Supreme Court of India
A.C. MUTHIAHversusBOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 337
- Decided
- 28 April 2011
- Disposal
- Matter referred to larger bench
- Bench
- M PANCHAL
Holding
A past President of the BCCI is an "Administrator" under the Regulations and therefore has locus standi to challenge the amendment, which is arbitrary and must be kept in suspension.
Summary
The appellant, a former President of the BCCI, challenged an amendment to Clause 6.2.4 of the BCCI's Regulations that exempted IPL, Champions League and Twenty‑20 events from the ban on administrators having commercial interests. He argued that the amendment was made to benefit the second respondent, who as a BCCI office‑bearer and Chairman of India Cements had won the IPL franchise for Chennai Super Kings, creating a conflict of interest. The Supreme Court, in a dissenting opinion, held that the definition of "Administrator" in the Regulations expressly includes past Presidents, giving the appellant locus standi to sue. The amendment was deemed arbitrary and biased, warranting an injunction to suspend its operation. The Court ordered the amendment to be kept in abeyance and restrained the second respondent from holding any BCCI office if he continues to own the franchise. The matter was referred to a larger bench for final resolution.
Issues considered
- Whether a past President of the BCCI has locus standi to challenge an amendment to the BCCI Regulations.
- Whether the amendment to Clause 6.2.4, creating an exception for IPL‑related events, is arbitrary, biased and violative of the conflict‑of‑interest rule.
- Whether an injunction can be granted to suspend the effect of the amendment.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 12, s. Article 136, s. Article 226, s. Article 227, s. Article 32
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 409, s. 420, s. 427( a), s. 468, s. 471
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 2(C)
- Societies Registration Act
Subjects
conflict of interestlocus standiBCCIIPL auctionregulatory amendmentinjunctionadministratorsports governancecivil suitstatutory interpretation
Judgment
(2011] 8 S.C.R. 445
A.C. MUTHIAH A
v.
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA AND
ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 3753 of 2011)
B
APRIL 28, 20·11
[J.M. PANCHAL AND GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.]*
Memorandum and Rules and Regulations of BCCI,
2008: Clauses 1(n), 6.2.4- Complaints filed by appellant-past C
president of BCCI before the BCCI President alleging that
second respondent being the office bearer·of BCCI and also
the Chairman and M.D. of India Cements Limited was
disqualified to participate in the auction held for owning Indian
· Premier League (IPL) in which he was declared sucdessful D
bidder and thus came to own Chennai Super King ..;.. No
response to the complaint - Suit filed by appellant - Just a
few days after filing of the said suit, the BCCI on 27.9.2008
introduced an amendment to Clause 6.2.4 carving out an
Exception - After the amendment, the said clause read "No E
Administrator shall have directly or indirectly any commercial
interest in any of the events of the BCCI excluding IPL,
Champions League and Twenty 20." - The amendment to
Clause 6.2.4 was challenged by the appellant by filing a
second suit wherein the appellant also filed two applications F
seeking temporary injunction restraining the BCCI from
permitting the second respondent to participate in the General
. Body Meeting and injunction against the amendment
introduced by pleading to put it under suspension - High
Court dismissed the applications on the ground that appellant G
had no locus standi to question the Regulations and the court
• There being difference of opinion, the matter has been referred to larger
bench and the dissenting opinion of Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Gyan Sudha Misra
is reported herein.
445 H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A also cannot interfere with the internal management of the
society - On appeal, Held: Per Gyan Sudha Misra, J. - Past
President of BCCI is also an Administrator and has locus
standi to file suit challenging amendment to the Memorandum
- Plea that the past President has to be nominated on any of
B the sub-committees of BCCI to be treated as an Administrator
is not tenable - In order to decide whether the plaintiff has a
right to file a civil suit or not, locus standi or competence of
the plaintiff alone is to be established and not the question
whether the BCCI is a State within the meaning of Article 12
c of the Constitution which is a condition to be fulfilled for
invoking the jurisdiction u/Articles 226 and/or 227 of the
Constitution as also Article 32 of the Constitution but surely
not for filing a civil suit or injunction application - Once, it is
held that the plaintiff/appellant was also an Administrator of
the BCCI in view of the definition of Administrator, his
0
competence to challenge the amendment introduced in the
regulation of BCCI cannot be held as not maintainable on the
ground that BCCI is not a 'State' within the meaning of Article
12 of the Constitution - Conflict of interest does not require
actual proof of any actual pecuniary gain or pecuniary loss -
E Second respondent necessarily was privy to highly sensitive
information about the bidding process, the design of the
tender, the rules of the game, the future plans of BCCI in
respect of IPL and, therefore, it was inconceivable that such
insider information to which any major office bearer of BCCI
F would necessarily be privy, would not have used and misused
both potential and actual materials in the capacity of a bidder
- Appellant fully succeeded in making out a prima facie case
that this amendment smacked of arbitrariness and bias in
favour of the second respondent and hence it was a fit case
G for grant of injunction keeping the impugned amendment
under suspension or abeyance - However, since second
respondent has already participated and succeeded in the bid,
and is also owning Chennai Super King, it is left open to him
to exercise his option whether he wishes to continue as an
H office bearer of the BCCI or own IPL Chennai Super King -
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 447
CRICKET IN INDIA
High Court was not justified in not granting the temporary A
injunction claimed by appellant - Per Panchal, J: High Court
was justified in not granting the temporary injunction claimed
by appellant ..:. In view of difference of opinion, matter
referred to larger bench - Reference to larger bench -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 12, 32, 226, 227. B
The first respondent, the Board of Control for Cricket
in India (BCCI) is a society registered under the Societies
Registration Act which has its own Memorandum of
Association, Rules and Regulations. The Regulations of
the BCCI incorporated rules for Players, Team Officials, C
Managers, Umpires and Administrators. In the
Regulation, Clause 6.2.4 stated "No Administrator shall
have directly or indirectly any commercial interest in any
events of the BCCI." The Regulation further stated that
an office bearer of BCCI is an Administrator. D.
The appellant who was the past President of the
BCCI filed two complaints before the President of the
BCCI in his capacity as past President alleging
disqualification suffered by the second respondent on E
the ground that he being the office bearer of BCCI and
also the Chairman and M.D. of India Cements Limited
should not have been allowed to participate in the auction
held for owning Indian Premier League (IPL) in which he
was declared a successful bidder and thus owned
F
Chennai Super King. The appellant's complaints did not
receive any response which prompted him to file a suit
before the High Court. The appellant sought to enforce
Clause 6.2.4 against the second respondent. Just after a
few days of filing of the said suit, the BCCI on 27 .9.2008 G
introduced an amendment to Clause 6.2.4 carving out an
Exception. After the amendment, the said clause read
"No Administrator shall have directly or indirectly any
commercial interest in any of the events of the BCCI
excluding IPL, Champions League and Twenty 20." The
H
448 SUPREME COURT
;
REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A said amendment was challenged by the appellant by
filing a second suit wherein the appellant also filed two
applications for injunction. In the first application, he
sought a temporary injunction restraining the BCCI from
permitting the second respondent to participate in the
8 General Body Meeting but in the second application, he
sought injunction against the amendment introduced by
pleading to put it under suspension.
The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the
interim applications on the ground that no outsider can
C question the regulations of the society and the courts
also cannot interfere in the internal management of the
society. The Single Judge, however, did not consider the
main issue and the amendment introduced in Clause
6.2.4. The Division Bench upheld the order of the Single
D Judge.
The question which arose for consideration in the
instant appeal was whether the appellant had locus
standi to file a civil suit challenging the amendment
E · introduced by the BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations
as he is merely the past president of the BCCI and
whether the same can confer any right on him as an
Administrator so as to challenge the amendment
introduced by the BCCI diluting the bar of commercial
F interest of the Administrator in the activities of the BCCI
thus generating 'conflict of interest', and in case the
answers were in the affirmative, then whether the
amendment introduced by the BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 was
fit to be injuncted by keeping the same in abeyance/
suspension as it clearly gave rise to conflict of interest
G between the BCCI and the second respondent since he
indulged in promoting his commercial interest while
functioning as an office bearer/Administrator of the BCCI
who participated and succeeded in the auction for
owning IPL Chennai Super King.
H
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR . 449
CRICKET IN INDIA
Referring the matter to larger bench (in view of A
difference of opinion), the Court
Per J.M. Panchal, J: [Judgment made non-reportable]
Per Gyan Sudha Misra, J (Dissenting)
B
HELD: 1.1. Clause 1(n) of the Memorandum and
Rules & Regulations of BCCI, 2008 defines the term
'Administrator' to mean and inciude present and former
Presidents, Vice Presidents, Hony. Secretaries, Hony.
Treasurers, Hony. Jt. Secretaries of the Board of Control C
for Cricket in India (BCCI), past and pres~nt Presidents
and Secretaries of Members affiliated to BCCI and any
person nominated in any of the sub committee appointed
by the BCCI as defined in the Memorandum and Rules
and Regulations of the ·eccl. The appellant was D
admittedly a past President of the BCCI and, therefore,
in view of the unambiguous definition of the
'Administrator' which includes past and present
Presidents and Secretaries. and Members affiliated to the
BCCI, it is difficult to accept the positio·n that the appellant E
had no locus standi to file a civil suit challenging the
amendment introduced by the BCCI. [Para 12) (468-H;
469-A-B)
1.2. The view taken by Justice Panchal that only if a
past President is nominated on any of the sub- F
committees of the BCCI, he would be deemed to be an
'Administrator' and not otherwise is not approved. This
view is clearly contrary to the express definition of an
'Administrator' given out in the Regulations of the BCCI
2008. Clause 32 of the Regulation, no doubt, deals with G
misconduct and procedure required to deal wi.th
complaint received from any quarter or based on any
report published or circulated or on its own motion in the
subject matter of indiscipline or misconduct. Clause 32(v)
of the Regulation also deals with a provision regarding H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A expulsion of any Member, Associate Member,
Administrator, Player, Umpire, Team Official, Referee or
the Selector, as the case may be, and in case any of them
is found guilty and expelled by the BCCI, he shall not in
future be entitled to hold any position or office or be
B admitted in any Committee or any Member or Associate
Member of the Board. Clause 32 thus clearly deals with
the misconduct and procedure to deal with office bearers
including all its constituents of the BCCI and for this
purpose it also lays down as to who will be the competent
c persons as member of the sub committee to deal with
misconduct. But to hold that in spite of the definition of
an 'Administrator' given out in Clause 1 (n) of the
Regulation which specifically includes President and past
President of the BCCI, the same would not include an
Administrator unless he is a member of the sub committee
0
of the disciplinary committee which is constituted for
dealing with the misconduct of any office bearer
including all its constituents as envisaged under Clause
32, would be a far fetched interpretation. The appellant
in the capacity of past president of the BCCI was,
E therefore, an Administrator within the meaning of the said
definition enumerated in Clause 1(n) of the Regulation
and as such, he was competent to institute a suit in his
individual capacity. Clause 1(n) of the Regulation cannot
be allowed to result into a provision rendering it nugatory
F by overlooking the express provision of the definition of
Administrator which unambiguously includes past
President, by extracting or attributing interpretation to it
with the aid of Clause 32 of the Regulation, which is not
even remotely connected with the definition and meaning
G of the expression 'past -President' but is a separate and
specific provision to deal with merely the consequence
of misconduct and its procedure to deal with the cases
of alleged misconduct which does not envisage dealing
with cases wherein the legality and efficacy of any
H
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 451
CRICKET IN INDIA
amendment to the Regulation of the BCCI is under A
challenge. [Paras 12, 13] [469-A-G; 470-B-E]
1.3. In the instant matter while dealing with the
question of 'locus standi' as to whether the appellant was
legally entitled to institute a suit for challenging the B
amendment or not, Clause 1(n) of the Regulation which
includes 'past President' within the definition of
'Administrator' is the only relevant provision and to dilute
its effect, reliance cannot be placed on Clause 32 of the
Regulation. When Clause 1(n) clearly and explicitly
defines the term "Administrator' and declares expressly C
that an 'Administrator' shall mean and include present
and former Presidents, Vice Presidents, Hony.
Secretaries, Hony. Treasurers, Hony. Jt. Secretaries of the
BCCI, and includes even past and present Presidents and
Secretaries of Members affiliated to BCCI i:;o much so that D
even a representative of Member or an Associate Member
of Affiliated Member of the BCCI and any person
connected with any of the sub committee appointed by
the Board defined in the Regulation of the BCCI has been
included within the definition of Administrator, it would E
be difficult to hold that such Administrator also has to be
a member of a sub committee which is constituted for
dealing with misconduct in order to challenge the
amendment introduced in the Regulation completely
missing that the power to challenge amendment of BCCI F
is altogether different from dealing with cases of
misconduct against players, umpires or administrator. A
plain and literal interpretation of the Rule clearly indicates
that the past presidents also have been unequivocally
included within the meaning of 'Administrator' and while G
an Administrator can also be included as a member of
the sub-committee for the Disciplinary Committee, it
cannot be interpreted so as to infer thatformer president
stands excluded from the definition of Administrator until
and unless he is a member of the Sub-Corri~ittee for H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A disciplinary proceedings. It is difficult to accept that this
would be so in order to give it a purposive Interpretation
as no purpose can possibly be inferred from his, on the
contrary, the purpose is writ large that it amounts to grant
exemption to the second respondent from getting
8 trapped into the bar imposed by Clause 6.2.4 of the
Regulation of the BCCI. It is explicitly clear and not even
remotely ambiguous that the object and purpose of
Clause 32 is merely to lay down the procedure for dealing
with misconduct of any player, umpire, administrator etc.
C and it is not even vaguely connected with the procedure,
object or efficacy of the amendment in the Regulation nor
the mode and manner of introducing amendment in the
Regulation so as to infer that unless an Administrator
whether past or present is member of the disciplinary
committee or sub-committee, he cannot be held
D competent to initiate action against any illegality of the
BCCI introduced by way of amendment into the
Regulation or otherwise, is clearly an argument which is
out of context and has absolutely no relevance to the
question of locus standi of an administrator to challenge
E an amendment introduced in the Regulation. [Paras 14-
16] [470-E-H; 471-A-F; 472-B-D]
1.4. The instant matter is not even remotely
connected with any disciplinary action to be taken against
F any member, as the specific issue in the suit is whether
the amendment could have been introduced by the BCCI
in Clause 6.2.4 ignoring and overlooking the fact that the
existing office bearer of the BCCI cannot be allowed to
participate in the auction for owning IPL or Twenty 20
G matches as it would clash and conflict with the interest
of the BCCI. It is well-settled principle of interpretation
that when the language in a statute is plain and admits
of one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be
said to arise, as in the instant matter, where the definition
H of 'Administrator' has been clearly given out in the
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 453
CRICKET IN INDIA
Regulation of the BCCI. But in order to oust the past A
President and his competence to challenge the action of
BCCI from questioning the speedy and hurried
amendment introduced by the BCCI in order to assist the
second respondent from participating in the bidding
process for owning Chennai Super King and then to B
interpret the definition of 'Administrator' so as to hold that
he was not competent to file a suit, can hardly be held to
be giving effect to a purposive and meaningful
interpretation to the expression 'Administrator' as the
purpose or object to serve some just cause is totally c
missing. The safer and more correct course of dealing
with a question of construction is to take the words
themselves and again if possible at their meaning without
any first instance reference to cases. Literal construction
·Of a provision cannot be allowed to assume a restrictive 0
•construction without considering its effect or
1consequence which would result from it for they often
rpoint out the real meaning of the words. It is no doubt true
that if the application of the words literally would defeat
.;he obvious intention of the legislation and produced a
wholly unreasonable result, some violence may be done E
~o achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational
-:onstruction. But the question of inconvenience and
-.1nreasonableness must be looked at in the light of
11pecific events. It would also be difficult to overlook the
well settled position that if a particular construction does F
not give rise to anomalies and the words used are plain,
.,rguments regarding inconvenience is of little weight. It
B also equally well settled rule of construction of statutes
lhat in the first instance the grammatical sense of the
r1ords is to be adhered to and the words of statute must G
•rima facie be given their ordinary meaning. Where the
rammatical construction of a statute is clear and
rianifest, that construction ought to prevail unless there
•e strong and obvious reason to the contrary but when
r;ere is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 8 S.C.R.
A construction. If the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the court must give effect to it and it has
no right to extend its operation in order to carry out the
real or supposed intention of the Legislature/Law maker.
When the language is not only plain but admits of just
B one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said
to arise; What is not included by the Legislature (law
maker), the same cannot be undone by the court by
principle of purposive interpretation. Taking into
consideration the said salutary principles ·of
c interpretation, the definition of the term 'Administrator'
does not exclude the past president from the meaning of
Administrator so as to hold that the action taken by the
Administrator by filing a civil suit and questioning the
amendment introduced by the BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 was
not fit to be entertained on the ground that the appellant
0
had no locus standi to challenge the amendment on the
ground of his competence or locus standi. [Paras 18-22]
[472-G-H; 473-A-D; F-H; 474-A-B-C-G; 475-A-C]
Dental Council of India and Anr. v. Hari Parkash and Ors . .
E (2001) 8SCC 61: 2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 310 - referred to.
The Attorney General v. The Mutual Tontine West
Minster Chambers Association, Limited (1876) 1 Ex.>O. 469;
Charles Bradlaugh v. Henry Lewis Clarke, (1883) VIII A.C.
F . ·354; Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover
(1957) A.C. 436 - referred to.
1.5. As the BCCI discharges important public
functions such as the selection of Indian Team and the
control on the players and has to discharge important
G public function, it cannot be expected to act arbitrarily
whimsically and capriciously so as to hold that the two •
suits are not maintainable at the instance of the appellant
who although, admittedly, is the past president of the
BCCI and hence an Administrator, had no locus standi to
H file even a civil suit and seek order of injunction for
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 455
CRICKET IN INDIA
suspending the effect of amendment on the plea that as A
he was not a member of the sub-committee, he was not
competent to challenge the amendment introduced in the
BCCI Regulation. [Paras 22, 23] [475-D-F]
Mis. Zee Tele Films Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and
8
Ors. (2005) 1 SCR 913 - held inapplicable
2.1. The appellant had not moved the High Court
under its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 32
of the Constitution before this Court so as to offer a plank
to the respondents to contend that as the BCCI is not a c
'State' within the meaning of Article 12, an Administrator
under the Regulation cannot file even a civil suit in the
capacity as former past President and hence as an
'Administrator' so as to challenge an unconstitutional
amendment in the Regulation of the BCCI. This is an o
appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution arising out
of an order passed in a civil suit refusing to grant
injunction which was filed in two regular civil suits.
Therefore, it is difficult to accept the contention for the
respondents and as accepted by Justice Panchal that E
merely because th.e BCCI cannot be regarded as an
instrumentality of the State, it will have to be held that the
two suits filed by the appellant are not maintainable. In
order to decide whether the plaintiff has a. right to file a
civil suit or not, locus standi or competence of the plaintiff F
alone is to be established and not the question whether
the BCCI is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution which is a condition to be fulfilled for
invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227 of
the Constitution as also Article 32 of the Constitution but
surely not for filing a civil suit or injunction application. G
[Paras 24, 25] [476-A-C-F-H; 477-A-B]
2.2. When a civil suit is filed, the question as to
whether a party comes under the purview of
instrumentality of a State does not arise at all and the H
..
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A whole and sole consideration would be as to whether the
plaintiff had a cause of action to file a civil suit, whether
he is competent to file a suit and whether the-suit is
maintainable at his instance. If the civil suit is
maintainable on the basis of existence of a cause of
B action, there is no room for assailing it by raising a
constitutional issue that the suit is not maintainable since
the BCCI is not an instrumentality of the State, as the said
question is not relevant for adjudication of a civil suit
under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure nor
c the civil courts are the Constitutional Courts to enter into
that question. Once, it is held that the plaintiff/appellant
is also an Administrator of the BCCI in view of the
definition of Administrator, his competence to challenge
the amendment introduced in the regulation of BCCI
cannot be held as not maintainable on the ground that
0
BCCI is not a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution as civil suits can surely be filed and can
be held maintainable if the plaintiff is able to make out a
case that cause of action has arisen for filing a suit and
if he is able to sustain the cause of action and he also is
E able to establish that he is the proper party to the suit,
the same will have to be tried by the Court and cannot
be dismissed on the ground of its maintainability. In fact,
when a civil suit is filed for seeking civil remedy, the
question whether the contesting party satisfies the
F condition that it is an instrumentality of the State is of no
relevance as the civil courts do not have to discharge
constitutional function so as to enter into this question.
---
If it does, it woul~ be traversing beyond the boundaries
of its jurisdiction. Hence, this question is clearly
G irrelevant for the purpose of the controversy raised in this
petition. [Paras 25, 27] [477-0-G; 479-A-D]
T.C. Mathew vs. K. Balaji Iyengar and Ors. SLP(Crl.)
No.10107 of 2010 - referred to.
H 3.1. Conflict of interest does not require actual proof
(l
AC. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 457
CRICKET IN INDIA
of any actuaJ pecuniary gain or pecuniary loss as the A
principle of 'conflict of interest' is a much wider,
equitable, legal· and moral principle which seeks to
prevent even the coming into existence of a future and/
or potential situation which would inhibit benefit or
promise through any commercial interest in which the B
principal actors are involved. The entire purpose of
'conflict of interest' rule is to prevent and not merely to
cure situations where the fair and valid discharge of one's
duty can be affected by commercial interests which do
not allow the fair and fearless discharge of such duties. c
On this aspect, it has been substantiated that the second
respondent necessarily was privy to highly sensitive
information about the bidding process, the design of the
tender, the rules of the game, the future plans of BCCI in
respect of IPL and so on and so forth. It is inconceivable 0
that such in.sider information to which any major office
bearer of BCCI would necessarily be privy, would not
have used and misused both potential and actual
materials by the second respondent in the capacity of a
bidder through his company India Cements Ltd. Thus, no
artificial Chinese walls can be assumed to exist between E
•the multiple personalities and activities of respondent
INo.2 both as tender issuer and as a bidder. It is for this
ireason that courts have levied and lined the principle of
"conflict of interest' both with the fiduciary character of a
->erson who should not put himself in a conflict situation F
and with the principles of a trustee dealing with a cesfui
..:tue trust. [Para 28.1] [480..C-H; 481-A]
Pierce Leslie Peter & Co. Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlony
lflapshare & Ors. (1969) 3 SCR 203 - referred to. G
3.2. Although anyone might not have indulged in
reating actual loss to the BCCI by any of his actions, the
act would remain that by virtue of his position as a
:hairman of a company who participated in the bid to
-wn IPL tournament and at the same time holdin9 the H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 8 S.C.R.
A position of an office bearer of the BCCI, is clearly bound
to result into conflict of interest of the BCCI. The fact
remains that the second respondent by virtue of his
position as Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of India
Cements Ltd. and ex-officio Member of the Governing
B Council of IPL clearly came in his way to participate in
the auction held by the BCCI for IPL matches and it is for
this very purpose that the amendment was hurriedly
introduced so that the second respondent may not be
held disqualified from owning IPL Chennai Super King.
c In fact, the concept of 'conflict of interest management'
has increasingly drawn the attention of governments and
citizens alike in all advanced countries including United
States of America over the last several years as has been
the case in much of the rest of the world. [Para 28.2) [481-
D C-D-E-H]
Bray v. Bradford (1896) A.G. 44 - referred to.
3.3. It is an inflexible rule of a court of equity that a
person in a fiduciary position is not, unless otherwise
E expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not
allowed to put himself in a position where his interest
and duty conflict. The BCCI itself took care to ensure this
principle by incorporating clause 6.2.4. But thereafter, the
BCCI without any deliberation and discussion introduced
F an amendment into this clause by making Twenty -20 IPL
or Champions League Matches an exception to this rule
for which the respondent could not come out with any
plausible explanation. Thus the appellant clearly came
out with a strong prima facie case that the amendment
was introduced with an oblique motive to benefit the
G second respondent so that he could not be held
disqualified from participating in the auction and own
Chennai Super King while continuing as Treasurer and
thereafter as Secretary of the BCCI and hence an
Administrator and thus the appellant succeeded in
H establishing his plea that the amendment introduced by
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 459
CRICKET IN INDIA
the BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 was an abuse of the amending A
power exercised by the BCCI in so far as the power of
amendment was introduced not to promote the game of
cricket but to promote the interest of the second
respondent as it is more than clear that without the
amendment, he would not have been entitled to B
participate in the bid as he was a Treasurer of the BCCI
and hence without the amendment he was not eligible
even to participate in the bid and enjoy dual status of that
of an office bearer of the BCCI as Treasurer and also own
Chennai Super King. [Paras 28, 29] [482-C-D-E-H; 483-A- c
C]
3.4. The appellant and the perception based on
consideration of the concept of conflict of interest and its
implication surely succeeded in making out a prima facie
case that this resulted in serving commercial interest of D
the second respondent which gave rise to conflict of
interest with the activities of the BCCI since he as
Administrator/office bearer was able to influence the
decision of the BCCI by being a treasurer and
simultaneously also participated in the IPL auction, E
clearly giving rise to commercial interest which is barred
if the amendment had not been introduced. If the
Administrator is clearly barred as per Regulation from
having any commercial interest in the events of BCCI, it
is beyond comprehension as to how only one class of F
matches which was IPL, Twenty-20 and Champions
League could be treated an exception by allowing an
office bearer to participate in the bid but preventing him
from other matches including Test Matches. The appellant
thus, fully succeeded in making out a prima facie case G
that this amendment smacks of arbitrariness and bias in
favour of the second Respondent and hence it was a fit
case for grant of injunction keeping the impugned
amendment introduced in Clause 6.2.4 of the BCCI
Regulation under suspension or abeyance. However,
H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 8 S.C.R.
A since the second Respondent has already participated
and succeeded in the bid and is also owning the Chennai
Super King, it may be appropriate to leave it open to him
to exercise his option whether he wishes to continue as
an office bearer of the BCCI or own IPL Chennai Super
B King. The appellant succeeded in making out his case to
the extent that the amendment was fit to be kept under
suspension by granting an injunction against the
amendment at least until the suit was finally decided. The
courts below while considering the application for
_c injunction was fully competent to mould the relief in a
given circumstance or situation which they have
miserably failed to do. Hence, the impugned amendment
dated 27.9.2008 was fit to be suspended by granting
injunction against the same. This is clearly so as it would
be difficult to overlook that multiple loyalties can create
0
commercial interest with the activities of BCCI thus
resulting in conflict of interest since the financial or
personal interest of the Board would clearly be
inconsistent with the commercial and personal interest
of the Administrator of the Board. In addition, the rule of
E equity and fairness provides that no one who stands in
a position of trust towards another can in matters
affected by that position, advance his own interests for
example, by trading and making a profit at that other's
expense as the rule of legal prudence mandates that
F once a fiduciary is shown to be in breach of his duty of
loyalty, he must disgorge any benefit gained even though
he might have acted honestly and in his principal's best
interest. In the instant matter, when the BCCI held
auction for owning IPL Team and an Administrator the
G second respondent participated in the bid, variety of real
and/or perceived conflict of interest cannot be ruled out.
These included access to insider information, poi;sible
undue influence on the decision makers who held the
auction and the like. The injunction is granted by
H directing suspension of operation of the impugned
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 461
CRICKET IN INDIA
amendment dated 27.9.2008 introduced in Regulation A
6.2.4 of the BCCI. In case, the second Respondent opts
to continue owning and operating IPL Chennai Super
King, he shall be at liberty to do so but in that event he
shall be restrained from holding any office in the BCCI
in any capacity. [Paras 30-32] [483-D-F-G-H; 484-A-B-D- B
E; 485-A-F]
Case Law Reference:
Per Gyan Sudha Misra, J
(1876) 1 Ex.D. 469 referred to Para 20 c
(1883) VIII A.C. 354 referred to Para 20
(1957) A.C. 436 referred to Para 20
2001 (2) S':fppl. SCR 310 referred to Para 21 D
(2005) 1 SCR 913 held inapplicable Para 24
(1969) 3 SCR 203 referred to Para 28.1
(1896) A.C. 44 referred to Para 28.2
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
3753 of 2011.
From the Judgment & Order dated 24.03.201 Oof the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in OSA Nos. 227 to 229 of 2009.
F
WITH
C.A. No. 3754-3756 of 2011.
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Nalini Chidambaram, Rohit
Bhat, Vikas Mehta, Amit Bhandari, Narhari Singh for the
Appellant. G
G.E. Vahanvati, AG, R.F. Nariman, P.R. Raman, Radha
Rangaswamy, Akhila Kaushik, A Poorv Kurup, Amit Sibal, Mihir
Chatterjee, Hari Shankar K., K. Harishankar, Vikas Singh
Jangra for the Respondents. l-:
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.
When the world at large is endeavouring to eradicate
conflict of interest in public life as also in private venture and
B the respondent - Board of Control for Cricket in India (shortly
referred to as the 'BCCI'), which enjoys monopoly status as
regards regulation of the sport of Cricket in India, and is
perceived to follow the doctrine of "fairness" and "good faith"
in all its activities, has itself recognized its value and importance
C by incorporating in its Regulation that
"No administrator shall have directly or indirectly any
commercial interest in any events of the BCCI,"
i
then whether any exception diluting its effect could be carved
D out of that without any just cause by introducing an amendment
into the same, is the question which essentially falls for
consideration in these appeals. Consequently, the question
also arises whether the amendment was fit to be kept under
suspension by grant of an order of injunction against the same
E as a result of which the respondent No. 2 would be restrained
from functioning as an office bearer of the BCCI in any capacity
as his commercial interest comes in conf!ict with the activities
of the BCCI. In this context the question of locus .standi and
legal competence of an 'Administrator' of the BCCI to file a suit
F for assailing the amendment introduced in the BCCI Regulation,
also arose for determination in the event of which only, the
challenge could be sustained at his instance. While the suits
are still pending in the High Court of Madras, the applications
for injunction have been rejected against which these appeals
G arise wherein extensive arguments have been advanced by
learned counsel for the contesting parties in support of their
respective pleas.
2. Having deliberated and meticulously considered the
H
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 463
CRICKET IN INDIA [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
same in the light of the background, facts and circumstances A
giving rise to these appeals as also having the benefit of the
views expressed in the judgment and order of my learned
Brother Panchal, J., I find it hard to subscribe to the view
expressed therein and hence record reasons respectfully
dissenting from the view on the issues raised in these appeals. B
For this purpose as also to test the relative strength and
weaknesses of the arguments advanced and to have an overall
view of the controversy involved, I deem it essential to relate
the genesis and background of the matter under which these
appeals arise. cl
3. The 1st respondent in these appeals which is the Board
of Control for Cricket in India (for short 'BCCI') is a society
registered under the Societies Registration Act which has its
own Memorandum of Association, Rules and Regulations.
Apart from these, BCCI also has regulations for Players, Team D
Officials, Managers, Umpires and Administrators which controls
· the game of Cricket in India and discharges public functions
which enjoys monopoly status as regards regulation of the sport
of Cricket. It thus earns huge revenues and is perceived to
follow the doctrine of "fairness" and "good faith" in all its Ft
activities. Fortunately, the Regulations of the BCCI which
incorporates rules for Players, Team Officials, Managers.-
Umpires and Administrators itself has incorporated a clause
which is Clause 6.2.4 stating that
F
"No Administrator shall have directly or indirectly any
commercial interest in any events of the BCCI",
thus prohibiting conflict of interest of an Administrator with that
of the BCCI. The Regulation further incorporates the definition
which states that an office bearer of BCCI is an administrator G
and Regulation of the BCCI also elaborately defines as to who
is an 'Administrator'.
4. However, putting laws and regulations on paper, does
not mark the end of fight against 'conflict of interest' in public H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A service and more so in private venture. More appropriately, this
step has to be viewed as a beginning. Effective implementation
and execution is absolutely crucial if these laws and regulations
are to be meaningful. Managing 'conflict of interest' is a relatively
young system, but these young systAms require maturing in the
B form of sincerity, will and dedication and they must be effective
in all spheres if they are to survive and become engrained in
the institutional structures of governance by public as well as
private bodies. In absence of this, even better established
programmes for conflict of interest management could wither
c quickly, if ignored.
5. Bearing the aforesaid principle in mind, it may be
relevant to record the essential details and background of the
matter which indicate that the appellant herein - Sri Muthiah who
is the past president of the BCCI initially filed two complaints
D on 5.9.2008 and 19.9.2008 before the President of the BCCI
in his capacity as past President and hence an Administrator
alleging disqualification suffered by the second respondent Sri
N. Srinivasan who being the Chairman and M.D. of India
Cements Umited should not have been allowed to participate
E in the auction held for owning Indian Premier League ('IPL' for
short - a separate sub-committee unit of BC.Cl) in which he was
declared a successful bidder and thus owned Chennai Super 1
King. The Complainant/Appellant therefore sought action ·
against him as he brought to the notice of the BCCl-President :
F that the second respondent - Sri N. Srinivasan being an office
bearer of the BCCI who is also heading a company named
'India Cements' had commercial interest giving rise to a
"conflict of interest" with the Indian Premier League (for short
'IPL') Tournament for which an auction was conducted by the
G BCCI, in so far as he was in substantial control of the India
Cements Ltd. which became the successful franchisee of the
Chennai Super King and at the same time is also in the
governing council of the IPL Tournament which disqualified him
to participate in the bid for owning Chennai Super King.
~ 6. The appellant's complaint did not meet with anv
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 465
CRICKET IN INDIA [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
· response whatsoever from the BCCI which prompted him to file A
a suit in the Madras High Court on 24.9.2008 bearing
C.S.No.No.930/2008 wherein the plaintiff-appellant herein
sought to enforce Clause 6.2.4 against the second respondent
- Sri N. Srinivasan as in the year 2008, respondent No.2 - Sri
N. Srinivasan who is the Managing Director of India Cements B
Ltd. became the successful bidder for the Chennai Super King
in the IPL auction held by the BCCI and also held the office of
the Vice Chairman and Managing Director of India Cements
Ltd. which derived commercial interest in the events of the
BCCI. Hence, the Plaintiff/Appellant herein raised an issue in _c
the suit that the respondent No.2 - SrL .N. Srinivasan being the
Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of India Cements Ltd.
and also being Office Bearer in BCCI, violated the Regulation
6.2.4 which specifically lays down that no 'Administrator' shall
have direct or indirect commercial interest in any of the events D ..
of the BCCI.
7. Just after a few days of filing of the suit by the Plaintiff/
Appellant herein - Sri Muthiah, wherein he sought to enforce
the policy in Clause 6.2.4 against the second respondent - Sri
N. Srinivasan, the BCCI met on 27.9.2008 and introduced an E
amendment to Clause 6.2.4 carving out an exception therein
which reads as follows:
"No Administrator shall have directly or indirectly any
commercial interest in any of the events of the BCCI F
excluding IPL, Champions League and Twenty 20."
Thus, by one stroke of an amendment, which was introduced
with racing speed, without any deliberation by the BCCI, and
without notice of 21 days to the members on this agenda which
was required under the Regulation, the most commercial event G
of BCCI namely IPL, Champions League and Twenty 20
matches were excluded from Clause 6.2.4 diluting the. entire
effect of Claa$e 6.2.4, reducing this salutary clause into a dead
letter.
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A 8. The amendment introduced by the BCCI to Clause 6.2.4
was, therefore,. challenged by the appellant by filing a second
suit bearing C.S.No. 1167/2008 wherein the appellant also filed
an interim application seeking an order of injunction in both the
suits for restraining the BCCI from giving effect to the new
B amendment by keeping the same under suspension which
according to the appellant, had been introduced surreptitiously
merely to benefit respondent No.2 - Sri N. Srinivasan who had
participated in the auction in pursuance to the tender issued
by the BCCI for persons and corporates to own and operate a
c team for IPL matches wherein respondent No.2 - Sri N.
Srinivasan who is the Vice-Chairman and Managing Director
of a company known as India Cements Ltd:, became the
successful bidder for the Chennai Super King in the IPL auction
which according to the case of appellant, could not have been
permitted in view of Clause 6.2.4 as it stood prior to the
0
amendment. But in order to obviate the bar imposed by Clause
6.2.4 which came in the way of Respondent No. 2 from
participating in the auction for IPL, an amendment was hurriedly
and most expeditiously introduced in Clause 6.2.4 in order to
E permit second respondent-Sri N. Srinivasan to participate in
the bid in which he was a successful bidder and consequently
owned Chennai Super King in spite of the bar of clause 6.2.4
which was operating against him prior to its amendment and
was introduced subsequent to the auction which was held for
owning Chennai Super King, in absence of which he would
F have been ineligible to participate in the bid and hence
disqualified. The appellant, therefore, filed two applications for
injunction and in the first application bearing No. 1041/2008 he
had sought a temporary injunction restraining the BCCI from
permitting Respondent No.2 - Sri N. Srinivasan to participate
G in the General Body Meeting but in the second application he
sought injunction against the amendment introduced by
pleading to put it under suspension.
9. However, the main thrust of the argument of learned
H counsel for the plaintiff/appellant all through in the suit and in
AC. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 467
. CRICKET IN INDIA {GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
.the appeal before .the High Court as also in the injunction A
application was to the effect thatthe amendment introduced by
the BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 was an abuse of the amending power
exercised by the BCCI, in so far as the power of amendment
had been used not to promote Cricket, but to promote the
interest of the second respondent. But the learned single Judge B
before whom the applications for injunction were filed in the suit
was pleased to dismiss the interim applications for injunction
as the single Judge compared the BCCI to private clubs and
held that no outsider can question the regulations of the society
and the courts also cannot interfere in the internal management c
of the society. The learned single Judge, however, did not
consider the main issue in the two suits in the context of the
amended Clause 6.2.4 and the amendment introduced in
Clause 6.2.4 due to which the plaintiff-petitioner filed an appeal
before the Division Bench against the rejection· of the 0
applications seeking injunction. But even on appeal, the
Division Bench dismissed the appeals against which these
appeals by special leave have been filed and were heard at
length.
10. The first and foremost question that requires E
consideration in this appeal by special leave is whether the
plaintiff/appellant herein can be held to be having any locus
standi to file a civil suit challenging the amendment introduced
by the BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations as he is merely
the past president of the BCCI and whether the same can confer F
any right on him as an Administrator so as to challenge the
amendment introduced by the BCCI diluting the bar of
commercial interest of the Administrator in the activities of the
BCCI thus generating 'conflict of interest', and in case the
answers were to be held in the affirmative, then whether the G
amendment introduced by the BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 was fit to
be injuncted by keeping the same in abeyance/suspension as
it clearly gave rise to conflict of interest between the BCCI and
respondent No.2 since he indulged in promoting his commercial
interest while functioning as an office bearer/Administrator of H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A the BCCI who'participated and succeeded in the auction fo,:
owning IPL Chennai Super King. To clarify it further, it may be•
reiterated that if the petitioner/appellant can be held to be
having the competence or locus to file a suit against the BCCI,
then whether the suit can be held to be maintainable at his
B instance so as to enter into further question whether the alleged
amendment introduced in Clause 6.2.4 can be held to be having
any conflict of interest with the interest of BCCI as in that event
it would permit respondent No. 2 to hold the field by functioning
as office bearer of the BCCI and thus participate in all its policy
c decisions as well as deliberations, while continuing also as
Vice Chairman/ Managing Director of his firm India Cements
Ltd. and simultaneously also own Chennai Super King as
successful bidder in the IPL auction.
11. The preliminary question on which the entire edifice of
D the case rests which will have the effect of making the entire
case stand or crumble down, is the question as to whether the
plaintiff/appellant has the locus standi to file a civil suit in the
High Court of Madras so as to challenge the amendment
introduced by the BCCI under Clause 6.2.4. In this context, it
E is extremely relevant to record the definition of the term
'Administrator' in the BCCI Regulations. Clause 1(n) defines
the term 'Administrator' as under:-
"Administrator: An Administrator shall mean and include
F present and former Presidents, Vice Presidents, Hony.
Secretaries, Hony. Treasurers, Hony. Jt. Secretaries of the
Board of Control for Cricket in India ("the Board"), past and
present Presidents and Secretaries of Members affiliated
to BCC/ and any person nominated in any of the sub
committee appointed by the Board as defined in the
G
Memorandum and Rules and Regulations of the Board."
12. The plaintiff/appellant is admittedly a past President
of the BCCI and hence in view of the unambiguous definition
of the 'Administrator' which include past and present Presidents
H and Secretaries and Members affiliated to BCCI, it is difficult
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 469
CRICKET IN INDIA [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
to accept the position that the petitioner/appellant had no locus A·
standi to file a civil suit challenging the amendment introduced
by the BCCI. I find it hard to approve of the view taken by
learned Brother Panchal, J. that only-if-a past President is
nominated on any of the sub'-Committees of the BCCI, he would
be deemed to be an 'Administrator' and not otherwise as it is B
clearly contrary to the express definition of an 'Administrator'
given out in the Regulations of the BCCI 2008. Clause 32 of
the Regulation no doubt deals with misconduct and procedure
required to deal with cqmplaint received from any quarter or
based on any report published or circulated or on its own c
motion in the subject matter of indiscipline or misconduct.
Clause 32 (v) of the Regulation also deals with a provision
regarding expulsion of any Member, Associate Member,
Administrator, Player, Umpire, Team Official, Referee or the
Selector, as the case may be, and in case any of them is found 0
guilty and expelled by the Board, he shall not in future be entitled
to hold any position or office or be admitted in any Committee
or any Member or Associate Member of the Board. Clause 32
thus clearly deals with the misconduct and procedure to deal
with office bearers including all its constituents referred to E
hereinbefore of the BCCI and for this purpose it also lays down
as to who will be the competent persons as member of the sub
committee to deal with misconduct. But to hold that in spite of
the definition of an 'Administrator' given out in Clause 1 (n) of
the Regulation which specifically includes President and past
President of the BCCI, the same would not include an F
Administrator unless he is a member of the sub committee of
the disciplinary committee which is constituted for dealing with
the misconduct of any office bearer including all its constituents
as envisaged under Clause 32, would be a far fetched
interpretation so as to hold that unless an Administrator is G
appointed on a sub committee for the purpose of constituting
a disciplinary committee under Clause 32 of the Regulation; he
cannot be treated as an 'Administrator' within the meaning of
Clause 1(n) of the Regulation and that it would not clothe him
with any legal right to maintain an action in law against the BCCI Hj
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A even for challenging the arbitrary amendment, is difficult to
agree and accept.
13. On the contrary, I find sufficient force and substance
in the c.ontention of the counsel for the appellant that the suits
were filed by the appellant in the capacity of past president of
8
the BCCI since he was an Administrator within the meaning of
the said definition enumerated in Clause 1(n) of the Regulation.
As such, he was competent to institute a suit in his individual
capacity since Clause 1(n) of the Regulation cannot be allowed
to result into a provision rendering it nugatory by overlooking
C the express provision of the definition of Administrator which
unambiguously includes past President, by extracting or
attributing interpretation to it with the aid of Clause 32 of the
Regulation, which is not even remotely connected with the
definition and meaning of the expression 'past President' but
D is a separate and specific provision to deal with merely the
consequence of misconduct and its procedure to deal with the
cases of alleged misconduct which does not envisage dealing
with cases wherein the legality and efficacy of any amendment
to the Regulation of the BCCI is under challenge.
E
14. In the instant matter while dealing with the question of
'locus standi' as to whether the petitioner/appellant was legally
entitled to institute a suit for challenging the amendment or not,
Clause 1(n) of the Regulation which includes 'past President'
F within the definition of 'Administrator' is the only relevant
provision in my view and to dilute its effect, reliance cannot be
placed on Clause 32 of the Regulation as it deals exclusively
with the procedure for dealing with the cases of misconduct of
the office bearers of the BCCI and its other constituents like
G Player, Umpire etc. In my view, this interpretation on the ground
that the same would lead to a purposive interpretation of the
expression 'Administrator' is neither literal nor purposive. When
Clause 1 (n) clearly and explicitly defines the term
'Administrator' and declares expressly that an 'Administrator'
shall mean and include present and former Presidents, Vice
H
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 471
CRICKET IN INDIA [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
Presidents, Hony. Secretaries, Hony. Treasurers, Hony. Jt. A
Secretaries of the Board, and includes even past and present
Presidents and Secretaries of Members affiliated to BCCI so
much so that even a representative of Member or an
Associate Member of Affiliated Member of the Board and any
person connected with any of the sub committee appointed B
by the Board as defined in the Regulation of the BCCI has
been included within the definition of Administrator, it would
be difficult to hold that such Administrator also has to be a
member of a sub committee which is constituted for dealing
with misconduct in order to challenge the amendment c
introduced in the Regulation completely missing that the power
to challenge amendment of BCCI is altogether different from
dealing with cases of misconduct against players, umpires or
administrator.
15. A plain and literal interpretation of the Rule clearly D
indicates that the past presidents also have been unequivocally
included within the meaning of 'Administrator' and while ari
Administrator can also be included as a Member of the Sub-
committee for the Disciplinary Committee, it cannot be
interpreted so as to infer that former president stands excluded E
from the definition of Administrator until and unless he is a
member of the Sub-Committee for disciplinary proceedings. It
is difficult to accept that this would be so in order to give it a
purposive interpretation as no purpose in my opinion can
possibly be inferred from this, on the contrary, the purpose is (!
writ large that it amounts to grant exemption to Respondent No.2
. from getting trapped into the bar imposed by Clause 6.2.4 of
the Regulation of the BCCI which laid down that "Administrator
shall have no direct or indirect commercial interest in any event
of the BCCI." With utmost respect, to hold it to be a purposive G
interpretation would amount to overlooking the express
provision of the definition of Administrator given out in Clause
1(n) of the Regulation which lays down that the Administrator
will include not only existing· presidents of the BCCI but also
past president, so much so that even a representative of H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 8 S.C.R.
A member or an associate member have been included within
the definition of Administrator.
16. It is explicitly clear and not even remotely ambiguous
that the object and purpose of Clause 32 is merely to lay down
the procedure for dealing with misconduct of any player, umpire,
8
administrator etc. and it is not even vaguely connected with the
procedure, object or efficacy of the amendment in the
Regulation nor the mode and manner of introducing amendment
in the Regulation so as to infer that unless an Administrator
whether past or present is member of the disciplinary
C committee or sub-committee, he cannot be held competent to
initiate action against any illegality of the BCCI introduced by
way of amendment into the Regulation or otherwise, is clearly
an argument which is out of context and has absolutely no
relevance to the question of locus standi of an administrator to
D challenge an amendment introduced in the Regulation.
17. To say that past president would mean to infer only
those past president who are members of the sub committee
of a disciplinary proceeding, in my view, amounts to deviating
E from the express meaning and intention ofthe Rule so as to
oust the past president from the affairs of the BCCI, contrary
to the express provision of the Regulation which cannot be held
to be a correct or purposive interpretation of the Rule as this
does not give effect to any purpose or laudable object which
F can be held to be serving the cause of justice, fair play and
interest of the BCCI. On the contrary, it results into a restraint
or hindrance to guarding the interest of the BCCI from indulging
in any malpractice obstructing the course of justice and fair play.
18. We have also to bear in mind at this stage that the
G instant matter is not even remotely connected with any
disciplinary action to be taken against any member, as the
specific issue in the suit is whether the amendment could have
been introduced by the BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 ignoring and
overlooking the fact that.the existing office bearer of the BCCI
H cannot be allowed to participate in the auction for owning IPL
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 473
CRICKET IN INDIA [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
or Twenty 20 matches as it would clash and conflict with the A
interest of the BCC!.
19. We have to remind ourselves the well-settled principle
of interpretation that when the language in a statute is plain and
admits of one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be B
said to arise, as in the instant matter, where the definition of
'Administrator' has been clearly given out in the Regulation of
the BCCI. But in order to oust the past President and his
competence to challenge the action of BCCI from questioning
the speedy and hurried amendment introduced by the BCCI in
order to assist respondent No.2 from participating in the bidding C
process for owning Chennai Super King and then to interpret
the definition of 'Administrator' so as to hold that he was not
competent to file a suit, can hardly be held to be giving effect
to a purposive and meaningful interpretation to the expression
'Administrator' as the purpose or object to serve some just D
cause is totally missing.
20. If we were to dig at the labyrinth of the archives of
judicial precedents, we may take note of the case of The
Attorney General vs. The Mutual Tontine West Minster E
Chambers Association, Limited (1876) 1 Ex.D. 469 as also
Charles Bradlaugh vs. Henry Lewis Clarke, (1883) VIII A.C.
354, wherein it was held that "if there is nothing to modify, alter
or clarify the language which the statute contains, it must be
construed in the ordinary, natural meaning of the words and F
sentences". The safer and more correct course of dealing with
a question of construction is to take the words themselves and
again if possible at their meaning without any first instance
reference to cases. Literal construction of a provision cannot
be allowed to assume a restrictive construction without G
considering its effect or consequence which would result from
it for they often point out the real meaning of the words. It is no
doubt true that if the application of the words literally would
defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produced a
wholly unreasonable result, we must "do some violence" and
HII
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 8 S.C.R.
A so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational
construction. But the question of inconvenience and
unreasonableness must be looked at in the light of specific
events as was held in the case of Attorney General vs. Prince
Ernest Augustus of Hanover, (1957) A.C. 436, wherein the
B question was whether the words used in the statute were
capable of a more limited construction. If not, the well settled
rules of interpretation lays down that we must apply them as
they stand, however unreasonable or unjust the consequence
and however strongly we may suspect that this was not the real
c intention of the law maker.
21. It would also be difficult to overlook the well settled
position that if a particular construction does not give rise to
anomalies and the words used are plain, arguments regarding
inconvenience is of little weight. It is also equally well settled
D rule of construction of statutes that in the first instance the
grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to and the
words of statute must prima facie be given their ordinary
meaning. Where the grammatical construction Of a statute is
clear and manifest, that construction ought to prevail unless
E there be strong and obvious reason to the contrary but when
there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
construction. If the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the court must give effect to it and it has no right
to extend its operation in order to carry out the real or supposed
F intention of the Legislature/Law maker. When the language is
not only plain but admits of just one meaning, the task of
interpretation can hardly be said to arise. What is not included
by the Legislature (law maker), the same cannot be undone by
the court by principle of purposive interpretation. This was the
G view expressed by this Court also in the matter of Dental
Council of India and Anr. Vs. Harl Parkash and Ors., (2001)
8 sec 61 wherein it was held that it cannot ignore the obvious
(provision) and object and the intention of the Legislature
apparent from the context and so interpret and construe it, so
H as to enlarge the scope of its application by imparting into it,
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 475
CRICKET IN INDIA (GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
meaning by implication, which do not necessarily arise. . A
22. Taking into consideration the aforesaid salutary
principles of interpretation, I am clearly of the view that the
definition of the term 'Administrator' does not exclude the past
president from the meaning of Administrator so as to hold that
8
the action taken by the Administrator by filing a civil suit and
questioning the amendment introduced by the BCCI in Clause
6.2.4 was not fit to be entertained on the ground that the
appellant had no locus standi to challenge the amendment on
the ground of his competence or locus standi. I, therefore, find C
it hard to subscribe and agree with the view that only if a past
President is nominated on any of the sub-committees of
disciplinary committee of the BCCI, he would be deemed to
be an Administrator and not otherwise, is a difficult proposition
to accept.
D
23. I also find sufficient .force and substance in the
contention of learned counsel.for the appella.nt that as the BCCI ·
discharges important public functions such as the selection of
Indian Team and the control on the players and has to discharge
· important public function, it cannot be expected to act arbitrarily E
whimsically and capriciously so as to hold that the two suits are
not maintainable at the instance of the appellant who although
admittedly is the past president of the BCCI and hence an
Administrator, had no locus standi to file even a civil suit and
seek order of injunction for suspending the effect of amendment F
on the plea that as he was not a member of the sub-committee,
he was not competent to challenge the amendment introduced
in the BCCI Regulation.
24. However, extensive arguments have been advanced
by learned counsel for the respondents that assuming there is G
violation of any fundamental right by the Board, that will not
make the Board a 'State' for the purpose of Article 12 of the
Constitution. This submission although may be correct in view
of the ratio of the judgment delivered in the matter of Mis. Zee
Tele Films Ltd. And Anr. Vs. Union of India And Ors. (2005) H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A 1 SCR 913, what is missed by the counsel for the respondents
is that the appellant herein has not moved the High Court under
its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 32 of the
Constitution before this Court so as to offer a plank to the
respondents to contend that as the Board is not a 'State' within
9 the meaning of Article 12, an Administrator under the Regulation
cannot file even a civil suit in the capacity as former past
President and hence an 'Administrator' so as to challenge an
unconstitutional amendment in the Regulation of the BCCI. The
counsel for the respondents has ignored while dealing with this
c question that the appellant had not moved the High Court for
enforcement of his fundamental right under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution nor a writ petition in this Court under
Article 32 of the Constitution has been filed alleging
infringement of his fundamental right, but has moved the High
Court by taking recourse to the civil remedy of filing civil suits
0
in the capacity as former president of the BCCI merely to
ensure suspension of the amendment by way of seeking
injunction which was introduced as the same was not in the
interest of the BCCI, since it gave rise to direct or indirect
E commercial interest of respondent No.2 with the events of BCCI
and is barred under Regulation 6.2.4 which is sought to be
diluted by introducing the amendment in the same.
25. It may be reiterated tharthis appeal by special leave
is not a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution but is an
F appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution arising out of an
order passed in a civil suit refusing to grant injunction which was
filed in two regular civil suits. I, therefore, find it difficult to accept
the contention of the counsel for the respondents and accepted
by brother Panchal, J. that merely because the BCCI cannot
G be regarded as an instrumentality of the State, it will have to
be held that the two suits filed by the appellant are not
maintainable. In order to decide whether the plaintiff has a right
to file a civil suit or not, locus standi or competence of the
plaintiff alone is to be established and not the question whether
H the Board is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 477
CRICKET IN, INDIA [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
. 0 Gonstitution which is a condition to be fulfilled for invoking the A
jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution as
\ also Article 32 of the Constitution but surely not for filing a civil
; suit or injunction application. It is perhaps in view of the
Constitution Bench judgment delivered in the matter of Zee Tele
Films (supra) due to which the appellant herein had to file a B
civil suit in the capacity as an Administrator that he has neither
filed a writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution
before the High Court nor any writ petition under Article 32 of
the Constitution before this Court so as to hold that he had no
locus standi to file even a civil suit although he comes clearly c
within the meaning of definition of an 'Administrator'. Hence,
the ratio of the decision in Zee Tele Films (supra) is wholly
inapplicable and irrelevant to the issue involved in this appeal
which arises out of civil suits and injunctions and the question
of locus standi as to who can file a suit or whether the suit filed
0
by the appellant could be held maintainable is the only relevant
issue for the purpose of maintainability of the suit and the
injunction applications. When a civil suit is filed, the question
as to whether a party comes under the purview of instrumentality
\Of a State does not arise at all and the whole and sole
·consideration would be as to whether the plaintiff had a cause E
of action to file a civil suit, whether he is competent to file a
suit and whether the suit is maintainable at his instance. If the
civil suit is maintainable on the basis of existence of a cause
of action, there is no room for assailing it by raising a
constitutional issue that the suit is not maintainable since the F
BCCI is not an instrumentality of the State, as the said question
is not relevant for adjudication of a civil suit under the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure nor the civil courts are the
Constitutional Courts to enter into that question.
G
26. In fact, it may be relevant by way of assistance to
mention regarding one latest order dated 31.1.2011 of the
Supreme Court passed in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.
10107 of 201 O wherein a coordinate Bench of this Court upheld
the judgment and order of the Kera la High Court whereby it. was H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
()
A held that the elected honorary office bearers of the Kerala
Cricket Association and others like players, coaches,
managers, members of various committees etc. are public
servants within the meaning of Section 2 (C) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act 1988 and the High Court of Kerala had
e reversed the judgment of the Special Court at Kerala which had
held that they are not public servants. To elaborate it slightly, it
may be stated that Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 10107/
2010 titled T. C. Mathew vs. K. Balaji Iyengar and Ors. was filed
challenging the judgment of the Kerala High Court wherein the
c substantial question of law which was raised before the
Supreme Court in the aforesaid special leave petition was
whether the elected office bearers of Kerala Cricket
Association could be prosecuted under the Prevention of
Corruption Act alleging offences under Section 13(1) (c) and
(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
0
and whether Section 409, 420, 468, 471, 427 (a) and 201 of
the Indian Penal Code was rightly initiated against elected
honorary office bearers of the Kerala Cricket Association viz.
honorary members of various committees, players, coaches,
manager, boys team members etc. A Bench of this Court was
E pleased to dismiss the special leave petition in limine by order
dated 31.01.2011 and thus upheld the judgment and order of
the Kerala High Court which had held that the aforesaid elected
officer bearers of the Kerala Cricket Association could be
prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act and hence
F the prosecution had rightly been launched. This judgment
although is not on the point as to whether the past President is
an Administrator or he has locus standi to challenge any illegal
action of the Kerala Cricket Association, it surely has a
pursuasive impact on the larger issue that the action of the
G BCCI and its state units are open to challenge even under the
Prevention of Corruption Act at the instance of anyone who is
concerned with its activities, more so an office-bearer/
Administrator who is a past President in view of the definition
of Administrator incorporated in the BCCI Regulation.
H
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR . 479
CRICKET IN INDIA [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
27. Thus once, it is held that the Plaintiff/Appellant is also A
an Administrator of the BCCI in view of the definition of
Administrator, his competence to challenge the amendment
introduced in the regulation of BCCI cannot be held as not
maintainable on the ground that BCCI is not a 'State' within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as civil suits can surely 8
be filed and can be held maintainable if the plaintiff is able to
make out a case that cause of action has arisen for filing a suit
and if he is able to sustain the cause of action and he also is
able to establish that he is the proper party to the suit, the same
will have to be tried by the Court and cannot be dismissed on c
the ground of its maintainability. In fact, when a civil suit is filed
for seeking civil remedy, the question whether the contesting
party satisfies the condition that it is an instrumentality of the
State is of no relevance as the civil courts do not have to
discharge constitutional function so as to enter into this question. D
If it does, it would be traversing beyond the boundaries of its
jurisdiction. Hence, in my opinion, this question is clearly
irrelevant for the purpose of the controversy raised in this
petition.
28. The next question that needs to be addressed in this E
appeal is whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the
application for injunction at least to the extent of keeping the
amendment introduced in Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulation of the
BCCI in abeyance specially when the appellant succeeded in
making out a prima facie case to the effect that participation F
of respondent No.2 in the bid held for IPL matches and thus
own Chennai Super King directly or indirectly came in conflict
with the interest of BCCI as respondent No.2 during and after
bidding process for the IPL Team admittedly held positions in
four capacities which are as follows:- G
{i) TrE:lasurer of BCCI;
{ii) Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of India
Cements Ltd.
H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 8 S.C.R.
A (e) Chairman, Managing Committee, Chennai Super
King; and
(f) Ex-officio Member of the Governing Council of IPL.
Additionally, with effect from September 2008, respondent No.2
3 became the Secretary of BCCI and, therefore, the Ex-officio
Chief Executive of BCCI and also Convener of the Meetings
of the Committees of BCCI including IPL and Champions
League. In this context, I find substance in the plea of learned
counsel appearing for the appellant that conflict of interest does
c not require actual proof of any actual pecuniary gain or
pecuniary loss as the principle of 'conflict of interest' is a much
wider, equitable, legal and moral principle which seeks to
prevent even· the coming into existence of a future and/or
potential situation which would inhibit benefit or promise through
o any commercial interest in which the principal actors are
involved. I also equally find substance in the contention that the
entire purpose of 'conflict of interest' rule is to prevent and not
merely to cure situations where the fair and valid discharge of
one's duty can be affected by commercial interests which do
E not allow the fair and fearless discharge of such duties. On this
aspect, it has been substantiated that respondent No.2
necessarily was privy to highly sensitive information about the
bidding process, the design of the tender, the. rules of the
game, the future plans of BCCI in respect-of IPL and so on and
so forth. It is contended that it is inconceivable that such insider
F information to which any major office bearer of BCCI would
necessarily be privy, would not have used and misused both
potential and actual materials by respondent No.2 in the
capacity of a bidder through his company India Cements Ltd.
Thus, I find it is correct to submit that no artificial Chinese walls :
G can be assumed to exist between the multiple personalities and
activities of respondent No.2 both as tender issuer and as a
;bidder. It is for this reason that courts have levied and lined the
principle of 'conflict of interest' both with the fiduciary character
of a person who should not put himself in a conflict situation
l·f and with the principles of a trustee dealing with a cestui que
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 481
CRICKET IN INDIA [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
trust. In support of this submission, learned counsel has relied A
on Pierce Leslie Peter & Co. Ltd. vs. Violet Ouchterlony
Wapshare & Ors. (1969) 3 SCR 203 paras 3 and 4. In this
context, the reasoning to the effect that there was no clear case
of 'conflict of interest' which could be cited by the appellant with
adequate proof has no force in view of Clause 6.2.4 as it clearly B
incorporates that no Administrator shall have any direct or
.indirect commercial interest in the events of the BCCI and
'amendment was introduced in this clause making IPL
Champions League and Twenty -20 the international matches
an exception to the same. Thus although anyone might not have c
indulged in creating actual loss to the BCCI by any of his
actions, the fact remains that by virtue of his position as a
Chairman of a company which participated in the bid to own
IPL tournament and at the same time holding the position of
an office bearer of the BCCI, is clearly bound to result into 0 .
conflict of interest ofthe BCCL It is altogether a different matter .
that the appellant has also tried to cite example that the
respondent No.2 as franchise holder for Chennai Super King
was compensated approximately for Rs.47 crores by
respondent No.2 on account of cancellation of a match.
E
However, this is not the stage to rely on this part of the allegation
even if it is by way of an example as the suit is still pending
before the High Court, but the fact remains that the respondent
No.2 by virtue of his position as Vice-Chairman and Managing
Director of India Cements· Ltd. and ex-officio Member of the
Governing Council of IPL clearly came in his way to participate F
in the auction held by the BCCI for IPL matches and it is for
this very purpose that the amendment was hurriedly introduced
so that the respondent No.2 may not be held disqualified from
owning IPL Chennai Super King.
G
28. In fact, the concept of 'conflict of interest management'
has increasingly drawn the attention of governments and
citizens alike in all advanced countries including United States
of America over the last several years as has been the case
in much of the rest of the world. Even a century ago in the case H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 8 S.C.R.
A of Bray vs. Bradford (1896) A.C. 44, it was held that the
directors as fiduciaries must not place themselves in a position
in which there is conflict of interest between the duties to the
company and their personal interests or d.uties to others. The
courts have adopted a severe method of ensuring that the trust
B and confidence reposed in a fiduciary such as a director are
not abused and the fundamental principle was stated by Lord
Herschell in 'the aforesaid case (supra) when it was held as
follows:-
"it is an inflexible rule of a court of equity that a person in
c a fiduciary position ... is not, unless otherwise expressly
provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put
himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. It
does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been said,
founded upon principle of morality. I regard it rather as
D based on the consideration that, human nature being what
it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of the person
holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather
than by duty, and thus, prejudic.:ing those whom he was
bound to protect. It was therefore deemed expedient to lay
E down this positive rule".
In fact, the BCCI itself took care to ensure this principle by
incorporating clause 6.2.4 wherein it laid down that "no
administrator shall have directly or indirectly any commercial
F interest in any of the events of the BCCI". But thereafter, the
BCCI without any deliberation and discussion introduced an
amendment into this clause by making Twenty -20 IPL or
Champions League Matches an exception to this rule for which
the respondent could. not come out with any plausible
G explanation.
29. Thus in my view, the appellant clearly came out with a
strong prima facie case that the amendment was introduced
with an oblique motive to benefit respondent No.2 so that he
could not be held disqualified from participating in the auction
H and own Chennai Super King while continuing as Treasurer and
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 483
CRICKET IN INDIA [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
thereafter as Secretary of the BCCI and hence an Administrator A
and thus the appellant in my considered opinion, succeeded
in establishing his plea that the amendment introduced by the
BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 was an abuse of the amending power
exercised by the BCCI in so far as the power of amendment
was introduced not to promote the game of cricket but to B
promote the interest of the 2nd respondent as it is more than
clear that without the amendment, Respondent No. 2 would not
have been entitled to participate in the bid as he was a
Treasurer of the BCCI and hence without the amendment he
was not eligible· even to participate in the bid and enjoy dual C
status of that of an office bearer of the BCCI as Treasurer and
also own Chennai Super King.
30. The plaintiff/appellant in my view and perception based
on consideration of the concept of conflict of interest and its
implication surely succeeded· in making out a prima facie case D
that this resulted in serving commercial interest of respondent
No. 2 which gave rise to conflict of interest with the activities
of the BCCI since Respondent No.2 as Administrator/office
bearer was able to influence the decision of the BCCI by being
a treasurer and simultaneously also participated in the IPL E
auction, clearly giving rise to commercial interest which is
barred if the amendment had not been introduced. Even at the
risk of repetition, it is essential to highlight that the BCCI
regulation itself acknowledges this position when it lays down
in clause 6.2.4 that "no Administrator shall have direct or indirect F
commercial interest in any events of the BCCI", but dilutes its
effect by amending it and making IPL, Champions League and
Twenty-20 matches as an exception which is the most lucrative
and revenue generating event. If the Administrator is clearly
barred as per Regulation from having any commercial interest G
in the events of BCCI, it is beyond my comprehension as to
how only one class of matches which was IPL, Twenty-20 and
Champions League could be treated an exception by allowing
an office bearer to participate in the bid but preventing him from
other matches including Test Matches. The plaintiff/appellant,
H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 8 S.C.R.
A .in my opinion thus, fully succeeded in making out a prima facie
case that this amendment smacks of arbitrariness and bias in
favour of the Respondent No.2 and hence it was a fit case for
grant of injunction keeping the impugned amendment
introduced in Clause 6.2.4 of the BCCI Regulation under
B suspension or abeyance.
31. However, since the Respondent No.2 has already
participated and succeeded in the bid and is also owning the
Chennai Super King, it may be appropriate to leave it open to
him to exercise his option whether he wishes to continue as
C an office bearer of the BCCI or own IPL Chennai Super King
since in view of Regulation 6.2.4, bereft of amendment, he was
not eligible even to participate in the IPL auction as it clearly
generated commercial interest of an office bearer/
Administrator in the events of BCCI, directly or indirectly. In my
D considered view, the plaintiff/appellant succeed in·making out
his case to the extent that the amendment was fit to be kept
under suspension by granting an injunction against the
amendment at least until the suit was f,nally decided. The Courts
below while considering the application for injunction was fully
E competent to mould the relief in a given circumstance or
situation which it has miserably failed to do. But as the event
of bidding has already taken place even before the amendment
was introduced in the BCCI Regulation and the amendment
was fit to be suspended, the respondent No. 2, in my opinion,
F will have to exercise his option whether he wishes to continue
owning IPL and operate Chennai Super King or is more
interested in managing the affairs of BCCI as an Administrator
with fairness, probity and rectitude by divesting himself from
commercial interest which directly or indirectly results in conflict
G of interest with the activities of the BCCI which was clearly
barred under Regulation 6.2.4 but has been diluted by
introducing an amendment after the IPL auction had already
been held when Respondent No.2 was ineligible even to
participate in the auction. Hence, the impugned amendment
H dated 27.9.2008 was fit to be suspended by granting injunction
A.C. MUTHIAH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 485
CRICKET IN INDIA [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
againstthe same. This is clearly so as it would be difficult to A
overlook that multiple loyalties can create commercial interest
with the activities of BCCI thus resulting in conflict of interest
since the financial or personal interest of the Board would
clearly be inconsistent with the commercial and personal
interest of the Administrator of the Bo~rd. In addition, the rule B
of equity and fairness provides that no one who stands in a
position of trust towards another can in matters affected by that
position, advance his owh interests for example, by trading and
making a profit at that other's expense as the rule of legal
prudence mandates that once a fiduciary is shown to be in c
breach of his duty of loyalty, he must disgorge any benefit
gained even though he might have acted honestly and in his
principal's best interest. In the instant matter, when the BCCI
held auction for owning IPL Team and an Administrator - the
respondent No.2 participated in the bid, variety of real and/or 0
perceived conflict of interest cannot be ruled out. These
included access to insider information, possible undue influence
on the decision makers who held the auction and the like.
32. Hence, I deem it appropriate to allow these appeals
and grant injunction by directing suspension of operation of the E
impugned amendment dated 27 .9 .2008 introduced in
Regulation 6.2.4 of the BCCI. In case, the Respondent No. 2 -
Sri. N. Srinivasan opts to continue owning and operating IPL
Chennai Super King, he shall be at liberty to do so but in that
event he shall be restrained from holding any office in the BCCI F
in any capacity whatsoever in view of the reasons assigned
hereinabove.
ORDER
Since there is difference of opinion, let the papers of these G
matters be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India
for being assigned to appropriate Bench.
D.G. Matter referred to larger Bench.
H
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