMA, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant; learned counsel for the
complainant; learned A.G.A for the State as also perused the record.

2. Instant application has been filed to quash the impugned order dated
07.04.2026 passed by the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Mawana,
Meerut (U.P.) in Complaint No.740 of 2019 (Vikrant Kumar Vs. Bhola),
under Section 138 N.I. Act, Police Station-Mawana, District-Meerut.

3. The applicant has challenged the order dated 07.04.2026 by which
applicant's application dated 10.02.2026 filed under Section 45 of Indian
Evidence Act has been rejected on the ground that applicant's evidence
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has been closed and applicant moved
application only to delay the proceedings. Counsel for the applicant
submits that applicant vide application dated 10.02.2026 had made
request before the court to get an expert opinion as amount Rs.5 lakh has
been manipulated. It is further submitted that the learned Magistrate
without considering the objection and on irrelevant consideration, rejected
the application vide order dated 07.04.2026 and the same is liable to be
set aside. It is next submitted that learned court has not considered the
defence evidence of the applicant.

4. Counsel for the complainant submitted that the applicant moved
application with malicious intention only to delay the proceedings. On
perusal of cheque, there is no alteration in the cheque and the bank has
                                                             NA528 No. 18335 of 2026
                                   2


dishonoured the cheque on account of fund insufficient. Moreover, the
submission of the applicant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has been closed
and case is posted for hearing.

5. Learned A.G.A. has vehemently opposed the prayer for quashing the
proceedings of the aforesaid case and submitted that the order impugned
do not suffer from any illegality or infirmity.

6. Considered the argument raised by counsel for the parties and perused
the record. On perusal of disputed cheque, it is apparent that there is no
alteration in the amount written over the cheque. The amount written over
the cheque in numeric form as well as in words do not appear, prima facie
fabricated or any alteration or manipulation. As such, the submission of
the applicant that amount written over the cheque is fabricated, prima
facie this Court does not find merit in the submission of counsel for the
applicant. The order impugned is just, proper and impugned order does
not suffer from any illegality and infirmity. The submission raised by
counsel for the applicant cannot be examined at this stage.

7. The Hon. Apex Court in Sri Om Sales Vs. Abhay Kumar @ Abhay
Patel and Another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2897 has
considered following judgments:

"14. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Narender and others, this Court held that a
presumption must be drawn that the holder of the cheque received the cheque of the
nature referred to in Section 138, for the discharge of any debt or other liability
unless the contrary is proved and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in
entertaining and accepting the plea of the accused at the initial stage of the
proceedings and quash the complaint.

15. Likewise, in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, it was held that the presumption mandated
by Section 139 of the N.I. Act includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability. It was observed that such a presumption is rebuttable, and the accused must
raise its defense in the trial.

16. In Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, it was held that the High Court
should not quash the criminal complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act by going into
disputed questions of fact regarding the cheque in question being issued for the
                                                               NA528 No. 18335 of 2026
                                     3


discharge of debt or liability. Moreso, when Section 139 of the N.I. Act raises a
statutory presumption as regards the cheque being issued for discharge of debt or
liability.

17. In Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court held that
when there is a legal presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, it would not be
judicious to carry out a detailed enquiry on a disputed question of fact at a pre-trial
stage to quash the complaint. The relevant observations in the judgment are extracted
below:

"17. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly clear that the court
should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial stage, when
the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility particularly because of the legal
presumption, as in this matter. What is also of note is that the factual defense without
having to adduce any evidence need to be of an unimpeachable quality, so as to
altogether disprove the allegations made in the complaint.

18. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pretrial stage can be grave
and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality
without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the
consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial court is ousted from weighing
the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited
advantage in the criminal process. Also, because of the legal presumption, when the
cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of
convenience at this stage is in favor of the complainant / prosecution, as the accused
will have the opportunity to adduce defense evidence during the trial, to rebut the
presumption.

19. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the summoning order,
when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed and considered by the trial court
will not in our opinion be judicious. Based upon a prima facie impression, an element
of criminality cannot entirely be ruled out here subject to the determination by the
trial court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, scuttling of the
criminal process is not merited.""

8. The Hon. Apex Court while deciding aforementioned case, in paragraphs
13 and 18 has observed that:
                                                                                                      NA528 No. 18335 of 2026
                                                                          4


                                    "13. However, the High Court, in its jurisdiction under Section 482, proceeded to test
                                    whether the cheque was issued for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or
                                    other liability. In our view, such an exercise was unwarranted because, under Section
                                    139 of the N.I. Act, there is a presumption that the holder of a cheque received the
                                    cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part,
                                    of any debt or other liability. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence led in
                                    trial. A fortiori, the said issue can appropriately be decided either at the trial, or later,
                                    upon conclusion of trial, by the appellate/ revisional court."

                                    "18. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions of this Court as also the provisions of
                                    Section 139 of the N.I. Act, we are of the considered view that the High Court
                                    committed an error by conducting a roving enquiry, at the pre-trial stage, as regards
                                    the cheque being issued for the discharge of debt or liability. Such an exercise, in our
                                    view, was not merited in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code more so
                                    when the complaint allegations disclosed that the cheque was issued for discharge of
                                    liability. As fulfillment of the necessary ingredients of Section 138 N.I. Act are prima
                                    facie made out from the complaint allegations, in our view, neither the summoning
                                    order nor the complaint could have been quashed by the High Court at the pre-trial
                                    stage."

                                    9. In view of the Apex Court's Judgment, no interference is warranted by this
                                    Court. The present application is, accordingly, dismissed.



                                                                                                        (Deepak Verma,J.)
                                    May 5, 2026
                                    Meenu Singh




Digitally signed by :-
MEENU SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad