Supreme Court of India
ASGER IBRAHIMAMINversusLIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 764
- Decided
- 12 October 2015
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- VIKRAMAJIT SEN
Holding
The termination of service was deemed voluntary retirement under Rule 31 of the 1995 Pension Rules, entitling the appellant to pension subject to PF refund and a three‑year limitation on arrears.
Summary
The appellant, who had served LIC for over 23 years and resigned after turning 50, sought pension under the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995, which were given retrospective effect. The corporation denied the claim, arguing that resignation forfeited pension rights. The Supreme Court examined the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement, the applicability of Rule 31 of the 1995 Rules, and the purpose of the beneficial legislation. It held that the appellant's resignation, coupled with a waiver of notice, satisfied the criteria for voluntary retirement, making him eligible for pension after refunding the corporation's PF contribution. However, due to the long delay, arrears were limited to three years preceding the petition. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court judgment.
Issues considered
- The appellant's resignation qualifies as voluntary retirement under Rule 31 of the 1995 Pension Rules.
- Whether the appellant is entitled to pension despite the corporation's claim of forfeiture upon resignation.
- Whether the claim is barred by limitation or laches, and the extent of recoverable arrears.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14
- Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956s. 48
Subjects
pensionresignationvoluntary retirementLife Insurance Corporationstatutory interpretationlimitationlachesbeneficial legislationArticle 14
Judgment
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 865
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN A
v.
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA
(Civil Appeal No. 10251 of 2014)
B
OCTOBER 12, 2015
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE,JJ.]
Service Law:
Pension - Entitlement of - Employee resigned on C
personal grounds after completing 23 years 7 months of
service - After attaining 50 years of age - Thereafter
employer-Corporation notified Life Insurance Corporation of
India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 - The Rules were 0
given retrospective effect - Employee sought for benefit of
pension as per 1995 Rules - Denial of claim by the employer
as well as the courts below- On appeal, held: In view of r. 3 of
Chapter II of Pension Rules, it is clear that the Rules are
applicable to the employee in question - None of the E
provisions of the Rules and Regulations by which the
employee was regulated at the relevant time, provided for
voluntary retirement - Rule 31 of the 1995 Rules (which
provides for pension on voluntary retirement) when
juxtaposed to the facts of the present case, makes it obvious F
that essential components of r. 31 stand substantially fulfilled
in the present case - The employee ought not be deprived
of pension benefits merely because he styled his termination
of services as 'resignation' or because there was no provision
for voluntary retirement at the relevant time - Life Insurance G
Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995- rr.
3 and 31 - Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff)
Regulations, 1960 - reg. 18.
865 H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.
A 'Resignation' and 'Retirement' - Distinction between-
discussed.
Delay!Laches - In claiming pension - Held: in cases
of continuing or successive wrongs, delay and /aches or
s limitation will not thwart the claim so long as the claim, if
allowed, does not have any adverse repercussions on the
settled third party rights- The claims for pension recurs from
month to month and would not get extinguished on application
of Jaw ofprescription- In case of recurring/successive wrongs
C the consequential reliefs relating to arrears normally should
be restricted to a period of three years prior to the date of
filing the case - Limitation.
Legislation - Beneficial legislation - Interpretation of-
D Held: The employer should construe the provisions of a
beneficial legislation in a way that extends the benefit to its
employees, instead of curtailing it- Interpretation of Statutes.
Interpretation of Statutes - Pension Rules -
E Interpretation of- Held: The objective of the Pension Rules
is to extend benefits to a class of people to tide over the crisis
and vicissitudes of old age - In case of inconsistencies
between the statutory provisions and the avowed objective
of the State so as to discriminate between the beneficiaries
F within the class, the ends of justice obligates the court to
palliate the differences between the two and reconcile them
as far as possible - The court should not go by the letter of
the Pension Rules and should go by the laudatory spirit of
statutory provisions and fundamental rights u!Art. 14 of the
G Constitution - Constitution of India, 1950 -Art. 14.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The respondent-Corporation has the
H power to compulsory retire an employee who has
attained the age of 50 years, if in its opinion, such
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 867
CORPORATION OF INDIA
decision is in the interests of the Corporation; and the A
employee may seek permission to retire upon completion
of 55 years of age and after rendering 25 years of service.
This very position finds reiteration in Rule 31 of the
Pension Rules under the epithet 'voluntary retirement'.
[Para 5] [875-G-H] B
1.2 'Resignation' and 'retirement' have disparate
connotations; that an employee can 'resign' at any time
but, in contradistinction, can 'retire' only on completion
of the prescribed period of qualifying service and in C
consonance with extant Rules and Regulations. [Para
6] [877 -B-C]
1.3 The provisions covered by the definition of
"retirement", which do not entail forfeiture of service, are o
sub-regulation (1 ), sub-regulation (2), and sub-regulation
(3) of Regulation 19 of the Life Insurance Corporation of
India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 and Rule 14 of the Life
Insurance Corporation of India Class Ill and Class IV
Employees (Revision of Terms and Conditions of E
Service) Rules, 1985. None of these provisions provides
for voluntary retirement like Rule 31 of the Pension Rules,
1995 nor does the definition of "retirement" make any
mention of Regulation 19(2A). [Para 9] [881-C-E]
F
1.4 In the present case, the appellant had tendered
his resignation in accordance with the provision of
Regulation 18 of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960,
which, does not dissimulate between the termination of
service by way of resignation on the one hand and G'
voluntary retirement on the other, or distinguish one from
the other. [Para 10] [881-F]
1.5 The appellant had worked continuously for over
20 years, that he sought to discontinue his services and H
requested waiver of three months notice in writing, and
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 9 S.C.R.
A that the said notice was accepted by the Respondent
Corporation and the appellant was thereby allowed to
discontinue his services. If one would examine Rule 31
of the Pension Rules juxtaposed with the
aforementioned facts, it would at once be obvious and
B perceptible that the essential components of that Rule
stand substantially fulfilled in the present case. [Para
12] [885-B-D]
1.6 The Pension Rules of 1995 have included two
C classes of beneficiaries into one homogenous class, to
wit, the employees who had retired before the notified
date i.e. 1.11.1993 and those who were to retire after the
notified date. The Appellant ought not to be deprived of
pension benefits merely because he styled his
D termination of services as "resignation" or because there
was no provision to retire voluntarily at that time. The
commendable objective of the Pension Rule is to extend
benefits to a class of people to tide over the crisis and
vicissitudes of old age, and if there are some
E inconsistencies between the statutory provisions and
the avowed objective of the statute so as to discriminate
between the beneficiaries within the class, the end of
justice obligates this Court to palliate the differences
F between the two and reconcile them as far as possible.
The Court would be failing in its duty, if it goes by the
letter and not by the laudatory spirit of statutory
provisions and the fundamental rights guaranteed under
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The State being a
G model employer should construe the provisions of a
beneficial legislation in a way that extends the benefit to
its employees, instead of curtailing it. [Paras 6, 7, 13 and
14] [877-E-G; 886-C-E; 888-B]
H 1.7 The Appellant's case does not fall within the
postulation of Rule 23 as the last four categories or
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 869
CORPORATION OF INDIA
genres or types of cessation of services are in character A
punitive; and the first envisages those resignations
where the right to pension has not been earned by that
time or where it is without the permission of the
Corporation. [Para 7) [880-E]
B
1.8 Thus the termination of services of the Appellant,
in essence, was voluntary retirement within the ambit of
Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of 1995. The appellant is
entitled for pension, provided he fulfils the condition of
refunding of the entire amount of the Corporation's C
contribution to the Provident Fund along with interest
accrued thereon as provided in the Pension Rules of
1995. [Para 16) [888-E]
Sheelkumar Jain v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2011) D
12 sec 197: 2011 (9) SCR 574- relied on.
Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon (2004)
9 SCC 461: 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 465; Shyam Babu
Verma v. Union of India (1994) 2 SCC 521: 1994 (1) E
SCR 700; State of M. P v. Yogendra Shrivastava (2010)
12 SCC 538: 2009 (14) SCR 1137; M.R. Prabhakarv.
Canara Bank(2012) 9 SCC 671: 2012 (8) SCR 1072;
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kirpal Singh (2014) 5
SCC 189: 2014 (1) SCR 380; UCO Bank v. Sanwar F
Mal (2004) 4 sec 412: 2004 (2) SCR 1125 -
distinguished.
2.1 In cases of continuing or successive wrongs,
delay and laches or limitation will not thwart the claim G
so long as the claim, if allowed, does not have any
adverse repercussions on the settled third-party rights.
The claims for pension recur month to month and would
not stand extinguished on the application of the laws of
prescription, merely because the legal remedy pertaining H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.
A to the time barred part of it has become unavailable. In
the case of recurring/successive wrongs the
consequential relief relating to arrears normally should
be restricted to a period of three years prior to the date
of filing of the case. In the facts of the present case, the
B claim for pension if otherwise sustainable in law, would
be restricted to three years prior to when it was raised in
a judicial forum. [Para 4] (872-H; 873-A; 874-A-C]
Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2008) 8 SCC 648: 2008
C (12) SCR 104- relied on.
2.2 Considering the huge delay, not explained by
proper reasons, on part of the appellant in approaching
the Court, the benefits of arrears of pension payable to
D the appellant is limited to three years preceding the date
of the petition filed before the High Court. However, if
the amount of arrears is less than the amount of refund
required, then the pension shall be payable on monthly
basis after the date on which the amount of refund is
E entirely adjusted. [Para 16] (888-F; 889-A]
Case Law Reference
2008 (12) SCR 104 relied on. Para4
F 2011 (9) SCR 574 relied on. Para 10
2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 465 distinguished. Para 14
1994 (1) SCR 700 distinguished. Para 15
2009 (14) SCR 1137 distinguished. Para 15
G
2012 (8) SCR 1072 distinguished. Para 15
2014 (1) SCR 380 distinguished. Para 15
2004 (2) SCR 1125 distinguished. Para 15
H
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 871
CORPORATION OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. A
10251 of2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 1.3.2013 of the
Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat atAhmedabad in
Letters PatentAppeal No. 1616 of2012. B
Nikhil Goel, Naveen Goel, Marsook Bafaki for the
Appellant.
Kailash Vasdev, Jyoti Prakash, Shreyans Singhvi, Umrao
Singh Rawat, R. Chandrachud for the Respondent. C
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. The question which falls for
consideration is whether the Appellant is entitled to claim D
pension even though he resigned from service of his own
volition and, if so, whether his claim on this count had become
barred by limitation or laches.
2. The Appellant joined the services of the Respondent E
Corporation on 30.6.1967 on the post of Assistant
Administrative Officer (Chartered Accountant) at the age of
twenty seven. He worked for 23 years and 7 months in the
Corporation before tendering his resignation on 28.1.1991,
owing to "family circumstances and indifferent health", F
presumably having crossed fifty years in age. The request of
the Appellant for waiver of the stipulated three months notice
was favourably considered by the Corporation vide letter dated
28.2.1991, and the Appellant was allowed to resign from the
post of Deputy General Manager (Accounts), which he was G
holding at that time. We shall again presume that the reasons
that he had ascribed for his retirement, viz. family problems
and failing health, were found to be legitimate by the
Respondent, otherwise the waiver ought not to have been
given. Thereafter, the Central Government in exercise of H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.
A power conferred under Section 48 of the Life Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956 had notified the LIC of India (Staff)
Regulations, 1960 and thereafter the Life Insurance
Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995
(hereinafter referred to as "Pension Rules") which, though
B notified on 28.6.1995, were given retrospective effect from
1.11.1993. The Pension Rules provide, inter a/ia, that
resignation from service would lead to forfeiture of the benefits
of the entire seivice including eligibility for pension.
C 3 On 8.8.1995, that is post the promulgation by the
Respondent of the Pension Rules, the Appellant enquired from
the Respondent whether he was entitled to pension under the
Pension Rules, which has been understood by the Respondent
as a representation for pension; the Respondent replied that
D the request of the Appellant cannot be acceded to. The
Appellant took the matter no further but has averred that in
2000, prompted by news in a Daily and Judgments of a High
Court and a Tribunal, he requested the Respondent to
reconsider his case for pension. This request has remained
E unanswered. It was in 2011 that he sent a legal notice to the
Respondent, in response to which the Respondent reiterated
its stand that the Appellant, having resigned from service, was
not eligible to claim pension under the Pension Rules.
F Eventually, the Appellant filed a Special Civil Application on
29.3.2012 before the High Court, which was dismissed by the
Single Judge vide Judgment dated 5.10.2012. The LPAof
the Appellant also got dismissed on the grounds of the delay
of almost 14 years, as also on merits vide Judgment dated
G 1.3.2013, against which the Appellant has approached this
Court.
4 As regards the issue of delay in matters pertaining
to claims of pension, it has already been opined by this Court
H in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 that in ·
cases of continuing or successive wrongs, delay and !aches
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 873
CORPORATION OF INDIA [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
or limitation will not thwart the claim so long as the claim, if A
allowed, does not have any adverse repercussions on the
settled third-party rights. This Court held:
7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related
claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches B
(where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or
limitation (where remedy is sought by an application
to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions
to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong.
Where a service related claim is based on a continuing c
wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long
delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date
on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such
continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury.
But there is an exception to the exception. If the D
grievance is in respect of any order or administrative
decision which related to or affected several others
also, and ifthe reopening of the issue would affect the
settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be
entertained. For example, if the issue relates to E
payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may
be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the
rights of third parties. But ifthe claim involved issues
relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others,
F
delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of
laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the
consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past
period is concerned, the principles relating to
recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a G
consequence, the High Courts will restrict the
consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a
period of three years prior to the date of filing of the
writ petition.
(emphasis is ours) H
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.
A We respectfully concur with these observations which if
extrapolated or applied to the factual matrix of the present case
would have the effect of restricting the claim for pension, if
otherwise sustainable in law, to three years previous to when
it was raised in a judicial forum. Such claims recur month to
B month and would not stand extinguished on the application of
the laws of prescription, merely because the legal remedy
pertaining to the time barred part of it has become unavailable.
This is too well entrenched in our jurisprudence, foreclosing
any fresh consideration.
c
5 The second issue which confronts us is whether th'e
termination of service of the Appellant remains unalterably in
the nature of resignation, with the consequence of disentitling
him from availing of or migrating/mutating the pension scheme
D or whether it instead be viewed as a voluntary retirement or
whether it requires to be regarded so in order to bestow this
benefit on the Appellant; who had 'resigned' after reaching the
age of fifty and after serving the UC for over twenty three years.
The Appellant resigned from service under Regulation 18 of
E UC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, which along with the
other provisions of relevance is reproduced for facility of
reference-
SECTION 3 - TERMINATION
F Determination of Service:
18. (1) An employee, other than an employee on
probation or an employee appointed on a temporary
basis, shall not leave or discontinue his service in the
G Corporation without first giving notice in writing to the
competent authority of his intention to leave or
discontinue the service. The period of notice required
shall be-
(a) three months in the case of an employee belonging
H
to Class I;
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 875
CORPORATION OF INDIA [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
(b) one month in the case of other employees. A .
Provided that such notice may be waived in part or in
full by the competent authority at its discretion. In case
of breach by an employee of the provisions of the sub-
regulation, he shall be liable to P.ay the Corporation
B
as compensation a sum equal to his salary for the
period of notice required of him, which sum may be
deducted from any moneys due to him.
Superannuation and Retirement:
19(1) xx
c
(2) An employee belonging to Class I or Class II
appointed to the service of the Corporation on or after
1st Sel'tember, 1956, shall retire on completion of 60
years of age, but the competent authority may, if it is D
of the opinion that it is in the interest of the Corporation
to do so, direct such employee to retire on completion
of 50 years of age or at any time thereafter on giving
him three months' notice or salary in lieu thereof.
E
The following Regulations, on which learned Senior
Counsel for the UC has placed reliance, came to be introduced
on 16.2.1996, that is after the Appellant had 'resigned' from
service. We have called for and perused this Notification, and
as we expected, these provisions apply retrospectively with F
effect from 1.11.1993. These Regulations ordain, inter alia,
that an employee may be permitted to retire (a) on completion
of the age of 55 and (b) after completing 25 years in service.
In other words, the Corporation has the power to compulsory
retire an employee who has attained the age of 50 years if in G
its opinion such decision is in the interests of the Corporation;
and the employee may seek permission to retire upon
completion of 55 years of age and after rendering 25 years of
service. This very position finds reiteration in Rule 31 of the
Pension Rules under the epithet 'voluntary retirement', which H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.
A pa~dect appears to have been available from the inception
i.e. 1.11.1993_
(2A) (a) Notwithstanding what is stated in sub-
rules. (1) and (2) above, an employee may be
B permitted to retire at any time on completion of the
age 55 after giving three months notice in writing
to the appointing authority of his intention to retire·.
(b) (i) Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause (a),
an employee governed by the Life Insurance
c Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules
1995 may be permitted to retire at any time after
he has completed twenty years of qualifying service,
by giving notice of not less than ninety days in.writing
to the appointing authority.
D
Provided that this sub-clause shall not apply to an
employee who is on deputation unless after having
been transferred or having returned to India, he has
resumed charge on the post in India and has served
E for a period of not less than one year.
Provided further that this sub-clause shall not apply
to an employee who seeks retirement from service
for being absorbed permanently in an autonomous
body or a public sector undertaking to which he is
F
on deputation at the time of seeking voluntary
retirement.
(ii) The notice of voluntary retirement given under
sub-clause (i) of clause (b) shall require acceptance
G by the appointing authority.
Provided that where the appointing authority does
not refuse to grant the permission for retirement
before the expiry of the period specified in the said
notice, the retirement shall become effective from
H
the date of expiry of the said period."
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 877
CORPORATION OF INDIA [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
6. As we have already recounted, the Appellant received A
a waiver of the requirement of giving three months prior notice
of his resolve to "discontinue his service in the Corporation",
bestowing legitimacy to the reasons that compelled him to do
so. It also brings to the fore that the 1960 Staff Regulations
did not provide for voluntary retirement or VRS as has become B
commonplace today. This Court has clarified and highlighted
that 'resignation' and 'retirement' have disparate connotations;
that an employee can 'resign' at any time but, in
contradistinction, can 'retire' only on completion of the
prescribed period of qualifying service and in consonance with C
extant Rules and Regulations.
7. We shall now consider the Pension Rules of 1995.
Rule 3 of Chapter II thereof, provides that the Rules are
applicable to employees (1) who '!"ere in the service of the D
Corporation on or after 1.1.1986 and had retired before 1.11.
1993 i.e. the notified date, or (2) who retired after 1.11.1993;
or (3)who were in the service before the notified date and
continued to be in service on or after the notified date; or (4)
who were in the service on or after 1.1.1986 but had retired on E
or after 1.11.1993 and before the notified date. What is
discernible from these dates is that the Pension Rules of 1995
have included two classes of beneficiaries into one
homogenous class, to wit, the employees who had retired
before the notified date and those who were to retire after the F
notified date. In our opinion, the advantage of these beneficent
Rules should be extended even to the Appellant who was
similarly placed as the retirees mentioned in Rule 3 but for the
fact that he had 'resigned' rather than retired. The two G
provisions caught in the crossfire are Rule 2(s), which defines
"retirement" and Rule 23, which deals with the "forfeiture of
service":
2(s) "retirement" means,- (i) retirement in
H
accordance with the provisions contained in sub-
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.
A regulation (1) or sub-regulation (2) or sub-regulation
(3) of regulation 19 of the Life Insurance
Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 and
rule 14 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India
Class Ill and Class IV Employees (Revision of
B Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1985
made under the Act;
(ii) voluntary retirement in accordance with the
provisions contained in rule 31 of these rules.
C (emphasis added)
23. Forfeiture of service - Resignation or dismissal
or removal or termination or compulsory retirement
of an employee from the seryice of the Corporation
D shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and
consequently shall· not qualify for pensionary
benefits.
Voluntary retirement, noted in the sub-Rule (ii) of Rule
E 2(s), has been defined in Rule 31, and it reads as follows:
31. Pension on voluntary retirement- ( 1) At any
time after an employee has completed twenty years
of qualifying service he may, by giving notice of not
less than ninety days, in writing, to the appointing
F
authority, retire from service:
Provided that this sub-rule shall not apply to an
employee who is on deputation unless after having
been transferred or having returned to India he has
G resumed cha~ge of the post in India and has serves:!
for a period of not less than one year:
Provided further that this sub-rule shall not apply to
an employee who seeks retirement from service
H for being absorbed permanently in an autonomous
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 879
CORPORATION OF INDIA [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
body or a public sector undertaking to which he is A
on deputation at the time of seeking voluntary
retirement.
(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under
sub-rule (1) shall require acceptance by the B
appointing authority:
Provided that where the appointing authority does
not refuse to grant the permission for retirement
before the expiry of the period specified in the said c
notice, the retirement shall become effective from
the date of expiry of the said period.
(3) (a) An employee referred to in sub-rule (1) may
make a request in writing to the appointing authority
D
to accept notice of voluntary retirement of less than
ninety days giving reasons therefor;
(b) on receipt of a request under clause(a), the
appointing authority may, subject to the provisions
of sub-rule (2), consider such request for the E
curtailment of the period of notice of ninety days on
merits and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of
the period of notice will not cause any administrative
inconvenience, the appointing authority may relax
F
the requirement of notice of ninety days on the
condition that the employee shall not apply for
commutation of a part of his pension before the
expiry of the notice of ninety days.
(4) An employee, who has elected to retire under G
this rule and has given necessary notice to that effect
to the appointing authority, shall be precluded from
withdrawing his notice except with the specific
approval of such authority:
H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.
A Provided that the request for such withdrawal shall
be made before the intended date of his retirement.
(5) The qualifying service of an employee retiring
voluntarily under this rule shall be increased by a
B period not exceeding five years, subject to the
condition that the total qualifying service rendered
by such employee shall not in any case exceed
thirty-three years and it does not take him beyond
the date of retirement.
c
(6) The pension of an employee retiring under this
rule shall be based on the average emoluments as
defined underclause(d) of rule 2 of these rules and
the increase, not exceeding five years in his
o qualifying service, shall not entitle him to. any
notional fixation of pay for the purpose of calculating
his pension.
It seems obvious to us that the Appellant's case does
E not fall within the postulation of Rule 23 as the last four
categories or genres or types of cessation of services are in
character punitive; and the first envisages those resignations
where the right to pension has not been earned by that tim~ or
where it is without the permission of the Corporation.
F
8 The Respondent Corporation has vehemently argued
that the termination of services is under Regulation 18 (supra)
of the LIC (Staff) Regulations, 1960 and is not covered by the
Pension Rules of 1995. Respondent Corporation has
G controverted the plea of the Appellant that at the relevant date
and time, viz. 28.1.1991 there was no alternative for him except
to tender his resignation, pointing out that he could not have
sought voluntary retirement under Regulation 19(2A) of LIC of
India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. If that be so, the Respondent
H being a model employer could and should have extended the
.1
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 881
CORPORATION OF INDIA [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
advantage of these Regulations to the Appellant thereby A
safeguarding his pension entitlement. However, we find no
substance in the argument of the Respondent since Regulation
~ 9(2A) was, in fact, notified in the Gazette of India on
16.2.1996, that is after the pension scheme came into existence
with effect from 1.11.1993: Otherwise there would have been B
no conceivable reason for the Appellant not to have taken
advantage of this provision which would have protected his
pensionary rights.
9 We also record that the provisions covered by the C
definition of "retirement", which do not entail forfeiture of service,
are sub-regulation (1 ), sub-regulation (2), and sub-regulation
(3) of Regulation 19 of the Life Insurance Cor~ration of India
(Staff) Regulations, 1960 and Rule 14 of the Life Insurance
Corporation of India Class Ill and Class IV Employees (Revision D
of Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1985. None of these
provisions provides for voluntary retirement like Rule 31 of the
Pension Rules nor does the definition of "retirement" make
any mention of aforementioned Regulation 19(2A).
E
10 The facts of the case disclose that the Appellant has
worked for over twenty years and had tendered his resignation
in accordance with the provision of Regulation 18 of UC of
India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, which, as is apparent from its
reading, does not dissimulate between the termination of F
service by way of resignation on the one hand and voluntary
retirement on the other, or distinguish one from the other.
Significantly, there was no provision for voluntary retirement at
the relevant time, arid it was for this reason that the Pension
Rules of 1995 specifically provided for it under Rule 31. In this G
backdrop of facts, we need not dwell much on the issue
because the case of Sheelkumar Jain v. New India
Assurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 12 SCC 197 is on all fours of this
case.
H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 9 S.C.R.
A 11 In Sheelkumar, the Appellant resigned from the
services of the Respondent Company after serving for over
20 years on 16.12.1991. His resignation was offered and
granted under Clause 5 of General Insurance (Termination,·
Superannuation and Retirement of Officers and Development
B Staff) Scheme, 1976. Thereafter, ·the Central Government
formulated General Insurance (Employees') Pension Scheme,
1995 with retrospective effect from 1.11.1993. Sheelkumar
applied for pension under this Scheme, which was declined
on the ground that resignation from service would entail
C forfeiture of service under Clause 22 of the General Insurance
(Employees') Pension Scheme, 1995. The Appellant moved
the High Court.challenging the rejection of his claim. His writ
petition as well as the writ appeal was dismissed by the High
D Court. The Appellant then moved this Court, whereby we noted
that Clause 5 of the Scheme of 1976 did not mention
resignation nor was the Appellant made aware of the distinction
between resignation and voluntary retirement; that this
distinction was a product of the General Insurance
E (Employees') Pension Scheme of 1995. This Court observed:
20. Sub-para (1) of Para 5 does not state that the
termination of service pursuant to the notice given
by an officer or a person of the Development Staff
to leave or discontinue his service amounts to
F
"resignation" nor does it state that such termination
of service of an officer or a person of the
Development Staff on his serving notice in writing
to leave or discontinue in service amounts to
G "voluntary retirement". Sub-para (1) of Para 5 does
not also make a distinction between "resignation"
and "voluntary retirement" and it only provides that
an employee who wants to leave or discontinue his
service has to serve a notice of three months to the
H appointing authority.
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 883
CORPORATION OF INDIA [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
21. We also notice that sub-para ( 1) of Para 5 does A
not require that the appointing authority must accept
the request of an officer or a person of the
Development Staff to leave or discontinue his
service but in the facts of the present case, the
request of the appellant to relieve him from his B
service after three months' notice was accepted by
the competent authority and such acceptance was
conveyed by the letter dated 28-10-1991 of the
Assistant Administrative Officer, Indore.
c
xxxxx
23. The 1995 Pension Scheme was framed and
notified only in 1995 and yet the 1995 Pension
Scheme was made applicable also to employees D
who had left the services of Respondent 1 Company
before 1995. Paras 22 and 30 of the 1995 Pension
Scheme quoted above were not in existence when
the appellant submitted his letter dated 16-9-1991
to the General Manager of Respondent 1 Company. E
Hence, when the appellant served his letter dated
16-9-1991 to the General Manager of Respondent
1 Company, he had no knowledge of the difference
between "resignation" under Para 22 and "voluntary
retirement" under Para 30 of the 1995 Pension F
Scheme. Similarly, Respondent 1 Company
employer had no knowledge of the difference
between "resignation" and "voluntary retirement"
under Paras 22 and 30 of the· 1995 Pension
Scheme, respectively. G
24. Both the appellant and Respondent 1 have
acted in accordance with the provisions of sub-para
(1) of Para 5 of the 1976 Scheme at the time of
termination of service of the appellant in the year H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.
A 1991. It is in this background that we have now to
decide whether the termination of service of the
appellant under sub-para (1) of Para 5 of the 1976
Scheme amounts to resignation in terms of Para
22 of the 1995 Pension Scheme or amounts to
B voluntary retirement in terms of Para 30 of the 1995
Pension Scheme.
25. Para 22 of the 1995 Pension Scheme states
that the resignation of an employee from the service
c of the corporation or a company shall entail
forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently
he shall not qualify for pensionary benefits, but does
not define the term "resignation". Under sub-para
(1) of Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme, an
D employee, who has completed 20 years of
qualifying service, may by giving notice of not less
than 90 days in writing to the appointing authority
retire from ~ervice and under sub-para (2) of Para
30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme, the notice of
E voluntary retirement shall require acceptance by the
appointing authority. Since "voluntary retirement"
unlike "resignation" does not entail forfeiture of past
services and instead qualifies for pension, an
employee to whom Para 30 of the 1995 Pension
F
Scheme applies cannot be said to have "resigned"
from service.
26. In the facts of the present case, we find that the
appellant had completed 20 years of qualifying
G service and had given notice of not less than 90
days in writing to the appointing authority of his
intention to leave the service and the appointing
authority had accepted notice of the appellant and
relieved him from service. Hence, Para 30 of the
H
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 885
CORPORATION OF INDIA [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
1995 Pension Scheme applied to the appellant A
even though in his letter dated 16-9-1991 to the
General Manager of Respondent 1 Company he
had used the word "resign".
12 What is unmistakably evident in the case at hand is B
that the Appellant had worked continuously for over .20 years,
that he sought to discontinue his services and requested waiver
of three months notice in writing, and that the said notice was
accepted by the Respondent Corporation and the Appellant
was thereby allowed to discontinue his services. If one would C
examine Rule 31 of the Pension Rules juxtaposed with the
aforementioned facts, it would at once be obvious and
perceptible that the essential components of that Rule stand
substantially fulfilled in the present case. In Sheelkumar, this
Court was alive to the factum that each case calls for scrutiny D
on its own merits, but that such scrutiny should not be detached
from the purpose and objective of the concerned statute. It
thus observed:
30. The aforesaid authorities would show that the E
court will have to construe the statutory provisions
in each case to find out whether the termination of
service of an employee was a termination by way
of resignation or a termination by way of voluntary
retirement and while construing the statutory F
provisions, the court will have to keep in mind the
purposes of the statutory provisions.
31. The general purpose of the 1995 Pension
Scheme, read as a whole, is to grant pensionary G
benefits to employees, who had rendered service
in the insurance companies and had retired after
putting in the qualifying service in the insurance
companies. Paras 22 and 30 of the 1995 Pension
Scheme cannot be so construed so as to deprive H
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.
A of an employee of an insurance company, such as
the appellant, who had put in the qualifying service
for pension and who had voluntarily given up his
service after serving 90 days' notice in accordance
with sub-para (1) of Para 5 of the 1976 Scheme
B and after his notice was accepted by the appointing
authority.
13 The Appellant ought not to be deprived of pension
benefits merely because he styled his termination of services
C as "resignation" or because there was no provision to retire
voluntarily at that time. The commendable objective of the
Pension Rule is to extend benefits to a class of people to tide
over the crisis and vicissitudes of old age, and if there are
some inconsistencies between the statutory provisions and
D the avowed objective of the statute so as to discriminate
between the beneficii'iries within the class, the end of justice
obligates us to palliate the differences between the two and
reconcile them as far as possible. We would be failing in our
duty, if we go by the letter and not by the laudatory spirit of
E statutory provisions and the fundamental rights guaranteed
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
14 Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon,
(2004) 9 SCC 461 relied upon by the Respondent, although
F distinguishable on facts, has ventured to distinguish "voluntary
retirement" from "resignation" in the following terms:
10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions
"superannuation", "voluntary retirement",
G "compulsory retirement" and "resignation" convey
different connotations. Voluntary retirement and
resignation irivolve voluntary acts on the part of
the employee to leave service. Though both
involve voluntary acts, they operate diffe~ently.
H One of the basic distinctions is that in case of
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 887
CORPORATION OF INDIA [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
resignation it can be tendered at any time, but in A
the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be
sought for after rendering prescribed period of
qualifying service. Other fundamental distinction
is that in case of the former, normally retiral
benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the B
same is not denied. In case of the former,
permission or notice is not mandated, while in
case of the latter, permission of the employer
concerned is a requisite condition. Though
resignation is a bilateral concept, and becomes c
effective on acceptance by the competent authority,
yet the general rule can be displaced by express
provisions to the contrary. In Punjab National Bank
v. P.K. Mittal (1989 Supp (2) SCC 175) on
D
interpretation of Regulation 20(2) of the Punjab
National Bank Regulations, it was held that
resignation would automatically take effect from the
date specified in the notice as there was no
provision for any acceptance or rejection of the E
resignation by the employer. In Union of India v.
Gopal Chandra Misra ((1978) 2 SCC 301) it was
held in the case of a judge of the High Court having
regard to Article 217 of the Constitution that he has
a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office and F
his resignation becomes effective from the date
which he, of his own volition, chooses. But where
there is a provision empowering the employer not
to accept the resignation, on certain circumstances
e.g. pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the G
employer can exercise the power.
(emphasis is ours)
The legal position deduCible from the above observations
further amplifies that the so-called resignation tendered by the H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2015] 9 S.C.R.
A Appellant was after satisfactorily serving the period of 20 years
ordinarily qualifying or enabling voluntary retirement.
Furthermore, while there was no compulsion to do so, a waiver
of the three months notice period was granted by the
Respondent Corporation. The State being a model employer
B should construe the provisions of a beneficial legislation in a
way that extends the benefit to its employees, instead of
curtailing it.
15 The cases of Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India,
C (1994) 2 SCC 521; State of M.P. v. Yogendra Shrivastav~,
(2010) 12 SCC 538; M.R. Prabhakar v. Canara Bank, (2012)
9 SCC 671; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kirpal Singh, (2014)
5 SCC 189; UCO Bank v. Sanwar Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 412
relied upon by the parties are distinguishable on facts from
D the present case.
16 We thus hold that the termination of services of the
Appellant, in essence, was voluntary retirement within the ambit
of Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of 1995. The Appellant is
E entitled for pension, provided he fulfils the condition of refunding
of the entire amount of the Corporation's contribution to the
Provident Fund along with interest accrued thereon as provided
in the Pension Rules of 1995. Considering the huge delay, not
explained by proper reasons, on part of the Appellant in
F approaching the Court, we limit the benefits of arrears of
pension payable to the Appellant to three years preceding the
date of the petition filed before the High Court. These arrears
of pension should be paid to the Appellant in one instalment
within four weeks from the date of refund of the entire amount
G payable by the Appellant in accordance of the Pension Rules
of 1995. In the alternative, the Appellant may opt to get the
amount of refund adjusted against the arrears of pension. In
the latter case, ifthe amount of arrear is more than the amount
H of refund required, then the remaining amount shall be paid
ASGER IBRAHIMAMIN v. LIFE INSURANCE 889
CORPORATION OF INDIA [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
within two weeks from the date of such request made by the A
Appellant. However, if the amount of arrears is less than the
amount of refund required, then the pension shall be payable
on monthly basis after the date on which the amount of refund
is entirely adjusted.
B
17 The impugned Judgments of the High Court are set
aside and the Appeal stands allowed in the terms above.
However, parties shall bear their respective costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed. C
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