Supreme Court of India
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI & ORS.versusSTATE OF GUJARAT
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 399
- Decided
- 16 May 2014
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A K PATNAIK
Holding
The convictions and sentences were set aside because the State's sanction under POTA was invalid, the confessional statements were improperly obtained and inadmissible, the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated, and the alleged Urdu letters were unreliable, leaving no independent evidence to sustain the charges.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined the convictions of six accused in the 2002 Akshardham temple terrorist attack, which were based largely on confessional statements recorded under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), testimony of accomplices, and two Urdu letters allegedly recovered from the terrorists' pockets. The Court found that the State's sanction under Section 50 of POTA was not valid because the sanctioning authority did not apply its mind to the material facts. It held that the confessional statements were not recorded in compliance with the procedural safeguards of Section 32 of POTA and the Criminal Procedure Code, and were obtained through torture. The Court also ruled that the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated and the Urdu letters were unreliable, rendering the prosecution's case untenable. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and sentences, acquitting all the accused.
Issues considered
- Whether the sanction granted by the Gujarat State Government under Section 50 of POTA was valid.
- Whether the confessional statements of the accused were recorded in accordance with Section 32 of POTA, the CrPC, and the principles laid down by this Court.
- Whether statements of the accomplices can be used to corroborate the confessional statements of the accused.
- Whether the two Urdu letters were actually recovered from the pockets of the terrorists and whether they were written by accused A‑4.
- Whether any evidence apart from the retracted confessional statement of A‑6 connects him to the offence.
- Whether any independent evidence exists beyond the confessional statements and accomplice testimony to prove the guilt of the accused.
- Whether the accused were guilty of criminal conspiracy under Section 120‑B of the IPC.
- Whether the appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution permits interference with the concurrent findings of fact of the lower courts.
Legislation cited
- Arms Act, 1959s. 25, s. 27, s. 29
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 162, s. 164
- Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 142, s. Article 20(3), s. Article 21
- Explosive Substances Act, 1908s. 3, s. 4, s. 6
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 133
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 153-A, s. 302, s. 307, s. 451, s. 452
- Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002s. 32, s. 3(3), s. 5, s. 50, s. 52
Subjects
terrorismPOTAconfessional statementsacquittalsanctionevidencecriminal conspiracyArticle 136human rights
Judgment
[2014] 7 S.C.R. 48
A ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI & ORS.
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 2295-2296 of 2010)
MAY 16, 2014
B
[A. K. PATNAIK AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002:
s. 3(3), 5, 32, 50 and 52 - Penal Code 1860 - Arms Act,
1959 - s. 25 - Explosive Substances Act, 1908- s. 4 - Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 164, 162 - Constitution of
India, 1950 - Article 136 - Terrorist attack in Akshardham
temple, Gujarat resulting in death of 33 persons including
commandos and injuries to 85 people - Prosecution case
0
based on some articles received from the head of NSG which
were collected from the clothes of the dead bodies of the
fidayeens including two letters written in urdu language, found
in the pocket of each one of the fidayeens; and car in which
one of the accused allegedly brought fidayaans and weapons
E to the place of incident - Conviction under the aforesaid Acts
and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, life imprisonment
and death sentence for the various offences under the Acts
- Upheld by High Court - On appeal, held: Courts below did
not examine the evidence with 'more than ordinary care' as
F needed under POTA - Courts below perverse in conducting
the case at various stages, right from the investigation level
to the granting of sanction by the State Government to
prosecute the accused persons under POTA - Sanction was
not a valid sanction uls. 50 of POTA - While recording
G confessional statements statutory mandates laid down u/ss.
32 and 52 of POTA not followed - Confessional statements
of accused persons obtained under torture, highly
contradictory and improbable in nature - Statements of
accomplices disclosing evidence of the offences, and the
H 48
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 49
GUJARAT
connection of the accused persons to the offence, cannot be A
relied upon to corroborate their confessional statements -
Prosecution case with respect to recovery of the alleged
letters in Urdu from dead bodies of the fidayeens and that
these letters were written by one of the accused, rendered fatal
- Further no evidence apart from the retracted confessional B
statement of A-6 which connects him to the offence - No
independent evidence on record apart from the confessional
statements recorded by the police, of the accused persons
and the accomplices, to hold them guilty of the crime - Also,
accused cannot be held guilty of criminal conspiracy under c
Section 120-B /PC - Thus, concurrent findings of fact of
Special Court (POTA) and High Court erroneous in fact as
also in Jaw and fit case for interference u/Art 136 - Order of
conviction and sentence against the accused set aside -
Evidence. D
s. 50 - Cognizance of offence - Previous sanction by
Central Government - Compliance of - Held: All the relevant
documents collected during the course of investigation with
respect to the crime required for granting sanction should be
presented before the sanctioning authority so that the E
sanction can be granted on basis thereof - On facts,
sanctioning authority did not apply its mind to the satisfaction
as to whether the instant case required granting of sanction
- Failure of prosecution to prove that sanction was granted
by the Government either on the basis of an informed F
decision or on the basis of an independent analysis of fact
on consultation with the Investigating Officer - Clear non-
application of mind by Home minister in granting sanction -
Thus, sanction void and not a legal and valid sanction uls
50 of the Act. Gt
s. 32 - Procedure for recording of the confessional
statements of the accused persons under - Compliance of
- Held: Police officer recording confessional statements is
required to explain in writing to the accused that he is not
H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A bound to make confessional statement and once such
statement is made, the same can be used against him -
Accused is to be assured that if he does not make the
confessional statement, it would not jeopardize his well-being
while in police custody and also to ensure that such
B statements are made before a competent police officer in a
threat-free environment - On facts, process of intimation did
not precede the recording of confessional statements police
officer-DCP as a continuous process - Accused persons were
making confessions after a period almost 11 months after the
C incident - Mere period of 15 minutes was not reasonable time
for reflection on the incident of the attack and their
involvement in the same - Accused who made confessional
statements on the same day, were produced before the Chief
Judicial Magistrate the very next day - CJM had discharged
his duty in a callous manner - He recorded statements of the
0
accused persons all in a period of half an hour which is highly
improbable - Thus, neither the police officer recording the
confessional statements nor CJM followed the statutory
mandates laid down u/ss. 32 and 52 while recording the
confessional statements of the accused persons -
E Confessional statements made by accused u/s. 32 not
admissible in !aw.
s. 32 - Retracted confessional statements of accused
persons - Evidentiary value - Held: Statements of confession
F of accused persons cannot be relied upon if they are retracted,
unless corroborated by independent evidence - On facts,
prosecution case rests on the confessional statements of
accused persons, accomplices and their evidence and two
Urdu letters purportedly found in the pockets of the trousers
G of the fidayeens and written by A-4 - Subsequently retraction
by accused persons revealing that they were tortured by police
to extract their confessional statement - There is absolutely
no independent evidence on record which corroborates the
confession - Retracted confessional statement of accused
H person cannot be used to corroborate the retracted
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 51
GUJARAT
confessional statement of co-accused - Thus, confessional A
statements of accused persons cannot be relied upon - Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 164, 162.
I
Stringent provisions - Caution by Supreme Court -
Held: In view of stringent provisions of POTA and the grave
B
consequences that misuse of the Act might result in-violation
of right to life and personal liberty, need to ensure that the
guidelines laid down in the Act are rigorously observed while
recording the confessional statements of the accused
persons.
c
Evidence:
Evidence of the accomplice - Reliability - Held:
Evidence of the accomplice is acceptable - Confessional
statements of accomplices form a very weak form of
0
evidence, to prove the culpability of the accused persons if.
the guilt of the accused cannot be proved, independent of the
statements of the accomplices - Therefore, the same cannot
be used to corroborate the confessional statements of an
accused - There should be independent evidence to
E
corroborate the evidence of the accomplice to establish the
culpability of the accused - On facts, evidence of the
accomplices raises suspicion and conjectures but the same
cannot be construed as legal evidence a_gainst the accused
persons - Prosecution did not make anyeffort to substantiate
the evidence of the accomplices with independent material F
evidence - Rather, the confessional statements of the
accomplices have been used to corroborate the confessional
statements af the accused persons, in the absence of any
independent evidence - Thus, evidence of the accomplices
cannot be used to corroborate the confessional statements G
of the accused persons in the absence of independent
evidence and the delay of more than one year in recording
their statements.
Evidence of witness - Reliance upon - Held: Witness H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A whose evidence is placed reliance upon by the Court, has to
be examined and questioned during the course of
investigation by the police and his name has to appear in the
chargesheet so that the accused gets a fair chance to cross
examine such witness.
B
Independent evidence - Evidentiary value - Evidence as
regards letters in urdu purportedly recovered from the pockets
of the dead bodies of the fidayeen - Reliance upon - Held:
Letters were. recovered by prosecution witness, a Major from
the bodies of the fidayeens - However, the statement of PW-
C 91 u/s. 161 Cr.P.C. was not recorded - He could not have
been presented as a chargesheet witness, as his evidence
was recorded for the first time before the Special Court (POTA)
- Further, the Brigadier who had signed the letters was not
examined either u/s. 161 or before the court- Contents of the
D letter nowhere mention the name of the placeJrom where the
fidayeens had allegedly come, as had been mentioned by
PW-91 in his deposition before the Special Court (POTA) -
Further if the statement of Police Inspector of Gandhi Nagar
was taken into consideration, it would mean that no signature
E was made on the back of the letters, and the letters seized
were not kept in sealed covers which increased the chance.
of letters being replaced subsequently - Photographer and
the videographer who recorded the scene of offence were not
examined - Post mortem report of fidayeens stated that all
F their clothes were stained with blood and mud and all clothes
bore multiple tears and holes due to perforation by bullets -
However, letters remained clean, without any tear, soiling or
stains of blood and soil, rendering them highly unnatural and
improbable - Thus, two letters cannot be taken as evidence
G in order to implicate the accused persons.
Independent evidence - Evidentiary value - Prosecution
case establishing involvement of accused persons in Temple
case - Independent evidence against accused persons that
two letters in urdu allegedly found from the pockets of the
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 53
GUJARAT
trousers of the fidayeens were written by A-4 - Reliability of- A
Held: Prosecution case that the Urdu letters were written by
A-4 by only placing reliance upon the opinion of the
handwriting expert - However, certificate of the senior most
official of FSL, Hyderabad on basis of which the handwriting
expert formed his opinion was not admitted on record till a B
much tater stage, after the charge sheet was prepared and
handwriting expert gave his statement before the court - It was
at this stage that his evidence was admitted with protest from
the defence - Handwriting expert in his evidence stated that
he has basic knowledge of Urdu and cannot differentiate c
between Urdu, Arabic and Persian; and that the opinion of
handwriting experts is not conclusive - Thus, the prosecution
failed to establish beyond reasor,3ble doubt that the Urdu
letters were written by A-4.
Independent evidence - Evidentiary value - Prosecution D
case establishing involvement of accused persons in Temple
case - Independent evidence that in the blue ambassador car
accused allegedly brought the fidayeens and the weapons to
place of incident - Reliance upon - Held: neither the
panchnama nor seizure memo of the car made during its E
·91/eged seizure - However, courts below without verifying the
contents of the panchnama and the seizure memo of the car,
admitted the involvement of the car in evidence on record,
merely on the basis of the subsequent panchna'ma drawn by
the G,µjarat police on which no weightage can be given - F
Prosecution failed to prove that car was used by accused to
carry weapons from Jammu and Kashmir to Bareilly for
carrying out the attack on Akshardham - Thus, no evidence
apart from the retracted confessional statement of A-6 to
connect him to the offence. G
Defence witness - Evidentiary value - Held: Equal
weightage should be given to the defence witnesses as that
of the prosecution witnesses - It erred in not given the same
weightage to the defence witnesses as they have to the
H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A prosecution witnesses.
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 1208 - Criminal conspiracy -
Offence of - Essential ingredients - Held: There should be
some common object to be achieved and an agreement by
accused persons to achieve that object - Individual
B conspirator need not know the entire sequence of the chain
and events - Limited knowledge is sufficient -On facts, it
cannot be said that conspiracy was hatched by accused
persons in furtherance of some common object, to take
revenge for Godhra Riots - Each accused claims to have
C complete knowledge of conspiracy, while contradicting the
other's version of the same events to constitute the act of
criminal conspiracy - None of the events of the alleged
criminal conspiracy was supported by independent evidence
that inspires confidence to uphold the conviction and
D sentences meted out to the accused persons - Thus,
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt
against the accused persons, for the offence of criminal
conspiracy u/s. 120-8 of the Code.
E The instant case is with regard to the terrorist attack
which took place on Akshardham temple, Gandhinagar,
Gujarat. The appellants-accused were convicted for the
said terrorist attack between the afternoon of 24.09.2002
and early morning of 25.09.2002 resulting in death of 33
people including commandos and injuries to more than
F 85 people including 23 police officers and jawans and
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, life imprisonment
and death sentence for the offences punishable under
the provisions of the Penal Code 1860; Arms Act, 1959;
Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Prevention of
G Terrorism Act, 2002 by the Special Court (POTA).
On the fateful day around 4.30 pm, two persons
armed with AK-56 rifles, hand grenades entered the
precincts of the Akshardham temple and fired
H indiscriminately towards the children, worshippers,
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 55
GUJARAT
devotees, volunteers and visitors, women and others and A
threw hand grenades on them, resulting in killing and
injuring them. Police officers were called at the place of
offence. The terrorists (fidayeens) once again started
firing. A fierce gun battle ensued and there was also a
bomb blast. National Security Guards took control of the B
situation at about ,12.00 at midnight. They began counter
attack against the fidayeens. Exchange of firing continued
for 5 hours, till the early hours of the next day and both
the terrorist were killed. The two fidayeens carried large
quantity of fire arms and explosive substances. Some c
explosives were seized along with other articles from the
premises. Then PW 126, ACP 'GLS' lodged a complaint
and registered an FIR for the offences under ss. 120-8,
302, 307, 153A, 451 IPC against unknown persons aged
20-25 years. Investigation was handed over to PW-119,
0
Police Inspector 'VR'. Prosecution case was that some
articles were received from Brigadier 'RS', head of NSG
which were collected from the clothes of the dead bodies
of the fidayeens including two letters written in urdu
language, found in the pocket of each one of the
fidayeens. Investigation started but 10 could not trace the E
accused persons. Almost a year later, investigation of the
case was transferred to PW-126. The next day A1 to AS
were arrested. The prosecution alleged that the criminal
conspiracy was hatched at Saudi Arabia, Hyderabad,
Ahemdabad and Jammu and Kashmir by some clerics F
and few others after the incidents of Godhra riots.
Subsequently, A-6 was taken into custody. Investigation
was concluded and charge sheet was filed against all the
six accused persons, after obtaining necessaiy sanction
order as required u/s 50 of POTA from the State G
Government. 26 persons were shown as absconding
accused. PW-78, SP recorded the confessional statement
as provided u/s. 32 of the POTA by following the
mandatory procedure. Out of 376 witnesses shown in the
H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A chargesheet, 126 witnesses were examined. The Special
Court (POTA) convicted all the accused persons and
sentenced A-2, A-4 and A-6 to death, A-3 to life
imprisonment, A-1 to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years
and A-5 to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. The High
B Court upheld the order passed by the Special Court
(POTA). Hence, the instant appeals.
The questions which arose for consideration are:
1. Whether sanction given by the State Government
c is in compliance with Section 50 of POTA?
2. Whether the confessional statements of the
accused persons were recorded as per the
procedure laid down in Section 32 of POTA, CrPC
and the principles laid down by this Court?
D
3. Whether the statements of the accomplices
disclosing evidence of the offences, and the
connection of the accused persons to the offence,
can be relied upon to corroborate their confessional
E statements?
4. Whether the two letters in Urdu which have been
translated in English, were found from the pockets
of the trousers of the fidayeens who were killed in the
attack?
F
5. Whether the letters allegedly found from the
pockets of the trousers of the fidayeens were written
by A-4?
6. Whether there is any evidence apart from the
G retracted confessional statement of A-6 which
connects him to the offence?
7. Whether there is any independent evidence on
record apart from the confessional statements
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 57
GUJARAT
recorded by the police, of the accused persons and A
the accomplices, to hold them guilty of the crime?
8. Whether A-2 to A-6 are guilty of criminal
conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC?
9. Whether the concurrent findings of the courts B
below on the guilt of the accused persons can be
interfered with by this Court in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution?
Allowing the appeals, the Court
c
HELD: 1. Accused persons are innocent with respect
to the charges leveled against them. The judgment and
order of the Special Court (POTA) and the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court along with Criminal o
Appeal Nos. 1675 of 2006 and 1328 of 2006 are set aside.
Consequently, the sentences of death awarded to A-2, A-
4 and A-6, life imprisonment awarded to A-3, 10 years of
1
rigorous imprisonment awarded to A-5 are set aside.
Since all the accused are acquitted and also, since A-1 E
was convicted and sentenced on the basis of the same
evidence which has already rejected, A-1 who is not in
appeal before this Court, is acquitted of the conviction
and sentence awarded to him by the courts below,
exercising the power of this Court under Article 142 of the F
Constitution and hold him not guilty of the charges
framed against him though ~ has already served his
sentence and he is absolved ofthe stigma he is carrying
of that of a convict. [Para 135) [256-F-H; 257-A-C]
2.1. All the relevant documents required for granting G
sanction shall be presented before the sanctioning
authority so that the sanction can be granted on the
basis of relevant material information and documents
collected during the course of investigation with respect
to the crime. [Para 75) [139-B-C] H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi & Ors. v. State of Gujarat
(1997) 7 SCC 744:1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 356; Anirudhsinhji
Karansinhji Jadeja and Anr. v. State of Gujarat (1995) 5 SCC
302:1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 637 - referred to.
2.2. PW-88, Principal Secretary, Home Department
8
deposed that PW-126, ACP 'GLS' had forwarded to him
the relevant documents-Patrak A and Patrak B details of
arrests of all the six accused, for the purpose of deciding
whether it was a fit case for granting sanction under
Section 50 of Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. He had
C reiterated that he had perused all these documents,
especially Patrak-A, which contained the details of the
two Urdu letters and the opinion of the handwriting expert
from the FSL and Patrak B, the contents of which were
not mentioned in his statement, and also the details of the
D arrest of the accused persons. But glaringly, PW-88
stated that he had not enquired about whether there were
any investigation papers regarding the involvement of A-
6 in the crime by the Crime Branch, Ahmedabad, at
Jammu and Kashmir. This aspect is important as he had
E stated that he had no knowledge of whether the custody
of A-6 was taken in accordance with due process of law.
He further stated that he had verified the case papers and
had satisfied himself that Section 52 of POTA had been
complied with completely but in the very next sentence,
F he stated that there were no papers suggesting
compliance of section 52 of POTA in the bunch of papers
sent to him. Thus, it is clear from the statement of PW-88
that he was an important part of the process of granting
sanction under POTA and could throw light on the
G aspects taken into consideration while granting sanction.
He was the only prosecution witness who was examined
by the court in this regard and it is apparent that he had
not applied his mind for the same, which is clearly visible
from the inherent contradictions in his statement. [Para
H 74] [136-C; 138-B-F,H; 139-A-B]
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 59
GUJARAT
2.3. It was the Deputy Secretary, Law and Order who A
had signed the document of sanction issued in the name
of the Governor. However, he was not examined by the
Court. On the other hand, PW-88 was examined.
Therefore, the statement of PW-88 is examined, since he
formed the only link in the Home Ministry of State of B
Gujarat and could enlighten the facts and information
which were taken into consideration by him while
granting sanction. While deposing before the Special
Court (POTA), PW-88 stated that he had not discussed
anything with the Home Minister regarding the grant of c
sanction and the Minister had simply signed the
proposed note as a mark of approval. PW-88 further
stated that he had not discussed anything with the 1.0
about granting sanction. However, the Special Court
(POTA) erroneously justified the granting of sanction on
0
the ground that the counsel for A-2 and A-4 before the
Special Court (POTA), did not insist on examination of the
.internal note and at no stage was such a request made
in writing. [Para 75] [142-F-H; 143-A-B]
Mansukh/a/ Vitha/das Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (1997) E
7 SCC 622: 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 705 - referred to.
2.4. The instant case does not show that the
sanctioning authority had applied its mind to the
satisfaction as to whether the instant case required
granting of sanction. The prosecution failed to prove that F
the sanction was granted by the government either on the
basis of an informed decision or on the basis of an
independent analysis of fact on consultation with the
Investigating Officer. This would go to show clear non-
application of mind by the Home Minister in granting G
sanction. Therefore, the sanction is void on the ground of
non-application of mind and is not a legal and valid
sanction under Section 50 of POTA. [Para 77] [143-H; 144-
A-C]
H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 3.1. The provisions of a Special Act prevail over the
provisions of General Act. Since the constitutionality of
the POTA was declared as valid by this Court, its
provisions would prevail over CrPC. However,
considering the stringency of the provisions of POTA and
B the grave consequences that misuse of the Act might
carry i.e, violation of right to life and personal liberty, there
is need to ensure that the guidelines laid down in the Act
are rigorously observed while recording the confessional
statements of the accused persons. [Para 79] [150-G-H;
c 151-A-B]
Peoples Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2004)
9 SCC 580: 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 860 - referred to.
3.2. On perusal of the evidence on record, stark
0 discrepancies is found in the manner in which the
statements of the accomplices and those of the accused
persons were recorded. While the statements of the
accomplices' namely-PW-SO, PW-51 and PW-52 were
preceded by written records of cautions in the same
E document, the confessional statements of the accused
persons do not show such caution. [Para 80] [151-E-G]
3.3. Reverting to the requirement of Section 32, the
police officer recording the confessional statements is
required to explain in writing to the accused that he is not
F bound to make confessional statement and once such
statement is made, the same can be used against him.
Further, it is imperative that the accused is assured that
if he does not make the confessional statement, it would
not jeopardize his well-being while in police custody and
G also to ensure that such statements are made before a
competent police officer in a threat-free environment. The
deposition of the police officer PW-78-DCP who had
recorded the confessional statements of the accused
persons how~ver, reflects otherwise. He admitted that he
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 61
GUJARAT
did not assure the accused persons that not making the A
confessional statement will not put them in adverse
position. [Para 84, 85] [60-F-H; 61-A-B]
3.4. Two exhibits-the letter of intimation and the
statements of confession, in the case of each of the B
accused persons, are of the same day. The intimation
letters of caution written by PW-78 failed to prove that the
process of intima~ion preceded the recording of
confessional statements as a continuous process. There
is nothing available on record to show that reasonable
reflection time was given to the accused persons before C
making the confessional statements, though the
prosecution claimed to have given them 15 minutes as
reflection period. The amount of time to be given for
reflection before confession depends on the facts and
circumstances of the case, it is imperative to bear in mind D
that in the instant case, the accused persons were
making confessions after a period almost 11 months after
the incident. Thus, a mere period of 15 minutes does not
appear to be reasonable time for reflection on the incident
of the attack and their involvement in the same. Therefore, E
PW-78, who recorded their confessional statements, did
not give enough time to the accused persons to record
their confessional statements, since they were making
confessions after 11 months of the incident. [Para 82, 85]
[155-C; 159-F-G; 160-A-C] F
State of Rajasthan v. Ajit Singh & Ors. (2008) 1 SCC 601:
2007 (11) SCR 251; Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2002) 8
SCC 73:2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 247 - referred to.
3.5. Since A-2 and A-4 made confessional statements G
on the same day, they were produced before the PW-99,
CJM the very next day. PW-99, CJM had discharged his
duty in a callous manner. From the statements of the PW-
99, it can be inferred that he was able to record the
statement of the accused persons, read it over to them H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A and enquire about any coercion and torture, all in a period
of half an hour. It is highly improbable that a confessional
statement running to more than 15 pages could be read
back to them within half an hour. From the statement of
PW-99 on examination in chief and also on cross
s examination, it is clear that he did not enquire about the
basic compliances he was required to make himself
aware of, to ensure fair investigation against the accused
persons. His conduct in recording of statement under
Section 32(5) of POTA merely resembles that of a passive
C reluctant officer involved in some procedural formality.
[Para 86] [164-D-E; 165-C-E]
3.6. While POTA makes a departure from Cr.P.C. in
that it makes confessional statements made before a
police officer admissible, the procedural safeguards
D therein are not a mechanical formality. On the other hand,
it should be able to inspire confidence to show that the
procedure has been scrupulously followed while
recording confessional statements particularly because
'o,f the grave consequences which follow such
E statements, which might result in deprivation of life and
personal liberty of the person, which is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution that can be taken
away only by following the procedure established by law.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the CJM to strictly and
F scrupulously follow all the statutory procedural
safeguards provided for under Section 32 of POTA. [Para
87] [165-F-H; 166-A]
3.7. The other statutory mandate under Section 32 of
POTA is that the person making the confessional
G statement shall be produced for medical examination and
thereafter, be sent to judicial custody after the CJM
records the si.atement of the accused person. The
question which arises for consideration is whether this
mandate is operative only if the accused makes a
H complaint of torture before the CJM or whether the CJM
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 63
GUJARAT
is duty bound to send the accused persons to judicial A
custody as a statutory requirement after recording the
statement. It was contended by the accused persons that
they were subjected to physical torture by the police
before the confessional statements were recorded and
that they were also kept in police custody in the B
intervening night between being produced before the
CJM and being sent to Judicial Custody. Therefore,
though they were subjected to torture, they could not
make a complaint before the CJM due to fear and
apprehension, since they were taken back to police C
custody after their statements were recorded. The
counsel for the accused persons, argued that Section
32(5) unambiguously declares that the accused shall be
sent to judicial custody after the recording of the
confessional statements, whereas the counsel for the D
prosecution contended that the accused must be sent for
medical examination only if there is a complaint of torture
and only in that case, must he be sent to judicial custody.
The argument of the counsel for the prosecution cannot
be accepted. The use of the phrase, 'shall be sent to E
judicial custody' after confession is a mandatory
requirement in comparison to the use of an alternative
term 'may' which gives discretionary power to the CJM.
[Para 88] (166-8-F]
3.8. Apart from Section 32 of POTA, Section 52 also F
lays down certain guidelines which are to be strictly
adhered to while recording the confessional statements
of an accused person under Section 32. Therefore,
neither the police officer recording the confessional
statements nor the CJM followed the statutory mandates G
laid down in POTA under Sections 32 and 52 while
recording the confessional statements of the accused
persons, and thus, the confessional statements made by
A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 under Section 32 of POTA are not
admissible in law. [Para 89, 90] (169-D; 177-H; 178-A-B] H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Hardeep Singh Saha/ & Ors. v. State of Punjab through
CBI (2004) 11 sec 612:2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 783;
Mohammad Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab Alias Abu
Mujahid v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 9 SCC 1:2012 (8)
SCR 295; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11
B SCC 600: 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 79 - referred to.
4.1. The evidence of the accomplice is not
acceptable. [Para 93)
Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1968
c SC 832: 1968 SCR 641; Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryanal
(1975) 3 SCC 742: 1975 (3) SCR 453; Mrinal Das & Ors. v.
State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479: 2011 (14) SCR 411 -
referred to.
4.2. PW-50 stated in his deposition about watching
D videos of riots and killing of Muslims in Gujarat in the
house of A-3 at Riyadh, which act, by itself does not
constitute a criminal offence. On being asked during the
cross examination before the Special Court (POTA) if the
money donated by the gathering in Saudi Arabia to A-3,
E was used for running the relief camps in Gujarat, he was
not able to answer for what purpose exactly the money
was collected. Therefore, at the most, even if his evidence
is taken to be true for the sake of argument, some
suspicion, if at all, can be cast on the involvement of A-3
F in some sort of illegal activity at the most. But culpability'
of a person in as grievous an offence as this, cannot be
premised on mere suspicion without knowledge of the
nature of the illegal activity. [Para 93] [189-D-G]
4.3. The evidence of PW-51 was not reliable because
G according to his evidence, it was reported to him by A-2
that the fidayeens had arrived from Hyderabad which
contradicts the claim of the prosecution; and A-2 did not
state anything beyond the alleged arrival of the fidayeens
which cannot be connected to the event of attack on
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 65
GUJARAT
Akshardham beyond reasonable doubt. It again, merely A
arouse suspicion about the involvement of A-2 and the
passive approval of A-4 and A-5 in the incident. [Para 94]
[189-H; 190-A]
4.4. With respect to PW-52, other than the fact that he
B
mentioned about A-2 telling him that they are planning a
'carnage' and that some 'guests' have arrived, no other
detail was provided by PW-52 in his evidence. A-6 had not
been mentioned at all in the evidence of any of the
accomplices. Therefore, the twin test to establish the
credibility of the guilt of the accused persons based on C
the evidence of the accomplices, fails miserably. [Para 94]
[190-B-C]
4.5. A perusal of the evidence of all the three
accomplices PW-50, PW-51, PW-52 shows that all of them o
intended to absolve themselves of the liability for the
conspiracy with respect to the attack on Akshardham,
going as far to mention that they were not involved in the
incident and only the accused persons knew about the
intricate details of the chain of events that ultimately led E
to the execution of their plan of 'carnage'. Even then, if it
is presumed that the accomplices have implicated
themselves by mentioning that they were aware about
some incident which was about to happen and thus, were
part of the criminal conspiracy, the evidence of the
F
accomplices fail the second test, in that it fails to prove the
guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt.
All the three accomplices mentioned about the plan of
'carnage' which the accused persons had planned
together. However, no link could be established between
the accused persons and the attack on Akshardham since G
the evidence of the accomplices is far too vague and they ..
fail to provide any form of substantive evidence against
the accused persons. [Para 93] [188-A-D]
Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra Etc. v. K. S. Dalipsinghji & H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Anr. Etc. (1969) 3 SCC 429:1969 (3) SCR 130; Vijay Kumar
Arora v. State(Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2010) 2 SCC 353:2010
(1 ) SCR 1069 - referred to.
4.6. The evidence of the accomplices at the most,
raises suspicion and conjectures but the same cannot be
8
construed as legal evidence against the accused
persons, relying solely on which they can be convicted,
as has been done by the courts below. Moreover, it is a
settled principle of law that the confessional statements
of accomplices form a very weak form of evidence, to
C prove the culpability of the accused persons if the guilt
of the accused cannot be proved, independent of the
statements of the accomplices. Therefore, the same
cannot be used to corroborate the confessional
statements of an accused. Instead, there shoulcl be
D independent evidence to corroborate the evidence of the
accomplice to establish the culpability of the accused.
[Para 95] [191-D-G]
I
Kashmira Sing/1 v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952 1
E SC 159: 1952 SCR 526 - relied on. ~
4.7. In the instant case, the prosecution did not make
any effort to substantiate the evidence of the accomplices
with independent material evidence. Rather, the
confessional statements of the accomplices have been
F used to corroborate the confessional statements of the
accused persons, in the absence of any independent
evidence. But, apart from all these aspects on the
statements of the accomplices, it is feared that the story
against the accused persons and its corroboration
•.J through the statements of accomplices is an act of
concoction to make up a case against them. It was
recorded in the statement of PW-126 that the information
regarding PW-50 was given to him by 'DGV'. However,
'DGV' had not even been examined in this case and there
H is no information as to how he came to know about PW-
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 67
GUJARAT
50 after almost a year of the attack on Akshardham. This A
very important aspect of the lapse in investigation was
ignored by the courts below. There is an inordinate delay
in recording of the statements of the accomplices and
this casts a grave suspicion on the reliability of the
testimony of the accomplices. [Para 96] [194-H; 195-A-D] B
State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Swamalatha & Ors. (2009)
8 SCC 383: 2009 (12) SCR 289 - referred to.
4.8. The statement made by PW-51 during the cross
examination leads to the conclusion that there was a c
serious attempt on the part of the investigating agency
to fabricate a case against the accused persons and
frame them with the help of the statements of the
accomplices, since they had not been able to solve the
case even after almost a year of the incidence. Thus, the 0
evidence of the accomplices cannot be used to
corroborate the confessional statements of the accused
persons in the absence of independent evidence and the
delay of more than one year in recording their statements
causes this Court to disregard their evidence. [Para 96,
E
97] [199-E-G]
5.1. A witness, whose evidence is placed reliance
upon by the Court, has to be examined and questioned
during the course of investigation by the police and his
name has to appear in the chargesheet so that the F
accused gets a fair chance to cross examine such
witness. [Para 99] [203-D-E]
Ram Lakhan Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(1977) 3 SCC 268: 1978 (1) SCR 125 - referred to.
G
5.2. The two Urdu letters were mentioned for the first
time in the list of Muddammal articles collected from the
fidayeens by PW-91 Major 'JL' and handed over to PW-
126, ACP by Panchnama drawn up for the same. Further,
the receipt voucher of articles recovered from the body H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R. r
A of the fidayeens and handed over to the 1.0. by PW-91
merely makes a mention of 'handwritten letters in Urdu'.
The FIR mentioned about the seizure of some articles
from the body of the fidayeens which were mentioned in
the list handed over by PW-91 to PW-126. It was
B imperative therefore, on the part of the prosecution to
ensure that Brigadier 'S' was required to be examined
before the Court so as to prove that he signed on the
letters and they were the same letters recovered by PW-
91, Maj. 'JL'from the bodies of the fidayeens. Otherwise,
C the absence of such evidence adversely affects the case
of the prosecution. However, the statement of PW-91
under Section 161 CrPC was not recorded. The
necessary implication of this is that he could not have
been presented as a chargesheet witness, as his
evidence was recorded for the first time before the
D Special Court (POTA). and his statement under Section
161 CrPC was not taken by the 1.0. However, Brigadier
'S', who is the most important witness for proving the
recovery of the alleged letters from the pockets of the
trousers of the fidayeens, was not examined either under
E Section 161 or before the Court. [Para 98, 99] [199-H; 200-
A-C; 202-G-H; 203-A-C]
5.3. To determine if they are the same letters which
were alleged to be recovered from the pockets of the
F trousers of the fidayeens, the deposition of PW 121, the
translator of the urdu letters before the Special Court
(POTA) is to be examined. There is no inclination to
accept any of the contradictory versions of either of the
parties. The poor translation of the documents from
G Gujarati language to English submitted by both the
parties caused inconvenience. [Para 99, 100] [204-C;
206-C]
5.4. The contents of the letter nowhere mention the
name of the place 'Atok' in Pakistan from where the
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 69
GUJARAT
fidayeens had allegedly come, as had been mentioned by A
PW-91 in his deposition before the Special Court (POTA).
If the statement of PW-105, Police Inspector of Gandhi
Nagar is taken into consideration, it would mean that no
signature was made on the back of the letters, and that
the letters seized were not kept in sealed covers which B
increased the chance of letters being replaced
subsequently. Further, the photographer and the
videographer who had recorded the scene of offence as
per the instruction of PW-126 were not examined. Further,
the post mortem report of the fidayeens stated that all c
their clothes were stained with blood and mud and all
clothes bore multiple tears and holes due to perforation
by bullets. In such a case, the fact that the letters
remained clean, without any tear, soiling or stains of
blood and soil is highly unnatural and improbable. 0
Therefore, the recording of the High Court that the secret
behind the crease-free unsoiled and unstained letter lies
in the divine philosophy of "Truth is stranger than
fiction", cannot be accepted. The two letters marked as
Ex. 658 cannot be take,n as evidence in order to implicate E
the accused persons in this crime. [Para 100, 101, 102,
103) [207-D, 209-F-H; 210-A-C]
6.1. The submission of the accused persons that the
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., of the key witness
PW-91 was not recorded, is accepted as the investigating F
officers have conveniently omitted to record the
statements of witnesses which could have established
beyond reasonable doubt that the letters were the same
ones as discovered from the site of offence. They tied A-
4 to the· letters merely based on his confessional G
statement whereas the opinions of the hand writing
experts are merely indicative and not conclusive beyond
reasonable doubt. But considering the fact that he was
not a hand writing expert, the statement of the evidence
of PW-89, hand writing expert who had assigned the H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A reasons for recording his finding in his report that the
hand writing of A-4 matches with the letters allegedly
found from the pockets of the trousers of the fidayeens,
is referred. [Para 105] [212-B-D, F, G]
6.2. Considering the seriousness of this case and the
8
gravity of the offences, it was the duty of the handwriting
expert to seek opinion of other experts which he claimed
to have done. PW-89 stated that he requested the Director
of FSL to seek the service of the Central Government
Laboratory, and the photocopies of the documents were
C sent to the Government Examiner of Questioned
Documents('GEQD'), Ministry of Home Affairs, Hyderabad
for the preliminary examination. Accordingly, Assistant
Government Examiner, the senior most GEQD of the
Central Government had arrived at the FSL of Gujarat. It
D was further stated by PW-89 that the officers from
Hyderabad had worked independently and prepared their
opinion. Accordingly, PW-89 formed a final opinion based
upon the opinion of the aforesaid officers. The senior
most officer, Mr. R.K Jain, sent certificate via fax in which
E he had stated that he was in consent with the opinion of
PW-89. However, objection was raised by the counsel for
the accused persons at the Special Court (POTA) for
taking this certificate on record, since this document of
certificate was never given to the defence in the
F chargesheet papers, or at any time thereafter. Moreover,
the prosecution had also submitted that even they were
unaware of the existence of this document, and this
knowledge had come before them only during the course
of recording of the deposition of PW-89 before the
G Special Court (POTA). Therefore, the certificate was taken
on record with the objection of the defence. [Para 106]
[215-C-H]
6.3. The prosecution contended that the Urdu letters
were written by A-4 by only placing reliance upon the
H opinion of the handwriting expert, PW-89. However, the
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 71
GUJARAT
certificate of the senior most official of FSL, Hyderabad A
was oot admitted on record till a much later stage, after
the charge sheet was prepared and PW-89 gave his
statement before the court. It was at this stage that his
evidence was admitted with protest from the defence.
PW-89 in his evidence had stated that he has basic B
knowledge of Urdu and cannot differentiate between
Urdu, Arabic and Persian. He further stated that the
opinion of handwriting experts is not conclusive.
Therefore, the prosecution had failed to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that the Urdu letters (Ex.658) were c
written by A-4. [Para 107] [207-A-D]
7.1. It is clear from the deposition of PW-123, Police
Inspector that firstly, A-6 is not the owner of the car since
it was registered in the name of some other person as per
the report of R.T.O. Secondly, as per the Order of the CJM D
of Budgam, Jammu and Kashmir, A-6 was not in physical
possession of the car which was allegedly used for
carrying weapons for the attack on Akshardham whereas
he was actually found in possession of another car .
bearing Registration no. CHOIX-3486. Finally, though a E
panchnama was drawn up of the sezure of the alleged
car, by the police of Jammu and Kashmir, it was for them
to hand over the car from their custody to the Gujarat
police. No panchnama or document of seizure of the car
had been produced to show that the car was recovered F
from the workshop/ garage of A-6 or even that the garage/
workshop from which the car was allegedly recovered
belongs to A-6. Therefore, the car cannot be linked to A-
6 in the absence pf any independent evidence other than.
his confessional statement which had been G
subsequently retracted. [Para 110) [218-F-H; 219-A-B]
7.2. The statement of PW-125, Inspector, Crime
Branch, Ahmadabad is mentioned regarding the seizure
of the car since it is reflective of how casually and with
H
!
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014} 7 S.C.R.
A what impunity the investigation has been conducted in
the instant case by the investigating officer. PW-125, who
was a part of the investigation of this case in Kashmir and
who was also responsible for escorting A-2, A-4 and A-5
to Srinagar , Kashmir. It is clear from the statement of PW-
B 125 that neither the panchnama nor seizure memo of the
car no. KMT 413, made during its alleged seizure in case
no. 130 of 2003 was seen by PW-125 since, he was
engaged in other work. However, without verifying the
contents of the panchnama and the seizure memo of the
c car in Case No.130 of 2003, the involvement of the car had
been admitted in evidence on record by the courts below,
merely on the basis of the subsequent panchnama
drawn by the Gujarat police, which was only for the
transfer of possession of the car from the police of
Jammu and Kashmir to the Gujarat police. [Para 111)
0
[219-C-D; 220-C-E]
7.3. In light of the evidence, no weightage can be
given to the panchnama drawn by the Gujarat police at
Jammu and Kashmir for the seizure of car already in the
E possession of the Jammu and Kashmir police at SOG
Camp, in the absence of the original panchnama and
seizure memo drawn by the police of Jammu and
Kashmir. The prosecution had failed to prove that the car
was used by A-6 to carry weapons from Jammu and
F Kashmir to Bareilly for carrying out the attack on
Akshardham. [Para 111) [220-F-G]
8.1. The rule of prudence as applying to confessions
of the accused under the general law, being that the
confessional statements which were retracted must be
G corroborated by independent evidence, must be
followed to convict the accused for the charges framed
against them. [Para 116) [235-H; 236-A]
8.2. In the instant case, there is nothing on record
H other than the statements of the accomplices (of which
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 73
GUJARAT
PW· 51 retracted from his confession) and the A
confessional statements of the accused persons which
were retracted and this aspect of the matter was required
to be considered by the courts below while recording the
findings on the charges framed against the accused
persons. The retraction of the confessional statements of B
the accused persons A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 and that of PW·
51 revealed that they were tortured by the police to
extract their confessional statements. Therefore, the
confessional statements of A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 cannot
be relied upon for this reason also i.e they have been c
retracted. [Para 115] [224-G-H; 225-A-B] ·
8.3. The findings and reasons for conviction and
sentencing of the accused persons were the
confessional statements of A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 and the
two Urdu letters which are purportedly written by A-4. A- D
2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 had retracted their confessional
statements as per the exhibits and all of them had alleged
that they were tortured and threatened with dire
consequences of death through 'encounter' and death of
their loved ones. All the accused persons speak of E
torture by beating, especially on the legs and this
corresponds to their complaints of pain 'under the feet'.
[Para 116] [236-B·C]
8.4. The statements of confession of the accused
persons cannot be relied upon if they are retracted,
F
unless corroborated by independent evidence. In the
instant case, the case of the prosecution rests on the
confessional statements of the accused persons, the
confessional statements of the accomplices and their
evidence and the two Urdu letters purportedly found in G
the pockets of the trousers of the fidayeens and written
by A-4, and apart from this, it is very clear that there is
absolutely no independent evidence to implicate the
accused persons for the crime. The evidence of the
H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A accomplices, PW-50, PW-51 and PW-52 are also rejected.
Therefore, there is no independent evidence on record
which corroborates the confession of the accused
persons which were subsequently retracted. Further, a
retracted confessional statement of an accused person
B cannot be used to corroborate the retracted confessional
statement of a co-accused. Thus, the confessional
statements of the accused persons cannot be relied upon
and the case of the prosecution fails. There is no
independent evidence on record to prove the guilt of the
c accused persons beyond reasonable doubt in the face
of the retractions and grave allegations of torture and
violation of human rights of the accused persons against
the police. [Para 120, 121] [231-8-E; 238-D-E]
Hari Charan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam v. State of Bihar
D AIR 1964 SC 1184: 1964 SCR 623; NCT vs. Navjot Sandhu
(2005) 11 SCC 600: 2005 (2) Suppl.SCR 79; Parmanada
Pegu vs. State of Assam (2004) 7 SCC 779: 2004 (4)'~uppl.
SCR 1; Subramania Goundan vs. State of Madras AIR f958
SC 66: 1958 SCR 428; Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. vs. State of
E West Bengal (2007) 12 SCC 230: 2006 (10) Suppl.SCR 662
- referred to.
9.1. In the instant case, the prosecution relied upon
the information contained in the confessional statements
of the accused persons in order to set up the plea that
F the offence of criminal conspiracy had been committed
by each one of them. A careful examination of this
information would reveal that this claim of the
prosecution does not hold water. [Para 124] [242-E]
G 9.2. To punish an accused under section 120-8 of the
IPC, it is essential to establish that there was some
common object to be achieved and that there was an
agreement by the accused persons to achieve that object
i.e there was a 'meeting of minds'. In the instant case, it
H cannot be said that the conspiracy was hatched by the
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 75
GUJARAT
accused persons in furtherance of some common object. A
The common object, according to the prosecution case
was to take revenge for the Godhra Riots of 2002. But this
object was vague, and was not very specific and the
charge of criminal conspiracy against the accused
persons cannot be proved on its basi9'. Further, even the B
confessional statements of the accused persons did not
help the prosecution to establish the chain of events in
pursuance of the alleged conspiracy. In fact, they are
highly contradictory and improbable in nature. [Para 125]
[242-F-H; 243-A·B] C
9.3. According to the prosecution, as disclosed in the
confessional statements of A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6, the
conspiracy was hatched in Saudi Arabia, and money was
delivered to India through havala; the two fidayeens were
apparently escorted to Ahmedabad by one Aiyub Khan D
and they also brought the arms and ammunition with them.
It was stated that A-2 then took the fidayeens in his auto
rickshaw and helped them reach places in Ahmedabad
and Gandhinagar,' and finally helped them in choosing the
I Akshardham temple at Gandhinagar as a suitable place to E
carry out the attack and hence take the revenge against
Hindus for the Godhra riots. According to the prosecution,
A-2 also stated that the accommodation of the fidayeens
was set up at Bavahir Hall. Per contra, as per the
confessional statement of A-6, he was the one who F
brought the two fidayeens from Kashmir, and drove the
car with ammunitions from Kashmir to Bareilly, and then
came to Ahmedabad in a train, and carried the
ammunitions in bedding. . A-6, .according to the
prosecution, was also the one who reached Gandhinagar G
and Ahmedabad with the two fidayeens, before finally
settling on Akshardham as the site of the attack. A-6 also
stated,. according to the prosecution, that the fidayeens
stayed at the Gulshan Guest House. Interestingly though,
neither A~2 nor A-6 speak of each other or each other's role H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A in the planning and conspiracy, even though they were
both seemingly doing the same task, i.e, of arranging for
the accommodation of the fidayeens, and making them
reach the cities of Gandhinagar and Ahmedabad and how
there could be two versions of the same event. [Para 126]
B [243-C-H]
9.4. It is true that in order to establish criminal
conspiracy, it is not required of every co-conspirator to
know the entire sequence of the chain and events, and
C that they can still be said to be conspirators even if they
are only aware of their limited roles and are not able to
identify the role of any other conspirator. But it is not the
case here that the knowledge of the conspirators is
limited to their role. Each accused claims to have
complete knowledge of the conspiracy, while
D contradicting the other's version of the same events to
constitute the act of criminal conspiracy. Therefore, the
confessional statements of the accused persons and the
accomplices do not complement each other to form a
chain of events leading to the offence. Rather, the
E depositions of the prosecution witnesses were
contradictory and disrupt the chain of events and turn it
into a confusing story with many discrepancies,
defeating the roles of each of the accused persons which
have been allegedly performed by them. Also, none of the
F events of the alleged criminal conspiracy was supported
by independent evidence that inspires confidence to
uphold the conviction and sentences meted out to the
accused persons. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt against the accused
G persons, for the offence of criminal conspiracy under
Section 120-B of the IPC. [Para 127, 128) [244-A-F]
K.R. Purushothaman vs. State of Kera/a (2005) 12 SCC
631 :2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 498; Ram Narayan Popli & Ors.
v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2003) 3 SCC 641 :2003 (1)
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMAN!3HAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 77
GUJARAT
SCR '119; Yash Pal Mittal vs. State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC A
540: 1978 (1) SCR 781; Ajay Aggarwal vs. Union of India
& Ors. 1993 (3) SCC 609: 1993 (3) SCR 543 - referred to.
10.1. Article 136 of the Constitution confers appellate
jurisdiction on this Court. [Para 129] [244-G]
B
Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham & Anr. (1979)2
SCC 297:1979 (3) SCR 482; Indira Kaur & Ors. v. Shea Lal
Kapoor 1988 AIR 1074 ;1988 ( 2 ) SCC 488; Bharwada
Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC
217:1983(3) SCR 280; Ganga Kumar Shrivastav v. State of C
Bihar 2005 AIR 3123 ; 2005 (6 ) SCC 211 - referred to ..
10.2. Even though the powers under Article 136 must
be exercised sparingly, yet, there is absolutely nothing
in the Article which prohibits this Court from reversing
the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below, if it D
is of the opinion on the basis of the evidence on record,
that affirming the findings of the courts below would
result in a grave miscarriage of justice. Moreover, if the
case is of death sentence, this Court can exercise its
power to examine material on record first hand and come E
to its own conclusion on facts and law, unbound by the
findings of the trial court and the High Court. [Para 130]
[247-F-H; 248-A]
Mohammad Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v. State of F
Maharashtra (2012) 9 SCC 1:2012 (8 ) SCR 295 - referred
to.
10.3. In the instant case, there was perversity in
conducting this case at various stages, right from the
investigation level to the granting of sanction by the State G
Government to prosecute the accused persons under
POTA, the conviction and awarding of sentence to the
accused persons by the Special Court (POTA) and
confirmation of the same by the High Court. The Apex
Court cannot afford to sit with folded hands when such H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A gross violation of fundamental rights and basic human
rights of the citizens of this country were presented
before this Court. [Para 131] [248-B-C]
10.4. A careful observation of the dates as regards
investigation process post Akshardham case would
8 show that the ATS was shooting in the dark for about a
year without any result. No trace of the people associated
with this heinous attack on the Akshardham temple
could be found by the police. Then on the morning of
28.03.2003, the case was transferred to Crime Branch,
C Ahmedabad. This was followed by D.G.V giving
instructions to the then ACP PW-126 about PW-50. PW-
126 was thereafter made in charge of the case on the
same evening at 6:30 p.m. and the statement of PW-50
was recorded at 8 p.m., i.e ·within one and a half hours.
D This shrouded the minds with suspicion as to why such
a vital witness- D.G. V, who discovered the link to the
accused persons, was not examined by the Special Court
(POTA). The courts below accepted the facts and
evidence produced by the police without being
E suspicious about the extreme coincidences with which
the chain of events unfolded itself immediately that is,
within 24 hours of the case being transferred to the Crime
Branch, Ahmedabad. [Para 131] [249-E-H]
Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952
F SC 159: 1952 SCR 526 - relied on.
10.5. The courts below did not examine the evidence
with 'more than ordinary care'. Firstly, the Special Court
(POTA) accepted the justification made by the
G prosecution in sending the accused persons to police
custody after being produced before the CJM on the
ground that there was no complaint made by them.
Secondly, the courts below held that the fact that A-1 to
A-5 did not know A-6, does not disprove the theory of
H criminal conspiracy, rather it displays the extreme caution
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 79
GUJARAT
with which the conspiracy was hatched. The reasoning A
of the courts below, cannot be accepted as not only did
A-1 to A-5 not know A-6 and vice versa, but also A-2, A-4
andI
A-6 had narrated different versions of the same story,
jilach of which contradicted the other and was actually
"fatal to the case of the prosecution. The courts below B
mechanically and without applying their mind, discarded
the submission of the accused persons. Thirdly, the two
Urdu lettersJ>ufportec;I to have been recovered from the
pockets--0·( the trousers of the fidayeens, did not have
~drop of blood, mud or perforation by the bullets, c
,whereas on physical examination of the trousers, which
are marked as mudammal objects, it is found that the
clothes on the pockets of the fidayeens were perforated
with bullets and smeared with dried blood even after 12
_years of the incident. [Para 132] [250-C-H; 251-A] 0
10.6. The Special Court (POTA) however, did not find
it imperative to examine why the letters recovered from
the pockets of the trousers of the fidayeens were
spotless. It admitted the letters as evidence merely on the
basis of the confessional statement of A-4 who had, in · E
his statement recorded that he had written the letters and
had also kept the pen to prove that the letters were
written with the same pen. The Special Court (POTA) also
admitted the letters as evidence on the ground that
signatures of Brigadier 'RS' as per the statement of PW· F
91, were present on those letters. The High Court admitted
the letters as evidence on the ground that "truth is
stranger than fiction" by overlooking not only the most
impossible fact that the letters marked by the police were
spotless, but also ignoring the evidence of PW-105 who G
in his deposition recorded that there were no signatures
of Brigadier 'RS' or anyone else on the letters when they
were handed over to PW-126. [Para 132] [251-B-D]
10.7. While examining the witnesses on record, equal
H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A weightage shall be given to the defence witnesses as that
of the prosecution witnesses. The courts below erred in
not given the same weightage to the defence witnesses
as they have to the prosecution witnesses. The accused
persons contended that the courts below should have
B given same weigthage to the evidence of the defence
witnesses as that of the prosecution witnesses.
However, the evidence of DW-3 was not only discarded
but also not mentioned in the decision of the Special
Court (POTA). The courts below ignored these basic legal
c principles while admitting the statement of witnesses
while weighing the case against the accused persons.
While the decision of the Special Court (POTA) found
mention of DW-1, DW-2, DW-4, DW-5 and DW-6, the
evidence of DW-3 which indicated that some of the
accused persons might have actually been detained in
0
police custody much before the official date of arrest, had
been completely overlooked. However, FIR shows that
DW-3 was arrested along with some other women under
Section 188 IPC for protesting against detention of some
persons from their area. This, read with the notification
E by the Police Commissioner Ahmedabad City holding
that from date 16.08.2003 00/00 hrs. to 31.08.2003 at 24.00
dharha hrs., not more than four persons would gather for
holding dharha or calling any meeting or shall take out
any procession, indicates a story under the layers of truth
F which the police has managed to suppress and the
courts below overlooked. Therefore, this is a fit case for
interference by this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution, as the concurrent findings of fact of the
Special Court (POTA) and the High Court are not only
G erroneous in fact but also suffers from error in law. [Para
133, 134] [251-E-F; 255-G-H; 256-A, DJ
Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 351 :
2001 (4) Suppl. SCR 25; State of Haryana v. Ram Singh:
H (2002) 2 SCC 426 : 2002 (1) SCR 208; State of Uttar Pradesh
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 81
GUJARAT
v. Babu Ram: (2000) 4 SCC 515 : 2000 (2) SCR 1201 - A
referred to.
11. Anguish is expressed about the incompetence
with which the investigating agencies conducted the
investigation of the case of such a grievous nature,
8
involving the integrity and security of the Nation. Instead
of booking the real culprits responsible for taking so
many precious lives, the police caught innocent people
and got imposed the grievous charges against them
which resulted in their conviction and subsequent
sentencing. [Para 136] [257-D-E] C
S.N. Dube v. N.B. Bhoir & Ors (2000) 2 SCC 254: 2000
(1) SCR 200; Lal Singh etc.etc. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.
(2001) 3 SCC 221: 2001 (1) SCR 111; Kartar Singh v. State
of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 (2) SCR 375; State of D
Maharashtra v. Bharat Chaganlal Raghani & Ors (2001) 9
SCC 1: 2001 (3) SCR 840; State of Tamil Nadu v. Nalini &
Ors (1999) 5 SCC 253: 1999 (3) SCR 1; State of W B. v. Mir
Mohammad Omar & Ors (2000) 8 SCC 382: 2000 ( 2 ) Suppl.
SCR 712; Rotash v. State of Rajasthan- (2006) 12 SCC 64: E
2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 264; State of MP. v. Mansingh (2003)
10 SCC 414: 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 460; Jayawant Dattatraya
Suryarao v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 10 SCC 109: 2001
( 5 ) Suppl. SCR 54; Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of
Delhi (2002) 5 SCC 234 2002 ( 2 ) SCR 767; Ramanath
Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (1997)7 SCC 744: 1997 (3) Suppl. F
SCR 356; Prakash Bhutto v. State of Gujarat (2005)2 SCC
409: 2005 (1) SCR 408; Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT
of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1: 2010 (4) SCR 103; Haricharan
Kurmi v. State of Bihar (1964)6 SCR 623; Prakash Kumar v.
State of Gujarat (2007) 4 SCC 266: 2007 (5) SCR 532; G
Chandrakant Chimanlal Desai v. State of Gujarat (1992) 1
..
SCC 473:1991 (5) JT 373; Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of
Maharashtra. AIR 1963 SC 599: 1963 SCR 830; Sarwan
Singh v. State of Pubjab AIR 1957 SS: 637 1957 SCR 953;
H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Abdul Sattar v. UT. Chandigarh (1985) Suppl (1) SCC 599;
Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra
(2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 104; Sheshanna
Bhumanna Yadav v. State of Maharashtra (1970) 2 SCC 122:
1971 ( 1 ) SCR 617; Bhuboni Sahu v. R. (1948-49) 76 IA 147;
B K. Hashim v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005) 1 SCC 237:2004
(6 )Suppl. SCR 1; State of Rajasthan v. Ba/veer Crl. Appeal
No. 942 of 2006 decided on 31.10.2013 by Supreme Court;
State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.Swarnalatha & Ors. (2009) 8
SCC 383: 2009 (12) SCR 289; Jagjit Singh@ Jagga v. State
c of Punjab (2005) 3 SCC 689: 2005 (1.) SCR 559; /COS Ltd.
v. Beena Shabeer & Anr. (2002) 2 SCC 426; Tulsiram Kanu
v. The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Ram Prasad & Ors. v. State of
UP. (1974) 3 SC-C 388: 1974 (1) SCR 650; State of UP. v.
Punni & Ors. (2008) 11 SCC 153:2008 (1) SCR 85; State of
D West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75: 1952 SCR
284 - referred to.
Case Law Reference:
(2000) 2 sec 254 Referred to Para 18
E (2001) 3 sec 221 Referred to Para 18
(1994) 3 sec 569 Referred to Para 18
(2001) 9 sec 1 Referred to Para 18
F (1999) 5 sec 253 Referred to Para 19, 30
(2000) 8 sec 382 Referred to Para 19
(2006) 12 sec 64 Referred to Para 19
(2003) 10 sec 414 Referred to Para 19
G
(2001) 10 sec 109 Referred to Para 30
(2002) 5 sec 234 Referred to Para 30
(1997)7 sec 744 Referred to Para 36
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 83
GUJARAT
(2005)2 sec 409 Referred to Para 36 A
(2005) 11 sec 600 Referred to Para 47, 49,
89, 116
(201 O) 6 sec 1 Referred to Para 48
B
(2002) 8 sec 73 Referred to Para 49
(2008) 1 sec 601 Referred to Para 49
(1964)6 SCR 623 Referred to Para 49
(2007) 4 sec 266 Referred to Para 50 c
(1992) 1 sec 473 Referred to Para 51
(2011) 9 sec 479 Referred to Para 52
AIR 1963 SC 599 Referred to Para 52 D
(1969) 3 sec 429 Referred to Para 52
AIR 1957 SC 637 Referred to Para 53
(1975) 3 sec 742 Referred to Para 53
E
(1985) Suppl (1) sec 599 Referred to Para 53
(2000) 8 sec 457 Referred to Para 53
(1970) 2 sec 122 Referred to Para 53
(1948-49) _76 IA 147 Referred to Para 53 F
(2005) 1 sec 231 Referred to Para 54.
(2009) 8 sec 383 Referred to Para 61
(2005) 3 sec 689 Referred to Para 61 G
(2002) 1 sec 351 Referred to Para 64
(2002) 2 sec 426 Referred to Para 64
(2000) 4 sec 515 Referred to Para 64
H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A AIR 1954 SC 1 Referred to Para 65
(1974) 3 sec 388 Referred to Para 65
(2008) 11 sec 153 Referred to Para 65
AIR 1952 SC 75 Referred to Para 73
B
(1997) 1 sec 744 Referred to Para 75
(1995) 5 sec 302 Referred to Para 75
(1997) 1 sec 622 Referred to Para 76
c
(2004) 9 sec 580 Referred to Para 78
(2004)11 sec 612 Referred to Para 81
(2012) 9 sec 1 Referred to Para 82
D (2008) 1 sec 601 Referred to Para 85
(2002) 8 sec 73 Referred to Para 85
(2005) 11 sec 600 Referred to Para 88
E AIR 1968 SC 832 Referred to Para 91
(1975) 3 sec 742 Referred to Para 93
(2011) 9 sec 479 Referred to Para 93
(1969) 3 sec 429 Referred to Para 93
F
(201 O) 2 sec 353 Referred to Para 94
AIR 1952 SC 159 Relied on Para 95,
(2009) 8 sec 383 Referred to Para 96
G
(1977) 3 sec 268 Referred to Para 99
AIR 1964 SC 1184 Referred to Para 113
(2004) 1 sec 779 Referred to Para 116
H AIR 1958 SC 66 Referred to Para 116
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 85
GUJARAT
(2001) 12 sec 230 Referred to Para 120 A
(2005) 12 sec 631 Referred to Para 122
(2003) 3 sec 641 Referred to Para 123
(1977) 4 sec 540 Referred to Para 123
B
1993 (3) sec 609 Referred to Para 123
(1979)2 sec 297 Referred to Para 129
(1988) 2 sec 488 Referred to Para 129
(1983) 3 sec 211 Referred to Para 129
c
(2005)6 sec 211 Referred to Para 129
(2012) 9 sec 1 Referred to Para 130
(2002) 1 sec 351 Referred to Para 133 D
(2002) 2 sec 426 Referred to Para 133
c2000) 4 sec 51.5 Referred to Para 133
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal E
Nos. 2295-2296 of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.06.2010 of the
High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Confirmation Case No.
2/2006 with CRL Appeal No. 1328 of 2006.
F
WITH
132 Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 2011.
K. T. S. Tulsi, Amarendra Sharan, Ranjit Kumar, lrshad
Ahmed, Ahmed Faraz Khan, Atif Suhrawardy, Ambika Mehta, G
S. Mehdi Imam, Tebrez Ahmed, Khalid Shaikh, Ejaz M. Qureshi,
Kamini Jaiswal, Khalid G.Shaikh, Abhimanue Shrestha, Shri
Krishan Tiwari, Shumaila, Altaf, Shilpi Dey, Ejaz Qureshi,
H·
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Hemantika Wahi, Pinky Behra, Mitesh Amin for the appearing
parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. These appeals are filed by
B the convicted accused-appellants as they are aggrieved by the
conviction and sentences awarded to them by the Special
Court (POTA), and confirmed by the High Court of Gujarat for
the offences punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (hereinafter 'IPC'), the Arms Act, 1959, the
c Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Prevention of
Terrorism Act, 2_002 (hereinafter 'POTA') as per list in para 2
below, for the attack on the Akshardham temple in Gandhinagar
between the afternoon of 24.09.2002 and early morning of
25.09.2002, wherein 33 people were killed and more than 85
o people were injured.
2. The following list outlines the charges against each of
the accused and the conviction and sentences meted out to .
them by the Special Court (POTA), Ahmedabad, and upheld·
by the High Court of Gujarat. Accused no.1 is not in appeal
E before us. The appellant nos. 1-5 before us will hereinafter be
referred to as per their position as accused i.e A-2 to A-6.
Appellant no.4, Abdullamiya Yasinmiya Kadri (A-5) has already
undergone 7 years out of the 10 years of sentence awarded
by the learned Judge, Special Court (POTA) and by order
F dated 03.12.2010, this Court directed him "to be released to
the satisfaction of the trial court." The following list outlines the
charges, conviction and sentences awarded to each of the
accused-appellants.
G All the accused persons had been charged with offences
under the following sections by the learned Judge, Special Court
(POTA):
1. Section 1208 of the IPC.
H
ADAM8HAI SULEMAN8HAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 87
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
2. Section 1208 of the IPC read with Sections 121, A
123, 124A, 153A, 302 and 307 of the IPC.
3. Section 1208 of the IPC read with Sections
25(1AA) 27 and 29 of the Arms Act.
4. Section 1208 of the IPC read with Sections 3, 4 B
and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act.
5. Section 1208 of the IPC read with Sections 3(1)(a)
and (b), 3(3), 4, 20 and 21 (2) (b) of the POTA.
6. Additionally, A-2 had been charged with offence
c
under Section 452 of the IPC (for entering
Akshardham illegally).
7. Additionally, A-6 had been charged under Section
135(1) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (for illegally D
possessing arms and explosives despite
notification, in force, issued by Gandhinagar District
Police Official).
The Special Court (POTA) framed the aforesaid charges E
and convicted and sentenced the accused persons as per
nature of offences detailed hereunder:
Altaf Malek (hereinafter 'A-1 ')
Gathered the Indian Muslims who had gone to F
Saudi Arabia.
Associated with banned organizations like
Lashkar-e-Toiba.
Collected funds from Jaish-e-Mohammed. G
Convicted and sentenced under:
Section 22 (1) of POTA. Rigorous Imprisonment for
5 years with a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 7 S.C.R.
A payment of fine, simple imprisonment for 6 months.
He was acquitted of rest of the charges.
Adambhai Ajmeri (hereinafter 'A-2')
Talked to locals to get idea about city, and to get
B idea about lodging etc. They took him to A-4 and
A-5.
Received money through Havala.
Meeting on 24.06.2002 with witness at G Royal
c Hotel, Hyderabad. Absconding accused gave him
Rs 3,500
Picked up the two assailants (hereinafter referred
to as the 'fidayeens') from the railway station and
D gave them shelter.
Moved around in an auto rickshaw and showed the
fidayeens places around the city, where strikes
could be done and also arranged for their night stay
E at his brother's place.
Was present at Akshardham at the time of the
incident and exited when the firing started.
Convicted and sentenced under:
F
Section 3 (3) of POTA- Life imprisonment and a
fine of Rs.10,000/- and in case of default, simple
imprisonment for 2 years.
Section 3 (3) read with Section 5 of POTA-
G Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of
Rs.5,000/- and in case of default, simple
imprisonment for 1 year.
Section 22 (2) (a) and (b) of POTA - Rigorous
H imprisonment for 10 years and fine of Rs.20,000/-
ADAM8HAI SULEMAN8HAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 89
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
and in case of default, simple imprisonment for 1 A
year.
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 4 of Explosive
Substanc.es Act - Rigorous imprisonment for 10
years and fine of Rs.10,000/- and in case of default, 8
simple imprisonment for 2 years.
Section 1208 IPC read with Sections 3 and 6 of
Explosive Substances Act - life imprisonment and
fine of Rs.20,000/-.
c
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 302 IPC -
Death penalty (hanging by neck till death) and fine
of Rs.25,000/-.
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 307 IPC - life
0
imprisonment and fine of Rs.20,000/- and in case
of default, simple imprisonment for 1 year.
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 27 of Arms
Act- Rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and fine of
Rs.10,000/- and in case of default of fine, simple E
imprisonment for 1 year.
The accused was acquitted of the rest of the
charges.
Mohammed Salim Hanif Sheikh (hereinafter 'A-3') F
Gathered Indian Muslims working in Saudi Arabia
at his home and showed them instigating videos.
Is a member of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar- G
e-Toiba.
Made instigating speeches with the intention of
endangering the unity and integrity of India.
H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Became a member of Jaish-e-Mohammed and
took funding from them.
Convicted and sentenced under:
Section 3 (3) of POTA- Ufe imprisonment and a
B
fine of Rs.10,0001- and in case of default, simple
imprisonment for 2 years.
Section 3(3) read with section 5 of POTA,
'•
Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of
c Rs.5,000/- and in case of default, simple
imprisonment for 1 year.
Section 20 of POTA - Rigorous imprisonment for
5 years and fine of Rs.20,000/- and in case of
default, rigorous imprisonment for 1 year.
D
Section 21 (2) (b) of POTA - Rigorous
imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of Rs.10,000/
- and in case of default, simple imprisonment for
1 year.
E
Section 22 (1) (a) of POTA - Rigorous
imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of Rs.20,000/
- and in case of default, simple imprisonment for
2 years.
F Section 1208 IPC read with Section 4 of Explosive
Substances Act - Rigorous imprisonment for 1O
years and a fine of Rs.10,000/- and in case of
default, simple imprisonment for 2 years.
G Section 1208 IPC read with Sections 3 and 6 of
Explosive Substances Act - life imprisonment and
fine of Rs.20,000/-.
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 302 IPC - life
H
ADAM8HAI SULEMAN8HAI AJMERI v. STATE OF . 91
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
imprisonment till his natural life (till he is alive) and A
a fine of Rs.25,000/-.
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 307 IPC - life
imprisonment and fine of Rs.20,000/- and in case
of default, simple imprisonment for 1 year.
8
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 121A IPC
Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of
Rs.5,000/- and in case of default, simple
imprisonment for 1 year.
c
.
Section 1208 IPC read with . Section 153A IPC
Rigorous imprisonmGnt for 3 years and a fine of
Rs.5,000/- and in case of default, simple
imprisonment for 6 months.
Section 1208 IPC re~d with Section 27 of Arms D
Act, Rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and a fine
of Rs.10,000/-, and in case of default, simple
imprisonment for 1 year.
The accused was acquitted of the rest of the E
charges.
Abdul Qaiyum Muftisaab Mohmed Bhai(hereinafter 'A-4')
Gave shelter to the fidayeens.
F
Wrote the two Urdu letters recovered from the
fidayeens, which spoke of instigating violence and
atrocities and communal riots.
Convicted and sentenced under:
G
Section 3 (3) of POTA- Life imprisonment and a
fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment,
simple imprisonment for 2 years.
Section 3 (3) read with section 5 of POT A - H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of
Rs.5,000/- in default of payment of fine, simple
imprisonment for 1 year.
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 4 of Explosive
Substances Act - Rigorous imprisonment for 10
8
years and a fine of Rs.10,000/- in default of
payment of fine, simple imprisonment for 2 years.
Section 1208 IPC read with Sections 3 an 6 of
Explosive Substances Act - life imprisonment and
c a fine of Rs.20,000/-, in default of payment of fine
to recover the amount in accordance with law.
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 302 IPC -
Death penalty (hanging by neck till death) and a fine
D of Rs.25,000/- in default of payment of fine to
recover the amount in accordance with law.
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 307 IPC - life
imprisonment and fine of Rs.20,000/- in default of
payment of fine, a simple imprisonment for 1 year.
E
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 153A IPC
Rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of
Rs.5,000/- in default of payment of fine, a simple
imprisonment for 6 months.
F
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 27 IPC of
Arms Act, Rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and
a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of fine a simple
imprisonment for 1 year.
G Section 1208 IPC read with Section 121A IPC
Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of
Rs.5,000/- in default of payment of fine, a simple
imprisonment for 1 year.
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 93
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
The accused was acquitted of the rest of the A
charges.
Accused-5 Abdullamiya Yasinmiya (hereinafter 'A-5')
Member of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-
B
Toiba.
Gave shelter to the fidayeens.
Dropped them near Kalur Railway Station, had also
put them in an ambassdor car to take them to the c
temple.
Convicted and sentenced
Section 3 (3) of POTA- Rigorous imprisonment for
10 years and a fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default D
of payment, simple imprisonment for 2 years.
The accused was acquitted of the rest of the
charges.
Accused-6 Chand Khan (hereinafter 'A-6') E
Met the dead terrorists, also bought an
ambassador car worth Rs 40,000 and made secret
compartment for storing weapons and explosives.
F
Came from Ahmedabad to Bareilly with explosives,
moved the fidayeens in an auto, and helped to
transfer the weapons.
Received Rs 30,000/- from Zuber (a dead terrorist,
killed in a separate encounter) G
Convicted and sentenced under:
Section 3 (3) of POTA- Life imprisonment and a
fine of Rs.10,000/- in default of payment of fine, H
simple imprisonment for 2 years.
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 7 S.C.R.
A Section 3 (1) of POTA, life imprisonment and a fine
of Rs.25,000/- in default of payment of fine, the
same shall be recovered in accordance with law.
Section 3 (3) read with Section 5 of POT A,
Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and fine of
8
Rs.5,000/- in default of payment, simple
imprisonment for 1 year.
Section 1208 IPC read with Sections 3 an 6 of
Explosive Substances Act - life imprisonment and
c a fine of Rs.20,000/-, in default of payment of fine
to recover the amount in accordance with law.
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 4 of Explosive
Substances Act - Rigorous imprisonment for 1O
D years and a fine of Rs.10,000/- in default of
payment of fine, simple imprisonment for 2 years.
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 302 IPC -
Death penalty (hanging by neck till death) and a fine
of Rs.25,000/- in default of payment of fine to
E recover the amount in accordance with law.
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 307 !PC- life
imprisonment and fine of Rs.20,000/- in default of
payment of fine, simple imprisonment for 1 year.
F
Section 1208 IPC read with Section 25 (1M) of
Arms Act - rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and
a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of fine a simple
imprisonment for 2 years.
G The accused was acquitted of the rest of the
charges.
3. The aforesaid sentences imposed upon each accused
person were ordered to run concurrently. The accused persons
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 95
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
were allowed to set off the sentences for the time spent in A
custody, wherever applicable.
Various sentences of rigorous imprisonment, life
1
imprisonment and death sentence as detailed in the list above
: were passed against the accused persons by the Special Court B
(POTA) in POTA case No. 16 of 2003 by the judgment dated
01.07.2006, which was affirmed by the High Court of Gujarat
at Ahmedabad by the impugned judgment and order dated
01.06.2010 in Criminal Confirmation Case No. 2 of 2006 along
with Criminal Appeal Nos. 1675 of 2006 and 1328 of 2006.
c
4. Aggrieved by the said impugned judgment and order
of the High Court of Gujarat, all the accused persons except
A-1 have appealed before this Court challenging the
correctness of their conviction and sentences imposed upon
them, urging various legal and factual grounds in support of the D
questions of law raised by them.
5. Certain relevant facts are stated herein below for the
purpose of examining the correctness of the findings and
reasons recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment E
and order while affirming the findings and reasons recorded in
the judgment and order passed by the Special Court (POTA).
The facts of the incident leading up to the case, the arrest of
the accused persons and their trial and conviction are detailed
below:
F
On 24.09.2002 at about 4.30 p.m., two persons armed
·with AK-56 rifles, hand grenades etc. entered the precincts of
the Swaminarayan Akshardham temple situated at
Gandhinagar, Gujarat from gate No.3. They fired
indiscriminately towards the children, games and rides and G
started throwing hand grenades. While continuing the attack,
they reached gate No. 2 of the temple and fired at the
worshippers, devotees, volunteers and visitors and then
proceeded towards the main building. Since the main door of
the temple was locked, they moved towards the Sachchidanand H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Exhibition Hall, killing and injuring women, children and others.
Thereafter, immediately CRPF personnel, Deputy Inspector
General (DIG), Gujarat State and other senior police officers
along with SRP commandos rushed to the place of offence to
return the fire. Ambulances were called and other police forces
8 were also urgently called at the place. The team led by Mr. V.B.
Rabari - Inspector General of Police. Mr. R.B. Brahambhatt -
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gandhinagar and four other
special reserve police commandos climbed on the roof. By
that time, the terrorists (fidayeens) once again started firing. A
c fierce gun battle ensued, and there was also a bomb blast.
6. In the meantime, a team of National Security Guard
(NSG) commandos was summoned from New Delhi. They
arrived by a chartered flight and took. control at about 12 .00 at
midnight. After understanding the topography of the area, they
D began the counter attack against the fidayeens. Exchange of
firing continued and lasted for nearly 5 hours which went on into
the wee hours of 25.9.2002. Eventually both of them were killed
in the early morning hours as they succumbed to the injuries
received in the said operation. It is the further case of the
E prosecution that a large quantity of fire arms and explosive
substances were carried by the two fidayeens. Some of the
explosives were seized along with other articles from the
premises. The attack resulted in the killing of 33 persons,
including NSG commandos, personnel from the State
F Commando Force and three other persons from SRP group.
Nearly 86 persons, including 23 police officers and jawans were
grievously injured. Those who were injured or killed during the
attack were removed to Sola Civil Hospital and to Civil
Hospital, Ahmedabad.
G
7. A complaint was lodged by the then ACP Mr. G.L.
Singhal, (Prosecution Witness (hereinafter 'PW')-126) on
24.09.2002 at the Gandhinagar Sector 21 police station. After
the possession of the temple premises was handed over from
NSG Commandos to the state police, an FIR was registered
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 97
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
being 1st CR No. 314 of 2002 on 25.09.2002 for the offences A
punishable under Sections 120-B, 302, 307, 153-A, 451 of the
IPC by PW-126. A Report under Section 157 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (hereinafter 'CrPC') was also prepared.
The same was lodged against the unknown persons aged
between 20 to 25 years and the investigation was handed over B
to Police Inspector Mr. V.R. Toliya (PW-119) of the local Crime
Branch, Gandhinagar.
It is the case of the prosecution that some articles were
received from Brigadier Raj Sitapati, Head of the NSG, which C
were collected from the clothes of the dead bodies of the
fidayeens, and according to them, these articles included two
letters written in Urdu language, allegedly found in the pocket
of each one of the fidayeens.
8. The investigation of the crime continued for sometime D
under the said PoliQe Inspector and thereafter, the Anti Terrorist
Squad (ATS) was directed by the Director General of police,
State of Gujarat to take over the investigation of the case. The
investigation continued but nothing fruitful came out of the
attempt of the investigating officer to trace the accused persons E
who were involved in the conspiracy and other offences
committed by two fidayeens. The investigation of the case was
transferred to ACP Singhal (PW-126) of the Crime Branch who
was the complainant in the case, on 28.08.2003 at the direction
of the DGP from Mr. K.K. Patel of ATS with 14 files, each with F
index.
9. On 29.08.2003 at 2 p.m., A-1 to A-5 were arrested by
PW- 126 and the matter was investigated further. The
prosecution alleged that the criminal conspiracy was hatched at
Saudi Arabia, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad and Jammu and G
Kashmir by sqme clerics, along with a few others, as they had
become spiteful after the incidents of riots which had taken
place in the state of Gujarat after the Godhra train burning
incident in 2002.
H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Subsequently, A-6 was also taken into custody and
arrested by the Gujarat police on 12.09.2003 from the State of
Jammu and Kashmir. It is also the case of the prosecution that
after investigation, the matter was concluded and the charge
sheet was filed against all the six accused persons by the Crime
B Branch, after obtaining necessary sanction from the State
Government for the purpose of taking cognizance of the offence
in compliance with Section 50 of POTA. In the said charge
sheet, 26 persons were shown as absconding accused.
The five accused persons, who were arrested on
C 29.08.2003, remained in the police custody, which had been
sought from the Judicial Magistrate, Gandhinagar on
29.08.2003. Provisions of POTA were invoked by the police
on 30.08.2003. The chargesheet was filed before the
designated Court constituted under Section 23 of POTA. on
D 25.11.2003. It is further the case of the prosecution that the
chargesheet was filed by the Investigating Officer after obtaining
necessary sanction order as required under Section 50 of
POTA from the government of the state of Gujarat vide sanction
order dated 21.11.2003 [Exhibit (hereinafter 'Ex.')498).
E
10. It is the case of the prosecution that the confessional
statements of the accused persons were recorded by the
Superintendent of Police, Sanjaykumar Gadhvi (PW-78), as
provided under Section 32 of the POTA by following the
F mandatory procedure.
11 .. There were 376 witnesses shown in the
chargesheet. Out of those, 126 witnesses were examined by
the prosecution to prove the charges against the accused
persons. The prosecution witnesses were examined on various
G dates and through them, various Exs. namely, 117 to 679 were
marked. The details of the names of the prosecution witnesses
and the dates of examination and the marking of exhibits to
them are described in the judgment passed by the Special
Court (POTA) and the same need not be adverted to in this
H judgment as it is unnecessary
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 99
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
12. The Special Court (POT A) had formulated 8 points for A
its consideration and answered the same in the judgment by
accepting the case of the prosecution and passed an order of
conviction against all the accused persons and sentenced A-
2, A-4 and A-6 to death, A-3 to life imprisonment, A-1 to
!rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and A-5 to rigorous B
imprisonment for 10 years.
13. A reference was made to the High Court of Gujarat
under Section 366 of the CrPC for confirmation of the death
sentence imposed upon A-2, A-4 and A-6. All the accused
persons appealed before the High Court against their C
conviction and sentences imposed on them.
14. The Division Bench of the High Court, after adverting
to the charges framed against each one of accused persons
under the provisions of POTA, Explosive Substances Act, Arms D
Act and IPC, and the punishment imposed for each one of the
offences under the aforesaid provisions of the Acts and Code,
confirmed the order passed by the Special Court (POTA).
Briefly stated, the High Court held that the attack was an
E
act of retaliation against the incidents of communal riots which
took place in the State of Gujarat in the months of March and
April, 2002 during which several Muslim persons had lost their
lives and properties. The High Court stated:
''Therefore, the terrorist attack was conceived by some F
unknown persons of foreign origin presumably of Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia. The Indian Muslims residing in Saudi
Arabia were instigated to retaliate for the incidents which
happened during the months of March and April, 2002 and
were enticed to fund the terrorist attack. The Fidayeens G
were recruited by the said masterminds who traveled to
Ahmedabad by train from Kashmir via Bareily and they
were provided with rifles, hand grenades, gun-powder and
other weapons. The said accused persons joined them in
providing necessary hide-outs in the city of Ahmedabad H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A and also provided them transport to go in and around the
city of Ahmedabad and helped them in selecting the place
and time for carrying out the attack. The accused persons
also helped in giving them last rites of namaaz for their well
being (Hifazat)."
B
15. The High Court further held that a criminal conspiracy
was hatched to strike terror amongst the Hindus in the State
of Gujarat. The accused persons and the absconding accused,
were in connivance, had gathered the Indian Muslims working ,
in the towns of Jiddah, Shiffa and Riyadh of Saudi Arabia at
C the residence of A-3. A-1, A-3 and A-5 and the absconding
accused Nos. 3 to 5 and 12 to 22, who at the instance of the
ISi of Pakistan became members of the terrorist outfit "Jaish-
e-Mohammad", and collected funds for it to spread terror in the
State of Gujarat. They showed the cassettes of the loss caused
D to the Muslims in the State of Gujarat and the gruesome photos
and the videos of the dead bodies of Muslim men, women and
children, at the residence of A-3; distributed the cassettes and
made enticing statements to damage the unity and integrity of
India and to cause loss to the person and property of Hindu
E people. It was also observed by the High Court that to carry out
the criminal conspiracy, the absconding accused No. 16 visited
the relief camps run at Ahmedabad during the communal riots.
16. The statements of the injured witnesses were
F examined, which is also adverted to in the impugned judgment
and the High Court stated that the casualties are also proved
by the postmortem notes Exs. 170 and 171 and by examining
various doctors and prosecution witnesses.
17. The High Court in the impugned judgment also noted
G that there is a reference made to the injuries sustained by the
individuals which is proved by the medical certificates and the
same have been proved by the doctors. The High Court also
referred to handing over of the list (Ex.524), recovered from the
bodies of fidayeens, including notes in Urdu, by Maj. Jaydeep
H Lamba (PW-91) to PW-126 under Panchnama (Ex. 440) and
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 101
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
the same is proved by the Panch-Vinodkumar Valjibhai A
Udhecha (PW-74.) Reference of recovery of white coloured AD
Gel pen from the scene of offence under Panchnama (Ex.650)
is proved by the Panch-Hareshbhai Chimanlal Shah (PW-11 :
Ex.649). The said pen was sent to the Forensic Science
Laboratory (in short 'FSL') under Panchnama (Ex.621). The B
FSL report (Ex.668) confirmed that the Urdu writings (Ex. 658)
were in the same ink as that of the muddamal pen. There was
also reference made of recovery of muddamal articles in the
afternoon of 25.9.2002 (84 in number) from the temple
precincts under Panchnama (Ex.396) which is proved by panch- C
Prakashinh Ratansinh Waghela (PW-71 : Ex.395). There was
further reference of recovery of empty bullet of Rifle-303, Rifle
Butt No. 553, disposal of left out hand grenades, recovery of
empties from the fire arms of the SRP Jawans, the empties
produced by l.G. Shri V.V. Rabari, production and sealing of
0
Dongri of the police constable, recovery of bullets from the
injured witnesses, production of clothes of injured PSl-
Digvijaysinh Chudasama and injured witness, the splinters
of hand grenades and bullets recovered from the injured and
these are proved by the panchnama Exs. 553, 106, 121, 107,
596, 108 597, 109, 110, 111 and 160. Also, the reference of E
recovery of the disputed signature of witness-Abdul Wahid
(PW-56) in the entry register of Hotel G. Royal Lodge,
Naampalli, Hyderabad and the collection of his specimen
signature collected under Panchnama (Ex.583) is proved by
Panch-Manubhai Chhaganlal Thakker (PW-101 :Ex.581) and F
collection of the natural signature of the witness Abdul Wahid
(PW-56) under Panchnama (Ex.684) is proved by the
investigating officer ACP Singhal (PW-126 : Ex.679).
Reference was made to the Panchnama (Ex.682) proved by
Panch-Dipakshinh Ghanshyamsinh Chudasama (PW-62: G
Ex.344) regarding seizure of Auto-rickshaw No. GRW-3861
wherein the fidayeens visited various places and the route they
had taken in Auto-rickshaw on 22.09.2002 and the route to
Akshardham Temple on 24.09.2002, was traced by A-2.
Reference was also made of the house of Abbas (the brother H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 7 S.C.R.
A of A-2) in which fidayeens and Ayub (absconding accused No.
23) were provided lodging, was identified by A-2 under
Panchnama (Ex.580) proved by the Panch-Jignesh Arvindbhai
Shrimali (PW-100 :Ex.579). There is also reference of seizure
of Panchnama (Ex.336) of the Passport and a piece of paper
s containing telephone numbers, a telephone diary and electricity
bill of February, 2003 of A-2 proved by the Panch-Santosh
Kumar R. Pathak (PW-59 :Ex.335). The panchnama (Ex.446)
of collection of the natural signature of A-2 is proved by the
Panch-Mukeshbhai Natwarlal Marwadi (PW-75:Ex.445) and
C recovery of specimen handwriting of A-2 under Panchnama
(Ex.448) is proved by Panch-Dineshbhai Chunaji Parmar (PW-
76:Ex.447). There is also panchnama of seizure of recovery of
Railway ticket(Ex.589) from Ahmedabad to Mumbai dated
22.04.2002, communication regarding cancellation of ticket
D dated 22.04.2002, telephone charge slips and the expense
account for mattresses, fan, petrol, food and hotel from the
residence of A-2 has been proved by the Panch-Navinchandra
Bechardas Kahaar (PW-103 : Ex.585). There is also seizure
of the Accounts Diary from Mehboob-ellahi Abubakar Karim
(PW-82) to prove receipt of Rs.10,000/- and Rs.20,000/- sent
E from Riyadh and paid to the A-2 under the Code "JIHAD" under
Panchnama (Ex.481), which is proved by the Panch-Bharatbhai
Babula I Parmar (PW-102 : Ex.584). There is recovery of natural
handwriting (Ex.613) of A-4 from a diary identified by him, which
was recovered under Panchnama (Ex.309) and proved by the
F Panch-Ashok Manaji Marwadi (PW-49 :Ex.308). Collection of
the specimen writing (Ex.698) of A-4 under Panchnama
(Ex.334) is proved by the Panch-Arvindbhai Jehabhai Chavda
(PW-58 : Ex.333).
G The High Court stated that the handwriting expert
Jagdishbhai Jethabhai Patel (PW-89 : Ex.507) has proved that
the disputed writings marked A/5/A and A/5/8 (Urdu writings
Ex.658) were the same as the natural handwriting and the
specimen writing of A-4. The report (Ex.511 ), which is the
H opinion of the handwriting expert, is also confirmed by the
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 103
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
expert report (Mark-T) of R.K. Jain, Directorate of Forensic A
Sciences, Hyderabad and in the presence of the Panch -
Bhikhaji Bachuji Thakore (PW-6: Ex.343). Under Panchnama
(Ex.681), A-4 and A-5 identified the place where the last
namaaz was performed for the fidayeens and the place where
the weapons were packed. The witness identified A-4 and A- B
5 in the court. Reference was made to the recovery of
muddamal-ambassador Car No. KMT-413 from the compound
of SOG Camp, Srinagar, J&K. The existence/disclosure of
concealed cavity under the rear seat of the car in Panchnama
(Ex.671), is proved by the Police lnspector-Shabirahmed (PW- c
123: Ex.670) and the Assistant Sub-Inspector Gulammohamad
Dar (PW-124: Ex.673). Reference was made of the disputed
handwriting of Yusufbhai Valibhai Gandhi (PW-57) from entry
No.81 €l.ated 23.09.2002 and his natural handwriting from entry
Nos. 224, 225 and 226 of 24.05.2003 and 26.05.2003 from D
the passenger register of Gulshan Guest House in Panchnama
(Exs.317 and 319) which have been proved by the Panch-
Poonambhai Narshibhai Parmar (PW-54: Ex.318) and Panch-
Ashok Sahadevbhai Kahaar (PW-53: Ex.316) respectively. The
Panch-Poonambhai Narshibhai has also proved recovery of the
disputed signature of A-6, from column No.13 of the aforesaid E
entry No.81. The collection of specimen handwriting of Yusuf
Gandhi (PW-57) in Panchnama (Ex.321) is proved by Panch-
Sajubha Adarji Thakore (PW-55:Ex.320). The High Court has
made further reference that A-6 identified STD booths used by
him during his stay in Ahmedabad on 23.09.2002 and F
24.09.2002 under Panchnama (Ex.342) proved by Panch-
Prahlad Bagadaji Marwadi (PW-60: Ex.341). Further, there is
reference to A-6, who identified the places visited by him, and
the way to Gulshan Guest House from Railway Station under
Panchnama (Ex.591) proved by Panch-Natwarbhai Fakirchand G
Kahar (PW-104: Ex.590). Reference is also made by the High
Court of the Taxi Driver, Rajnikar:it (Rajuji) Thakore, who
identified'the dead bodies of the fidayeens under Panchnama
(Ex.130) which is proved by Panch-Bhupatsinh Chandaji
Waghela (PW-5 : Ex.129). The route of the fidayeens from H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Kalupur Railway Station to Akshardham gate no.3 is identified
by Taxi driver Rajnikant Thakore (PW-68) under Panchnama
(Ex.131) proved by Panch-Bhupatsinh Andaji Waghela (PW-
5: Ex.129).
8 18. From paragraph 75 onwards in the impugned
judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has referred to
the judgments of this Court. Reliance was placed on the cases
of S.N. Dube v. N.B. Bhoir & Ors. 1 and Lal Singh etc.etc. v.
State of Gujarat & Anr. 2 which made reference to the
C confessional statement recorded under Section 15 of Terrorist
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter
TADA'), wherein this Court rejected the contention urged on
behalf of the accused persons that the confessional statements
were inadmissible in evidence because (a) t.he statements
were recorded by the investigating officer or the officers
D supervising the investigation (b} the accused persons were not
produced before the judicial Magistrate immediately after
recording the confessional statements and (c} guidelines laid
down in the case of Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab 3 were not
followed. Reliance was also placed by the High Court on the
E case of State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Chaganlal Raghani
& Ors. 4, wherein this Court held the confessional statements of
the accused p'ersons to be admissible in evidence. The Court
further held that confessional statements having been proved
to be voluntarily made and legally recorded, can be used
F against all or some of the accused persons in the light of other
evidence produced in the case.
19. The High Court referring to the broad principles
covering the law of conspiracy as laid down in the case of State
G of Tamil Nadu v. Nalini & Ors. 5, and also referring to Section
1. c2000) 2 sec 254.
2. (2000) 3 sec 221.
3. (1994) 3 sec 569.
4. c2001) 9 sec 1.
H 5. (1999) 5 sec 253.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 105
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
120-A of IPC which constitutes the offence of criminal A
conspiracy, held that the acts subsequent to achieving an object
of criminal conspiracy may tend to prove that a particular
accused person was a party to the conspiracy. Conspiracy is
hatched in private or in secrecy and it is rarely possible to
establish a conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually, both the B
existence of the conspiracy and its objects have to be inferred
from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused
persons.
Further, reference was also mad.e to the judgment in the C
case of State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors. 6,
wherein it was held that the courts should bear in mind the time
constraints on the police officers in the present system, the ill
equipped machinery they have to cope with and the traditional
apathy of respectable persons towards them.
D
The High Court also relied upon the case of Rotash v.
State of Rajasthan 7 , wherein this Court held that the
investigation was not foolproof but that defective investigation
would not lead to total rejection of the prosecution case. Further,
reference of St~te of M.P. v. Mansingh 8 in the case of Rotash E
(supra) in support of the aforesaid proposition of law.
20. The Division Bench of the High Court also referred to
the evidence of Asfaq Abdulla Bhavnagari (PW-50: Ex.312)
who had worked at Riyadh in Saudi Arabia and whose
F
statement was recorded by the police, which according to the
. prosecution, led to the revelation of the entire conspiracy.
21. The High Court further placed reliance upon the
statement of Mohammed Munaf Hajimiya Shaikh (PW-52 :
Ex.315) who gave evidence against A-2, A-4 and A-5 regarding G
running of relief camp in the State of Gujarat and against his
6. (2000) 8 sec 382.
7. (2006) 12 sec 64.
8. (2003) 10 sec 414. H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A brother Abdul Rashid Sulemanbhai Ajmeri (absconding
accused No. 4). According to the witness, A-5 and A-4 advised
A-2 to go ahead with the plan and gave telephone number of
one Nasir Doman to A-2. He·identified A-2, A-4 and A-5 in the
court.
B
22. The High Court also placed reliance on the statement
of Abdul Wahid (PW-56 : Ex.325), who admitted that on
24.04.2002 he had gone to Hyderabad with A-2 and that they
had met Khalid (absconding accused No. 16) there. According
C to this witness, the said Abdul Raheman @Abu Talah @ Khalid
had made arrangement for their lodging at Hotel G-Royal. He
also admitted to having met Ayub (absconding accused No.23)
at Hyderabad. He further admitted the disputed signature in the
hotel register (muddamal article no. 129) and the specimen
signature (muddamal article no. 131) as that of his own. He also
D identified A-2 in the court.
23. The High Court also placed reliance on the statement
of Mehboob-e-llahi Abubakar Karimi (PW-82) who has
admitted to transfer of money through him. He also admitted
E the payment made to A-2 and identified the muddamal Diary
(article no. 106) and the entries (Ex.477) and (Ex.478) made
in respect of the aforesaid transfer of money. The High Court
further placed reliance on the statement of Sevakram Bulaki
(PW-97 : Ex.563), owner of Hotel G. Royal Lodge, Hyderabad,
F who supported the prosecution version and admitted to having
allotted Room No. 322 to two persons namely Abdul Shaikh
and A.S. Shaikh who came from Ghatkopar, Bombay on
26.04.2002. He further admitted entry (Ex.326) made in the
entry register.
G 24. The High Court further referred to the statement of A-
1 (Ex.456) recorded before the Deputy Commissioner of Police
Zone-IV, Ahmedabad under Section 32 of POTA, who admitted
that he and other Muslims from Gujarat, working at Riyadh used
to meet at the residence of A-3 and also admitted that one
H Karim Annan Moulvi (absconding accused No. 20), who was
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 107
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
a native of Pakistan, also used to attend the meetings. He also A
stated that he used to collect funds in the name of Islam and
was connected with Pakistani Jihadi group "Sippa-e-Saheba"
and had also become a member of "Jaish-e-Mohammed". The
High Court also stated that the confessional statement made
by him is supported by the evidence of Abdul Rahaman Panara B
(PW-51 :Ex.314)
25. In paragraph 19 of the impugned judgment, the Division
Bench of the High Court examined the admissibility of the
confessional statements made by A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6
and their probative value and held that the confessional C
statements were made by the accused persons under Section
32 of POTA before Sanjay Gadhvi, Deputy Commissioner of
Police (Zone-IV) (PW-78: Ex.452), Ahmadabad, who had been
examined by the prosecution. He had deposed before the
Special Court (POT A) about the manner in which the D
confessional statements of th.e accused persons were
recorded. He also identified and proved their confessional
statements (marked as Exs. 454, 456, 458, 460 and 462). He
stated before the court that the provisions of POTA were
explained to the accused pP.rsons before their statements were E
recorded, and further stated that he had warned them that their
statements may be used against them and that they were not
bound to make such statements before him.
26. The contention of the counsel for the accused that the
aforesaid statements have been recorded mechanically by PW- F
78, without following the mandatory procedural safeguards
provided under Section 32 of POTA, was rejected by the
Division Bench of the High Court, which held that the same have
been recorded after following the mandatory procedural
safeguards provided under Section 32 of POTA, after careful G
examination of the above provisions of Section 32. The High
Court opined that sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 32 do not
make it mandatory for the Police (Recording Officer) to send
the accused to judicial custody after recording his confessional
statement under Section 32 of POTA. H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 27. The High Court came to the conclusion that the Chief
Judicial Magistrate is obliged to send the accused to judicial
custody only in case the accused persons complain of ill-
treatment or torture by the police. All the accused persons who
made confessional statements appeared before the CJM (PW-
B 99), and they made no complaint against the police and they
had also admitted the statement made by them. The Division
Bench of the High Court held that the aforesaid facts tend to
prove that none of the accused persons making the
confessional statement had been ill treated by the police or had
C been oppressed or lured to do so.
28. Therefore, the High Court has concluded at paragraph
131 of the impugned judgment that the prosecution had proved
that the confessional statements of all the six accused persons
were properly recorded and procedural requirements under the
D statute were complied with.
The Division Bench of the High Court further recorded the
concurrent finding at para 132 of the impugned judgment that
if the statutory safeguards are properly followed by the police
E officer and the CJM, and other facts and evidence on record
indicate free will of the accused persons in making the
confessional statement, such statement is admissible in
evidence and can be relied upon as a truthful account of facts
of the crime.
F 29. The High Court further examined the evidence of
Suresh Kumar Padhya CJM (PW-99 : Ex.568) who had
recorded the statement of A-1 and A-3 on the request of PW-
78, DCP on 18.09.2003, i.e a day after their confessional
statements were recorded. A-2 and A-4 made their
G confessional statements before PW-78 on 24.09.2003 and
were sent to PW-99 on 25.09.2003. A-6 made his confessional
statement on 05.10.2003 and was sent to PW-99 on
06.10.2003. PW-99 had stated before the Special Court
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 109
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
(POTA) that accused persons had stated before him that they A
were not ill treated by the police. Their statements were read
over to them. With regard to cross examination of PW-99, he
admitted that he had not inquired from the accused persons
as to how long they were in the police custody nor did he send
them to judicial custody after recording their statements. He B
deposed that he did not think it necessary to send the accused
persons to the judicial custody. He has also admitted that he
had not recorded a specific statement that the accused
persons had made confessional statement of their own volition. •
30. The High Court considered the evidence of PW-99 and
c
came to the conclusion that the procedural safeguards
provided under Section 32 of POTA have been followed by PW-
78 to record the statements of the accused persons as per the
guidelines issued by the Apex Court in various judgments
particularly State of Tamil Nadu v. Nalini & Ors.(supra) and D
Jayawant Oattatraya Suryarao v. State of Maharashtra 9 . The
High Court came to the conclusion that this Court in the case
of Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi 10 held that the
initial burden is on the prosecution to prove that all the
requirements under Section 15 of TADA and Rule 15 of E
TADA Rules were complied with. Once that is done and the
prosecution discharges its burden, then it is for the accused to
satisfy the court that the confessional statement was not made
voluntarily. The High Court opined that in present case, each
accused making confessional statement was granted time of F
around 15 minutes to reflect over his decision to make
confessional statement, and the High Court stated that there
is no evidence on record to suggest that 15 minutes time was
inadequate so as to render the confessional statements
inadmissible in evidence or unreliable as none of the five G
accused persons while making the confessional statement had
asked for further time. None of them had made a complaint of
9. (2001) 10 sec 109.
10. (2002) s sec 234. H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 7 S.C.R.
A inadequacy of time before PW-99 and on the other hand,
admitted the confessions made by them.
31. The High Court further stated that the contention made
by the learned counsel for the accused persons that they were
8 kept in police custody for around 45 days before the official
date of arrest, is absolutely unbelievable. Further, sending the
accused persons to judicial custody after recording the
confessional statement is a matter of prudence and not a
statutory requirement. PW-99 had made a specific note on the
·• writings (Exs. 453, 455, 457, 459 and 461 }, that each of the
C accused person was asked whether he had suffered ill-
treatment at the hands of the police and that none of them had
complained of ill-treatment by the police. The Division Bench
held the confessional statements of the accused persons to be
admissible in evidence in order to prove their guilt, relying on
D various decisions of this Court.
32. After recording such findings, the defence evidence
was also examined. Defence witness (hereinafter 'OW') Nos.
1 to 7 have given evidence and the same have been adduced
E by the defence to support their claim that the accused persons
were arrested long before the official date recorded and that
they were tortured by the police to make the confessional
statements. The aforesaid evidence of DW-3 referred to A-2
and A-3. The High Court referred to all the defence witnesses,
F except DW-3 to hold that none of the aforesaid evidence
remotely supports the defence version that A-2 and A-3 were
arrested long before 29.08.2003, i.e the dates of arrest as
mentioned in their arrest memos. The High Court held that the
evidence of the doctors also does not prove the police atrocities
G allegedly committed upon the accused persons during the
period they were in the police custody. All the six accused
persons, in their retraction statements, complained of having
been beaten up by ACP Singhal (PW-126), V.D. Vanar and
R.I. Patel, because of which they could not stand up on their
H feet. On denying their complicity in the Akshardham attack, they
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 111
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
were threatened of being encountered. Each accused persons A
said that every day they were called either by Singhal, V.D.
Vanar or by R.I. Patel and were forced to admn their complicity
in the Akshardham attack. On 05.11.2003, the accused
person~ were produced before the Special Court (POTA) from
the judicial custody. Each one of them was given audience B
before the judge of the Special Court (POTA) wherein, they all
made an oral complaint of police atrocities during the police
custody and also complaineq of having been in police custody
for long time. According to each accused person, he was made
to sign the confessional statement prepared by the police c
under coercion and duress and had not made the same of his
own free will.
At paragraph 144 of the impugned judgment, the Division
Bench of the High Court had recorded its finding that the
aforesaid retractions are ex facie unbelievable, without giving D
any reason.
33. At para 145 of the impugned judgment, the High Court
examined the evidence in respect of the letters written in Urdu
(Ex.658), which is a vital incriminating evidence against A-4. E
According to the defence, these letters were planted by the
police at a later stage, an9 they placed reliance on the
evidence of PW-42 (Ex.266), the inquest Panchnama(Ex.267)
of the bodies of the deceased fidayeens, the post mortem
notes(Ex.492 and Ex.493) and the muddamal clothes of the F
fidayeens and submitted that since both of them died of bullet
wounds sustained during the counter attack by the NSG
commandos, the bodies were wounded and soiled in blood,
and their clothes were tattered by the bullet holes and the
splinters. There were holes in the clothes of the fidayeens G
particularly. on the pockets of their trousers. In the aforesaid
-circumstances, it is not possible that the letters recovered
allegedly from the pockets of the trousers of the fidayeens were
unsoiled and in perfect condition, and therefore, the expert
opinion (Ex.511) is not very accurate and is not reliable. The H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A High Court stated that it is true that the Urdu letters recovered
from the bodies of the deceased fidayeens were in perfect
condition in spite of the multiple injuries received by the
fidayeens and assigned the reason in paragraph 189 of the
impugned judgment as "But then the truth is stranger than
B fiction" and that it is not possible to disbelieve that two Urdu
letters (Exh.658) were recovered from the bodies of the
fidayeens. It was stated by the High Court that both the letters
were signed by Brig. Raj Sitapati of NSG. The recovery of these
letters is recorded in the muddamal articles as per list (Ex.524)
c which were received by ACP G.L Singhal (PW-126) in the
premises of Akshardha111 temple itself under Panchnama
(Ex.440), signed by the Police Officer Shri Prakashchandra
Mehra (PW-105 : Exh.592). The evidence and the opinion
(Exh.511) of the handwriting expert J.J.Patel (PW-89: Exh.507)
o was relied upon to prove that the said letters were written by
A-4.
34. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
accused persons regarding the subsequent planting of letters
was rejected by the High Court, stating that if this argument was
E to be accepted, then the aforesaid evidence adduced by the
prosecution has to be disbelieved and it has to be held that
the police had such presence of mind that in the:
"milieu of the aftermath of the terrorist attack, the police
F thought of creating the evidence, found out a person who
knew Urdu, got them to write the write-ups in handwriting
that would match the handwriting of accused no.4, Abdul
Kayyum, made Lt.Col Lamba and Brig. Raj Sitapathi their
accomplices and that the two officers of the NSG readily
G agreed to be the accomplices. SO did the panch witness,
Vinod Kumar(PW-74) and Dilip Sinh (PW-1). This
possibility is too far-fetched to believe."
The High Court therefore held that the accused persons
had committed offences for which they had been charged and
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 113
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
confirmed the conviction and sentence, i.e. death sentence A
awarded to A-2, A-4 and A-6, life-imprisonment to A-3, five
years Rigorous Imprisonment to A-1 and ten years Rigorous
Imprisonment to A-5 and the appeals of the accused persons
were dismissed.
B
The correctness of the impugned judgment and orders
passed by the High Court is under challenge in these appeals
by the accused - appellants, in support of which they urged
various facts and legal contentions before this Court.
35. The rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the C
accused persons and the prosecution will be dealt with as
hereunder:
Contentions on behalf of the prosecution
D
We will first examine the contentions urged on behalf of
the prosecution represented by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, the learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Gujarat who
has advanced the following arguments to establish the guilt of
the accused persons:
E
The procedure under Section 50 of POTA was followed
by the State Government while granting sanction:
36. It was contended by the learned senior counsel that
on completion of the investigation, PW-126 forwarded a F
complete set of papers and his report through official channel
recommending prosecution against all six accused persons
under the provisions of POTA. The sanction granted by the
Home Department was given under the signature of the Deputy
Secretary of the said department, Mr. J.R Rajput by sanction G
no. SB.V/POTA/10/2003/152 (Ex.498). All the papers were
received by the sanctioning authority on 12.11.2003 and the
section officer put up the file to the Under Secretary on
13.11.2003 and after proper application of mind, the sanction
was approved by Kuldeep Chand Kapur, Principal Secretary,
H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Home Department (PW-88) on 15.11.2003 and it was sent
back to the Minister for State (Home) who approved it on
18.11.2003 and received back these papers from the Minister
on 19.11.2003 and thereafter sanction order was issued on
21.11.2003. It was further submitted that the procedure for
B granting sanction by the Home Department was followed as per
the Gujarat Government Rules of Business, 1990. It was
submitted that the sanction order was passed by the State
Government after proper application of mind by the competent
authority.
c The learned senior counsel also submitted that the learned
counsel for A-6, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal placed reliance on the
case of Ramanath Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat 11 qua the
sanction under Section 20-A (2) of TADA, which has been
declared per incuriam by a 5 Judge Bench in the case of
D Prakash Bhutto v. State of Gujarat12 and therefore the judgment
has no relevance.
Confessions of A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 are valid:
37. The learned senior counsel contended that the
E
procedure for recording of the confessions as under Section
32 of POTA was scrupulously followed. The accused persons
did not make any complaints of beatings or ill treatment by the
police when produced before the CJM for remand on different
dates. When the complaints were made later, a medical
F examination was carried out in which none of the complaints
were found to be true. The learned senior counsel also
submitted that the confessional statements of A-2 and A-4 were
recorded on 24-09-2003, that of A-3 on 17-09-2003 and that
of A-6 on 05-10-2003. A-5 did not make any confession at all.
G The retraction to these confessional statements came around
five weeks later. He contended that it is clear that these
retractions are mechanical as even A-5, who had not made any
confessional statement, sent his retraction.
11. (1997) 1 sec 744.
H 12. (2005) 2 sec 409.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 115
GUJARNT" [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
The Urdu letters were collected from the dead bodies of A
the two fidayeens:
38. The inquest panchnama was drawn of the dead bodies
of the two fidayeens by Police Officer Shri Prakashchandra
Mehra (PW-105: Exh.592), who in his statement has confirmed
8
the collection of the two Urdu letters. PW-91, Maj. Jaydeep
Lamba, who was the commander of the task force, also stated
that two Urdu letters were found from the dead bodies of the
fidayeens by him and Brig. Raj Sitapati, and that they contain
the signature of Brig. Raj Sitapati at the bottom and that a list C
was prepared of the articles recovered (Ex.524) which' was
signed by him.
Reliance was also placed by the learned senior counsel
on the evidence of PW-89 who had opined that the letters
(Ex.658) had been written by A-4. D
The learned senior counsel also submitted that PW-91
deposed before. the court, and that in his cross examination,
he was not questioned regarding the 'condition' of the letters
written in Urdu, as recovered from the two fidayeens. Similarly, E
even PW- 126 was not cross examined by the counsel for the
accused persons on the condition of the letters. On being
questioned by us as to why the letters did not have any blood
stains on them, the learned senior counsel submitted that the
panchnama stated that the trousers were stained with blood F
and not soaked with it. Their trousers became wet due to the
oozing of blood which has gone to the back of the trousers
because of gravity as the bodies were lying on their back after
shooting.
The link of accused persons to Akshardham attack has G
been established.
39. The learned senior counsel had relied upon the
confessional statements of the accused persons to draw the
link between them and the attack on the Akshardham temple. H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A He had submitted that the confessional statements would
clearly go to show how each one of the accused persons had
a different and compartmentalized role from the procurement
of arms and ammunitions to providing the logistics to the
fidayeens .for carrying out the operation and the motivation
B provided for the attack.
The role of A-6 has also been proved.
40. The learned senior counsel submitted that A-6 played
a crucial role in bringing the weapons from Kashmir to Bareilly-
C in his ambassador car bearing registration no. KMT 413, in a
secret cavity made underneath the back seat, and thereafter
he carried the weapons, concealed in the bedding in the train
and accompanied the fidayeens to Ahmedabad.
The Navgam Police Station at Jammu & Kashmir had
0
arrested A-6 in offence registered in FIR: CR no. 130 of 2003,
and it was during the interrogation in the above said offence
that he had disclosed his involvement in the Akshardham
attack. A fax message was received by the Gujarat ATS from
E the IGP Kashmir regarding the same on 31.08.2003. The
investigation was conducted by PW-126 who was the then
ACP and was authorized to do so as per section 51 of POTA.
A team was formed under the proper authorization for collecting
materials from different places during investigation. l.K Chauhan
(PW- 125) was asked to go for inquiry to Jammu & Kashmir.
F
It was submitted that there were many other evidences,
other than his confessional statement, including the testimony
of Yusuf Gandhi, owner of Gulshan Guest House, (PW-57) who
had stated before the Special Court (POTA) that A-6 stayed
G there, and also the panchnama of the ambassador car KMT
413 (Ex.671).
Delay in cracking the case.
41. The learned senior counsel submitted that initially the
H
ADAMBHAL SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 117
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
investigation was conducted by V.R Tolia (PW-113) of the A
Local Crime Branch, Gandhinagar, and thereafter by K.K Patel
of the ATS. The investigation was then handed over to G.L
Singhal, ACP Crime Branch (PW- 126) on 28.08.2003. It was
on 28.08.2003, that Ashfaq Bhavnagri (PW-50) was
interrogated, who revealed the entire conspiracy as well as the B
role of A-1 and A-3 in committing the dastardly offences.
The Conspiracy.
42. It was further submitted that it has been proved that the
accused persons, along with the absconding accused hatched C
a conspiracy to create terror and take revenge on the Hindus
on account of the Godhra riots. For this purpose, secret
meetings were held at Jiddah, Riyadh, Hyderabad and
Kashmir. A-2 was contacted by his brother who ensured supply
of finance, weapons and trained terrorists. A-4 and A-5, who D
were running relief camps and were also religious leaders,
accepted to garner local support and thus money was sent
through havala. A-2 and the two fidayeens visited various
places in Ahmedabad and finally chose Akshardham temple
in Gandhinagar as the site for the attack on 24.09.2002. A-4, E
at the instance of A-5, wrote the two Urdu letters and gave them
to the fidayeens. A-5 took the fidayeens to the railway station,
from where they took a taxi to the Akshardham temple. The
arms and ammunitions were brought from Kashmir by A-6.
F
Concurrent findings of the courts below
43. It was further submitted by the learned senior counsel
for the prosecution that the Sp3cial Court (POTA) as well as
the Division Bench of the High Court, after proper appreciation
and analysis of evidence, gave concurrent findings of fact and G
thus the conviction and the sentences ordered by the courts
below ought to be upheld.
44. The learned senior counsel for the prosecution thus
submits that it has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A accused persons were involved in the conspiracy for the attack
on the Akshardham temple and the sentences meted out to
them by the Special Court (POTA) and confirmed by the High
Court must be upheld by this Court as the concurrent findings
of fact recorded on the charges framed against the accused
s persons does not warrant any interference by this Court.
Contentions on behalf of A-2 & A-4 and A-3 & A-5.
45. We will now examine the contentions urged on behalf
of A-2 and A-4 who are represented by learned senior counsel,
C Mr. K.T.S Tulsi and thereafter A-3 and A-5, who are represented
by learned senior counsel, Mr. Amarendra Sharan.
Subsequently, the contentions urged on behalf of A-6 who is
represented by learned counsel, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal will be
dealt with. The contentions will be dealt with topic wise.
D
That the Sanction required under Section 50 of POTA was
not obtained in a proper manner.
46. Section 50 of POTA provides that "no court shall take
cognizance of any offence under the Act without the previous
E sanction of the Central Government or as the case may be by
the State Government." The prosecution has relied on the
testimony of Kuldeep Chand Kapoor (PW-88) to prove that the
sanction was granted in accordance with the law.
F' It was contended by the learned counsel for A-6 that the
perusal of the statement of PW-88 would show that all the
documents pertaining to the investigation were not placed
before the sanctioning authority and it was only on the approval
of the Minister that the sanction was granted. The sanction was
G granted without due application of mind. Thus the said sanction
is not a proper previous sanction, on the basis of which the
court could have taken cognizance of the offences.
Evidentiary value of confessions:
H 47. All the three learned counsel have similar submissions
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 119
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
with respect to the reliance placed by the courts below on the A
confessional statements made by the accused persons to hold
that the accused persons are guilty of the offences they are
charged with. They submitted that the concurrent findings of fact
upholding the conviction of the accused persons on the basis
of their confessional statements is erroneous, keeping in mind B
that there is no admissible or reliable evidence on record which
:onnect them with the offences.
It is contended by both the learned senior counsel Mr.
1<.T.S. Tulsi and Mr. A. Sharan on behalf of A-2 and A-4 and C
A-3 and A-5 respectively, that the prosecution had not complied
with the statutory provisions under Section 32(5) of POTA,
though they produced the accused persons before the learned
CJM PW-99, within 48 hours as provided under Section 32(4)
of POTA. It is contended that after recording their statements,
CJM (PW-99) failed to discharge the vital obligation of sending D
them to judicial custody and thus, committed a grave error in
remanding them back to police custody which was a clear
violation of Section 32(5) of POTA and Article 20(3) of the
Constitution. It was submitted that the Division Bench of the
High Court had erroneously made an observation in the E
impugned judgment in this regard with reference to Section
32(5) of POTA, stating that the Chief Judicial Magistrate has
the power to send a person to a judicial custody only when he
complains of ill treatment and torture by the police. The
aforesaid finding is contrary to the law laid down by this Court F
in NCT v. Navjot Sandhu 13.
48. Further, the learned senior counsel placed reliance on
the deposition of PW-99 to contend that it leaves no manner
of doubt that he was neither mindful of his obligations under G
Section 32 of POTA nor did he ma.ke any enquiry regarding
fear or torture likely to have been faced by the accused persons
while making their confessional statements. On the contrary, he
mechanically sent the accused persons back to police custody
13. (2005) 11 sec 600 H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A after recording their statements. It was further submitted that the
CJM had failed to perform the most important duty of informing
himself about the surrounding circumstances for making the
confessional statements by the accused. Remanding the
accused persons to judicial custody has been considered as
B the most significant safeguard and protection against torture
by police, which was thrown to the wind by the CJM, thereby
he had violated the fundamental rights guaranteed to the
accused persons under Articles 20(3) and 21 of the
Constitution. It was further contended by the learned senior
c counsel that there was a failure on the part of the courts below
in not considering the evidence of doctors who work in
Government Hospitals and who deposed in the case on behalf
of the accused persons that A-2 to A-6 had complained of
having received severe beating by the police prior to recording
the confessional statements. The said evidence is clear from
0
the depositions of DW-2(Ex.731), DW-4(Ex.736), DW-
5(Ex.737) and DW-7(Ex.744). From the evidence of DW-2, it
is revealed that the X-ray plates and case papers of A-4 were
found missing and from the aforesaid evidence, the only
E conclusion that can be drawn is that once the accused persons
had complained of having received severe beatings by the
police prior to their making of their confessional statements, the
credibility of such confessions became doubtful as the same
had not been made voluntarily before PW-78 by them.
Therefore, it had been urged that neither the Special Court
F (POTA) nor the Division Bench of the High Court should have
placed reliance upon the said confessional statements to
record the finding of guilt against the accused persons. The
courts below should have considered that there was a statutory
obligation upon the prosecution not to suppress any evidence
G or document on record which indicates the innocence of the
accused persons. Thus, in the light of evidence of DW-2, the
conduct of the prosecution in the facts and circumstances of
the case becomes unjustified. The learned senior counsel in
support of the said contention placed reliance upon the
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 121
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
decision of this Court in the case of Sidhartha Vashisht v. State A
(NCT of Delhi)1 4 .
49. Further, the learned senior counsel on behalf of the
accused persons contended that there were serious infirmities
with regard to the manner in which the alleged confessional 8
statements of the accused persons were recorded without
sufficient time being given for reflection, which was in violation
of the principle laid down by this court in the cases of Ranjit
Singh@ Jita & Ors. v. State of Punjab 15 , Navjot Sandhu case
(supra) and State of Rajasthan v. Ajit Singh & Ors. 16 . It was C
further urged that the courts below had failed to take into
consideration the element of fear of further torture by the police,
in the minds of the accused persons which was bound to be
present, especially when their confessional statements were
recorded by PW-78 in his office without them being assured
of being sent to judicial custody immediately after making their D
statements. These above important facts had certainly vitiated
the confessional statements made by the accused persons,
making them highly unreliable and unnatural. Therefore, the
courts below should not have placed reliance on the same to
record the finding of guilt against the accused persons. The E
remaining evidence on record placed on behalf of the
prosecution, does not establish even remotely that they were
party to any of the material ingredients of the conspiracy of the
attack on Akshardham temple. In support of the said contention,
the learned senior counsel invited our attention to concurrent F
findings of fact of the courts below contending that the same
are liable to be set aside as they have relied solely upon the
confessional statements made by the accused persons while
upholding their conviction. The courts below had gravely erred
in not considering the very important legal aspect of the matter, G
that a trial court cannot begin by examining the confessional
14. (2010) 6 sec 1.
1s. (2002) a sec 73.
16. (2008) 1 sec 601. H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A statements of the accused persons to convict them. It was
contended that it must begin with other evidence adduced by
the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard
to the quality and effect of other evidence, only then, the court
must turn to the confessions in order to be assured as to the
B conclusion of guilt, which the judicial mind is about to reach,
based on the said other evidence. In support of the aforesaid
legal submissions he had placed reliance upon the judgment
of this Court in the case of Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar17
and the Navjot Sandhu case (supra).
c 50. Further elaborating their submissions, the learned
senior counsel urged that the confession of an accused person
has been regarded by this Court as fragile and feeble evidence
which can only be used to support other evidence. In support
of this contention he relied upon the judgment of this Court in
D the Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujarat18 . The approach of the
courts below to record the finding of guilt against the accused
persons, should be to first marshal! evidence against the
accused persons excluding their confessions and see whether
conviction can safely be based upon it.
E
Retracted confessions.
51. The learned senior counsel Mr. A. Sharan appearing
for A-3 and A-5 had further contended that the courts below had
failed to take into consideration that the confessional
F statements made by the accused persons had been retracted
at the earliest possible opportunity available to them. The
evidence of the doctors that the sustained fracture being found
on the bodies of the accused persons by the examining doctor
and subsequent disappearance of the X-ray plates from the
G records, raised a series of doubts regarding the manner in
which the confessional statements were recorded. In support
of this contention the learned senior counsel placed reliance
17. (1964) 6 SCR 623.
H 1a. (2007) 4 sec 266.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 123
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
upon the decision of this Court in the case of Chandrakant A
Chimanlal Desai v. State of Gujarat 19 • The learned senior
counsel further contended that in the present set of facts, there
was sufficient proof that the confessional statements were not
made voluntarily and in the light of the above, the courts below
were duty bound to corroborate the confessional statements B
with other independent evidence to test their veracity.
Learned senior counsel Mr. K.T.S Tulsi representing A-2
and A-4 and learned counsel, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal representing
A-6 have reiterated the same and submitted that there had to C
be independent evidence corroborating the confessional
statements of the accused persons if they had been retracted.
Evidence of accomplices.
52. The learned senior counsel Mr. K.T.S Tulsi submitted o
that the learned senior counsel for the prosecution had placed
reliance on the evidence of PW-50 as substantial evidence
against the accused persons. He contended that a careful
reading of the evidence of PW-50 showed that the said witness
had clearly admitted that he was an accomplice in as much as E
he admitted to having contributed money, even when A-3
informed them that the money was to be used for taking
revenge. It was further contended that a court should not rely
on the evidence of an accomplice to record finding of guilt
against the accused persons and to buttress the said
F
submission, he placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court
in the case of Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura 20. In support of
the said submission, he had further placed reliance upon the
judgment of this Court in the case of Bhiva Ooulu Patil v. State
of Maharashtra 21
G
Further elaborating his submission in this regard, he
19. (1992) 1 sec 473.
20. c2011) 9 sec 479.
21. AIR 1963 SC 599. H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 7 S.C.R.
A placed reliance upon another judgment of this Court in the case
of Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra v. K. S. Oalipsinghji22 , wherein
this Court had further stated with regard to the combined effect
of Sections 133 and 114, Illustration (b) of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 and held that corroboration must connect the accused
B persons with the crime.
53. The learned senior counsel relied upon the case of
Sarwan Singh v. State of Pubjab 23 , wherein this Court has laid
down the legal principle that the courts are naturally reluctant
to act on such tainted evidence unless it is corroborated and
C that independent corroboration should support the main story
disclosed by the approver apart from a finding that the approver
is a reliable witness. The accomplice evidence should satisfy
a double test, i.e. he is a reliable witness and that there is
sufficient corroboration by other evidence to his statement. This
D test is special to the case of weak or tainted evidence like that
of the approver.
In support of the said principle, he further placed reliance
on the cases of Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana 24 , Abdul
E Sattar v. U. T. Chandigarh 25, Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary
v. State of Maharashtra 26, Sheshanna Bhumanna Yadav v.
State of Maharashtra 27 and Bhuboni Sahu v. R. 28.
54. The learned senior counsel specifically referred to the
case of K. Hashim v. State of Tamil Nadu 29 wherein this Court,
F after adverting to Sections 133 and 114, Illustration (b) of the
Evidence Act has held that the said provisions strike a note of
22. (1969) 3 sec 429.
23. AIR 1957 SC 637.
G 24. (1975) 3 sec 742.
25. (1985) Suppl (1) sec.
26. (2000) 8 sec 457.
27. (1970) 2 sec 122.
28. (1948-49) 76 IA 147.
H 29. (2005) 1 sec 237.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 125
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
warning cautioning the court that an accomplice does not A
generally deserve to be believed.
55. He then drew our attention to an unreported judgment
of this Court delivered by one of us, A.K. Patnaik, J. in the case
of State of Rajasthan v. Ba/veer (Crl. Appeal No. 942 of 2006 B.
decided on 31.10.2013) wherein this Court observed, while
referring to illustration (b) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act,
and observed that the Court will presume that an accomplice
is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated by material
particulars.
c
56. It was further urged that the learned senior counsel on
behalf of the prosecution had strongly relied on the statement
of PW-51, whereas the aforesaid deposition was virtually
rendered useless during cross examination before the Special
Court (POTA). The version given by the said witness in his cross D
examination was more credible, natural and casts a serious
doubt about the manner in which the evidence was sought to
be fabricated by police officer, D.G Vanzara whose entrusting
of the case to the Crime Branch on 28.08.2003 suddenly
resulted in feverish activity, whereupon the accused persons E
were arrested and their confessional statements were
recorded.
The learned senior counsel for the prosecution had relied
upon the deposition of PW-52 who had stated in his evidence
F
about sending money through A-3, as well as the weapons for
the carnage and had also identified A-2, A-4 and A-5 before
the Court. The learned senior counsel, Mr. K.T.S Tulsi submitted
that the said statement of this witness was exculpatory as he
had stated that no work was assigned to him. Therefore, such
statement can neither be considered to be reliable nor worthy G
of acceptance without corroboration in material particulars from
independent sources. In view of the test laid down by this court
in a catena of judgments referred to supra, upon which strong
reliance had been placed by the learned counsel based on the
presumption contained in illustration (b) of Section 114 read H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A with section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, it was submitted
that provisions of the Evidence Act are of no avail to the
prosecution case.
Letters purportedly recovered from the pockets of the
fidayeens cannot be relied upon:
8
57. Both the learned senior counsel, Mr. K.T.S Tulsi and
Mr. A. Sharan contended that it was not possible to believe that
the letters were recovered from the pockets of the two
fidayeens, mainly on the evidence from the post mortem of the
C dead bodies of the fidayeens which showed that the bodies
had 46 and 60 external injuries, respectively, due to multiple
bullet shots and the panchnama of the clothes of the assailants
clearly demonstrated that their clothes were full of blood and
mud and therefore, it was highly improbable and difficult to
D believe that the alleged letters were recovered in a perfect
condition from the clothes of the fidayeens. The High Court had
failed to reconcile the fact of absence of bullet holes on the
letters with the presence of multiple bullet holes on the pockets
of the trousers, from which the letters were purported to have
E been recovered. With regard to the letters being in a perfect
condition, the High Court merely observed that "Truth is
stranger than fiction" and it was submitted that the courts below
ought not to have relied upon such a document to record their
findings of guilt against the accused persons on the basis of
F the same.
58. The learned senior counsel also referred to various
discrepancies in the statements of the two important witnesses
in relation to the letters, i.e of PW-91, Lt. Col. Jayadeep Lamba,
who, according to the prosecution, had recovered them from
G the pockets of the trousers of the fidayeens, but whose
statement was not recorded under Section 161 CrPC and that
of PW-121, the translator of the letters. It was claimed by the
prosecution that PW-9~ was not examined by the investigation
officer under Section 161 CrPC since the NSG had refused to
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 127
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
grant permission to its personnel to disclose any information A
regarding their operation with respect to the attack. The
prosecution had placed reliance upon a letter dated 11.02.2002
by the Ministry of Home Affairs to prove the same. The learned
senior counsel contended that the prosecution had however,
relied upon the statement made by this witness, PW-91 before B
the Special Court (POTA), who was a chargesheet witness
although his statement under Section 161 CrPC was never
recorded and thus, the accused persons had been naturally
deprived of an opportunity to effectively cross-examine the
witness and thereby they were very much prejudiced. c
59. The learned senior counsel also contended that the
claim of the prosecution that the letters were found in a pouch
which was present in the pocket of the trousers of the fidayeens
cannot be believed as there is no evidence to support the same
and on the contrary, the receipt voucher of the articles collected D
from the fidayeens only listed two 'handwritten letters in Urdu'
and there was no mention of the pouch whatsoever.
Delay in recording statements of accomplices and
confessional statements of the accused persons.
E
60. The learned senior counsel, Mr. A. Sharan had
submitted that the preliminary investigation of the case was
initially carried out by the police from 27.09.2002 and thereafter,
the investigation was handed over to the ATS on 03.10.2002.
After the matter was investigated for a year, it was transferred
F
to the Crime Branch on 28.08.2003 and surprisingly, on the very
next day i.e, 29.08.2003, all the accused persons, except A-6
were arrested and on 30.08.2003, the provisions of POTA
were invoked by the Crime Branch against them.
61. It was further contended by him that this made the G
prosecution story highly improbable and the fact that the
accused persons were apprehended a year after the incident
made the conduct of the prosecution highly doubtful and totally
unreliable.
It was further contended by him that it is a well settled H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A principle of law that there should not be an inordinate delay in
the recording of the statements of the accomplices by the police.
PW-50, PW-51, PW-52 and PW-56 had stated in their
depositions that their statements were recorded around the 7th
or 8th month of 2003. Thus, this inordinate delay leads one to
B draw an adverse inference and also leads one to believe that
the police had sufficient time to fabricate the story and rope in
the accused persons falsely in this case. Reliance was placed
by the learned senior counsel on the case of State of Andhra
Pradesh v. S. Swarnalatha & Ors. 30, wherein even 26 days
c delay in recording statements of prosecution witnesses was not
allowed by this Court. The learned senior counsel also referred
to the case of Jagjit Singh @ Jagga v. State of Punjab 31 in
support of the above position of law.
It was contended that the delay in recording the statements
D of the accused and witnesses by police and reliance placed·
upon the same by the courts below vitiated the finding recorded
that the accused persons are guilty, and the same is liable to
be set aside. There was delay in recording the statement of
PW-52 and PW-56 which is evident from the record that PW-
E 52 had stated that his statement was recorded on 07.09.2003,
while PW-56 stated that his statement was recorded in the 7th
or 8th month of 2003. Thus, there was a delay of almost of a
year in recording the statement of the aforesaid witness by the
Police.
F Failure of prosecution to establish a nexus between the
accused persons and the crime as well as link between
the fidayeens and the accused persons.
62. The learned senior counsel Mr. A. Sharan contended
that for the prosecution to invoke common intention under
G Section 34 IPC or common object under Section 149 IPC, it is
required to establish beyond reasonable doubt the connection
between the accused persons and the common intention/object
30. c2009J 8 sec 383.
H 31. (2005) 3 sec 689.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 129
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
of the crime with which they are charged. In this regard, it was A
submitted that all the main prosecution witnesses, i.e PW-50,
PW-51, PW-52 and PW-56 upon which strong reliance had
been placed by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the
prosecution, had failed to show and establish the nexus either
with common intention or object, or the cumulative effect of the B
proved circumstances, to establish any connection between the
accused persons and the conspiracy of the attack on
Akshardham. Further, it was contended that the courts below
had grossly erred in placing strong reliance upon the evidence
of above prosecution witnesses to hold that there was a link or c
connection between the fidayeens and the accused persons,
and that it was on the failure of the prosecution to establish such
connection, that they had been subsequently roped in.
63. Further,· it was contended that even from the
confessional statement of A-6, wherein he had narrated as to D
how the two fidayeens were brought from Jammu & Kashmir
to Gujarat, there was no mention of A-1 to A-5. Therefore, the
prosecution had failed to establish the connection between A-
6 and A-2, A-4, A-3 and A-5 and this important aspect of the
matter had not been considered at all by the courts below while E
recording the finding of guilt against the accused persons and
the same cannot be allowed to sustain.
Defence Witnesses to be given same weightage as
prosecution witnesses.
f
64. The learned senior counsel also contended that the
courts below should have given same weightage to the
evidence of the defence witnesses as that of the prosecution
witnesses and in support of this contention, he placed reliance
upon the cases of Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihaf32, I. G.D. S.
G
Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer & Anr'33. and State of Uttar Pradesh v.
Babu Ram 34
32. (2002) 1 sec 351.
33. (2002) 2 sec 426.
34. (2000) 4 sec 515. H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Suppression of material witness draws an adverse
inference against the prosecution.
65. It was contended by the learned senior counsel that
PW-126 stated that his senior officer D.G Vanzara, had orally
told him that PW-50 was aware of the details of the conspiracy,
8
but D.G. Vanzara was never produced as a prosecution
witness. The case is the same with Brig. Raj Sitapati, who was
also a witness to the recovery of the two Urdu letters, and this
material witness had also been conveniently brushed aside both
by the police and the prosecution. Reliance was placed by the
c learned senior counsel in this regard on Tulsiram Kanu v. The
State 35, Ram Prasad & Ors. v. State of U.P. 36 and State of UP.
v. Punni & Ors. 37
Alternative stories put forth by the prosecution.
D
66. Further, it was contended by the learned senior
counsel Mr. A Sharan that alternative stories had been put forth
by the prosecution. It was borne out from the confessional
statement of A-4 that the two fidayeens, i.e. Doctor 1 (Murtuza/
E Hafiz Yasir) & Doctor 2 (Ashraf/Mohd. Faruk) belonged to
Lahore and Rawalpindi respectively. As per the confessional
statement of A-6, the names of the two fidayeens were Sakil
and Abdullah, who belonged to Jammu and Kashmir and had
travelled along with A-6 to Gujarat. It was observed from the
F deposition of Maj. Jaydeep Lamba (PW-91) that it was written
in the two Urdu letters that the two fidayeens were from 'Atok'
region of Pakistan. It was submitted that the prosecution had
come forth with three different versions insofar as the origin of
the two fidayeens was concerned. Even the prosecution was
not certain as to which of the three versions was true. It was
G submitted that therefore, in the presence of these major
discrepancies in the prosecution story, and the non-reliability
35. AIR 1954 SC 1
36. (1974) 3 sec 388
H 37. (2008) 11 sec 153
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 131
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
of the confessional statements of the accused persons, they A
were entitled to acquittal.
Contentions on behalf of A-6.
67. The contentions urged by learned counsel Ms.Kamini
Jaiswal on behalf of A-6 will now be adverted to as he was ·· B
arrested later and his situation is different from that of the other
accused persons.
Arrest of A-6 in an offence investigated by Jammu and
Kashmir police. c
68. It is contented that as per the case of the prosecution,
A-6 was under arrest at the Navgam police station Kashmir, in
relation to offence in FIR no. 130 of 2003 under Sections 120-
~,and 153-A of Ranbir Penal Code(RPC) and Sections 7 and
27 of the Arms Act. It was also the case of the prosecution that D
a fax message was sent by the IGP Kashmir to ATS, Gujarat
on 31.08.2003, and that pursuant to the receipt of the fax, the
Transfer Warrant was sought from the Special Designated
Court (POTA), Ahmedabad and on that basis, the Application
for Remand was made to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, E
Badgaum. A-6 was brought to Ahmedabad on 12.09.2003 and
was arrested by the Gujarat police in CR No. 314 of 2002 at
9:30 P.M.
Confessional statement of A-6 is not admissible against F
him.
69. It was further submitted that the entire case of the
prosecution rested solely on the alleged confession of A-6 which
was recorded on 05.10.2003 (Exs.461-462), while he was in
police custody. It had been submitted that there were several G
violations of the mandatory requirements of Section 32 of
POT A while recording his confessional statement. Learned
senior counsel Mr. K.T.S Tulsi, appearing on behalf of A-2 and
A-4 and Mr. A. Sharan learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of A-3 and A-5 had also advanced arguments in detail H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A as to how the confessional statements of the accused persons
were not recorded in accordance with the mandatory
procedural safeguards under Section 32 of POTA and the
.
learned counsel for A-6, Ms.Kamini Jaiswal had alluded to
them with respect to A-6 also. Hence, we will not reiterate the
B same in this portion of the judgment.
That the other evidence produced by the prosecution
also does not point to the guilt of A-6.
70. The learned counsel submitted that during the remand
C of A-6, the investigation was carried on by V.D Vanar (PW-
112), at Bareilly and Ahmedabad. He had drawn panchnama
of a PCO from where the accused had allegedly made
telephone calls, but though he stated that a panchnama was
drawn at Bareilly, no such panchnama had been brought on
D record. He was also said to have recorded the statement of
PW-69, Minhaas Ashfaq Ahmed who had stated that A-6 got
the ambassador car repaired at Das Motors and also the
statement of one Dr. Sudhanshu Arya (PW-93) who had stated
that the accused came to him for treatment of his child.
E However, it is contented that none of these incidents in any way
connected the accused to the attack on the Akshardham temple.
Some other evidence which the prosecution sought to rely
on to establish the guilt of A-6 were the deposition of the owner
of Gulshan Guest House, Yusuf Gandhi, (PW-57: Ex.328),
F Panchnama of specimen signature of A-6 in the register of the
guest house (Ex. 683), recovery of the ambassador car from
the custody of the J & K Police (Ex 672) and the report of the
RTO regarding the ownership of the said ambassador car.
(Ex.672).
G
It was submitted that the register of the Guest House,
which was seized around 27.08.2002 and 28.08.2002, was
never sealed, and that the pointing out of the signature by A-6
while being in custody of the police was not admissible in
H evidence.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 133
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
It was further submitted that with regard to the ownership A
of the ambassador car, the report of the RTO (Ex.672), showed
that it was registered in the name of Abdul Majid Rathor. The
prosecution had also not been able to bring anything on record
to connect A-6 with the said owner or with the car, or of the
case with the attack at Akshardham temple. B
That there had also been a violation of Section 51 of
POTA.
71. It was contended by the learned counsel that Section
51 of POTA, which starts with the non-obstante clause, makes C
it mandatory that the investigation under POTA be carried out
only by the officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of
Police or a police officer of an equivalent rank. It was argued
that the investigation in the present case was mostly carried
out by the officer of the rank of a Police Inspector. The POTA, D
unlike CrPC does not contain any provision where the powers
of the 1.0 could be delegated to any other.person. Thus, it was
contented that any investigation, if carried out by any officer
·below the rank of ACP is illegal and evidence, if any, collected
during such investigation could not be looked at. E
Findings of this Court:
72. We have heard the rival factual and legal contentions
raised at length for a number of days and perused in detail the
· written submissions on record produced by the learned counsel F
representing both the parties. We have also perused the
material objects and evidence on record available with this
Court in connection with this case. The following points that
would arise in these appeals for the purpose of adjudication
of the appeals by this Court are: G
1. Whether sanction given by the Gujarat State
Government dated 21 .11.2003 in this case is in
compliance with Section 50 of POTA?
H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 2. Whether the confessional statements of the
accused persons were recorded as per the
procedure laid down in Section 32 of POTA, CrPC
and the principles laid down by this Court?
3. Whether the statements of the accomplices
8 disclosing evidence of the offences, and the
connection of the accused persons to the offence,
can be relied upon to corroborate their confessional
statements?
c 4. Whether the two letters in Urdu presented as
Ex.658 which have been translated in English vide
Ex. 775, were found from the pockets of the trousers
of the fidayeens who were killed in the attack?
5. Whether the letters allegedly found from the pockets
D
of the trousers of the fidayeens were written by A-
4?
6. Whether there is any evidence apart from the
retracted confessional statement of A-6 which
E connects him to the offence?
7. Whether there is any independent evidence on
record apart from the confessional statements
recorded by the police, of the accused persons and
F the accomplices, to hold them guilty of the crime?
8. Whether A-2 to A-6 in this case are guilty of criminal
conspiracy under Section 120-8 IPC?
9. Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below
G on the guilt of the accused persons can be
interfered with by this court in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution?
10. What Order?
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 135
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
We will now proceed to answer each point in detail. A
73. Justice Vivian Bose while dealing with the incipient
constitution in the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkaf38 , made an observation which is very pertinent to be
quoted herein, which reads thus: 8
"90. I find it impossible to read these portions of the
Constitution without regard to the background out of which
they arose. I cannot blot out their history and omit from
consideration the brooding spirit of the times. Th~y are not
just dull, lifeless words static and hide-bound as in some C
mummi-fied manuscript, but, living flames intended to give
life to a great nation and order its being, tongues of
dynamic fire, potent to mould the future as well as guide
the pr~sent. The Constitution must, in my judgment, be left
elastic enough to meet from time to time the altering D
conditions of a changing world with its shifting emphasis
and differing needs. I feel therefore that in each case
judges must look straight into the heart of things and regard
the facts of each case concretely much as a jury would do;
and yet. not quite as a jury. for we are considering here a E
matter of law and not just one of fact: Do these "laws" which
have been called in question offend a still greater law
before which even they must bow? "
(emphasis laid by this Court)
F
POTA was repealed in 2004. Yet, the trials, its
implementation has entailed, are continuing till date. POTA was
repealed for the gross violation of human rights it caused to the
accused persons due to abuse of power by the police. This is
an important aspect to be kept in mind while deciding this case G
and hence, it was pertinent to mention this in the beginning to
say that we are wary of the abuse the provisions of this Act
might bring. And we are conscious of it.
38 . . AIR 1952 SC 75. H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Answer to point no.1
74. It was contended by Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, the learned
counsel for A-6 that a perusal of the statement of PW-88 would
show that not all documents pertaining to the investigation were
placed before the sanctioning authority and that it was only on
8
the approval of the Home Minister of the State of Gujarat to
prosecute the accused, that sanction as required under Section
50 of POTA was granted in this case.
PW-88 Kuldeep Chand Kapoor IAS, Principal Secretary,
C Home Department, had stated in his statement (Ex.497)
recorded before the Special Court (POTA) as under:
"I agree that the last paragraph of the letter of ACP (Ex.
502) contains the details of papers submitted to the Home
D Department and these are the only papers that had been
received by me.
I am producing Patrak- A and B details of arrests.of all the
six accused. Patrak- A, Patrak - B and details of the
accused arrested are being given respectively Ex. 503,
E Ex. 505 and Ex. 506.
It is true that while granting the sanctions against all the
six accused to be prosecuted, I had perused Patrak-A and
B other two Patraks.
F
(q). Did you notice while granting sanction against the
accused that no explosives substance has been seized
from any of the accused?
(a). Explosive substances and firearms were found at the
G site.
I agree that from these six accused, no explosive
substance had been recovered.
I do not know that A- summary had been filed earlier.
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF . 137
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
(q). Whether there were any papers of investigation by A
Crime Branch, Ahmedabad conducted at Jammu and
. Kashmir?
(a). As far as I know, there was no investigation by Crime
Branch, Ahmedabad at Jammu and Kashmir Police. B
Therefore, I cannot say whether there were no papers to
my knowledge to that effect and it was the police of
Jammu and Kashmir who had intimated the Gujarat Police
about the whereabouts of Chand Khan from Jammu and
Kashmir Police by following due process of law.
c
I was not supplied the papers of investigation carried out
by Jammu and Kashmir police. Therefore, I cannot say
whether there were any such papers or not. Witness
volunteers that in my opinion those papers were not
relevant for me to come to the conclusion for permitting the D
prosecution to prosecute against the accused.
I have no idea whether the accused Adam Ajmeri and
Adbul Qayum a Mufti had been taken to Jammu and
Kashmir for investigation by Crime Branch, Ahmedabad. E
Witness volunteers that as Crime Branch would not need
to take my permission for taking accused for Investigation
of State of Jammu and Kashmir, I am not aware.
I had verified the case papers and satisfied that section
52 of POT A had been· complied with completely. F
There were no papers suggesting compliance of section
52 of POTA in the bunch of papers sent to me. According
to me, those papers were not relevant for my purpose as
compliance was to be observed by the 1.0. and I was not G
investigating the case.
I do not agree that the entire Investigation had not been
done by the competent officer of the level of ACP.
I do not agree to the suggestion that neither Minister nor I H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A applied mind while granting sanction nor officer below also
applied mind for such a grant."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
B submitted on behalf of State of Gujarat)
PW-88, in his deposition had stated that PW-126 had
forwarded to him the relevant documents as aforementioned
for the purpose of deciding whether it was a fit case for granting
c sanction under Section 50 of POTA. He had reiterated in his
deposition that he had perused all these documents, especially
Patrak-A, which contained the details of the two Urdu letters
and the opinion of the handwriting expert from the FSL and
Patrak B, the contents of which were not mentioned in his
0 statement, and also the details of the arrest of the accused
persons. But glaringly, PW-88 had stated in his deposition that
he had not enquired about whether there were any investigation
papers regarding the involvement of A-6 in the crime by the
Crime Branch, Ahmedabad, at Jammu and Kashmir. This
E aspect is important as he had stated that he had no knowledge
of whether the custody of A-6 was taken in accordance with due
process of law. He further stated that he had verified the case
papers and had satisfied himself that Section 52 of POTA had
been complied with completely but in the very next sentence,
he stated:
F
"There were no papers suggesting compliance of Section
52 of POTA in the bunch of papers sent to me. According
to me, those papers were not relevant for my purpose as
compliance was to be observed by the 1.0 and I was not
G investigating the case."
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of State of Gujarat)
Thus, it is clear from the statement of PW-88 that he was
H an importanf part of the process of granting sanction under
ADAMBHAI ·SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 139
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
POTA and could throw light on the aspects taken into A
consideration while granting sanction. He was the only
prosecution witness who was examined by the court in this
regard and it is apparent that he had not applied his mind for
the same, which is clearly visible from the inherent
contradictions in his statement as shown above. B
75. It has been held by this Court that all the relevant
documents required for granting sanction shall be presented
before the sanctioning authority so that the sanction can be
granted on the basis of relevant material information and
documents collected during the course of investigation with C
respect to the crime. In the case of Rambhai Nathabhai
Gadhvi & Ors. v. State of Gujarat39, this Court, while examining
a similar sanction Order as provided under Section 15 of TADA
(repealed), has held as under:
D
"8. Taking cognizance is the act which the Designated
Court has to perform and granting sanction is an actwhich
the sanctioning authority has to perform. Latter is a
condition precedent for the former. Sanction contemplated
in the sub-section is the permission to prosecute a E
particular person for the offence or offences under TADA.
We must bear in mind that sanction is not granted to the
Designated Court to take cognizance of the offence, but
it is granted to the prosecuting agency to approach the
court concerned for enabling it to take cognizance of the F
offence and to proceed to trial against the persons
arraigned in the report. Thus a valid sanction is sine qua
non for enabling the prosecuting agency to approach the
court in order to enable the court to take cognizance of the
offence under TAPA as disclosed in the report. The G
corollary is that, if there was no valid sanction the
Designated Court gets no jurisdiction to try a case against
any person mentioned in the report as the court is
39. (1997) 1 sec 744. H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence without
such sanction. If the Designated Court has taken
cognizance of the offence without a valid sanction, such
action is without jurisdiction and any proceedings adopted
thereunder will also be without jurisdiction.
B
9. In this case the prosecution relies on Ext. 63, an order
issued by the Director General of Police, Ahmedabad, on
3-9-1993, as the sanction under Section 20-A(2) of TADA.
We are reproducing Ext. 63 below:
c "Sr. No. J-1/1909/1/Khambalia 55/93
Director General of Police.Dated 3-9-1993
Gujarat State,
Ahmedabad.
Perused: (1) FIR in respect of offence Registered No. 55/
D 93 at Khambalia Police Station 25(1 )(b)(a)(b) of Arms Act
and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the TADA.
(2) Application sent by DSP Jamnagar vide his letter No.
RB/D/122/1993/1820 dated 9-8-1993.
E Having considered the FIR in respect of offence
Registered No. 55/93 at Khambalia Police Station District
Jamnagar under Section 25(1 )(b)(a)(b) of Arms Act and
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of TADA and letter No. RB/D/122/
1993/1820 of DSP dated 9-8-1993 seeking permission
F to apply the provisions of TADA carefully, I A.K. Tandon,
Director General of Police, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad
under the powers conferred under the amended provisions
of TADA (1993) Section 20-A(2) give permission to add
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of TADA.
G A.K. Tandon
Director General of Police
Ahmed abad
Gujarat"
10. Apparently Ext. 63 makes reference only to two
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 141
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
documents which alone were available for the Director A
General of Police to consider whether sanction should be
accorded or not. One is the FIR in this case and the other
is the letter sent by the Superintendent seeking permission
or sanction. No doubt in that letter to the Director General
of Police the Superintendent of Police had narrated the B
facts of the case. But we may observe that he did not send
any other document relating to the investigation or copy
thereof along with the application. Nor did the Director
General of Police call for any document for his perusal. All
that the DGP had before him to consider the question of c
granting sanction to prosecute were the copy of the FIR
and the application containing some skeleton facts. There
is nothing on record to show that the Director General of
Police called the Superintendent of Police at least for a
discussion with him." D
(emphasis laid by this Court)
It was further held by this Court in the case of Anirudhsinhji
Karansinhji Jadeja and Anr. v. State of Gujarat4°, as under:
E
" 15. The aforesaid is however not all. Even if it be
accepted that as an additional safeguard against arbitrary
exercise of the drastic provisions, the State Government
had provided by administrative instructions an additional
safeguard whereunder the DSP was required to obtain the
F
sanction/consent of the State Government, we are of the
view that in the present case the same was given by the
State Government without proper application of mind. We
have taken this view because the sanction/consent was
given by the Government merely on the basis of the fax
message dated 17-3-1995 of the DSP. The reason for our G
saying so is that though there is no record a fax message
of Deputy Director General of Police also, which is dated
18-3-1995, the sanction/consent order has mentioned
40. (1995) s sec 302. H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A above the fax message of the DSP only. Now, no doubt
the message of the DSP is quite exhaustive, as would
appear from that message which has been quoted above
in full, we are inclined to think that before agreeing to the
use of harsh provisions of TADA against the appellants,
B the Government ought to have taken some steps to satisfy
itself whether what had been stated by the DSP was borne
out by the records, which apparently had not been called
for in the present case, as the sanction/consent was given
post-haste on 18-3-1995, i.e., the very next day of the
c message of the DSP. It seems the DSP emphasised the
political angle in the first two paragraphs of his message.
The dispute or motive stated was that the Darbars were
annoyed because they were refused loan and not because
of any political rivalry. In the third paragraph there is
reference to statements of accused after arrest which
D
would ordinarily be inadmissible in evidence. Reference
to avoid incident of the past does not provide any nexus.
The State Government gave the sanction without even
discussing the matter with the investigating officer and
without assessing the situation independently. All these
E show lack of proper and due application of mind by the
State Government while giving sanction/consent."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
F It was the Deputy Secretary, Law and Order, Mr. J.R Rajput
who had signed the document of sanction issued in the name
of the Governor (Ex.498). However, he was not examined by
the Court. On the other hand, PW-88, the Principal Secretary
was examined. Therefore, we intend to examine the statement
G of PW-88, since he formed the only link in the Home Ministry
of State of Gujarat and could enlighten us with the facts and
information which were taken into consideration by him while
granting sanction.
While deposing before the Special Court (POTA}, PW-88
H stated that he had not discussed anything with the Home
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 143
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
Minister regarding the grant of sanction and the Minister had A
simply signed the proposed note as a mark of approval. PW-
88 further stated that he had not discussed anything with the
1.0 about granting sanction in the present case. However,-the
Special Court (POTA) erroneously justified the granting of
sanction on the ground that the learned counsel for A-2 and A- B
4 before the Special Court (POTA), Mr. R.K. Shah, did not insist
on examination of the internal note and at no stage was such ·
a request made in writing.
76. In the case of Mansukhla/ Vithaldas Chauhan v. State C
of Gujarat4 1, it has been held by this Court as under:
"19. Since the validity of "sanction" depends on the
applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts
of the case as also the material and evidence collected
during investigation, it necessarily follows that the D
sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent
mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether
prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the
sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from
any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon E
it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the
discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely
in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown
to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration.
If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to F
apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or
was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to
grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that
the discretion of the authority "not to sanction" was taken
away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction G
the prosecution."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
77. However, the present case does not show that the
41. (1997) 7 sec e22. H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A sanctioning authority had applied its mind to the satisfaction as
to whether the present case required granting of sanction. The
prosecution had failed to prove that the sanction was granted
by the government either on the basis of an informed decision
or on the basis of an ir;idependent analysis of fact on
B consultation with the Investigating Officer. This would go to show
clear non-application of mind by the Home Minister in granting
sanction. Therefore, the sanction is void on the ground of non-
application of mind and is not a legal and valid sanction under
Section 50 of POTA.
C Answer to Point no. 2
78. To begin with, the provisions for recording confessional
statements can be found in CrPC under Section 164 which
reads as:
D
"164. Recording of confessions and statements.
(1) Any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate may,
whether or not he has jurisdiction in the case, record any
confession or statement made to him in the course of an
E investigation under this Chapter or under any other law for
the time being in force, or at any time afterwards before
the commencement of the inquiry or trial:
Provided that any confession or statement made under this
F sub-section may also be recorded by audio-video
electronic means in the presence of the advocate of the
person accused of an offence:
Provided further that no confession shall be recorded by
a police officer on whom any power of a Magistrate has
G
been conferred under any law for the time being in force.
(2)The Magistrate shall, before recording any such
confession, explain to the person making it that he is not
bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may
H be used as evidence against him ; and the Magistrate
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 145
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
shall not record any such confession unless, upon A
questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe
that it is being made voluntarily.
(3)1f at any time before the confession is recorded, the
person appearing before the Magistrate states that he is 8
not willing to make the confession, the Magistrate shall not
authorise the detention of such person in police custody.
(4)Any such confession shall be recorded in the manner
provided in section 28.1 for recording the examination of
an accused person and shall be signed by the person C
making the confession ; and the Magistrate shall make a
memorandum at the foot of such record to the following
effect: -
"I have explained to (name) that he is not bound to make o
a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he
may make may be used as evidence against him and I
believe that this confession was voluntarily made. It was
taken in my presence and hearing, and was read over to
the person making it and admitted by him to be correct, E
and it contains a full and true account of the statement
made by him.
(Signed) A. B.
Magistrate".
(5) Any statement (other than a confession) made under F
sub- section (1) shall be recorded in such manner
hereinafter provided for the recording of evidence as is,
in the opinion of the Magistrate, best fitted to the
circumstances of the case ; and the Magistrate shall have
power to administer oath to the person whose statement G
is so recorded.
(6) The Magistrate recording a confession or statement
under this section shall forward it to the Magistrate by
whom the case is to be inquired into or tried."
H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A However, caution against the use of confession statements
made by accused persons before the police, is specifically
provided in Section 162 of the CrPC, which reads as:
"162. Statements to police not to be signed: Use of
B statements in evidence. (1) No statement made by any
person to a police officer in the course of an investigation
under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be signed
by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or
any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise,
or any part of such statement or record, be used for any
c purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial
in respect of any offence under investigation at the time
when such statement was made:
Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution
D in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced
into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly
proved, may be used by the accused, and with the
permission of the Court, by the proseq..1tion, to contradict
such witness in the manner provided by section 145 of the
E Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872); and when any part
of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also
be used in the re- examination of such witness, but for the
purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his
cross-examination.
F (2) Nothing in'this section shall be deemed to apply to any
statement falling within the provisions of clause (1) of
section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872),
or to affect the provisions of section 27 of that Act.
G Explanation.-An omission to state a fact or circumstance
in the statement referred to in sub-section (1) may amount
to contradiction if the same appears to pe significant and
otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which
such omission occurs and whether any omission amounts
H to a contradiction 1n the particular context shall be a
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 147
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
question of fact." A
-----
The caution against the use of confessional statements of
an accused given to police as incriminating evidence stems
from Article 20(3) of the Constitution which provides that no
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
B
However, POTA makes a departure from the above principle
through Section 32 which reads as under:
"32. Certain confessions made to police officers to be
taken into consideration.-
c
(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code or in the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), but subject to the
provisions of this section, a confession made by a person
before a police officer not lower in rank than a
Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police 0
officer either in writing or on any mechanical or electronic
device like cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of
which sound or images can be reproduced, shall be
admissible in the trial of such person for an offence under
this Act or the rules made thereunder.
E
(2) A police officer shall, before recording any confession
made by a person under sub-section (1 ), explain to such
person in writing that he is not bound to make a confession
and that if he does so, it may be used against him:
Provided that where such person prefers to remain silent, F
the police officer shall not compel or induce him to make
any confession.
(3) The confession shall be recorded in an atmosphere
free from threat or inducement and shall be in the same G
language in which the person makes it.
(4) The person from whom a confession has been
recorded under sub-section (1 ), shall be produced before
the Court of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Court
H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A of a Chief Judicial Magistrate along with the original
statement of confession, written or recorded on
mechanical or electronic device within forty-eight hours.
(5) The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, shall, record the statement, if any, made by the
B
person so produced and get his signature or thumb
impression and if there is any complaint of torture, such
person shall be directed to be produced for medical
examination before a Medical Officer not lower in rank than
an Assistant Civil Surgeon and thereafter, he shall be sent
c to judicial custody."
Since this Act makes a departure from the established
criminal jurisprudence as well as the provisions of the
Constitution, the constitutionality of the Act came to be
D challenged before this Court in the case of Peoples Union of
Civil Liberties v. Union of lndia 42 . The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Act after taking into account all the
provisions which seemingly violate the fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution. For the purpose of this case,
E we intend to record the finding of this court with respect to the
provisions of Section 32. The relevant paragraphs of the case
read as under:
"63. Concerning the validity and procedural difficulties that
could arise during the process of recording confessions,
F the Petitioners submitted that there is no need to empower
the police to record confession since the accused has to
be produced before the Magistrate within forty-eight hours,
in that case the magistrate himself could record the
confession; that there is no justification for extended the
G time limit of forty eight hours for producing the person
before the Magistrate; that it is not clear in the Section
whether the confession recorded by the police officer will
have validity after Magistrate has recorded the fact of
H 42. (2004) g sec sao.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 149
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
torture and has sent the accused for medicaf examination; A
that it is not clear as to whether both the confession before
the police officer as well as confessional statement before
the Magistrate shall be used in evidence; that the
Magistrates cannot be used for mechanically putting seal
of approval on the confessional statements by the police; B
that, therefore, the Section has to be nullified. Validity of
this Section was defended by the learned Attorney General
by forwarding the arguments that the provisions relating to
the admissibility of confessional statements, which is
similar to that of Section 32 in POTA was upheld in Kartar · c
Singh case ; that the provisions of POTA are an
improvement over TADA by virtue of enactment of
Sections 32(3) to 32(5); that the general principles of law
regarding the admissibility of a confessional statement is
applicable under POTA; that the provision which entails D
the Magistrate to test and examine the voluntariness of a
confession and complaint of torture is an additional
safeguard and does not in any manner inject any
constitutional infirmity; that there cannot be perennial
distrust of the police; that Parliament has taken into account E
all the relevant factors in its totality and same is not unjust
or unreasonable.
64. At the outset it has to be noted that Section 15 of
TADA that was similar to this Section was upheld in Kartar
Singh case (pp. 664-83 of SCC). While enacting this F
Section Parliament has taken into account all the
guidelines, which were suggested by this Court in Kartar
Singh case. Main allegation of ttie Petitioners is that there
is no need to empower the police to record confession
since the accused ha~ to be produced before the G
Magistrate within forty-eight hours in which case the
Magistrate himself could record the statement or
confession. In the context of terrorism the need for making
such a provision so as to enable Police officers to record
the confession was explained and upheld by this Court in H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Kartar Singh case (p. 680 para 253 of SCC). We need
not go into that question at this stage. If the recording of
confession by police is found to be necessary by
Parliament and if it is in tune with the scheme of law, then
an additional safeguard under Sections 32(4) and (5) is
B a fortiori legal. In our considered opinion the provision that
requires producing such a person before the Magistrate
is an additional safeguard. It gives that person an
opportunity to rethink over his confession. Moreover, the
Magistrate's responsibility to record the statement and the
c enquiry about the torture and provision for subsequent
medical treatment makes the provision safer. It will deter
the police officers from obtaining a confession from an
accused by subjecting him to torture. It is also worthwhile
to note that an officer who is below the rank of a
Superintendent of Police cannot record the confessional
D
statement. It is a settled position that if a confession was
forcibly extracted, it is a nullity in law. Non-inclusion of this
obvious and settled principle does not make the Section
invalid. (See: Kartar Singh case, p. 678, para 248 --49 of
SCC). Ultimately, it is for the Court concerned to decide
E
the admissibility of the confession statement. (See: Kartar
Singh case p. 683, para 264 of SCC). Judicial wisdom
will surely prevail over irregularity, if any, in t11e process of
recording confessional statement. Therefore we are
satisfied that the safeguards provided by the Act and under
F the law are adequate in the given circumstances and we
don't think it is necessary to look more into this matter.
Consequently we uphold the validity of Section 32."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
G
79. The provisions of a Special Act prevail over the
provisions of General Act. Since the constitutionality of the
POTA was declared as valid by this Court, its provisions would
prevail over CrPC. However, considering the stringency of the
provisions of POTA and the grave consequences that misuse
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 151
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
of the Act might carry i.e, violation of right to life and personal A
liberty, we need to ensure that the guidelines laid down in the
Act are rigorously observed while recording the confessional
statements of the accused persons. We will examine herein the
various mandatory provisions to be followed while recording the
confessional statements and whether the same have been B
followed in the instant case.
80. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of A-
2, A-3 and A-4 submitted that the mandatory provisions laid
down in Section 32 were not followed by PW-78 Mr.
Sanjaykumar Gadhvi while recording their confessional C
statements. It was argued by the learned senior counsel that
Section 32(2) had not been complied with since the accused
persons were not statutorily informed in writing that they were
not bound to make confessional statements and their
statements, if made, shall be used against them. The learned D
senior counsel on behalf of the prosecution, on the other hand
contended that the statutory mandates had been complied with
by the police.
We have perused the evidence on record in this aspect. E
We have found stark discrepancies in the manner in which the
statements of the accomplices and those of the accused
persons were recorded. While the statements of the
accomplices in the present case, namely- PW-50, PW-51 and
PW-52 were preceded by written records of cautions in the F
same document, the confessional statements of the accused
persons do not show such caution. On the other hand, the
intimation by the DCP Sanjaykumar Gadhvi (PW-78) appeared
on a s~parate documents marked as separate Exhibits from
the confessions. The same are as follows:
G
For A-2- Adambhai Sulaimanbhai Ajmeri
Intimation letter given by DCP prior to confession- Ex.457
Confessional Statement- Ex. 458
H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A For A-3-Mohaminad Salim Mohammad Hanif Sheikh
Intimation letter given by DCP prior to confession- Ex.453
Confessional Statement- Ex. 454
B For A-4- Abdul Kayum
Intimation letter given by DCP prior to confession- Ex. 459
Confessional Statement- Ex. 460
c For A- 6- Shanmiya@ Chandkhan Sajjadkhan Pathan
Intimation letter given by DCP prior to confession- Ex. 461
Confessional Statement- Ex. 462
D On this aspect of the matter, the CJM, PW-99 made the
following statement during cross examination by the learned
counsel for the accused persons vide Ex.568:
".... It is true that the explanation given to the accused and
statement made by him, the said both were separate
E
papers. I agree to the fact that generally the explanation
and the statement should be in same paper. As both of
this were in same papers, I did not suspect that the said
explanation which was given, has been brought later on"
F (translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the Appellants)
It is also pertinent to extract one of the intimation letters
given by the DCP prior to the confession of one of the accused
G persons. The intimation letter given by DCP to A-2 reads thus:
"....... your statement under section 32 of the POTA before
the Superintendent of Police is to be taken. But you are
not bound to make this statement or confession and the
confession that you will make could be used against you
H as evidence. So it is informed to you that you give this
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 153
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA;.J.]
. .
s~atement willingly and free from any kind of pressufe or A
threat or allurement."
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the Appellants)
81. It was held by this Court in the case of Hardeep Singh B
Sohal & Ors. v. State of Punjab through CB/43 that the police
officer recording the confessional statement under TADA is
required to give in writing at'the end of the statement, that the
accused was informed that the confessional statement he has
voluntarily decided to make, can be used against him as C
evidence and also the fact that the accused after fully knowing
the consequences has decided to make the confessional
statement. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment can be
read as' under:
D
"16. The constitutional validity of Section 15 of the TADA
Act was challenged. A Constitution Bench of this Court in
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab upheld the constitutional
validity of the said provision.,-l'tie contention urged in Kartar
Singh case was that the procedure in the TADA Act is the
E
antithesis of a just, fair ~i"rid reasonable procedure and this
power could be abused to extort confession by unlawful
means by using third-degree methods. This plea was
rejected on the ground that sufficient safeguards have been
made in the Rules as to the manner in which the
F
confession is to be recorded. Rule 15 extracted above
would show that confession shall be in writing and signed
by the person who makes the confession. The police
officer shall also certify under his own hand that such
confession was taken in his presence and recorded by him
and that the record contains a full and true account of the G
confession made by the person and such police officer
shall make a memorandum at the end of the confession
and the pro forma of such certificate also is appended to
Rule 15.
43. (2004)11 sec 612. H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 17. Ext. PAA does not contain such a certificate having
been given by PW 34. It is true that PW 34 had put certain
questions to the accused as to whether he was aware that
the statement which he wants to make could be used
against him and on the basis of the same he will be
B sentenced. The officer also asked him whether there is any
pressure, fear on him and he answered in the negative.
However, PW 34 did not give the certificate at the end of
the confession. The certificate should have specifically
stated that he had explained to the person making the
c confession that he was not bound to make the confession
and, if he does. so, the confession he may make may be
used against him and that he believed that this confession
was voluntarily made and it was taken in his presence and
recorded by him and was read over to the person making
it and admitted by him to be correct, and it contained a
D
full and true account of the statement made by him.
18. This Court has in a series of decisions deprecated the
practice of non-observance of this provision and held that
such violation would be inadmissible. In Bharatbhai v.
E State of Gujarat this Court held that Rule 15(3)(b) of the
TADA Rules was not complied with and no memorandum
as required was made. There was also no
contemporaneous record to show the satisfaction of the
recording officer after writing of confession that the
F confession was voluntarily made or read over to the
accused. Thus, the confessional statement was
inadmissible and cannot be made the basis for upholding
the conviction.
19. In S.N. Dube v. N.B. Bhoirthis Court held that writing
G
the certificate and making the memorandum under Rule
15(3)(b) to prove that the accused was explained that he
was not bound to make a confession and that if he made
it, it could be used against him as evidence; that the
confession was voluntary and that it was taken down by
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 155
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
the police officer fully and correctly are all matters not left A
to be proved by oral evidence."
Though the case mentioned supra dealt with TADA, the
Rules of which cannot be imported into POTA, the main
objective behind mentioning this case was that the underlying
B
safeguards which were required to be taken while making
confessional statement to the police cannot be compromised
with.
82. The intimation letters of caution written by PW-78 fail
to prove that the process of intimation preceded the recording C
of confessional statements as a continuous process. On the
other hand, the letters of intimation and the confessional
statements exist as disjunctive evidence, failing to prove the
required chain of procedure, i.e, that the letters of caution
precede the confessional statements and not vice versa. D
Further, in the instant case,_ the CJM (PW-99 : Ex.568)
during cross examination before the Special Court (POTA) by
the learned counsel for the accused persons, on being asked
about sending the accused to judicial custody after confession,
stated: E
"I had not sent him in judicial custody. I did not feel that I
should send him in judicial custody ...... ! had not asked the
accused about how many days of his remand are left. I had
not told him that he will not be sent to police custody F
again".
In the case of Mohammad Ajmal Mohammad Amir
Kasab Alias Abu Mujahid v. State of Maharashtra 44 , the
accused was willing to make confessional statement while he G
was in police custody. Yet, his confession was deferred on the
ground that he shall be sent to judicial custody after the
confession was made before the CJM and this would hinder
the investigation procedure. However, in the present case,
44. (2012) 9 sec 1. H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
·'
. A presenting the accused persons before the CJM for half an
hour was a mere formality to show compliance with the
provisions of Sections 32(4) and 32(5) of POTA since they
were sent back to police custody immediately after being
presented before the CJM.
83. In the present case, the CJM (PW-99 : Ex.568), during
cross examination went on to record that:
"..... I did not make inquiry with any police officers with
regard to the said confessions. I had not asked the two
c accused produced before me as to whether they need any
lawyer or not. I had not taken the said accused persons in
my custody. It is true that I did not issue any warrant for
them to be sent to judicial custody. It is true that I did not
inquire with the accused about where and at what time and
D who recorded their statements. It is true that I nave not kept
any rojkam or record in my court about the accused
persons produced before me on date 25th. There is entry
· in the postal book with regards to the covers along with
the statements having been sent by me to the POTA court."
E
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
The statements made by the CJM show how casually the
mandates under Sections 32(4) and 32(5) were followed,
F rendering the said requirement a hollow and empty exercise.
84. Now, we proceed to examine the statement of PW-78,
DCP Mr. Sanjaykumar Gadhvi(Ex.452), who recorded the
confessional statements of the accused persons. On being
G cross examined by the learned counsel for A-1, A-3 and A-5,
he stated as under:
" .. I have not asked the accused about since how many
days they were in custody. I had asked to the officer who
had brought the accused about since how many days the
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 157
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
accused was in police custody. I had asked him but I don't A
remember presently what reply was given by him. Before
taking the statement of the accused persons, I did not
examine their physical condition by removing their clothes.
I knew that the fact that the accused persons were brought
from the custody of Crime Branch. I had not asked to the B
accused persons before recording confessional statement
that since how many days they were in custody prior to the
recording of the confessional statement. I had not informed
the accused persons that if they do not give confessional
statement they will not be sent back. to the Crime Branch c
custody. I have not made any note with regards to the fact
that I had sent back the Crime Branch Officer along with
vehicle. It is true that I had also not written the fact at any
place with regards to the instruction given by me to return
after around three hours and only when called by me. ·D
I had also not made any note with regards to the fact that
I had got the accused persons seated in my P.A.s room.·
The fact that I had informed accused persons in writing that
they are not bound to make statement and if they make
then the same can be used against them, with regard to E
the said fact, I have not kept any copy with me. On asking
me about how I had reached to the conclusion as stated
by me with regards to the language of Mohammad Salim,
I state that that he was speaking fearlessly and whatever
facts were stated by him, its point were clear. There was F
no sign of fear in his expression and he was not crying. I
have not made any note at any place with regards to the
fact stated by me to the accused persons that their case
is with Crime Branch and I am not associated with Crime
Branch in any way. I have also not made note about having G
· stated to the accused that I am Deputy Superintendent of
different area. It is true that I have not noted the fact
separately regarding which l have stated in my deposition
that for the purpose that he can re-think about giving
statement voluntarily, I had called my office boy and had H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A got him seated in adjacent office of my PA and had asked
to have water and think over with peaceful mind for 10-15
minutes and then come back to my office.
It is true that I have not made any note with regards to the
fact that "After 15 minutes, he had again come to my office
B
and had stated that he had thought with peaceful mind
about his good and bad, thereby on the basis of feeling
regret felt by him, and that he in fact desires to make his
statement". It is true that there is no note regarding the fact
that I had read over the statement to the accused. I have
c also not made note about the fact that I had stated to the
accused that "this statement is still with me and since it is
in the form of confession, he is free to give or not give
statements, and he can also deny the same".
D (translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the State of Gujarat)
Further, during cross examination by the learned counsel
for A-2 and A-4, he stated that:
E "It is true that with regards to the fact stated by me during
cross examination regarding non- presence of written
notes, the said written notes are not present in case of
every accused .... It is true that the two documents which
have been shown to me today in court, except for the said
F documents, there are no other written records with regards
to confessional statement. It is true that there is no note
with regards to time at any place in the statement under
s. 32 or in the document of understanding. It is true that
there is no mention of any specific place of Ahmedabad
G city in the column for place therein. "
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the State of Gujarat)
On being asked about what kind of understanding was
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 159
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
given by him to the accused persons before the recording of A
the confessional statement, he stated:
"I had given understanding to the accused during oral
understanding that the type of his statement is confessional
statement."
8
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the State of Gujarat)
Reverting to the requirement of Section 32, the police
officer recording the confessional statements is required to c
explain in writing to the accused that he is not bound to make
confessional statement and once such statement is made, the
same can be used against him. Further, it is imperative that
the accused is assured that if he does not make the
confessional statement, it will not jeopardize his well-being while
0
in police custody and also to ensure that such statements are
made before a competent police officer in a threat-free
environment. The deposition of the police officer PW-78 who
had recorded the confessional statements of the accused
persons however, reflects otherwise. He admitted to the fact E
that he did not assure the accused persons that not making the
confessional statement will not put them in adverse position.
85. Further, there is nothing available on record to show
that reasonable reflection time was given to the accused
persons before making the confessional statements, though the F
prosecution claimed to have given them 15 minutes as
reflection period. We will examine this aspect of the matter
herein.
It is pertinent to mention here that the two exhibits referred G
to supra, namely, the letter of intimation and the statements of
confession, in the case of each of the accused persons, are of
the same day. It has been contended by the learned senior
counsel of the accused persons that not enough time was given
to them to reflect on the incident before making confessional
H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A statements. They were given a token amount of time i.e., 15
minutes to think and reflect and thereafter the recording of
confessional statements began, which fact is on record as per
the statement of PW-78, who recorded their confessional
statements. While it has been laid down by this Court that the
8 amount of time to be given for reflection before confession
depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, it is
imperative to bear in mind that in the present case, th~ accused
persons were making confessions after a period almost 11
months after the incident. Hence, a mere period of 15 minutes
does not appear to be reasonable time for reflection on the
C incident of the attack and their involvement in the same. In this
regard, we wish to mention the observation made by this Court
on this issue. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Ajit Singh &
Ors. 45 , this Court observed as follows:
D "12. We have perused the confession of the seven
accused and the prefatory proceedings relating thereto.
We first examine the confession made by Noordeen. From
Ext. P-18, the note recorded by Shri Ranjit Basot as a
prelude to the recording of the confession, it transpires that
E he had been produced before him at 12.30 p.m. on 21-9-
1991 and after the completion of the formalities the
recording of the confession had started at 12.45 p.m.
Likewise Ajit Singh alias Guru Lal Singh had been
produced before the officer at 10.50 a.m. and the
F recording of the confession had started half an hour later.
We have seen the record of confessions of the other
accused as well and it shows that 15 to 30 minutes' time
was given to the accused for reflection before the actual
confessions were recorded. We accordingly find that
sufficient cooling-off time had not been given to the
G
accused. in the background that they had been in police
custody over a long period of time. It has been held in
Ranjit Singh case: (SCC pp. 76-77, paras 10-12)
H 45. (200BJ 1 sec ao1.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 161
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
"10. According to the deposition of PW 3 in cross- A
examination, the accused were in police custody
18-20 days prior to recording of their confessional
statements. PW 3 has deposed that he gave the
requisite warning to the accused that they were not
bound to make the confessional statement and if B
they make.it will be used as evidence against them,
but despite the warning they were prepared and
willing to make the statement. After recording the
introductory statement in this behalf in question-
answer form he still considered it proper to give c
them some time for rethinking and for this purpose
they were allowed to sit in a separate room for
some time and were brought to him after about half
an hour and expressed their desire to make
· statement and thereafter the confessional
0
statements were recorded.
11. Before adverting to the facts said to have been
narrated by the accused as recorded in the two
confessional statements, it deserves to be noticed
that in case the recording officer of the confessional E
statement on administering the statutory warning to
the accused forms a belief that the accused should
·'. be granted some time to think over the matter, it
becomes obligatory on him to grant reasonable
time for the purpose to the accused. In other words, F
the cooling time that is granted has to be
reasonable. What time should be granted would of
course depend upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. At the same time, however, when the
time to think over is granted that cannot be a mere G
farce for the sake of granting time. In a given case,
depending on facts, the recording officer without
granting any time may straight away proceed to
record the confessional statement but if he thinks
H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 7 S.C.R.
A it appropriate to grant time, it cannot be a
mechanical exercise for completing a formality.
12. In Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of
Punjab where a Magistrate granted about half an
hour to the accused to think over and soon
B
thereafter recorded the confessional statement, this
Court reiterated that when an accused is produced
before the Magistrate by the investigating officer,
it is of utmost importance that the mind of the
accused person should be completely freed from
c any possible influence of the police and the
effective way of securing such freedom from fear
to the accused person is to send him to jail custody
and give him adequate time to consider whether he
should make a confession at all. It would naturally
D be difficult to lay down any hard-and-fast rule as to
the time which should be allowed to an accused
person in any given case."
13. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of
E the present case, we are of the opinion that
adequate time had not been given to any of the
accused as they had been in police custody for
almost 45 days in each case. We also observe that
there is no evidence on record to suggest that the
F special report envisaged under sub-rule (5) of Rule
15 had been submitted to the Magistrate. The
confessions cannot, therefore, be taken into
account for any purpose.
(emphasis laid by this Court)
G
Further, in the case of Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab 46 ,
which case is relied upon in the case of Ajit Singh (supra) this
Court observed as under:
H 46. (2002) s sec 73.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 163
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
"1.1. Before adverting to the facts to have been narrated A
by the accused as recorded in the two confessional
statements, it deserves to be noticed that in case the
recording officer of the confessional statement on
administering the statutory warning to the accused forms
a belief that the accused should be granted some time to B
think over the matter, it becomes obligatory on him to grant
reasonable time for the purpose to the accused. In other
words. the cooling time that is granted has to be
reasonable. What time should be granted would of course
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. c
At the same time, however. when the time to think over is
granted that cannot be a mere farce for the sake of
granting time. In a given case, depending on facts, the
recording officer without granting any time may
straightaway proceed to record the confessional statement 0
but if he thinks it appropriate to grant time, it cannot be a
mechanical exercise for completing a formality.
13. This Court further held:- "However, speaking generally,
it would, we think, be reasonable to insist upon giving an
accused person at least 24 hours to decide whether or not E
he should make a confession. Where there may be reason
to suspect that the accused has been persuaded or
coerced to make a confession, even longer period may
have to be given to him before his statement is recorded.
In our opinion, in the circumstances' of this case it is F
impossible to accept the view that enough time was given
to the accused to think over the matter."
20. In the facts and circumstances of the present case the
grant of half an hour to the accused to think over before G
recording their confessional statement cannot be held to
be a reasonable period. We do not think that is safe to
base conviction on such confessional statements. Further,
on the facts of the present case, conviction cannot be
maintained on the sole testimony of two police officials. It
H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A may also be noticed that although PW6 Chander Bhan,
Armourer, was examined by the prosecution to prove that
the weapons were in working conditions, no effort was
made to prove that the ammunition or the empties matched
the weapons."
B
(emphasis laid by this Court)
Therefore, in the given facts and circumstances on record
and based on the legal principles laid down by this Court, we
are of the opinion that enough time was not given to the accused
C persons to record their confessional statements, particularly in
the present case since they were making confessions after 11
months of the incident.
86. It is also pertinent to take note of the callous manner
o in which PW-99 had discharged his duty in the present case.
Since A-2 and A-4 made confessional statements on the same
day, they were produced before the CJM PW-99 the very next
day. It is pertinent therefore, to note the observation made by
him with respect to A-2 and A-4. The statement of PW-99 with
E respect to A-2 is recorded as under:
"The accused has signed in this above statement in my
presence at 16-30 hrs, today on 25.9.2013. And therefore,
his statement by read over and conveying him noted and
he has signed by admitting.
F
Sd/-
Chief Judicial Magistrate Rural"
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
G submitted on behalf of the appellants)
The statement of CJM with respect to the AA is as under:
"The accused has made his signature in the above
statement made by him today on dated 25.9.2003 at .§
H p.m. before me. The statement is read over and explained
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 165
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
to accused and as he admits the same, he has made his A
signature in his confession.
Sd/- illegible
Chief Judicial Magistrate
Ahmedabad (Rural)
Old High Court, Ahmedabad" B
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
From the above statements of the CJM PW-99, it can be C
inferred that he was able to record the statement of the accused
persons, read it over to them and enquire about any coercion
and torture, all in a period of half an hour. It is highly improbable
that a confessional statement running to more than 15 pages
could be read back to them within half an hour. The statement D
of PW-99 on examination in chief and also on cross
examination has been mentioned above and it is clear that he
did not enquire aboutthe basic compliances he was required
to make himself aware of, to ensure fair investigation against
the accused persons. His conduct in recording of statement E
under Section 32(5) of POTA merely resembles that of a
passive reluctant officer involved in some procedural formality.
87. It is pertinent to note here that while POTA makes a
departure from CrPC in that it makes confessional statements
F
made before a police officer admissible, the procedural
safeguards therein are not a mechanical formality. On the other
hand, it should be able to inspire confidence to show that the
procedure has been scrupulously followed while recording
confessional statements particularly because of the grave
. consequences which follow such statements, which might result G
in deprivation of life and personal liberty of the person, which
is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution that can
be taken away only by following the procedure established by
law. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the CJM to strictly and
scrupulously follow all the statutory procedural safeguards
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A provided for under Section 32 of POTA.
88. Further, the other statutory mandate under Section 32
of POTA is that the person making the confessional statement
shall be produced for medical examination and thereafter, be
8 sent to judicial custody after the CJM records the statement of
the accused person. The question which then arises for our
consideration is whether this mandate is operative only if the
accused makes a complaint of torture before the CJM or
whether the CJM is duty bound to send the accused persons
C to judicial custody as a statutory requirement after recording the
statement. It had been contended by the learned senior counsel
on behalf of the accused persons that they were subjected to
physical torture by the police before the confessional statements
were recorded and that they were also kept in police custody
in the intervening night between being produced before the
D CJM and being sent to Judicial Custody. Therefore, though they
were subjected to torture, they could not make a complaint
before the CJM due to fear and apprehension, since they were
taken back to police custody after their statements were
recorded. The learned senior counsel for the accused persons,
E argued that Section 32(5) unambiguously declares that the
accused shall be sent to judicial custody after the recording of
the confessional statements, whereas the learned senior
counsel for the prosecution contended that the accused must
be sent for medical examination only if there is a complaint of
F torture and only in that case, must he be sent to judicial custody.
We are unable to agree with the argument of the learned senior
counsel for the prosecution.
Firstly, the use of the phrase, 'shall be sent to judicial
G custody' after confession is a mandatory requirement in
comparison to the use of an alternative term 'may' which gives
discretionary power to the CJM. Further, this court in the case
of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu4 7 , has unambiguously
observed as under:
H 47. c2oos) 11 sec aoo.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 167
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
"177. Now we look to the confession from other angles, A
especially from the point of view of in-built procedural
safeguards in Section 32 and the other safeguards
contained in Section 52. It is contended by the learned
senior counsel Mr. Gopal Subramanium that the DCP
before recording the confession, gave the statutory B
warning and then recorded the confession at a place away
from the police station, gave a few minutes time for
reflection and only on being satisfied that the accused Afzal
volunteered to make confession in an atmosphere free
from threat or inducement that he proceeded to record the c
confession to the dictation of Afzal. Therefore, it is
submitted that there was perfect compliance with sub-
sections (2)&(3). The next important step required by sub-
Sec\ion (4) was also complied with inasmuch as Afzal was
produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan D
Magistrate-PW63 on the very next day i.e. 22.12.2001
along with the confessional statements kept in a sealed
cover. The learned Magistrate opened the cover, perused
the confessional statements, called the maker of
confession into his chamber, on being identified by PW80- E
ACP and made it known to the maker that he was not
legally bound to make the confession and on getting a
positive response from him that he voluntarily made the
confession without any threat or violence, the ACMM
recorded the statement to that effect and drew up
necessary proceedings vide Exts.PW63/5 and PW63/6. F
It is pointed out that the accused, having had the
opportunity to protest or complain against the behavior of
police in extracting the confession, did not say a single
word denying the factum of making the confession or any
other relevant circumstances impinging on the correctness G
of the confession. It is further pointed out that Afzal and the
other accused were also got medically examined by the
police and the Doctor found no traces of physical violence.
It is therefore submitted that the steps required to be taken
under sub-Sections (4)&(5) were taken. However, the H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A learned counsel for the State could not dispute the fact that
the accused Afzal was not sent to judicial custody
thereafter, but, on the request of the 1.0 PW80, the ACMM
sent back Afzal to police custody. Such remand was
ordered by the ACMM pursuant to an application made by
B PW80 that the presence of Afzal in police custody was
required for the purpose of further investigation. Thus, the
last and latter part of sub-Section (5) of Section 32 was
undoubtedly breached. To get over this difficulty, the learned
counsel for the State made two alternative submissions,
c both of which, in our view, cannot be sustained.
178. Firstly, it was contended that on a proper construction
of the entirety of sub-Section (5) of Section 32, the question
of sending to judicial custody would arise only if there was
\ any complaint of torture and the medical examination prima
D facie supporting such allegation. In other words, according
to the learned counsel, the expression 'thereafter' shall be
read only in conjunction with the latter part of sub-Section
(5) beginning with 'and if there is any complaint' and not
applicable to the earlier part. In our view, such a restrictive
E interpretation of sub-Section (5) is not at all warranted
either on a plain or literal reading or by any other canon of
construction including purposive construction. The other
argument raised by the learned counsel is that the provision
regarding judicial custody, cannot be read to be a
F mandatory requirement so as to apply to all situations. If
the Magistrate is satisfied that the confession appears to
have been made voluntarily and the person concerned was
not subjected to any torture or intimidation, he need not
direct judicial custody. Having regard to the circumstances
G of this case, there was nothing wrong in sending back Afzal
to police custody. This contention cannot be sustained on
deeper scrutiny.
179. The clear words of the provision do not admit of an
interpretation that the judicial custody should be ordered
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 169
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
by the Chief Judicial Magistrate only when there is a A
complaint from the 'confession maker' and there appears
to be unfair treatment of such person in custody. As
already stated, the obligation to send the person whose
alleged confession was recorded to judicial custody is a
rule and the deviation could at best be in exceptional B
circumstances. In the present case, it does not appear that
the ACMM (PW63) had in mind the requirement of Section
32(5) as to judicial custody. At any rate, the order passed
by him on 22.12.2001 on the application filed by PW80
does not reflect his awareness of such requirement or c
application of mind to the propriety of police remand in the
face of Section 32(5) of POTA. Compelling circumstances
to bypass the requirement of judicial custody are not
apparent from the record."
89. Apart from Section 32 of POTA, Section 52 also lays D
down certain guidelines which are to be strictly adhered to while
recording the confessional statements of an accused person
under Section 32. On this issue, it was held in Navjot Sandhu
case (supra) as under:
E
"158. These provisions of Section 32, which are conceived
in the interest of the accused, will go a long way to screen
and exclude confessions, which appear to be involuntary.
The requirements and safeguards laid down in sub-
sections (2) to (5) are an integral part of the scheme F
providing for admissibility of confession made to the police
officer. The breach of any one of these requirements would
have a vital bearing on the admissibility and evidentiary
value of the confession recorded under Section 32(1) and
may even inflict a fatal blow on such confession. We have G
another set of procedural safeguards laid down in Section
52 of POTA which are modelled on the guidelines
envisaged by D.K. Basufl Section 52 runs as under:
"52. (1) Where a police officer arrests a person, he
H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A shall prepare a custody memo of the person
arrested.
(2) The person arrested shall be informed of his right
to consult a legal practitioner as soon as he is
B brought to the police station.
(3) Whenever any person is arrested, information of
his arrest shall be immediately communicated by
the police officer to a family member or in his
absence to a relative of such person by telegram,
c telephone or by any other means and this fact shall
be recorded by the police officer under the signature
of the person arrested.
(4) The person arrested shall be permitted to meet the
D legal practitioner representing him during the
course of interrogation of the accused person:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall entitle
the legal practitioner to remain present throughout
the period of interrogation."
E
Sub-sections (2) and (4) as well as sub-section (3) stem
from the guarantees enshrined in Articles 21and22(1) of
the Constitution. Article 22(1) enjoins that no person who
is arrested shall be detained in custody without being
F informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such
arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to
be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. They are
also meant to effectuate the commandment of Article 20(3)
that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled
G to be a witness against himself.
159. The breadth and depth of the principle against self-
incrimination embedded in Article 20(3) was unravelled by
a three-Judge Bench speaking through Krishna Iyer, J. in
Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani. It was pointed out by the
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 171
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.)
learned Judge that the area covered by Article 20(3) and A
Section 161 (2) CrPC is substantially the same. "Section
161 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code is a parliamentary
. gloss on the constitutional clause" - it was observed
(SCC p. 434, para 21). This Court rejected the contention
advanced on behalf of the State that the two provisions, B
namely, Article 20(3) and Section 161, did not operate at
the anterior stages before the case came to Court and the
incriminating utterance of the accused, previously
recorded, was attempted to be introduced. Noting that the
landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona did extend the c
embargo to police investigation also, the Court observed
that there was no warrant to truncate the constitutional
protection underlying Article 20(3). It was held that even the
investigation at the police level is embraced by Article
20(3) and this is what precisely Section 161 (2) means. D
The interpretation so placed on Article 20(3) and Section
161, in the words of the learned Judge,
"brings us nearer to the Miranda-mantle of
exclusion which extend$ the right against self-
incrimination, to police examination and custodial E
interrogation and takes in suspects as much as
regular accused persons" (SCC p. 435, para 22).
The observations in MP. Sharma v. Satish Chandra-(SCR
p. 1088) to the effect that: F
"the protection afforded to an accused insofar as it
is related to the phrase 'to be a witness' is not
merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the
.court room but may well extend to compelled
testimony previously obtained from him" G
were cited with approval in Nandini Satpathy case
(SCC p. 448, para 43)."
90. Therefore, we are of the opinion that neither the police H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A officer recording the confessional statements nor the CJM
followed the statutory mandates laid down in POTA under
Sections 32 and 52 while recording the confessional statements
of the accl,lsed persons, and we hold that the confessional
statements made by A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 under Section 32
B of POTA are not admissible in law in the present case.
Therefore, we answer this point in favour of the appellants. We
have to observe next therefore, whether the statements of the
accomplices can be relied upon to determine the involvement
of the accused persons in this case.
c Answer to point no.3:
91. Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 states
that:
o "an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an
accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely
because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice."
E Both the courts below have placed extensive reliance upon
the evidence of accomplices, PW-50, PW-51 and PW-52 to
establish the culpability of the accused. However, one needs
to understand the extent of admissibility of such evidence. But
prior to that, we also need to emphasize upon the reliability of
the evidence given by an accomplice. It has been held by this
F court in the case of Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of
Maharashtra 48 as under:
•
"8 ....... The Evidence Act in Section 133 provides that an
accomplice is a competent witness against an accused
G person and that a conviction is not illegal merely because
it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice. The effect of this provision is that the court
trying an accused may legally convict him on the single
evidence, of an accomplice. To this there is a rider in
H 48. AIR 1968 SC 832.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 173
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Act which provides that A
the Court may presume that ah accomplice is unworthy of
credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars.
This cautionary provision incorporates a rule of prudence
because an accomplice, who betrays his associates, is not
a fair witness and it is possible that he may, to please the B
prosecution, weave false details into those which are true
and his whole story appearing true, there may be no means
at hand to sever the false from that which is true. It is for
this reason that courts, before they act on accomplice
evidence, jnsist on corroboration in material respects as c
to the C)ffence itself and also implicating in some
satisfactory way, however small, each accused named by
the a6complice. In this way the commission of the offence
is c6nfirmed by some competent evidence other than the
sirigle or unconfirmed testimony of the accomplice and the
0
inclusion by'the accomplice of an innocent person is
defeated. This rule of caution or prudence· has become so
ingrained in the consideration of accomplice evidence as
to have almost the standing of a rule of law.
9. The argument here is that the cautionary rule applies, E
whether there be one accomplice or more and that the
confessing co-accused cannot be placed higher than an
accomplice. Therefore, unless there is some evidence
besides these implicating the accused in some material
respect, conviction cannot stand. Reliance is placed in this F
connection upon the observations of the Judicial
Committee in Bhuboni Sahu v. Emperor a case in which
a conviction was founded upon the evidence of an
accomplice supported only by the confession of a co-
accused. The Judicial Committee acquitting the accused G
observed:
"...... Their Lordships whilst not doubting that such
a conviction is justified in law under s. 133,
Evidence Act, and whilst appreciating that the
coincidence of a number of confessions of co- H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A accused all implicating the particular accused given
independently, and without an opportunity of
previous concert, might be entitled to great weight,
would nevertheless observe that Courts should be
slow to depart from the rule of prudence. based on
B long experience. which requires some independent
evidence implicating the particular accused. The
danger of acting upon accomplice evidence is not
merely that the accomplice is on his own admission
a man of bad character who took part in the offence
c and afterwards to save himself betrayed his former
associates. and how has placed himself in a
position in which he can hardly fail to have a strong
bias in favour of the prosecution; the real danger
is that he is telling a storv which in its general outline
is true. and it is easy for him to work into the storv
D
matter which is untrue ..... "
(emphasis laid by this Court)
However, in the present case, the Courts below have
E placed strong reliance upon the statements of accomplic~s
PW-50 Ashfaq Bhavnagri, PW-51 Abdul Rehman
Gulamhussain Panara and PW-52 Mohammad Munaf Sheikh
to establish the culpability of the accused persons. Though the
confessional statement of PW-51 was followed by a retraction,
F the same as per the courts below, did not vitiate the admissibility
of the evidence against the accused persons.
92. We will therefore, examine the relevant excerpts from
the statements of the three accomplices namely, PW-50, PW-
51 and PW-52 to ascertain what each of them had to say about
G the incident of the attack, on the premise that Section 133 of
the Evidence Act states that an accomplice is a competent
witness. PW-50 in his deposition (Ex.312) before the Special
Court (POTA) stated as under:
H "..... We used to arrange cassette at Salimbhai's place on
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 175
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
Thursday night, it was done by Salimbhai, and we had A
seen the cassette over there, in which Muslim children
were burnt alive. There was mass killing of Muslims. Huge
mobs of Hindus had come and they used to attack on
Muslims, and there were mass burial ceremo.nies. We had
also seen interviews of relief camps. Thereafter, there were B
two maulanas (priests) at Salimbhai's place, among them
one was named as Faradullah Ghauri alais Abu Sufiyan
and Saukatullah Ghauri who was brother of Abu Sufiyan.
They had said their speech before us that this much has
happened in your Gujarat, despite this you do not awake c
from your sleep and you are engaged in playing carom.
We are from Hyderabad and have come to help you.
There were also talks over there that Lashkar-e-Toiba is D
having huge fund but is not having network and Jaish-e-
Mohammed does not have fund but is having manpower
as well as it is having network, and hence, both these
groups will work together, therefore you just give donation.
On that night many persons gave donation, donation of E
about 12 to 13 thousand Riyals was given. We were taken
to the program by Rashidbhai Ajmeri and Salimbhai
because we did not know those people. Those people
were new for us. Similar program was also organized after
riots in Gujarat. At that time at least 400 people had F
gathered and all were from Gujarat. Good amount of
donation was gathered in it also .
. . .And thus by doing such small meetings, they used to
gather money. After some time, people got fed up and
used to say that you are not doing anything and are just G
utilizing the money. We used to give money to Salimbhai
Sheikh who was with us, and he used to give this money
to Faradullah Ghauri, and he used to send this money to
India through charge responsibility (Hawala). He used to
send this money through Majid Vora Patel and Iqbal Vora H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Patel who are basically from Bharuch. Thereafter, during
about three months of riots post- Godhra in 2002,
Faradullah Ghauri and Shaukatullah Maulana came to
India, these people had visited the relief camps in
Ahmedabad, and they had met with a person named Jahid
B in camp, and they had gathered persons whose family
members were killed or who had suffered great losses.
When Abu Talah and Faridullah Ghauri had! come to India,
c they had called Adam Ajmeri brother of Rashid Ajmeri to
Hyderabad for meeting. Thereafter we came to know about
Akshardham tragedy on Saudi TV. Initially nobody spoke
about it, an thereafter one meeting was organized after 8
days, and had said that this is work of Jaish-e-Mohammed.
D And Abu Talah had said to them, we came to know about
this from Salimbhai and Rashidbhai. These people had
also said that the persons who had gone to Akshardham,
their intention was to spread terror and not to kill, their fight
was with the police, and had also said that they gave fight
E for about 10 to 12 hours and got martyred."
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitt~d on behalf of the appellants)
He further stated during cross examination by learned
F counsel Mr. H. N. Jhala for A-1, A-3 and A-5:
"Question: Was Salimbhai your leader?
Answer: Salimbhai had more responsibilities. He had
more worries about Islam. When I met with Salimbhai on
G
first Thursday after Godhra carnage, he had no cassette
at that time. I had not kept any note for Salimbhai coming
and going to India. At the time of Godhra carnage,
Salimbhai was present at Saudi Arabia, and I met him on
Thursday thereafter.
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 177
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
Question: Incidence of Godhra happened on date 27/02/ · A
2002, what do you want to say about Salimbhai was in
India from January- 2002, and not in Saudi Arabia?
Answer: It is true that he was not present in Saudi at the
time of Godhra carnage. Witness voluntarily states that he 8
was present at Saudi at the time of Akshardham.
We had watched the cassette in the following month of
Godhra carnage. It is true that the cassette in the following
month of Godhra carnage. It is true that the cassette (C.D.)
which was watched regarding the incidences of Post C
Godhra carnage, the said were watched at the house of
Salimbhai. There is television and VCD player at the house
of Salimbhai."
D
Question: The money which was collected in Saudi Arabia,
the said money was utilized for running relief camps?
Answer: We used to give money to Salimbhai and we had
not asked him about what he did with money nor did he E
say to us about what he did with the money.
I had given maximum of 500 Riyal to Salimbhai, it is Rs.
··soOO/-. Besides me, there were my other friends who also
used to meet at Salimbhai's place on every Thursday. F
Except me, all other used to ask Salimbhai about what he
did with the money. Salimbhai used to say that this money
has been collected for taking revenge. Since he didn't say
anything everybody had stopped giving money. I don't
know if this money was utilized for running relief camps.
G
..... The meetings which held during nights, the said
meetings held in big halls and party plots of Riyadh.
Salimbhai used to take us in these meetings, and
therefore, we used to go, he had said you will have to come
H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A and therefore we had attended two or three meetings. It
was not like that I have to go wherever Salimbhai asked
to, because he was doing his business and I was doing
job."
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
B
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
Further, on cross examination by learned counsel of A-2
and A-4 before the Special Court (POTA), PW-50 deposed as
under:
c
"I know Rashid Ajmeri since two years of incidence.
Rashid Ajmeri was at Saudi Arabia in year 2002. Name
of the brother of Rashid Ajmeri is Adam. It is Adam Ajmeri.
The fact that Adam Ajmeri was called at Hyderabad was
D stated to me by Salimbhai and Rashidbhai. I don't know
about why he was called at Hyderabad. It is not true that I
know that the fact I have stated about Adam Ajmeri having
gone to Hyderabad is false. It is not true that the fact I am
stating about I having been called to Hyderabad by
Salimbhaiand Adambhai is also stated false by me."
E
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
PW-51, in his deposition (Ex.314), particularly indicated
F the active involvement of A-2 and also about the involvement
of A-4 and A-5. The relevant excerpt from the deposition reads
as under:
"Nashir Doman, (the cable operator) in our area had
brought one person to me during afternoon time at Bawahir
G Hall. Nasir had introduced him to me as his friend
Adambhai from Shahpur. Nashir had said that Adambhai
has come with regards to taking revenge about what has
been suffered by Muslims during riots. During talks, another
of our friend named Munaf Radiator had also arrived. And
H I had asked Adam to inform about the matter.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 179
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
Adam had said to us that his brother Rashid resides at A
Riyadh Saudi Arabia. And Salim of Dariapur, Kankodi Pol
is with him. And under leadership of Altaf Sheikh of
Shahpur Adda, there is big group of Muslim youths from
Gujarat especially from Ahmedabad. And they have support
of Jaish-E-Mohammad organization. Those people will B
send weapons to us, will send men, and are also ready to
send funds. We will have to remain helpful in doing survey
work of Hindu areas. On listening to such serious talk, I had
said that I will have to talk to my leaders .....
At that time, I had met with Mufti Qaiyum and Maulvi C
Abdullah near the hall. I had said to them about what Adam
had said, and in a way as if they already knew about it.
Thereby, they replied that we know it and had assigned
me the responsibility of arranging house for the guests who
would come for the work of this carnage, and I had D
agreed .....
As Adam informed about the talk having taken place at
Saudi Arabia, and he having informed that phone call will
come at Doman Nasir's place, Mufti Ayub and Maulvi had E
asked to four of us to go and discuss at Nasir's home. But
phone did not come. Thereafter, we and Adambhai had
departed after deciding to talk to Saudi from opposite of
Kalupur Railway .....
After two to three days, I and Adam had gone to Kalupur F
Darwaja on my scooter, and Nasir Doman had also come
along on his scooter. From STD/ ISO booth named
Kohinoor Telecom, Adam had dialed number at Saudi
Arabia and firstly he had done all the talk in Arabic
language, and thereafter to give us assurance, he had -G
talked in Hindi language and asked to exchange greetings
with the people involved with me in work. By saying this,
Adam handed over the receiver to me ....... I was asked
from the other side in Gujarati, 'brother, what you need,'.
H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Prior to this, Adam had asked me to demand for Rs. 20
Lac for the work. Therefore, on my say that it would take
Rs. 20 lac for the work, I was asked from the other side to
give the phone to Adambhai. And Adam had done some
talk in Arabic language. We could not understand the said
B language ....
In the last week of May 2002, Nashir had called me to his
house by sending message through someone. And when
I went, Nashir, Adam and Adam's brother Ahmed was
present. Adam had given me Rs. 5000/- and had said to
c me that guests are going to come and you have to arrange
for their lodging. And he had also given Rs.5000/- to Nashir
and he said to buy two mobile phones from it and give it
to Rehman, and had said that the numbers for the same
will be given to the guests and had said that thereby they
D will remain in contact. At that time, I had said to Adam that
another Rs. 15,000/- will be required for deposit of house
and for mattresses. So Adam said that it will also be
arranged, and when it was informed to Mufti Qaiyum and
Maulvi Abdullah at Bawahir Hall about all this, at that time
E Mufti Qaiyum had said to me that arrangement for lodging
of guests should be done, money is arranged or not. At
that time, Maulvi Abdullah had said that if there is much
problem then he should be informed. After, one week,
Nashir had given two mobile phones to me ..... After taking
F the said phone, I had given it to Mehmood Wadhwani, and
I had said to him that you should only switch it on when you
want to use it, or keep it continuously switched off. This
Mehmood Wadhwani is from Madhno Mohallo, Charwat,
Dariapur, and is my friend ......
G
One day at 9 or 10 o' clock in the night, Adam had called
me on my mobile phone ...... We had cold drinks over
there and he had given me Rs. 5000/-. At that time, I had
asked for another Rs. 10,000/- for house and arrangement
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 181
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
as the earlier Rs. 5000/- had got spent in rickshaw fare A
and SIM card. Therefore, Adam had agreed for arranging
another Rs. 10,000/- and thereby we had departed.
Thereafter, Nashir Doman had come to call me at Hall and
had said to me that Adam is presently sitting at his brother,
Ahmed's house and is calling you. Thereafter, I and Nashir B
both went to Ahmed's house by walking and Adam had
given me Rs. 10,000/- and had informed me that guests
will come from Hyderabad to do carnage in Gujarat, and
had asked me to do arrangement for house and other
arrangements speedily, and therefore, I had agreed and c
thereby we had departed.
· ..... And Adam had informed that the guests will arrive from
Hyderabad in one or two weeks. But nobody had arrived.
During June 2002, Adam had said to me .that your mobile
phone for contact is switched off. Therefore, the guests D
arriving from Hyderabad while arriving at Ahmedabad had
contacted from Kheda, but since mobile phone was
switched off, contact could not be made and thus, it seems
that they have returned ..... I had informed him that if the
phone is switched off, I will get it switched on. .. E
I felt that Adam must have assured about the other phone
given to me if it is switched off or switched on. And since
the phone was continuously switched off, he has made
story about the guests having returned frohi Kl"]eda, just to F
reprimand me. But I did not come to know if the guests
may have come up to Kheda or not. After about a week
or 10 days, Adam met me at Dariapur and had said to me
that the carnage persons have returned back after coming
to Bareja- Narole as contact could not be made. Therefore, G
there is no meaning keeping the mobile phone with you.
By having said this, he has asked us to return both the
mobile phones, and therefore I had replied that there is my
card inserted in the mobile phone with me and I will return
it to you after I get another instrument for me, and I will H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A return the other one by getting it back from my friend, so
Adam had said to give both the mobile phones to Nashir
and thereby he had left .....
During this time, Liyakat of Juhapura who had gone
outstation for marriage ceremony had returned, and he met
B
me at the corner of Madhno Mohallo at Dariapur. He had
said to me that now the guests are not going to come.
Possession of the said house is to be handed back to
Sohrabkhan after returning mattresses, barrels and table
fans. The rent for it is to be paid by me. After informing
c this, three or four days later, Liyakat had said to me at
Madhno Mohallo that everything has been returned and
Sohrab had said about Rs. 500/- with regard to the rent.
Therefore, I had given Rs. 500/- to Liyakat. ...
D Adam used to come every week for collecting the money
because he had given me Rs. 20,000/- and two mobile
phones for making arrangements for the person to coming
from Hyderabad to do carnage, and from among them, one
mobile phone was taken back through Nashir and one
E was with me and therefore, he used to ask for it. I used to
give him Rs. 300/- to Rs. 500/-. At last, during end of
September, once Adam had come to my shop during
noon time and had said that the guest who were to come
from Hyderabad for doing carnage have arrived. He said,
F "I have to take them around the city and therefore, I am in
need of more money". At that time, Adam had asked for
Rs. 2000/- from me, but since the said was not with me, I
was asked to meet at night, because I had to pay the due
amount. Adam had come in the night and since I had
arrangement for Rs. 900/-, I had given Rs. 900/- to him.
G
At that time Adam had also said to me that I had received
the guests coming from Hyderabad at Railway station, who
have come to do carnage and have taken them around the
city and thereafter have dropped them at the railway
station. During those days, while I was passing from
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 183
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
opposite of Dariapur Bawahir Hall, at that time Mufti Abdul A
Qaiyum and Maulvi Abdullah had met and exchanged
greetings. He had asked for well being and at that time
Mufti Abdul Qaiyum had informed me that "the persons who
were to come for carnage, those guests have arrived, and
God willing, victory will be ours in short time". Some days B
earlier I had dispute with Maulvi Abdullah and Mufti
regarding dissimilarity of dowry in the marriage of refugee
girls in camp and since there was no arrangement for
distribution of sewing machines. Therefore, I had not given
interest in their say. Thereafter, some days later, while I c
was sitting at my traders place at Gomaji complex,
Pankornaka, Tran Darwaja, I got the news that terrorists
have attacked Akshardham Temple. Therefore, I got the
doubt that this work may have been done by the persons
who have come from Hyderabad to do carnage. Because,
0
these people have said to me the persons for carnage
have arrived."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents E
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
Finally, we are extracting the relevant excerpt from the
stcitement made by PW-52 (Ex.315). The excerpt from his
statement reads as under:
F
"When the relief camp for Muslims had started at Dariapur
Bawahir Hall, at that time Muslim youths of our area used
·to gather over there. All used to sit and talk. Abdul Rehman
Panara was the organizer of the camp. Since he had
business by name of Panara Garments, I knew him. The G
main administrators of the camp were Mufti Abdul Qaiyum
and Maulvi Abdullah. Nasirbhai Doman who used to visit
camp is cable operator of our area, and I know him. I know
Aeiambhai since last election of Municipality because he
used to take interest in politics by Congress Party. I knew H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A brother of Adambhai named Ahmedbhai of Dariapur, and
therefore, I started knowing Adambhai.
In the beginning of April 2002, once Adam had called me
on my mobile phone during noon time. I had gone to
Chaarwad Bawahir Hall and Nasir, Adam and Abdul
B
Rehman were present over there. At that time, Adam Bhai
had said that Muslims have been oppressed here. And
therefore, carnage for taking its revenge is to be done. He
said that "my brother Rashid is in Saudi. And Salim is with
him. They have support of Jaish-e-mohammad
c organization. We will seek money from there. Those
people will send men and provide weapon. Salim has
contact with Jaish-e-Mohammad and Tanzeem. He had
said that these people are being sent for committing
carnage (kand). On listening to this, I got up and felt afraid.
D When I got up, Adambhai had made me to sit by holding
my hand and had stated that we will also have to take
advice from big persons in this regard. Thereafter, we had
met with Mufti Aiyub Qaiyum and Maulvi Abdullah at the
offic~ outside hall.
E
Both of them had informed that guests will arrive for
carnage. The work of arranging for their house has been
assigned to Abdul Rehman.
Adam had asked for a local phone number. Therefore,
F Doman Bhai had given his house telephone number....
On second time, I, A.bdul Rehman, Nasir Doman, Adam
had met in presence of Mufti Qaiyum and Abdullah at
Bawahir Hall. At that time, Adam had informed that talk has
G been done at Saudi, and number of Doman's house has
been given. Therefore, phone will come over there.
Thereafter, Mufti Qaiyum and Maulvi Abdullah had asked
to four of us to go and discuss at Nasir's house, so that
the phone call at Nasir's can be attended to .... But since
H no call came, we had departed. Therefore. Rehman and
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 185
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
Adam had gone on Rehman's scooter to talk from PCO/ A
STD at railway station. And after returning from Bawahir
Hall, they had stated that after trying to Saudi. nobody was
found present.
After some days of it, when I had gone to Dariapur from B
Kalupur, Abdullahmiya and Mufti Qayuim was stopped me
and said that the guests who were going to arrive have
arrived , and you will hear in sometime about the work
which is to be done. And therefore, I had got afraid and
had left, and had said don't say it to me. Guest means C
terrorist. After sometime, I got to hear the news of
Akshardham incidence. Police had taken my statement
with regards to the facts mentioned by me today. I was
taken to Gandhinagar court for statement. Since I had not
seen the court, I asked the police to take me along ....
D
Immediately after April 2002 that is after about one month,
I did not reveal to anybody that such carnage is going to
happen. I don't have relations with any police personnel. I
E
know Crime Branch Officer Mr. Singhal. I came to know
him when he called me for the first time for statement. My
friends are in garage profession. After I came to know
regarding this carnage. I was not afraid at any time that I
may be implicated in this carnage. Witness himself states
F
that I don't know anything about it so why should I be
afraid? I was suddenly called at Crime Branch on
6.9.2003. It is true that next day, on 7th, my statement was
recorded. It is not true that I was kept for one month at
Crime Branch. I have never met any body after this. I had
not talked with any one of them. G
It is true that there was no activity in the relief camp at
Bawahir Hall. It is true that I don't know anything about if H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A there was any daily note in register for entry/ exit in
Bawahir Hall. It is true that I have stated in examination in
chief that no work was assigned to me. It is true that when
I was informed during cross examination about my
statement having been recorded on 7.9.2003, at that time
B I got idea about the date, month and year.
Question: Had you understood at the respective time that
confession of the offences is being written?
c
Answer: No, I have not committed any offence at any time,
then how such confession can be written.
I don't remember if Magistrate Sir had asked me that the
statement that will be given by you, can be used against
D
you.
Question: If the Magistrate sir had asked you that if police
has done any misbehavior with you?
E Answer: No misbehavior was done. Although I was asked
as such.
It is not true whole of my reply (statement) was got written
before Magistrate from my statement and I didn't say
anything. I had placed only one signature in my statement,
F which was recorded before the Magistrate. It is true that 1
had placed the signature on the last page. It is not true that
I am giving false deposition on oath. It is not true that the
police had written my statement by threatening me to make
me accused. It is not true that I am giving false deposition
G even today under the threat of police.
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted the appellants)
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 187
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
93. Before examining the evidence of the accomplices on A
merit, we need to satisfy ourselves that the evidence of the
accomplices is acceptable. The twin test on this point has been
laid down by this Court in the three judge bench decision of this
Court in Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana 49 which was
reiterated in the case of Mrinal Das & Ors. v. State of B
Tripura 50 , wherein this Court in the Ravinder Singh case
(supra) held as under:
"12. An approver is a most unworthy friend, if at all, and
he, having bargained for his immunity, must prove his C
worthiness for credibility in court. This test is fulfilled, firstly,
if the story he relates involves him in the crime and appears
intrinsically to be a natural and probable catalogue of
events that had taken place. The story if given, of minute
details according with reality is likely to save it from being
rejected brevi manu. Secondly, once that hurdle is crossed. D
the story given by an approver so far as the accused on
trial is concerned, must implicate him in such a manner as
to give rise to a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In a rare case taking into consideration all the
factors, circumstances and situations governing a E
particular case, conviction based on the uncorroborated
evidence of an approver confidently held to be true and
reliable by the court may be permissible. Ordinarily,
however. an approver's statement has to be corroborated
in material particulars bridging closely the distance F
between the crime and the criminal. Certain clinching
features of involvement disclosed by an approver
appertaining directly to an accused. if reliable, by the
touchstone of other independent credible evidence. would
give the needed assurance for acceptance of his testimony G
on which a conviction may be based."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
49. (1975) 3 sec 742.
50. c2011) 9 sec 479. H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A A perusal of the evidence of all the three accomplices in
the present case shows that all of them intended to absolve
themselves of the liability for the conspiracy with respect to the
attack on Akshardham, going as far to mention that they were
not involved in the incident and only the accused persons knew
s about the intricate details of the chain of events that ultimately
led to the execution of their plan of 'carnage'. Even then, if, we
were to presume that the accomplices have implicated
themselves by mentioning that they were aware about some
incident which was about to happen and thus, were part of the
c criminal conspiracy, the evidence of the accomplices fail the
second test, in that it fails to prove the guilt of the accused
persons beyond reasonable doubt. All the three accomplices
mentioned about the plan of 'carnage' which the accused
persons had planned together. However, no link can be
established between the accused persons and the attack on
0
Akshardham since the evidence of the accomplices is far too
vague and they fail to provide any form of substantive evidence
against the accused persons. Therefore, we need to examine
the statements of the accomplices in the light of the legal
principle laid down by this Court in the case of Mohd. Husain
E Umar Kochra Etc. v. K. S. Oalipsinghji & Anr. Etc. 51 which held
as under:
"21. On the merits, we find that the two courts have
recorded concurrent findings of fact. Normally this Court
F does not re-appraise the evidence unless the findings are
perverse or are vitiated by any error of law or there is a
grave miscarriage of justice. The courts below accepted
the testimony of the accomplice Yusuf Merchant. Section
133 of the Evidence Act says:
G
"An accomplice shall be a competent witness
against an accused person; and a conviction is not
illegal merely because it proceeds upon the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice."
H s1. (1969) 3 sec 429.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 189
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
Illustration (b) to Section 114 says that the Court may A
presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless
he is corroborated in material particulars. The combined
effect of Sections 133 and 114, Illustration (b) is that
though a conviction based upon accomplice evidence is
legal the Court will not accept such evidence unless it is B
corroborated in material particulars. The corroboration
must connect the accused with the crime. It may be direct
or circumstantial. It is not necessary that the corroboration
should confirm all the circumstances of the crime. It is
sufficient if the corroboration is in material particulars. The C
corroboration must be from an independent source. One
accomplice cannot corroborate another, see Bhiva Oou/u
Patil v. State of Maharashtra and R. v. Baskerville. In this
light we shall examine the case of each appellant
separately." D
Therefore, in the light of the case mentioned above, we
begin with examining in detail the evidence of PW-50. He has
stated in his deposition about watching videos of rfots and
killing of Muslims in Gujarat in the house of A-3 at Riyadh,
which act, by itself does not constitute a criminal offence. On E
being asked during the cross examination before the Special
Court (POTA) if the money donated by the gathering in Saudi
Arabia to A-3, was used for running the relief camps in Gujarat,
he was not able to answer for what purpose exactly the money
was collected. Therefore, at the most, even if his evidence is F
taken to be true for the sake of argument, some suspicion, if
at all, can be cast on the involvement of A-3 in some sort of
illegal activity at the most. But culpability of a person in as
grievous an offence as this, cannot be premised on mere
suspicion without knowledge of the nature of the illegal activity. G
94. Next, with respect to PW-51, the evidence is not
reliable because of two reasons. Firstly, according to his
evidence, it was reported to him by A-2 that the fidayeens had
arrived from Hyderabad which contradicts the claim of the
H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 7 S.C.R.
A prosecution. Secondly, A-2 did not state anything beyond the
alleged arrival of the fidayeens which cannot be connected to
the event of attack on Akshardham beyond reasonable doubt.
It again, merely arouses suspicion about the involvement of A-
2 and the passive approval of A-4 and A-5 in the incident.
8
Even with respect to PW-52, other than the fact that he
mentioned about A-2 telling him that they are planning a
'carnage' and that some 'guests' have arrived, no other detail
was provided by PW-52 in his evidence. It is also pertinent to
C mention here that A-6 had not been mentioned at all in the
evidence of any of the accomplices. Therefore, the twin test to
establish the credibility of the guilt of the accused persons
based on the evidence of the accomplices, fails miserably in
the present case.
D Further, on the aspect of guilt to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, it is pertinent to mention the case of Vijay
Kumar Arora v. State(Govt. of NCT of De/hi) 52 , wherein the
Court held as under:
E "16.Essential ingredients to prove the guilt of an accused
by circumstantial evidence are:
16.1. The law relating to circumstantial evidence is well
settled. In dealing with circumstantial evidence, there is
always a danger that conjecture or suspicion lingering on
F mind may take place of proof. Suspicion, however. strong
cannot be allowed to take place of proof and, therefore, the
Court has to be watchful and ensure that conjectures and
suspicion do not take place of legal proof. However, it is
no derogation of evidence to say that it is circumstantial.
G Human agency may be faulty in expressing picturisation
of actual incident, but the circumstances cannot fail.
Therefore, many a times it is aptly said that "men may tell
lies, but circumstances do not".
H 52. c201oi 2 sec 353.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 191
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
16.2. In cases where evidence is of a circumstantial A
nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully
established. Each fact sought to be relied upon must be
proved individually. However, in applying this principle, a
distinction must be made between facts called primary or s
basic on the one hand and inference of facts to be drawn
from them, on the other. In regard to proof of primary facts,
the court has to judge the evidence and decide whether
that evidence proves a particular fact and if that fact is
proved, the question whether that fact leads to an inference c
of guilt of the accused person should be considered. In
dealing with this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of
benefit of doubt applies."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
D
95. Thus, as can be seen from the above mentioned case,
the evidence of the accomplices at the most, raises suspicion
and conjectures but the same cannot be construed as legal
evidence against the accused persons, relying solely on which
they can be convicted, as has been done by the courts below. E
Moreover, it is a settled principle of law that the confessional
statements of accomplices form a very weak form of evidence,
to prove the culpability of the accused persons if the guilt of the
accused cannot be proved, independent of the statements of
the accomplices. Therefore, the same cannot be used to F
corroborate the confessional statements of an accused.
Instead, there should be independent evidence to corroborate
the evidence of the accomplice to establish the culpability of
the accused. In this regard, we intend to rely upon the three
Judge bench decision of this court as early as 1952 which still G
holds its field. In the case of Kashmira Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh 53 , this court held as under:
"8. Gurubachan's confession has played an important part
53. AIR 1952 SC 159.
H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A in implicating the appellant, and the question at once
arises, how far and in what way the confession of an
a_ccused person can be used against a co-accused? It is
evident that it is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the
term because, as the Privy Council say in Bhuboni Sahu
B v. The King, 76 Ind App 147 at p.155 :-
"It does not indeed come within the definition of
'evidence' contained in S.3, the Evidence Act. It is
not required to be given on oath, nor in the
presence of the accused and it cannot be tested
c by cross examination."
Their Lordships also point out that it is
"obviously evidence of a very weak type ...... It is a
D much weaker type of evidence than the evidence
of an approver, which is not subject to any of those
infirmities."
E 10. Translating these observations into concrete terms they
come to this. The proper way to approach a case of this
kind is. first, to marshal the evidence against the accused
excluding the confession altogether from consideration and
see whether, if it is believed. a conviction could safely be
F based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the
confession. then of course it is not necessary to call the
confession in aid. But cases may arise where the judge
is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands
even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a
G conviction. In such an event the judge may call in aid the
confession and use it to lend assurance to the other
evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without
the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to
accept.
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 193
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
11. Then, as regards its use in the corroboration of A
accomplices and approvers. A co-accused who confesses
is naturally an accomplice and the danger of using the
testimony of one accomplice to corroborate another has
repeatedly been pointed out. The danger is in no way
lessened when the "evidence" is not on oath and cannot B
be tested by cross-examination. Prudence will dictate the
same rule of caution in the case of a witness who though
not an accomplice is regarded by the judge as having no
greater probative value. But all these are only rules of
prudence. So far as the law is concerned, a conviction can c
be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice provided the judge has the rule of caution,
which experience dictates, in mind and gives reasons why
he thinks it would be safe in a given case to disregard it.
Two of us had occasion to examine this recently in 0
Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan,Cri. App. No.2 of
1951 : (Al R 1952 SC 54). It follows that the testimony of
an accomplice can in law be used to corroborate another
though it ought not to be so used save in exceptional
circumstances and for reasons disclosed. As the Privy E
Council observe in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, 76 Ind. App.
147 at p.157:
"The tendency is include the innocent with the guilty
is peculiarly prevalent in India, as judge have noted
on innumerable occasions, and it is very difficult for F
the court to guard against the danger.... The only
real safeguard against the risk of condemning the
innocent with the guilty lies in insisting on
independent evidence which in some measure
implicates such accused." G
12 .......... We do not doubt that a rickshaw was used
because rickshaw tracks were discovered by the well long
before anybody had suggested that a rickshaw had been
used. But we find it difficult to resist the inference that this H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A witness was an accomplice so far as the disposal of the
body was concerned. Consequently, he is in much the
same category so far as credibility is concerned. That
brings us at once to the rule that save in exceptional
circumstances one accomplice cannot be used to
B corroborate another; nor can he be used to corroborate a
person who though not an accomplice is no more reliable
than one. We have therefore either to seek corroboration
of a kind which will implicate the appellant apart from the
confession or find strong reasons for using Gurubachan's
c confession for that purpose. Of course against Gurubachan
there is no difficulty, but against the appellant the position
is not as easy.
We will therefore examine the reliability of Gurubachan's
confession against the appellant. Now there are some
D glaring irregularities regarding this confession and though
it was safe for the Sessions Judge and the High Court to
act on it as against Gurubachan because he adhered to it
throughout the sessions trial despite his pleader's efforts
to show the contrary, a very different position emerges
E when we come to the appellant.
The first point which emerges regarding this is that the
confession was not made till the 25-2-1950, that is to say,
not until two months after the murder ... "
F (emphasis laid by this Court)
In the present case, the prosecution did not make any effort
to substantiate the evidence of the accomplices with
independent material evidence. Rather, the confessional
G statements of the accomplices have been used to corroborate
the confessional statements of the accused persons, in the
absence of any independent evidence.
96. But, apart from all these aspects on the statements of
H the accomplices, we fear that the story against the accused
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 195
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
persons and its corroboration through the statements of A
accomplices is an act of concoction to make up a case against
them. It was recorded in the statement of PW-126 that the
information regarding PW-50 was given to him by D.G.
Vanzara. However, D.G. Vanzara had not even been examined
in this case and there is no information as to how he came to B
know about PW-50 after almost a year of the attack on
Akshardham. This very important aspect of the lapse in
investigation had been ignored by the courts below. The
learned senior counsel for the accused persons have
contended that there has been a delay of around a year from c
the time of the attack on Akshardham in recording, the
statements of the accomplices which shrouds the case of the
prosecution. We have to accept the contention of the learned
senior counsel for the accused persons in this regard as there
is an inordinate delay in recording of the statements of the
0
accomplices and this casts a grave suspicion on the reliability
of the testimony of the accomplices.
It has been held by this Court in the case of State of
Andhra Pradesh v, Swarnalatha & Ors54. as under:
E
"21. It stands accepted that the statements of PW 3 and
PW 6 were recorded only on 31-1-1998. The investigating
officer did not assign any reason as to why so much delay
was caused in recording their statements. A panchnama
in regard to the scene of offence was conducted. PW 6 F
was admittedly not present at that time. The statements of
PW 3 and PW 6 were recorded under Section 164 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure much before their recording
of their statements under Section 161 thereof.
22. In Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State of Maharashtra this G
Court held:
"47. All the infirmities and flaws pointed out by the trial court
54. (2009) a sec 383. H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 7 S.C.R.
A assumed importance, when considered in the light of the
all-pervading circumstance that there was inordinate delay
in recording Ravji's statement (on the basis of which the
'FIR' was registered) and further delay in recording the
statements of Welji, Pramila and Kuvarbai. This
B circumstance, looming large in the background, inevitably
leads to the conclusion, that the prosecution story was
conceived and constructed after a good deal of
deliberation and delay in a shady setting. highly redolent
of doubt and suspicion."
c (emphasis laid by this Court)
Further, PW-51 on being cross examined by the counsel
for A-1, A-3 and A-5, Shri H.N. Jhala before the Special Court
(POTA), stated that:
D
"It is true that I was taken to the Crime Branch 60 days
earlier when my statement was taken. I was severely
beaten up and therefore even my thumb had got broken. I
was told that I as well as my family will be taken as accused.
I have not done anything wrong in my life. I was beaten up
E
at the Crime Branch for 15 to 20 days. I am coming just
now from the Crime Branch. I was called today at 9:30 in
the morning and was also called yesterday at 6:00 p.m. It
is true that I was told at Crime Branch that you have to
depose as we say or else you will get in trouble. It is true
F that whatever I have stated in the examination in chief, the
said has been stated by me at the instance of the Crime
Branch. The fact as stated by me in examination in chief
that Mufti Abdullah and Maulvi Abdullahmiya met me after
Godhra carnage, the said has been false stated by me.
G Prior to the time when I was deposing, I was said that I
have to state before the Court that guests are going to
come and they are terrorists ans they were still reading
over the said facts to me. It is true that Maulana
Abdullahmiya leads in prayer in Haji Saki Mosque. It is true
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 197
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
that the facts stated by me to have sought Rs. 20 lakhs A
from Saudi Arabia on phone, the said facts are false. It is
true that I have stated in the chief- examination that when
I was asked who are guests, at that time I have said that
the guests will survey the Hindu areas and will do the
killings which are to be done, the said facts have been · B
stated falsely. It is true that I stated in examination in chief
that while I was passing from the near the Bawahir Hall, at
that time Maulana Abdullahmiya and Mufti Abdul Qaiyum
met me, had exch~nged greetings and they also said that
the guests have arrived and God willing in some days c
victory will be ours, the said facts have been stated by me
falsely ...... "
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
D
Also on cross examination by Adv. Shri R.K. Shah for A-
2 and A-4, PW-51 said:
" ....... It is true that around 700 people lived in the satd
camp. I don't kr;iow if except for me, many other workers
E
were taken by the Crime Branch personnel and there were
protest in this regard. The witness states that Khalid
Sheikh was taken from our place. The witness himself
states that I was kept blind folded (by tying strip on eyes)
and therefore, I don't know. I was questioned about
F
identification of accused no. 2 and 5. I do not know after
how many days these accused persons were brought when
I was taken by the Crime Branch personnel because I could
not make out about dates and days. It is true that I was
released after two months by the crime branch and remand
of the accused had completed prior to the time when I was G
released. It is true that when I was taken to the magistrate,
I was told that this confession could be used against me
in the Court ..... It is true that the statement written by the
H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Magistrate Sir was written from the statement at Crime
Branch."
(translation extracted from the Additional documents_
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
B During cross examination by th~ Special Public
Prosecutor, Shri H.M. Dhruva, he stated thus:
"...... I was taken to Crime Branch in seventh or Eighth
month of the year 2003. I was confined continuously for two
c months and was not allowed to go anywhere. Application
was not submitted by any of my relative in this regards. My
relative had not filed any case with regards to my wrongful
confinement nor was any application filed. After I got
released 2 months later, I have not submitted any
D application anywhere. I was questioned with regard to the
case. The witness himself states that questioning was
done just with regards to the camp. With regards to all the
other facts, only written statements were given. It is true that
I was taken to the Magistrate Sir regarding what I know
about this statement. It is not true that the Magistrate had
E
asked any question to me and I had replied to the Sir. It is
true that I did state the fact to the magistrate that I was
confined for two months and was beaten up. The witness
himself states that I was told not to say it. It is true that from
the time I was released from Crime Branch and till the time
F when I came to give this deposition, I have not submitted
any application in this regards, nor have I made any
complaint. ......
.... It is true that I did not give any written or oral complaint
G on the last court date with regards to having been confined
for 60 days and having been threatened by the Crime
Branch. It is true that I am stating these facts for the first
time after my deposition on the last date 15. 7.2005. It is
true that I went to Crime Branch after I had deposed on
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 199
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
the last occasion, and thereafter I had gone to my house. A
: ... .The witness himself states that I made daily phone calls
to Crime Branch ..... Crime Branch officer used to
investigate if I am threatened by anybody. It is not true that
when I went even today. I was questioned if anybody has
threatened me. B
It is not true that I am giving such deposition since I have
received threats from the accused persons. It is not true
that I received such threats after I deposed on the last court C
date."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants) 0
The statement made by PW-51 during the cross
examination along with the legal principle laid down by this
Court leads us to the conclusion that there was a serious
attempt on the part of the investigating agency to fabricate a E
case against the accused persons and frame them with the
help of the statements of the accomplices, since they had not
been able to solve the case even after almost a year of the
incidence.
F
97. Therefore, we hold that the evidence of the
accomplices cannot be used to corroborate the confessional
statements of the accused persons in the absence of
independent evidence and the delay of more than one year in
recording their statements causes us to disregard their
evidence. Therefore, we answer this point in favour of the G
appellants.
Answer to point no. 4
98. The two Urdu letters were mentioned for the first time H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 $.C.R.
A in the list of Muddammal articles (Ex.524) collected from the
fidayeens by Major Lamba (PW-91) and handed over to PW-
126 by Panchnama drawn up for the same(Ex.440). In the
same, the mention of the two Urdu letters comes as under:
"(7). Two white papers upon the same some writing have
B
been made in Urdu language estimated price of the same
can be assumed at Rs. 0.00''
Further, the receipt voucher of articles recovered from the
body of the fidayeens and handed over to the 1.0. by PW-91
C (Ex.524) merely makes a mention of 'handwritten letters in
Urdu'.··
· · · PW-91, in his deposition before the Special Court (POTA)
(Ex.522), had made the following statement:
D "Thereafter, we had carried out search of entire area of
Akshardham and all explosives those were not exploded,
we had destroyed all of them at the same place.
Thereafter, I handed over two dead bodies, two AK 47/56
Rifles, chocolates, one live hand grenade, two chits found
E from dead body, and other articles by preparing its
separate list to D.S.P. Shri G.L. Singhal.
...... I am shown the articles of list Exhibit 524. I am shown
both the letters written in Urdu language Mark-P. After
F seeing that I say that the same were found from pocket of
cloth on body of those persons. One letter was found from
each both of them, and at backside part of the letter
signature has been made by Force Command Brigadier
Rajsitapati, and I identify his signature. I was knowing him
G for one year of incident and I was serving with him,
therefore I identify his signature. I was commander of task
force and Brigadier Sitapati was as Force Commander.
One maulvi was called in presence of us both and other
persons, who was conversant with the Urdu language. The
letters which were obtained by me from pocket of cloth put
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 201
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
on by terrorists. he had done translation of its writing, A
wherein as per my memory such fact was written that, this
attack was by way of reply to the communal riots took place
in Gujarat state. wherein both terrorists were of "Atok"
region of Pakistan. I am shown muddamal. After seeing
that, I say that,, this is the same muddamal, as had been B
handed over to Gujarat police by me after preparing list
thereof."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents C
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
Further, during cross examination by the counsel on behalf
·of the accused persons, PW-91 deposed that:
"At the time of seizing the articles whichever were found D
as articles which ever found from the bodies of both the
terrorists, from their pockets and Rucksack I was
continuously present there. I don't remember that by which
of my army man these articles had been obtained. It is not
true that I cannot say as to which of the army man had E
taken out which of the articles and from where taken out. I
don't remember name of Jawan who had prepared list of
Exhibit 524, but list was prepared in my presence. It is true
that no signature of concerned Jawan has been obtained
on Exhibit 524 . F
..... Both the two chits, which I state to have been found,
were found from pocket of pant of terrorists. The search
of both of them was carried out by one Junior
Commissioned Officer and two Jawans, wherein Junior G
Commissioned Officer was carrying out search and both
the jawans were collecting the articles found .
... ... On suggesting me to give name of any junior
Commissioned Officer, I state he was Subedar Suresh
H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Yadav. He was expired at that time. I handed oyer"all those
articles and dead bodies to the police. I handed over the
same in Akshardham temple itself. They were checking as
per list of Exhibit 524 and they had prepared voucher
thereof and in that manner they had seized the articles. The
B Maulvi was called in Akshardham temple itself. He came
during period of 8:00 AM to 9:00 AM. I don't remember
certain time. I cannot give his name. His signature is not
obtained at any place. When we had seized the articles
of Exhibit 524 from the terrorists, at that time no police
c officers were present, because, that premises was in our
possession. I don't know as to where Shri Singhal kept all
those items after I handed over to him. I don't know the
Urdu language. It is true that for showing that both these
chits were seized by us. there is no other evidence with
me to show except the signature of Brigadier Sitapati. It
D
is true that there is no date therein. It is not the same as
were seized at the relevant time. Witness willingly states
that, these are these chits, which had been seized from
the dead body by me. It is not true that, Brigadier Sitapati
has not made any signature in my presence.
E
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
F The learned senior counsel on behalf of the accused
persons had expressed strong suspicion as to whether the
letters produced before the court as Ex.658 were the same
letters which were found from the pocket of the trousers of the
fidayeens. While making the above contention, the learned
G senior counsel on behalf of the accused persons placed
reliance upon the FIR registered under Section 154 CrPC by
PW-126 on 25.09.2002 (Ex.680). The FIR mentioned about the
seizure of some articles from the body of the fidayeens which
were mentioned in the list handed over by PW-91 to PW" 126.
H It was imperative therefore, on the part of the prosecution to
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 203
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
ensure that Brigadier Sitapati was required to be examined A
before the Court so as to prove that he signed on the letters
marked as Ex.658 and they were the same letters recovered
by Maj. Jaydeep Lamba (PW-91) from the bodies of the
fidayeens. Otherwise, the absence of such evidence adversely
affects the case of the prosecution. However, the statement of B
PW-91 under Section 161 CrPC was not recorded. The
necessary implication of this is that he could not have been
presented as a chargesheet witness, as his evidence is
recorded for the first time before the Special Court (POTA). and
his statement under Section 161 CrPC was not taken by the c
1.0. However, Brigadier Sitapati, who is the most important
witness for proving the recovery of the alleged letters from the
pockets of the trousers of the fidayeens, was not examined
either under Section 161 or before the Court.
99. It is a settled position of law in the criminal D
jurisprudence that a witness, whose evidence is placed reliance
upon by the Court, has to be examined and questioned during
the course of investigation by the police and his name has to
appear in the chargesheet so that the accused gets a fair
chance to cross examine such witness. It was held in the case E
of Ram Lakhan Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh 55 as
under:
"37. It is true that no enmity or grudge is suggested against
this witness, but we find that this witness was not even F
examined by the police nor was he cited in the
chargesheet. In a grave charge like the present, it will not
be proper to place reliance on a witness who never figured
during the investigation and was not named in the
chargesheet. The accused who are entitled to know his G
earlier version to the police are naturally deprived of an
opportunity of effective cross-examination and it will be
difficult to give any credence to a statement which was
given for the first time in court after about a year of the
55. (1977) 3 sec 268 H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 7 S.C.R.
A occurrence. We cannot, therefore, agree that the High
Court was right in accepting the evidence of this witness
as lending assurance to the testimony of other witnesses
on the basis of which alone perhaps the High Court felt
unsafe to convict the accused."
B
The legal principle laid down by this Court in the
aforementioned case renders the case of the prosecution with
respect to the recovery of the alleged letters from the dead
bodies of the fidayeens, fatal. We however, intend to further
examine the contents of the letters (Ex.658) to determine if they
C are the same letters which were alleged to be recovered from
the pockets of the trousers of the fidayeens. It is pertinent here
to examine the deposition of PW-121(Ex.657), the translator
of the Urdu letters before the Special Court (POTA). The
translation of his statement from Gujarati to English, as per the
D documents submitted on behalf of the accused persons, reads
as under:
"I know Urdu, Arabic and Persian languages. I have
studied all these languages by living at Bihar, U.P and
E Ahmedabad. The said degree is called Aalim.
After three days of Akshardham incidence, DSP Shri B.D
Waghela had given news to me at Petlad, and I had
received news at my village Bisnoli from Petlad, I had come
to the office of L.C.B at Gandhinagar as I had received the
F news. I was said that, "sir (bapu), translate the two papers
which we take out from the cover. I had read both the
papers which were written in Arabic language, and
thereafter had translated the same to Gujrati from Urdu.
That was written by writer of Tolia Sir. I was speaking and
G he was writing. Police had taken my statement on the
same day on which I had translated. On showing me letters
of Mark-P and Mark-F/1 written in Gujarati script. I state
that the said is not same which was read by me on the
relevant day and it is not the same which was given to me
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 205
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
to read. He was writing whatever was spoken by me. and A
at present on reading the same. I state that this writing is
same which has been written as spoken by me.
(emphasis laid by this Court)
. (translation extracted from the Additional documents 8
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
During the cross examination before the Special Court
(POTA) by the learned counsel for A-2 and A-4, it was stated
by him as under: C
"No certificate was taken from me for the translation done
by me, so that there is writing that the said translation was
done by me.
There is no other written base that the said translation was D
done by me. I don't know the name of the person who had
written the translation. Translation was not written by Tolia
sir. It is not true that Tolia sir had written the translation of
both the letters. It is true that the letters which were
translated by me on that day were not seen by me E
thereafter till today. It is not true that the said letters were
not there at the respective time.
It is not true that I have not done any translation. It is not
true that I don't know difference between Arabic and Urdu F
language.
There are similar writings in both the papers, but as per
my opinion the writer is not the same, writer has changed."
(translation extracted from the Additional documents G
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
The statement of PW-121 as per the documents submitted
on behalf of the prosecution, to the extent of contradiction,
reads as under:
H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A "I was told to read two letters from an envelope and to
translate them. I read both the letters which were in Arabic
language, then entire matter was in Urdu language. I
translated Arabic language to Urdu language into Gujarati
language. There was a writer appointed by Shri Tolia. I
B stated and he typed them. My statement was taken by the
police on the day I did the translation".
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of State of Gujarat)
C 100. We are therefore, not inclined to accept any of the
contradictory versions of either of the parties. It is pertinent to
mention here that the poor translation of the documents from
Gujarati language to English submitted by both the parties have
majorly inconvenienced us. Therefore, instead of relying on
D either of the versions, particularly the aspect of the statement
of the translator, since the same has been majorly contested
before us, we intend to closely consider the other relevant
evidence on this aspect which is brought to our notice. The
excerpts of the translation of letter marked as Ex. 775 read as
E under:
"Tehrik-e-Kassas, Gujarat Hind.
F Now each young boy of Tehreek-e-kassas will take revenge
of the Muslims.
Muslims of Gujarat come and by joining steps with young
G boys of Tehrik-e-Kassas, we should rebuild our mosques
and take revenge of killings of Muslims.
Allah may give us guidance to point true path for Muslims
H
. ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 207
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
and may keep alive Tehrik-e-Kassas till the time revenge A
of each one killed is hot taken.
From: Real Representatives of Group of Muslims of
Gujarat B
Tehrik-e-Kassas, Gujarat.
Sd/- V.S.M.
PMG Raj Seethapathi"
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
c
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
The contents of the letter nowhere mention the name of the
place 'Atok' in Pakistan from where the fidayeens had allegedly
come, as had been mentioned by PW-91 in his deposition D
before the Special Court (POTA).
101. Further, the statement of PW- 105, Prakash Chandra
Mehra (Ex.592), Police Inspector of Gandhi Nagar only raises
our doubts further. PW-105 stated as under: E
" .... During this time, NSG Major Joydeep Lamba had
produced a list before me and before divisional officer Shri
Singhal, by which he had handed over the articles
recovered from the dead bodies, like weapons,
ammunitions, cash as well as papers written in Urdu and F
edible items etc, and the said were seized by me by
calling panchas and in presence of panchas as per
instruction of Mr. Singhal. During questioning, Major
Lamba Sir had stated that the Urdu papers were recovered
from the right pocket of pant of deceased persons. The G
said panchnama is by exhibit- 440, and it being shown to
me, and on seeing the same, I state that the panchas have
signed therein before me, and it has my signature as
before me, and facts written therein are true. I am being
H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 7 S.C.R.
A shown list of Exh- 524, the said is the list given by Major
Lamba and it has my signature.
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
B
During the cross examination, he further stated that:
"I was the very first officer to reach Akshardham. At present
I cannot say whether S.P Brahmbhatt and Dy Shri Singhal
c were present there before I had reached over there or not,
but I had seen them at that place. After I had reached at
the site, I immediately came to know that cognizable
offence has been committed. It is true that the two dead
bodies which I had seen, all of their cloths were stained
D with blood, I had questioned Major Lamba, but I had not
recorded his statement.
It is true that it has happened that the seized papers were
not kept in sealed covers. It is true that there is no
description of the said papers in panchnama except for
E the description that the said papers were written in Urdu
language. It has not happened that the said papers were
seized by any other officer before me.
It is true that panchnama of dead bodies of two terrorists
F which I stated to have been done, its videography was
done. I presently don't remember as to who had done the
said videography. After getting the videography done, I
have not received it cassettes or CD, because
immediately thereafter investigation was handed over to
G another officer. It is true that my statement which is
recorded by P.S.I Shri Padheriya has no clear mention
about Urdu papers.
The order to hand over the investigation to Shri Tolia was
not of Shri Singhal, but of Shri Brahmbhatt."
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 209
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
(translation extracted from the Additional documents A
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
He further stated during the examination by the J_udge of
the Special Court (POTA):
"I am being shown signature of Brig. Raj Sitapati from the B
time when both the papers of Mark-P were produced
before me, I don't remember about the same presently
and I cannot identify the said signature. It has not happened
that any Maulvi (Muslim priest) was called before me, and
the said papers were got translated." C
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
He also stated during the cross examination by the learned
0
counsel for A-2 and A-4:
"I have not recorded any statement of Brig. Raj Sitapati
during my investigation, nor have I met with him."
(translation extracted from the Additional documents E
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
If the statement of PW-105 is taken into consideration, it
would mean that no signature was made on the back of the
letters, and that the letters seized were not kept in sealed
covers which increased the chance of letters being replaced F
subsequently. It is also on record that the photographer and the
videographer who had recorded the scene of offence as per
the instruction of PW-126 had not been examined.
102. Further, the post mortem report of the fidayeens G
(Ex.492) stated that all their clothes were stained with blood and
mud and all clothes bore multiple tears and holes due to
perforation by bullets. In such a case, the fact that the letters
remained clean, without any tear, soiling or stains of blood and
soil is highly unnatural and improbable. H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 103. Therefore, we cannot accept the recording of the High
Court that the secret behind the crease-free unsoiled and
unstained letter lies in the divine philosophy of "Truth is stranger
than fiction" for this renowned epithet by the author Mark Twain
comes with a caveat that says, "Truth is stranger than fiction.
B Fiction must make sense". We accordingly accept the
contentions of the learne·d senior counsel on behalf of the
accused persons and hold that the two letters marked as Ex.
658 cannot be taken as evidence in order to implicate the
accused persons in this crime. Hence, we answer this point in
c favour of the appellants.
Answer to point no. 5
104. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the
prosecution, Mr. Ranjit Kumar contended that the two Urdu
D letters allegedly recovered from the pockets of the trousers of
the fidayeens had been written by A-4, as he had admitted the
same in his confessional statement as under:
"..... On the next day night Aiyub came at my office and he
stated that persons come by taking goods (arms).
E
Tomorrow they three will come here at the time of noon's
prayer here, at that time I and both fidayins will have to go
to Akshardham separately, therfore Adam. be called at
noon time before Johar's prayer with rickshaw to take me,
and keep ready by writing two chits in Urdu to the effect
F that this massacre is committed as a revenge of torture
beyond limit committed on Muslims, and as writer of that
chit name of group taking revenge on Gujarat i.e. "tehrik-
e-qisas Gujarat" be written ..... .
G ...On that night at late hours, in my office of Zankar sound
by closing shutter, I and Maulvi Abdulla made discussion
and I wrote two chits in Urdu in my handwriting wherein we
wrote that "violence on Muslims in Gujarat due to which
feeling of revenge is spread in Muslims. now blood of
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 211
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GO'WDA, J.]
Hindus. police will come out and now Shiv Sena. VHP and A
temple will be burnt and due to that Muslims will get relief
and called upon all Muslims to take revenge by shaking
shoulders. and if you want to live. live with pride and if you
want to die, then die with pride. This gift of massacre is
for Advani and Modi. ... by saying to give both these chits 8
and pen to fidayins on next day, I had given it to Maulvi
Abdullah ...
... ... we performed two rakat fazal namaz, and as I called
upon both fidayins to state their real names to make prayer
for success of massacre, their safety and if they are died C
then they are going to heaven, doctor-2 stated his real
name as Hafiz Yasir res. Lahore, Pakistan and Doctor-3
(Ashraf) stated his real name as Mohammed Faruk
residence Ravalpindi, Pakistan and for their prayer we all
five persons performed two rakat natal namaz and gave D
hug to each other. At that time Maulvi Abdullah had given
one chit each to the fidayin written by me in Urdu yesterday
as per my instruction and if in future chits are caught to
show that chits are written by fidayins he had also given
them pen. E
During this in the encounter with armed forces, they both
terrorists are also killed and one chit each having one kind
of urdu writing have been found from pockets of both. I had
seen photographs of those chits and photographs of both
F
the terrorists killed afterwards in T.V and newspapers. l
identified that those chits are same which I and Maulvi
Abdullah made discussion and both terrorists who died
were doctor-1 and doctor-2."
. (emphasis laid by this Court) G
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the State of Gujarat)
Therefore, by placing reliance upon the confessional
H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A statement of A-4, read with the contents of the letters
mentioned above and the opinion of the hand writing
expert,Jagdish Bhai(PW-89) the learned counsel on behalf of
the prosecution contended that the alleged letters had been
written by A-4.
B 105. The learned counsel for the accused persons have
contended that the statement under Section 161 of the CrPC,
of the key witness PW-91, Maj.Jaydeep Lamba was not
recorded. We have to accept this contention as the
investigating officers have conveniently omitted to record the
C statements of witnesses which could have established beyond
reasonable doubt that the letters were the same ones as
discovered from the site of offence. They tied A-4 to the letters
merely based on his confessional statement whereas the
opinions of the hand writing experts are merely indicative and
D not conclusive beyond reasonable doubt. We begin with the
comment made by the translator of the Urdu letters (PW-121:
Ex.657) who had categorically stated that:
"The matter in both the letters was same but the persons
who wrote it are not the same as per my opinion".
E
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
But considering the fact that he was not a hand writing
F expert, we shall refer to the statement of the evidence of the
hand writing expert, Jagdish Bhai (PW-89: Ex.507) who had
assigned the following reasons for recording his finding in his
report that the hand writing of A-4 matches with the letters
allegedly :found from the pockets of the trousers of the
G fidayeens:
"Pictorial appearance of all the disputed specimen and
natural writings are similar.
All these writings are written freely with speed showing
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 213
·GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
natural variation among themselves. A
They agree in the writing habits such as movements,
slants, spacing, relative size and proportion of characters,
line qual_ity, alignment of characters; manner of
accommodation etc.
B
They also show similarities in the execution of various
commencing, terminal and connecting strokes.
However, during cross examination by the learned counsel
c
on behalf of A-2 and A-4 while deposing before the court, he
has stated as under:
"Question: Hand writing science is not a perfect science.
D
Answer: It is also not imperfect science. It can be called
developing science.
Question: What basic knowledge of Urdu you have? E
Answer: The Urdu language is written from right to left, the
said fact as well as the fact that the complete word is
written in combination that initial, medial and final. Also,
wherever there is double pronunciation like in bachcha,
kachcha then letter like little 'W' like English is made. I F
have studied 'Kaaf', 'Gaaf', 'Nukta', 'Hamja', 'Tasdid', 'full-
stop, 'comma', small S, big SW, vowels and Sh thereby
all words .... I cannot write Urdu. I cannot read Urdu
language, But by taking reliance of book, I can read it.
G
It is true reason that there is no mention about the
discussion of the reasons given by me with the Expert of
Hyderabad. It is true that in the reasons given by me, there
H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A is no signature of any examiner except for me. It is true
that in my reasons, general characteristics, which are
given, in the said, details like measurements have not
been mentioned. It is true that the sample documents were
compared mutually has not been mentioned in my reasons.
B It is true that the specimen and natural hand writings were
compared with each other, but it is not written in my
reasons. It is true that I have written natural variations in
my reasons, but I have not mentioned details about what
these variations are."
c (translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
On cross examination by the Judge of the Special Court
(POTA) however, he was asked whether the hand writing expert
D can also give opinion on the language which is not known to
him. To this, he answered that:
"It is necessary to have basic knowledge of the concerned
language. Even many signatures are written illegibly in
monogramatic formation, even then also by examining
E
different characteristics of hand writing, one can come to
the conclusion from the same."
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
F
Further, he was asked, if the person who analyses such a
document can read or write the language of the document
and whether the opinion given by such a person can be
called more reliable than the opinion given by the person
G who does not know to read or write the language, he
answered:
"I don't agree that the opinion can be called more reliable,
but I can just say that the knower of the language can give
reasons in more details. The witness states on his own that
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 215
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
1apart from me, two other experts of Hyderabad were taken, and A
they knew Urdu language better than me."
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants)
The hand writing expert had stated that he cannot read or B
/write the Urdu language. He can read Urdu language only with
ithe aid of a book:
'
106. We state that considering the seriousness of this case
and the gravity of the offences, it was the duty of the handwriting c
expert to seek opinion of other experts which he claimed to
have done. PW-89 stated that he requested the Director of FSL
to seek the service of the Central Government Laboratory, and
the photocopies of the documents were sent to the Government
Examiner of Questioned Documents(in short 'GEQD'), Ministry D
of Home Affairs, Hyderabad for the preliminary examination.
Accordingly, Assistant Government Examiner, Shri A.K Singh
and Shri R.K Jain, the senior most GEQD of the Central
government had arrived at the FSL of Gujarat. It was further
stated by PW-89 that the officers from Hyderabad had worked E
· independently and prepared their opinion. Accordingly, PW-89
formed a final opinion based upon the opinion of the aforesaid
officers (Ex.511 ). The senior most officer, Mr. R.K Jain, sent
certificate via fax on 14.09.2003 in which he had stated that
he was in consent with the opinion of PW-89. However,
objection was raised by the counser for the accused persons F
at the Special Court (POTA) for taking this certificate on record,
since this document of certificate was never given to the
defence in the chargesheet papers, or at any time thereafter.
Moreover, the prosecution had also submitted that even they
were unaware of the existence of this document, and this G
knowledge had come before them only during the course of
recording of the deposition of PW-89 before the Special Court
(POTA). Therefore, the certificate was taken on record with the
objection of the defence.
H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 107. After perusing the above mentioned evidence on
record, we decipher that the prosecution had contended that
the Urdu letters (Ex.658) were written by A-4 by only placing
reliance upon the opinion of the handwriting expert, PW-89.
However, the certificate of the seniormost official of FSL,
B Hyderabad was not admitted on record till a much later stage,
after the charge sheet was prepared and PW-89 gave his
statement before the court. It was at this stage that his evidence
was admitted with protest from the defence. PW-89 in his
evidence had stated that he has basic knowledge of Urdu and
C cannot differentiate between Urdu, Arabic and Persian. He
further stated that the opinion of handwriting experts is not
conclusive. Therefore, we hold that the prosecution had failed
to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Urdu letters
(Ex.658) were written by A-4. Accordingly, we answer this point
in favour of the appellants.
0
Answer to point no.6
108. As per the Order of the CJM of Budgam, Jammu and
Kashmir (Ex.674) dated 11.10.2003, A-6 was arrested from
E Bareilly during investigation in the case FIR no. 130 of 2003
for offences under Sections 120-B, 153-A RPC, Section 10 of
one 'C.B.A. Act' and Sections 7 and 27 of Arms Act registered
at the police station at Nowgam, Jammu and Kashmir. A car
bearing Registration no. CHOIX- 3486 was seized as the
F vehicle was subjected to checking, and arms and ammunitions
were recovered from1he vehicle. The driver disclosed his name
as Chand Khan, resident of Barsia Tehsil Nawabgunj, Dist.
Bareilly, U.P. The seizure memo was drawn up immediately and
A-6 was taken into custody. He thereafter, allegedly confessed
G that he was affiliated to militant outfits in the style of Lashkar-
e-Toiba and was involved in subversive activities outside
Jammu and Kashmir as well. A-6 had further allegedly
confessed that he was using one ambassador car bearing
Registration no. KMT 413 for subversive activities outside
Jammu and Kashmir, which was recovered by the Jammu &
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 217
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
Kashmir police from the workshop under the name of 'Chand A
Motor Khanabai Anantnag' as stolen property, under Section
550 of the Jam mu and Kashmir CrPC. Thereafter, the car was
subsequently handed over to Gujarat Police, on their
requisition, for investigation in the present case which was
registered vide FIR 314 of 2002. In this regard, we shall B
examine the statements of Police Inspector Shabbir Ahmed
(PW-123), Sub-Inspector, Gulam Mahammed (PW-124) who
are from the Jammu & Kashmir Police and Ibrahim Chauhan,
Police Inspector of Crime Branch, Ahmedabad (PW-125).
109. The statement of PW- 123 is extracted as under:
c
"the car was seized in our police station limit. The car was
seized in September 2003. I do not remember exact date.
There may be letters of seizing car in our police station. I
did not seize the car, but investigating officer of the case D
did it. The car was seized by Gulam Mohammad Dar. I do
not know if there were documents of the car. It is true that
this car was seized by our police station and then by the
Gujarat Police by Exhibit 671. During this course, I saw
papers of seizure. The witness himself'states that the E
papers would have been given to Gujarat Police, but I am
not sure in this regard, but our case papers are those
papers. It is true that we seized the car on the basis of
suspect for investigation. I do not know the condition of the
car when we seized it for our police station case. Whether F
it was as written in existing panchnama. My Investigation
Officer must be knowing it. It is true that I saw seizure
papers including panchnama before Gujarat po.lice seized
it. .... When the car was seized, it was in our custody, but
kept in S.O.G. camp. Then the car was handed over to G
Ahmedabad police. Thereafter, I had an occasion to see
the car. It was true that when the car was given to Gujarat
police, it was not in working condition.
H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Question: Are you prepared to produce panchnama and
other papers in court when you seized the car in suspected
condition?
Reply: Our file has been submitted to the government for
sanction. I am prepared to produce when it comes. I am
B
prepared to produce when court orders after getting
sanction.
After getting reply from R.T.O., we came to know that its
owner's name is Abdul Majid Rathor. We enquired in this
c regard but no such person exists. The car was registered
in pseudonym. It is true that panchnama was made to
handover the car to the police. There is record in my police
record in this regard .... There were engine number and
chasis number in the inner part of the car. No photographs
D were taken of the car in my presence then. It was seized
in our police station. Then also no photographs were
taken. It is true that there are no photographs of the car in
our record.
(basically they talk about the seizure of the car by Gujarat
E
Police and not the police of J&K)."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
F submitted on behalf of State of Gujarat)
110. Therefore, it is clear from the deposition of PW-123
that firstly, A-6 is not the owner of the car since it was registered
in the name of some other person as per the report of R.T.O
(Ex.672). Secondly, as per the Order of the CJM of Budgam,
G Jammu and Kashmir (Ex.674) dated 11.10.2003, A-6 was not
in physical possession of the car which was allegedly used for
carrying weapons for the attack on Akshardham whereas he
was actually found in possession of another car bearing
Registration no. CHOIX-3486. Finally, though a panchnama
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 219
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
I
!Was drawn up of the alleged car, by the police of Jammu and A
Kashmir, it was for them to hand over the car from their custody
to the Gujarat police. No panchnama or document of seizure
of t~e car had been produced before us to show that the car
was recovered from the workshop/ garage of A-6 or even that
the garage/ workshop from which the car was allegedly B
recovered belongs to A-6. Therefore, we cannot see how the
car can be linked to A-6 in the absence of any independent
evidence other than his confessional statement which had been
subsequently retracted.
111. It is also of the utmost importance for us to mention C
the statement of PW-125, Ibrahim Chauhan, Crime Branch,
Ahmedabad regarding the seizure of the car since it is reflective
of hqw casually and with what impunity the investigation has
been conducted in the instant case by the investigating officer.
PW-125, who was a part of the investigation of this case in D
:Kashmir, and who was also responsible for escorting A-2, A-4
( and A-5 to Srinagar, Kashmir, states as under:
"After knowing the facts of seizing car in the case 130/
2003, I had no occasion to ask for papers regarding E
vehicle seized, because I was engaged in other works. It
is in my view that panchnama regarding seizure of car no.
KMT- 413 existed earlier to panchnama of Exhibit 671. !
have not seen panchnama."
(emphasis laid by this Court) F
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the State of Gujarat)
He again went on record to state that: G
"I do not believe that if any car is seized in one crime,
seizure, panchnama and other-papers should be
possessed before seizing car in another crime. It is true
that when the car is confiscated. its panchnama is made,
H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A that panchnama should be obtained while seizing car in
another crime. As I was engaged in other work, I did not
get panchnama. It is not true that panchnama of Cr. No.
130/ 2003 was not produced because its details were not
in consonance with Panchnama Exhibit 671 ....... "
B
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of State of Gujarat)
c It is clear from the statement of PW-125 that neither the
panchnama nor seizure memo of the car no. KMT 413, made
during its alleged seizure in case no. 130 of 2003 was seen
by PW-125 since, "he was engaged in other worl('. However,
without verifying the contents of the panchnama and the seizure
0 memo of the car in Case No.130 of 2003, the involvement of
the car had been admitted in evidence on record by the courts
below, merely on the basis of the subsequent panchnama drawn
by the Gujarat police, which was only for the transfer of
possession of the car from the police of Jammu and Kashmir
E to the Gujarat police.
. '
In light of the evidence mentioned above, we are not
inclined to give any weightage to the panchnama drawn by the
Gujarat police at Jammu and Kashmir for the seizure of car
already in the possession of the Jammu and Kashmir police
F at SOG Camp, in the absence of the original panchnama and
seizure memo drawn by the police of Jammu and Kashmir. In
view of the evidence on record, and the reasons recorded by
us, we answer this point in favour of the appellants and hold
that the prosecution had failed to prove that the car was used
G by A-6 td carry weapons from Jammu and Kashmir to Bareilly
for carrying out the attack on Akshardham.
Answer to point no.7
112. The independent documentary evidence produced
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 221
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
before us against the accused persons are the two letters in A
Urdu allegedly recovered from the pockets of the trousers of
the fidayeens, upon which the prosecution had placed strong
reliance to establish the involvement of A-4 in the offence. The
other independent evidence is the blue ambassador car in
which A-6 was alleged to have brought the fidayeens and the B
weapons to Ahmedabad through Bareilly from Jammu and
Kashmir. We have already ascertained while answering the
point about the above letters that neither the two letters
produced before the Special Court (POTA) nor the procedure
by which the ambassador car was seized by the Gujarat police, c
inspires confidence in our minds to show that these are genuine
evidence to implicate the accused persons in the offence. The
only other material evidence on record on the basis of which
the prosecution had argued the involvement of the accused
persons, are the confessional statements given by A-1, A-2, A- 0
3, A-4 and A-6 before the Gujarat police under Section 32 of
iPOT A. We have already mentioned that the confessional
1
statements had not been recorded as per the strict statutory
mandate provided for under Section 32 of POTA, which made
their confessional statements inadmissible as evidence.
E
However, we also intend to record certain other reasons as to
why the conviction and sentencing of the accused persons by
the Special Court (POTA), which was upheld by the High Court
in the appeals and reference order, is liable to be set aside.
113. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the confessional F
statements of the accused persons were recorded by the DCP,
PW-78 in e~tremely suspicious circumstances. We have
already held that the procedure of presenting them before the
CJM and subsequently sending them to judicial custody
mandatorily had been reduced to a mere, empty formality. This G
above said procedural lapse coupled with the fact that the
letters of caution to be given to them, before the making of such
statements, mandated under Section 32(2) of POTA, and the
process of recording their confessional statements were done
H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A in an extremely casual manner which is not the conduct
expected from such high ranking police officers of the state
government. Since we have already recorded our findings and
reasons in this regard, while answering the point no.2 on
confessional statements, we therefore do not intend to reiterate
s the same here.
114. Even if the confessional statements of the accused
persons are made admissible, that alone could not have been
made the only ground for convicting them, as it would amount
C to a violation of the legal principle laid down in the five judge
bench decision of this court in the case of Hari Charan Kurmi
and Jogia Hajam v. State of Bihar56, wherein this Court held
as under:
"12. As we have already indicated, this question has been
D considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and
it has been consistently held that a confession,cannot be
treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against
a co-accused person. In dealing with a criminal case
where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one
E accused person against another accused person, the
proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence
against such an accused person. and if the said evidence
appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold
that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed
F against the said accused person. the court turns to the
confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion
which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right.
As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v.
Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty, I.LR. 38 Cal. 559 at p.588 a
confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other
G
evidence against a co-accused". In Peryaswami Moopan
v.Emperor,l.L.R. 54 Mad. 75 at p.77: (AIR 1931 Mad. 177
at p.178) Reilly, J., observed that the provision of
S. 30 goes not further than this, "where there is evidence
H 56. AIR 1964 SC 1184.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 223
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support A
his conviction, then the kind of confession described in
S. 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason
for believing that evidence." In Bhuboni Sahu v. The
King, 76 Ind App 147 at p.155: (AIR 1949 PC 257 at
p.260) the Privy Council has expressed the same view. Sir B
John Beaumont who spoke for the Board, observed that,
"a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a
very weak type. It does not indeed come within the
definition of "evidence" contained in S. 3 of the Evidence
Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the
c
presence of the accused, and ;t cannot be tested by cross-
examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the
evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of
those infirmities. S. 30, however, provides that the Court
may take the confession into consideration and thereby, D
no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act;
but the section does not say that the confession is to
amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The
confession is only one element in the consideration of all
the facts proved in the case: it can be put into the scale E
and weighed with the other evidence."
It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions
contained in S. 30, the confession has no doubt to be
regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way. F
because whatever is considered by the court is evidence;
circumstances which are considered by the court as well
as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic
sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as
evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions G
of S. 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined
by S.3 of the Act. The result, therefore. is that in dealing
with a case against an accused person. the court cannot
start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must
begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and
H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 7 S.C.R.
A after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and
effect of the said evidence. then it is permissible to turn to
the confession in order to receive assurance to the
conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach
on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect
B of the provisions contained in S. 30. The same view has
been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State
of Madhya Pradesh 1952 SCR 526 :(AIR 1952 SC 159)
where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni
Sahu's case, 76 Ind App 147 (AIR 1949 PC 257) has
c been cited with approval.
14. The statements contained in the confessions of the co-
accused persons stand on a different footing. In cases
D where such confessions are relied upon by the prosecution
against an accused person, the Court cannot begin with
the examination of the said statements. The stage to
consider the said confessional statements arrives only
after the other evidence is considered and found to be
E satisfactory. The difference in the approach which the Court
has to adopt in dealing with these two types of evidence
is thus clear, well-understood and well-established. It,
however, appears that in Ram Prakash's case, 1959 SCR
1219: (AIR 1959 SC 1), some observations have been
F made which do not seem to recognize the distinction
between the evidence of an accomplice and the
statements contained in the confession made by an
accused person."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
G
115. Again, in the present case, there is nothing on record
other than the statements of the accomplices (of which PW- 51
retracted from his confession) and the confessional statements
of the accused persons which were retracted and this aspect
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 225
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
of the matter was required to be considered by the courts below A
while recording the findings on the charges framed against the
accused persons. The retraction of the confessional statements
of the accused persons A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 and that of PW-
51 revealed that they were tortured by the police to extract their
confessional statements. Therefore, the confessional B
statements of A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 cannot be relied upon for
this reason also i.e they have been retracted vide Exs. 779 (A-
2), 780 (A-4), 33 (A-3) and 32 (A-6). A-2 had retracted his
jconfessional statement vide Ex.779, wherein he had detailed
the account of how he was detained on the charge of c
'autorickshaw theft' and was brought to the Crime Branch,
Ahmedabad and forced to confess regarding the crime of
attack on the Akshardham temple. He had stated that he was
put to intense physical and psychological torture and the police
threatened him and his family members with the motive of
0
eliciting a confession out of him which he stated to be 'false'
as he is not guilty of the same and had been falsely charged.
IRelevant portions of the retraction statement(Ex. 779) are
extracted hereunder in order to examine the import of his
statement of retraction:
E
"I, Ajmeri Suleman Adam, state in writing that five to six
officers of Ahmedabad City Crime Branch from Gaekwad
haveli came in maruti car at the corner of my mohalla at
about 1.30-2.00 in the night and they called me. They
asked my name and occupation. I told the officers that I F
am rickshaw driver. They told me to sit in our maruti car.
We have to take you for enguirv. They told me that the
rickshaw which them that the rickshaw that I drive is not
be theft.He has owner. Then the officer abused me, beat
me and seated me in the car by coercion. I was taken into G
the crime branch office at night they tied a strip on eyes
and placed me at such a place that I do not know. Then I
could not sleep for whole night. I was thinking that I have
not done any wrong. Then why I was brought here, then on
10-8-2003. on next day at 1.00 noon a constable came and H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 7 S.C.R.
A told me to come with him as higher officer call you. At that
time a strip tied on my eyes. The constable caught me and
put in an office and opened the strip from my eyes. I saw
four officer sitting there. Shri Vanzara. DCP Shri Singhal.
ACP Shri Vanar Pl and Shri pate! Pl. I came to know
B afterwards that these officers are from crime branch. Shri
DCP Vanzara asked me whether I know after works that
these officers are from crime branch. Shri DCP Vanzara
asked me whether I know why I was brought here. I replied
that you other officers told me that the rickshaw that I drive
c is by thefts and I am to be asked about it. He told me that
I was not brought here for that crime but for other crime. I
told that I not have made such crime that I should be
brought here. Then Singhal Sahib abused me and told that
should agree to what they say. I should agree that I am the
criminal of Akshardham carnage. I told them that I have
D
never gone to Akshardgam nor have I seen it. Kindly do
not involve me. He immediately called five or six persons
and told me to have handcuffs and fetters. Vanar Saheb
beat me on soles. Shri Singhal Saheb told me that I agree
with the crime of Askhardham , they shall not beat me and
E have some benefits. Then they beat me in such a way that
I became unconscious and fell down ...
.. When I became conscious I was near Vanar Saheb
office. I suffered much difficulty. I was weeping. It was night.
F At that time one constable came and told me that superior
sahib was calling. I had no strength to walk or stand. I was
caught and taken to Vanzara Saheb office. All four officers
were present there. They told me to agree the crime,
otherwise I shall be encountered. But I did not believe.
G Then they brutally beat me. There was bleeding in back
portion .... They gave me currents. Then I told them, sir, have
mercy on me. I am not culprit. Pardon me. Please don't
make me criminal wrongly. I do not know anything in this
regard. They threatened me to harass me and my family
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v.. STATE OF 227
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
members. Even though I have not committed any crime, A
they wanted to agree Akshardham crime."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the State of Gujarat) B
A-2 further stated:
"One day Singhal Saheb called me to office and asked me
to do as we say. I know that you are a good congress C
worker. The relief materials received from congress at the
time of godhra episode were distributed among Muslims
and poor persons as said by congress leader you
contested as an independent candidate in 1998. We know
that congress candidate was defeated and BJP candidate D
won the election. You made a case against BJP in the High
Court. The case was extended to Supreme Court but you
could not do anything. What shall you able to do now ....
... I was harshly beaten from 9-8-2003 to 28-8-2003 without
my fault and behaved rudely.... Singhal Saheb came to my E
office at night (29-8-2003) and told me, " We have
declared you as criminal. We shall take you to court and
present before Judge. You should not speak anything
against us, otherwise we shall get you down on the way
and encounter you. You shall not come alive. Then I F
requested Vanzara Saheb, Singhal Saheb, Vanar Saheb
and Patel Saheb that you have beaten the truth and placed
lying in a higher position ...... They told me to sign where
they say ...
... They threatened me and presented to the court G
Hon.Court gave remand. During court, I was in crime
branch. Shri Vanzara Saheb, Singhal Saheb, Vanar
Saheb and Patel Saheb behaved with me as if I am an
animal. During that time, I was taken to VS Hospital. They
H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A told me one thing that I should not narrate my difficulties
to the Doctor. otherwise I shall be harassed like anything.
I should say to the doctor I am healthy and I shall get
treatment from the private doctor who comes in crime
branch for any trouble ....
B
.... Singhal Saheb seated me in his office on 4-9-03 at night·
and told me to write in my handwritings as he says,
otherwise I shall be finished. I went to writing as he stated.
I have not written this willingly but as per wish of Singhal
Saheb. If I would not have written so. I would have been
c encountered on that very day or night. I was frightened and
I wrote on account of fear. I was taken to Ahmedabad
airport on 5-9-03. Vanzara Saheb, Patel Saheb, AA
Chauhan Saheb and other three PSI s were with me .... IG
Shrinagar called me on 7-9-03. At that time three officers
D of Shrinagar were present. He told me to tell the truth. Then
I told on oath of kuran-sharif true facts. I was arrested on
9-8-03. Till them I am beaten. I do not know anything about
Akshardham. They have threatened my family members
and threatened me to encounter. I have been forced to
E agree to the crime. I told officers of Shrinagar to help me,
otherwise these officers shall kill me. Then they told me that
we also know that you are innocent.. .. .
... I reached to Ahmedabad on 9-9-03 .... Then I was taken
F to POTA Court. Prior to it Singhal and Vanar Saheb told
me that I was to be taken to the Court. " If you complain.
you shall not be kept alive. You might not be knowing what
we can do. We can take out prisoner from the Central Jail
and encounter him. while you are with us. Latif was in jail.
We brought him out and killed. What can you do against
G us." I was not allowed to speak anything in the Court ...
I was taken on 23-9-2003 with strips on my eyes. I wa~
told that Doctor had come for my treatment. .. I was given
two injections on my right hand .... On the next day I told
H them that I have many difficulties on account of your
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 229
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
injections. Then Vanar Saheb and Patel Saheb told me A
that our work is over and I am not required now. On 25-9-
03, Vanar Saheb, Singhal Saheb and other officers seated
me in a jeep and took me to old high court. Singhal Saheb
and vanar Saheb informed me that here in big judge. You
should sign where he says. otherwise you know what we B
can do. Here court is ours, Govt. is ours. polics is ours and
judge sahib is also ours. I was taken to judge.sahib room.
There were some written papers. I do not know what was
written in it. Without allowing me to read anything judge
sahib and crime branch officers took my signatures c
thereon ..... Singhal,Vanar and other officers at in judge
hamber. They took snacks and tea. After one hour all
officers came out smiling saying our work is over. We shall
present him in Pota court and send them to Central Jail ....
... I request you that since last two months I remained in D
crime branch as helpless and humble ....
... I f you want the truth in this case to be revealed, hand
over the case to CBI officers. It is my humble request to
you to hand over the investigation to the CBI and truth shall E
be revealed to you. Sir, when I was sent to central jail I told
the jail authorities that I required treatment.. .
... I am hopeful that you shall prevent ine and my family from
ruin and do justice. I am hopeful that you shall do justice
to me and my family after considering my request."
F
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the State of Gujarat) G
116. Excerpts from the statement of retraction of A-4 (Ex.
780), reads as under:
"I state with request that I am (Mufti) Abdul Kayyam
Ahmedhussain Mansuri. .. I taught namaz at Haji Sakhi H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Masjid charvat and teach Koran to children ....
... On 17/8/2003, Sunday, in the evening, I was at Haji
Sakhi Masjid, Dariyapur when four people came in the
Masjid in civil dress and asked me if I was Mufti A.Kayyam.
I replied that I am and they told me that I had to come to
B
crime branch office as senior officer was calling me ....
One of them told me that some enquiry has to be made
and I would be left after enquiry in 3-4 days ... they took me
to Haveli crime Branch office. They blindfolded me and
c made me sit down later. At about 10.00 to 11.00 pm in
the night they took me to some officer. They removed the
blindfold and released my hands. Later I learnt that the
name of the Saheb was ACP GL Singhal.Shri Singhal
asked me as to why I was brought here. I told him that I
D did not know .... Then Singhal asked me questions about my
family, friends etc ... and I satisfactorily answered them.
Suddenly. Singhal started beating me on my backside and
told me to go and you would know as to why I was brought
there on next day. Then I was blindfolded again and my
E hands were tied up and taken back again ...
... Then everyday from 18/8/03 to 29/8/03, at noon and at
night, that is two to three times a day I was taken to the
office of Singhal Vanzara sir. Vanar sir also remained
present there. They presented a story of Akshsardham
F before me and asked me to repeat that story before senior
officer and confess it. I refused and so mental and physical
torture was effected on me. I was beaten with a stick
everyday on my backside, feet and palms. They used to
beat me so badly that I fell down on the floor. Sometimes,
G lips were attached on my hand fingers and current was
given to me. Pins were pierced below the nails of my
finger tips. Such inhuman torture wad done on me for
about ten days from 17/8/03 to 29/8/03. I was illegally kept
in the Crime Branch office and tortured and threatened ...
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 231
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
.. Later on 29-8-03, Friday at 3.00 pm noon, on officer A
(whose name I learnt later) Pl RI Patel called my father and
me too. My and fathers signatures were taken on some
papers. Neither do I or my father know what was written
on those papers. But we were helpless and had to sign
them. At about 3-4 o clock many photographers came and 8
made me cover my face with a bukha (cloth) and clicked
photographs. That day at about 10.00 pm night Singhal
Saheb called me and told me that I was arrested in
Akshardham case. He told me that I would be presented
in the court the next day.... I was presented in court the next c
day. Judge asked me whether I had any complain but due
to fear I could not say anything ...
... Later on the day I got remand on 30-8-03 at night I was
called to Singhals office by Shri Singhal and VD Vanar. D
They told me that letters were found from both the dead
terrorists at Akshardham complex. They asked me if I had
written those letters. I replied that I had not written them and
I do not know anything about it. On this they started torturing
me mentally and physically. Then Singhal said it was ok,
they knew I had .not written those letters. He asked me read E
and rewrite the copy of the two letters. Saying so he gave
me a copy of those two letters. I trusted them and copied
those two letters. Due to innocence I could not understand
their conspiracy and I was repeatedly asked to copy those
letters by Vanar and RI Patel for three four days every night F
Patel and those urdu letters and asked me to copy them
till three four o clock late night. They used bad words and
said those letters were found from terrorists. They asked
me to match the handwritings of these letters and exactly
write in those many lines and paragraphs also must be at G
the same place .... They threatened and forced me to write
40-50 copies of those letters.
Later on 5.9.03 they took me to Srinagar (Kashmir). Out
of the officers present with me RI Patel repeatedly told me H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A that there I would be presented before officer. He would
ask me about Akshardham and I must repeat the false
story which they had told me earlier. They threatened me
if I revealed the truth, they would kill me and throw my body
somewhere. They would inform my family that i would be
B killed in an encounter with the terrorists. They told me that
I would be shown a person, they told me to identify him and
then they presented me before those officers. I learnt the
names of officers later as DIG K Rajendra, ACP Sandip
vazir and ACP Saheb of these officers showed me a
c person and asked me if I knew him. I did not know that
person at all. So I dared to say that I did not know him ....
... So those officers made the officers of Crime Branch,
Ahmedabad sit in another room. They asked me to speak
the truth. I replied that if I did so these officers would kill
D me and trouble my family too. At this DIG K Rajendra
answered me that they would not let any trouble fall upon
my family, if I told the truth. I was impressed with his words
and started owning loudly. Due to his humanitarian
approach, I gained confidence and told him that I was
E innocent arid knew nothing about Akshardham. They
answered me that they would not let injustice happen to
innocent as they had arrested the person involved in this
scandal. ...
.... Later on 9-9-03 I was brought again to Ahmedabad ... I
F
was brought to. Crime Branch on 14-9-03, Vanar Saheb
called me ... he was writing something on some
papers ... Then he gave those papers to me(which he was
writing). He asked me to read those papers. In them, I was
accused of crime and falsely trapped in Akshardham case
G
by these officers. After reading, I pleaded and requested
Vanar saying that I was innocent and such allegations must
not be charged on me .... He asked me to read those
papers in same way and confess in front of live camera,
. as they had written my role in those papers .... At about
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF · 233
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
10.00 pm they compelled me to tell the false story in front A
of video camera .... ! used to forgot and make mistakes in
telling the written story. At this Pl Vanar used to sign me
and remind me .... He also made the camera close and
abused me and reminded me the untrue story in this way
by beating and threatening me they made me reveal an B
absolutely untrue story ...
... I swear I have been wrongly trapped by Crime branch
Officers in Akshardham case. I am absolutely innocent and
do not know anything about Akshardham case ... "
c
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of State of Gujarat)
This Court in the case of Navjot Sandhu (supra) while D
deciding whether the same rule of prudence for confessions
under the general law would apply for confessions under the
POTA as well, held as under:
"46 ..... The better view would be to follow the same rule E
of prudence as is being followed in the case of
cqnfessions under the general law. The confessional
statement recorded by the police officer can be the basis
of conviction of the maker, but it is desirable to look to
corroboration in a broad sense, when it is retracted. The F
non obstante provision adverted to by the learned Judges
should not, in our considered view, affect the operation of
the general rule of corroboration broadly."
Further, in the case of Parmanada Pegu v. State of
1 Assam 57, this Court relied upon many judgments, most G
important of which is Subramania Goundan v. State of
Madras58 which was relied upon in the case of Navjot Sandhu
57. (2004) 7 sec 779.
58. AIR 1958 SC 66. H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A (supra), in order to hold that the confessional statement of the
accused which is retracted, cannot be relied upon to convict
him in the absence of corroborating evidence. In the
Subramania Goundan case (supra), this Court held thus:
B
"14. The next question is whether there is corroboration of
the confessiQn since it has been retracted. A confession
of a crime by a person, who has perpetrated it, is usually
the outcome of penitence and remorse and in normal
circumstances is the best evidence against the maker. The
question has very often arisen whether a retracted
c confession may form the basis of conviction if believed to
be true and voluntarily made. For the purpose of arriving
at this conclusion the court has to take into consideration
not only the reasons given for making the confession or
retracting it but the attending facts and circumstances
D surrounding the same. It may be remarked that there can
be no absolute rule that a retracted confession cannot be
acted upon unless the same is corroborated materially. It
was laid down in certain cases one such being In re.
Kesava Pillai ILR 53 Mad 160: (AIR 1929 Mad 837) (B)
E that if the reasons given by an accused person for
retracting a confession are on the face of them false, the
confession may be acted upon as it stands and without any
corroboration. But the view taken by this court on more
occasions than one is that as a matter of prudence and
F caution which has sanctified itself into a rule of law, a
retracted confession cannot be made solely the basis of
conviction unless the same is corroborated one of the
latest cases being 'Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab (S) AIR
1957 SC 216 (C) , but it does not necessarily mean that
G each and every circumstance mentioned in the confession
regarding the complicity of the accused must be separately
and independently corroborated nor is it essential that the
corroboration must come from facts and circumstances I
discovered after the confession was made. It would be ·
H sufficient. in our opinion. that the general trend of the
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 235
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
confession is substantiated by some evidence which would A
tally with what is contained in the confession. In this
connection it would be profitable to contrast a retracted
confession with the evidence of an approver or an
accomplice. Though under S. 133 of the Evidence Act a
conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on the B
uncorroborated testimony of witnesses. illustration (b) to
S. 114 lays down that a court may presume that an
accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated
in material particulars. In the case of such a person on his
own showing he is a depraved and debased individual c
who having taken part in the crime tries to exculpate himself
and wants to fasten the liability on another. In such
circumstances it is absolutely necessary that what he has
deposed must be corroborated in material particulars. In
contrasting this with the statement of a person making a'
0
confession who stands on a better footing, one need only
find out when there is a retraction whether the earlier
statement, which was the result of remorse, repentance
and contrition, was voluntary and true or not and it is with
that object that corroboration is sought for. Not infrequently
one is apt to fall in error in equating a retracted confession E
with the evidence of an accomplice and therefore, it is
advisable to clearly understand the distinction between the
two. The standards of corroboration in the two are quite
different. In the case of the person confessing who has
resiled from his statement, general corroboration is F
sufficient while an accomplice's evidence should be
corroborated in material particulars. In addition the court
must feel that the reasons given for the retraction in the
case of a confession are untrue."
G
(emphasis laid by this Court)
This above said view of this Court has been endorsed in
various judgments subsequently and we find it necessary to
reiterate the same herein. The rule of prudence as applying to
H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 7 S.C.R.
A confessions of the accused under the general law, being that
the confessional statements which were retracted must be
corroborated by independent evidence, must be followed to
convict the accused for the charges framed against them. The
findings and reasons for conviction and sentencing of the
s accused persons in this case were the confessional statements
of A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 and the two Urdu letters which are
purportedly written by A-4. A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 had retracted
their confessional statements as per the exhibits
aforementioned and all of them had alleged that they were
C tortured and threatened with dire consequences of death
through 'encounter' and death of their loved ones. All the
accused persons speak of torture by beating, especially on the
legs and this corresponds to their complaints of pain 'under the
feet'.
D 117. Further, A-5 also made a statement as per Ex.778
that he was tortured in police custody and that he had no role
in the conspiracy to attack the Akshardham temple and he was
being framed in the case. The statements of retraction also
referred to the repeated entreaties by accused persons before
E the Spec;ial Court (POTA) as well as by A-2, A-4 and A-5,
before the DIG of Police at Jammu and Kashmir, Mr. K
Rajendra Kumar to transfer the case to the CBI for an
independent investigation and enquiry.
F 118. Further, A-6 had also retracted his confessional
statement (Ex.32), wherein he had also alleged severe torture
and beating by the Srinagar police as well as the Crime Branch,
Ahmedabad and he alleged that he was arrested at Nagpur and
sent to Srinagar and a compulsory confession had been
G extracted from him in order to implicate him in the crime.
119. Further, with respect to the two Urdu letters, which
were purportedly written by A-4, upon which the prosecution
placed such an unflinching reliance in order to establish a link
between the fidayeens and the accused persons, has already
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 237
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
been answered by us in point nos. 4 and 5 to be completely A
unreliable for the reasons stated by us in this judgment.
120. The story of the prosecution crumbles down at every
juncture. Most importantly, the case laws relied upon above
show that the statements of confession of the accused persons 8
cannot be relied upon if they are retracted, unless corroborated
by independent evidence. In this case, as already elucidated,
the case of the prosecution rests on the confessional statements
on the accused persons, the confessional statements of the
accomplices and their evidence and the two Urdu letters
purportedly found in the pockets of the trousers of the fidayeens C
and written by A-4, and apart from this, it is very clear that there
is absolutely no independent evidence to implicate the accused
persons for the crime. The evidence of the accomplices, PW-
50, PW-51 and PW-52 are also rejected for the reasons given
in the answer to point no.3. Therefore, there is no independent D
evidence on record which corroborates the confessions of the
accused persons which were subsequently retracted.
Further, a retracted confessional statement of an accused
person cannot be used to corroborate the retracted E
confessional statement of a co-accused. In the case of Aloke
Nath Dutta & Ors. V. State of West Benga/59, this Court held
as under:
"110. A retracted confession of a co-accused cannot be
F
relied upon for the purpose of finding corroboration for the
retracted confession of an accused ....
116. Whatever be the terminology used, one rule is almost
certain that no judgment of conviction shall be passed on
an uncorroborated retracted confession. The court shall G
consider the materials on record objectively in regard to
the reasons for retraction. It must arrive at a finding that
the confession was truthful and voluntary. Merit of the
confession being the voluntariness and truthfulness, the
59. (2001) 12 sec 230. H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A same, in no-circumstances, should be compromised. We
are not oblivious of some of the decisions of this Court
which proceeded on the basis that conviction of an
accused on the basis of a retracted confession is
permissible but only if it is found that retraction made by
B the accused was wholly on a false premise .......
117. There cannot. however. be any doubt or dispute that
although retracted confession is admissible. the same
should be looked with some amount of suspicion - a
stronger suspicion than that which is attached to the
c confession of an approver who leads evidence to the court.
"
(emphasis laid by this Court)
0 121. Thus, for the above reason also, the confessional
statement~ of the accused persons cannot be relied upon and
the case of the prosecution fails. Accordingly, we hold that there
is no independent evidence on record to prove the guilt of the
accused persons beyond reasonable dpubt in the face of the
E retractions and grave allegations of torture and violation of
human rights of the accused persons against the police. We
accordingly answer this point in favour of the appellants.
Answer to point no. 8
F 122. The accused persons have been found guilty of the
offence of criminal conspiracy by both the courts below. It was
contended before us by the learned senior counsel for the
prosecution that the accused persons in the instant case are
guilty of criminal conspiracy and though the accused persons
G did not know each other, it is not a prerequisite for establishing
the offence of criminal conspiracy provided under Section 120-
A of IPC. On the other hand, it was contended by the learned
senior counsel for the accused persons that neither the common
intention nor the common object of the accused, i.e attack on
H Akshardham temple in the intervening night between
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 239
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
24.09.2002 and 25.09.2002, has been established by the A
prosecution.
To begin with, we intend to reiterate the provisions of the
relevant section of the IPC.
"120-A~ When two or more_persons agree to do, or cause B
to be done-
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an C
agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to
commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy
unless some act besides the agreement is done by one
or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof." D
Explaining what constitutes the offence of criminal
conspiracy, it was held by this Court in the case of K. R
Purushothaman v. State of Kera/a 60 as under:
E
"13. To constitute a conspiracy. meeting of minds of two
or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal
means is the first and primary condition and it is not
necessary that all the conspirators must know each and
every detail of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary that
every one of the conspirators takes active part in the F
commission of each and every conspiratorial acts. The
agreement amongst the conspirators can be inferred by
necessary implication. In most of the cases, the
conspiracies are proved by the circumstantial evidence,
as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair. The existence G
of conspiracy and its objects are usually deduced from the
circumstances of the case and the conduct of the accused
involved in the conspiracy. While appreciating the evidence
60. (2005) 12 sec 631. H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R. .
A of the conspiracy, it is incumbent on the court to keep in
mind the well-known rule governing circumstantial evidence
viz. each and every incriminating circumstance must be
clearly established by reliable evidence and the
circumstances proved must form a chain of events from
B which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the
accused can be safely drawn, and no other hypothesis
against the guilt is possible. Criminal conspiracy is an
independent offence in the Penal Code. The unlawful
agreement is sine qua non for constituting offence under
c the Penal Code and not an accomplishment. Conspiracy
consists of the scheme or adjustment between two or more
persons which may be express or implied or partly express
and partly implied. Mere knowledge, even discussion, of
the plan would not per se constitute conspiracy. The offence
of conspiracy shall continue till the termination of
D
agreement."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
123. The ingredients necessary to establish the offence of
E criminal conspiracy have been discussed by a three Judge
bench of this Court in the case of Ram Narayan Popli & Ors.
& Ors v. Central Bureau of lnvestigation 61 in a portion of the
below para, as under:
"342 ..... The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been
F stated to be: (a) an object to be accomplished, (b) a plan
or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object,
(c) an agreement or understanding between two or more
of the accused persons whereby, they become definitely
committed to co-operate for the accomplishment of the
G object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any
effectual means, and (d) in the jurisdiction where the
statute required an overt act. The essence of a criminal
conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the
H 61. c2003) 3 sec 641.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 241
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
offence is complete when the combination is framed. From A
this, it necessarily follows that unless the statute so
requires, no overt act needs be done in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and that the object of the combination need
not be accomplished, in order to constitute an indictable
offence .... " B
As far as the role of each individual accused is concerned,
it has been established by this Court that each individual
conspirator need not know the contents of the entire conspiracy,
or each and every step. It is possible that the co-conspirator's C
knowledge of the conspiracy is limited to his role in the
conspiracy, and he may have no knowledge about the actions
of the other co-conspirators. In the case of Yash Pal Mittal v.
State of Punjab 62 it was held by this Court as under:
"9. The offence ofcriminal conspiracy under Section 120- D
A is a distinct offence introduced for the first time in 1913
in Chapter V-A of the Penal Code. The very agreement,
concert or league is the ingredient of the offence. It is not
necessary that all the conspirators must know each and
every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co- E
participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There
may be so many devices and techniques adopted to
·achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may
be division of performances in the chain of actions with
one object to achieve the real end of which every F
collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them
must be interested. There must be unity of object or
purpose but there may be plurality of means sometimes
even unknown to one another, amongst the conspirators.
In achieving the goal, several offences may be committed G
by some of the conspirators even unknown to the others.
The only relevant factor is that all means adopted and
illegal acts done must be and purported to be in
furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though
62. (1977) 4 sec 540. H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A there may be sometimes misfire or over-shooting by some
of the conspirators. Even if some steps are resorted to by
one or two of the conspirators without the knowledge of
the others it will not affect the culpability of those others
when they are associated with the object of the
B conspiracy .... "
It was also observed in the case of Ajay Aggarwal v.
Union of India & Ors 63. that:
"8 .... It is not necessary that each conspirator must know
C all the details of the scheme nor be a participant at every
stage. It is necessary that they should agree for design or
object of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as
having three elements: (1) agreement; (2) between two or
more persons by whom the agreement is affected; and (3)
D a criminal object, which may be either the ultimate aim of
the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the
means by which that aim is to be accomplished ..... "
124. In the present case, the prosecution had relied upon
E the information contained in the confessional statements of the
accused persons in order to set up the plea that the offence of
criminal conspiracy had been committed by each one of them.
A careful examination of this information will reveal that this
claim of the prosecution does not hold water.
F 125. To punish an accused under section 120-B of the
IPC, it is essential to establish that there was some common
object to be achieved and that there was an agreement by the
accused persons to achieve that object i.e there was a 'meeting
of minds'. In the present case, it cannot be said that the
G conspiracy was hatched by the accused persons in furtherance
of some common object.
The common object, according to the case of the
prosecution was to take revenge for the Godhra Riots of 2002.
H 63. 1993 (3) sec 609.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 243
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
But this object is vague, and is not very specific and the charge A
of_criminal conspiracy against the accused persons cannot be
proved on its basis. Further, even the confessional statements
of the accused persons did not help the prosecution to
establish the chain of events in pursuance of the alleged
conspiracy. In fact, they are highly contradictory and improbable B
in nature.
126. According to the prosecution, as disclosed in the
confessional statements of A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6, the
conspiracy was hatched in Saudi Arabia, and money was
delivered to India through havala; the two fidayeens were C
apparently escorted to Ahmedabad by one Aiyub Khan and
they also brought the arms and ammunition with them. It was
stated that A-2 then took the fidayeens in his auto rickshaw and
helped them reccie places in Ahmedabad and Gandhinagar,
and finally helped them in choosing the Akshardham temple at D
Gandhinagar as a suitable place to carry out the attack and
hence take the revenge against Hindus for the Godhra riots.
According to the prosecution, A-2 also stated that the
accommodation of the fidayeens was set up at Bavahir Hall.
E
Per contra, as per the confessional statement of A-6, he
was the one who brought the two fidayeens from Kashmir, and
drove the car with ammunitions from Kashmir to Bareilly, and
then came to Ahmedabad in a train, and carried the
ammunitions in bedding. A-6, according to the prosecution, was F
also the one who recceied Gandhinagar and Ahmedabad with
the two fidayeens, before finally settling on Akshardham as the
site of the attack. A.fl _als9 stated, according to the prosecution,
that the fidayeens stayed at the Gulshan Guest House.
Interestingly though, neither A-2 nor A-6 speak of each other G
or each other's role in the planning and conspiracy, even
though they were both seemingly doing the same task, i.e, of
arranging for the accommodation of the fidayeens, and making
them reccie the cities of Gandhinagar and Ahmedabad and we
wonder how there can be two versions of the same event.
H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 127. It is true that in order to establish criminal conspiracy,
it is not required of every co-conspirator to know the entire
sequence of the chain and events, and that they can still be said
to be conspirators even if they are only aware of their limited
roles and are not able to identify the role of any other
B conspirator. But that is not the case here. It is not the case here
that the knowledge of the conspirators is limited to their role.
Each accused claims to have complete knowledge of the
conspiracy, while contradicting the other's version of the same
events to constitute the act of criminal conspiracy.
c 128. Therefore, the confessional statements of the
accused persons and the accomplices do not complement
each other to form a chain of events leading to the offence.
Rather, the depositions of the prosecution witnesses were
contradictory and disrupt the chain of events and turn it into a .
D confusing story with many discrepancies, defeating the roles
of each of the accused persons which have been allegedly
performed by them. Also, none of the events of the alleged
criminal conspiracy was supported by independent evidence
that inspires confidence in our minds to uphold the conviction
I
E and sentences meted out to the accused persons.
128. Hence, we hold that the prosecution has failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt against the accused
persons, for the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section
F 120-B of the IPC. We, therefore answer this point in favour of i
the appellants.
Answer to point no. 9
129. Article 136 of the Constitution confers appellate
G jurisdiction on this court, the scope and powers of which has
been discussed by this court in a catena of decisions.
In the case of Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham &
64
Anr. , Chinappa Reddy, J. observed:
H 64. (1979)2 sec 297.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 245
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
"4 .... Article 136 of the Constitution of India invests the A
Supreme Court with a plenitude of plenary, appellate
power over all Courts and Tribunals in India. The power is
plenary in the sense that there are no words in Article 136
itself qualifying that power. But, the very nature of the power
has led the Court to set limits to itself within which to B
exercise such power. It is now the well established practice
of this Court to permit the invocation of the power under
Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances, as
when a question of law of general public importance arises
or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court. But c
within the restrictions imposed by itself. this Court has the
undoubted power to interfere even with findings of fact
making no distinction between judgment of acquittal and
conviction, if the High Court, in arriving at those findings,
has acted "perversely or otherwise improperly" .... "
0
(emphasis laid by this Court)
While examining as to whether this Court has the power
to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
courts below, it was held in the case of Indira Kaur & Ors. v. E
Sheo Lal Kapoor6 5 as under:
"7 .... Article 136 of the Constitution of India does not forge
any such fetters expressly. It does not oblige this Court to
fold its hands and become a helpless spectator even when
F
this Court perceives that a manifest injustice has been
occasioned. If and when the Court is satisfied that great
injustice has been done it is not only the "right" but also
the "duty'' of this Court to reverse the error and the injustice
and to upset the finding notwithstanding the fact that it has
been affirmed thrice ............ It is not the number of times G
that a finding has been reiterated that matters. What really
matters is whether the finding is manifestly an
unreasonable. and unjust one in the context of evidence
65. (1988) 2 sec 488. H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A on record. It is no doubt true that this Court will unlock the
door opening into the area of facts only sparingly and only
when injustice is perceived to have been perpetuated. But
in any view of the matter there is no jurisdictional lock
which cannot be opened in the face of grave injustice ... "
B
(emphasis laid by this court)
Further, this court has explained the circumstances in which
it can interfere with the findings of the fact recorded by the
courts below. In the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v.
C State of Gujarat66 , it was held by this Court that:
"5 ........ Such a concurrent finding of fact cannot be
reopened in an appeal by special leave unless it is
established : (1) that the finding is based on no evidence
D or (2) that the finding is perverse, it being such as no
reasonable person could have arrived at even if the
evidence was taken at its face value or (3) the finding is
based and built on inadmissible evidence, which evidence,
if excluded from vision, would negate the prosecution case
or substantially discredit or impair it or (4) some vital piece
E
of evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the
convict has been overlooked, disregarded, or wrongly
discarded .... "
More recently, in the case of Ganga Kumar Shrivastav v.
F State of Biha~ 7 it was stated while discussing previous cases
on the subject that, the following principles could guide the
courts in determining the scope of the criminal appellate
jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court, especially on the
issue of reversing findings of fact by the lower courts:
G
"10.
66. (1983)3 sec 211.
H 67. (2005)6 sec 211.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 247
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the A
Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this Court
does not interfere with the concurrent findings of the fact ·
save in exceptional circumstances.
(ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of
8
fact given by the High Court if the High Court has acted
perversely of otherwise improperly.
(iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article
136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and when
a question of law of general public importance arises or a C
decision shocks the conscience of, the Court.
(iv)When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell
short of the test of reliability and acceptability and as such
it is highly unsafe to act upon it. o
(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is
vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary
to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and
misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of
the High Court are manifestly perverse and E
unsupportable from the evidence on record
130. From the aforementioned two cases, the legal
principles laid down regarding the scope and ambit of exercise
of this Court's power, it is clear that even though the powers F
under Article 136 must be exercised sparingly, yet, there is
absolutely nothing in the Article whi<;:h prohibits this Court from
reversing the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below, if
it is of the opinion on the· basis of the evidence on record, that
affirming the findings of the courts below will result in a grave G
miscarriage of justice. Moreover, it has been held by this Court
in the case of Mohammad Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v.
State of Maharashtra 68 that if the case is of dP.ath sentence,
this Court can exercise its power to examine material on record
68. (2012) 9 sec 1. H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A first hand and come to its own conclusion on facts and law,
unbound by the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court.
131. Here, we intend to take note of the perversity in
conducting this case at various stages, right from the
8 investigation level to the granting of sanction by the state
government to prosecute the accused persons under POTA,
the conviction and awarding of sentence to the accused
persons by the Special Court (POTA) and confirmation of the
same by the High Court. We, being the apex court cannot afford
C to sit with folded hands when such gross violation of
fundamental rights and basic human rights of the citizens of this
country were presented before us. The investigation process
post Akshardham attack happened as under:
The incidence of Akshardham happened in the
D intervening nights between 24.09.2002 and
25.09.2002. An FIR was registered by PW-126 on
25.09.2002.
According to the instruction of Superintendent of
E Police, the investigation of the complaint was
handed over to Police Inspector Shri V.R. Tolia
(PW-113).
The investigation was then handed over to the Anti
Terrorist Squad on 03.10.2002.
F
The investigation was thereafter handed over to the
Crime Branch which was assigned to PW-126 on
28.08.2003 at 6:30 p.m.
The statement of PW-50 was taken at 8 p.m, on the
G
same night of 28.08.2003, after receiving verbal
instruction from higher officer-D.G. Vanzara in the
morning.
A-1 to A-5 were arrested on 29.08.2003.
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 249
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
POTA was invoked on 30.08.2003. A
The l.G.P. Kashmir sends a fax message to l.G.P.
operations ATS Gujarat state on 31.08.2003
regarding A-6 being in the custody of Kashmir
Police and that he has stated that he was involved 8
in the Akshardham attack.
A-6 was brought to Ahmedabad on 12.09.2003 and
was arrested at 9:30 p.m.
A-1 and A-3 confessed on 17.09.2003. c
A-2 and A-A confessed on 24.09.2003.
A-6 confessed on 05.10.2003.
A-6 was broughtto Ahmedabad on 12.09.2003 and' D
was arrested at 9:30 p.m.
A careful observation of the above said dates would show
that the ATS was shooting in the dark for about a year without
any result. No trace of the people associated with this heinous E
attack on the Akshardham temple could be found by the police.
Then on the morning of 28.03.2003, the case is transferred to
Crime Branch, Ahmedabad. This was followed by D.G. Vanzara
giving instructions to the then-ACP G.S. Singhal (PW-126)
about one Ashfaq Bhavnagri (PW-50). PW-126 was thereafter
made in charge of the case on the same evening at 6:30 p.m. F
and the statement of PW-50 was recorded at 8 p.m., i.e within
one and a half hours. This shrouds our minds with suspicion
as to why such a vital witness- D.G. Vanzara, who discovered
the link to the accused persons, was not examined by the
Special Court (POTA). The courts below accepted the facts G
and evidence produced by the police without being suspicious
about the extreme coincidences with which the chain of events
unfolded itself immediately that is, within 24 hours of the case
being transferred to the Crime Branch, Ahmedabad.
H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 132. We are reminded of the legendary lines of Justice
Vivian Bose in the case of Kashmira Singh's case (supra)
wherein he cautioned that:
"2. The murder was a particularly cruel and revolting one
B and for that reason it will be necessary to examine the
evidence with more than ordinary care lest the shocking
nature of the crime induce an instinctive reaction against
the dispassionate judicial scrutiny of the facts and law."
(emphasis laid by this court)
c
The 'courts below have not examined the evidence with
'more than ordinary care'. Firstly, the Special Court (POTA)
accepted the justification made by the prosecution in sending
the accused persons to police custody after being produced
D before the CJM on the ground that there was no complaint
made by them.
Secondly, the courts below held that the fact that A-1 to
A-5 did not know A-6, does not disprove the theory of.criminal
E conspiracy, rather it displays the extreme caution with which the
conspiracy was hatched. We are unable to bring ourselves to
agree with this reasoning of the courts below, as in the instant
case, not only did A-1 to A-5 not know A-6 and vice versa, but
also A-2, A-4 and A-6 had narrated different versions of the
same story, each of which contradicted the other and was
F actually fatal to the case of the prosecution. The courts below
mechanically and without applying their mind, discarded this
contention of the learned counsel on behalf of the accused
persons.
G Thirdly, the two Urdu letters purported to have been
recovered from the pockets of the trousers of the fidayeens
(Ex.658), did not have even a drop of blood, mud or perforation
by the bullets, whereas on physical examination of the trousers
by us, which are marked as mudammal objects, we found that
H the clothes on the pockets of the fidayeens were perforated with
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 251
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
bullets and smeared with dried blood even after 12 years of A
the incident.
The Special Court (POTA) however, did not find it
imperative to examine why the letters recovered from the·
pockets of the trousers of the fidayeens were spotless. It B
admitted the letters as evidence merely on the basis of the
, confessional statement of A-4 who had, in his statement
recorded that he had written the letters and had also-kept the
pen to prove that the letters were written with the same pen.
The Special Court (POTA) also admitted the letters as evidence C
on the ground that signatures of Brigadier Raj Sitapati as per
the statement of PW-91 Major Lamba, were present on those
letters. The High Court admitted the letters as evidence on the
ground that "truth is stranger than fiction" by overlooking not
only the most impossible fact that the letters marked by the
police were spotless; but also ignoring the evidence of PW-105 D
who in his deposition recorded that there were no signatures
of Brigadier Sitapati or anyone else on the letters when they
were handed over to PW-126.
133. Another error of the courts below is reflected in the E
fact that they have not given the same weightage to the defence
witnesses as they have to the prosecution witnesses. The
learned senior counsel for the accused persons contended that
the courts below should have given same weigthage to the
evidence of the defence witnesses as that of the prosecution F
witnesses. However, the evidence of DW-3 was not only
discarded but also not mentioned in the decision of the Special
Court (POTA). DW-3 stated as under:
"Nazneen Bastawala was a Municipal Corporator in
Dariyapur area in the year 2003. Air those were arrested G
on 25.8.2003 under POTA. Therefore, a rally was
organized for going from Dariyapur Lake to Kalupur. 200-
300 women gathered near Dariyapur Talawadi at ten o
clock in the morning. While we were going for rally, police
H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A made lathi charges and Nazneen was forced to sit in
vehicle.
Thereafter, we were taken to the Office of the
B Commissioner at Shahibag in vehicle. Police personnel
said that you have to engage advocate for obtaining bail.
We were taken to Court no. 10 from there at
Meghaninagar. Nazneen Ben called an advocate by
making a phone and thereafter we were released on bail
c at about 5 o' clock in the evening on the relevant day.
The persons who were taken from Dariyapur Kalupur under
POTA were- Maulvi Ahmed, Maulvi Abdulla, Mufti Kayum
D and many such people. All these people were taken before
eight to nine days of the rally."
In Cross Examination by Special P.P. Shri H.M. Dhruv for
the state, DW-3 states as under:
E
"....... I had given the names of the boys who were arrested
under POTA to Nazneenben. Boys were talking in Mohalla.
Maulvi Ahmed resides in Kalupur. It takes five to seven
minutes if we go to Kalupur on foot from my house which
is situated at Dariyapur. Maulvi Abdullah resides at
F
Baluchawad Moti Haveli in Kalupur area. Mufti Kayum
resides in Dariyapur and his house is situated at a
distance of two to three minutes from my house. It is true
that there may not be any occasion for me to visit houses
of these people, only we meet on the way. It is true that
G Nazneen Ben told for arranging the rally in respect of their
arrest under POTA. It is true that boys were saying that
Maulvi Abdulla. Mufti Kayum and Maulvi Ahmed had been
taken away by arresting them under POTA. It is not true
that I had stated falsely that Mufti Abdulla. Mufti Kayum and
H
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 253
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
Maulvi Ahmed were taken before 8 to 9 days of A
25.8.2003.
They were not my kin or kith out of the persons who have
been arrested in POTA. We reside in one Mohalla and we
belong to one caste. Mufti Kayum is my neighbour. There B
is distance of two or three minutes between our houses .
... .. Mother of Mufti Kayum met me and she told that they
have been taken and no one is released and therefore, a
rally is required to be arranged. There were two vehicles
of police. Fifty or sixty women went in them and the rest of C
them had left."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
(translation extracted from the Additional documents
submitted on behalf of the appellants) D
It has been held by this Court in a catena of cases that
while examining the witnesses on record, equal weightage shall
be given to the defence witnesses as that of the prosecution
witnesses. In the case of Munshi Prasad & Ors. v. State of
Biha~9, this Court held as under: E
"3 ..... Before drawing the curtain on this score however. we
wish to clarify that the evidence tendered by the defence
witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one
by reason of the factum of the witnesses being examined F
by the defence. The defence witnesses are entitled to
equal respect and treatment as that of the prosecution. The
issue of credibility and the trustworthiness ought also to be
attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of
the prosecution - a lapse on the part of the defence G
witness cannot be differentiated and be treated differently
than that of the prosecutors' witnesses." ·
(emphasis laid by this Court)
69. c2002) 1 sec 351. . H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 7 S.C.R.
A Further, it has been held in the case of State of Haryana
v. Ram Singh 70 as under:
"19 ............. Incidentally, be it noted t~at the evidence
tendered by defence witnesses cannot always be termed
to be a tainted one - the defence witnesses are entitled
B
to equal treatment and equal respect as that of the
prosecution. The issue of credibility and the
trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence
witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution. Rejection
of the defence case on the basis of the evidence tendered
c by the defence witness has been effected rather casually
by the High Court. Suggestion was there to the prosecution
witnesses, in particular PW 1O Dholu Ram that his father
Manphool was missing for about 2/3 days prior to the day
of the occurrence itself - what more is expected of the
D defence case: a doubt or a certainty - jurisprudentially a
doubt would be enough: when such a suggestion has been
made the prosecution has to bring on record the availability
of the deceased during those 2/3 days with. some
independent evidence. Rejection of the defence case only
E by reason thereof is far too strict and rigid a requirement
for the defence to meet - it is the prosecutor's duty to
prove beyond all reasonable doubts and not the defence
to prove its innocence - this itself is a circumstance,
which cannot but be termed to be suspicious in nature."
F
(emphasis laid by this Court)
Also, in the case of State of U.P. v. Babu Ram 71 , this court
held as under:
G "21. Shri N.P. Midha, learned counsel for the respondent
submitted written submissions over and above the oral
arguments zddressed by him. One of the contentions
70. c2002) 2 sec 426.
H 71. c2000) 4 sec 515.
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 255
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
adverted to by the learned counsel is pertaining to the A
evidence of the defence witness (DW 1 Moharam Ali).
Counsel contended that if the evidence of DW 1 Moharam
Ali can be believed it is sufficient to shake the basic
structure of the prosecution evidence. Shri N.P. Midha
invited our attention to ttfe following observations contained B
in the decision of this Court in Dudh Nath Pandey v. State
/•
of UP.. (SCC p. 173, para 19)
"Defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment
with those of the prosecution. And, courts ought to
overcome their traditional, instinctive disbelief in C
defence witnesses."
22. We may quote the succeeding sentence also from the
said decision for the sake of completion of the
observations of their Lordships on that score. It is this: D
"Quite often they tell lies but so do the prosecution
witnesses."
23. Depositions of witnesses, whether they are examined
on the prosecution side or defence side or as court E
witnesses, are oral evidence in the case and hence the
scrutiny thereof shall be without any predilection or bias.
No witness is entitled to get better treatment merely
because he was examined as a prosecution witness or
even as a court witness. It is judicial scrutiny which is
warranted in respect of the depositions of all witnesses for F
which different yardsticks cannot be prescribed as for
those different categories of witnesses. "
(emphasis laid by this Court)
G
134. The courts below had ignored these basic legal
principles while admitting the statement of witnesses while
weighing the case against the accused persons. While the
decision of the Special Court (POTA) found mention of DW-1,
DW-2, DW-4, DW-5 and DW-6, the evidence of DW-3 which H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A indicated that some of the accused persons might have actually
been detained in police custody much before the official date
of arrest, had been completely overlooked.
However, FIR-ICR No. 3090 of 2003 (Ex.733) in the
present case shows that DW-3 was arrested along with some
8
other women under Section 188 IPC for protesting against
detention of some persons from their area. This, read with the
notification G.P.K.N.S./774/2003 by the Police Commissioner
Ahmedabad City holding that from date 16.08.2003 00100 hrs.
to 31.08.2003 at 24.00 hrs., not more than four persons shall
C gather for holding or calling any meeting or shall take out any
procession, indicates a story under the layers of truth which the
police has managed to suppress and the courts below
overlooked.
D Therefore, according to us, this is a fit case for interference
by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, as we are
of the firm view that the concurrent findings of fact of the Special
Court (POTA) and the High Court are not only erroneous in fact
but also suffers from error in law.
E
Answer to point no. 10
135. On the basis of the issues we have already answered
above based on the facts and evidence on record and on the
basis of the legal principles laid down by this Court, we are
F convinced that accused persons are innocent with respect to
the charges leveled against them. We are of the view that the
judgment and order of the Special Court (POTA) in POTA case
No. 16 of 2003 dated 01.07.2006 and the impugned judgment
and order dated 01.06.2010 of the High Court of Gujarat at
G Ahmedabad in Criminal Confirmation Case No.2 of 2006 along
with Criminal Appeal Nos. 1675 of 2006 and 1328 of 2006 are
liable to be set aside. Consequently, the sentences of death
awarded to A-2, A-4 and A-6, life imprisonment awarded to A-
3, 10 years of Rigorous Imprisonment awarded to A-5 are set
H aside. Since we are acquitting all the accused in appeal before
ADAMBHAI SULEMANBHAI AJMERI v. STATE OF 257
GUJARAT [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
us for the reasons mentioned in this judgment and also, since A
A-1 was convicted and sentenced on the basis of the same
evidence which we have already rejected, we also acquit A-1
who is not in appeal before us, of the conviction and sentence
of 5 years Rigorous Imprisonment awarded to him by the courts
below, exercising the power of this Court under Article 142 of B
the Constitution and hold him not guilty of the charges framed
against him. We are aware that he has already served his
sentence. However, we intend to absolve him of the stigma he
is carrying of that of a convict, wrongly held guilty of offences
of terror so that he is able to return to his family and society, c
free from any suspicion. ·
136. Before parting with the judgment, we intend to express
our anguish about the incompetence with which the
investigating agencies conducted the investigation of the case
0
of such a grievous nature, involving the integrity and security of
the Nation. Instead of booking the real culprits responsible for
taking so many precious lives, the police caught innocent
people and got imposed the grievous charges against them
which resulted in their conviction and subsequent sentencing.
E
137. We allow the appeals accordingly by setting aside
., the judgment and order of Special Court (POTA) in POTA case
No. 16 of 2003 dated 01.07 .2006 and the impugned common
judgment and orders dated 01.06.2010 of the High Court of
Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Confirmation Case No.2 of F
2006 along with Criminal Appeal Nos. 1675 of 2006 and 1328
of 2006. Accordingly, we acquit all the appellants in the present
appeals, of all the charges framed against them. The appellants
who are in custody shall be set at liberty forthwith, if they are
not required in any other criminal case. We also set aside the G
conviction and sentence awarded to A-1, though he has already
undergone the sentence served on him. All the applications filed
in these appeals are accordingly disposed of.
Nidhi Jain Appeals allowed.
H
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