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Supreme Court of India

AMARENDU JYOTI & ORS.versusSTATE OF CHHATISGARH & ORS.

Citation
2014 INSC 990
Decided
4 August 2014
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The offence of cruelty under Section 498A is not a continuing offence; therefore, the court having jurisdiction is the one where the acts occurred (Delhi).

Summary

The husband and wife lived together in Delhi for a month before the wife returned to her parents in Ambikapur. Two years later her father filed an FIR under Section 498A IPC alleging cruelty. The High Court held that the cruelty continued and that the Ambikapur court had jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the FIR and found that all alleged acts of cruelty occurred in Delhi and that, under Sections 178 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the offence could not be classified as a continuing offence. Consequently, the appropriate court with territorial jurisdiction is the one in Delhi, not Ambikapur. However, invoking Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court permitted the Ambikapur court to proceed with the trial in the interest of justice.

Issues considered

  • Whether the alleged cruelty under Section 498A IPC constitutes a continuing offence under Sections 178 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for purposes of territorial jurisdiction.
  • Whether the Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try the offence.
  • Whether the Supreme Court may, under Article 142 of the Constitution, allow the trial to continue at Ambikapur despite the jurisdictional finding.

Legislation cited

Subjects

territorial jurisdictioncontinuing offenceSection 498Adowry crueltyCriminal Procedure CodeArticle 142Supreme Courtcriminal appeal

Judgment

                     [2014] 13 S.C.R. 1079


                  AMARENDU JYOTI & ORS.                            A
                                V.

              STATE OF CHHATISGARH & ORS.
               (Criminal Appeal No. 546 of 2009)
                                                                   B
                        AUGUST 4, 2014
        [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                       S. A. BOBDE, JJ]
        Jurisdiction - Territorial jurisdiction to try an offence - c
  Wife after residing at place 'D' with husband for a month
  started residing at parent's place at~·- Girls'fatherfiling FIR
  u/s. 498A alleging cruelty-Application u/s. 482 Cr.PC. by
  the husband seeking quashing of FIR since FIR did not
  disclose a continuing offence -Application dismissed by the 0
  High Court holding that offence of cruelty continued, thus,
  was a continuing offence - On appeal, held: All overt acts,
  which are said to have constituted cruelty have allegedly
  taken place at place 'D' - Offence of cruelty cannot be said to
  be a continuing one as contemplated by s. 178 and 179 E
  Cr.PC. - Thus, going by the complaint, it cannot be held that
  the court at place 'A' has jurisdiction to try the offence since
. the appropriate court at place 'D' would have jurisdiction to
  try the said offence - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
  ss. 482, 17~ and179.
                                                                   F
        After marriage, appellant no. 1-husband and
 respondent no.2-wife resided at place 'D' for a month.
 Thereafter, respondent no. 2 left for her parents place at
 'A'. Two years later, father of respondent no. 2 filed an
 FIR uls. 498A IPC at place 'A' alleging cruelty against G
 appellant no. 1 and his family. The appellants filed an
 application uls. 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court
 challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the court at place
 'A' to try the offence alleged against the appellants when
                                                                   H
                              1079
1080      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 13 S.C.R.

 A the incidents of cruelty alleged by respondent no.• 2 took
   plac:e at place 'D' and thereafter, respondent no. 2 left for
   her parents' at place 'A'. The High Court dismissed the
   application holding that the acts of cruelty continued and
   thus, the offence of cruelty was a continuing offence.
 B Hence the instant appeal.
          Allowing the appeal, the Court
        HELD: 1.1 It is found from the F.l.R. that all the
   incidents alleged by the complainant in respect of the
 c alleged cruelty are said to have occurred at place '0'.
   The husband, elder brother-in-law and elder sister-in-law
   for bringing less dowry are said to have been uttered at
   place 'D'. Allegedly, arbitrary demands of lakhs of rupees
   in dowry have been made at place 'D'. The incident of
 0 beating and dragging the respondent no. 2 and abusing
   her in filthy language also is said to have taken place at
   place 'D'. Suffice it to say that all overt acts, which are
   said t1) have constituted cruelty have allegedly taken
   place at place 'D'. [Para 7][1085-B-E] ·
 E       1.2 The offence of cruelty'cannot be said to be a
    continuing one as contemplated by Sections 178 and
    179 of the Code. The holding by the High Court that the
    mental cruelty inflicted upon the respondent no. 2
    "continued unabated" on account of no effort having
  F been made by the appellants to take her back to her
    matrimonial home, and the threats given by the
    appellants over the telephone cannot be accepted. It
    might be noted incidentally that the High Court did not
    make rc~ference to any particular piece of evidence
  G regarding the threats ·said to have been given by the
    appellants over the telephone. Thus, going by the
    complaint, it cannot be held that the Court at place 'A'
    has jurisdiction to try the offence since the appropriate

  H
     AMARENDU JYOTI v. STATE OF CHHATISGARH                      1081


Court at place 'D' would have jurisdiction to try the said A
offence. It is appropriate, in the interest of justice to permit
the Court at place 'A' to proceed with the trial of criminal
case arising out of F.l.R., in exercise of powers conferred
on this Court by Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
[Para 8, 9][1085-G-H; 1086-A-D]                                  B
     Manish Ratan v. State of M.P 2006 (8 ) Suppl.
     SCR 226 : (2007) 1 SCC 262 ; Sujata Mukherjee
     v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee 1997 (3)
      SCR 1127 : (1997) 5 SCC 30 ; State of Bihar v.
     Deokaran Nenshi1973 (3) SCR 1004: (1972) 2                  c
     SCC 890 ; Y Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police
     2004 (3) Suppl. SCR 604 : (2004) 8 sec 100 ;
     Ramesh v. State of TN. 2005 (2) SCR 493:(2005)
     3 sec 507 - referred to.
                                                                 D
                 CASE LAW REFERENCE
2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 226 referred to               Para 4,5
1997 (3) SCR 1127           referred to           Para 5
1973 (3) SCR 1004           referred to           Para 5         E
2004 (3) Suppl. SCR 604 referred to               Para 5
2005 (2) SCR 493            referred to           Para 5
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No(s). 546 of 2009.                                       F
     Fromthe Judgment and Order dated 19.12.2006 of the
High Court of Chattisgarh in Misc. Crl. Case No. 1104 of 2006.
     Bhaskar Y. Kulkarni, Adv., for the Appellants.
    Sumit Kumar Sharma, Niraj Sharma, Advs., for the G
Respondents.




                                                                 H
1082        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            S. A. BOBDE, J.
         1. The appellant no. 1 -Amarendu Jyoti, who is husband
   of respondent no. 2 - Smt. Kiran Sinha, has challenged the
 B Order dated 191h December, 2006 passed by the High Court
   of Chhattisgarh in Miscellaneous Criminal Case [MCRL] No.
   1104 of 2006 dismissing the appellants' application under
   Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
   [hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'] and holding that the First
 c Information Report [F.1.R.] for offence under Section 498-Aof
   the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'],
   lodged by the respondent no. 3 - Madhusudan Sinha, was
   liable to be tried by the Court at Ambikapur, which has
   jurisdiction to try the offence. The main contention of the
 D appellants is that the incident of cruelty alleged by respondent
   no. 2 has taken place only at Delhi, where the couple resided
   after which the respondent no. 2 went to stay with her parents
    atAmbikapur in the State of Chhattisgarh, therefore, the Court
    at Ambikapur has no jurisdiction to try the alleged offence
 E against the appellants in the F.l.R. under Section 498-A, IPC,
    lodged by respondent no. 3.
         2. The marriage of the appellant no. 1 to the respondent
   no. 2 took place on 21.04.2003 at Patna. The couple resided
   at Delhi from 27.04.2003 to 22.05.2003 when the respondent
 F no. 2/wife left Delhi for her parents' place atAmbikapur. After
   about 2 % years, her father- Madhusudan Sinha/respondent
   no. 3 filed an F.l.R. atAmbikapur alleging that respondent no.
   2/Kiran Sinha has been subjected to cruelty by her husband/
   appellant no. 1, elder brother-in-law/appellant no. 2 and elder
 G sister-in-law/appellant no. 3, who are therefore to be punished
   under Section 498-A of the IPC.
            3. The appellants approached the High Court of
       Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur under Section 482 of the Code
       questioning the territorial jurisdiction of the Court atAmbikapur
 H
     AMARENDU JYOTI v. STATE OF CHHATISGARH                           1083
                [S. A. BOBDE, J.]

to try the offence alleged against the appellants. The                A
respondent no. 3 has alleged cruelty in the F.1.R. dated
31.12.2005. However, according to the appellants each of
the alleged incidents, which constitute cruelty, has taken place
when the couple resided together in Delhi between 27.04.2003
to 22.05.2003, before the respondent no. 2 shifted to                 8
Ambikapur to stay with her father - respondent no. 3. Thus,
according to the appellants the territorial jurisdiction to try the
offence cannot be with the Court at Ambikapur, where no
incident is alleged to have taken place. This argument did not
find favour with the High Court, which dismissed the application      c
under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court held, having
regard to the provisions of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code
that after the respondent no. 2 had left the appellants society
at Delhi and ·gone to Ambikapur to reside with her father, the
acts of cruelty continued and therefore the offence of cruelty,       D
was a continuing offence. The High Court relied on the fact
that the respondent no. 2 was made to abandon her husband's
company because of cruel treatment and compelled to stay at
Ambikapur; further, thatthe respondent no. 2 was subjected to
cruelty by telephone calls over which she was threatened and           E
demand of dowry was made. The letters written by respondent
nos. 2 and 3 showing the sufferings of the wife atAmbikapur
were relied on and the High Court noted that despite the
respondent's plight the appellant made no effort to take her
back to the matrimonial home. Accordingly, the High Court             F
held that the offence of cruelty was a continuing offence and
the court arAmbikapur had jurisdiction to try.
   . . 4. Aggrieve,d by the rejection of the application under
Section 482 of the Code, the appellants have approached this
Court by way of SRecial leave to appeal. The main contention G
on behalf of the appellants was that the F.l.R. did not disclose
a continuing offence. The offence, if any, was alleged to have
been committed only at Delhi and there was no question of
any offence having been committed after the respondent no. 2
went to st.ay at Ambikapur. The learned counsel for the H
1084         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A appellants relied on the decision of this Court in Manish Ratan
   v. State of M.P., (2007) 1 SCC 262.
          5. In Manish Ratan's case (supra), in the complaint, the
    Incident was said to have taken place in Jabalpur. The wife
    had left her matrimonial house and started residing at Datia.
 B The Criminal Revision filed by the accused, questioning the
  , jurisdiction of the Court at Datia, was dismissed opining that
    the offence was a continuing one, arid therefore, the Datia Court
    had jurisdiction to take cognizance. The High Court held that
    the Court at Datia also has jurisdiction to try the case since
 C the harassment to the wife continued at the place where she
    was residing with her father "since she was forced to live at
       her father's place on account of the torture of the in-laws and
       as such it can safely be said that there was also a mental
       cruelty." This conclusion of the High Court was dubbed as
 D curious by this Court since the High Court found earlier that
       "there is nothing in the complaint to show that any
       maltreatment was given to the appellant at Datia. The
       allegations, which I may repeat here, are that the
       maltreatment was givenwithin a specific period at Jabalpur."
 E After looking at the decided case on the point i.e. Sujata
   Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC
   30; State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, (1972) 2 SCC 890;
   YAbrahamAjith v. lnspectorof Police, (2004) 8 SCC 100;
   and Ramesh v. State of T.N., (2005) 3 SCC 507, this Court
 F held that the order of the High Court was unsustainable, and
   therefore, set it aside. ·it is not only that in the interest of justice,-
   while setting aside the order of the High Court, this Court
   directed the transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court
   of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia, where the wife was staying
 G with her father to the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur
   (vide para 18).
            6. Relying on the Judgment of this Court in Manish
       Ratan's case (supra), the learned counsel for the appellants
       contended that the offence in the present case cannot be
 H
     AMARENDU JYOTI v. STATE OF CHHATISGARH                      1085
               . [S. A. BOBDE, J.]·

considered to be a continuing offence, if any, and must be taken A
to have been comp,lete at Delhi and no cause of action can be
said to have arisen atAmbikapur. As must necessarily be, the
application of law and the consequences mu.st vary from case
to case.
       7. The core question thus is whether the allegations made 8
in the F.l.R. constitute a continuing offence. We find from the
F.l.R. that all the incidents alleged by the complainant in respect
of the alleged cruelty are said to have occurred at Delhi. The
cruel and humiliating words spoken to the 2"d respondent/wife
by her husband, elder brother-in-law and elder sister-in-law C
for bringing less dowry are said to have been uttered at Delhi.
Allegedly, arbitrary demands of lakhs of rupees in dowry have
been made in Delhi. The incident of beating and dragging the
respondent no. 2 and abusing her in filthy language also is
said to have taken place at Delhi. Suffice it to say that all overt D
acts, which are said to have constituted cruelty have allegedly
taken place at Delhi. The allegations as to what has happened
atAmbikapur are as follows:
     "No purposeful information has been received from the E
     in-laws of Kiran.even on contacting on telephone till today.
     Tliey have been threatened and abused and two years
     have been elapsed and the in-laws have not shown any
     interest to call her to her matrimonial home and since
     then Kiran is making her both ends meet in her parental F
     home. To get rid of the ill-treatment and harassment of
     the in-laws of Kiran, the complainant is praying for
     registration of an FIR and request for immediate legal
     action so that Kiran may get appropriate justice."
      8. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be said to be G
a continuing one as contemplated by Sections 178 and 179
of the Code. We do not agree with the High Court that in this
case the mental cruelty inflicted upon the respondent no. 2
"continued unabated' on account of no effort having been
made by the appellants to take her back to her matrimonial H ·
1086          SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014) 13 S.C.R.


 A home, and the threats given by the appellants over the
   telephone. It might be noted incidentally that the High Court
   does not make reference to any particular piece of evidence
   regarding the threats said to have been given by the appellants
   over the telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we are of
 B the view that it cannot be held that the Court atAmbikapur has
   jurisdiction to try the offence since the appropriate Court at
   Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said offence.
   Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.
          9. However, we consider it appropriate, in the interest of
 C justice to permit the Court atAmbikapur to proceed with the
   trial of Criminal Case arising out of F.1.R. No. 798 of 2005 dated
    31.12.2005, in exercise of powers conferred on this Court by
   Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

 D
       Nidhi Jain                                      Appeal allowed.


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