Allahabad High Court
GANGADHAR TIWARIversusSTATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS
- Decided
Holding
The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 applies to electrocution injuries and the Collector may award compensation of any amount deemed just under Section 6, leading to an enhanced award of Rs 9 lakhs.
Summary
The petitioner, Gangadhar Tiwari, suffered 40% permanent disability after contacting a live 11,000 kV wire that had been reported broken but not repaired by the electricity department. He filed a claim under Section 6(1) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 and was awarded Rs 4 lakhs by the Additional Collector/Accident Claim Tribunal, which he alleged was insufficient for medical expenses and loss of earnings. The electricity corporation contended that the Act, 1991 did not apply, arguing that liability should arise only under the Electricity Act, 2003. The High Court, relying on earlier judgments, held that the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 applies to electricity as a hazardous substance and that the Collector’s power under Section 6 is unlimited. Consequently, the court modified the award to Rs 9 lakhs (Rs 5 lakhs enhanced compensation plus Rs 4 lakhs for medical expenses) and directed payment with interest. The writ (Writ‑C No. 61435 of 2010) was allowed, while the related writ (Writ‑C No. 51093 of 2010) was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 applies to electrocution injuries caused by electricity distribution companies.
- Whether the Collector has jurisdiction to award compensation beyond the Schedule under Section 6 of the Act.
- Whether the compensation awarded of Rs 4 lakhs is adequate for the petitioner’s permanent disability and expenses.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of India — s. Article 21
- Electricity Act, 2003 — s. 161
- Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — s. 2(d)
- Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 — s. 22, 3, 6(1)
Subjects
- electrocution
- public liability insurance
- compensation enhancement
- hazardous substance
- strict liability
- Electricity Act 2003
- fundamental rights
- Article 21
- interest on delayed payment
- district magistrate jurisdiction
Judgment
AFR
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - C No. - 61435 of 2010
Gangadhar Tiwari …..Petitioners(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and …..Respondents(s)
Others
Counsel for Petitioners(s) : Brijesh Chandra Naik, I. N.
Pandey, Kamlakar Dwivedi,
S. P. Singh Parmar
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C. S. C., H.P.Dube, Sandep
Kumar Srivastava, Sushil
Kumar Pandey
Along with :
Writ - C No. 51093 of 2010:
Managing Director Uppcl and others
1.
Versus
Additional District Magistrate S.R.N. and others
Court No. -21
HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, J.
HON'BLE KUNAL RAVI SINGH, J.
1. Heard Shri Kamlakar Dwivedi, learned counsel for the
petitioner (respondent no.2 in connected Writ-C
No.51093 of 2010; Shri Devesh Vikram, learned Addl.
Chief Standing Counsel for State respondents and Shri
Sushil Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for respondent
nos.3 & 4- Purvanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam (Electricity
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WRIC No.61435 of 2010
Distribution Division-II), Sant Ravidas Nagar (Bhadohi) 1
(the petitioners in connected Writ-C No.51093 of 2010).
FACTS
2. Since the controversy involved in both the writ
petitions are similar, with the consent of learned counsel
for parties, they are being decided by this common order.
3. The facts of Writ-C No.61435 of 2010 are being taken
as leading case for deciding the controversy.
4. The facts of the case in brief are that on 09.12.2006,
when the claimant-petitioner (Gangadhar Tiwari) was
going to answer the call of nature in the morning, he
came into contact with live electrical wire of 11000 KV
and sustained severe burn injuries due to electrocution.
Somehow with the help of stick and bamboos the
petitioner was separated from the live electrical wire due
to which the life of the petitioner was saved. It is alleged
that the electrical wire was broken on 7.12.2006 and on
the same day Gram Pradhan had informed about the
same to the concerned Junior Engineer of the Electricity
Distribution Division, Wahida Nagr Power House, Distt.
Sant Ravidas Nagar, Bhadohi but inspite of the
information, the broken electrical wire was neither
repaired nor electric supply was stopped. The
information of the said unfateful incident was also given
to the Police Station, Koirauna, Distt. Sant Ravidas
Nagar, Bhadohi. The petitioner was treated in several
hospitals and due to the said electrocution the petitioner
has sufferred from 40% permanent disability.
1 Nigam
3
WRIC No.61435 of 2010
5. The petitioner filed a Claim Petition No.7 of 2007 in
the court of Additional Collector/ Accident Claim
Tribunal, Sant Ravidas Nagar, Bhadohi under Section 6
(1) of Public Liability Insurance Act, 19912 claiming
Rs.10 lacs as compensation. The claim petition was
allowed on 21.5.2010 awarding compensation of Rs.4
lacs in favour of the petitioner.
6. It is alleged that the Addl. Collector/ Accident Claim
Tribunal, Sant Ravidas Nagar has not paid compensation
to the petitioner towards loss of actual earning, mental
agony and medical expenses. Such situation has impelled
the petitioner to invoke the writ jurisdiction by way of
instant writ petition for the following reliefs:-
"(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus
enhancing the amount of Rs.4,00,000/- awarded by Additional
Collector/ Accident Claim Tribunal, Sant Ravidas Nagar, Bhadohi in
Claim Petition No.7 of 2007 under Section 6 (1) of Public Liability
Insurance Act, 1991 to Rs.10,00,000/- and directing the respondent
no.2 to pay the enhanced amount to the petitioner."
7. The order dated 21.5.2010 passed by the Addl.
Collector/ Accident Claim Tribunal, Sant Ravidas Nagar
was challenged by the U.P. Power Corporation 3 in
connected Writ-C No.51093 of 2010. In the said writ
petition, following interim order was passed by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court on 26.08.2010:-
"Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned standing
counsel appearing for the respondents.
Notices on behalf of respondents no. 1 and 3 have been accepted by
learned standing counsel. He prays for and is granted one month's
time to file counter affidavit. Three weeks thereafter is allowed to
the petitioner to file rejoinder affidavit.
2 Act, 1991
3 Corporation
4
WRIC No.61435 of 2010
Issue notice to respondent no. 2 through registered post.
Steps be taken within two weeks. Office shall send notice returnable
at an early date.
List this case on the date fixed by the office in the notice.
Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the order passed by
Additional District Magistrate, Sant Ravidas Nagar (Bhadohi) is
without jurisdiction as the Public Liability Insurance Act,1991 is not
applicable to U.P. Corporation or a person who receive any injury or
death or damage. Hence the petitioner is entitled for interim relief.
Until further order of this Court, the effect and operation of order
dated 21.5.2010 passed by Additional District Magistrate, Sant
Ravidas Nagar, Bhadohi (annexure 2 to the writ petition) shall
remain stayed."
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued
that although the information of broken wire was already
furnished by the Gram Pradhan to the Electricity
Department but the Electricity Department in gross
negligence did not repair the high voltage wire, which
resulted in the 40% permanent disability of the
petitioner.
9. He further argued that even the Claim Petition No.7 of
2007 was allowed on 21.05.2010 but the Tribunal has not
awarded compensation towards actual earning, mental
agony and medical expenses.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the
Act, 1991 is fully applicable in the instant case and the
objection qua its maintainability is misplaced.
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WRIC No.61435 of 2010
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT-
NIGAM
11. Learned counsel for the Nigam has vehemently
opposed the relief claimed by the claimant-petitioner
(Gangadhar Tiwari). He states that the Corporation is the
licensee under the provisions of Electricity Act, 2003 4
and Nigam comes under it. The Nigam is distributing
electricity within the area of their operation strictly in
accordance with law to the satisfaction of the consumers.
It is alleged that in the said claim petition the notices
issued to the Nigam could not be served and as such
Nigam could not acquire knowledge about the pendency
of the said claim petition. Without there being any
finding on the ordersheet to the effect that the service of
notice could not be effected on the Nigam by hand or by
registered post, straightaway order for publication of
notice was passed and an alleged copy was filed on
record after its publication and the matter was directed
to be decided exparte. Eventually the claim petition was
allowed on 21.5.2010 granting compensation to the
petitioner for a sum of Rs.4 lacs.
12. Learned counsel for the Nigam further contended
that the order impugned dated 21.5.2010 is totally
arbitrary and patently illegal and the same is liable to be
quashed. He submits that the claim petition filed by the
petitioner purporting to be under Section 6 (1) of the
Act, 1991 will not apply for grant of compensation in
case of electrocution. The Act, 2003 is a special
enactment and there is provisions for enquiry in case of
accident to be conducted by the Electrical Inspector
under Section 161 of the Act, 2003. Therefore, unless the
4 Act, 2003
6
WRIC No.61435 of 2010
enquiry under Section 161 of the Act, 2003 is conducted,
no compensation can be awarded by any court or
authority. The notices in the said claim petition were not
actually served upon the Nigam and as such the order
impugned is arbitrary and illegal being exparte.
13. Learned counsel for the Nigam lastly submitted that
only in this backdrop the Division Bench has rightly
passed the interim order dated 26.8.2010 as the order
impugned is without jurisdiction and the Act, 1991 is not
applicable to U.P. Power Corporation or a person, who
receive any injury or death or damage.
ARGUMENT OF STATE RESPONDENTS
14. Shri Devesh Vikram, learned Addl. Chief Standing
Counsel, while adopting the submissions made by
learned counsel for the Nigam vehemently argued that
the Act, 1991 is not applicable in the instant matter. He
submitted that the Act, 1991 is made for business
handling hazardous substances to provide immediate
relief to victims of industrial accidents, as such the order
passed by the Addl. Collector is illegal and without
jurisdiction.
REJOINDER ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONER
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner-claimant, in
rejoinder arguments, vehemently opposed the contention
of learned counsel for Nigam and submitted that the
Addl. District Magistrate has rightly proceeded to accord
compensation under the Act, 1991 as the same would
definitely be attracted in the instant matter. He submits
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WRIC No.61435 of 2010
that similar controversy has earlier been raised in Writ-C
No.12492 of 2017 (Purwanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd.
v. Pradeep Kumar Bind & Anr.) in which the Division
Bench has refuted the similar contentions raised by
learned counsel for Nigam and proceeded to dismiss the
writ petition on 27.3.2017.
16. Learned counsel for the claimant-petitioner, in this
backdrop, has submitted that the Addl. Collector is
competent to accord compensation under the Act, 1991.
The claimant-petitioner has sustained permanent
disability and while passing the order impugned the
Addl. Collector has not only accorded ex-gratia payment
of Rs.4 lacs but also accorded said amount towards
medical expenses. The petitioner is entitled for ex-gratia
payment under the Act, 1991.
17. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his
submissions, has also placed reliance on the judgment
passed in U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. v. District
Magistrate, Dehradun & Ors.5, wherein learned Single
Judge while considering the Act, 1991 and Environment
(Protection) Act, 19866 has found that the electricity is
hazardous and also substance and, therefore, learned
Single Judge had denied to interfere in the impugned
award. Learned Single Judge had also provided that the
claimant in addition to the amount awarded to them by
the impugned award may also institute any other
proceeding for claiming further relief.
18. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
relief has rightly been accorded by Addl. Collector under
the Act, 1991, which warrant no interference. It is
5 (1997) 2 UPLBEC 1344
6 Act, 1986
8
WRIC No.61435 of 2010
contended that on account of pendency of instant
proceedings as well as continuation of interim order for
more than 15 years, the claimant-petitioner has suffered
a lot. Due to sustaining grievous injury causing
permanent disability, the claimant-petitioner is not
capable to discharge his day to day work. He submits
that the compensation is not commensurate to his
disability and as such indulgence may be accorded in
favour of the claimant-petitioner.
ANALYSIS BY THE COURT
19. Heard rival submissions, perused the record and
respectfully considered the judgments cited at Bar.
20. The precise objection as raised by learned counsel
for the Nigam is that in the instant proceeding the Act,
1991 is not applicable. In order to appreciate the
controversy, it would be apt to have a glance on the
judgment in Purwanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v.
Pradeep Kumar Bind & Anr. (Supra), which is reproduced
as under:-
"Heard Mr Narendra Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mrs Subhash Rathi, learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel for respondent no.2.
This writ petition, filed by the Electricity Distribution Company,
challenges the order dated 29.12.2016 passed by respondent no.2-
District Magistrate, whereby compensation of Rs.5,79,456.00 has
been awarded, on the application made by respondent no.1, who
suffered permanent disability on account of an electrocution
accident. The challenged is raised on two grounds. Firstly, that the
provisions of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (in short 'the
Insurance Act') are not attracted in view of the fact that such
accidents are covered by the rules framed under the Electricity Act,
2003. Secondly, that even if it is held that the provisions of the
Insurance Act are attracted, the Collector has no power to grant
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WRIC No.61435 of 2010
anything more than what is prescribed in the Schedule appended to
the Act.
In our opinion, both the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the petitioner deserve to be rejected outright. Section 22 of the
Insurance Act clearly provides that the provisions of this Act and any
rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. It may be true
that a person, like respondent no.1, may have a remedy under the
provisions of the rules framed under the Electricity Act, 2003, but
that itself would not debar him from making an application under
the provisions of the Insurance Act more particularly, in view of the
provisions contained in Section 22 thereof. Hence, the first
submission deserves to be rejected outright and is rejected as such.
The second submission advanced by learned counsel for the
petitioner is based on Section 3 of the Insurance Act, which places a
liability to give relief in certain cases on the principle of "no fault-
liability". The application made by respondent no.1 was not under
Section 3, but it was under Section 6 of the Insurance Act, which
does not put any restriction on the powers of the Collector to award
an amount as relief which appears to him to be just. Section 3
confers power only to give the minimum relief to a victim in terms of
a scale as provided for in the Schedule. Insofar as the power of the
Collector to award relief under Section 6 of the Insurance Act is
concerned, it is unlimited and it is left to the Collector to make an
award determining the amount of relief which appears to him to be
just. This power cannot be curtailed and is not curtailed by the
provisions of this Act or any other Act.
It is needless to mention that the learned counsel for the petitioner,
though made submissions as aforementioned, he did not point out
any provisions in support of his contention or judgment of either this
Court or any other High Court or the Supreme Court.
In the circumstances, we find no merit in the writ petition. The writ
petition is dismissed. "
21. In the said judgment, the Court had considered
Section 22 of the Act, 1991 and negated the claim of
Electricity Department and held that in addition to the
Act, 2003, the Act, 1991 would also be attracted in the
instant matter. As such the objection raised by Nigam
that Act, 1991 is not applicable in the instant matter is
10
WRIC No.61435 of 2010
not tenable as the same has been clearly answered by
the Division Bench in the aforesaid judgment.
22. In a similar matter, vide judgment and order passed
by learned Single Judge in U.P. State Electricity Board &
Ors. v. District Magistrate Dehradun & Ors. (Supra), it
has been held that electricity is both hazardous and
substance and it is also admitted that the petitioner has
sustained permanent disability from electrocution.
23. Nothing is brought on record to suggest that the
aforesaid judgments have been annulled or modified or
they do not hold the field.
24. We have also occasion to peruse the judgment and
order dated 19.09.2014 passed in Writ-C No.23783 of
2010 (Neetu Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors.), wherein the
Division Bench has also considered the judgment passed
by the Apex Court in Raghuvansh Dewanchand Bhasin v.
State of Maharashtra7. For ready reference, para 18 of
the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
"18 In the case reported in 2012 (9) SCC 791: Raghuvansh
Dewanchand Bhasin Vs. State of Maharashtra, while considering the
ambit and scope of Article 21 and its violation, and court's right to
payment compensation, their lordships held as under:-
17 It is trite principle of law that in matters involving infringement
or deprivation of a fundamental right; abuse of process of law,
harassment etc., the courts have ample power to award adequate
compensation to an aggrieved person not only to remedy the wrong
done to him but also to serve as a deterrent for the wrongdoer.
18 In Rudul Sah Vs. State of Bihar, Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ, speaking
for a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court had observed thus:
(SCC p. 147, para 10)
7 (2012) 9 SCC791
11
WRIC No.61435 of 2010
"10. ...One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can
reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of
Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of
monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant
infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any
other method open to the judiciary to adopt."
19 In Bhim Singh, MLA Vs. State of J & K, holding illegal detention
in police custody of the petitioner Bhim Singh to be violative of his
rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution, this Court, in
exercise of its power to award compensation under Article 32,
directed the State to pay monetary compensation to the petitioner.
Relying on Rudal Sah , O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. echoed the following
views: (SCC p.686, para 2)
"2. ... When a person comes to us with the complaint that he has
been arrested and imprisoned with mischievous or malicious intent
and that his constitutional and legal rights were invaded, the
mischief or malice and the invasion may not be washed away or
wished away by his being set free. In appropriate cases we have the
jurisdiction to compensate the victim by awarding suitable monetary
compensation..."
20. In Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita Behera Vs. State of Orissa,
clearing the doubt and indicating the precise nature of the
constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution
to award compensation for contravention of fundamental rights,
which had arisen because of the observation that "the petitioner
could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his
claim to compensation was factually controversial" in Rudul Sah
(SCC p. 147, para 10), J.S. Verma, J. (as His Lordship then was)
stated as under: (Nilabati Behera case, SCC pp. 762-63, para 17)
"17 It follows that 'a claim in public law for compensation' for
contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the
protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an
acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such
rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to
a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a
fundamental right is 'distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in
private law for damages for the tort' resulting from the
contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign
immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee
of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence
being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which
justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of
12
WRIC No.61435 of 2010
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the
only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention
made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their
powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by
resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by
recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. This is what was
indicated in Rudul Sah and is the basis of the subsequent decisions
in which compensation was awarded under Articles 32 and 226 of
the Constitution, for contravention of fundamental rights."
(emphasis supplied)
21. In the same decision, in his concurring judgment, Dr. A.S. Anand,
J. (as His Lordship then was), explaining the scope and purpose of
public law proceedings and private law proceedings stated as under:
(Nilabati Behera case, SCC pp. 768-69, para 34)
"34. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the
private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as
exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or
under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement
of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the
strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and
indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not
only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they
live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and
preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by
granting "compensation" in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of
the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental
rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the
wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State
which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights
of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to
be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for
damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing
relief by an order of making 'monetary amends' under the public law
for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting
the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the
nature of 'exemplary damages' awarded against the wrongdoer for
the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights
available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the
private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a
court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under
the penal law." (emphasis supplied)
13
WRIC No.61435 of 2010
22. The power and jurisdiction of this Court and the High Courts to
grant monetary compensation in exercise of its jurisdiction
respectively under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India to
a victim whose fundamental rights under Article 21of the
Constitution are violated are thus, well-established. However, the
question now is whether on facts in hand, the appellant is entitled to
monetary compensation in addition to what has already been
awarded to him by the High Court. Having considered the case in
the light of the fact- situation stated above, we are of the opinion
that the appellant does not deserve further monetary compensation."
25. The Division Bench has also considered the judgment
passed by the Apex Court in Salem Advocate Bar
Association (II) v. Union of India8. Eventually, the Division
Bench in Neetu Devi (Supra) has accorded indulgence in
favour of claimant-petitioner (in the said writ petition).
26. This Court in the case of U.P. State Electricity Board
vs. District Magistrate, Dehradun9, has also considered
the issue that electricity falls within the definition of
"hazardous substance" and the accident, caused on
account of it, is covered under the provisions of the Act,
1991. Relevant extract of the judgment, as contained in
paragraphs 42 to 44, is being quoted below:
"42. Hence in my opinion 'hazardous substance' as defined in
Section 2 (d) of the 1991 Act is not to be confined to a substance
specified in the notification issued by the Central Government, but it
includes all substances which come under the definition of
'hazardous substance' under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986,
with this exception that if any such substance is also notified by the
Central Government under Section 2 (d) of the 1991 Act then it will
be a 'hazardous substance' only if it exceeds the quantity specified in
the said notification. Thus the notification issued by the Central
Government under Section 2 (d) of the 1991 Act can only narrow
down the scope of 'hazardous substance' as defined under the
Environment (Protection Act, 1986, but substances which are not
specified in the said notification will nevertheless be regarded as
'hazardous substances' under the 1991 Act if they come within the
8 (2005) 6 SCC 344
9 1997 UPLBEC (2) 1344
14
WRIC No.61435 of 2010
definition of 'hazardous substances' under the Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986.
43. I have already stated above that electricity is "hazardous
substance" as defined under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986
and hence I reject the submission of the learned counsel for the
petitioners that it is not a hazardous substance since it has not been
included in the Notification dated 24-3-1992.
44. THE principle of strict Liability Section 3 (2) of the 1991 Act
places a strict liability (liability without fault) in cases of such
accident due to 'hazardous substances' and it is not necessary for
the claimant to plead that the death or injury was caused by wrong
or negligent act of any person….."
27. Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.P. Electricity Board v.
Shail Kumari10 has held that the Electricity Board is
liable to pay compensation even though there was no
negligence on its part. In Parvati Devi & Ors. v.
Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Ors. 11, the Supreme
Court observed that once it is established that the death
occurred on account of electrocution while walking on
the road, necessarily the authorities concerned must be
held to be negligent and the legal heirs of the deceased
are entitled for compensation.
28. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India12, Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that where an enterprise is engaged in a
hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is
caused on any one on account of the accident in the
operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and
absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected
by the accident.
10 (2002) 2 SCC 162
11 (2000) 3 SCC 754
12 (1987) 1 SCC 395
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WRIC No.61435 of 2010
CONCLUSION
29. We find that the issue in hand is no more res integra.
In the light of the above cited judgments, we find that
the quintessence is that the compensation has rightly
been accorded under the Act, 1991. It is writ large that
the petitioner had set up the claim under the Act, 1991
on the ground that he had received grievous injury and
during treatment he has incurred expenses of more than
Rs.4 lacs towards medical costs and other expenses. We
find that under the present facts and circumstances the
order impugned is required to be modified qua the
amount of compensation. As a stay order was operating
in the connected writ petition, therefore, the amount
quantified by the District Magistrate was never paid to
the petitioner. The petitioner has been deprived of the
compensation amount, which he is legally entitled to
receive.
30. The stay order was granted on the ground of
jurisdiction of the District Magistrate to pass the order.
However, as observed above, the District Magistrate has
the jurisdiction to pass an order under the Act.
Therefore, the ground of jurisdiction is unsustainable.
The incident is of the year 2006 and the order of
compensation was passed in the year 2010. Ordinarily,
the deprivation of the compensation amount would
require granting of damages and interest to the
petitioner as despite an award for grant of compensation,
no amount came to be given for a period of 16 years.
Therefore, in the interest of justice and to balance the
equities, we deem it appropriate that a further sum of
Rs.5,00,000/- be quantified over and above to what has
16
WRIC No.61435 of 2010
been awarded as medical expenses and enhanced
compensation to be awarded to the petitioner.
ORDER AND DIRECTIONS
31. We accordingly modify the order impugned to the
extent that the petitioner is entitled for compensation of
Rs.9,00,000/- in total (Rs.5,00,000/- as enhanced
compensation and Rs.4,00,000/- as medical expenses).
The Corporation/Nigam is directed to disburse the
aforesaid amount to the claimant-petitioner within four
weeks, failing which the claimant-petitioner will be
entitled for 9% interest over the said amount towards
delayed payment from the date of impugned order
32. In view of above, WRIT - C No. - 61435 of 2010
stands allowed and Writ - C No. 51093 of 2010
stands dismissed.
(Kunal Ravi Singh,J.) ((Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,J.))
April 20, 2026
SP/
Digitally signed by :-
SURYA PRAKASH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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