AGNIRAJ & ORS. ETC.versusSTATE THROUGH DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE CB-CID

                 [2025] 5 S.C.R. 856 : 2025 INSC 774

                     Agniraj & Ors. etc.
                             v.
    State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID
               (Criminal Appeal No(s). 1686-1688 of 2023)
                                 23 May 2025
               [Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court was justified in upholding the conviction
       of the appellants/accused no. 1 to 11 for offences punishable
       u/ss.302 and 307 r/w. s.149 of the Penal Code, 1860 and the other
       offences; whether, in the instant case, the trial Court followed the
       condition precedent before examining a minor witness; whether
       the trial Court satisfied itself that minor witness understood the
       importance of the oath.

                                  Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 307 r/w.149 – Tamil Nadu Prevention
       of Damage to Public Property Act, 1992 – s.3 – FIR lodged
       against thirty accused persons on a complaint made by
       PW-1 – There was political rivalry between the parties – On
       the night of 14.11.2012, PW-1, deceased no. 1 (brother of
       PW-1) along with his son (deceased no. 2) and daughter
       PW-9, were travelling in a car driven by his driver (deceased
       no. 3) – At around 9:30 p.m., a truck came towards them from
       the opposite side – To avoid a collision, deceased no. 3 swerved
       the car, and the truck grazed the car – A group including
       accused no. 1, armed with weapons attacked the car and its
       inmates – PW-1 escaped and hid in a nearby bush – The group
       attacked the three other occupants to death – When the group
       tried setting the car on fire, they spotted some men in police
       uniforms and fled – PW-2 witnessed this incident with one
       AR – Written complaint filed by PW-1 led to the registration
       of the FIR – Prosecution also relied upon fingerprints lifted
       from the car and recovery of weapons – Out of the twenty-
       one accused who were charged, accused nos. 1 to 11 were
       convicted and others were acquitted – High Court confirmed
       the findings of the Trial Court – Correctness:


* Author
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                              857

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

     Held: The material prosecution witnesses are PW-1 who is the
     first informant and alleged eye-witness, PW-2 and PW-9, a minor
     witness – Firstly, the evidence of PW-1 is dealt with – It is brought
     on record that though the DSP and other police officers met PW-1 at
     the scene of the offence, they did not record his statement – It has
     come on record that PW-1 did not directly go to the police station to
     record his complaint – Instead, PW-1 along with an advocate, PW-
     14 and PW15 went to the police station and handed over a written
     complaint to PW-52 – There was a political rivalry between him and
     accused No. 1 – The possibility of filing complaint after deliberation
     with the supporters of political party cannot be ruled out – In the
     written complaint, PW-1 named 22 persons as accused – During
     investigation, 36 persons were treated as accused, out of which,
     only 21 persons were charged – 15 accused persons were dropped
     with the consent of PW-1 – The reason given is that PW-1 was
     nervous and hence, he exaggerated the incident by naming the said
     15 accused – He gave no objection for deletion of 15 accused –
     PW-1 admitted that, in his report, he stated that 36 persons stood
     around the car – Then he came out with the theory that there were
     20 persons – PW-1 has exaggerated the incident due to their political
     rivalry – He was unsure about the number of accused who were
     present at the time of the incident – The incident happened after
     09:30 pm – PW-1 has not stated the distance between the bush in
     which he was hiding and the spot of the incident – There is a serious
     doubt whether he could have seen the incident in the light of the
     car – Therefore, the evidence of PW-1 does not inspire confidence
     – Now, dealing with evidence of PW-2 – For more than one and
     a half months, he did not approach the police or filed a complaint
     in any form – Considering the conduct of the witness of remaining
     silent for a long period of one and a half months, the testimony of
     this witness cannot be believed – Moreover, during this period, he
     moved from place to place – It is not his case that anyone threatened
     him during the said period – Moreover, he stated that one AR was
     an eye-witness – However, the prosecution failed to examine him
     – Therefore, adverse inference will have to be drawn against the
     prosecution – Now coming to PW-9, who was 10 years old on the
     date of recording of evidence – The Trial Court has not followed
     the condition precedent before examining a minor witness – Before
     administering oath, the Trial Judge did not satisfy himself that the
     witness understood the importance of the oath – Moreover, she
     deposed that after the date of occurrence, for the first time in the
     Court, she identified several accused – But test identification parade
     was not held – From the answers given in the cross-examination
858                                                            [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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       that her mother told her the details of what happened to her, the
       possibility of tutoring the witness cannot be ruled out – Minors are
       prone to tutoring and in this case – Considering other materials
       on record, the failure of the prosecution to draw a Mahazar or
       Panchnama at the time of taking photographs of the fingerprints
       on the car goes to the root of the matter – The case made out by
       the prosecution cannot be accepted – Since evidence of PW-1,
       PW-2 and PW-9 and fingerprints allegedly found are to be ignored,
       what remains is the evidence of the alleged recovery of weapons
       at the instance of the accused – Only on the basis of recovery, by
       no stretch of imagination can the accused be convicted – Thus,
       impugned judgments of the High Court and the trial Court are set
       aside. [Paras 27-30, 32, 35, 42]

       Evidence – Recording evidence of a minor – Procedure:
       Held: The law is well settled that before proceeding to record
       the evidence of a minor witness, preliminary questions must be
       asked by the Court to ascertain whether the witness is able to
       understand the questions and answer the same – The Court must
       be satisfied about the capacity of the minor to understand the
       questions and answer the same – In the instant case, the age of
       PW-9 was 10 years – However, preliminary questions were not
       put to the witness – The Court did not ask any question to the
       witness to ascertain whether she understands the importance of
       an oath – Without satisfying himself that the witness understands
       the importance of an oath, the Trial Judge administered oath to
       her – It is very well known that child witnesses are susceptible
       to tutoring and therefore, not asking preliminary questions to the
       minor witness makes her evidence very vulnerable. [Para 25]
       Constitution of India – Art. 134 vis-à-vis Art. 136 – Scope of
       Appellate jurisdiction – Re-appreciation of evidence in criminal
       appeal arising out of Art. 136 – Discussed. [Paras 36-39]

                                Case Law Cited
       Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2022] 2 SCR 13 : (2022) 10 SCC
       321; Mst Dalbir Kaur and Others v. State of Punjab [1977] 1 SCR
       280 : (1976) 4 SCC 158 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
       Penal Code, 1860; Tamil Nadu Prevention of Damage to Public
       Property Act, 1992.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                                859

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

                              List of Keywords
     Section 302 of IPC; Political rivalry; President of the Panchayat
     Board; Eye-witnesses; Minor witness; AIADMK party; Communist
     party; Election; Delay in recording statement; Importance of oath;
     Child witnesses; Susceptible to tutoring; Preliminary questions to
     minor witness; Test identification parade; Dropping the names;
     Mahazar; Panchnama; Fingerprints; Recovery of weapons; Article
     134; Article 136; Distinction between appellate jurisdiction in criminal
     matters; Interference with concurrent findings; Re-appreciating
     evidence.

                             Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
     No(s).1686-1688 of 2023
     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.03.2019 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Madras in Madurai in CRLA (MD) Nos. 290, 291,
     292 of 2015

                          Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellants:
     R. Basant, Siddharth Agarwal, Sr. Advs., Rajeev Maheshwaranand
     Roy, Manu Krishnan, Raunak Arora, Gunjan Kumar.
     Advs. for the Respondent:
     Amit Anand Tiwari, Sr. A.A.G., Sabarish Subramanian, Ms. Devyani
     Gupta, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Ms. Tanvi Anand, Ms. Saushria
     Havelia, Ms. Jahnavi Taneja, Pranjal Mishra, Danish Saifi, Vishal
     Tyagi.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

     ABHAY S. OKA, J.

     FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.   These appeals have been filed against the judgment dated 21st March
     2019, of the High Court of Madras at Madurai. The impugned judgment
     upheld the conviction of the Accused Nos. 1 to 11 for the offences
     punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 of
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                          Supreme Court Reports


       the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’), and Section 3(1)
       of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act. The
       Accused Nos. 1 and 9 to 11 have also been convicted under Section
       147 of the IPC, while Accused Nos. 2 to 8 have been convicted
       under Section 148 of the IPC. The appellants were sentenced to
       suffer life imprisonment.
2.     A First Information Report (for short, ‘the FIR’) was registered on
       14th November 2012 under Sections 147, 148, 307, 302, and 120B
       of the IPC and Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Damage
       to Public Property Act against thirty accused persons on a complaint
       made by PW-1.
3.     The prosecution’s case is that the family members of Accused No.
       1 had occupied the post of President of the Panchayat Board for
       approximately four decades. In the 2011 elections, the wife of PW-1
       won the elections. The brother of PW-1 (Deceased No. 1) worked
       extremely hard during the elections. Both sides allegedly engaged
       in numerous skirmishes in the months following the elections. On
       the night of 14th November 2012, Deceased No. 1 (Kathiresan/
       brother of PW-1), along with his son Prasanna (Deceased No. 2) and
       daughter Nikila (PW-9), were travelling in a car driven by his driver
       (Deceased No. 3). At around 9:30 p.m., a truck came towards them
       from the opposite side. In an attempt to avoid a collision, Deceased
       No. 3 swerved the Scorpio car to the left, and the truck grazed the
       car. Deceased No. 3 stopped the car after being hit. At that time,
       Accused No. 1 and some others arrived by three motorbikes, while
       others jumped from the truck and approached the car. The group
       was armed with weapons and attacked the car and its inmates, and
       attempted to set them on fire. PW-1 managed to escape and hid
       in a nearby bush. The group attacked the three deceased to death
       and inflicted serious knife injuries to PW-9. When the group tried
       setting the car on fire, they spotted some men in police uniforms
       and fled the scene.
4.     After this, PW-1 narrated the incident to PW-52 (Sub-Inspector) and
       PW-56 (Deputy Superintendent of Police). A written complaint filed
       by PW-1 led to the registration of the FIR mentioned above. During
       the investigation, thirty-six persons were arraigned as accused. Out
       of them, fifteen persons were dropped by the prosecution, and a
       chargesheet was filed against twenty-one persons. PW-1 gave his
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                       861

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

     no objection to dropping the names of these fifteen persons. The
     prosecution also relied upon fingerprints lifted from the Scorpio car,
     which matched the fingerprints of Accused Nos. 2 and 3. PW-35,
     who prepared the fingerprint report, was examined as a witness.
     PW-46, who was a photographer and who took photographs of the
     fingerprints, was also examined. The prosecution has also stated that
     aruvals were recovered at the instance of Accused Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6
     and 8. At the instance of Accused No. 5, a knife has been recovered.
     A wooden log was recovered at the instance of Accused No. 11. The
     prosecution has also placed reliance on paint flakes found in the
     Scorpio car that matched with that of the truck.
5.   The Trial Court examined fifty-eight witnesses, out of which the
     material eye witnesses are PW-1(Krishnan) who is the informant,
     PW-2 (Loorthu Prabhu) who witnessed the incident with one Abdul
     Rahman, and PW-9 (Nikila) who is the minor daughter of PW-1 and
     sustained injuries.
6.   Based on the evidence on record, the Trial Court vide judgment dated
     29th September 2015 convicted Accused Nos. 1 to 11 and sentenced
     them to life imprisonment. The Trial Court acquitted Accused Nos.
     12 to 21 of all the charges. Against this judgment of the Trial Court,
     Accused Nos. 1 to 11 filed an appeal against their conviction before
     the High Court. The State and PW-1 also challenged the acquittal
     of Accused Nos. 12 to 21. These appeals came to be decided by
     the High Court vide the impugned judgment which confirmed the
     findings of the Trial Court and dismissed all appeals.

     SUBMISSIONS
7.   The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submits that
     the case of the prosecution is based on three eye witnesses, namely
     PW-1, PW-2, and PW-9, all of which have material contradictions
     and cannot be relied upon. He took us through the depositions of
     PW-1 and contended that this was wholly unreliable as it has material
     embellishments and exaggerations. While PW-1 claims to have told
     PW-52 (Sub-Inspector) and PW-56 (Deputy Superintendent of Police)
     about the incident at the scene of the incident itself, no statement
     has been recorded by them. Instead, he, along with an advocate
     and members of his political party, went with a written complaint to
     the police station almost two hours after the incident. The learned
     senior counsel contends that PW-1 has exaggerated the incident
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       and initially named thirty-six persons as accused. Therefore, he said
       that he has no objection if the names of fifteen accused persons
       are removed.
8.     Regarding PW-2, the learned senior counsel for the appellants submits
       that PW-2 is a chance witness who allegedly saw the incident with
       one Abdul Rahman. This PW-2 emerged from thin air after 43 days
       from the date of the incident and Abdul Rahman has not even been
       examined. Accordingly, an adverse inference has to be drawn based
       on this. No test identification parade has been conducted either.
9.     Regarding PW-9 who was 7 years and 11 months at the time of the
       incident and was examined at the age of about 9 years, the appellant
       contends that no preliminary questions were asked. In the absence
       of voir dire examination, the appellant argues that no reliance can
       be placed on her statement.
10. In relation to other corroborating evidence, the learned senior counsel
    for the appellants has submitted that the fingerprint evidence is
    unreliable as PW-46 who was the photographer had denied taking
    the photos of the fingerprints and these photographs have not
    been exhibited either. No Mazhar was prepared of the fingerprints
    appearing in the car or while taking the fingerprints of the accused
    either. The learned senior counsel for the appellants also submits
    that there are contradictions in the recovery of weapons. No proper
    procedure was followed while collecting the paint flakes on the car
    either as mazhar was not prepared and no record was produced
    to show where the paint flakes were picked up from and to whom
    it was handed over.
11. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State
    made a preliminary objection regarding the jurisdiction of this Court
    to consider the evidence that was on record before the Trial Court
    and the High Court. He made a distinction between the jurisdiction
    of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and
    Article 134 which is the criminal appellate jurisdiction. The learned
    senior counsel vehemently submitted that this Court while exercising
    jurisdiction under Article 136 has to only consider whether the findings
    recorded by the High Court or Trial Court suffers from any manifest
    illegality or perversity and cannot reappreciate evidence. In cases
    where there are concurrent findings of conviction such as the present,
    the learned senior counsel submitted that this Court cannot interfere
    with such findings by reappreciating evidence.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                     863

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

12. The learned senior counsel supported the findings of both the Trial
    Court and the High Court and submitted that the appellants have not
    been able to controvert any of these findings. He stated that there
    is nothing to show that PW-1 was planted or was not present at the
    scene of the incident. The presence of PW-1 is also established
    by the statement of PW-9 and other witnesses. He submitted that
    there is no embellishment or material contradictions in the testimony
    of PW-1. The allegation of tutoring and making false allegations
    was rejected by the Trial Court and the High Court. He has also
    explained the delay of approximately 2 hours in registering the FIR
    by explaining the chain of events after the incident.
13. On the argument that there was a delay in recording the statement of
    PW-2, the learned senior counsel for the State contends that PW-2
    could not approach the police as he had witnessed a gruesome
    attack by and against people he knew making his fear justifiable.
    The conduct of a person who has witnessed such a murderous
    assault can differ from person to person. As the statement of PW-2
    has been consistent, it cannot be disregarded only because of the
    delay and because he knew PW-1 and his family. Further, it is not
    necessary that adverse inference has to be drawn for not examining
    Abdul Rahman as the totality of circumstances has to be seen.
14. The learned senior counsel submitted that the Trial Court and High
    Court found the testimony of PW-9 as reliable. The High Court had
    made an observation that preliminary questions were put to PW-9.
    Even if they were not put, it cannot be the sole reason for rejecting
    the witness testimony of PW-9. He has also relied on corroborating
    evidence such as the fingerprints of accused Nos. 2 and 3 being
    found in the car, blood recovery from bikes of the accused, and
    the paint flakes of the truck matching with the car. Accordingly, the
    learned senior counsel submitted that there is no scope to interfere
    with the concurrent findings of both the Trial Court and the High
    Court in the limited jurisdiction that this Court has when hearing
    cases under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

     CONSIDERATION
     Consideration of material prosecution witnesses
15. The material prosecution witnesses are PW-1 (Krishnan) who is the
    first informant and alleged eye-witness, PW-2 (Loorthu Prabhu) and
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       PW-9 (Nikila), a minor witness. Firstly, we deal with the evidence
       of PW-1 (Krishnan). He stated that one of his brothers was working
       as the Secretary of the District Student Group in the AIADMK party.
       PW-1 (Krishnan) further deposed that the said brother was the
       deceased, Kathiresan. His wife is Prema. Kathiresan and Prema
       had two children, Prasanna and Nikila (PW-9). He stated that for
       40 years, the father of the accused No.1 (since deceased), was
       the Panchayat President of Periyakannoor. After the demise of his
       father, accused No.1 and thereafter, his wife became the President.
       PW-1’s wife (Sathya) and accused No.1’s wife contested the election
       against each other in the year 2011. PW-1’s wife was elected as
       the Panchayat President. Kathiresan worked hard in the election of
       Sathya. According to PW-1 (Krishnan), the accused No. 1 belonged to
       the Communist Party. He has given a history of the dispute between
       his family and the family of the accused.
16. He deposed about the incident that occurred on 14th November 2012
    by stating that at about 6:30 pm, his brother Kathiresan, his son
    Prasanna and daughter Nikila (PW-9) came by a Scorpio car which
    was driven by his driver, Boominathan, to his village. He stated that
    when he along with Kathiresan started for Sivagangai in the night
    at 9 pm, Kathiresan was sitting on the seat to the left of the driver,
    PW-1 was on the rear seat behind his brother and Nikila (PW-9)
    and Prasanna were sitting on his right-hand side. He stated that at
    about 9:30 pm, an oncoming truck came towards the Scorpio car. To
    avoid a collision, the driver turned the car to the left side but the truck
    grazed the car. At that time, Kathiresan asked the driver to switch on
    the lights inside the car. He saw accused No. 7 (Vijaykumar) getting
    out of the truck with a 10-litre white can. At that time, 6 to 7 people
    got out of the truck with weapons like aruval, knife and wooden log.
    Four motorcycles came there. From the said motorcycles, accused
    No. 1 (Arjunan), accused No. 2 (Agniraj), accused No. 3 (Sathyaraj),
    accused No. 4 (Paulpandi), accused No. 6 (Yoganathan), accused
    No. 9 (Kanthamalai), accused No. 10 (Ganesan), accused No. 13
    (Muthukumar) and accused No. 17 (Bose), came there. Accused
    No.1 (Arjunan) shouted to cut the persons sitting inside the car
    and burn them by pouring kerosene. At that time, accused Nos.
    5 (Siva Kumar), 8 (Suresh @ Lenin Kumar),11 (Jayakumar), 14
    (Kanagarajan) and 16 (Rajamani) also came with accused No.7
    (Vijaykumar). Accused No.8 (Suresh @ Lenin Kumar) broke the car
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                         865

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

     mirror and accused No.2 (Agniraj) smashed the windscreen of the
     car with the aruval in his hand. When Kathiresan got out of the car,
     accused No.2 (Agniraj) assaulted him with an aruval. By that time,
     PW-1 (Krishnan) had gotten out of the car. Kathiresan told him to
     run away. He ran into Karuvelam tree bush. He deposed that the
     accused No.3 (Sathyaraj) hit the head of Prasanna, and he fell into
     the nearby stream. Accused No.4 (Paulpandi) assaulted the driver
     of the car on his head with an aruval.
17. Accused No. 5 (Sivakumar) stabbed and injured the driver
    Boominathan with a knife. Accused No.6 (Yoganathan) pulled out
    Nikila (PW-9) and assaulted her on her head with an aruval. Thereafter,
    all the accused came together and assaulted Kathiresan, his son
    and the driver. They poured kerosene, which was in the 10-litre white
    colour can, around the car. At the time of setting the car on fire, a van
    came from the other side. Accused No.3 (Sathyaraj) told the driver
    of the Tata Magic van to go away. However, the van stopped and
    two police men wearing uniforms got down of that van. The accused
    who came by motorcycles went back by motorcycles, and others
    sat in the truck of accused No.7 (Vijaykumar) and left. The witness
    stated that he saw two police men coming, and after the accused
    left, he came to the place of occurrence from the place where he
    was hiding in the bush. The witness claimed that he had seen the
    occurrence through the headlight of the car, the light inside the car
    and the light of the truck. The witness stated that he received a call
    from his father. At that time, the witness talked about the details of
    the incident to his father. Thereafter, one person stopped his Maruti
    car, and he called the telephone No. 108. The witness further stated
    that a bus came there and 4 to 5 policemen got down from the
    bus. The policemen enquired about the incident. These policemen
    informed the police department. He stated that Kathiresan, his son
    Prasanna and his driver died. Thereafter, the 108 van came. On his
    complaint, an FIR was registered.
18. Now, we come to the cross-examination of the PW-1. In the cross-
    examination, he stated that he was hiding in a bush during the
    occurrence. He came out after the police had arrived. He stated
    that when he went to the place of occurrence from the bush, the
    Deputy Superintendent of Police (for short ‘the DSP’) had arrived at
    the place. When he was crying, the DSP questioned him. He told
    the details to the DSP. He was not sure whether the DSP recorded
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                          Supreme Court Reports


       the information given by him in writing. He stated that from the
       Superintendent of Police to the higher police officers, all came to
       the place of occurrence. He stated that he went to the hospital at
       10:45 pm. In the hospital, the doctors asked him about the incident.
       Though there were number of police officials in the hospital, no
       one enquired with him about the incident. He stated that he did not
       disclose anything to anyone. He stated that he went to the Taluka
       Police Station from the hospital, which is where he gave a complaint.
19. He admitted that when he gave the report for the first time, he stated
    that 36 persons stood around the car by which they were travelling.
    When his deceased brother got down from the car, he also got down
    from the car. In further cross-examination, he stated that he got down
    from the car and ran through the field and did not hide. He stated
    that he did not tell that to the police. He stated that he did not hide
    in the stream, he just ran across the stream and disappeared. He
    stated that no one had an axe in their hand and they were carrying
    rods. They did not attack anybody with the rods. They only attacked
    the car with the aruval and rod.
20. The witness stated that he showed to the DSP, the place where he
    was hiding. He accepted that it was dark at the time of the incident
    and nothing could be seen without light. He stated that he saw the
    incident with the help of the car light and other lights. Thereafter, he
    stated that there were more than 20 persons who were attacking the
    car by using aruvals, rods and wooden logs. The witness stated that
    when he lifted the deceased Prasanna, there was blood all over his
    head and body. He stated that his shirt and dhoti were fully stained
    in blood when the police arrived. In the cross-examination, he again
    claimed that he could see the incident from the place where he
    was hiding. He stated that he did not remember whether he told in
    the police enquiry that accused-Vijayakumar got down along with
    a kerosene can.
21. A very lengthy cross-examination was done on political parties such
    as AIADMK and Community Party. He admitted that he had no
    objection for removal of persons named as accused by him earlier.
22. Then we come to the evidence of PW-2 (Loorthu Prabhu). At the
    time of incident, one Abdul Rehman was with PW-2. It must be
    noted here that the said Abdul Rehman has not been examined by
    the prosecution. He stated that while he, along with Abdul Rehman,
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                        867

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

     were proceeding on a motorcycle on Ilayangudi road, deceased
     Kathiresan’s car overtook them. Thereafter, a truck came towards
     the Scorpio car of Kathiresan. However, the driver drove the car to
     the left-hand side to avoid collision but the truck grazed the car. He
     stated that the accused No. 7 (Vijaykumar) got down from the driver’s
     side of the truck and came along with one white colour can. Seven
     or eight people jumped along with him. Accused No. 8 (Suresh @
     Lenin Kumar) came with aruval and accused No. 11 (Jayakumar)
     came with a wooden log. The witness stated that accused No. 1
     (Arjunan), accused No. 2 (Agniraj), accused No. 3 (Sathyaraj),
     accused No. 6 (Yoganathan), accused No. 9 (Karanthamalai), accused
     No. 10 (Ganesh) arrived along with accused No. 4 (Paulpandi)
     and accused No. 5 (Sivakumar). They were carrying aruvals and
     wooden logs. He stated that the headlights of the car were on. He
     and Abdul Rehman disappeared behind a Tamarind tree. He stated
     that accused No. 1 (Arjunan) showed to Kathiresan and set him on
     fire by pouring kerosene. At that time, accused No. 8 (Suresh @
     Lenin Kumar) smashed the side mirror of the car with the aruval in
     his hand. Kathiresan got out of the car, at that time, accused No. 2
     (Agniraj) assaulted deceased Kathiresan on his head with his aruval.
     He said that “you have spoiled my life and you will die with it”. He
     alleged that accused No. 3 (Sathyaraj) cut Kathiresan’s head with an
     aruval. He alleged that accused No. 4 (Paulpandi) and accused No.
     5 (Sivakumar) cut Boominathan’s head. Accused No. 5 (Sivakumar)
     stabbed him in the right and left shoulders with the knife. Accused No.
     6 (Yoganathan) pulled PW-9 (Nikila) out of the car and assaulted her
     on her head with an aruval. She fell down. Thereafter, accused No. 3
     (Sathyaraj) and 7 (Vijayakumar) poured kerosene around Kathiresan
     and his car. At that time, one Tata Magic van came. Acccused No. 8
     (Suresh @ Lenin Kumar) and 9 (Karanthamali) told persons in the
     van not to stop, otherwise, they would kill them. However, the van
     stopped and policemen in uniform got down from the van and went
     to the place of occurrence.
23. What is important to note is that next day, in the morning, he dropped
    Abdul Rehman at his house, kept his motorcycle in his sister’s
    house and left for Coimbatore. He stated that he came to know
    about the incident when he saw it in the newspaper. He stated that
    he was scared to tell anybody about the incident. He stated that on
    24 th December, 2012, he came to the village for Christmas.
868                                                        [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       After hearing a sermon, he went to CBCID office at Madurai on
       26th December, 2012 and told the truth. So, for 1 month and 12
       days, witness did not inform the police about the incident. All this
       has come in the examination-in-chief of the witness.
24. In the cross-examination, he admitted that after the occurrence, he
    went to his house directly with his friend. When he went to his house,
    his father was there. On the next day, he left his house at 5 am or
    6 am. Thereafter, he came to his friend’s place in Sivagangai. Thus,
    there is a gross delay on the part of the police in recording statement
    of PW-2 (Loorthu Prabhu). There is no explanation for this delay.
25. Now, we come to the evidence of PW-9 (Nikila). The law is well settled
    that before proceeding to record the evidence of a minor witness,
    preliminary questions must be asked by the Court to ascertain whether
    the witness is able to understand the questions and answer the
    same. The Court must be satisfied about the capacity of the minor
    to understand the questions and answer the same. In this case, the
    age of PW-9 (Nikila) was 10 years. However, preliminary questions
    were not put to the witness. The Court did not ask any question to
    the witness to ascertain whether she understands the importance of
    an oath. Without satisfying himself that the witness understands the
    importance of an oath, the learned Trial Judge administered oath
    to her. It is very well known that child witnesses are susceptible to
    tutoring and therefore, not asking preliminary questions to the minor
    witness makes her evidence very vulnerable.
26. The witness states that she was able to identify the persons who
    attacked them on that day. She stated that she had not identified
    the persons earlier whom she was now identifying in the Court. The
    witness identified some of the accused sitting in the Court. She
    stated that she was seeing them for the first time after the date of
    the incident. Admittedly, test identification parade was not conducted.
    She stated that her mother told her in detail what had happened to
    her and how many days she was in the hospital.
27. As noted earlier, PW-9 (Nikila) was 10 years old on the date of
    recording of evidence. The Trial Court has not followed the condition
    precedent before examining a minor witness. Before administering
    oath, the learned Trial Judge did not satisfy himself that the witness
    understood the importance of the oath.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                        869

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

28. Moreover, she deposed that after the date of occurrence, for the
    first time in the Court, she identified several accused. But test
    identification parade was not held. From the answers given in the
    cross-examination that her mother told her the details of what hap-
    pened to her, the possibility of tutoring the witness cannot be ruled
    out. Minors are prone to tutoring and in this case, we are dealing
    with a minor child who was 10 years old.
29. In the evidence of PW-1, it is brought on record that accused No. 1’s
    wife was defeated by PW-1’s wife (Sathya) in the local panchayat
    election. Accused No. 1 belongs to the Communist Party of India and
    PW-1’s wife (Sathya) was a member of the AIADMK political party.
    Though the DSP and other police officers met PW-1 (Krishnan) at
    the scene of the offence, they did not record his statement. It has
    come on record that PW-1 (Krishnan) did not directly go to the po-
    lice station to record his complaint. Instead, PW-1 (Krishnan) along
    with an advocate (Thangapandiyan), PW-14 (Anbumani, AIADMK
    Counsellor) and PW-15 (Nickson Anand, AIADMK Secretary) went
    to the police station and handed over a written complaint to PW-52.
    There was a political rivalry between him and accused No. 1. PW-1’s
    wife was a member of AIADMK. The possibility of filing complaint
    after deliberation with the supporters of AIADMK cannot be ruled
    out. In the written complain, PW-1 (Krishnan) named 22 persons
    as accused. During investigation, 36 persons were treated as ac-
    cused, out of which, only 21 persons were charged. By a report at
    Exhibit P-107, 15 accused persons were dropped with the consent
    of PW-1 (Krishnan). The reason given in the report is that PW-1
    (Krishnan) was nervous and hence, he exaggerated the incident by
    naming the said 15 accused. He gave no objection for deletion of
    15 accused. PW-1 (Krishnan) admitted that, in his report, he stated
    that 36 persons stood around the Scorpio car. Then he came out
    with the theory that there were 20 persons. PW-1 (Krishnan) has
    obviously exaggerated the incident due to their political rivalry. It is
    obvious that he was unsure about the number of accused who were
    present at the time of the incident. Out of the 21 accused who were
    ultimately charged, accused Nos. 1 to 11 were convicted and other
    accused were acquitted. The incident happened after 09:30 pm.
    PW-1 (Krishnan) has not stated the distance between the bush in
    which he was hiding and the spot of the incident. There is a serious
    doubt whether he could have seen the incident in the light of the
    car. Therefore, the evidence of PW-1 (Krishnan) does not inspire
    confidence.
870                                                      [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


30. As far as PW-2 (Loorthu Prabhu) is concerned, for more than one
    and a half months, he did not approach the police or filed a complaint
    in any form. He claims to have become wise after a gap of 43 days
    after hearing a sermon during Christmas. Considering the conduct
    of the witness of remaining silent for a long period of one and a half
    months, the testimony of this witness cannot be believed. Moreover,
    during this period, he moved from place to place. It is not his case
    that anyone threatened him during the said period. Moreover, he
    stated that one Abdul Rehman was an eye-witness. However, the
    prosecution failed to examine him. Therefore, adverse inference will
    have to be drawn against the prosecution.
31. As far as PW-9 (Nikila) is concerned, we have already recorded
    reasons for discarding her testimony. Since the condition precedent
    for recording of statement of PW-9 (Nikila) for evidence has not been
    satisfied, her testimony has to be kept out of consideration.

       Consideration of other materials on record
32. The prosecution has heavily relied upon the evidence of fingerprints
    of accused No. 2 (Agniraj) and accused No. 3 (Sathyaraj) found
    on the Scorpio car. PW- 46 (Prithiviraj) is a photographer who
    allegedly took photographs of the fingerprints. What is important is
    that no Mahazar was drawn at the time of taking photographs of
    the fingerprints allegedly appearing on the Scorpio car. Moreover,
    the photographs taken were not exhibited. Similarly, no Mahazar
    was recorded while taking the fingerprints of the accused. The
    case of the prosecution is that the fingerprints found on Scorpio car
    matched the specimen fingerprints of accused Nos. 2 (Agniraj) and
    3 (Sathyaraj). This fact becomes relevant only if the fact of taking
    photographs of fingerprints on the Scorpio car is proved. PW-46
    (Prithviraj) stated that he took photographs of the fingerprints on
    the Scorpio car. In the cross-examination, he stated that he did
    not remember whether he had taken photos of fingerprints like that
    earlier. His examination-in-chief is silent about any Mahazar drawn
    at the time of taking photographs of the fingerprints on the car. The
    failure of the prosecution to draw a Mahazar or Panchnama at the
    time of taking photographs of the fingerprints on the car goes to the
    root of the matter. The case made out by the prosecution cannot be
    accepted for the reasons recorded above.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                      871

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

33. Then we come to the evidence of recovery. According to the
    prosecution, aruvals were recovered at the instance of accused Nos.
    2 (Agniraj), 3 (Sathyaraj) and 6 (Yoganathan) from the bush near
    the shutter of Periya Ooran in Athapadaki village. The recovery is
    shown from the same place on 5th December, 2012 at three different
    times. Even recovery of aruval at the instance of accused No. 4
    (Paulpandi) and recovery of knife at the instance of accused No.
    5 (Sivakumar) was at two different times on 10th December, 2012
    from the same place which is a thorny bush under the bridge on
    the way to EID Parry Company. A wooden log was recovered at the
    instance of accused No. 11 (Jayakumar) from the bush opposite to
    Government Arts College which is an open place. Aruval was shown
    recovered at the instance of accused No. 8 (Suresh @ Lenin Kumar)
    from bushes in a dilapidated building opposite to Government hostel
    for college students.
34. The evidence of PW-2 (Loorthu Prabhu) and PW-9 (Nikila) is
    required to be discarded for the reasons which were set out above.
    We have also found that the evidence of PW-1 is not trustworthy.
    In any case, the conviction cannot be supported only on the basis
    of his evidence.
35. We have perused the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court.
    We found that both the courts have completely brushed aside the
    factors which we have highlighted above from the evidence which
    make it impossible for any Court to believe the testimonies of these
    three witnesses and act upon the same. According to us, if evidence
    of PW-1 (Krishnan), PW-2 (Loorthu Prabhu) and PW-9 (Nikila) and
    fingerprints allegedly found are to be ignored, what remains is the
    evidence of the alleged recovery of weapons at the instance of the
    accused. Only on the basis of recovery, by no stretch of imagination
    can the accused be convicted.

     Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136
     of the Constitution
36. Learned counsel appearing for the State tried to make a distinction
    between appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters of this Court under
    Article 134 and jurisdiction under Article 136. He mainly relied upon
    the decisions of this court in the case of Pappu v. State of Uttar
872                                                           [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


       Pradesh1 and Mst Dalbir Kaur and Others v. State of Punjab2. He
       submitted that these two decisions dealing with the scope of appellate
       jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution have
       been consistently followed.
37. In paragraphs 63 and 71 of the decision of this Court in the case of
    Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh1 it was held thus:
            “The scope and width of these appeals
            63. As could be readily noticed, in the wide range
            of submissions made on behalf of the appellant, the
            concurrent findings leading to his conviction have been
            challenged as if it were a matter of regular appeal; and
            are practically to the effect that the entire evidence led
            in the matter be reappreciated on its contents as also
            its surrounding factors. However, while entering into the
            process of analysis, we cannot lose sight of the fact that
            the present one is a matter of concurrent findings of fact
            by the trial court and the High Court. Though the periphery
            of an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the
            Constitution of India and the parameters of examining the
            matters in such appeals have been laid down repeatedly by
            this Court in several of the decisions but, having regard to
            the submissions made in this case, we feel rather impelled
            to recapitulate the nuanced principles, particularly on the
            subtle but relevant distinction in the scope of a regular
            appeal and an appeal by special leave.
            71. In summation of what has been noticed hereinabove,
            it is but clear that as against any judgment/final order
            or sentence in a criminal proceeding of the High Court,
            regular appeals to this Court are envisaged in relation to the
            eventualities specified in Article 134 of the Constitution of
            India and Section 2 of the 1970 Act. The present one is not
            a matter covered thereunder and the present appeals are
            by special leave in terms of Article 136 of the Constitution
            of India. In such an appeal by special leave, where the



1   (2022) 10 SCC 321
2   (1976) 4 SCC 158
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                             873

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

           trial court and the High Court have concurrently returned
           the findings of fact after appreciation of evidence, each
           and every finding of fact cannot be contested nor such
           an appeal could be dealt with as if another forum for
           reappreciation of evidence. Of course, if the assessment
           by the trial court and the High Court could be said to be
           vitiated by any error of law or procedure or misreading of
           evidence or in disregard to the norms of judicial process
           leading to serious prejudice or injustice, this Court may,
           and in appropriate cases would, interfere in order to
           prevent grave or serious miscarriage of justice but, such
           a course is adopted only in rare and exceptional cases of
           manifest illegality. Tersely put, it is not a matter of regular
           appeal. This Court would not interfere with the concurrent
           findings of fact based on pure appreciation of evidence
           nor it is the scope of these appeals that this Court would
           enter into reappreciation of evidence so as to take a view
           different than that taken by the trial court and approved
           by the High Court.”
     37.1 In appropriate cases, this Court can interfere with the concurrent
          findings of the Courts when the assessment of evidence is
          vitiated by misreading of the evidence. However, this should
          be done in rare and exceptional cases of manifest illegality.
38. In the case of Mst Dalbir Kaur and Others v. State of Punjab2, in
    paragraphs 2, 3 and 8, this Court held thus:
           “2. Two questions arise in these appeals:
           “(1) Can this Court in a criminal appeal by special leave
           enter into a fresh review or reappraisement of the evidence
           and examine the question of credibility of witnesses where
           the two courts have concurrently found that the prosecution
           case against the appellants has been proved; and
           (2) Is it open to the appellants, once special leave is
           granted, to argue on questions of fact at the hearing, or
           is he required to confine his arguments only to the points
           on which special leave could be granted.”
           Not that these points are not covered by authorities but
           in spite of a catena of decisions of this Court laying down
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                      Supreme Court Reports


       the various principles from time to time over two decades
       and a half, counsel for the parties have been insisting
       upon this Court to go into the questions of fact in order
       to examine whether the judgment of the High Court is
       correct. I would, therefore, like to review the decisions of
       this Court on the two points mentioned above so as to
       clarify the position and settle the controversy once for all.
       3. As to the principles on which special leave is granted
       by this Court, the same have been clearly and explicitly
       enunciated in a large number of decisions of this Court.
       It has been pointed out that the Supreme Court is not an
       ordinary court of criminal appeal and does not interfere on
       pure questions of fact. It is only in very special cases where
       the court is satisfied that the High Court has committed
       an error of law or procedure as a result of which there
       has been a serious miscarriage of justice that the court
       would interfere with the concurrent findings of the High
       Court and the trial court. It has also been pointed out by
       this Court more than once that it is not in the province
       of this Court to reappraise the evidence and to go into
       the question of credibility of the witnesses examined by
       the parties, particularly when the courts below have after
       considering the evidence, given their findings thereon. In
       other words, the assessment of the evidence by the High
       Court would be taken by this Court as final, unless it is
       vitiated by any error of law or procedure, by the principles
       of natural justice, by errors of record or misreading of
       evidence, non-consideration of glaring inconsistencies in
       the evidence which demolish the prosecution case or where
       the conclusion of the High Court is manifestly perverse and
       unsupportable and the like. As early as 1950 this Court in
       Pritam Singh v. State [1950 SCC 189 : AIR 1950 SC 169 :
       1950 SCR 453 : 51 Cri LJ 1270] speaking through Fazal
       Ali, J. (as he then was) observed as follows:
       “The obvious reply to all these arguments advanced by
       the learned counsel for the appellant, is that this Court
       is not an ordinary court of criminal appeal and will not,
       generally speaking, allow facts to be reopened, especially
       when two courts agree in their conclusion in regard to them
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                              875

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

           and when the conclusions of fact which are challenged
           are dependent on the credibility of witnesses who have
           been believed by the trial court which had the advantage
           of seeing them and hearing their evidence.
           In arguing the appeal, Mr Sethi proceeded on the
           assumption that once an appeal had been admitted
           by special leave, the entire case was at large and the
           appellant was free to contest all the findings of fact and
           raise every point which could be raised in the High Court
           or the trial court. This assumption is, in our opinion, entirely
           unwarranted.
           The rule laid down by the Privy Council is based on sound
           principle, and, in our opinion, only those points can be
           urged at the final hearing of the appeal which are fit to
           be urged at the preliminary stage when leave to appeal
           is asked for, and it would be illogical to adopt different
           standards at two different stages of the same case.
           On a careful examination of Article 136 along with the
           preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary
           power with which this Court is invested under it is to be
           exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only....
           Generally speaking, this Court will not grant special
           leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special
           circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice
           has been done and that the case in question presents
           features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the
           decision appealed against.”
           Analysing this decision, two principles appear to have
           been clearly laid down by this Court:
           “(1) that in appeals by special leave against the concurrent
           findings of the courts below, this Court would not go into
           the credibility of the evidence and would interfere only
           when exceptional and special circumstances exist which
           result in substantial and grave injustice having been done
           to the accused; and
           (2) that even after special leave has been granted the
           appellant is not free to contest all the findings of fact, but
876                                                      [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                      Supreme Court Reports


       his arguments would be limited only to those points even
       at the final hearing, which could be urged at the stage
       when the special leave to appeal is asked for.”
       This case was followed by another Bench decision of this
       Court a little later in Mohinder Singh v. State [1950 SCC
       673 : AIR 1953 SC 415 : 1950 SCR 821] where this Court
       observed thus:
       “This Court, as was pointed out in Pritam Singh v. State [1950
       SCC 189 : AIR 1950 SC 169 : 1950 SCR 453 : 51 Cri
       LJ 1270] will not entertain a criminal appeal except in
       special and exceptional cases where it is manifest that by
       a disregard of the forms of legal process or by a violation
       of the principles of natural justice or otherwise substantial
       and grave injustice has been done.”
       In Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer [AIR 1954 SC 462 :1954
       SCR 1133 : 1954 Cri LJ 1313] the same principle was
       reiterated by Mahajan, C.J., speaking for the Court, where
       it was observed thus:
       “Unless it is shown that exceptional and special
       circumstances exist that substantial and grave injustice
       has been done and the case in question presents features
       of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision
       appealed against, this Court does not exercise its overriding
       powers under Article 136(1) of the Constitution and the
       circumstance that because the appeal has been admitted
       by special leave does not entitle the appellant to open out
       the whole case and contest all the findings of fact and
       raise every point which could be raised in the High Court.
       Even at the final hearing only those points can be urged
       which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when
       the leave to appeal is asked for.”
       In Khacheru Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1956 SC
       546 : 1956 Cri LJ 950] it was pointed out that this Court
       does not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by
       the courts below, unless something substantial has been
       shown to persuade this Court to go behind the findings of
       fact. Imam, J., who spoke for the Court observed as follows:
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                            877

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

           “In an appeal by way of special leave this Court usually
           does not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by
           the courts below and nothing substantial has been shown
           to persuade us to go behind the findings of fact arrived
           at by them.”
           In Saravanabhavan v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC
           1273 : 1966 Cri LJ 949] Hidayatullah, J., (as he then
           was) speaking for the majority crystallised and reiterated
           the principles already laid down by this Court on previous
           occasions and observed as follows:
           “No doubt this Court has granted special leave to the
           appellants but the question is one of the principles which
           this Court will ordinarily follow in such an appeal. It has
           been ruled in many cases before that this Court will not
           reassess the evidence at large, particularly when it has
           been concurrently accepted by the High Court and the court
           or courts below. In other words this Court does not form a
           fresh opinion as to the innocence or the guilt of the accused.
           It accepts the appraisal of the evidence in the High Court
           and the court or courts below. Therefore, before this Court
           interferes something more must be shown, such as, that
           there has been in the trial a violation of the principles of
           natural justice or a deprivation of the rights of the accused
           or a misreading of vital evidence or an improper reception
           or rejection of evidence which, if discarded or received,
           would leave the conviction unsupportable, or that the court
           or courts have committed an error of law or of the forms
           of legal process or procedure by which justice itself has
           failed. We have, in approaching this case, borne these
           principles in mind. They are the principles for the exercise
           of jurisdiction in criminal cases, which this Court brings
           before itself by a grant of special leave.”
           The minority judgment in the same case by Wanchoo, J.,
           (as he then was), so far as the question of interference
           by this Court was concerned, also took more or less the
           same view and observed as follows:
           “Ordinarily, this Court does not go into the evidence when
           dealing with appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution
           particularly when there are concurrent findings. This does
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                      Supreme Court Reports


       not mean that this Court will in no case interfere with a
       concurrent finding of fact in a criminal appeal; it only
       means that this Court will not so interfere in the absence
       of special circumstances. One such circumstance is where
       there is an error of law vitiating the finding as, for example,
       where the conviction is based on the testimony of an
       accomplice without first considering the question whether
       the accomplice is a reliable witness. Another circumstance
       is where the conclusion reached by the courts below is so
       patently opposed to well established principles of judicial
       approach, that it can be characterised as wholly unjustified
       or perverse.”
       The only difference between the two views was that
       while the majority view was that except for the principles
       mentioned above the Supreme Court could never interfere
       with the concurrent findings of fact in a criminal appeal,
       the minority view agreed with the principles but it held
       that in view of special circumstances as pointed out in
       the observations quoted above the Court could interfere.
       At any rate, according to both the views the ratio is that
       this Court would not normally interfere with the concurrent
       findings of fact, unless there are special circumstances
       justifying interference.
       8. Thus, the principles governing interference by this Court
       in a criminal appeal by special leave may be summarised
       as follows:
       “(1) that this Court would not interfere with the concurrent
       finding of fact based on pure appreciation of evidence
       even if it were to take a different view on the evidence;
       (2) that the Court will not normally enter into a reappraisement
       or review of the evidence, unless the assessment of the
       High Court is vitiated by an error of law or procedure or
       is based on error of record, misreading of evidence or is
       inconsistent with the evidence, for instance, where the
       ocular evidence is totally inconsistent with the medical
       evidence and so on;
       (3) that the Court would not enter into credibility of the
       evidence with a view to substitute its own opinion for that
       of the High Court;
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                               879

                         Agniraj & Ors. etc. v.
         State through Deputy Superintendent of Police CB-CID

           (4) that the Court would interfere where the High Court has
           arrived at a finding of fact in disregard of a judicial process,
           principles of natural justice or a fair hearing or has acted
           in violation of a mandatory provision of law or procedure
           resulting in serious prejudice or injustice to the accused;
           (5) this Court might also interfere where on the proved
           facts wrong inferences of law have been drawn or where
           the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse
           and based on no evidence.”
           It is very difficult to lay down a rule of universal application,
           but the principles mentioned above and those adumbrated
           in the authorities of this Court cited supra provide sufficient
           guidelines for this Court to decide criminal appeals by
           special leave. Thus, in a criminal appeal by special
           leave, this Court at the hearing examines the evidence
           and the judgment of the High Court with the limited
           purpose of determining whether or not the High Court
           has followed the principles enunciated above. Where
           the Court finds that the High Court has committed no
           violation of the various principles laid down by this
           Court and has made a correct approach and has not
           ignored or overlooked striking features in the evidence
           which demolish the prosecution case, the findings of
           fact arrived at by the High Court on an appreciation of
           the evidence in the circumstances of the case would
           not be disturbed.”
                                                       (emphasis added)

     38.1 This decision refers to the requirement of this Court examining
          the evidence and judgment of the High Court. It lays down that if
          this Court finds that High Court has overlooked striking features
          in the evidence which demolish the prosecution’s case, a finding
          of fact recorded can be disturbed by this Court.
39. None of these decisions prevent this Court from reappreciating
    evidence in a criminal appeal arising out of Article 136 of the
    Constitution against an order of conviction. Without appreciating the
    evidence, this Court cannot decide whether the case is within the
    parameters laid down in the aforesaid decisions. These decisions
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                              Supreme Court Reports


       only lay down the self-imposed constraints on interference with the
       concurrent findings of the fact recorded by the Trial Court and the
       High Court.
40. In this case, the analysis of the evidence of material witnesses made
    by us shows that the Trial Court and High Court have misread the
    evidence of these material prosecution witnesses. Very striking
    features of the prosecution’s case and evidence have been ignored
    by the Courts.
41. Therefore, in this case, interference will have to be made with the
    impugned judgments. We are of the view that the guilt of the accused
    has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. All the appellants
    have undergone sentence for more than 9 years and 4 months.
42. Hence, the appeals are allowed. The impugned Judgments of the
    High Court and the Trial Court are hereby set aside and the appellants
    are acquitted of the offences alleged against them. They shall be
    released from custody forthwith, if not required in any other case.

       Result of the case: Appeals allowed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan