POOJAversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                 APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 38418 of 2026

Pooja
                                                                   .....Applicant(s)
                                      Versus

State of U.P. and Another
                                                                       .....Opposite
                                                                             Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)                 :   Lavkush Yadav, Nikil Pathak
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)            :   G.A.

Court No. - 79
                  HON'BLE SAURABH SRIVASTAVA, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for applicant and learned AGA for the State.

2. Present application has been preferred with the prayer to quash the
chargesheet dated 16.5.2025 and cognizance/summoning order dated
2.6.2025 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut as well as
entire proceedings of Case no. 8767 of 2025 (State of U.P. vs. Gulfam and
others) arising out of Case Crime no. 119 of 2025, under Sections 318(4),
316(2), 61(2) BNS, P.S.- Kankarhhera, District Meerut.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of applicants has challenged the
impugned chargesheet along with cognizance/summoning order and entire
proceedings of the present case precisely on the ground that Sections 420
and 406 IPC (i.e. section 318(4) and 316(2) BNS) cannot go together in the
same breath as per the proposition of law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and others vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and another reported in 2024 10 SCC 690. The relevant portion of
the said judgment is being reproduced hereinbelow:-

     "38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to spell out any
     of the aforesaid ingredients noted above. We may only say, with a view to
     clear a serious misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as
     the courts below, that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of
     criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable
     under Section 406 IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same
     breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence
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     of cheating as defined and explained in Section 415 IPC, punishable
     under Section 420 IPC.

     41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of
     criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one. In case of cheating,
     the intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked
     into which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the
     subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot
     give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or
     dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction
     i.e. the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it
     is this intention, which is the gist of the offence.

     43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating.
     For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false
     or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of
     trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal
     breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and
     he dishonestly misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating,
     the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving
     him to deliver any property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot
     co-exist simultaneously.

     55. It is high time that the police officers across the country are imparted
     proper training in law so as to understand the fine distinction between the
     offence of cheating vis-vis criminal breach of trust. Both offences are
     independent and distinct. The two offences cannot coexist simultaneously
     in the same set of facts. They are antithetical to each other. The two
     provisions of IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins that they cannot survive
     without each other."

4. On the other hand, learned AGA for the State has vehemently opposed the
prayer sought through the instant application but unable to dispute the settled
proposition of law as relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for
applicants.

5. Since, only legal argument has been raised at the behest of applicant,
process to issue notice to opposite party no. 2 is hereby dispensed with.
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                                    6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going through the record
                                    of the case and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the
                                    case of Delhi Race Club (Supra), it is crystal clear that both the sections i.e.
                                    Sections 318(4) and 316(2) (i.e. 420 and 406 IPC) cannot go in the same
                                    breath and as such without interfering in any other merit of the present
                                    matter, cognizance/summoning order dated 2.6.2025 passed by learned
                                    Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, is quashed only in respect of applicant(s)
                                    herein. Matter is hereby remitted back to learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
                                    Meerut for passing fresh order of taking cognizance of offence, if required,
                                    in light of the proposition of law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
                                    case of Delhi Race Club (supra).

                                    7. Accordingly, the instant application stands allowed in part.



                                                                                         (Saurabh Srivastava,J.)
                                    September 11, 2026
                                    Shaswat




Digitally signed by :-
SHASWAT SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad